Committee Reports > List of Committees > Dáil > 1971 > Committee of Public Accounts > Final Report - Northern Ireland Relief Expenditure

MIONTUAIRISC NA FIANAISE

(Minutes of Evidence)

Déardaoin, 18 Feabhra, 1971.

Thursday, 18th February, 1971.

The Committee met at 10 a.m.

DEPUTY P. HOGAN in the chair.

ORDER OF DÁIL OF 1st DECEMBER, 1970.

Mr. E. F. Suttle (An tArd-Reachtaire Cuntas agus Ciste) was in attendance in an advisory capacity.

The Committee deliberated.

Colonel Hefferon further examined.

8322. Deputy Keating.—I want to turn to the period which, you said, was in January, 1970, when Captain Kelly notified you of his intention of helping some groups in Northern Ireland to import arms into Northern Ireland via this part of the country. I want to know, in the light of what you told me yesterday about your responsibilities as the Head of Army Intelligence, your responsibilities in the light of a continuing struggle against the IRA, what your attitude was to that notification to you by Captain Kelly?

—Well, I think I have made this clear already. At the time that Captain Kelly came to me there was no question of importing the arms into this part of the country and——

8323. Sorry to break in there, but did I understand you to confirm last night that you knew of an effort in which Captain Kelly was involved to import arms into the country the previous November, two months earlier?

—Captain Kelly was not involved directly in this matter.

8324. He was involved in discussions with one of the participants, on his own admission, on the evening before that participant went to England and in giving advice to that participant and, as I recall your testimony last night, you were aware of this within a few weeks of it happening—before the end of November, you told us?

—Yes.

8325. You are now telling me that though you knew that one of your immediate subordinates, your immediate personal assistant, two months earlier had been advising one of the participants in an effort to import arms into this part of this country that, when the issue arose two months later of getting arms into the North, you had no knowledge that it might be through this part of the country that it would be done?

—I had no knowledge. This was an entirely different operation.

8326. Did it not strike you as being the most likely way to get arms into the North in view of the known surveillance by the British Navy, for example? If one were trying to get arms into the North would not this be the obvious way to do it?

—That is a possibility, but there was also a possibility of getting it into the North direct.

8327. Indeed, there was, but Captain Kelly was in the jurisdiction and so were you?

—Yes.

8328. And to rule out a very grave likelihood that it would have been through this part of the country is surely, for an Intelligence officer, a little unrealistic?

—I do not think so. I think Captain Kelly has given evidence that there was no evidence at this stage of where the arms were to be imported into.

8329. Was there a question from you as to where the arms would be imported into?

—No, there was not.

8330. So, in January, your immediate subordinate told you that he was helping the people in Northern Ireland to get arms. Two months earlier he had been involved in an effort to get them into the jurisdiction and you did not ask him whether they were going to come into the jurisdiction or not. Is that the situation?

—The position that arose at that time was I told him that he could not do this as an Army officer.

8331. Now you are changing the subject?

—No, I am not.

8332. With respect, I was asking you about the question of the use of the jurisdiction of this State for the importation of arms. You told me just now, if I understand you correctly, that you did not know whether the jurisdiction, for which you held a very special responsibility, the area of this State, you did not know whether that would be involved and you did not ask. Am I correct in that?

—I did not ask, no.

8333. And you did not surmise that it might be used—that it was possible or likely?

—Well, I gathered this was a very early stage of the operation that he was engaged in and that there were no arrangements made as to where they would be imported into.

8334. Your attitude then—I asked you what your attitude was—your attitude was that, since you did not know for certain that they were coming into the jurisdiction, in which you had a special responsibility, you did not consider that it particularly involved you. Is that correct? Am I paraphrasing you unjustly?

——Not at that stage. As I pointed out already, my main preoccupation at that stage was that Captain Kelly could not help these people. The initiative came from the other——

8335. We will come to that in a moment. I cannot obviously lead you in this regard but it is important for me to be clear about what your attitude was. Am I fair in drawing the inference from your answers that your attitude was that it was all right for Captain Kelly as your personal assistant to participate in this work provided the arms were not brought in through the jurisdiction?

—No, I do not think so. I think my attitude at that time was that, as an Army officer, he could not directly take part in any of these operations.

8336. But he could indirectly—is that the inference of your answer?

—Well, as an Army officer that he could not take part in it at all—take an active part.

8337. Well then—oh—as an Army officer he could not take an active part in it at all?

—Yes.

8338. Does that mean he could take an inactive part by means of advice or——

—No.

8339. —encouragement—that he could not do the thing physically. Is that what you considered improper?

—No. I expected him to keep in touch with the situation as an Intelligence officer and to inform me what was going on.

8340. Well, what did you find out, as distinct from the matter of your attitude? You became aware in January of his participation in this effort. I want to be clear about your actions as distinct from your attitude?

—Yes.

8341. You were his immediate superior?

—I was.

8342. What did you do?

—I advised him that if he were determined to go ahead with it he should retire from the Army.

8343. That was the advice to him. If we are talking about the chain of command, that was some advice down the chain. What did you do up the chain of command in relation to the discharge of the responsibility that you have towards this State? What did you do?

—I asked him to go and think it over for some days and then eventually he did come back to me and said he wanted to retire and he handed me his papers, his application for retirement, and asked that if possible it should be from the 13th February. I said I would see the Minister about it, which I did, and the question, as you know, came up about giving him some job.

8344. We will come to that in due course. Could I take it then that in regard to your actions apart from advice and discussions with Captain Kelly you went to see the Minister?

—I did.

8345. Did you seek an interview with Mr. Gibbons making it clear that this was the subject matter of your discussion with him or did it come up in a sort of ancillary conversational way in the course of one of the meetings you would have been having with him anyway?

—I met Mr. Gibbons over this period quite often. There were probably other things I discussed with him.

8346. You explained that Captain Kelly was participating in these activities?

—I saw him at the earliest possible time when it was possible to see him. I cannot put a date to it.

8347. Did you put any report in writing to him about it or was it entirely conversational?

—It was entirely conversational.

8348. Could we ask the tenor of that conversation? When you saw the Minister did you indicate an alternative or set of alternatives in regard to courses of action or did you recommend a particular course of action.

—I made my view plain that as an Army officer he could not take part in this operation and that he should retire but that in view of his service up to then I thought he should be facilitated by getting some position, some compensatory position, that would——

8349. You did not in fact choose to find out whether it was contemplated using the territory of the Republic of Ireland for this importation at that stage?

—No. I do not think there was any question about that at that time.

8350. If you did not ask that, there was not. They were obviously discussing all the possible alternatives. If you were involved in importing arms you would think of a whole lot of alternatives. As far as I am concerned it is totally obvious beyond any moment of doubt that using the jurisdiction of this date would have been one of the alternatives. I suggest to you seriously that must have been obvious to you. However, you did not choose to ask that question and you then recommended what one might call a benevolent transfer in regard to a man who was trying to carry out, or whom you had good reason to think might be trying to carry out, activities which, in essence, your post as Head of Intelligence existed to prevent.

—I think that is over simplifying it. I was naturally concerned that Captain Kelly would not suffer financially.

8351. Could I ask you this, Colonel Hefferon? Let us say, to pick a very crude example and I admit it is crude, if somebody robs a bank would you say “I was naturally concerned to see he would not suffer financially”?

—I do not see any analogy at all between the two.

8352. Let me just spend a little time trying to explain the analogy. You are a senior public servant, Head of Army Intelligence. We teased out last night your relationship to the IRA and your duties in regard to the IRA and to the illegal importation of arms into this country. You find that your immediate subordinate, who is also on the public payroll is involved in doing this. You are not shocked, you are not outraged, you do not try to have him court-martialled. You try to arrange for a benevolent transfer because he cannot continue to do it, as you say, while he is an Army officer.

—That is true.

8353. But besides that you do not wish him to suffer, though he is trying to do exactly the opposite to his duty and trying to violate the arrangement that you are paid and employed by the State to uphold.

—I do not think so. I think you are reducing this down to a position where you ignore the other factors in it.

8354. Tell us about them?

—We had from August onwards a position where our troops were in the vicinity of the Border where they were subject, let us face it, to attack. As far as possible we had to——

8355. Our troops were subject to attack?

—Yes.

8356. Would you not use the words “possibility of attack”?

—“Possibility of attack”, yes.

8357. You will admit though that there is a difference in the circumstances of the time. We are at the stage where I ask myself, “Do words have any meaning?” after listening to last night’s questioning from Deputy FitzGerald. You have just said our troops were under attack. They were not, were they?

—Liable to attack.

8358. All right, thank you. I am liable to die. I am not dead. There is a difference.

—I cannot comment on that.

8359. Continue, Colonel.

—Our troops were liable to attack. This is one of the possibilities. We did have occasions in fact when incursions were made from the other side of the Border to blow up or attempt to blow up Ballyshannon, one of the cases in point, and I had to be very much aware of the fact that this business which had happened in August, 1969 might again spill over at any time. So against this background and with what I regarded as a valuable officer, as Captain Kelly was at the time, although I had been operating, as I knew, with the Minister for Finance particularly, I did not think that, at this stage, without bringing it to the Minister and discussing it with him I was called upon to take any action.

8360. Did you consider it your duty to use your office as Head of Army Intelligence to facilitate the importation of arms into Northern Ireland?

—No.

8361. Did you consider it your duty to use your office to hinder it?

—It is going back again to what I have said already. I do not see any point in going over it. I have explained what my reaction was to Captain Kelly’s request.

8362. I must say I am massively unclear about it at this moment so if you will bear with us to explain a little further I personally would be indebted to you. I would like to hear it a little more fully.

—I do not know how I can explain it fully. I have explained the thing already to the Committee.

8363. Then perhaps I can help you by means of questions. You have said you did not ask whether jurisdiction would be used or not.

—Yes.

8364. But as an Intelligence Officer you must have known there was a very serious possibility of this happening?

—There was, yes.

8365. A likelihood even, I think we might say?

—I would not go that far.

8366. Yes, but you did not consider it— you told me that you did not consider it was your duty to facilitate this importation?

—Yes.

8367. And you told me that you thought that it was incompatible with Captain Kelly’s position as an Army officer? Was your objection solely concerned with the matter of the image of the Army in the event of his being discovered?

—There was more than the question of the Army involved in it because I think an Army officer on full pay, if he is discovered taking part in an action like that, it is very difficult for the Army or even the Government to——

8368. Yes?

—It could be an embarrassment in this case.

8369. In you attitude of benevolent neutrality towards this arms importation were you acting on your own initiative or had you received any instruction from any Minister or from the Government as a whole?

—I had not.

8370. You had not what? You had not received any instruction from a Minister or from the Government as a whole?

—No.

8371. It follows that you were acting on your initiative in this matter?

—Yes. I kept my Minister informed on this matter and he had been informed, as I knew from reports from Captain Kelly also, of the progress of this matter.

8372. From your answers, Colonel Hefferon, it seems to me at times that it is clear that you knew what Captain Kelly was doing. I suggest, from your answers last night, that you knew this was contrary to the policy of the Government and contrary to the intentions of your office as head of Army Intelligence? It is therefore a fair inference that as someone who knew that there was benevolence by at least two Ministers and who was near the end of his period of service that you simply washed your hands of it and said: “Let them do what they like. It is not my business.” Is that fair?

—No. I would not think that is a fair summary of it.

8373. Was there any strand of that? If that was not your entire motivation was it part of your motivation? You have told us, for example, that you went to see Mr. Gibbons twice, I think, either twice or three times, and that you said that in the absence of the instruction to desist towards Captain Kelly that you took no further action?

—No, I did not, no.

8374. This, in a way, since the importation of arms into the country—you knew where they were going and you knew they might have come in through the jurisdiction that it was your job to protect—I must say you know, looks to me rather as if you were washing your hands. Can you indicate anything that would lead us to believe the contrary?

—Well, as to washing my hands, I have to again state that from reports and from my talks with the Minister for Defence particularly, that the situation was that there was an effort being made to get Captain Kelly an appointment outside the Army over a period which did not come to anything until, I think, the third week of March and if, as I knew it was known to the Minister, this abortive attempt to bring in arms on the 25th March and I had asked him and I had told him about Captain Kelly going abroad and the fact that I would be asking his good offices to facilitate him to get him freed from duties—and this was about the end of March too—I do not know that in the circumstances I was a bit unclear as to what Government policy was.

8375. I see. You were a bit unclear as to what Government policy was. Let us just for ourselves get clear about your opportunities for knowing these things. Captain Kelly told us the other day, you know, and we have no reason to doubt it, that 80 per cent of intelligence was in fact to be gleaned from reading currently available material. Head of Army Intelligence is a sensitive job and it would be your duty, surely, in a sensitive area like this to be well aware of what Government policy was?

—Well, Government policy, as far as I was concerned, would be translated to me by the Minister for Defence for the time being by meeting him every week.

8376. But Captain Kelly—I have not got the quotations with me—but you must be aware that all through this period the Taoiseach was making speeches, spelling out absolutely explicitly the specific intentions of this Government and ridiculing the IRA, ridiculing the thought of incursions into the North by the IRA, saying that we sought only peaceful means of the solution of our national problem, all of these things. The Taoiseach was saying that?

—Yes.

8377. You are now saying you were not quite clear as to what Government policy was. Would you indicate to us what raised any possible confusion in your mind?

—I was aware of this but there is a difference between force which I think nobody— the use of force or the using of the Army or the armed forces to go into the North and to take over the Six Counties by force and the situation in which the Government here are forced to take some action owing to a breakdown of law and order in the North, or a similar situation, a worse situation perhaps arising in Northern Ireland than the one that arose in August—I think there is a difference between the two.

8378. I agree there is and I do not propose to tease out the difference because incursions by an Army in the context of a breakdown of law and order is one thing and the arming of the civilian population in the Six Counties is a different thing. However, the question I was asking you is what evidence you can give us which would validate your statement that you were unclear about Government policy and which would indicate indeed that there was a confusion of Government policy on this issue?

—Well, first of all, I think the meetings with the Northern Defence Committees or their representatives on the 3rd and 4th March were reported in detail to me by Captain Kelly.

8379. Could I ask you this at this stage— I appreciate the sense of your answer and we will turn to it in a moment, but you see it now emerges that Captain Kelly had a very deep participation, a very profound emotional commitment to these activities that he was participating in. If he was your only source of supply of information about what transpired at these meetings is it not likely that he would, of course, slant the information being fed to you, his way?

—I do not think so. I have no reason to believe that the information he gave me at that time was not accurate.

8380. You believe that you got neutral, impartial, accurate accounts from him of what transpired between visiting Northern delegations and Ministers.

—Yes.

8381. Would you tell us the content of these meetings as reported to you which would lead you to believe there was a confusion in Government policy?

—It was reported to me that these delegations were received by several Ministers together.

8382. Would you amplify “several”? This is a nice conventional phrase we have heard often.

—Ministers that met them at the time. First, Deputy Haughey and Mr. Blaney; and I think it was reported to me that Dr. Hillery met a delegation; Mr. Gibbons certainly. I cannot name——

8383. Did you have any reports of meetings of the Taoiseach with delegations?

—I did.

8384. Would you now tell us the content of the report to you from Captain Kelly about these meetings which led you to believe there was a confusion in Government policy?

—As far as I remember, the big delegations had met the Taoiseach and asked him for arms and gas masks. This, again, was Captain Kelly’s report: that gas masks would be made available but he would have to think about arms.

8385. “He would have to think about arms”, was the report on meetings you got of the Taoiseach with visiting delegates?

—Yes.

8386. In other words, that he did not either assent immediately or rule out the possibility?

—This is so.

8387. “That he would have to think about it”. Would this indicate that he personally would have to think about it or the Government would have to discuss it.

—I presume it would be discussed by the Government. I do not know. I am giving you the formal report.

8388. This is a report of a meeting between the Taoiseach and the delegates in which, I think, we could say that the Taoiseach was equivocal about the matter: he did not say yes and he did not say no. He asked for time to think about it and time for the Government to think about it?

—As far as I was concerned the report said “Yes, they could be made available but the arms we would have to think about; he would have to think over the question”.

8389. “Think over the question”—this is an equivocal answer, not a clear “yes” or “no”. I do not think I am paraphrasing it unjustly. If a person says “I do not know. I have to think about it.” I think one can say he is being equivocal. What about the other Ministers?

—The sense of the reporting to me by Captain Kelly at that stage was that they were sympathetic to the request.

8390. But a confusion of policy, which you have mentioned, indicates that different people are saying different things. You have just told us what the Taoiseach was saying. Have you any indication to suggest that any other Minister was offering a stronger version of this equivocation or an outright promise of arms?

—I think you have Captain Kelly’s evidence, very fully, on this matter of the meetings.

8391. We have indeed Captain Kelly’s evidence, Colonel. It is full, though not always clear. I am asking you if you have any knowledge other than his reports to you of the content of these meetings between Northern delegations and Ministers other than the Taoiseach?

—I have no reports other than reports that these meetings did take place, from other sources. People went back to the North and, probably, talked about this.

8392. Did they go back to the North believing they would get arms?

—I do not know. I am not in a position to say definitely yes or not; but they were satisfied with the approaches to various Ministers here.

8393. They came asking for arms and gas masks and they went back—you do not know whether explicit promises were made to them but you know they were satisfied with the approaches?

—This is the report that I got.

8394. Colonel, I have asked whether in fact you washed your hands of this and you have answered me on that. Could I ask you, on the matter of your resignation, did you in fact resign at the normal time? Was your resignation a completely normal resignation in the Army?

—Yes. It was not a resignation. It was a retirement. I make the point that there is a difference.

8395. I accept that, that in fact “resignation” was the wrong word. Had you any reason to expect that your period of service might be extended?

