Committee Reports > List of Committees > Dáil > 1971 > Committee of Public Accounts > Final Report - Northern Ireland Relief Expenditure

MIONTUAIRISC NA FIANAISE

(Minutes of Evidence)

Dé Céadaoin, 17 Feabhra, 1971

Wednesday, 17th February, 1971

The Committee met at 11 a.m.

DEPUTY P. HOGAN in the chair.

ORDER OF DÁIL OF 1st DECEMBER, 1970.

Mr. E. F. Suttle (An tArd-Reachtaire Cuntas agus Ciste) was in attendance in an advisory capacity.

The Committee deliberated.

Mr. Pádraig Haughey, sworn and examined.

7838. Chairman.—Mr. Haughey, as you know, we are investigating the question of the expenditure of a Grant-in-Aid of £100,000, and, owing to statements that have been made about the alleged importation of arms, I want to ask you a few questions in general in which you may be able to help us?

—With respect, Mr. Chairman, my name is Pádraig Haughey. I reside at 25 Foxfield Avenue, Raheny, Dublin 3. I am aged 38, married—with one child. I wish to make a statement on oath. On the 29th January, 1971, I received a letter, a registered letter, which was notice to produce to the Committee of Public Accounts all documents in my possession touching on the matters into which the Committee was inquiring. These alleged documents were to be produced before the 22nd January, 1971, and, on the following Monday, I received a letter from the Clerk of the Committee extending the time to produce these alleged documents to the 8th February, 1971, and apologising for the mistake to the date for final production of documents in the original letter. On the 6th February, 1971, I received, by register post, a witness summons signed by Garret FitzGerald, member of the Committee. I am here in answer to this summons. I have not now, nor had I ever, any documents or copy documents which would or could in any way relate to the matters presently being investigated by this Committee. I wish to state that I never, directly or indirectly, got in touch or sought to get in touch with Mr. C. J. Haughey in order that he would authorise customs clearance of any guns, ammunition or materials of any nature or description, nor did he ever indicate to me what his attitude would be if such requests were made to him as the matter never arose between us. Again, referring to reports, which I have read, of alleged evidence given before this Committee, I definitely state I never received or gave money, or received or gave any cheque, or any valuable security in the name of George Dixon; nor did I ever use the name of George Dixon in any connexion with any financial or banking dealings.

I also wish to state that no moneys from the Grant-in-Aid for Northern Ireland Relief issued from subhead J, Vote 16, Miscellaneous Expenses for 1969/70, were ever paid to me, nor did I ever have any control over any of these moneys; nor had I ever any say in the disbursement of this money. Further, I wish to state positively that my brother, Charles Haughey, never discussed the moneys voted for Northern Ireland relief with me until I— until after I had received the subpoena to attend before this Committee. I now wish to state that the reasons why I am not prepared to be examined by the Committee are as follows:

I am advised by my lawyers that Statute No. 22 of 1970, The Committee of Public Accounts of Dáil Éireann (Privilege and Procedure) Act, 1970, does not give any privilege or immunity to any newspaper, periodical, radio or television which publishes any evidence allegedly given by a witness before this Committee. At present my legal advisers are considering my position in civil law as a result of the reports of alleged evidence already given by witnesses here in so far as that alleged evidence relates to me personally. I am advised that by giving evidence before this Committee I might be liable in civil law and under the laws of the land for any answer I might make. I wish to state that, while I appreciate that the laws of evidence may well be stretched by a non-legal body, such as this, nevertheless I am not prepared to submit to examination arising out of so-called principles of justice. I am advised that, because of the publicity already given to allegations not based on best evidence or admissions made against me I am entitled as of right, to make this sworn statement and I am further advised not to answer any questions for the reasons already given. I have copies now which I will hand out to you all.

7839. Deputy E. Collins.—Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that we go into private session?

7840. Chairman.—Is that agreed?

7841. Deputy Treacy.—Agreed.

7842. Deputy Nolan.—Agreed.

Mr. Haughey—With respect, Mr. Chairman, I do not see why that is necessary.

7843. Chairman.—That is a matter for the Committee, Mr. Haughey.

—I take it, then, that I am dismissed?

7844. Chairman.—No, you may not take that. So far you have indicated—you have given us a statement here which we wish to look at in private session and as I understand from this statement, so far as you have read it out already, you are not prepared to answer any questions or give any evidence and, therefore, the Committee wishes to have a look at it. That is fair enough.

—And what is my position, Mr. Chairman?

7845. Chairman.—You will be called in a short while. We will look at this for about maybe 20 minutes or half an hour.

—I am entitled, as of right, to make this sworn statement and I am further advised not to answer any questions for the reasons already given.

7846. Chairman.—Yes. Well, you are following that advice, are you?

—That is what I said, Mr. Chairman.

7847. Chairman.—Yes. Right. Very well then. So we go into private session.

—Excuse me. Statements were made in public and published——

7848. Chairman.—You must retire; we are going into private session.

—I must retire?

7849. Chairman.—And we will let you know. We will probably be in private session for a half an hour or so.

—Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Committee went into private session at 12.05 p.m. and resumed public session at 12.50 p.m.

Examination of Mr. Pádraig Haughey continued.

7850. Chairman.—Mr. Haughey, do you accept the authority of this Committee of Public Accounts of Dáil Éireann to conduct this investigation?

—I must refer you to my statement, Mr. Chairman. I have stated in my sworn evidence everything relevant to this Committee.

7851. I do not understand.

—I have made a sworn statement, and everything in that is relevant to the inquiry that is taking place here.

7852. You have accepted the authority of this Committee to summons witnesses by the fact that you are here.

—I was supoened to come in here.

7853. Further to that, do you accept the authority of this Committee to examine witnesses attending before it?

—Again I must repeat myself. I have stated in my sworn evidence all things relevant to this inquiry.

7854. Do you then claim the right to refuse to answer any question whatsoever that this Committee of Dáil Éireann may put to you?

—I am further advised—I will read the last sentence—not to answer any questions, for the reasons already given.

7855. Are you aware that in accordance with the Committee of Public Accounts of Dáil Éireann (Privilege and Procedure) Act, 1970.

A witness before the committee and a person sending a document to the committee shall be entitled to the same immunities and privileges as if he were a witness before the High Court.

—I am further advised not to answer any question, for the reasons already given.

7856. I just want to ask you one other question: did you travel by plane to England with Mr. Murnane and others?

—I am further advised not to answer any questions, for the reasons already given.

7857. At this point, Mr. Haughey, I must advise you that

If any person—

(a) on being duly summoned as a witness before the committee makes default in attending, or

(b) being in attendance as a witness before the committee refuses to take an oath or to make an affirmation when legally required by the committee to do so, or to produce any document in his power or control legally required by the committee to be produced by him or to answer any question to which the committee may legally require an answer, or

(c) fails or refuses to send to the committee any document in his power or control legally required by the committee to be sent to it by the person, or

(d) does anything which would, if the committee were a court of justice having power to commit for contempt of court, be contempt of such court,

the committee may certify the offence of that person under the hand of the chairman of the committee to the High Court and the High Court may, after such inquiry as it thinks proper to make, punish or take steps for the punishment of that person in like manner as if he had been guilty of contempt of the High Court.

I thi k it is only fair to warn you that the committee may be obliged to act on that if you continue to refuse to answer questions or give evidence. Are you aware, Mr. Haughey, that the government, at a meeting on 16th August 1969, decided inter alia, that

a sum of money—the amount and the channel of the disbursement of which would be determined by the Minister for Finance—should be made available from the Exchequer to provide aid for the victims of the current unrest in the Six Counties.

—I have made a sworn statement, Mr. Chairman, and everything in it is relevant to your inquiry, as far as in relation to me personally.

7858. And are you aware that on the same date the Government Information Bureau announced that:

the Minister for Finance will make funds available for the relief of victims of the disturbances in the Six Counties and he will have early consultation with the Chairman of the Irish Red Cross.

—I am further advised not to answer any questions, for the reasons already given.

7859. You are refusing to answer that question—would you say “yes” or “no”?

—I am further advised not to answer any questions.

7860. We will take that as a “no”. Thank you very much.

—Thank you Mr. Chairman and Committee. I am free to go?

Mr. Pádraig Haughey withdrew.

The Committee adjourned at 1.0 p.m. until 4.0 p.m.

Colonel Michael Hefferon, Sworn and examined.

The Committee resumed at 5.25 p.m.

7861. Chairman.—Colonel Hefferon, Deputy Collins has something to ask you.

—Colonel Hefferon.—Before we start there are a few small corrections in the transcript of the evidence I gave on the last occasion which might be worth correcting. The first is in Book No. 7, Question 4147, where the figure of “7,500” appears. That figure should be “1,500”. I make the point because it might cause confusion later.

7862. Deputy FitzGerald.—It is very hard to make sense of the sentence. Is it otherwise correct?

—This should be “to Dundalk” instead of “in Dublin”.

7863. The words “because the way” are incorrect. Was it “because it was the day”? It is very hard to make sense of it in its present form.

—It was certainly a weekend in March or early April. I remember this distinctly because an order was given to change 1,500 rifles from Dublin to Dundalk. This is the only occasion on which the number of rifles of this nature came up. The next is in Book No. 8, page 323, Question No. 4262. I do not honestly know what the question was that was being asked by Deputy Barrett, “You mentioned that you phoned Mr. Gibbons about the contents of the Northern paper.”

7864. I had marked that, Mr. Chairman, as possibly an error.

7865. Deputy Barrett.—I do not recall mentioning the Northern paper.

—It does not make sense.

7866. Deputy FitzGerald.—You remember I drew that to your attention.

7867. Deputy Barret.—Yes.

—The next point I would like to raise—I think in fairness to myself I should raise this because it involves my own professional competence in this matter—is that there was a suggestion, I think by Mr. Briscoe, that Captain Kelly was not qualified to be an Intelligence Officer, that he was more in the nature of a private secretary. I did mention the Middle East as a place where he had had experience. I have had occasion to think over these things since then. In fact he did the courses, in common with most officers of his rank, which would qualify him to be in Intelligence.

7868. Deputy Briscoe.—I asked had he taken a formal Intelligence course. I think that was my question.

—To answer that point, the courses the Infantry and Command staff take contain a good deal of Intelligence work and Intelligence instruction.

7869. I was merely asking a question. As I explained to Captain Kelly, I cannot be responsible for the answers given to the questions, but as I am on the subject, is there a separate intelligence course for men in the Intelligence Service?

—Yes, at a lower level.

7870. But there is a formal intelligence course as such?

—Yes, a very short intelligence course.