—I had no reason to expect it would be extended; but I was on the age limit of 60.

8396. In what proportion of cases is another five years’ service granted to officers of your level in the Army?

—Well, I do not say that five years’ would be granted, but it is possible that a year or two’s extension of services could be granted in special circumstances.

8397. When you say “special circumstances”, let us try and express it statistically. Would half of the officers reaching 60 retire, or one-third, or two-thirds. Is the granting of extension very rare?

—It is rare, yes.

8398. It is rare?

—The question you asked me, I think, was whether I had reason to believe that I would be extended.

8399. I did ask you that originally. I was not pressing it if you did not wish to amplify an answer to that.

—I do not know whether I would claim privilege on this.

8400. You did not in fact answer and I did not push you on an answer, because it is obviously a question which you might wish to say something on or not. If you did not wish to amplify it I was not going to push it. You said last night that Mr. Haughey had given Captain Kelly instructions about the expenditure of funds. I would like to amplify and try to clarify this. Do you know this for certain.

—I can only go on the fact that Captain Kelly reported to me from time to time and reported to the Department of Finance and was sent for by the Minister for Finance from time to time, or would himself make a request to see the Minister for Finance, and he was received.

8401. Did Captain Kelly tell you he had received instructions from Mr. Haughey to pay out funds from these accounts?

—My understanding of the position there was that he did go from time to time, on request from the Northern Committees, to the Department of Finance and made requests for funds to be made available to them.

8402. I wish to be clear about which way the instructions were going. Captain Kelly was acting as an intermediary in regard to moneys?

—Yes.

8403. But, as we have heard, he made his request for moneys to be paid from the Department of Finance into the Red Cross bank account, from which it was subsequently transferred?

—Yes.

8404. This, to me, is a different thing from instructions from a Minister. Do you know anything about Mr. Haughey’s giving Captain Kelly instructions in regard to moneys?

—No. Let me get this right: the difference between giving instructions and himself operating the account—is this what you mean?

8405. I understood you to say yesterday that Captain Kelly, on occasions, was acting on the instructions of Deputy Haughey?

—Yes.

8406. Instructions about what?

—Instructions concerned with the fund.

8407. What sort of instructions concerned with the fund? To close it up, or to take out all the moneys and give them to the newsboys of Dublin or what?

—Well, the Minister for Finance had overall responsibility for the administration of this fund and he would probably be getting requests from various sources which he may have referred to Captain Kelly to verify. My understanding was that Mr. Haughey was getting requests himself directly as well, which he would refer to Captain Kelly to report on—this form of instructions.

8408. Mr. Haughey got the request——

—Well, the Minister for Finance had overall responsibility for the administration of this fund and he would probably be getting requests from various sources which he may have referred to Captain Kelly to verify. I think he was getting—my understanding of it—Mr. Haughey was getting requests himself directly as well which he would refer to Captain Kelly to report on to him—this form of instructions.

8409. Mr. Haughey got the request directly from where?

—Well, there were quite a number of delegations and representatives of Northern committees coming down here.

8410. They had access to him and they could make their requests directly to him: was that your understanding?

—That was my understanding, yes. They did not make all these requests to him but, perhaps, some of these requests would go direct or through some other source.

8411. I wrote down last night, and this is possibly incorrectly quoted, what you said so, first of all, I should like to know if it is correct, and then go on to talk about it. It is in relation to the three meetings between Captain Kelly and Cathal Goulding. What I wrote was you saying that somebody had suggested that Cathal Goulding wanted to meet him, the “him” being Captain Kelly?

—Yes.

8412. Is that correct approximately?

—That is correct, yes.

8413. In other words, the request came from Cathal Goulding. Somebody suggested that Cathal Goulding wanted to meet him, not that he wanted to meet Cathal Goulding?

—Oh, yes. This was my understanding.

8414. Is that correct?

—That is correct, yes.

8415. In other words, someone suggested Cathal Goulding wanted to meet him?

—Oh, yes. This was my understanding.

8416. The request came from Goulding?

—Yes.

8417. In when? In October, 1969?

—I am not too sure about the right—the exact—time, but I would be more inclined to think it was September.

8418. Is there somebody there a source you wish to protect or can you say anything more about the somebody who delivered this message from Goulding to Captain Kelly?

—Well, the position that I am in about that is I am not sure who the person was and, therefore, it would not be proper to answer it.

8419. It is somebody in that sense, not somebody in the security sense?

—Oh, no. It is not somebody in the security sense. It is someone Captain Kelly had met in the course of his duties in the North.

8420. But you are clear that the request came from Goulding?

—This was my understanding of it.

8421. It was a request for a meeting. It was a request for a discussion with a Captain in Army Intelligence here, your immediate personal assistant——

—Yes.

8422. From Goulding?

—Yes.

8423. And you told us last night that they did not talk about money?

—Yes.

8424. And they did not talk about arms?

—I do not—my recollection of this is that there was no talk about money or arms in it. There may be—there was at some stage, I think, possibly a request by Goulding to him as to what the Army would do about giving arms to the people in the North. I think this may have come up, but there was no request by Goulding for arms.

8425. I want to savour this situation to the full. Cathal Goulding gets in touch with your immediate assistant, a Captain in Irish Army Intelligence; his request for a meeting is acceded to; they held discussions but there is no request for money and, apart from some speculation about what the Army might do in certain circumstances, there is no request for arms: is this what you are telling us?

—This is my understanding of the conversation that went on. I do not think that Goulding would ask him for arms.

8426. What do you think Goulding was talking to him about? You knew he requested a meeting?

—He requested a meeting. You know a good many people were requesting meetings.

8427. Yes, but there are not too many Cathal Gouldings around. I am referring to the position he occupies, not to the person. One would have thought one of your principal adversaries over a decade. Would that be a fair description?

—Well——

8428. So, now he suggests a meeting, your personal assistant goes along, your personal assistant comes back and tells you that he did not talk about money and he did not talk about guns?

—He did not talk about asking for money or guns. He did not ask for money or guns.

8429. What did he talk about, tell us, as reported to you, that is?

—Well, at this distance of time—it is two and a half years ago—it is rather difficult to say exactly. First of all, I had grave——

8430. Two and a half years ago? We are talking about October, 1969?

—1969—sorry—a year and a half.

8431. Just under a year and a half—not quite the same?

—During a very busy time. The first thing that you have raised is why Goulding— you described him as being a principal adversary of Intelligence over a long period —why should I let Captain Kelly at all go. Well, I felt that, if there was an approach, it might be useful. We knew where we stood and I do not have to spell it out for you—that an officer can be let go with instructions.

8432. Oh, indeed, I have no reservations about the propriety from your point of view about it, but I am just a little surprised at the content?

—I would also say that at this time we were very concerned, indeed, with the situation on the Border both from the viewpoint of our own troops and from the viewpoint of raids being made for arms, and so on, and we wanted to have it known to all and sundry that the Army security was very tight, and would continue to be so, and there would be no question of arms being got by the Army.

8433. You were issuing a warning then via this meeting to Cathal Goulding to indicate you were on your toes?

—Well, I think it was useful to have no doubt in anybody’s mind as to what the reaction of the Army would be to any attempt to—

8434. I thought there was a doubt in your own mind?

—Pardon?

8435. Any attempt to what?

—Any attempt to get arms by raids on posts, or anything like that.

8436. Oh, I see, yes?

—The other aspect of it was that I did not know why he wanted to meet Captain Kelly.

8437. There were three meetings, you see?

—There was.

8438. This was one meeting. You could have issued your warning and discovered his intention at one meeting. Why the others? Did they continue their conversations about these things at the others?

—Yes, but out of it emerged absolutely nothing.

8439. This is one version of these events, but you must be aware that from two other sources, namely, the head of the Special Branch, on the one hand, and a Gestetner document, that you have probably seen, put out by the Republican movement very near this period, another version has emerged, you see?

—No, I do not remember any. You mean the evidence that Chief Superintendent Fleming gave that money was passed to Cathal Goulding?

8440. Yes, and the Republican movement put out a document, which I do not now possess, but which I saw approximately a year ago, a typed, duplicated statement that was circulated in Dublin indicating sums of money——

—Captain Kelly, I think, had no control over any money at this stage.

8441. When he got permission to go and talk to Cathal Goulding was this open-ended or was it for one meeting?

—Initially it was for one meeting.

8442. Then he came back and he had to report and he had to justify going to a second meeting?

—Yes, a second meeting.

8443. Do you remember anything of the justification which validated granting him a second commission, and a third, I understand?

—No, I do not, no.

8444. Have you a good memory, Colonel Hefferon?

—Reasonably.

8445. But you do not remember the content of his reporting back after the first meeting prior to his getting permission for the second one?

—No. There was nothing in it at all. Goulding and Captain Kelly met. They had a discussion. Captain Kelly put across the viewpoint of the Army and Goulding put his own viewpoint across in his own way, but it was indetermined. There was nothing at that meeting, to any other meeting, that had any bearing on funds or a request for funds or arms.

8446. Are you sure, Colonel Hefferon, that Captain Kelly was not using these meetings outside your instructions for the transmission of funds? You know, there are charges from two sources, from the recipient source and from another source involved with surveillance, the Special Branch, that it did happen, and now there is your word that it did not happen?

—I would be extremely surprised, I would be astonished, if this were so because in all my talks with Captain Kelly I got the very strong impression that he was unalterably opposed to the IRA and Cathal Goulding.

8447. In the light of hindsight and what you now know, can you sustain that assessment of Captain Kelly’s outlook? Do you still think he feels that way?

—I think so.

8448. Do you think he hoodwinked you at any stage and gave you reports, without you checking what you accepted, doing totally different things?

—There is the possibility that it is so slight I am inclined to discount it.

8449. Colonel, there is a real dilemma here. Whatever his motives and whatever his authorisation, we have a pretty clearcut indication of his activities in regard to bank accounts, travelling, advising certain people and all that.

—Yes.

8450. You have said contradictory things about being informed. You said, “Captain Kelly kept me informed at all times” on the one hand and then rather drew back from that and said, “Anything I wanted to know he kept me informed on”. It is not quite the same. Never mind. There does seem to me a real conflict between what we know he did and what you seem to think he did, what you accepted he was doing. Do you think he kept you informed fully all the time?

—Certainly he kept me fully informed on any question, any reports which I asked him to get me.

8451. Do you think he kept you accurately informed as well as fully informed?

—I think so.

8452. You do not think he hoodwinked you in fact. You think he told you what he was doing all the time and you knew about it all the time?

—He did not tell me everything quite naturally, because he would be away four or five days at a time. You do not expect somebody to come back and tell you what he did all that time, but——

8453. Were there certain things you deliberately avoided asking him about because you did not want to know?

—As far as the operation of the money accounts was concerned, I did not go into any detail about that because I regarded that as a matter between themselves.

8454. You did not want to know about it in fact because you felt it was not in your area of jurisdiction or responsibility?

—I do not think it was.

8455. You said last night, “I did not want to get myself involved in the administration of the fund for the Northern people”. You are saying the same thing now. You said also last night, “The £100,000 should normally have been channelled through the Red Cross”. Why “normally channelled through the Red Cross”? Why the choice of that channel?

—I understood there was a public statement made on this matter at that time.

8456. Oh, indeed. But why, in the light of your experience—I am not analysing what the Government did—do you think that it should normally be channelled through the Red Cross?

—Probably on account of the statements that were made at the time. There were a good number of statements made about the Red Cross not being able to operate in Northern Ireland.

8457. You knew about this. You knew it would not operate in Northern Ireland?

—The public knew at that time.

8458. I think it did. It is a bit abnormal as far as I am concerned to choose the Red Cross. If you know that the Red Cross cannot operate in the area to which you are transmitting the aid, there is nothing normal about choosing it to transmit the aid. If you are transmitting it or trying to transmit it to Northern Ireland there is nothing normal in my view, knowing it cannot operate there; it is abnormal. Let me be more explicit about it. If you wanted to transmit funds in a bona fide way to aid Northern Ireland, as I said last night, you set up a committee, name the people, and transfer the money properly. If, on the other hand, you thought in your head from the beginning you would conceal the transfer of money, what better than to pick a greatly respected organisation like the Red Cross and get them to do it for you?

—I do not know if I am required to answer that question.

8459. You do not have to answer it if you do not want to. You said £100,000 should normally have been channelled through the Red Cross. This is what strikes me as odd. I was asking for a comment on that statement.

—I think I was referring at that time to the various statements that had been made in the public press and otherwise about the Red Cross. I think in the beginning the Red Cross was mentioned.

8460. Indeed it was—the Government Information Bureau of the 16th August.

—At a later stage the Red Cross found themselves unable to operate there.

8461. I think, with respect, there was an instant comment from people aware of the situation to say it could not function; anyway immediately it was announced it was clear it could not function in the North legally. You said in regard to the £100,000 —or as much of it as was transmitted to the Northern Ireland Defence Committees and we need not necessarily call it £100,000, the Grant-in-Aid was £100,000, but anyway— the bulk of the £100,000 was given to the Northern Ireland Defence Committees. You said, “I did not know there were any conditions put on its expenditure”. That is a quote from last night’s evidence, that you did not know there were any conditions put on it once they had it.

—Yes, in the sense that I looked upon this money once it was transferred, that the distribution of it in Northern Ireland was a matter for the committees that were set up.

8462. Did you feel that they could spend it in any way they decided?

—That was my understanding of it.

8463. Did you feel, by any conceivable extension that this could be stretched to the purchase of arms?

—In the light of what has happened, I suppose it would be difficult to justify it and what I have heard since then——

8464. At the material time before these events broke?

—No, I did not. The position about this is I was aware that the Northern Defence Committees had funds other than Red Cross funds at their disposal.

8465. I understood you to tell Deputy FitzGerald last night that your attitude was that once the Northern Defence Committees had the money it was their business what they did with it.

—Yes.

8466. You said, “I did not know there were any conditions put on”.

—I do not know what conditions they put on. I did not know there were any conditions put on.

8467. There is a minute of the Government meeting of the 16th August:

“A sum of money should be made available from the Exchequer to provide aid for the victims of the current unrest”

and in the Government Information Bureau statement of the same day:

“The Government Minister for Finance will make funds available for the relief of victims of the disturbance.”

When the matter was presented for subsequent validation of the Suspense Account in the Dáil on the 18th March, 1970, it was for the relief of distress and the bank account that was set up to contain these moneys in the name of White, Loughran and Murphy was the Belfast Fund for the Relief of Distress. You did not know there were any conditions put on it?

—I did not know in the sense that the moneys that were available to the Northern Defence Committees—there were other moneys other than the Red Cross moneys available to them and I think I felt that the ownership of the money when it was passed from here rested with the committees in the North.

8468. You felt the ownership rested with them?

—Yes.

8469. And therefore since they owned them they could do as they like with it?

—I imagined so.

8470. Colonel Hefferon, you said last night that you knew that Captain Kelly drew money from the Baggot Street account and that you knew that it was for the purchase of arms?

—Yes.

8471. And you at the material time were his superior officer?

—Yes.

8472. Can you, therefore, indicate to us how you were not part of the conspiracy yourself to import arms illegally?

—Well, this is a question, I think, that I can only answer by going back on all the events that led up to this and I have already gone into that time and time again and I do not propose to go into it any further.

8473. I think, Sir, if you refer to the Act that established this Committee you will see that you are required to answer reasonable questions. You can claim privilege if you wish, but you may not refuse to answer questions that are not covered by privilege?

—I did not refuse to answer the question. I said I had answered, had already answered the question in detail.

8474. Chairman.—I may not have heard completely but I do not think the witness has claimed privilege on this matter.

8475. Deputy Keating.—He has not claimed privilege in fact. I was going on to say that as far as I was concerned he had not answered it and that I did not know he had been asked it. I did not know that the question of your responsibility in regard to this conspiracy had been raised and discussed at this Committee before. I wonder if any of my colleagues recall this discussion?

8476. Deputy FitzGerald.—No.

8477. Deputy Keating.—Well, then I propose to continue the questioning, Colonel. I asked you if you could explain—or let me put it this way, do you feel that you yourself were part of the conspiracy, wittingly or unwittingly?

—No, I do not.

8478. Do you feel there was a conspiracy?

—I do not feel there was a conspiracy.

8479. Deputy Tunney.—Mr. Chairman, I think, in my interpretation of what we are at, this is not relevant to the expenditure of the £100,000. I would be anxious that we would get on with the work of finding out where this £100,000 went. As a member of the Committee I do not see the relevance as to whether or not the Colonel was part of any plot to import arms. That is my opinion, Mr. Chairman.

8480. Deputy Keating.—Mr. Chairman, with respect to Deputy Tunney, the matter of the authorisation of this expenditure is absolutely central and we are trying at this stage to discover. I am trying to discover whether Captain Kelly’s activities in regard to these expenditures at this time were as a result of instructions from the Minister for Defence with which his immediate superior, Colonel Hefferon, whatever his private reservations were, in fact acquiesced and concurred, and that seems to me not just relevant but absolutely centrally relevant to everything that we are here about. I was asking if you felt there had been a conspiracy and you have just told me you did not so feel.

Colonel Hefferon.—But, Mr. Chairman, with respect, this is becoming Arms Trial No. 3. This issue was tried in the Four Courts and it was found in effect that there was no conspiracy. Now I am being asked was I part of a conspiracy which did not exist. I think it is going beyond——

8481. Chairman.—Colonel Hefferon has said that he was not part of any conspiracy and perhaps we could move on from that.

8482. Deputy Keating.—Yes, I will move to other things, Mr. Chairman. You went to the Minister in regard to the arrangement of a transfer for Captain Kelly from being your immediate assistant to another job where he could remain in the Government service and retain his income or a large proportion of his income, and the job that was discussed between yourself and the Minister for Defence was that he should some way get in the anti-pig smuggling campaign on the Border?