7871. Captain Kelly did not take that course but took other regular Army courses?——

—The regular Army courses he would take would contain an awful lot more of what would be the more formal part. The junior course is for officers of the level of battalion and below that. I do feel that his experience in the Middle East would add to his professional competency in Intelligence because I received a number of reports from him while he was there which were very useful to us and I think that he has already brought before the Committee, if I am not mistaken, the reports he got from General Od Bull in the Middle East.

7872. He dealt with that last night, as you know?——

—I merely raise the point.

7873. What you are in fact saying is that as far as you are concerned, as his superior officer, you do not wish the impression to go abroad that you had an incompetent man working under you whom you had appointed?

—More to the point, I would not like the impression to go out that I picked Captain Kelly out of a hat. I did not pick Captain Kelly—he was there and he had had some experience in Intelligence before I came there in 1962. The next point I want to raise is in relation to the meeting of 23rd April. I think that again Deputy Briscoe asked a question as to whether we were there to get our stories right.

7874. Would you tell me what volume this is?

—I have not got it, but do you accept that you did, in fact, say that we were there to get our stories right—Mr. Blaney, Mr. Gibbons, myself and Captain Kelly.

7875. I asked you whether, after you had retired from the Service, you had a meeting in Mr. Blaney’s office. I put a question to you asking what was the purpose of your visit there and I may have asked was it to get your stories right?

—I think it is a very grave reflection, taking into account that I had already given evidence as to what transpired at that meeting.

7876-7-8. I think you denied that it was to get any story straight?

—Yes, but I think the question did not arise out of the evidence or any evidence which had given before. The fact that Mr. Gibbons, who was my boss up to a fortnight before, guaranteed …

7879. He was present?

—He was, and certainly the meeting was not to get any stories right.

7880. The question was:

This meeting was really to get your stories agreeing with one another, was it?

and you replied:—

On, no, far from it. The Revenue Commissioners and some civil servants were at this stage being questioned by the Special Branch and nobody seemed to know why exactly, or what they were being questioned about or on whose authority.

The next question was:

Who sent for you—Mr. Blaney himself or was it Captain Kelly who called you and you replied:

Captain Kelly asked me to go.

You were then asked:

Did you have any subsequent meetings?

And you replied:

No.

That was after 23rd April?

—That is right. The point I am making is that I think it is a reflection, a very grave reflection, on me to say that I went to concoct some story or agree to some story.

7881. But you say that Mr. Gibbons was at this meeting?

—Oh, yes, he was.

7882. And who else was at the meeting?

—This came out in Court at both trials.

7883. Who else was at the meeting?

—Mr. Blaney, Captain Kelly, Mr. Gibbons and myself. The last point I have here is that there was a good deal of play about this £250 which I expended on aid to the North and in this connection I would like to say that the people we were dealing with—I want to pay a public tribute to them here—in this office were very fine citizens of this country—some of them, and some of them not within the jurisdiction. They were most helpful. They asked nothing, and indeed the main item of this amount, £100, was sent to them to help them out in the office initially and some office furniture was purchased and sent—the main item of that furniture has been salvaged, I understand, and is being used in a Dublin Barracks. I do not want to go into that any more, but if the Committee feel that further information should be given on this particular item, it can be given, but I do not think we should go into it now.

7884. Chairman.—These are all the points you want to raise?

—Except, Mr. Chairman, that on the last day I think I did raise on a couple of occasions my position in this matter and my position as to giving evidence before the Committee here, that I would possibly infringe matters which deal with national security. To be quite candid, I do not know what my position at all is now because the Official Secrets Act is a sort of cradle to the grave in this respect—even though you leave the service you are still bound. Everybody is bound and, I suppose, in a very particular way I feel that. At the first trial it was made quite clear that privilege was waived by the State and, indeed, on one occasion, when a question on a very sensitive matter was being pressed, the chief prosecutor, the chief counsel for the prosecution, got up and said the State is not claiming privilege. This, I take it, covered me there. I want to know what my position is before this tribunal. Do the same question of privilege that was accorded in the courts—does it apply because matters other than these connected with the trial may be arising?

7885. Chairman.—The position here under the Public Accounts Committee of Dáil Éireann (Privilege and Procedure) Act, 1970, section 3 (2) is:

A witness before the committee and a person sending a document to the committee shall be entitled to the same immunities and privileges as if he were a witness before the High Court.

—I wonder, Chairman—I do not want to be difficult about this—but does this really answer the point? I am aware that a witness, my former Chief of Staff, was here recently and claimed it and was accorded it in a particular matter. I am very sensitive about this thing because the fact of the matter is, if I give evidence here on matters I should not give evidence about, I may find myself this year, or next year, or some other time, hauled before the courts.

7886. It is up to yourself to take advice on matters like that, some legal advice?

—I do not agree, Chairman, at all because the State in the last analysis is responsible for all these proceedings and I think I have a right to seek the Attorney General’s advice on this matter because much more than the question of the rather limited privilege of the court was accorded to me in the arms trial arises in this case. Questions of public policy, which have been, in the main, of security with successive governments over a number of years, arise as to how far one can go in this and how far I can be fair to myself.

7887. Which are you concerned with at the moment, yourself or national security?

—Oh, I am concerned first and foremost with the fact that I do have immunity from any proceedings under the Official Secrets Act and I think that there may be some further matters also arising out of this which certainly I would like to refer to. The Attorney General has, as a matter of fact—when I was first asked for a statement by the Garda Síochána, I refused to give a statement—I raised the question of privilege and I was later served with a notice by the Attorney General giving me immunity for the purposes of the trial, for the purpose of talking about the illegal importation of arms.

7888. What are you looking for now—a similar certificate, is it?

—I understand that the Official Secrets Act is statute law and a breach of it by me before this Committee, or any other committee, might be liable to proceedings at a later stage and I want to be assured that I have this immunity that was accorded specifically in one of the trials anyway.

7889. Colonel Hefferon, I think we will have to proceed and, if any matter arises in which you think you will have to claim privilege, let me know.

—Am I to take it that I can claim privilege in any matter that seem to me one of privilege?

7890. Tell me and I will do the best I can.

—Thank you, Chairman.

7891. Deputy Collins.—The last question I asked you—the second last actually—was about a complaint from the Department of Justice from Mr. Berry in relation to Captain Kelly’s activities. Can you give us any indication as to the nature of the complaints?

—Yes. It was some time, and I am not clear specifically on the date—it could be November —Mr. Gibbons, my Minister, asked me to see him and told me that the Taoiseach had had a report from Mr. Berry that Captain Kelly had attended a meeting in Bailieboro, or had attended a meeting at Cavan—I do not think he was specific about the place—at which there were IRA people present, that he had there waved a wad of notes around, promising money to them.

7892. Did he mention any specific sum?

—No, sir, no—that he waved a roll of notes.

7893. Did he indicate the type of people that were involved?

—Except that they were subversive and had come under the notice of the gardaí.

7894. That they were members of a subversive organisation?

—Yes. I told him that I would investigate it so I called Captain Kelly in. I knew he had been at a meeting in Bailieboro which happened, I think, about 3rd or 4th of October and I questioned him on this matter and he denied all knowledge of it.

7895. All knowledge of the meeting?

—Of this action of promising the money and waving wads of notes around that he hadn’t in any way and that there was nothing to it. I went back to Mr. Gibbons and reported to him that I was satisfied from what I had talked to Captain Kelly about that there was no foundation for this at all.

7896. Yes. Did you have a discussion with the Minister for Defence Mr. Gibbons, at that time, on the matter of Captain Kelly’s activities in general apart from this Cavan meeting?

—Well, I would have, in bringing out this matter I would have told him that Captain Kelly had been sent by me to this meeting, that he was there with my permission and this is as far as I can go on this matter, as far as I can remember.

7897. At that time Captain Kelly had discussed with you the matter of importation of arms?

—At that time?

7898. At that time?

—No.

7899. You were not aware of his position in the whole matter?

—No, this would be very early on, 3rd or 4th October, the meeting in Bailieboro, which he had referred to.

7900. When you discussed with Captain Kelly his position in relation to, his attitude to the importation of arms, did you discuss the matter with Mr. Gibbons at any time?

—You are referring to January?

7901. January, yes?

—Yes, I did, probably within a week or thereabouts of the time, as soon as I got an opportunity of seeing him, I told Mr. Gibbons about the position.

7902. And what was his attitude?

—and I also told him that in my view that Captain Kelly should be looked after, that he should get some post in the State for——

7903-4. Outside the armed forces?

—What would be the difference between his pension and his pay and Mr. Gibbons agreed with me on this.

7905. Later on, in fact, he wasn’t in a rush to accept Captain Kelly’s resignation. He allowed him to continue on?

—This is so. I broached it again to him, of course, before Captain Kelly left for the Continent for the first time but I took it there was some difficulty in getting a post which would be suitable for him.

7906. At that time in January you were aware that Captain Kelly was involved in the Baggot Street account?

—Yes; well, he told me the time it was changed that the Northern people wanted the account changed from Clones to Baggot Street.

7907. He informed you of that?

—Yes, he did.

7908. And you were aware that he was handling the moneys from that account?

—Well, my awareness in general would be that he would get requisitions from the Northern people for money and that he would pass these on to the Department of Finance and that the Department of Finance would lodge them in the Bank.

7909. You were therefore aware that the moneys being passed were Government moneys? State funds?

—Passed for—?

7910. Passed by him, passed on Captain Kelly’s request into the Baggot Street account?

—Into the Baggot Street account, yes.

7911. You were aware there were State moneys involved?

—Yes.

7912. Did you at any stage connect up the availability of such State moneys with the importation of arms?

—Certainly not immediately. My feeling when he told me that he wanted to help these people to import arms was that these were the moneys that were available to the Northern Defence Committees.

7913. Deputy Keating.—Mr. Chairman, I wonder would it be possible to ask Colonel Hefferon—it is very hard to hear—to go nearer the microphone or speak a little louder, please.

Chairman.—Yes.

Colonel Hefferon.—Sorry.

7914. Deputy Collins.—You didn’t link up the moneys with Captain Kelly’s position in the matter of importation of arms?

—No, the position at that time was that the Northern people were looking to import arms and they had asked him to help them.

7915. When did it dawn on you that there was possibly a link between the State funds and the importation of arms?

—This is difficult to say.

7916. Was it, say, before the February 6th directive?

—No, I don’t think so, no.

7917. It was not until afterwards?

—No, it was after, well after it, I would say.

7918. When you did decide, say, that there was possibly a connection between the use of State moneys for the importation of arms, did you discuss the matter with anybody?