—This is not quite accurate. I did not discuss this with the Minister for Defence. This was discussed by the Minister for Defence, in my understanding, with the Minister for Finance and possibly with Mr. Blaney and, arising out of these discussions, my understanding was that the Minister for Finance came up with this suggestion.

8483. But you do not know where the suggestion of anti pig smuggling came from, do you?

—I understand the Minister for Finance came up with this suggestion.

8484. And the Minister for Defence accepted it?

—Yes.

8485. Would this suggestion which would locate Captain Kelly on the Border have been motivated by a desire to give him a suitable cover so that he could continue with his work?

—I am not in a position to answer that.

8486. You do not have any opinion on the matter?

—You are asking me a question as to——

8487. Chairman.—I think, Deputy, it would be unfair to press the witness on that question.

8488. Deputy Keating.—If the arrangement, Colonel, had been made, if the post had been created for him, would you have been happy in his transfer from being your immediate assistant to filling that post?

—I would.

8489. Would you have thought that it was an equitable arrangement in the circumstances?

—Yes.

8490. Colonel, we have had a great deal that we have had to take which is the report of individuals who participated, which is a report of verbal proceedings, what Captain Kelly said to you, what you said to Deputy Gibbons, what Deputy Gibbons said to you, etc. Are there any documents produced by you for transmission either to Captain Kelly instructing him as to how to proceed, or produced by you for transmission to the Chief of Staff or the Minister for Defence which would validate some of the things you have been telling us here? It may be, should I say, that privilege will be claimed in regard to them; we can find that out when we try to get them, but could you indicate to us the existence of any document which would help us to try and clear our minds as to the real state of affairs?

—I cannot——

8491. Did you prepare any written reports about Captain Kelly’s activities?

—I did not.

8492. Did you receive any written reports other than the directive which has been refused to us in regard to Captain Kelly’s activities?

—I do not now recall any.

8493. Did you produce any written reports on the whole question of the efforts to import arms into the country, either North or South?

—No.

8494. Did Captain Kelly produce any such reports?

—I am not aware he did, not in writing.

8495. Is it your belief that no such reports emanating from Army Intelligence, exist?

—This is my belief at the moment, yes.

8496. At the moment, Colonel?

—I cannot recall that any written report, anything about this matter was committed to writing at all, not by me.

8497. Apart from by you, by any immediate subordinate of yours?

—I am not aware of that, no.

8498. It is your belief then that there is no documentation emanating from Army Intelligence in regard to the importation of arms into either part of the country which could be of value to this Committee—is that correct?

—I think so, yes. There may be documents dealing with correspondence, with this Malcolm Randall thing. There is correspondence, I am sure, about that but this has nothing to do with the other issue, I think.

8499. But is that the only documentation that you can recall?

—That is right.

8500. On a meeting on 23rd April in Mr. Blaney’s office, who was there, Colonel?

—Mr. Blaney, Mr. Gibbons, Captain Kelly and myself.

8501. Just the four of you?

—Just the four.

8502. You were then in retirement?

—Yes.

8503. Can you amplify a little on the content of the discussions, or do you wish to claim privilege?

—I do not think I can amplify any more than what I stated last night.

8504. You received a telephone call from Captain Kelly and you went along to the office of the Minister for Agriculture?

—Yes.

8505. What was the first matter discussed?

—My recollection of it is that I was introduced to Mr. Blaney, whom I had not met before, and we chatted about a few things for a moment. He said: “Mr. Gibbons will be along in a moment” and very shortly Mr. Gibbons came in, and the conversation was as I stated yesterday.

8506. I am anxious to know a little more of the conversation. What was the immediate topic taken up when Mr. Gibbons came in?

—My recollection is that both Ministers talked for a moment about this examination or questioning of some of the Revenue Commissioners’ people.

—8507. It came up immediately, without preamble? Was that what they went at straight away?

—Well, I do remember Mr. Gibbons saying to Captain Kelly “You are in the hot seat”. That is something that sticks in my mind about it. I think, as far as I remember, perhaps Mr. Blaney asked Mr. Gibbons did he know anything about it.

8508. Was the discussion between Captain Kelly, yourself and Mr. Blaney before Mr. Gibbons arrived, or did you just sit waiting for his arrival?

—We just sat waiting. The waiting was very short.

8509. I see. You immediately started to talk about the fact that the Special Branch was making an investigation?

—Questioning Civil Servants.

8510. Who provided this information that such questioning was going on?

—From what I remember is was Mr. Blaney.

8511. Had you been aware of it previously?

—I cannot now recall. I probably was told by Captain Kelly that something like this was going on. I do not know. I cannot say for sure.

8512. Did you go to the Minister’s office with Captain Kelly?

—I did.

8513. Did he collect you and——

—No.

8514. You travelled there separately?

—Yes. We met somewhere near.

8515. Did you have some discussion. Did he brief you before you went in?

—We probably had a word about it.

8516. It was the 23rd. You had been in retirement and were called back to meet two Ministers at a time when there had been a serious accident to another Minister and at a time of some tension in the country, some uncertainty?

—Yes.

8517. Were you told before you went there what the content of the meeting was to be?

—Yes, I think I was told, as far as I now remember, that is was probably in connection with the questioning of Civil Servants of the Revenue—by Captain Kelly.

8518. Did the circumstance emerge that Mr. Blaney did not know why they were being questioned?

—There was a good deal of doubt in the whole conversation as to where it was coming from. Mr. Blaney said at one stage “I think it is upstairs”, which did not convey very much to me I must say. “It was coming from upstairs.”

8519. That did not convey very much to you?

—No.

8520. Does it now?

—I do not know. I think that it may well be it was from the Taoiseach’s Department. I do not know the geography of the place there.

8521. Why should there be a special meeting of two Ministers and two Army Intelligence personnel, one of them retired, because the Special Branch was questioning the Civil Servants and yet another Minister? Why should they be worried at all? What was it to do with them?

—Probably because the other Minister was not then available. He was in hospital and unconscious. They were probably worried about him.

8522. I am afraid this answer means nothing as far as I am concerned. The other Minister might have been out of the country, he might have been anywhere. OK, he was unconscious, which is a thing that everyone would naturally regret, but why should they feel that they had to have a special meeting with you and Captain Kelly because the Special Branch was questioning some revenue people?

—I do not know.

8523. Did anyone at the meeting know?

—I do not think they did. This was a question that the Revenue Commissioners’ people were being questioned by the Special Branch and they seemed to be in a great deal of doubt about where this was coming from.

8524. Where what was coming from? The instructions?

—The instructions for the questioning.

8525. Did they know the content of the questioning? Did they know the sort of questions that were being asked by the Special Branch of the employees of the Revenue Commission?

—I do not think they did, in any detail.

8526. Did they know in general?

—They knew in general that it was connected with something to do with the Airport, and the importation of arms.

8527. Ah, yes, so. So you knew at the time that it was about the importation of arms through Dublin Airport?

—Yes.

8528. You know everybody is assuming this, but you have not said so up to this moment. So that is what the meeting was about—about the fact that the Special Branch was questioning people at the Airport about the importation of arms?

—Yes.

8529. Why should Messrs. Gibbons and Blaney have a meeting with Captain Kelly and yourself about this subject?

—This I do not know. I still do not know. Perhaps whether we could throw some light——. I still do not know why.

8530. You do not know. You were not able to throw any light on it?

—No. Possibly they may have felt, because of the position I had held before March——

8531. What sort of light would that throw on it? In other words, were they afraid of implicating themselves?

—I do not know. They appear to be quite genuinely puzzled about it.

8532. Let us take it on its face value. There is a rumour that an effort has been made to import arms illegally, through the Airport. Not surprising, in the circumstances, because we know—you agreed with me last night—that the IRA had been trying to do this and the people of the North had been trying it secretly. So in August, 1969 there was a rumour, not the first, that stuff had come through the Airport?

—Yes.

8533. Possibly not the first time stuff had come through the Airport, even, if we accept Chief Superintendent Fleming’s evidence. Then a meeting is held between you, Captain Kelly and these two Ministers. Was it simply to find out what had happened, and for information?

—I do not know. I have said that the upshot of the meeting was that it was decided Mr. Blaney would go to see Mr. Haughey, would try to get to see him, about this.

8534. Why should Mr. Blaney have wanted to see Mr. Haughey at that stage.

—I suppose because the people who were being questioned came under his jurisdiction.

8535. But why should Mr. Blaney, who is Minister for Agriculture, after all, worry that people under the jurisdiction of the Minister for Finance should be questioned by the Special Branch?

—I do not know.

8536. You did not know then?

—I do not think so, no.

8537. And you do not know now?

—I could advance a lot of theories, but as to knowledge——

8538. Essentially you did not know?

—They did not tell me why the meeting was called.

8539. You told Deputy Hugh Gibbons last night that some of the Northern groups when they visited Ministers were promised arms and Deputy Gibbons said to you that they were promised arms and you said, in reply, “Certainly, by some Ministers”?

—Yes.

8540. I think it is fair that you should amplify that. “Some”, put like that, could mean any number of the present Government and a few who are no longer members of the Government. Now what do you mean by “some Ministers”?

—This—again I am going on the reports, of course, that Mr. Haughey and Mr. Blaney were two of the people concerned.

8541. Mr. Haughey and Mr. Blaney is what you meant by “some Ministers”?

—Yes.

8542. Simply those two?

—Simply those two, yes.

Deputy MacSharry.—I have no questions,

Mr. Chairman. The ones I would like to ask have already been asked.

8543. Deputy Nolan.—Last week, Colonel Hefferon, Captain Kelly informed the Committee that he purchased 400 sub-machine guns. I think at £16 each. Now, from your experience in the Army of the price of guns, was £16 very cheap for a sub-machine gun?

—Very, very.

8544. What is the approximate price, say, of the Gustav sub-machine gun that the Army has now? Have you any idea of the price?

—I do not know because I did not deal with the purchasing, that end of it, but I should certainly say it would be nearer to £100. I do not know now, giving you a figure here, but I would regard £16 as being rockbottom.

8545. Captain Kelly did go, on your evidence, to the Continent to vet arms on one occasion. Did he report to you—did he test them on a range or did he examine them to report back to you as to what he did with the arms at that time?

—In reporting back at that time I do not think—I think he has given evidence—I may be wrong in this—that he did not see any arms on this occasion.

8546. Yes, he went to vet them, but did not see them?

—Yes, he went to vet them but I do not think the arms were produced on this occasion.

8547. So in actual fact then the arms were bought without inspection by anybody. Would that be——

—I think that Captain Kelly’s evidence at one stage there shows that he did, in fact, examine arms sometime at a later stage.

8548. Yes?

—Possibly before the 25th March. You are talking about the occasion in which I used the words “to vet arms”, mid-February, and leading up to it.

8549. This is the time, I think, that there was the cover story of the calling to see the sister. I think that was the occasion. Now, you have answered quite a number of questions here but, irrespective of what questions we ask, it could happen that there is something you might like to tell this Committee that would be of help to it in the inquiry and, at this stage, is there anything you would like to inform the Committee of that has not already been told?

—It is a very difficult question.

8550. It is. I accept that?

—In two trials and in rather a lengthy period here I think I have been asked all the questions that could be asked. But, of course, I am speaking in a sense with my hands behind my back because there are many, many areas, which I cannot and will not go into, which had a bearing on national security and so on, and which would involve, of course, the bringing in of the question of public policy, and all that kind of thing, and these areas are some that I cannot speak about and I certainly will not speak about and I doubt if anybody can authorise me even to speak about it, but I do not think so. I think there is nothing else that I have to talk about.

8551. That would be relevant to this inquiry that we do not already know from so far as your involvement as Director of Intelligence, any other moneys that we have no record of that were supplied by anybody, or any other people getting money that we do not know of?

—No.

8552. Deputy Treacy.—Colonel Hefferon, you have been subjected to a rather long interrogation and it is not my intention to detain you unduly. There are a few questions that I am prompted to talk to you about. In the course of your work did you receive the fullest co-operation from those who could and should have co-operated with you in the discharge of his duties?

—Within the Army?

8553. Within the Army?

—Yes, I think so, yes.

8554. I am particularly concerned about the period under discussion, say, August, 1969 to the Spring of 1970; during that period, in particular, can you say with certainty that you received the fullest co-operation from the Army authorities, the Gardaí, the Special Branch and the heads and staffs of the various Departments with which you were obliged to work from time to time?

—I would say so, yes.

8555. Were you at any stage frustrated or hindered in the course of your work?

—No, I cannot say that I was. There was frustration of one type or another but, possibly, there are reasons for these things. Apart from the usual frustrations one has, I cannot recall any.

8556. During the period in question, the period with which we are concerned, the crisis period, did you feel at any stage that you had been deceived or misled?

—No, I did not get that impression at any stage, no.

8557. So that you did feel at all times you were getting the fullest co-operation from all those around you?

—I did, yes.

8558. How long have you known Chief Superintendent Fleming?

—I think two or three years. I cannot say. I got to know him first, I think, when he came in charge of the Special Branch.

8559. Yes.

—I do not know. I did not have very much to do with him certainly, if I knew him before that.

8560. Might I ask what kind of relationship existed between you?

—Some difficulty, Mr. Chairman, here— the question of the relationship between the intelligence services and the Garda Síochána is one which I do not feel free to enter in to.

8561. Yes. Could I ask, to make it easy for you, how often, perhaps, did you meet?

—Over this period of two or three years, perhaps—not very often, not very often. I did not deal directly with Chief Superintendent Fleming, no.

8562. I see. To what extent did your section and his exchange views and information?

—I think fairly freely.

8563. Would you agree that there was between the respective secret service organisations—the Army, of which you were Chief, and the civilian authority, over which Colonel—Chief Superintendent—Fleming was Chief, that there seemed to exist a deep gulf, a lack of liaison proper?

—I do not think so. You talk about Chief Superintendent Fleming, but my liaison was not with Chief Superintendent Fleming. To describe him, he is Chief of the Special Branch—but, again, Mr. Chairman, I am in a bit of a difficulty because I will hear the bringing in matters which are normally and always have been affecting national security and I do not know—I do not feel that I am free to give this information.

8564. Colonel Hefferon, you will appreciate that we in this Committee have had to contend with a very serious conflict of evidence in recent days. I personally would be very grateful to you if you could give us any assistance in separating the truth from the blatant falsehood which has evidently come up here.

—It is not a question of reluctance or unhelpfulness on my part, Deputy. I just ask you to consider in discussing this matter that we would have to go into detail on certain matters which I do not feel free to go into, which have always been matters which are concerned with national security in the broad sense; it involves the operation of the Intelligence Services.

8565. I appreciate that, Colonel. At the same time, we have had evidence from others here which impinges upon these questions I am now putting to you. I think you will agree, Colonel, that the revelations made to this Committee by Chief Superintendent Fleming were, to say the least, startling?

—Yes.

8566. And it did involve your subordinate, Captain Kelly?

—Yes.

8567. It did involve some two ex-Ministers of State and their respective brothers?

—Yes.

8568. And we have heard a forthright repudiation from these people of the allegations made by Chief Superintendent Fleming.

—Yes.

8569. In the circumstances, it behoves me to ask you whether you can throw any light on this subject.

—The only light I can throw on it is this. I did not receive any reports at any time from Chief Superintendent Fleming or indeed any other source involving the passage of money by Captain Kelly. I think he mentioned three or four sums to Cathal Goulding. This was certainly startling to me to say the least, if that happened. Nor from any other Border source for that matter.

8570. Traditionally, Colonel, would you agree that there has been a lack of co-operation between Army Intelligence and the civil intelligence of this country?

Chairman.—I think the question is a bit broad. Perhaps the Deputy could put it that co-operation could be better, or something like that.

8571. Deputy Treacy.—It has been alleged that there has been a lack of co-operation between the two departments, so to speak, in respect of the episode with which we are dealing here and we would like confirmation or otherwise of that.

—Yes, Deputy. I will put it this way. This has been said in the court as well, of course, and all that. I was dealing on one level with certain personnel in regard to ordinary liaison which is traditional and in all my time there the liaison was excellent. To unravel this whole thing, I think would need possibly a special investigation to go into the Intelligence services as a whole.

8572. I see. With regard to the Bailieborough meeting you were fully informed by Captain Kelly prior to the convening of this meeting, you were advised how it was being funded, you were directly involved in financing this meeting, in making arrangements for it, and entertaining the guests, so to speak. Were you aware, Colonel, that members or non-members of an illegal organisation were present on that occasion?

—My understanding, indeed from what I know since was true, was that the people from the North of Ireland were nearly all members of the Civil Rights Association, that they might also be members of the Republican Movement, something that was probably known to me too, or ex-members I should say.

8573. Have you read the evidence of Chief Superintendent Fleming to this Committee?

—Not the evidence given to the Committee. I have read newspaper accounts of it.

8574. Is there anything in that evidence which you have read with which you disagree very, very strongly?

—I do not know, as I say, in any detail about the evidence at this stage. Certainly, about the passage of sums of money from Captain Kelly to Cathal Goulding, everything that has been reported to me and so on, I would most strongly disagree with and, if this is so, then I think I would be willing to admit that I had been deceived but I do not believe it is so that from what I know of Captain Kelly and his background— and I have known him for seven or eight years and I suppose I have as good a judgment of people as the next person—I would consider it absolutely astonishing if these particular matters that had been alleged about Captain Kelly handing certain sums of money—I do not know the sums, but I think on several occasions the Chief Superintendent—I mean I do not recollect the number of times there were——

8575. Colonel, I propose to refresh your memory on that and to quote from the Chief Superintendent’s evidence to us. Turn to the transcript of 9th February, 1971, volume 11, page 417, the second to last paragraphs. Firstly, he says: “First, in about the last week of September, 1969”——

Chairman.—Perhaps it would be better if we gave the Colonel a copy so that he will be able to follow it.

(Copy given to Witness.)

8576-7. Deputy Treacy.—That is the quotation, Colonel.

—“On or about 7th October, 1969”—is this the one to which you are referring?

8578. Yes.

“… he paid over £7,000 at Cavan Town to Cathal Goulding. During the last week in November, 1969, he paid over a further sum of £1,000”. I had no reports at all on such matters and I frankly do not believe them. From the state of my knowledge at the moment, I frankly do not believe he every handed money over to Cathal Goulding. In my opinion it can only be a question of opinion because quite obviously I cannot have heard evidence of it, but in my opinion this is completely out of character with the officer that I know and I do not believe it, quite frankly.

We have also the statement here, Colonel, that he promised Captain Kelly to provide training facilities for Northern Ireland members of the IRA in Gormanston Camp.

—Nonsense.

8579. You say: “Nonsense”. And that Captain Kelly attended an IRA meeting in County Cavan on 1st October, 1969—would you comment there, Colonel?

—The question about training, as a matter of fact that very week-end—and Captain Kelly knew it before he left—the training in Dunree had been cancelled. Because of certain approaches to the Minister and to our—and to the Army Chief of Staff, this training in Dunree had been sanctioned and went on for a while.

8580. May I ask—sorry if I interrupted you—who sanctioned the training?

—I will have to go into some detail about this. Certain persons in the North of Ireland approached the Officer Commanding in the Donegal area with certain requests. The requests included that the Army would do something about training people in the Bogside. Quite naturally, the officer concerned informed them that he had no authority, but he would pass them up the line and eventually they were passed through the chain of command to the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Staff went to see Mr. Gibbons about them, and certain people, nine or ten of them, I think, of these Bogsiders were taken into the FCA and trained there for a week. On the Friday of that week, I think, I became aware that the newspapers were on to this and in view of the damage I thought it would cause by having this brought out in public and not being able to get either the Chief of Staff or the Minister, I cancelled it on my own authority. I cancelled the course which was due to commence; the second course on the Saturday was cancelled on Friday night.

8581. Yes. The training of these men was carried out on the instructions of the then Minister for Defence, Deputy James Gibbons?

—Yes.

8582. Were they trained with arms?

—They would be trained in arms.

8583. FCA arms?

—Yes, FCA arms. They were enlisted. They were enlisted, attested into the FCA, yes.

8584. Would you agree, Colonel, that this clearly implied the use of arms at a later stage, the furnishing of arms at a later stage?

—Well, one could argue it that way, but it could also mean that the Bogsiders would be able to provide their own arms. I raise this point because the question of training and Captain Kelly promising training against the background of this, I find it very difficult for him to do——

8585. Colonel, can I pass on to the other statements here?——

—Particularly at Gormanston, which was full of refugees at the time and which would be a very difficult proposition.

8586. Can I mention here the statement that he, Captain Kelly, promised the IRA to give them £50,000 by instalments and, to prove this, to prove that he was not bluffing rather, he promised to pay the first instalment within three days? What is your reaction to that statement?

—The date of this statement is presumably the same one, the date of the meeting in Bailieborough. Well, I do not know. As far as I knew, he had £500 to set up this meeting, but the sum of £50,000—I find it very difficult to believe that he could promise anything like that, where he would get it from for a kick-off. He is not the type of man who is given to telling—to chancing his arm like that. I think I—I find it difficult to credit this.

8587. Colonel, I think you have already —sorry if I am interrupting—I think you have already repudiated the suggestion in the next sentence here that Captain Kelly paid over £7,000 at Cavan town to Cathal Goulding. During the last week in November, 1969, he paid over a further sum of £1,000. I think you have already repudiated these statements as well?

—Yes. This in a sense is central to everything, because I do not feel that Captain Kelly did this.

8588. And we have a further statement of the passing of money by Captain Kelly to Cathal Goulding which will follow on to— in early December, 1969, he, Captain Kelly, paid a further £1,500, he thinks it was to Cathal Goulding, and about the third week of August, 1969, Pádraig Haughey paid over £1,500 to Cathal Goulding in London. What is your feeling about these statements, sir?

—Well, again about Captain Kelly, I think the same applies as what I said about the two previous alleged payments. I just simply do not believe it. If this were done, I certainly got no report about it. However, I assert with great emphasis I cannot credit it.

8589. Yes. Do you also feel that the statement in respect of Mr. Harry Blaney passing over large sums of money to the IRA from September, 1969, onwards is also untrustworthy?

—I never heard of—well, I may have heard there was a person called Harry Blaney but I——

8590. You had no personal contact with the man referred to here?

—No, I did not know anything about him.

8591. In respect of the Bailieborough meeting, Colonel Hefferon, there was quite a controversy about this and there was a report submitted to the Taoiseach about this meeting and allegations were made that drink was being consumed in large amounts and that wads of notes were being handed over and it was the subject of an investigation, in any event, by the Taoiseach himself?

—Yes.

8592. You were quite satisfied, sir, that nothing untoward happened at this Bailieborough meeting?

—Yes.

8593. That it was quite an orderly affair and carried out with due decorum and was no way expensive as such, or lavish in the manner of drinks——

—Well, I did, of course, get Captain Kelly in and put to him that this was a matter which had come from the Taoiseach, had been reported to him and was a rather serious matter. I asked him to give me a full report of this, which he did, that he did not, in fact, that there was no basis at all for it, that far from being a drinking party, it was a very sober one, that there was no question of his waving money, wads of notes, around and promising money in large quantities. I believed him in this one. It would be out of character with him completely, from what I knew of him, to carry on in this way.

8594. At this time a more serious accusation was made about this Bailieborough meeting that Captain Kelly did, in fact, meet members of the IRA there and passed over money to them. I understand that Chief Superintendent Fleming had the responsibility of investigating this matter and broached the subject with you either personally or through correspondence and that your reaction to this matter was to say, to use the words, “all poppycock”. Do you recollect that?

—I got nothing except this report, which had been made by Mr. Berry, I believe, to the Taoiseach and which he had passed on to the Minister for Defence. To what extent Chief Superintendent Fleming—I do not think that Chief Superintendent Fleming said that he reported this thing to me directly. Am I wrong in that?

8595. Maybe not, but I might refer you to page 419 of the same volume, (volume 11) question 5659. Chief Superintendent Fleming states here, in respect of the Bailieborough meeting:

—I understand. I made some inquiries on my own in the matter. I believe when it was put to Colonel Hefferon—I do not know by whom—he said it was pure poppycock about Captain Kelly meeting members of the IRA and passing over money.

Have you any recollection of that?

—This is, of course, the purest hearsay. I do not remember using the word “poppycock”. Possibly I was reporting back to the Minister for Defence: “There is nothing to this story.”

8596. The statement made by Chief Superintendent Fleming:

… I made some inquiries of my own. … I believe when it was put to Colonel Hefferon—I do not know by whom—he said it was pure poppycock.…

He is more affirmative if you go down further, and more definite in his statement. He says:

I cannot go further with that at this stage, to whom he said that, but I know he did refer to this as pure poppycock.

“I know he did refer to this as pure poppycock”. “Know” is the affirmative word there.

—Yes. I have explained to you the report made to the Taoiseach and passed from the Taoiseach to the Minister for Defence and brought by him to my notice and the investigation I made with Captain Kelly is the only report that I have had in this matter. And coming back to the Minister for Defence, I told him so, that I had made some investigation and was satisfied that there was nothing to the report.

8597. Would you go to question 5662, Colonel Hefferon. A categorical statement, again, by Chief Superintendent Fleming, that Mr. Haughey had a meeting with one of the leading members of the IRA and he also promised him £50,000.

—I do not know anything about that.

8598. Have you any comment to make on it?

—No, I cannot make any comment on that. It is a statement that a leading member of the IRA had a meeting with Mr. Haughey, who promised him £50,000. I cannot make any comment on that.

8599. I think Mr. Haughey has dealt with that already in his statement. You will see what the purpose of the handing over of this money was. Again, in the statement of John P. Fleming, Chief Superintendent: “For funds for the North. For the IRA, for the North. And the meeting took place in Dublin”. You have no knowledge of that meeting and cannot confirm or deny the veracity of that statement?

—No.

8600. The name of Mr. Blaney is also mentioned here. Chief Superintendent John P. Fleming is reported on page 40, question 5691, as saying, in answer to the question: Where does he come into your information?

He handed over certain sums to the IRA from time to time, both he and his brother.

Money and arms are mentioned. Again, you have no knowledge of whether these statements are true or false?

—No, no knowledge.

8601. I think the question is relevant, because it is all, I presume, moneys coming out of the fund with which we are dealing here. The conflict of evidence, Colonel, between Captain Kelly and your good self and, say, Chief Superintendent Fleming, and the others who have probably denied his assertions, is fundamental to our deliberations?

—It is.

8602. It is being denied by Captain Kelly, your good self, and Mr. Haughey and Mr. Blaney and their respective brothers. This Committee is concerned as to the veracity of these statements by Mr. Fleming, and it was put to him very strongly and very fully here.

Chief Superintendent, are you absolutely sure that your sources of information are accurate and to be trusted?

And the reply to that question, question 5643 in volume 11, is:

—Absolutely. They have been checked and double checked.

That is the voice of the repository of justice, law and order in this country and the vast resources available to him, speaking authoritatively, under oath, to this Committee. He is quite definite his information is accurate and to be trusted; it has been checked and double checked. And yet, Colonel Hefferon, we have complete repudiation of all this trusted, reliable information by so many other people in high places. What are we to think in the circumstances?

—Well, I have given you my views on the statement, in connection with Captain Kelly’s attitude and passing moneys to the IRA, and because I know Captain Kelly well, I have said that I do not believe it. Of course, this is my personal opinion. I cannot be quite certain about it. I have no evidence. But if Chief Superintendent Fleming has evidence that Captain Kelly passed money to Cathal Goulding—in the summer, it was mentioned here—this would put a different complexion on it. I can only state my opinion, and my opinion is that Captain Kelly did not pass these sums of money to Cathal Goulding. I think if he did, all the questions I have been asked about deception, and so on, are very relevant. I am quite certain Captain Kelly would have told me, had he done so.

8603. Were you aware, Colonel Hefferon, at any stage during the period in question— say to February/March—that your own subordinate, Captain Kelly, your trusted officer, was under surveillance by the Special Branch?

—No; but I expected that he would be, if only for the reason that there would be a number of people meeting Cathal Goulding and they would certainly be under surveillance. I would assume he would be. Therefore, if he was seen meeting him, he would be under surveillance. In this sense, yes. I had, in fact, informed the Garda that Captain Kelly would be meeting people like this, just to show—

8604. Was there any direct approach by the Special Branch to you concerning the activities of Captain Kelly at this time? Were you asked to verify, or approve?

—This approach was made by the Taoiseach to the Minister for Defence about the Bailieborough meeting sometime after, about November. I am not aware of any other approach in connection with Captain Kelly’s activities made to me.

8605. I think it has been borne out in evidence here, Colonel, that despite your wish and desire, and your feeling that you were being fully informed by Captain Kelly of his various activities, you were not so informed, that much was kept from you. I think this is pretty clear from the questioning of Deputy FitzGerald, Deputy Gibbons and, indeed, Deputy Keating—that you were not really kept fully aware of the accounts, the bank accounts and the subsidiary accounts, and the manner in which these accounts were being manipulated and were not aware of the trips to the Continent until, in fact, the Captain returned from such, and that very many important matters were kept from you?

—This is a very general statement. I do not think it is quite right to say that the Captain did not inform me before going to the Continent on these trips. It has already been given in evidence that he did inform me before going on the various trips.

8606. Chairman.—The Deputy has mentioned a number of things—seven or eight things—all of importance. I think it would be better, to get it correctly on the record, if he put each point he has made, which he has put in the form of a statement, in the form of a question—each one—to the witness.

8607. Deputy Treacy.—I deduce from your statements last night, Colonel, that you were not fully informed in respect of the account at Baggot Street in particular?

—That is so, but I think, I explained at that time that I did not look for information on this. I regarded this as a matter between the Minister for Finance and Captain Kelly. I think this was fundamental to my position.

8608. I further deduce that you were not fully informed by Captain Kelly in respect of his various activities concerning arms deals?

—In so far as Captain Kelly informed me that he was going to the Continent to purchase arms for the Northern Defence Committees on the various occasions on which he went, I was aware of these things and where he was going to purchase arms, as was the Minister for Defence.

8609. Were you made aware by him of the trip to London on an arms deal by certain gentlemen?

—Yes, I think I heard about this afterwards.

8610. Afterwards?

—I think so, yes.

8611. This is why I am saying that you were not as well informed as you might have been in all the circumstances. Was it the position that in so far as ordinary secret service work was concerned, Captain Kelly could be relied upon, was trustworthy in every sense of the word, but that from the period, say, March onwards, he came under the control of certain Ministers of State, Mr. Haughey, in particular and Mr. Blaney perhaps in particular, and that from March onwards, the Captain seemed to slip away from under your control and from March onwards, was working very largely for, and on behalf of, the then Minister for Finance and the then Minister for Agriculture, Messrs. Haughey and Blaney? Is that a fair assumption? This is the assumption which I am personally coming to in the matter.

—I do not think so—I do not think there is any evidence to support that. He was reporting, and even after my retirement he reported on several occasions, directly to the Minister for Defence. He reported to him after the abortive effort of 25th March and was keeping him regularly and fully informed. The suggestion that Captain Kelly was either acting on his own or directly under the instructions of Messrs. Haughey and Blaney—I do not think——

8612. You would not accept that?

—No.

8613. You are on record on many occasions as saying that he was taking his orders from Messrs. Haughey and Blaney, meeting them regularly?

—Meeting them regularly, yes, but I do not think—orders——

8614. Instructions, perhaps?

—Instructions, yes.

8615. Having regard to his close proximity and the fact that he was trusted so much by these two important members of the Cabinet, would it be fair to assume that you were rather loth to interfere with his activities for and on behalf of these gentlemen?

—I think that from an early stage of these proceedings, the Minister I was directly responsible to, the Minister for Defence, knew about the attempts to assist the Northern people in getting arms.

8616. In respect of the matters about which I feel you had not been informed, is it not true to say that you were not aware that Mr. Luykx was accompanying Captain Kelly to the Continent, or perhaps that he assisted him in funding the arms operation there by the handing over of a substantial cheque?

—No, I was not. I think Captain Kelly mentioned that he was accompanied by an interpreter, Mr. Luykx, and this I imagine he would have reported to me at some stage.

8617. Afterwards?

—Before or after—I am not sure.

8618. I was interested, Colonel, in your various statements about the success, or otherwise, of the Northern Committee’s viists here to Dublin and their meetings with various Ministers. I gather that they got the very definite impression that they would not merely get support but that they would be given full support in respect of money and probably arms. This was the very definite impression they brought away from their various meetings with Messrs. Haughey, Blaney and Gibbons at that time?

—This was what I got by report and from other reports—when these people went back to their own areas, these things became known to certain people. We got the same impression, that they were satisfied—from the detailed report which I had from Captain Kelly—about their reception.

8619. I believe that these very strong assurances came from no less a personality than the Taoiseach himself. While he did not indicate to them that they would get arms, he told them it would be considered?

—About the gas masks, all right, but that he would have to consider the question of arms.

8620. Andt here was a suggestion that it might be considered by the Cabinet—there would have to be a decision by the Cabinet as such?

—I would not like to put it any further than that.

8621. Are you aware of any positive reply from the Taoiseach in this matter? Was it considered and, if so, what was the outcome?

—I was not aware of that.

8622. Could I ask you, Colonel, in your opinion, was there any association whatsoever between the bank robberies which were taking place about this time and the various gun-running activities with which we are concerned here?

—You mean, Saor Éire?

8623. Yes indeed?

—I do not know. We had to keep a very close eye on them because they were associating—they were attempting to get arms and buy ammunition and arms. In fact, on one occasion they did succeed in purchasing arms in Cork——

8624. Yes?

—for which, later on, some people were court-martialled. We had reports from time to time that they were or they could be looking out for making a small raid somewhere if arms were not properly secured, that they were interested in making a raid so, to that extent, I knew about them. I also knew they were a very small group and were pretty closely under the surveillance of the Garda Síochána Special Branch, who, apparently knew them all and knew a good deal about what they were doing.

8625. Yes. There were a number of bank raids north and south of the Border?

—Yes.

8626. In which quite substantial amounts of money were taken?

—Yes.

8627. As a result of them?

—Yes.

8628. Arms were used by a, shall I say, para-military organisation and lives were lost. Garda Fallon lost his life in one of these escapades?

—Yes.

8629. Since this was not clearly a civilian activity, were you or your department asked to assist?

—Oh, yes, we were, yes.

8630. You were?

—We had to in our own interest because, as I say, they had, in fact, been successful in purchasing some ammunition from one of our people in Cork and we had to investigate this and bring the people concerned to justice. But, in fact, I think, on the question of Garda Fallon, it must have been two or three days before I retired— maybe it was on the eve of my retirement anyway—I was asked by the Garda Síochána to the Bridewell, because they had some information that Garda Fallon’s murderers had been holed-up somewhere in the northside and they wanted Army help and we had a conference about it. As it happened, they were not there.

8631. Was it not rather strange, Colonel, that your joint efforts—the Army Intelligence and the civil intelligence forces of the Gardai—were so utterly unsuccessful in tracking down culprits on that occasion and that the one single arrest made had to be made in England, in fact?