—No, I have no recollection that I did, no.

7919. At a later stage you were satisfied that Captain Kelly’s activities were from the orders of the Minister for Defence rather than from yourself?

—Well, this is one of the difficulties of this date, that the Minister for Defence did not give any orders, as far as I knew. Captain Kelly was reporting to him and he didn’t get any orders to desist, from him.

7920. In reply to Question 4360 of February 6th you felt that he was working under Ministerial direction, did you?

—I felt certainly after 6th February that the possibility might arise. This directive was a very plain and very responsible statement of policy by the Government, etc.

7921. So, you are satisfied he could have been working under Ministerial direction?

—Well, he was working in the fact that he was reporting directly to Mr. Gibbons on numerous occasions and telling him what he was doing and at the same time the situation which existed from January when I put up the question as to his not doing this while an Army officer, obtained. He wasn’t fixed up with this post: he wasn’t fixed up with the post which I had asked for him to be fixed up with. I understood it was being in the process of being gone into.

7922. You were satisfied that he was reporting at every stage back to the Minister for Defence?

—No, not every day, no.

7923. No, I mean every event that happened, every happening of importance and so on?

—Well, this he reported to me and I had no reason to doubt it.

7924. You say he reported his visits to Germany?

—Yes.

7925. When was your next discussion with the Minister on this matter?

—I should say that certainly we had a discussion before the end—before the going away at April. He went away, I think, around about the 1st April to the Continent or maybe it was the day before it, and there was some question arose at that time about regimental duties which had to be performed and which I didn’t feel competent or I didn’t think I was in a position to cancel or to have cancelled. I went to Mr. Gibbons and asked him could he use his good offices in this matter, that Captain Kelly wanted to go to the continent at the week-end, so he said what did I suggest, what did I want? I think he said what did I think he should do. I suppose what I would advise him to do. He said would he speak to the Chief of Staff?

7926. Are you satisfied that the Minister knew at that stage that Captain Kelly was involved with the importation of arms?

—Oh yes.

7927. Are you satisfied that the Minister knew that this was going to happen—in other words, that he had his authority?

—Well, there is no other logical conclusion to be drawn.

7928. You were at all times satisfied that the Minister had authorised Captain Kelly’s activities?

—Yes, I was.

The Committee adjourned at 6 p.m. until 7.30 p.m.

The Committee resumed at 7.35 p.m.

7929. Deputy Collins.—At the time of Captain Kelly’s visit to Germany were you satisfied that he was working with Ministerial authority?

—At the time that he went to Germany in February?

7930. February?

—February, yes.

7931. Why would he not have been eligible for expenses if you were under the impression that he had authority to go to Germany?

—This is rather a mixed-up question. I had, as I have already told you, recommended in January the resignation which they accepted, in fact I think the date was 13th February. I did not see anything strange with going with the Northern Defence Committees in the purchase of arms. I did not see anything strange in providing the money. He did not ask me for any money.

7932. I think you said earlier you would have refused the expenses. Would that have been in order?

—Yes. I do not think they would have been.

Yes.

7933. Yet you are satisfied that he was working under Ministerial authority?

—In a sense, as I had reported to the Minister that he was going to Germany on this mission, he was in that sense working with Ministerial authority.

7934. To what extent were you under the impression that Captain Kelly was also working in consultation with Mr. Haughey and Mr. Blaney?

—From the time, I suppose, that I went out with Captain Kelly to Mr. Haughey’s house in October—I think it was earlier, probably the end of September, I knew he was working with Mr. Haughey from then on. He had reported to me on occasions that he was seeing Mr. Blaney as well.

7935. For what purpose would he have been seeing Mr. Blaney?

—To consult him about Intelligence matters. Mr. Blaney was very well informed on certain areas in the North.

7936. Relating to his contacts with Mr. Haughey, the then Minister, as far as he was concerned this was in relation to the moneys out of the Government fund?

—Yes.

7937. And did you ever have any discussions with Mr. Haughey about Captain Kelly’s activities?

—I had no discussion with Mr. Haughey after his visit to his house in September, the end of September. I cannot recollect any other discussion with him after that. No, I called at his office on one occasion when he was not in to see him about reporting matters connected with other things about which he had asked. Other than that I do not think I had any conversations with him.

7938. Finally, what did you make of Mr. Gibbons’ remarks to Captain Kelly on the 23rd April that he was “in the hot seat now”. What is the relevance of those remarks?

—I thought it was a joke, which he made at that time. I did not attach any particular significance to it.

7939. Deputy FitzGerald.—Colonel, was I right in understanding you to say earlier on that an army officer needs permission to leave the State?

—That is right, yes.

7940. Did Captain Kelly seek permission to leave the State on the 11th August, 1969?

—It does not apply to Northern Ireland.

7941. I see. I would like to be clear under whose instructions Captain Kelly was working at various points, as we have very conflicting evidence on this. You were reported in the Irish Press on the 14th October as making certain statements which I have not got in the transcript. Whether it is an error in the paper or whether the section of the transcript is incomplete I have not yet established. I would like to check it with you at this point. The Irish Press of that day said that Colonel Michael Hefferon “told the arms conspiracy in Dublin yesterday that he regarded Captain James Kelly, his personal assistant while he was Head of Army Intelligence, as a direct link between the Government and the Northern Defence Committees. He said he was not giving orders to Captain Kelly, who was reporting directly to Messrs. Haughey, Blaney and Gibbons, the Ministers concerned with Northern affairs.”

Now, for the moment I am just concerned with the particular issue. “He said he was not giving orders to Captain Kelly.” Did you in fact say that?

—I have no recollection of saying that.

7942-3. I think this may be? …

—Because he was under my orders and I think I said that in some other part of it.

7944-5. That is my impression. You think this is an incorrect report which may have misled us?

—I think so?

7946. I thought it useful to clarify that. We can check the transcript more fully but I have certainly found nothing in the transcript to date which confirms that. You did say on a number of occasions in court that Captain Kelly was acting under the instructions of the Ministers concerned?

—He was acting under the instructions of Mr. Haughey insofar as the Northern funds were concerned, because I understood at an early stage that the Red Cross could not operate in Northern Ireland and possibly Mr. Haughey was anxious that he would get somebody who would supply guide to him, to advise him as to where these funds were going.

7947. It is one thing to be asked by a Minister to advise him on something and it is another thing to be acting under his instructions. What I am talking about now is this particular evidence that he was acting under the instructions of these two Ministers, which I think you said repeatedly in your evidence. I would like to be clear about this, as to what is meant by it. May I read you the relevant extracts?

—Yes.

7948. You were asked:

Who was the first Minister that he named to you as instructing him to do anything on behalf of the Government?

You answered:

Mr. Haughey.

Later:

But did he tell you that in reporting these arms …

these are the proposals for the import of arms—

… he was acting on the instructions of any Minister of the Government or is that something you inferred?

You replied:

I certainly inferred it but I think that also Mr. Haughey and Mr. Blaney were—knew of his acting in this capacity, about giving him orders is a different matter. I don’t know.

It is a bit incoherent at that point. Next:

I can’t hear you, Colonel, please.

You answered:

Sorry, about giving him orders or acting on the orders of any Minister, this I don’t know, of course I don’t think Ministers would have a right to give him orders, except the Minister for Defence.

Later:

Did Captain Kelly make it clear to you as a result of many meetings that he was acting on behalf of certain Ministers in the Government?

You replied:

He did.

We have a situation where three different statements are made in close juxta position— one is that Captain Kelly told you he was acting on the instructions of the Ministers, certainly in reference to Mr. Haughey, and indeed there is another reference to that which brings in Mr. Blaney too—“did Captain Kelly tell you that he was doing anything on the instructions of either Mr. Haughey or Mr. Blaney in connection with the Northern Defence Committees between September, say, 1969 and March 1970 prior to his first meeting with Mr. Gibbons.”—Yes. So that on two occasions you said he was acting under the instructions of one or other, or both, of these Ministers. On one occasion you said he was acting for them, on behalf of them, and on two occasions, you said he was not acting under their orders. Clearly you make a distinction between instructions and orders and I would like to be clear on that. Is this a matter of orders being something that an officer of the army is given by his superior officers?

—Yes.

7949. Whereas instructions is something given to him by somebody in general authority?

—Yes, I would say so. I would say that is a fair enough assumption that I had permitted him to operate in this capacity with the Ministers concerned, but as for the orders concerned, I would give him orders as to what I wanted of him in the matter of intelligence.

7950. Could you explain to us the process in the Army by which an officer comes under the instructions of a Minister to act separately from the order he is given by his superior officer. I had not heard of that and I would like to know how this can be done?

—I would explain it by saying that Captain Kelly was, in my understanding, operating directly with the Minister for Finance in connection with these Northern funds.

7951. I want to be clear on this—An Officer is under the orders of his superior officer?

—Yes.

7952. Acting under the authority of the Minister for Defence?

—Yes.

7953. If anybody is to be transferred so as to be entitled to act on the instructions of another Minister, there must be some process for this. Quite apart from the Army, in the Civil Service a member of the staff of one Department could not take instructions from another Minister unless released by his own Minister. Presumably you have some procedure in the army for this?

—I do not know. I think this may well be and is probably the normal way but we were in a very abnormal situation.

7954. Abnormal or not, there must be some transfer of authority under which, instead of being under the instructions and authority of the Minister for Defence, he came for a period under the instructions or authority of two other Ministers?

—He was continually under the orders of I acting on behalf of the Minister for Defence.

7955. But he came into a position where he was acting on the instructions of two other Ministers and apparently for a number of months—five months or so—without the knowledge of the Minister for Defence?

—I do not know about the knowledge of the Minister for Defence. This is an area in which I am not at all sure as to what period the Minister for Defence knew that he was operating.

7956. You had no reason to believe that the Minister for Defence knew anything of this before you first spoke to him on the subject of Captain Kelly’s activities in relation to arms?

—No, I do not think so.

7957. Right—so that the position is that this officer under your orders is acting on the instructions of two Ministers, other than the Minister for Defence; you did not check as to whether the Minister for Defence knew of this or approved it; there was no written instruction of any kind, or notifications and the only evidence you had that in fact they had given him any instructions was Captain Kelly’s own word. Is that a fair summary or have I gone wrong?

—No, I do not think so, because I was aware from the Minister for Finance—on a number of occasions he rang my office looking for Captain Kelly or Mr. Fagan rang my office looking for Captain Kelly, and this I know was in connection with the Northern Defence Fund.

7958. You said to us earlier, Colonel, that it was your understanding the Minister was seeking guidance from him?

—Yes.