—But I must remind you that we have no responsibility except when called upon by the Garda Síochána in this matter of apprehending bank robbers, or anybody else for that matter. Anybody else who commits a crime under the civil law, this is a matter for the Garda Síochána. If the Gardaí want banks to be guarded or if they want help in apprehending these people, they call on the Army to give them that.

8632. To what extent, if any, did these moneys taken in bank robberies find their way into a northern fund?

—Oh, I could not say anything about this. I do not know anything at all about that.

8633. You said earlier in evidence that Captain Kelly was adverse to the IRA all his life and violently opposed to their activities and perhaps still was. Was it not strange, therefore, that he should become so involved with them, not merely fraternising with them but allegedly assisting them in the matter of arms——

—And passing money to them?

8634. Yes.

—This is, again, passing money to Cathal Goulding; I think it is in this connection we are talking. It would be completely out of character for him.

8635. What do you think of the suggestion which has been made elsewhere that the real purpose of Captain Kelly and others was not to supply arms to the Northern people but, rather, to mislead them and to undermine and subvert their organisations both north and south of the Border and that there was never any real intention of supplying arms, as such?

—I do not know. Of course, if the arms were supplied, if they had come in, which they did not, the question of what to do with them would arise and the Government Ministers concerned, Mr. Haughey and Mr. Gibbons and so on, would have to consider what they would do about it. It is one thing to bring them in. It is another thing —incidentally, they were not brought in, of course, but your question was about the intention to break up the IRA or anything like that——

8636. Yes.

—Certainly this was not——

8637. It has been alleged that the real purpose was to destroy the potency and the effectiveness of the IRA and to subvert the Civil Rights Movement in the North?

—Oh, no. I do not think that this proposition could be sustained at all, anyway, because the position, as far as we were concerned, was that, if another August, 1969, or worse—indeed, the indications were that if it happened the next time, it would be a good deal worse—were to happen, that we would be in a position to do something about it, if only on humanitarian grounds.

8638. Well, whether this was the intention or not, would you not agree that the outcome was the same—that the IRA were, in fact, and are, in fact, split into various factions and the Civil Rights Movement is a very effete one at the present time?

—There are many causes for that, of course. The split in the IRA did not happen this year or last year. It is going back quite a time.

8639. I was impressed by your desire to take care of Captain Kelly when this unfortunate business came to a climax, but I could not understand the intention or the decision to place him in the position where he would be an officer in anti-pig smuggling campaign along the Border?

—Well, as I have said, this was not my doing.

8640. The inference one could draw from this quite easily was that the position he was being placed in on the Border was to assist him to continue in his endeavours in the work he had been doing as a liaison officer between the northern committee and the various people of importance here in the south?

—Yes. It is an inference that could be drawn from it, yes.

8641. This may not seem relevant to our business here, but you may feel yourself like availing of an opportunity to clear up the matter. I think it is a matter of some public importance myself. It is in respect of a statement you made, under duress, I must admit, in another place when you were asked to indicate the repository for any arms importation that might come in. You claimed privilege, but you were pressed to name a certain place and you did so name the place?

—I did not.

8642. You said an abbey?

—I did not. I think at this stage that all counsel had—all the defence counsel at any rate—protested that, in view of the climate we were living in, that to expose people of this place to reprisals or mishandling would be done and the question was not pressed. The question was not pressed finally because the prosecution moved from that and said if the judge liked to come back to it later—in fact, he never came back to it, naming the place.

8643. How was an abbey in a certain Border county referred to in the Press then?

—Because the next question was, will you name the abbey? This is the point at which I claimed that I would write it down, but I would not name it. I would write the name of it for the judge.

8644-54. But the county was mentioned?

—The county was mentioned, yes.

8655. This is what I want to come to— Cavan, an abbey in County Cavan was mentioned?

—Well, I think it should not have been mentioned at all. I was under a good deal of pressure at the time and I do not think, quite honestly, that this Committee should go on referring——

8656. Serious repercussions could arise from a statement of this kind, as you yourself say, and it was misleading in any event in that the abbey in question, which is used as a depot by the Department of Defence, has not——

—I must claim privilege, Mr. Chairman.

8657. ——has not been occupied for a long number of years by any religious order and, in order properly to safeguard the religious communities in the area——

8658. Chairman.—The witness has claimed privilege and the Deputy is now giving evidence.

—I must claim privilege, Mr. Chairman.

8659. It has not been occupied for a number of years by any British soldiers and in order to properly safeguard British communities in the area——

8660. Chairman.—The witness has claimed privilege and the Deputy is now giving evidence.

8661. Deputy Treacy.—I do not want to pursue the point except to say one thing. It is my belief the abbey was not used for a number of years——

8662. Chairman.—Perhaps the Deputy would pass on to the next point.

8663. Deputy Treacy.—Colonel, had you any information as to the condition of the guns which were sent to Dundalk, the 500 rifles? Have you any information as to this consignment?

—No. I would not have any information on that because this was an order to the Chief of Staff which would be submitted through the usual channels.

8664. You would not know what make they were?

—I do not know what make they were, no. I never saw the rifles that were sent to Dundalk. The order that was given possibly specified what type of rifle they would be. I would assume that they were surplus rifles. They might be of an older pattern or of a different pattern from the ones in normal service.

8665. Deputy Tunney.—I hope my questioning will not take any more than five or ten minues. On the other hand, these questions are important to me. Have you read the evidence of Captain Kelly?

—Yes. I would not say I had read it all but I had read——

8666. You would agree that on his evidence the Bailieborough meeting of the 4th and 5th October is a very important meeting, looking back at it now at least. Captain Kelly has said that this was the meeting where the genesis of the whole operation arose. This was a major meeting in the whole operation.

—I did not look at it in that way at the time nor indeed looking back at it can I regard it as being the genesis of the operation—you say it followed the conspiracy to import arms.

8667. You would not see it that way?

—No. I assume that Captain Kelly was referring to this meeting, that requests had been made for arms from the South, but certainly there was no authority given at that stage.

8668. The requests which were subsequently satisfied were made at this meeting?

—This is certainly true in that sense, yes. There was also a request made at this meeting for training.

8669. I would not be concerned about training just at the moment. I would be concerned about money because from this emanated the amounts, the subsidiary amounts and the whole lot.

—Well, I take it from Captain Kelly——

8670. You do, and this was the meeting regarding which a complaint came to you?

—Yes.

8671. I think you said that the complaint there was that Captain Kelly met certain people but, apart from that, that he had money with him or seemed to be careless in the showing of money. I think he himself said he was perhaps trying to subvert people by showing the money. That was his own comment on it, that that was the nature of the complaint.

—Oh, I see. No. The nature of the complaint was that he had been promising money and had, in fact, waved a roll of notes.

8672. Did you assure the Minister that that could not have been correct?

—I investigated this with Captain Kelly and I went into it rather deeply with him and he assured me that no such incident had happened.

8673. You did not know he had brought £500 with him to that meeting?

—Oh, yes.

8674. In his statement of how that £500 was spent—you were there, I think, when he justified asking for expenses for this meeting?

—Yes.

8675. He shows in his statement of January this year that only £35 was spent at the meeting. Would you not think that rather strange?

—I think in going to a meeting of this nature the question of expenses is one which would have to be estimated and if it came to £35 it seems to be an extremely reasonable sort of thing, I must say. I do not think Captain Kelly asked for £500 at this meeting. The cheque that came to him was for £500.

8676. After having listened to him speak about this meeting and the money that would be required for it, we learned that £23 of that, he claims, was in respect of expenses which he had incurred prior to the meeting.

—I do not know. You are asking me about Captain Kelly making a claim about £23 prior to the meeting. I do not know what he means by that.

8677. Again I put the point to you. Would you be surprised in his explanation of how the money was spent to know that it extends from a period prior to the Bailieborough meeting until the following month of May?

—No. It would not exactly surprise me. As regards this £500 he had, he was directly accountable to the Minister for Finance. No doubt it was given to him, not for the Bailieborough meeting alone, but for any follow-ups that would be necessary. I should also say that about that time, and this may have a bearing on it, in early October or November—I do not know when but I think it was October—Intelligence Officers were forbidden to go into Northern Ireland as such and going into Northern Ireland, I suppose, would have involved probably heavier expenses than going just from Dublin down to, well, south of the Border here, wherever he might meet his contacts.

8678. Actually I should refer back to what I had intended saying. Captain Kelly did not tell you that arising from that meeting came the plans for this operation?

—No. I do not think there was any plan about it at that stage. At all times the Northern people had been looking for training and arms.

8679. But Captain Kelly at that time did not say to you that it was arising from this that subsequent accounts were open for the purchase of arms?

—No.

8680. Therefore, you could not have told the Minister?

—No, this is true.

8681. Did you tell the Minister that Captain Kelly had £500 with him going to Bailieborough?

—I cannot be sure of this. I cannot be sure whether I told him this or not.

8682. Even when the charge of his having money there was made for you to investigate?

—Yes, even then I cannot be sure.

8683. Would you not think here, Colonel, it would have been a relevant point?

—I do not think so. What I was asked about was the question of Captain Kelly behaving in what was to me an extraordinary manner by making all sorts of promises to people about the money he had, which would have been part of the £500, I presume, but promising—I think this was made clear, too—in terms that there was more where that came from, or words to that effect.

8684. On that it is quite possible, Colonel, I think, that Captain Kelly at that meeting could have £500 on the table. I mean that is possible. We know that he brought £500 with him.

—Yes.

8685. Therefore, should you not have been cautious and say to the Minister: “Well, I do know that he had £500 with him and maybe he had it on the table”?

—As I say, I cannot be sure whether I told the Minister about this £500 but I certainly told him that I did not believe that this incident where he had promised money had any substance in fact.

8686. I was only concerned with what Captain Kelly himself said. I do not think he talked about promising at all but that he had money with him. As I see it there is every evidence that he did have money with him. He knew it and you knew it?

—Yes, the £500.

8687. Which was a rather unusual sum for an Army Captain to have with him, if you like, and he going to a meeting. Therefore, I suggest that the case should have been made, that he had £500 with him and possibly could have had it on the table.

—This, of course, would invalidate the whole thing, I mean if he said that he did not produce money at the meeting, that he did not make any promises of this nature. This was surely denying——

8688. You would accept that, knowing Captain Kelly as well as you do, but looking at it from here, the fact that he brought £500 with him——

—He possibly brought £500 with him; he got £500——

8689. On the 3rd October?

—But whether he brought that £500 with him I do not know. I would say that he would bring sufficient of it, if he were normally prudent, bring sufficient to do him.

8690. You do say—and this will be my second last question—that Captain Kelly was often away for three to four to five days. Would that have been prior to your ordering him to keep out of the North or subsequent to it?

—Oh, it would be prior to ordering him out because he would not have any reason to be away for that length of time——

8691. Well, that is what I thought?

—Except of course when he went abroad.

8692. Right. Finally, I can appreciate, while I would not agree at all with, having regard to the circumstances, your being concerned for Captain Kelly’s fate in circumstances where he was going to leave the Army, on the other hand I can appreciate that as a comrade you would have been concerned for himself and the future and you have told us that and as a non-military side of the esprit de corps I would accept that but would you say that possibly your anxiety and your concern for him, that that influenced the Minister for Defence in your presentation of the case, in short in what politicians would call, did you make representations to the Minister in accordance with how you yourself felt?

—Oh, yes. This was part of—when presenting the retirement form I made a representation, as you put it, that in my opinion he should be fixed up, that he should leave the Army but that he should be fixed up with some civilian post.

8693. So it is possible then to assume that the Minister’s handling of the situation subsequent to that had been coloured by the request which you made to him regarding Captain Kelly’s future?

—I cannot answer that one. The Minister, I think, should answer it. Of course it is possible.

8694. That is all, Chairman. Thank you very much.

8695. Chairman.—I suggest that we adjourn now gentlemen until 2.30 p.m. and then take the Red Cross. We can communicate with Colonel Hefferon about seeing him later.

Deputy FitzGerald.—I wonder could we not finish with Colonel Hefferon. Should we not continue?

Chairman.—I’ll be probably three-quarters of an hour with Colonel Hefferon.

Deputy FitzGerald.—Oh, I see.

Chairman.—We shall let him know. It will probably be next week. Thank you, Colonel Hefferon.

The Witness withdrew.

The Committee adjourned at 1.55 p.m.

Mrs. Leslie Mary Barry sworn and examined.

8696. Chairman.—Mrs. Barry, I do not think we will have too much to ask you, and if you want any help I think Miss Murphy may be with you, if you want to refresh your memory on figures. You might forget things. If she will stay near you can ask her any question you are doubtful about.

—Very well, thank you.

8697. I see from your summary, Mrs. Barry, that from your own resources you gave donations for relief to people in Northern Ireland. On page 3 of your submission, the second paragraph from the top, you said that £2,000 was sent to the Reverend Dr. Farren, Bishop of Derry, £2,000 to His Grace the Most Reverend G. O. Simms, Archbishop of Armagh, £2,000 to the Trench House Relief Co-ordinating Committee, £250 to the Most Reverend Dr. Philbin, Bishop of Down and Connor, and £2,000 to the Reverend Dr. J. T. Carson, Moderator of the Presbyterian Church. That is correct Mrs. Barry?

—Yes.

8698. That makes a total of £8,250?

—Yes.

8699. Then, further to that, you also gave, again from your own resources, £5,000 to an account at Clones at the request of the Minister for Finance?

—Yes. To three people that we term F, G and H.

8700. That is right, yes. You also transmitted £20,000, not from your own resources but via your accounts, in the Bank of Ireland, £20,000 that came from the Department of Finance or out of the Vote. You transmitted that to the Munster and Leinster Bank, Belfast. Is that correct?

—Yes. To the Belfast aid account in the bank in Belfast.

8701. The Belfast Refugee Re-establishment Committee you have down here. I expect that is the same thing?

—The same thing.

8702. That is distinct, that is a different group?

—That was taken from the money, the £100,000, that all the discussion is about.

8703. You will be able to help us in that. Is that a different group, a different committee, from the committee which the money went to subsequently?

—The committee that sent the £20,000 to us was in Belfast. The others were in Clones and in the Baggot Street Bank.

8704. I know, but was the Belfast Refugee Re-establishment Committee, as such, different from what we are calling here the Belfast Relief Committee?

—This was a different committee.

8705. I know that, but was it a distinct body from the one that money went to subsequently?

—Yes, it was.

8706. A different body. Then on the 15th October, 1969, £5,000 was sent from the Grant-in-Aid Fund via your account in the bank here to Clones—is that correct?

—You call the money that came from the Department of Finance our number 2 account. That is our relief account. That is what we always call it. It is the relief account, the number 2 account in the bank.

8707. Your first disposal of money through that mechanism was £5,000 on the 15th October?

—Yes, from the Department of Finance funds.

8708. That is right. And another £5,000 to Clones again on the 31st October?

—Yes, that is true.

8709. Well, then, the position changed and after that you sent through the same mechanism, beginning on 10th November, you sent items now to Baggot Street?

—Yes. These were all sent on instructions. I have stated that.

8710. From the 10th November on, the only function you had in respect of this fund was when you forwarded a sum of money from the fund of the Department of Finance to your number 2 account?

—At the Bank of Ireland.

8711. You just immediately forwarded that?

—Transferred.

8712. You transferred?

—I think you have got all the communications with it in your little red book, you know.

8713. We have, but we have to establish it by question and answer. Did you feel at that time that this method of disposal of that money through the Red Cross, using the Red Cross as a channel for the distribution of the money rather than as an administrator, did you find that unusual?

—No. That has been the practice since the Society was inaugurated. If the Government wished at any time to make a Grant-in-Aid to any foreign country where there was distress, or to the Red Cross of any particular country where there was a disaster, it was transferred to us and we transferred it to the destination to which we were told to send it. It was not a bit unusual. It has been the practice since the Society was started in 1939.

8714. But in respect of the disposal of other funds, say, for example, to parts of Africa or other places, have you always been told what bank to put it into and in whose names?

—No, in most cases we were asked to transfer money for the relief of distress in some place and we transferred it to the League of Red Cross Societies in Geneva, or the International Committee of the Red Cross and they distributed it; but we never followed it up; we never wanted to know whether it was spent on water, soup, drink or anything else. We trusted the people to whom we sent it; and we followed the same practice in this.

8715. And you treated the persons in whose name this fund was placed in the same way as you would treat a branch of the Red Cross in any other part of the world?

—Exactly.

8716. You had the same confidence in them?

—We had, because we were dealing with the elected Ministers of our Government and we recognised the Ministers of our Government, and if they told us to send it, we sent it off.

8717. In relation to this particular fund, granting your acceptance of it ab initio, looking at it with hindsight, would you be satisfied as to how the Red Cross was involved in this affair?

—Well, Mr. Chairman, I never look at things with a hindsight, to tell you the honest truth. I usually look at them seriously when they come before me to deal with them, and it did not strike me as a bit odd that this fund should be transferred for relief. We were told it was for relief and we accepted it. If a person gives me a statement, unless I know that they are lying—I do not want to use the word ‘liars’—then I accept it because I would hope that they trust me and I trust them.

8718. I think you told us in your submission—I am speaking from memory now —that your acquiescence in this method of distribution of the fund had the sanction of your committee?

—It had, yes. I explained the formation of the Society; there is a central council of 42 members and that meets twice a year. At its first meeting, it elects an executive of 12 members and four of these are elected honorary officers—the chairman, the honorary secretary, the vice chairman and the honorary treasurer. The executive are cognisant of these transfers because any time, as I stated before to you, the Government asked us to do anything, we did it immediately without question. I do not know if I stated this in the submission to you, but I think I did to Superintendent Fleming—that the Chairman of the Irish Red Cross can deal with matters in an extreme emergency, but I have been appointed since 1950 and I have never had to exercise that authority in all my dealings with any relief matters. I have always had my executive to give their consent and I have never had to use the authority vested in me.

8719. This figure of £13,250 which you paid out from your own resources in relation to Northern Ireland—is that the sum total of your financial help in respect of this emergency in the North of Ireland?

—The first time we were asked to give £5,000 from our own funds—the Minister for Finance, Mr. Haughey asked us immediately when the situation started, to give £5,000—we did it from our own emergency relief fund.

8720. That figure of £13,250—if you want to check with Miss Murphy, she might be able to help you on the figure?

—The sum total, excluding the £5,000, is £11,850, and I have mentioned to you that Dr. Farren got £1,000, did I not? Then there is Trench House Co-ordinating Committee, Northern Bank, Andersonstown, Belfast, £1,000; Most Rev. Dr. Simms, £1,000—that went into the Royal Bank in Rathmines, Dublin (this was before he was transferred to Armagh); then Dr. Simms, when Archbishop of Armagh, £1,000; Trench House Co-ordinating Committee, £1,000; certain charities Dr. Farren had, £1,000; and then we got a donation from an individual for £250 specifically for Dr. Philbin and we merely transferred that. Then, to be more ecumenical, we went further afield and gave £2,000 to the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, Northern Bank, Donegall Square, Belfast and Trench House Co-ordinating Centre (Nazareth Lodge Welfare Committee), £2,000; and the Refugee Re-establishment Committee of Trench House, £1,100. I do not know if you have that list in front of you, but if you wish, you can have it.

8721. The Committee would like to have that. We have one, but I do not know whether it is figure for figure with this. Could we make a copy of this?

—Yes, of course.

8722. Deputy FitzGerald.—At your first meeting, Mrs. Barry, with the Minister, he was asking you to provide funds from your resources for this account in Clones?

—No.

8723. At your meeting in August?

—No. The first demand that went to the joint account in Clones for F, G and H was on the 7th of October. I met the Minister on the 17th of August and I think I stated that in my submission to you.

8724. Could you describe your first meeting with the Minister and what was decided at that meeting?

—The first meeting I had with the Minister—he rang me at my home on Saturday, 16th August. He asked me if I could come to Dublin, that he wanted to see me in connection with relief for those suffering in the North, in the Six Counties. I said to him that I would travel on that evening’s train and see him the following day, Sunday, if he wished me to see him. I saw him on the Sunday and it was then he told me that the Government had decided to set aside an amount of money for the relief of distress in the North. He did not give me the actual figure that day, but on Monday, I saw him, and he told me the figure and that very morning the Government had issued a statement through the Government Information Bureau stating that the Government had decided that the Irish Red Cross would be the channel for relief to the North and that the Archbishop of Dublin had sent to the Taoiseach a donation of £100—£1,000—and that the Taoiseach had transferred that immediately to the Irish Red Cross Society, and it was in that way then it started. But he asked me if we could send money immediately, help immediately, to this Trench House and I said: “Well, we do not carry very much in our number 2 account,” which is an emergency relief account, but I said I would go back to the office, so I asked the general secretary to come to the office with me that day, and we went to it and we found we could send £5,000 and we did it.

8725. To Trench House?

—Yes, to Trench House.

8726. Yes?

—You see, numbers of our members come from Belfast and they had information that they brought in to us about conditions and about where stuff could be sent.

8727. I thought it was £2,000 to Trench House. Am I wrong in that, Mrs. Barry? I have not got the figures in front of me.

—Oh, sorry—I made a mistake. It was £500. It was £500.

8728. Yes, I see—it was £500?

—Yes.

8729. To Trench House?

—No. I will tell you where it went now.

8730. This is the first £500 on your sheet?

—This is the first £500.

8731. Were these all——

—From public donations. Are you dealing with the sheet that is dealing with——

8732. I am, yes. You see, you were asked to send money to Trench House?

—No. We were asked to send money to the North and we found out from different people here who knew the North where we could send it. Now, we know Father MacClafferty and Father Duffy of St. Teresa’s School, Belfast, we sent £250 there; Mater Hospital, £125; Trench Co-ordinating Centre, £100 and £25—that was a total of £500. I neglected to give you that when I started on the 25th August.

8733. Mr. and Mrs. Kildea, £25?

—Yes.

8734. They were distributing relief, were they?

—Well, I have to ask Miss Murphy that. Oh, yes—it was through Father MacClafferty that this money was distributed and he sent us——

8735. This is what he did with it actually?

—What he did with it.

8736. I understand. Then in October the Minister saw Miss Murphy and asked her if you would send £500 to the Clones account and I take it she reported back to you?

—She phoned me immediately and I told her she could go ahead and do it and to report at once to the Honorary Secretary of the Society that she was doing it and she did.

8737. I see. Up to that point there was no suggestion of money from the fund being available to you. You had been told about the fund, but it had not been suggested that money would be paid out of this £100,000 to you?

—No, we did not handle any of it. I suppose, you see, in the long run, if we had run short in our own money to deal with the caring of the refugees, for instance, well then we would have been entitled to state we wanted some of it for them, and we would have got it, I feel sure.

8738. Yes, but up to that point it was only when the second £5,000 was requested for the Clones account that you, or Miss Murphy, said you had not got it available and you asked for money from the fund?

—No. The first £5,000 we sent from our own money, but then there was a request for a second £5,000—our number 2 account had run low——

8739. Yes?

—And then the transfer was.

8740. That was the first payment from the fund through or to you and I would like to ask you what was your role in this. You see, you could have had two roles. It could be that the Government was assisting the Society to enable the Society to provide relief or it could have been that the Government was using the Society as a channel for its own relief and these are legally two quite different positions and I would like to know your understanding of what exactly you were doing?

—My understanding always was in emergency relief that the Government were using the Society to do the work, do you see.

8741. Using the Society?

—Yes, using the Society, say—if, now, we will take the example, say, of the Pakistan upset—well, we had—suppose that at that time we had about £400 or £500 in our emergency relief fund, we would inform the Department of Defence we were short in that and they would reimburse our number 2 account to the amount that we had to spend on something or other, but it was always, as I said, and I said it in this case too—it was asking the Red Cross to do a job that the Government, well, had not any other means of doing.

8742. But, you see, there is a very important distinction here. We are trying, you know, to find out who is responsible for what and there is a very great distinction between the Government assisting the Red Cross financially, on certain conditions—that the money is used by them for a certain purpose—and the Government channelling funds through the Red Cross, its own money for its own purposes, and what I am anxious to know is which of these two describes the operation?

—Well, I suppose it is a combination of the two.

8743. Well, this is an important point because the Government, you see, is entitled to assist the Red Cross?

—I know.

8744. And to apply conditions to that assistance. It is assisting the Society to do something which the Society is doing on its own responsibility and it is entitled to do that under the Red Cross Act, 1938. It is not clear that the Government has any entitlement to use the Society to distribute its own funds, which is a very different thing?

—Just a moment. Mr. Chairman, it is entitled to use the Society to distribute its own funds. If, for instance, as I stated at the beginning to the Chairman, if the Government considers that there is great distress in any country, it can give £5,000 from Government funds into our Society for us to transfer.

8745. Yes, quite. It is giving money to the Irish Red Cross Society on condition that the Society uses it for this purpose. I quite understand that. That is in accordance with the Act?

—Well, we got this on the understanding that it was to be used for the relief of distress in the Six Counties and isn’t that the same as if it were relief in Greece.

8746. Yes. I mean I will come to that, but I am concerned to know whether the responsibility for distributing these funds was a Government responsibility or an Irish Red Cross responsibility?

—Well, for the issuing of it, it was the Government, but, for the transfer of it to these accounts, it was a direction from the Government to us. You have those letters in your little red book.

8747. Mrs. Barry, I am not clear as to what their standing is because I am aware of the Government’s power to assist the Red Cross Society financially and to lay down conditions as to what that assistance is to be used for. That is one type of operation. It is quite a different thing if the Government channels money through the Red Cross and directs the Red Cross to use that money in a particular way—just to channel it through it. The important thing here is whether the Irish Red Cross Society was or was not legally responsible for the decision to use this money in this way?

—We were not responsible for the use of the money at all. We were only responsible for transferring it from our number 2 account to specific accounts that we were instructed to.

8748. Yes. Well, you see, if you were not responsible for it, then the Government could not be said to be assisting you. You appreciate the distinction?

—I do, but generally it assists the standing of the Society in the country, isn’t it, because it recognises the Society as the agents, the national agents.

8749. I see this, but what we are trying to establish is where the legal responsibilities lie for the decision to put the money into the two accounts in Clones and Baggot Street. It could either lie in the Government deciding to put it into these accounts and using the Red Cross as a channel to get the money there. That is one possible explanation. The other explanation is that the Government assisted the Irish Red Cross Society, gave it financial assistance, on condition that it used the money for a particular purpose. These are two quite different sets of circumstances legally. In the first case your responsibility would not be engaged. In the second your responsibility is engaged We have to establish the legal responsibility here and I am anxious to discover it?

—I must say, I cannot speak for the Government.

8750. No?

—I am only an ordinary citizen, a volunteer. I am not a paid official in any sense. I have never handled money belonging to the Red Cross, or any other group for which I was working. The only way I handle it is if I get a donation, I send it on immediately to headquarters and the receipt is sent, and my husband and I give donations ourselves but, otherwise, I never handle money and more, I am very happy to be in that position, may I tell you. I would say you will have to ask a Government representative as to whether it was their responsibility or whether it was ours.

8751. We will do that, Mrs. Barry. You do appreciate, the Irish Red Cross Society must know whether it was either being assisted financially on condition that the money was used in a particular way, or whether it was being used as a channel to distribute Government money? It must know whether it is responsible or not. The Government can tell us what it thought it was doing, as long as the Irish Red Cross Society can tell us what it was doing and whether or not its legal responsibility was engaged. I have to ask you that question.

—Legally, we were not responsible at all. We merely did as we were instructed.

8752. You realise it can be argued if you had no responsibility in the matter and merely transferred it as instructed that the Government might not have been entitled to provide money to you in that way.

—No, Mr. FitzGerald, I am sorry, but I do not follow your argument.

8753. I will try to explain again. The Red Cross Act, Section 2, says the Minister for Finance might, by money provided by the Oireachtas, give assistance to the Society’s capital by way of grant or loan on such terms or conditions as he should think proper. It may be the Minister for Finance will assert when we meet him that that is what he was doing, that he was merely assisting the Society on certain conditions, in which event subsequent disposal of the money is a matter in which the Society’s responsibility is legally engaged. But there is an alternative theory: that what he was doing was not using the power in Section 2 at all, but simply channelling money into this fund and using the Irish Red Cross as a channel. These are two completely different circumstances. In one case, the Irish Red Cross Society’s responsibility is engaged and in the other there is no authority to touch the money. We are the Public Accounts Committee. It is our job to find out where the responsibility lies and whether the money was provided at all. I have got to ask you which of these two is your understanding of the matter.

—My understanding was we transferred the money as we were directed, we were the transferring agency, but we had no further responsibility as to whether the money was eaten, drunk, walked on or torn up; we had nothing to do with it.

8754. Can you indicate on what power of the Minister you were relying?

—I am relying on the same power as happened years ago when there was a difficulty over the Hungarian refugees who came in. The power was then the Taoiseach. He telephoned me and asked me to do certain things which I did.

8755. Yes.

—When Mr. Lemass was Taoiseach, he wanted something else done; it was something like that about refugees. He telephoned me and I did it. I met Mr. Haughey —and I am on oath now. The day Mr. Haughey asked me to meet him, I understood that he was speaking for the Taoiseach or for the Government. In the other two cases, the Taoiseach himself had asked me to come up and do a certain thing. In this case I acted on the assumption that he was speaking for the Government or for the Taoiseach. I did not ask him. Why should I?

8756. Quite. I mean if you are saying that you did not get the money under Section 2 of the Red Cross Act, that it was not a question of providing money for the Society to which it was responsible, under what powers of direction of the Taoiseach do you think the money was given? I am not aware of the Taoiseach having any power to direct the Irish Red Cross Society. Maybe it is my ignorance, maybe there is such a power and I would be glad to know of it.

—No. I must emphasise it is for the Government to answer the first part of the question. I have told you we acted as the transferring body and if you can use it legally this way or that way, I cannot interpret the Government’s view on it.

8757. You accept that you were bound by Government direction on the matter?

—I do, because all the instructions came in writing to us.

8758. Yes, all right. I will not press it any further. I am trying to clarify this point. You appreciate, Mrs. Barry, that it is absolutely essential if the Red Cross Society was merely a channel and was accepting a direction from the Government, then the Government is clearly responsible. At the same time, the question arises as to how the Irish Red Cross Society came to accept a direction from the Government which the Government had no authority to give. On the other hand, if the Government was merely assisting the Society under Section 2, that is perfectly proper from the Government’s point of view and it was the Irish Red Cross Society’s responsibility for that. It has to be one or the other. It is vital that this Committee should discover which it is. We cannot just have the Government telling us; we have to have the view of the Irish Red Cross Society as well. If you feel you were given it under Section 2, as a channel of the Government, I have to ask you, to which powers of direction of the Taoiseach are you referring?

—I have no knowledge of any power which the Taoiseach has in this matter, or any Minister. All I know is I agreed to help the situation in the North and when we got the instruction after the 7th October to send the money to those accounts, I accepted it. I did not question it.

8759. You do not think the Taoiseach or the Government have a power of direction or instruction, but they were merely requesting you to make available the facility of this channel, it was a request not an instruction? This is rather important. You did issue a statement saying you relied on the written instruction of the Department of Finance, but the Department of Finance have no power to give you instructions. They have power to assist the Society on certain conditions.

—I am not capable of inserting my mind into Mr. Fagan’s or Mr. Haughey’s mind. All I know is, we got the written instruction that they were going to transfer so much money into our number 2 account and would we kindly transfer it.

8760. The Red Cross is an autonomous body as such, established as such by statute. Its autonomy is guaranteed by the statute. I am puzzled as to how you could accept anybody’s written instructions about channelling money. I can quite understand the Red Cross Society acceding to a request of the Government in the matter and agreeing to engage itself in a certain activity at the Government’s request. I can understand how the Red Cross can accept an instruction from the Government under Section 2, but I cannot understand how the Red Cross Society, as an autonomous body, could accept written instructions from the Department of Finance or the direction of the Taoiseach, when neither of these bodies has any power or how you could rely on these instructions, which they had no power to give, as eliminating your responsibility in the matter. This is what is bothering me.

—I can only stand on the fact that we transferred as requested. I am not going to go into whether the Government was right in directing us to do it or not. That is not for me to decide. I did as I was asked and I may tell you, Mr. FitzGerald, that the conditions in the North were so bad at the time that money from any place would have been very helpful.

8761. I mean, that you were assisting in this is evidence to support that. It is important in any financial operation to be clear on what are the conditions of the financial operation and who is responsible for the money. It is vital to know who is responsible. It seems to me that either the Society was assisted with funds under Section 2 and then was responsible for them thereafter, or that you acceded to a request from the Government and then subsequently disposed of that money at the Government’s request. But I do not see how one can avoid the conclusion that the Society’s responsibility is engaged or how you could rely on a Government direction or written instructions from the Department of Finance when they have no power to give you those directions or instructions. This is what I am worried about. Unless there is some such power, that I am not aware of?

—Well, I think you will have to ask for a Goverment direction on that.

8762. But I am concerned with the action of an autonomous body as to how it acted and whether it is responsible and I will ask the Government and the Minister, and we have spoken to the Department of Finance about it, but we have to find out what the Red Cross position was on it. And I am still not completely clear on that. You seem to feel that you were merely a channel used by the Government. I can understand you voluntarily agreeing to a request from the Government to be used as such a channel but, of course, your responsibility remains engaged if you accede voluntarily to a request. I do not understand how you could accede to a written direction which would eliminate your responsibility when there is no power to give that direction? This is, I think, central to the vital point.

—I assumed that it was given, that it was a responsible direction. I assumed on every letter that it was.

8763. But, as Chairman of an autonomous body, would you not be very concerned to retain the autonomy of the body and not to act on written instructions or directions from anybody outside, who had no power to direct you or instruct you as to what to do? I am not suggesting that you should not have acceded to the request. Naturally, you accede to the request; it is entirely natural that you should want to do so, but it is one thing to accede to a request and then to go ahead on your own responsibility and provide the money; it is a different matter to rely on a written instruction or direction from somebody else that they were not entitled to give and to suggest that that eliminates your responsibility. That is what I cannot follow.

—But did not the Government, in a statement the first day issued by the Government Information Bureau, state that it was setting aside £100,000 for the relief of distress in the Six Counties or in the North, whatever you like to call it, and that they were asking the Irish Red Cross to deal with the matter?

8764. Asking, yes?

—This is the statement. I do not know if you have it.

8765. I think I may have part of it here. Would you like to read it?

—“The Minister for Finance has announced—this was the 18th August, 1969; Northern Relief, it is entitled “The following statement has been issued by the Government Information Bureau on behalf of the Government. The Minister for Finance has announced that the Government is making available adequate funds for the relief of the victims of the disturbances in the Six Counties. These funds will be administered mainly by the Irish Red Cross Society. The Government are aware that groups and organisations are anxious to help and they ask that the money would be channelled through the Society——

8766. This is precisely my point, Mrs. Barry; these funds would be administered by the Irish Red Cross Society. That was an announcement of the Government’s intention to exercise Section 2 of the Red Cross Act to assist the Society on certain conditions by providing funds to be administered by the Society, but if the Society is administering the funds, the Society is responsible subsequently for what happens. This is my point.