7959. That is one thing. I can quite understand a Minister seeking guidance from an officer in another Government Department with the consent and knowledge of that man’s Minister, and similarly with an Army officer, but it is quite a different thing for him to be acting on the instructions of these Ministers.

—Yes—well——

7960. You see, I do want to make a distinction here and I do not want that to confuse you. I would like to make that clear. I am making a distinction between the Minister for Finance seeking guidance from this officer about the status of people in Northern Ireland and the Minister for Finance instructing this officer to take action in regard to the fund, drawing money and acting on it, dealing with the fund. These are two quite different issues, you appreciate?

—Yes.

7961. Well now, I want to be clear on this, first of all, as to how and in what circumstances, in your view, he came under the instructions of these Ministers and is there any authority by which that can be done without the knowledge and direct consent of his own Minister?

—Well, I think, again, to go back to the national situation in which we found ourselves at the time, it was of such a nature that the requirements of Intelligence were paramount in my opinion certainly. If the Minister for Finance, or someone else charged with the administration of this fund, found it difficult and one of my officers was the person whom he felt would be useful to him in determining where these funds should go, then I certainly feel I would have some authority to let this officer guide him.

7962. Yes, to let this officer guide him and advise him when to act?

—Yes.

7963. Now we are talking of a different thing. We are talking of him coming under the instructions of the Minister for Finance—quite different from guiding and advising the Minister.

—Yes. Well, the instructions were as far as the finances of the funds themselves were concerned.

7963a. I do not understand that. Would you like to elaborate?

—That in other words, he was not coming under the instructions of the Minister for Finance in order to give him orders on military matters. It was purely for the matter of guidance on the fund.

7964. Yes. Well now, let us distinguish clearly—guidance to the Minister on the funds and acting on the Minister’s instructions on the handling of these funds, you will appreciate these are totally different things. I want to know, in your discussions with the Minister for Finance, about instructions given by the Minister for Finance to Captain Kelly about the handling of these funds?

—I must confess I do not see such a difference between the two things as you see, Mr. FitzGerald, because, quite obviously, if the Minister for Finance gets a request from Captain Kelly, who is, as he did on a number of occasions for moneys for any place in the North, that he is quite entitled to say to him: “Come in and discuss this with me”.

7965. Yes?

—And “You can do this” and “You cannot do that” or “Give this to them”— or “Do not give it to them”.

7966. This I understand fully. I can understand a Minister seeking his advice and guidance as to which bodies in the North, or persons, might be suitable recipients of funds because of Captain Kelly’s special knowledge. That would seem appropriate.

—Yes.

7967. It might have been more appropriate if Captain Kelly’s own Minister knew he was doing this. But that is another question. But, when it comes to the Minister instructing Captain Kelly to give this money to people, that seems to me a quite different matter. I do not understand how any Minister can give this kind of instruction to an officer or, indeed, to a civil servant in the Department of another Minister without that Minister’s authority and I should like to be guided as to just how that situation could arise?

—Well, I did not see any difficulty in it at the time.

7968. Well, do you see any difficulty in it now?

—I do not, I do not. I felt against the climate of the time and our requirements, that it was quite, you know—I would not say a normal thing because the whole situation was abnormal, but I did not see anything abnormal in it.

7969. I see and, if the Minister for Defence had called in Mr. Charlie Murray and instructed him to give money to somebody, would you consider that equally normal?

—I do not think this thing would arise.

7970. I am just putting it to you because I want to see what is the thing you consider normal about it. To me, when a Minister of one Department——

—You see——

7971. Let me finish. To me, when a Minister of one Department instructs an officer of another Department to do something, including the handling of public funds, that seems to me to be so abnormal as to be quite unacceptable as a method of procedure. You consider it normal. I am putting it to you if, in the alternative case, the Minister for Defence instructed Mr. Charlie Murray to pay out funds, would you consider that normal and, if not, where is the normality in the Kelly case?

—I put it to you this way: If Mr. Charlie Murray knew his Belfast and the Northern people as well as Captain Kelly did I would not, speaking as a Director of Intelligence, see anything wrong in it.

7972. In the Minister for Defence instructing him to pay out money?

—To pay out money, yes.

7973. I see. Well, I do not think I will pursue that any further. Now, can I be clear on the chain of events? Captain Kelly starts off as an intelligence officer under your orders, and purely under your orders, carrying out an intelligence mission. He then becomes a liaison officer acting on the instructions of the Minister for Finance and the Minister for Agriculture. As a subsequent point he comes under the direct orders of the Minister for Defence, in your theory?

—Yes.

7974. When do you say that happened?

—Well, again, to come back on the evidence I have given before, I think it was when Captain Kelly came to me in January and notified his intention of helping the Northern Defence Committee to import arms; I told him at that time he could not do that as an Army Officer. I went to Mr. Gibbons at that time and told him—being very brief about it because it all bears on so many court cases, and all this was gone through——

7975. Yes, but on what date did he come under the Minister’s direct orders as distinct from yours?

—It is very difficult to put a date to it.

7976. But it is an important point. Have you got the date on which he came under the Minister’s direct orders, because it is very important. An Army officer must always know under whose orders he is working at the particular time?

—Yes.

7977. Then what was the date?

—Well, let me pursue this. The efforts to get a job for Captain Kelly in some other part of the State service were going ahead from the time that I told the Minister about his requirement. I told the Minister he was going to Germany about mid-February. I had reports from Captain Kelly that the Minister was present when certain delegations from the North were down here. This was on the 3rd and 4th of March and, from these reports, I inferred very strongly that they had been promised support here. The 25th March, as you know, the Minister knew about this abortive attempt to import arms and I would say some time in—certainly, seeing that the Minister knew about it in the end of January, or early February, I would say it was probably March some time.

7978. So, on some unknown date in March, Captain Kelly comes under the Minister’s orders rather than yours and you cannot even specify the date of this very important event?

—Well——

7979. Could you tell us what form it took; who notified to you that he was under the Minister’s orders and what led you to believe that?

—The fact that Captain Kelly had been— had told me that the Minister was, that a certain number of Ministers had received these Northern delegations.

7980. What Captain Kelly told you is not evidence of under whose instructions he is working. I do not think I have ever heard of a case where a person decides for himself under whose instructions he is working and tells a superior officer in the Army?

—Well, in addition to that, I had been reporting to the Minister for Defence.

7981. Yes, but at what stage did you infer from anything the Minister said, or did not say, that he was taking Captain Kelly under his orders?

—He did not say it at any stage.

7982. Right. At what stage did you infer it? You say he was under the Minister’s orders on a date in March?

—Probably some date in March.

7983. And on what occasion and from what did you infer this?

—Well, I inferred it from the general way things had been going from the time I asked for Captain Kelly’s retirement to be considered and that he be given another job in the State.

7984. You are an Army officer. Would you consider that a defence to a court-martial in the Army on somebody not obeying the orders of a superior officer, to say that he thought from the general way things were going that he no longer had to obey him and would obey somebody else. I mean, could we be precise about this? We are talking about an Army officer and under whose orders he is acting?

—We are also talking about an Intelligence Officer.

7985. Yes, in an army?

—Yes.

7986. Under discipline?

—Yes.

7987. Could you tell me from what you inferred that the Minister had taken him under his orders and on what date?

—I have told you that the whole sequence of events from January onwards, from the time that I approached the Minister first about Captain Kelly’s retirment, led me to believe that the Minister was—I will not say directly at that stage ordering—giving orders to Captain Kelly but that he knew about his activities and that he was going along with them.

7988. That’s quite a different matter. I may know a lot of things and go along with them but it does not mean that I am giving orders to somebody. I am asking about at what stage the Minister started giving him orders and in your view he came under the Minister’s orders and not yours?

—Well, at what stage he started giving him orders—I am not able to put a date on that.

7989. Yet you say this happened in March?

—As near as I can——

7990. You have no evidence for this order than Captain Kelly’s unsupported word?

—Yes.

7991. I see: So the position is that Captain Kelly then came under——

—That and the attendant circumstances arising out of the attempted resignation.

7992. Yes. So that the only evidence you had for Captain Kelly coming under the instructions of Messrs. Haughey and Blaney or the orders of Mr. Gibbons was Captain Kelly’s word in the first two cases and in the third, together with attendant circumstances in the third case?

—Yes.

7993. Could I ask you in respect of what matters Mr. Blaney was giving instructions?

—I don’t know is “instructions” the right word——

7994. It’s the word you used, Colonel.

—It is the word I used but I just wonder is it the right word to apply to Mr. Blaney because, as I said, Mr. Blaney was very well versed on matters on the North, his own particular part of it anyway, the Donegal-Derry area, and there were requests, I understood, from Mr. Blaney to Captain Kelly which he passed on to—or I don’t know whether they were to Captain Kelly or to the Minister for Finance but on the matter of “instructions”, I don’t know.

7995. I want to be clear on this because it is important. From the court evidence it would appear that you thought he was acting on the instructions of Mr. Haughey and Mr. Blaney. Are you now modifying your position on that?

—Well, you asked me what the instructions were——

7996. Well, I’d like to—first of all, you seem to have cast doubt on this statement. Do you stand over the statement that he was acting under Mr. Blaney’s instructions as well as Mr. Haughey’s or do you withdraw that?

—Well, he was acting under Mr. Haughey’s instructions in the matter of the fund.

7997. Right. Was he acting at any stage under Mr. Blaney’s instructions? Are you withdrawing that?

—I’m not withdrawing it.

7998. Right. Can you give us any information as to what Mr. Blaney’s instructions related to? How did you get evidence, other than what Captain Kelly told you, that he was acting on Mr. Blaney’s instructions?

—Well, I presume I had reports from Captain Kelly at the time that Mr. Blaney had made requests to him for funds to be allocated in certain cases.

7999. Requests to?

—Requests to Captain Kelly.

8000. For funds to be allocated?

—I presume that this was the reason that I had, to say that he was working under Mr. Blaney’s instructions.

8001. I must say that it seems odd that if Mr. Blaney was instructing him that Mr. Blaney, you say, was requesting him for money. This is an odd way of instructing somebody. Could we hear more about these requests for money from Mr. Blaney to Captain Kelly? I am not clear that any evidence we have relates to that. I am open to correction.

—I don’t know. I am not too sure about it either, but I know in reports at the time that whether in fact these requests were given to Captain Kelly, who met him often, to give to Mr. Haughey or whether they were made to Mr. Haughey directly, I don’t know.

8002. So you have no evidence on that at all. But, now, is there any matter on which you do know that Mr. Blaney instructed Captain Kelly?

—No, not directly.

8003. So the position is that Captain Kelly told you that Mr. Blaney was instructing him and you did not enquire about what?

—This—no, I didn’t.

8004. Yes, I see. Now, could you tell us how often you met Mr. Blaney during this period from October to April?

—I didn’t meet him at all——

8005. At all?

—Until 23rd April.

8006. I see. And you had no contact with Mr. Haughey after the initial contact at his home?

—Yes, possibly I met him once, I think, after that.

8007. I see. And on that occasion did you discuss Captain Kelly in any way?

—No, I don’t think so, no.

8008. I see. So that even when you met Mr. Haughey you didn’t say anything to him that would have elicited—

—I knew Captain Kelly was working with him at that stage.

—8009. Yes. We have been through that, I think. You appreciate that Captain Kelly, I think, has given a somewhat different version. He insists that he was under your orders all the time and that he was not acting under instructions or orders of the Ministers and, if I understand him correctly, that he therefore did not tell you he was acting under their instructions. I haven’t got a reference and I don’t want to put to you anything that is incorrect but my impression of his evidence is that?

—That was not my understanding of it, no.

8010. Yes. Could you recall anything of the conversations in which he came to you and told you that he was acting under their instructions, any bits and pieces of it that you can recall that would help us——?

—No, I don’t think so, no.

8011. You can’t recall when he came to you with this, was it on a single occasion when he mentioned both of these or was it on different occasions that he told you about these instructions?

—The instructions as far as Mr. Haughey was concerned, I have gone into already, that is about the allocation of funds and the operation of these funds and, as I say, I cannot be specific about when he told me about Mr. Blaney. He reported to me on a number of occasions conversations he had with Mr. Blaney and these conversations would bear largely on intelligence matters.

8012. Did you ever discuss with the Minister for Defence during this period, Captain Kelly’s relationship with the other two Ministers, or when did this first come up in conversations at all?

—Captain Kelly’s relationship with the——?

8013. Other two Ministers; the fact that he was acting under their instructions. When did this first transpire in conversation between you and the Minister for Defence?

—I don’t remember at any stage having a conversation with the Minister for Defence on the——

8014. You saw the Minister for Defence fairly frequently during this period?

—I did, yes.

8015. You discussed Captain Kelly with him on a number of occasions?

—I did.

8016. Yet you never disclosed to him that Captain Kelly was working under the instructions of two other Ministers?

—I can’t recall it.

8017. I see. Is there any reason why you didn’t disclose that to him? I would have thought it would be the very first thing you would raise with him on the first occasion after it came to your notice?

—No, I don’t think so. I think he was aware of it himself, certainly from March onwards.

8018. That is about what—about four or five months after it began?

—Yes.

8019. How often did you see the Minister in that period?

—I should say I saw him about a dozen times or more around then.

8020. I see. Could I just be clear about Captain Kelly’s contact with the IRA here, this Cathal Goulding. Did these initiate on your instructions?

—No.

8021. Well, does that mean—when did you first become aware of them? How did they first come to your notice?

—They came to my notice when Captain Kelly came to me and said that somebody had suggested that he meet Cathal Goulding, Cathal Goulding was anxious to meet him, and I breifed him. I was not very enamoured of it but at the same time I felt that he had nothing to lose by going provided that he was properly briefed and he saw Cathal Goulding on, I think, three occasions.

8022. But when he came to you first he had not yet met Cathal Goulding?

—No, he hadn’t.

8023. He came to you for advice and to consult with you on it?

—Yes.

8024. And you authorised him to go ahead?

—Yes.

8025. And he reported to you on both of these discussions?

—He did.

8026. Yes, I see. Did any of these discussions relate to the provision of arms or money to the IRA?

—No. There was never any question of Captain Kelly promising money to Cathal Goulding.

8027-8. Or being asked for it?

—Not as he reported to me, certainly.

8029. Or being asked for arms?

—I don’t think so.

8030. Could we come now to the question of the fund. Captain Kelly has said that he informed you about the withdrawal of £3,500 before Christmas. I think in examination here he became a little vaguer about the precise time and said it was around Christmas. Now first of all, when did you first hear about these funds, that is to say, the fund with which Captain Kelly himself had some direct involvement as distinct from advising the Minister and recipients?

—I think the first time I became aware of it was when Captain Kelly came to me with this offer of his resignation.

8031. That was in mid-January?

—In mid-January; possibly early January.

8032. Was that the first occasion on which you had heard about his withdrawing money? The first occasion you heard about the funds at all?

—The funds—I think it was known since August that funds were being made available for Northern defence.

8033. No, you miss my point. I have not put the question very well, Colonel. You have told us that you became aware quite early, I thought that he was guiding Mr. Haughey and taking his instructions for the giving of money from these funds.

—Yes.

8034. And in fact that is why you said in evidence at the trial that from October ownards, I think, he was acting under Mr. Haughey’s instructions. Therefore you must have known about the fund in October, that is to say, a fund that he was advising the Minister on and giving money from?

—Yes. But I think this is a different question you brought up. There was £3,500 drawn at Christmas.

8035. I am afraid I confused you. There are two separate issues and perhaps I phrased it badly. First of all, when did you first hear about this fund, that there was not only a vote of money but that this money was being channelled to Northern Ireland on the advice of Captain Kelly as regards recipients and that he was involved in the giving of the money? When did you first hear of that operation?

—This would be, I should say, about mid-October; sometime in October I should say.

8036. As far as you were concerned at that time, and for some time thereafter, this was simply an aid operation. It had no other significance from the point of view of arms or anything?

—No.

8037. Were you aware at that stage that Captain Kelly was involved to the extent of cashing cheques on this fund?

—No, I was not so aware.

8038. When did you first become aware of that? Was that also in mid-January?

—I do not think I became aware that he was cashing cheques until after the whole thing was over. You mean cashing cheques at the bank directly and operating an account?

8039. I thought you just said that in mid-January he told you about withdrawing the £3,500 for arms?

—No, I said it was in mid-January he came and told me that the Northern Defence Committee wished to purchase arms abroad.

8040. I am talking about the fund at the moment. I understood from Captain Kelly’s evidence that either before Christmas or—he corrected it—around Christmas he went to you and told you about the withdrawal of £3,500 from this account, as a deposit. That was his evidence. I thought from what you had said, but I could be wrong, that you accepted this, with the proviso that it was not until mid-January that this happened. Are you now saying you did not know about this financial end at all?

—I did not know about this because the understanding I had from Captain Kelly in mid-January was he came to me and said that the Northern Defence Committees were looking——. He possibly told me a deposit had been made on arms at that time.

8041. But not that he was involved in that deposit and had withdrawn money from the fund?

—No.

8042. You say that at no stage did you know of his withdrawal of money from this fund until the whole thing broke?

—I cannot recall any stage at which he told me he was withdrawing money directly from the fund.

8043. You said he was giving the money on the instructions of the Minister earlier. What did you mean by giving the money, if it is not withdrawing from the fund?

—I would say he got requests from the Northern people and he went to the Minister and told him so-and-so, that this was all right, or that they wanted so-much—in that sense.

8044. I see. But he did not give the money?

—I understood the Department of Finance were the people that gave the money.

8045. So you were talking of his advising the Minister not only about who to give the money to but the amounts to be lodged into the fund at the particular time? Is that what you meant by “giving”?

—Yes.

8046. You were not aware that he had any other function in regard to the fund, that he cashed cheques, received money from the fund? He told you nothing of this?

—I did not ask him anything.

8047. He did not tell you anything of it, yet you have told us that he kept you fully informed about his activities? It was one of the first things you said.

—All his Intelligence activities.

8048. This was not Intelligence activity. This was withdrawing money?

—No.

8049. He has, you know, insisted at great length that it was an integral part of his Intelligence work and that he informed you of this around Christmas.

—He informed me he was working——

8050. No. He informed you about withdrawing some money or informed you about the fund, and that this whole work of withdrawing money from the fund was an integral part of his Intelligence duties, carried out under your orders. Is all of that false?

—No. This is over-simplifying the case—“Is all that false?”

8051. He has said these things to us and we are trying to establish are they true or not. Can you not simply tell us, in regard to each of these things, whether they are true or false? Either he did or did not tell you around Christmas that he had withdrawn £3,500 from this fund as a deposit for arms. Did he or did he not tell you that?

—Not around Christmas. It is possible that after he talked to me in mid-January about the request from the Northerners to help them out in the purchase of arms he mentioned that a deposit had been paid.

8052. This is not what Captain Kelly told us.

—I have no recollection of hearing of the sum of £3,500.

8053. He did not tell you that he had withdrawn money from this fund? You have told us you knew nothing about it until the trial, or thereabouts?

—No.

8054. When he tells us that all these withdrawals are an integral part of and cannot be divorced from his Intelligence operation carried out under your orders this is incorrect? He is not telling the truth?

—I think we have gone into this question about instructions and funds. I told you that I did not have anything to do with these funds.

8055. We are faced with what appears to be a direct conflict of evidence on factual matters between yourself and Captain Kelly. We are anxious to get at the truth, and I want to be clear. What you are saying is he has not told the truth on this matter, because we can quote what he has said here? He said he withdrew this money and told you about it around Christmas and that you were aware of the fund, and this entire operation was part of an Intelligence operation carried out under your orders. Are any of those statements true or false?

—I have no recollection of this £3,500 being told to me.

8056. Are any of those statements true?

—These statements are not.

8057. That he told you about the fund, that he told you he had withdrawn this money as a deposit on arms and that in withdrawing money for arms from this fund he was doing this as part of an Intelligence operation carried out under your orders. Is there any truth in any of that?

—No. He could not have at that stage.

8057a. I do not want to be unfair either to you or to Captain Kelly but this is important. There is a direct conflict of evidence, and we should know this; it should not be “fudged” in any way. We are trying to get at the truth. I want to be absolutely clear. It is not just that he did not tell you about subsidiary accounts— he did not tell you about the main account. either?

—I do not follow, about the main account. What I knew was that there was the transfer from Clones to Baggot Street. This I knew about. This, I take it, would be the main account.

8058. But not that he had any involvement in regard to this account? You were not aware of his being involved in the original operation, at the time the account was opened?

—Except in so far as he advised the Department of Finance as to the requests and requisitions on that fund, and payment out of it.

8059. Presumably if he did not tell you about the funds he did not tell you about the switching operation?

—No.

8060. In the light of all that, and in the light of the fact that you have now told us Captain Kelly’s statements here were not true, would you like to comment on your original statement that Captain Kelly kept you informed of all his activities at all times? Do you sustain that statement?