—Well, I must say here and now that I do not accept responsibility for whatever use was made of the money. I assumed, and I honestly believe, and now I am saying this on oath, that the moneys that was sent to the joint accounts at the various banks, I believed that they were used for the relief of distress in the North.

8767. Were you holding that you were not administering these funds?

—I do. I hold that we did not administer them.

8768. When the Government, having announced that you would be administering these sums, proceeded by a different method excluding you from their administration, did you raise any question about that change of plan from the publicly announced plan?

—No, I did not.

8769. Was there any reason for that, because it is a very important change?

—I did not raise any objection, nor I did not raise any question of it.

8770. Well, now, in your accounts on page 7, I think there is a sum of £99,862 recorded as being paid by you for Northern relief from your funds. This is in your stencilled accounts?

—Yes.

8771. Page 7 of the stencilled accounts: have you got a copy?

—I think you said page 9, did you?

8772. Page 7, in fact. If it is of any assistance to you to have Miss Murphy beside you when answering the questions—

—Yes, I think it is a bit awkward for her to be coming from behind.

8773. Is there room for her?

—She can sit on half my chair.

8774. First of all, on page 3 of the balance sheet of the Irish Red Cross Society, the first item is “Specific Funds Holdings. See Schedule 3.” Right?

—“Specific Funds Holdings, Schedule 3.”

8775. Yes. This is among your assets. So these funds are part of your assets in your balance sheet—the first point. Now we turn to Schedule 3, on page 7, which sets out the position about these funds which are part of your balance sheet. There is an item there about one-third way down the page, “Northern Ireland—£99,862?”

—Yes.

8776. Does that include the sums paid into Clones and Baggot Street?

—Yes.

8777. So that these funds were part—they were not simply being channelled through you—they were part of your accounts, part of your income on the one hand and of your expenditure on the other?

—Yes. They came into our bank account and they went out of our bank account.

8778. Yes, but you treated the money that came in as part of your assets?

—Yes.

8779. Whatever part is left on the date in question. So they are part of your funds?

—Yes.

8780. This seems to me to suggest that the Minister may have been acting under Section 2, that he may have been assisting the Society, because if he was not assisting the Society, but merely channelling money to Northern Ireland through you, I do not see how the money could turn up as an asset in your balance sheet?

—I’d say it was assisting.

8781. Under Section 2?

—Under section 2.

8782. Right. We are talking now about what the Red Cross actually did with the money it received from the Government on certain conditions. The Government assisted the Society with money on condition that it be put into this account—is that right?

—Yes.

8783. Well, now, the next thing in your statement that you published on 30th October—have you got a copy, Mrs. Barry?

—I am not sure I have.

8784. There are so many papers that it is difficult.

—Yes, I have a copy.

8785. The third paragraph reads: “Accordingly, the Society received written instructions from the Department of Finance”— I suppose that should be, ‘received money on condition’—“to transfer moneys, as publicly announced, to bank accounts in Clones and Baggot Street, Dublin, in the names of three persons with whom the Red Cross had no previous connection whatever. This the Society did ...”

8786. I can find no record of money being transferred to accounts in three names in Baggot Street. All the transferring to Baggot Street was transferred either to the manager of Baggot Street or to funds of various descriptions—the Belfast Fund for the Relief of Distress, or something rather different.

—Mr. Chairman, may I change one word in the third paragraph?

8787. Chairman.—Yes.

—The Society received written “requests”, instead of “instructions”.

8788. Deputy FitzGerald.—Wait, now. We have just agreed it was not a request, but assistance to the Society under conditions, under Section 2. I am afraid this does not fit in with a request to you to transfer money.

—You were coming to another point, and I am sorry I interrupted.

8789. The point is, you state here that you received written instructions to transfer the money to bank accounts in the names of three persons. The fact is that these three persons were, in fact, Messrs. F, G and H. Is that not right?

—That was for Clones.

8790. What were the three names given to you, if any, for Baggot Street?

—We were told the account was to be transferred from Clones to Baggot Street.

8791. But you did not transfer any money to Baggot Street in the names of F, G and H, although you say here you had written instructions to this effect?

—No. We transferred, we changed the transfer from Clones to Baggot Street but we had no names for Baggot Street at all.

8792. But you just said “the same names”. You said in your statement here, you had written instructions to transfer the moneys to bank accounts in these two places in the names of these three persons, in Clones and Baggot Street. The point is where it went wrong. The fact is, the money did not get into an account in the names of three persons, F, G and H, in Baggot Street. It did in Clones, but when it came to Baggot Street, you are going to the bank manager with a letter which did not tell you what to do with it, but presumably there was some conversation. The first payment—am I wrong in that? Have you got the first letter about Baggot Street? If I can track that down, what was the date? Baggot Street, £7,500 was the sum, on November 12th?

—On November 10th.

8793. Yes. The letter, what does it say?

—The letter, from the Department of the Minister for Finance:

Dear Miss Murphy,

The Minister would appreciate if you would transfer a sum of £7,500 to the Munster and Leinster Bank, Baggot Street, Dublin, today, if possible.

The cheque should be made payable to the bank and the covering note addressed to Mr. William Walsh, Deputy Manager.

At your convenience please, perhaps you would complete and return the attached receipt to me.

That is signed by Mr. Fagan.

8794. That is right. So that, in fact, you were not requested to lodge that money in the account in the three names?

—No.

8795. At least, if you were, that must have been done verbally but no written instruction was given to send it under cover to Mr. Walsh?

—Well, we understood it was the same. Mr. Fagan telephoned Miss Murphy that morning about this.

8796. And he said to send it to Mr. Walsh, because the account was being transferred—is that the position?

—That is the position.

8797. I see. So that, in fact, where the thing went wrong it was not, as far as that payment was concerned, your fault in any sense, because instead of putting it in the names of F, G and H, it was to be sent to Mr. Walsh, you understood?

—We understood it was.

8798. Your subsequent payments, none were made out to F, G or H at any stage?

—No they were not. They were transfers to the bank.

8799. That is, I think, perhaps because the requests you got from the Department of Finance after that were simply to transfer it to the Munster and Leinster Bank, without specifying, and you presumed it was the same people and the same account, or else they asked you to transfer it to the Belfast Refugee Aid Fund. You were not ever asked, in a letter from the Department of Finance, to transfer any money from those three names?

—No.

8800. This explains why you did not.

—We were not told any names, but the Munster and Leinster Bank, Baggot Street.

8801. I thought your statement in this respect was a bit confusing, and perhaps a little unfair to you.

—No. I will tell you about the statement. I hope that the Press here will not be annoyed by my saying this. When the Press want to know something, they generally start at 11 o’clock at night on the telephone.

8802. We have all had that experience.

—And they do not let a finger off until 2 o’clock in the morning. Luckily, my husband is slightly deaf, but to me it is a penance to have this going on, and I never answer it, you see. The night before I issued this statement this had happened. The finger went on the buzzer at eleven o’clock and did not come off until two. Well, then, at eight o’clock in the morning I said to myself, “This will start again”, so I had to answer it. I answered it at half past eight and I said to the young man who phoned me that I would issue a statement within half an hour. I rang Miss Murphy and told her that a reporter had been on to me and that I was making out a statement. I dictated it over the phone to her and she had it typed and handed to the papers. Now, in my hurry, perhaps I overlooked the fact that I had said “in the names of the three persons.” That explains that, and I would say that it is a most human——

8803. Yes, of course, and perhaps it is as well that it should be clarified, because through this inadvertent error, in those circumstances, you are really suggesting——

—That I knew the three names.

8804. Which, of course, you did not at all?

—No, I did not. Thanks for accepting my statement, at any rate.

8805. Oh, yes, thank you. Now, may I refer to what Miss Murphy said to the police. Do you have it there?

—Yes.

8806. I think this would help also to clarify the answer to Question 5. We might as well clear it up at the same time.

—This is when Mr. Fleming came to us?

8807. Do you have her answer there. Question 5?

—I have:

Question 5: “From the 10th November onwards, were sums of money transferred from the Northern Ireland Relief Expenditure (Grant-in-Aid) to the Number 2 account of the Irish Red Cross Society and later transferred by the Irish Red Cross Society to the “Relief Committee of Belfast Fund for the Relief of Distress”, in the names of: John White, John Loughran and Roger Murphy, at the Munster and Leinster Bank Ltd., 2 Lower Baggot Street, Dublin 2? What was the total amount transferred to the above account at the Munster and Leinster Bank, 2 Lower Baggot Street, by this arrangement?” And Miss Murphy’s answer is: “No”.

8808. That was what puzzled me at first, but perhaps the explanation is, first of all, she was asked two questions which she could not possibly answer by “Yes” or “No”.

—I am delighted to hear you say that, because some people do that.

8809. But the explanation of “No”, would you suggest the explanation is that she was asked if she lodged it in the names of the three people and of course she had not, so she said “No”?

—Yes.

8810. That, again, clarifies that misunderstanding there.

8811. You mentioned earlier that it is quite a normal procedure for the Government to request you to provide money for relief in different parts of the world and assist you financially to do so. What you do in these circumstances is to forward the money to the Red Cross Society in that particular country. Has there been any precedent for sending money in this way to bodies other than Red Cross Societies?

—There was one during the 1939—1945 War. I was not on the executive of the Society at that time, but a request came from the Government to transfer £100,000 to a Vatican relief fund for the relief of distress in Italy and it was transferred on the same system. I do not know whether it was spent on Chianti or cigarettes and matches, but it went out, and I do not think there was a Government commission held to find out what happened to it.

8812. It has not since been suggested that the Vatican spent it on guns, anyway?

—I never heard, because I do not follow these things up.

8813. Or even on pikes for the Swiss Guard?

—I like to live in peace.

8814. We have that precedent but that——?

—That is the only one I can remember.

8815. When this request came to provide money and put it into the names of three individuals, were you at all concerned about this, because in so far as you have said now the money was assistance to the Society, the Society’s responsibility is engaged as to what happens and when you were asked to provide money uniquely to three individuals, which I think is not in the same category as a Vatican relief fund, were you concerned at all about this or what steps did you think it proper to take to follow it up and to make sure that, in these extraordinary circumstances, the money would be properly used?

—I do not think I reacted to having a follow up at all, because I assumed that I was dealing with honourable people, decent people and that I would not be doing any wrong by transferring it. As a matter of fact, the people in the Clones account— I never heard their names. I do not know them.

8816. I understand that. Miss Murphy mentions in her submission—I cannot track it down at the moment—but there was a reference to the fact that all those payments were notified to your executive?

—Yes, they were.

8817. And to the finance committee?

—Well, the treasurer is a member of the executive, and if a meeting of the finance committee is held before the executive, it is notified to the finance committee.

8818. But not otherwise—some of these payments might not have been notified to the finance committee?

—No, some of them might not have been, but they would have been reported to the executive.

8819. And some of them would have been reported to the finance committee?

—Yes. If a finance committee meeting is held before an executive meeting, then all the income and expenditure is explained to them.

8820. I take it that these payments would be minuted in the minutes of the executive and of the finance committee?

—The totals would, yes.

8821. At any given meeting of the executive, the total sum transferred through this channel since the last executive would be notified?

—Would be notified, yes.

8822. But not necessarily with—the breakdown?

—Not necessarily.

8823. But the minutes do record, first of all, the fact that this exercise was being engaged in and secondly, the sums that were paid through?

—Yes.

8824. I see. We will be able to see the minutes—you have not got them here, obviously, but we can see them in due course. Was there any different treatment in your account, or in the executive, or in the minutes, for these Government moneys and the moneys you were getting from the public for Northern Ireland or were they both treated the same?

—They were treated in the same general way. Money that went to the chiefs of religious groups—I suppose you call them hierarchies—that could have come from part of our own and part of the other, and then of course we used money on the transport of the refugees and for their rail fare back to Belfast and so on.

8825. These decisions about providing the money—were these made initially at officer level or executive level, or at officer level and approved at executive level?

—At officer level.

8826. And approved—minuted and approved by the executive?

—Yes.

8827. Finally, we have raised the question of the relations with the Red Cross and there is this note we have of “Relations with National Societies with one another and with International Red Cross agencies,” You probably have a copy of that—it is Chapter IV, section 7, subsection 1, from the hands of the International Red Cross?

—I have not. (Copy handed to witness). Yes, it is section 7—“Relations of National Societies with One Another.”

8828. Because of this section, when the Minister first spoke to you about this, you got in touch with the British Red Cross and went to see them about it?

—Yes.

8829. What transpired from these discussions—they did not agree?

—We phoned to London and asked them to meet us. We flew over on Tuesday morning, I think, or Wednesday morning, Miss Murphy and I, and we met three representatives of the executive of the British Red Cross and one of their officials and we told them—at least I told them—the situation and about our anxiety to help. I suggested to them that it would be a good idea, were they to agree to Irish-English or English-Irish teams working in distressed areas, and I said I thought it would be very good for the status of both national Societies because it would show that whatever ill-wind was up in the Six Counties did not exist between national Societies and they said they would have to have a meeting of their procedure committee and they would advise, in due course, the result. I said to them that we did not need any financial help, nor did we need goods, but we wished to have these combined teams. It was five days after that we got a note to say that they had sufficient personnel and materials in the Six-Counties to deal with the situation and we let it drop at that, but we continued to send food and bedding and all the remainder to the distressed areas ourselves.

8830. Sent them direct?

—Yes, and I told them we would, and they did not object to that at all. It was the combined team they did not like.

8831. Were you in correspondence with them at that stage? When you say you told them that, did you write and say it?

—It was verbal.

8832. Could you say exactly what you told them you were going to do?

—I made a statement at an international conference at Istanbul afterwards and this is a short report of it.

At the XXIst international conference of the Red Cross in Istanbul in September, 1969 the chairman of the Irish Red Cross Society made a statement. In it she stated that on 20th August, 1969 accompanied by the general-secretary of the Irish Society, she had met officials of the British Red Cross Society in London to see whether it would be possible for the two Societies to agree on combined Red Cross relief teams of Irish/British personnel. On 27th August, 1969 she received a letter from the British Society informing her that the Society had sufficient supplies and personnel to meet the situation. The chairman then went on to say: “I took no further action with the Society concerned, but arranged that our supplies and money would be sent direct to the striken areas through the leaders of the major religious denominations. My Society will continue to channel supplies and funds in this way for the relief of distress in the North as long as the need continues.” That is part of what I stated.

8833. But you said there you took no further action with the Society concerned. I understood you to say that you had notified the Society verbally. Do you mean you had notified them through this international meeting?

—No. We told them before we left London that we would continue to channel this stuff where they allowed the teams to operate.

8834. Through the heads of religious denominations?

—Yes.

8835. Yes, I see. But did you at any stage tell them that you were channelling money through this committee who were not members of the British Society?

—Well, it had not arisen at that time.

8836. When it did arise subsequently— you had told the International Red Cross and the British Society of your intention to channel supplies and relief through the heads of religious denominations and I think that would be taken to mean through them and through them only. When you decided to channel it, at the request of the Government, to these individuals, you did not notify the International Red Cross or the British Red Cross at that time of the change of this plan?

—But I do not think it was—it is not necessary for me to notify the British Red Cross of everything that the Irish Society does. It might have been a different matter for me, but I did speak to the representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross at this meeting at Istanbul and I told them the whole situation.

8837. Well, what you told them then was that you were sending relief through the heads of religious denominations and intended continuing to do so, whereas, what happened in October was there was a change and very much larger sums were given, or transferred, to this committee of three people. Do you not feel that the International Committee of the British Red Cross might have taken, from what you said, that you would be confining your efforts to religious denominations unless you told them otherwise?

—No. I did not imagine so, because I met them afterwards; I met them last year in Geneva at an executive meeting of the Red Cross and the British Red Cross did not raise any question with me and the International Committee only wished to know how the matter was developing from the whole national point of view, in the Six Counties. But there was no comment at all on the money that was transferred to——

8838. Yes. In proceeding in this way of changing from the heads of religious denominations to this other account, you would not feel that you were at variance with the requirements of this Chapter 7, which provides that you should operate always with the agreement of the International Red Cross, in the third paragraph?

—Well, I concluded that was only really regarding personnel working together.

8839. Sorry?

—I concluded that was really referring to personnel rather than goods?

8840. Personnel?

—Hmmm.

8841. You see, it provides: (Section read). It does not say anything about personnel, as such?

8842. Deputy Keating.—It is quite explicit.

—Well, I did not do anything about notifying them, because I thought that the situation, the Six County situation, was an extraordinary situation and this was for ordinary routine work.

8843. Deputy FitzGerald.—I see. Right. Thank you very much, Mrs. Barry.

8844. Dr. Gibbons.—In the case of a disaster in a foreign country, do you, on your own initiative, make aid available to them, or do you wait until you are requested?

—Well, if it is a very serious one, when I hear it on the radio or read it in the papers, I ring Miss Murphy, you see, from my home and I suggest to her—I say to her, if the disaster now is a very heavy one, we should send £5,000 worth—send £5,000 immediately to the International, or to the League of Red Cross Societies, for relief in the stricken area, but I always instruct her to ring the other three honorary officers to get their consent and that is routine. Then, if the situation is a very, very large one, we wait for the League of Red Cross Societies to send us a telegram and they do; they send a telegram to all national societies and they state what kind of goods are needed, and so on, and then we comply with their request.

8845. If, at that time, your number 2 account was low in funds, would you seek funds from the Government at that stage?

—If—I think I said that to the Chairman —if our funds were low in the emergency relief fund we would report to the Department of Defence—remember, Defence is the one we always work under—we would report to the Department of Defence that we wanted to send £5,000 and that we have only £3,000 and then they would reimburse us what we had paid out of the emergency relief fund during the previous 12 months.