—Yes, I will not withdraw that statement, because I mentioned at the time that my main interest in Captain Kelly’s operations was Intelligence.

8061. So when you say he kept you informed——

—Had I asked him at any stage I am quite sure he would have told me.

8062. When you say he kept you informed about his activities at all times you mean his legal activities, and

—What do you mean by legal activities?

8063. The fact that he was carrying out other activities under your orders, the fact that he was involved in this operation of withdrawing money from this fund and using it for the purchase of arms for people outside this State, the fact that he did not tell you about those activities does not affect your feeling that he kept you fully informed?

—But you mentioned a while ago his “illegal activities”. I did not look upon his operation with the Minister for Finance as any way illegal.

8064. I am sorry; I may have implied that by the use of the word “legal”. If so I withdraw it. What I meant was the fact that he told you about the work he was doing under your orders and did not tell you about the withdrawal of money to buy arms, from this account, does not that in your view invalidate your statement that he kept you informed of all his activities at all times?

—My statement was that anything I wanted to know he kept me informed of.

8065. I do not think that was the only thing you said. I think you did say he kept you informed about his activities at all times.

—Yes, of all the activities I wanted to know about. As I think I pointed out already, I did not want to get myself involved in the administration of the funds of the Northern people.

8066. I am not talking about the administration of the funds of the North. We are talking about an officer withdrawing money for arms to be imported into this country with a view to being used in Northern Ireland. He did not tell you about this?

—What he did not tell me about was that the Northern people had put a deposit— There was no question at that time by the way about importing arms into this country.

8067. What I am talking about here is the question of the money from the fund. You will appreciate that is our main concern. He told you nothing about this but you do not regard this as invalidating your statement that he kept you informed at all times.

—No. I do not.

8068. There are two statements in your evidence which I would like to put to you for you to reconcile. First of all Volume Seven, Page 311, Question 4126. You were asked:

“You were aware that Captain Kelly had access to the Baggot Street account— to use the Baggot Street account?”

Your reply:

“My understanding of this was that Captain Kelly would get requests that would be made on the Minister for Finance for money and that this money would be lodged in this account in Baggot Street or that this money would be lodged by the Department of Finance. I certainly did not get the impression that he was drawing the money and lodging the money.”

That is in line with the evidence you have just given us.

—Yes.

8069. Turn to Page 312, Question 4136. You were asked:

“Were not you aware that funds were being drawn by Captain Kelly from the Baggot Street account at that time?”

You replied:

“In a general way what I was aware of at that time was that he had in his capacity as a link between the Minister for Finance and the Northern Committees—that he had drawn money, and I think he had told me so, on occasions to give to the Northern Committees.”

Would you reconcile that statement with your answer to Question 4126 and your previous answers here?

—Could I have the answers?

8070. It is Question 4136 on the next page.

—What do you want me to reconcile?

8071. I want you to reconcile your answers to questions 4126 and 4136 and the answers you have given me here in the last five minutes.

—I do not think there is any difference between them.

8072. Oh. So when you say on the one hand “I certainly did not get the impression that he was drawing money and lodging money” and when you say “In a general way what I was aware of at that time was that he had drawn money” these statements are not in conflict with each other?

—I cannot reconcile these two statements. I do not know that at some time I know Captain Kelly told me he had drawn money to give to the Northern people.

8073. At some time?

—At some time he had told me he had drawn money to give to the Northern people I mean they might send a requisition to him that they wanted money and they sent him a cheque.

8074. So you were aware he had access to this account, that he drew money from it and gave it to the Northern people?

—Yes.

8075. I frankly—well, I will not comment. May I point out to you your reply to Question 4133? You were asked:

“Were you aware of Captain Kelly’s drawing of money from the Baggot Street funds for the purchase of arms as he claims?”

Your reply was:

“Not in any detail. I was aware that funds at the disposal of the Northern Committees were being used for the purchase of arms.”

What do you mean by “Not in any detail”. To me, that answer implies that you knew but not in any detail.

—My interpretation of the money question at the time was that this £100,000 was there for giving to Northern Ireland aid and relief and that this money should have been normally channelled through the Red Cross but the Red Cross were not able to operate in Northern Ireland and therefore the Minister for Finance had used Captain Kelly as a link between themselves and the Northern Defence Committees and when Captain Kelly came to me first it was that the initiator for the purchase of the arms had come from the Northern Defence Committees and that the funds they were to use for them were funds at their disposal. I also knew that funds other than the funds here were at their disposal. I knew that by the reports.

8076. The question I put to you was: “Were you aware of Captain Kelly’s drawing of money from the Baggot Street funds for the purchase of arms as he claims?” Your reply was: “Not in any detail”, and that implies you did know but not in any detail as to the amounts. Would you suggest how else I can interpret that?

—I think I can interpret that by the fact that the account set up in Baggot Street was one in which the moneys were channelled from the Department of Finance and were in my understanding the property at that stage of the Northern Defence Committees.

8077. To do what they liked with, including buying arms?

—I did not know there were any conditions put on it.

8078. I see. So your impression was that the money that was put into this fund from which Captain Kelly was drawing was being and could quite legally and properly be used for the purchase of arms and was so being used?

—I do not know about that being used for the purchase of arms. I did know it was the property of the Northern Defence once it had been passed over to them.

8079. I am sorry. Your second last answer, I think, suggested you did know they were using this money for the purchase of arms.

—I knew they were using money which was from funds at their disposal but these funds could also include money which had been subscribed from other sources.

8080. Sorry. The answer you gave to the question which related to the Baggot Street funds “Were you aware of Captain Kelly’s drawing of money from the Baggot Street funds for the purchase of arms as he claims? “Not in any detail” which to me is an affirmative but qualified answer.

—I do not agree with you there.

8081. You think when you say “Not in any detail” it means no?

—Let me see the question “Were you aware of Captain Kelly’s drawing of money from the Baggot Street funds for the purchase of arms as he claims?” “Not in any detail”. I do not remember at any time being aware that he drew £10,000, £5,000 or whatever it might be.

8082. Quite. You did not know the amounts?

—No.

8083. You knew that he knew the money was being used to purchase arms?

—I knew that he drew money on instruction from the Northern Defence Committees.

8084. And it was to be used for the purchase of arms?

—Yes.

8085. I see. I want to refer to Volume Six, Page 269, Question 3599, at the end of the first column on the page:

“They came down here”—that is the Northern people—“I think it was in January or February—Colonel Hefferon gave evidence about this—it was in January, in fact, I put the proposition of the Northern people to Colonel Hefferon. He suggested to me would I assist them in this operation.”

He goes on to say “He said I could not do so”— rather curiously—“and he gave various reasons that it would be embarrassing to the Government if it was found out”—and then suggested he should resign from the Army. I would like you to comment on Captain Kelly’s statement that he suggested that you would assist him.

—The only thing I can suggest on this one is that it may be a misprint, because everything that follows is contrary to it in his own evidence.

8086. I did put this subsequently to Captain Kelly and while he argued about it a good deal, he never suggested that he had not said it?

—He goes on in the second sentence to say “He said that I could not do so and gave various reasons—that it would be embarrassing for the Government if it were found out, that there were various set procedures——

8087. And that it would be better if he was out of the army. He went on to say that you suggested that he should leave the Army; and we asked him questions about this, and he said “Well, if you do not really want to leave the Army,” but that if he wanted to do this, he would have to, I am asking where did the initiative come—from you or from him?

—Not at all. On this matter I made it quite clear that if he wanted to go ahead and assist these people with the importation of arms, he could not do it and remain in the Army.

8088. You did not make the suggestion to him?

—No.

8089. When he came to you in January may I recap the situation up to this time— he was engaged in an intelligence operation, to find out what was happening, particularly with regard to arms. He has explained to us himself that in doing this, it was necessary to go along with the operation in order not to lose the trust of the people concerned and that the justification for withdrawing the £3,500 as part of an intelligence operation was to maintain their trust. Up to this point it is an intelligence operation, to find out what is happening—one presumes, though it was not explicitly stated that he was frustrating it. He comes to you in January as the culmination of this intelligence operation to find out what is happening and actually proposes himself to get involved in this operation. What was your reaction to this, if I may put this to you? It did not occur to you to react, that here was an Irish Army officer proposing to engage in activities on behalf of people in another State—in activities illegal in that State and if arms came through here, would be illegal in this State—and it did not occur to you to simply forbid him or to report the matter to your superiors that he was engaged in this activity? Your only reaction appears to have been to say that he would not want to do this as an Army officer. Would you like to explain your reaction and why you did not react more strongly to the conversion of an intelligence operation, to find out what was going on, into active participation in this particular illegal activity—because in Northern Ireland it would be illegal, and indeed would be illegal if the arms came in here?

—In this case I think there is no doubt about my reaction immediately to him—that he could not do it as an Army officer. Still, he had been a very excellent Army officer, and I think I went on to tell him that he need not do it, that I could transfer him to other work, that he need not carry on with his intelligence work any longer, that if he had any qualms about these people feeling let down, I could transfer him to other work but that he could not carry on as an Army officer in this.

8090. When you discovered that from being an intelligence officer, finding out what was happening, he was turning into somebody who was actively participating in this activity on behalf of people outside this State, you did not decide at that stage “I will report this to your superiors,” or instruct him to cease this at once and return to his normal duties?

—I certainly did not do any such thing.

8091. Would you like to explain your reaction?

—Your questions are based entirely on the assumption that this was a situation where you went to your office at 9 o’clock in the morning and worked a normal day, and went through a filing system and so on. This was a situation in which an officer had been very successful in his operations up to this, as far as the intelligence end was concerned. I was naturally concerned lest I should lose him, but at the same time, I saw quite clearly, and so explained it to him, that he could not do it and then remain in the Army.

8092. You did not regard it as appropriate to simply tell him to stop doing it, as distinct from saying “Do it in some other capacity”?

—No, I did not.

8093. Would you like to explain it? You are Director of Intelligence in the Irish Army and you have an officer under you, who has been spying on certain activity which we needed to know about, and suddenly he comes to you and proposes to engage actively in this activity. There was no authority for that from your Minister, with whom you had not discussed it, and did not discuss it for some time after, and there is no authority for it from anybody else—the Chief of Staff—and yet instead of reacting to it by telling him not to, or reporting him for this kind of activity on behalf of people in another State, you merely confine yourself to saying that he should not do it as an Army officer. Would you like to explain that fully?

—I said “You cannot do it.”

8094. As an Army officer?

—Yes.

8095. But you did not instruct him not to do it?

—No.