8846. You mentioned, I think, in the 1940s that you sent money to the Vatican at the request of the Government. Would there be any other occasion, or would this be the only one, where, at the request of the Government, or the Department of External Affairs, or the Department of Defence, that you sent money to any country. In other words, say, following a debate in the Dáil, or a question in the Dáil, or somebody approaching the Government, would the Government make money available to you and suggest to you that you send this on to a particular foreign country?

—Yes, they would.

8847. Have there been many occasions this happened?

—Well, looking past, over the past records, I found the only one was the large amount I mentioned to Mr. FitzGerald. There were other small amounts to a few countries—Greece, I think, oh, yes—in India also. You see, if the question was raised in the Dáil by some member from the floor stating that the destitution was very severe in such and such a place, then the Government would, the Department of Defence, would suggest, would tell us that they were sending us £5,000 or £4,000, or whatever it would be, to send to the stricken area.

8848. You would send on the amount you got from them to the particular——?

—We would send on the amount to the League of Red Cross Societies or to the Red Cross Society of the country concerned.

8849. Go raibh maith agat.

—Ná habair é.

8850. Deputy Keating.—Mrs. Barry, I want to refer to your statement, not the statement but the replies to questions which you made to, I think it was Chief Superintendent Fleming?

—Mr. Fleming.

8851. Chief Superintendent Fleming?

—Yes.

8852. You say that you met Mr. Haughey on 18th August. You had come from Cork to Dublin in the train on that morning, which was a Sunday, I think? Is that correct?

—No, Saturday evening. I explained to the Chairman that it was on the 16th August that the Minister phoned me and asked me to come up and that was on a Saturday and I came up that night.

8853. Did you go to his home then?

—I beg your pardon.

8854. Were the discussions in the Minister’s home?

—No, no. I never was near Mr. Haughey’s home.

8855. I see. You met him somewhere in Dublin on that Sunday?

—No, I met him in his office.

8856. In his office?

—That is where he told me to go.

8857. I see, and you said, at his request, to discuss relief. Now were you concerned in that discussion—you know, this could have a number of aspects—were you concerned to discuss the mechanism of transmitting the relief or the sort of relief that was necessary?

—No. We did not discuss anything like that because I must say that, when I go to see people on business, I am very short about it. I get through the business very rapidly and I get out of the situation. I just had a discussion with him about sending relief to the North.

8858. About the mechanism of doing it?

—No. No mechanism was discussed at all.

8859. But if you did not discuss a mechanism and if you did not discuss what they needed, then what did you discuss—you know, the content?

—Well, from my own experience I would know what was needed in a desolated area.

8860. Yes, but I am trying to find out —you know, if you did not discuss how it was going to be sent up there and you did not discuss what was going to be sent, I do not see what else there was to discuss and I am concerned to know the content of this discussion with Mr. Haughey.

—The content of the discussion was that I said we were very anxious ourselves——

8861. Yes?

——to send up goods and materials to the two stricken areas—one was the Bogside and the other was Belfast—and that I knew that immediately that we would say that we were going to send up stuff that we would be inundated with clothing and bedding and that happened, that actual day, when we announced in the Press that we were. People came in with bedding and clothing and all and we started to transfer to the two religious groups.

8862. This is an account of your activities that day and subsequently, but I am concerned to know what you discussed with him?

—I discussed with him sending relief to the victims in the Six Counties.

8863. Was the fact of the difficulties that subsequently arose in regard to functioning inside the Six Counties raised on that occasion?

—No, never.

8864. Did you take it for granted then that you could function freely inside the Six Counties?

—I took it for granted that there was nothing to prevent me sending goods and food up to the Six Counties.

8865. Did the question of a joint team with the British Red Cross arise at that time?

—No, I didn’t mention that to him because it was the day after I had talked with him that I thought of this.

8866. It wasn’t a matter of personnel then, it was a matter of sending materials?

—That’s right.

8867. Did the question of sending money arise on that occasion?

—No. There was nothing specific, only that I said we would do our best, now; our best could mean sending money, or it could mean sending goods and clothing and we would find out the places to where we could send it best, where it would be most useful.

8868. Was there any previous record of the Irish Red Cross having worked inside the Six Counties?

—No.

8869. You did not anticipate any difficulty in doing so?

—No, I didn’t. I knew that many of our members came from Belfast and Derry and that I had only to ask them to tell me to whom I could send stuff and they would tell me.

8870. But am I to be clear that no discussion of money arose on that occasion, of the transfer of money?

—None, whatever. You see, the first idea of transfer of money is given on Miss Murphy’s statement, where she said she was asked by the Minister on 7th October.

8871. Yes, I have seen that, but I was trying to find out if there had been any previous occasion?

—None whatever.

8872. Question Three of the same statement of yours says: “Were you aware of the identity of the persons operating this account”—this is the Clones account?

—Yes.

8873. I understood you to say in reply to Deputy FitzGerald just now, at the end of your testimony, you said: “I never heard the names of the people in the Clones account”. Was I right in thinking that you said that?

—No, I said I never met them. I had no knowledge of them.

8874. I see. But you say at the time the money was first made available—this is your reply—“I was made aware of the fact that F, G and H were the responsible persons?”

—That is right.

8875. By whom?

—By a letter from—oh, it was Miss Murphy telephoned me.

8876. By word of mouth from Miss Murphy?

—Yes.

8877. Did the names mean anything or nothing or much or little to you?

—Nothing. They meant nothing to me.

8878. Nothing?

—Nothing and they don’t even mean anything to me today.

8879. Yes. Question Nine of the same statement: “As far as you are aware, was any of this money used for any other purpose”—I am reading it as it is—“other than that it was explicitly intended”?

—And my answer was “No; I am not aware.”

8880. Yes. Now, Mrs. Barry, you were first approached on 21st July by Chief Superintendent Fleming and this reply came from you on 17th September?

—That’s right.

8881. Which is almost two months, and on 17th September the country was on the running to the arms trial?

—You see, when Chief Superintendent— I must get his name accurately now—Chief Superintendent Fleming came in—he rang Miss Murphy one day and he asked if he could see her and me. Miss Murphy phoned me and I came up from Cork and Mr. Fleming and, I think, Detective Inspector Doucey came in with him. Now, the two of them sat down and I said to them, did they wish to see us about something and they said yes. And then I said to them: “Well, tell us what you want”. So they said they wanted to know this that and the other and then I said to them: “Well, I must inform you that I will not answer any questions unless that they are given to me in writing and the same goes for Miss Murphy”. Well, then they said that they would send them back to us and I had to submit those to an executive meeting before I could—I submitted the questions and then I submitted the answers to the executive; so that was the cause of the delay and we don’t have a meeting of the executive in the month of August. So it had to wait then until September and that is the explanation. But I must say that when Mr. Fleming got them, he didn’t raise any question about the delay.

8882. No, that’s fine, but the point I was making was that there had been a fairly lengthy period of time to think it over.

—Well, we don’t meet in August; we have a recess like the Dáil.

8883. I appreciate that, but even though it was after the dismissals, after the long debate and shortly—it was the same month as the arms trial—you said that as far as you were aware there was not any of this money used from any purpose other than for what it was explicitly intended and you were able to say “no” without qualification to that question in September?

—Well, what time—how was I to know between July and September?

8884. Well, if you didn’t, a lot of information had already come out in May. There had been some Ministerial dismissals. There had been quite a crisis about this, and a major national crisis and some cases were pending which everybody knew was pending. The question that interests me is that you were able to give a total and unequivocal “no”.

—I hope you are not assuming that I held back this reply until after the trial?

8885. No, I recognise you gave it before the trial, Mrs. Barry; I am not suggesting that for a moment. I am suggesting that in approximately eight weeks there was plenty of time to think about the questions and I am commenting on the fact, asking you to comment on the fact that you were able to answer that question with an explicit “no”, without any qualification.

—Well, I never qualify. You see, the first part of the question is the main part of the question to me and it is, “As far as you are aware …”. Therefore, my answer is negative, “no”.

8886. As far as you were aware in September?

—Yes. There is no use in—never trim an answer.

8887. With that thought Mrs. Barry, perhaps I should go on to your dealing with the British Red Cross and with the International Red Cross. You told us that you didn’t in any way follow up your discussions with the British Red Cross when they indicated they had enough people?

—That’s right.

8888. You didn’t raise the matter as it is laid down in this section on the relations of national societies that disputes can be submitted to the International Red Cross. You didn’t go to Geneva or do anything like that to take it any further?

—No, I didn’t.

8889. But you made a statement in Istanbul?

—Well, the following week, you see, the meeting was at Istanbul, 20th August.

8890. So you went to Istanbul and said you were preparing to distribute funds through the leaders of the major religious denominations. This was in August and, then, in October you undertook to distribute funds through Messrs. F, G and H even though you never heard of them. When Miss Murphy told you their names, I take it you did not think they were leaders of the major religious denominations? Their names meant nothing to you? You did not know them?

—No, I did not know them.

8891. But you did recognise they were not leaders of the major religious denominations?

—There are certain leaders of religious organisations or groups who are Mr. This or Mr. That. They are not Reverend.

8892. Did you think that Messrs. F, G or H were leaders of the major religious denominations?

—I did not think of what they were, to tell you the truth.

8893. But you thought they might have been?

—It did not dawn on me to question one name.

8894. Yes, but you had given an assurance, which you did not ever alter, that you were distributing the money through the leaders of the major religious demoninations. You left the British Society in the position of believing that, when in fact, you were not making a distribution of money in that way?

—I gave no assurance to the British Red Cross. At the time of seeing them, I do not think I had given any money to religious organisations. I went to see the British Red Cross people on 20th August and, at that time, we had not given a penny to anyone.

8895. All right, but you used the phrase that you proposed distributing the money through the leaders of the major religious denominations. Is that not correct? That was the phrase you read out. I did not know about the content of your statement in Istanbul until you read it here?

—I took no further action with the Society concerned—the British Society—but arranged that our supplies and money would be sent to the stricken areas through the leaders of the major religious denominations and will continue to channel supplies and funds in this way for the relief of distress in the North——

8896. “will continue to channel relief in this way”—this being through the leaders of the major religious denominations. Then, within two months, you channelled it in another way without informing the British Society?

—A person can make a decision on 20th August but circumstances may make one alter it on 20th November.

8897. Of course, but you used the phrase “will continue to do so” but when you changed your mind you did not notify the British Society. In this section relating to national societies with one another it is stated explicitly that:

No Red Cross Society shall have any activity in a foreign country without the consent of the central committee of the national society in the country.

—I did not notify the British Red Cross but I talked to them afterwards about it and also to members of the International Red Cross but there was no question raised.

8898. Did they know that Messrs, F, G and H were not leaders of major religious denominations?

—I do not believe they knew anything about them, just like myself.

8899. Has there been any query since from the International Red Cross?

—None whatever.

8900. Chairman.—I take it that in the past you have received most of your State funds from the Department of Defence?

—Most of the Emergency Relief Fund.

8901. In that particular year also there was a substantial amount voted?

—Yes.

8902. Were there ever follow-up instructions or details from the Minister in relation to moneys which you got previously from the Department as to how you would dispose of that money in the same detail as there was in this case?

—No. When the money is voted in the Dáil it is stated publicly that so much is set aside in the Estimates for the Irish Red Cross Society. We try to keep our Emergency Relief Fund at about £2,000 or £3,000 and this comes to us annually from the Department of Defence. There was no question ever as to how it should be used. If we use it to relieve any area where there is disaster or anything, we notify the Department of Defence immediately that we have done this. In fact a member of the staff of the Department of Defence is on our Executive. He acts as liaison between us and the Department.

8903. I am trying to get your attitude on this matter: if the Minister transfers money to you from public funds with suggestions in some detail as to the disposal of the money, would you consider that you were under obligation or under request to manipulate these funds as suggested?

—I would do exactly as I was asked and the Executive agree with that.

8904. You would regard it as a directive?

—I would accept the honesty of the Minister who sent me the request. Perhaps I am very foolish but I am not built to be suspicious and if the Minister for Defence sent £3,000 to the Society and said he considered it should be used in Istanbul, Pakistan, Nigeria or elsewhere, we would comply with his suggestion but I would never think for one moment that he was anxious to do anything illegal in Pakistan or in Nigeria.

8905. Apart from legality, did you consider at any time that the direction you got in this particular case as to the disposal of these funds were in any way in breach of Red Cross autonomy?

—No, I did not. I think I answered Deputy FitzGerald on that. I did not think it was a breach of the autonomy of the Society at all. I may tell you that I hold very high the dignity of the Society.

8906. But you were satisfied about this?

—I was satisfied about it.

8907. Thank you, Mrs. Barry.

Miss Mary Bridget Murphy (General Secretary, Irish Red Cross Society) sworn and examined.

8908. Deputy FitzGerald.—Would you tell us about your discussions with the Minister on 7th October?

—It is exactly as in the statement I have submitted. I got a telephone call requesting me to go to the Minister’s office. I went over and the Minister explained that he had this information about people who were in considerable distress in the North and would the Society make money available and transfer it to this joint account in Clones. I came back and informed the Chairman and, following approval, I made arrangements for the transfer of the money.

8908a. He told you of these three names?

—Yes.

8909. He told you the account would be in their names?

—Yes.

8910. Is there anything you would like to add to what Mrs. Barry has said?

—No, except to say that our sole aim is to help in distress and that we would consider that this money was being used to help relieve distress.

8911. Deputy Keating.—On the 7th October Mr. Haughey said to you there were people in distress. You wanted to transfer money to the North. Money had already been sent to Dr. Farren in Derry, to the Northern Bank, Andersonstown, Belfast et cetera, a number of places in Derry, Belfast and different places in Northern Ireland. Was any reason given why, when it was intended to transfer considerable quantities of money to Northern Ireland for the relief of distress, Clones was chosen?

—Yes, there were people who were not getting any relief whatsoever.

8912. It was the location of Clones specifically that I was interested in. Why Clones?

—I do not know anything about that except that it was possibly convenient for the people in whose name the account was. There was no reason given to me as to why Clones was being used except perhaps to facilitate the people in whose name the account was.

8913. You were given the names of Messrs. F, G and H. Had you heard of them previously?

—I knew two of their names but I never met anyone of them.

8914. But you knew they were all resident in Northern Ireland I take it?

—Yes.

8915. Yet this bank account was inside the jurisdiction, as the phrase is, in Clones, inside the Republic. Did you take it that this was simply a straightforward case?

—I took it that this was simply a straightforward case because we had received various letters from pepole saying because of discrimination they had to leave their jobs and they were not getting any kind of relief. I took it that it was probably to help people like that.

8916. It was the Minister who was the source of those three names to you?

—Yes.

8917. Then, in your answer to question five you were able to answer “no” because of the nature of the question. You were asked “from the 10th November onwards were sums of money transferred in the names of White, Loughran and Roger Murphy” and you said “no”. Let me ask the question down to the comma which says “the Relief Committee for the Belfast Fund for the relief of distress”. If we ask you the question “From the 10th November, 1969 onwards were sums of money transferred from the Northern Ireland Relief Expenditure Grant-in-Aid to the number two account of the Irish Red Cross Society and later transferred by the Irish Red Cross Society to the Relief Committee of Belfast for the relief of distress” what is the answer to that question?

—Yes.

8918. You were able to say “no” after eight weeks of consideration without modification of that answer “no”?

—Yes.

8919. Just “no” by itself?

—Yes.

8919a. If you were concerned to aid Chief Superintendent Fleming would you not have thought it helpful to him and helpful to the State, on whose behalf he was acting, to have indicated further information to him?

—I took it he would have come back with further questions if he required further clarification.

8920. You said you would not answer questions unless they were submitted in writing. You got a submission in writing and you chose to answer with one syllable in a way that I think probably confused everybody who read that answer. It certainly confused me and I have no doubt it confused Chief Superintendant Fleming. I hope it was not intended to confuse?

—It was not intended to confuse.

8921. Would you not have thought you might have been of a little assistance by saying that the names of White, Loughran and Murphy were not known to you but that the transfers occurred from the Grant-in-Aid to your account to the Belfast Committee for the relief of distress. I know one does not automatically volunteer information to the police when they ask questions but it does seem to me a little unreasonable to have answered that question with one syllable which though formally true was indeed deeply misleading?

—I did not intend it to be misleading. I just answered that we did not transfer money in those names.

8922. Both things are in the question. You were asked, firstly, about the transfer and, secondly, in the names and by answering “no” it seems to me you were very close to the line of confusing people?

—The subsequent questions show that we did transfer money but not in those names because again those names were mentioned in a further question. They asked there did we transfer money and was it on written or telephone conversations.

8923. Yes, but where do the subsequent questions, which indicate that you did transfer moneys, occur? Have you got the questions?

—Yes. Were all the business arrangements between Mr. Fagan and yourself conducted in writing or by telephone? That is one. Did the Minister ever contact you in relation to the distribution of the above-mentioned funds? Did Mr. Fagan inform you that he was making arrangements regarding the transfers?

8924. Yes, but when they asked you if you transferred the money you said “no”. I draw attention to it because it certainly threw me, and, I have no doubt it threw Chief Superintendent Fleming. This was at a time when an arms trial was in course of preparation. I think it was worth referring.

8925. Deputy FitzGerald.—May I just ask a question to clear up one point? Did you ever meet Captain Kelly?

—No.

8926. That is what I thought but I thought it was no harm to clear that up.

8927. Chairman.—Thank you Miss Murphy.

Miss Murphy withdrew.

The Committee deliberated.

The Committee adjourned at 4.30 p.m. until 11 a.m. on Wednesday, 24th February, 1971.