8096. You did not report it to higher authority?

—No. He came back to me a week later with his papers and it is only then that I went to higher authority about the matter.

8097. You would not like to give any comment as to why you reacted in that way? It would be helpful to know your thinking on that?

—I felt—again I go back to it—that this officer had given excellent service, and in fact, my reaction, when he told me of his intention to engage on this thing, was to tell him he would have to resign, but I thought this was indeed rather harsh because I felt that he had given good service to the country, and certainly to the Intelligence Section, and I was rather anxious, knowing his family circumstances and all that, that he would be fitted up with another job, but I did not——

8098. Had he got this other job, you would have permitted this to continue? You would not have reported it to the Special Branch? You would have allowed him to engage in this activity without taking any action about it?

—This is, of course, a question which does not arise.

8099. Why not?

—Because he did not get the other job for one thing.

8100. But in the meantime you permitted him to continue with this activity?

—Oh, yes.

8101. At this time was it your view that the arms were to be imported into Northern Ireland?

—There was no question as to where they were to be imported at this stage.

8102. I had understood from Captain Kelly that he had at this stage suceeded in persuading the Northerners that they should import them here and that the point of his involvement was that they were to be imported here. He did not say this to you?

—No, he did not.

8103. When you went to see the Minister for Defence, which I think you did on this particular matter in early February or sometime in February——?

—Possibly late January or late February.

8104. What was his reaction when you told him that Captain Kelly proposed to engage in this arms importation? Could you describe how he reacted to that?

—I put two things to him. First of all, when Captain Kelly came back and definitely handed in his papers—set a date on which he should retire from the Army—I felt that I should do something about getting him a job, or trying to get him a job, in another part of the State Service or otherwise, and I put it to Mr. Gibbons—I explained to him the whole circumstances. I also explained that he could not do it as an army officer, that he would involve the Army directly in his activities then, but that I felt that he should be provided with some post that would at least make up the difference between his pension and the salary he was then drawing. Mr. Gibbons was sympathetic to this and promised to see what he could do about it.

8105. Well, was Mr. Gibbons’ reaction—I mean, there are various possible reactions and one would have been this must be stopped and another reaction would be that this should go ahead?

—Hmmm!

8106. You are suggesting an intermediate reaction—it can go ahead so long as he is out of the Army. Is that what Mr. Gibbons said?

—I had told Mr. Gibbons that I had advised Captain Kelly at the same time to see Mr. Haughey and Mr. Blaney, whom I know he had been working with and, you see, to tell him that it was my opinion he could not do this as an Army officer.

8107. You told Mr. Gibbons that?

—No, I told Mr. Kelly.

8108. Before you went to see Mr. Gibbons?

—Yes. When Mr. Kelly handed in his resignation——

8109. Yes—sorry?

—I then told Mr. Gibbons. I gave him the report that I detailed to you there and made a request in it that Mr. Kelly would be and should be facilitated with some post.

8110. What was Mr. Gibbons’s reaction to this suggestion?

—He promised to talk to Mr. Haughey, I think.

8111. He did not in any way suggest that this operation should be stopped?

—No.

8112. Did he express any surprise at Mr. Kelly’s involvement in this way?

—No. I cannot recollect he did.

8113. Yes. You told us in talking to Mr. Gibbons about Captain Kelly paying a visit to the Continent, that on that occasion, or immediately after—I think you said about 14th February—you said: “I told Mr. Gibbons that he said he was going to the Continent and I suspected he was going to vet arms—that was the expression I used, I think.”

—Yes.

8114. Would you like to comment on that use of the word “suspect”. It does not sound like—it does not fit in with your account that Captain Kelly told you what he was going to do and you went and got the authority of Mr. Gibbons and he then came under Mr. Gibbons’s orders?

—Yes.

8115. “Suspect” suggests Captain Kelly had not told you, you had found out and were informing the Minister of what you had found out?

—Yes. Well, I did possibly use the word “suspect”, but I think, candidly, the way we were talking at the time left no doubt in his mind that that was the purpose he was going for.

8116. You did use the word “suspect” and you said that was the expression you used, I think, in your own evidence to us. Why use that word if Captain Kelly told you all about it?

—I used the word “suspect” in a loose sense. I suppose I should have said “I know he is going for these arms”, but I think this is the sense in which I used it. There was no doubt in the general conversation we had anyway as to the fact that Captain Kelly was going at that stage to vet arms.

8117. Yes. Just to come back to another point to clear my mind on this: can you explain to us how you reconcile Captain Kelly as an Irish Army intelligence officer investigating what is happening in Northern Ireland, to keep you informed, with Captain Kelly operating for the Northern committees to purchase arms for them? How do you reconcile these two roles? They seem to me to be incompatible.

—I did not quite catch the last——

8118. How do you reconcile his role as an intelligence officer with his working for a group outside this State?

—Well, again we had to go back to this resignation. I mean, I did not at any stage— at this stage—feel that he should take part in this operation as an intelligence officer because he would be involving the Army, which would be embarrasing to the Army and, possibly, to the Government.

8119. Could we be clear as to what the end of that story was? You referred to this yourself a minute ago—you asked Captain Kelly to see Mr. Haughey or Mr. Blaney, or both, and to make known your views on this matter to them. You developed this, I think, more fully at the trial. What you said, as reported in The Irish Times—it is not a verbatim report so that, if you are unhappy with it at any stage, you can check the transcript; you asked Captain Kelly to report back to the Ministers, Mr. Haughey and Mr. Blaney, he thought it was, and advise them that in Colonel Hefferon’s opinion he could not carry on with this work while a serving Army officer.

Mr. McKenna—you were aware that he had been in touch with Mr. Blaney and Mr. Haughey?—I was aware that, because of his early duties, he had been in contact with both of these men.

Colonel Hefferon said he had told Captain Kelly to go to Mr. Blaney or Mr. Haughey and his purpose in doing this was to let Captain Kelly know that in his opinion he should not continue in the Army in these circumstances and that he would be facilitated in getting some position that would make up to him for the losses entailed in retiring from the Army.

Chairman.—Would the Deputy give the reference?

Deputy FitzGerald.—It is The Irish Times of 29th September, page 8, second last and last columns.

Colonel Hefferon said that Captain Kelly returned a few days later and said that these gentlemen were taking the matter up with Mr. Gibbons.

As far as I know, this is the last reference to it. What was the outcome of these talks with Messrs. Haughey and Blaney?

—The outcome of it was—the proposition which, I think, was put up to me was—I was informed of it some time about the third week in March—that Captain Kelly would be accomodated in some post, I am not sure, in the Department of Agriculture or in the Department of Finance—but it had to do with anti-pig smuggling.

8120. With what?

—Pig smuggling on the Border.

8121. Who informed you of that?

—Mr. Gibbons and, I think, Captain Kelly informed me, much about the same time.

8122. Was there any reaction to the talks with Messrs. Blaney and Haughey?

—Sorry?

8123. You had told him to see Messrs. Blaney and Haughey?

—Yes.

8124. Did any message come back from them through Captain Kelly on this matter?

—No. I understood they were looking for a suitable post at this time.

8125. The three Ministers were looking for a suitable post?

—I do not think Mr. Gibbons was involved in it because he would not have any post.

8126. It was he who told you the post had been found?

—Yes.

8127. That was in response to your own direct proposition to Mr. Gibbons?

—It was.

8128. You never mentioned to Mr. Gibbons you had told Captain Kelly to see Messrs. Blaney and Haughey?

—Oh, yes, I did, yes.

8129. You did?

—Yes.

8130. So that Mr. Gibbons then knew from you that Captain Kelly was in touch with Messrs. Blaney and Haughey?

—He did, yes.

8131. How much did you tell him of the relationship between them? You told us before—I hesitate to be firm in my recollection, but I had understood that you had not at any stage spoken to Mr. Gibbons about Captain Kelly’s working, shall we say, with Messrs. Blaney and Haughey?

—Yes.

8132. It now transpires you did, in fact?

—But I told him at this stage that I had advised Captain Kelly——

8133. When you told him that Captain Kelly had been working for these two other Ministers, did he express any surprise?

—No.

8134. And this was the first occasion you mentioned it and the only occasion you mentioned it?

—Well, as far as I can recollect, yes. It is possible I mentioned it before, but I have no recollection of it now.

8135. In the trial on the same date, 29th September, Irish Times, page, 9, column 4 you are quoted as saying:

Colonel Hefferon agreed that from his inquiries he was satisfied that John Kelly was an idealistic, sincere kind of man and a man of great integrity.

Subsequently, in response to subsequent questions, you accepted that he had been, you knew he was a member of the IRA and had been tried and charged with possession of arms and explosives and having associated with the Republican movement in Northern Ireland in 1956-62. Were you not concerned at Captain Kelly’s association with somebody who had had such relatively recent involvement with the IRA?

—No, not really. My impression, or at least assessment of the IRA in Northern Ireland was that it was practically non-existent and had, indeed, gone out after the collapse of the 1956-62 campaign, that, as I think John Kelly later gave evidence himself in Court that after coming out, that he divorced himself entirely, to a large extent, from politics. I think this was true of a lot of the people, if not all of them, in Northern Ireland at that time.

8136. And the fact that Captain Kelly was involved with an ex-member of the IRA in this arms affair didn’t bother you because he was “a sincere, idealistic type of man of great integrity”?

—Yes, well these are the words his counsel put to me, with which I agreed from what I knew of him, which wasn’t very much, but no, I wouldn’t be—after all I think the Cameron position, the Cameron report gave a good deal of credit to some members of the Republican movement up there for their ability to steward marches and so on. I think the situation between what the IRA was down here and the IRA or the Republican movement, as they prefer to call them, in Northern Ireland were two entirely different things.

8137. Do you still hold that view?

—Well, I must go back to the view that I was required not to——

8138. I’m sorry; that question is irrelevant. I should not have put it to you.

—I mean, it’s most highly unfair to try and put questions like this in a climate such as this room, when at the time such an explosive situation existed in Northern Ireland that we were required by all means in our power to try and calm if the worst turned up.

8139. But, Colonel Hefferon, it is precisely because the situation was explosive that I put the question to you as to whether you would not be disturbed at Captain Kelly’s close association with a former member of the IRA?

—I think that the situation reports we were getting up there were that, they were, a lot of the Republican movement or the IRA were involved with the Northern Ireland Civil Rights people and the question of leadership, responsible leadership in these communities was one of great importance.

8140. Of great importance?

—Yes.

8141. Do you mean that it was important that they should be in position of leadership, in your view?

—No, I didn’t say that, but it was important that the people, that we should find out who were the people that the community respected and would look to for leadership.

8142. Yes, I see. On the directive, could you tell us precisely what your view of it is because I think you referred to it on two occasions and I wasn’t quite clear on the significance you attached to it on these two occasions. The references are in Volume No. 7 there—have you got number 7 there? I am sure we gave you number 7?

—Yes, I have.

8143. Volume 7, page 313, 4164. and the other reference is in Volume 8, page 329. Have you got Volume 8 there?

—Yes.

8144. The first reference reads as follows, 4164—well, the previous question is:

But this is a usual operation!

—this is the question of funds for the arms.

—Oh no, an unusual operation, I would say.

Would you regard it as irregular?

—In the climate of the time, I had made my position clear to the then Minister for Defence on this matter on two occasions and had not been told to stop it. I did not feel it was my job to stop it. The directive of 6th February to some extent probably put a different complexion on matters than there had been previous to that.

The other reference is 4360:

You felt that he was working under ministerial direction, did you?—In reference to Captain Kelly.

—I felt, certainly after the 6th of February, that the possibility might arise, that this directive was a very plain and very responsible statement of policy by the Government, as I understood it, conveyed to the Chief of Staff at the time, that the Army would make preparations for incursions into Northern Ireland and I told the Minister for Defence and put him in the picture about it at this time and I certainly did not feel at that time that I should do anything to stop him, to stop Captain Kelly from …

Then you were interrupted at that point.

In other words it could have been part of Government policy to allow this activity?

—It could have been Government policy to prepare for the contingency which indeed in the climate of the time seemed to be going that way.

Now, these are the two references that I would trace to the directive. Could you tell us precisely what role, in your view, the directive played in this and what relevance it had, if any, because some of the evidence we have suggests it had no relevance. So would you tell us the words in the directive that you rely on for relevance and just how relevant you regard it as authorising anything that was done in the matters we are discussing?

—I think we referred to the directive earlier and I think the directive has not been produced, has it? Am I in a position now to elaborate on this one? At the time I gave this evidence, I did not know the State was claiming privilege on it.

8145. Yes, I can understand your reluctance to state what is in it at this stage. Would you like to state merely—you may like to claim privilege on this question, too, of course— what way you felt in replying to these two questions that it was relevant to the matter being discussed?

—I cannot very well go into it without quoting the words of the directive, can I?

8146. Yes. All right, I think, perhaps, it is unfair to press you under these circumstances. I can see your difficulty.

—I know it has been published already, but under privilege on that occasion and I think—

8147. Published? Under privilege?

—It was published—what my knowledge of it was, was referred to in evidence in the first trial.

8148. Published?

—Well, it was published in the newspapers.

8149. But in what form?

—It was printed as my evidence in the court.

8150. You quoted from it in court?

—Yes.

8151. Yes. I think what you said in court was that the directive was subject to a Government decision to implement it and you agreed that no decision had been made?

—Yes.

8152. You may not be able to comment, but that would suggest to me that it has no relevance to what we are discussing, although you did bring it in on two occasions?

—Yes, but I think if you read the directive you will see that it has relevance.

8153. Even though you told the court that the directive was subject to a Government decision to implement it and that no such decision had been made?

—Yes, even so.

8154. Could you suggest how a directive whose implementation had not been decided could be relevant to action taken?

—Well, as a directive, naturally, it was of such a nature that it would only be implemented in the case of some grave situation developing on the border. Plans had to be made to cater for this.

8155. Do you include, under plans, action involving the purchase of arms, because I would call that implementation rather than planning?

—You mean, did the directive give direct authority for the importation of arms?

8156. Yes?

—No, it didn’t.

8157. No. I see. So we have had a different view from Captain Kelly. I think the last thing I want to raise is simply if you would give us a full account of the meeting in Mr. Blaney’s office on 23rd April, because the account we have had of it from you so far has been very brief, containing little detail?

—Yes, and my attendance at it was very brief, for a kick-off.

8158. That explains your account being brief.

—But at the same time, I think Captain Kelly rang me that morning and he said that Mr. Blaney was rather anxious to have a meeting, had asked him to go down to his office—I am not sure of the time—it may have been half-past two or three o’clock, or some time like that. and that Mr. Gibbons would be there, and would I come along. I did not feel I had any function in going along, but I said all right, I would go along. We went to the office. It was the first time I had met Mr. Blaney, by the way, the 23rd April. We talked for a few moments about matters.

8159. Had you spoken to him on the phone before that?

—No. It was the first time I had met him, to my knowledge. I may have met him years ago, as a Deputy. I cannot remember that. But the point was, Mr. Haughey at that stage was in hospital and, I gathered, unconscious, or certainly had been unconscious the day before, and very seriously ill. And a point came up that certain officials of the Department of Finance were being questioned by the Special Branch, and in the absence of Mr. Haughey nobody seemed to know very much about it.

8160. Who produced this information?

—I think it was Mr. Blaney, and I think it was pretty well known at that time anyway, 23rd April.

8161. Within a limited circle?

—Yes, well, perhaps. Certainly known around Government Buildings, I think.

8162. But not in Leinster House, I think?

—Maybe; maybe. But the up-shot of the meeting, as far as I remember it, was that Mr. Blaney said he would go and try and get the doctor’s permission to see Mr. Haughey that night, to see if he could throw any light on it.

8163. Why did he think Mr. Haughey would throw light on it?

—I presume because he was the Minister in charge of the Department.

8164. What Department?

—The Department of Finance.

8165. But the Special Branch is in the Department of Justice. I do not follow the connection?

—Could he throw any light on the question, why it was going on.

8166. Surely the logical thing was to ask the Minister for Justice? It was the Special Branch—

—It was officials of the Department of Finance who were being questioned.

8167. But the officials were being questioned by the Special Branch. Surely the logical thing is to go to the Department of Justice, not to the people who are being investigated?

—Well, you need not ask me. I was out of office at that time.

8168. Do you not think it curious to go to the Minister for Finance rather than to the Minister for Justice?

—I am only giving you an account of the matter.

8169. It did not strike you as curious at the time?

—Not at the particular time, against the uncertainty. Mr. Blaney himself did not know what was going on. I do not think anybody else did. Mr. Gibbons did not appear to know either.

8170. And that was the end of the meeting?

—That was the end of the meeting, substantially.

8171. Did it resume later?

—It did, but I did not go in for the second meeting. I walked around, and at some stage one of the ushers came out and asked was I Colonel Hefferon, and I said “yes”. He said “come along”. The meeting had broken up.

8172. The meeting was here, was it, or at Government Buildings?

—In Government Buildings, I think. The first part, in the Minister for Agriculture’s office. When I met them the second time there were experts, possibly from here.

8173. You had no further discussion with anybody on that day? You did not meet any participants on the way out?

—I did. They were breaking up.

8174. What did they say?

—Just that Mr. Blaney was going to see the doctor to see if he could talk to Mr. Haughey.

8175. That was all that happened?

—That was all.

8176. Did you have any subsequent contact in the next week, with Mr. Blaney, Mr. Gibbons or Captain Kelly on this issue?

—No.

8177. What was the next thing you heard about the whole affair?

—I think the next thing was when it all became public property in the Dáil.

8178. There is one other point I omitted. Mr. Brady was explaining that he had had contacts with you about the Voice of the North, I think—am I right?

—Yes.

8179. About a radio station? That you approached him about costings for a radio station?

—At that time we had been approached by some of the Northern people to see what could be done about communications in the case of a breakdown.

8180. Who had been approached?

—We had been approached.

8181. You, or Captain Kelly?

—I had been approached, actually, through another of my Intelligence people. Intelligence people had been approached by the Northern people. I remember about this, because we had gone into it in some detail with some of our own technical officers and I had a report compiled about it which I mentioned to Mr. Haughey and that was the last I heard. It was not a very feasible proposition.

8182. You were not in touch with Mr. Brady about it?

—He was, as far as I remember, at that time in Government propaganda. Government Information Bureau. I met him, indeed, as much to find out, because I had reports that he was a very well-informed man in the North of Ireland at the time. I met him for that reason and mentioned this to him. I mentioned it during the course of the talk.

8183. Did you suggest he should produce costings?

—We produced the costings. I think I sent him a copy when it was over.

8184. I thought you had asked him to produce costings?

—No, he would not be in a position to produce costings. Possibly I asked him if he knew anything about Radio Éireann, the capacity to broadcast into the North, because my information at the time was that Radio Éireann was not received in many areas of the North.

8185. That was the only contact you had with Mr. Brady?

—I met him once more, I think.

8186. On this subject?

—No, merely a matter of finding out——

8187. Information about the North?

—About the North.

8188. Deputy H. Gibbons.—Colonel Hefferon, I expect that the Intelligence Section would be watching many activities within and without the State. Would the legal or illegal importation of arms be one of those activities over which you would be watching?

—It would be a matter in which we would have an interest. “Watching” is hardly the word that I would use for it, because our capacity for surveillance is very limited.

8189. But it would be of interest?

—It would be of interest.

8190. To know whether arms were coming in or not, legally or illegally?

—Yes.

8191. You stated at some stage you had to enlarge your staff, in the middle of August. Had you ever sufficient staff to do the work you had for them?

—I do not think I had because, as a matter of fact, the enlargement of staff which I got came from officers in the Reserve who had been called up and a number of them did not stay up very long.

8192. So that you were always somewhat short-staffed?

—We were having problems with staff.

8193. You were always somewhat short-staffed then? I think you agreed with Deputy FitzGerald that this importation of arms was not an Intelligence operation?

—No, I did not regard it as such.

8194. And you did not regard it as a security operation?

—Well, I do not know where you draw the distinction between security and Intelligence, but I suppose it would be one or the other.

8195. I had hoped to avoid defining what an Intelligence operation and what a security operation is, and where the importation of arms would fit into it. I could imagine its fitting into a security operation, but not very well into an Intelligence operation, particularly if it had some illegal overlay. Anyway, I think you said to Deputy FitzGerald that this was not an Intelligence operation?

—Yes.

8196. And you stated in Court that “it was not an Intelligence mission at all”. I think that is quoting you verbatim. I just do not want to be repeating some of the things that have been dealt with. At some stage during the Court proceedings you stated that “I looked on this whole matter in this light”, and the light was that it had been illegal. Is this your view still, of the purchase?

—I am sorry, Deputy Gibbons, I did not catch the question.

8197. You stated in the courts—you were being cross-examined—“I looked on the whole matter in this light.” This was the reply you made. It was being put to you that the operation was illegal. Do you still agree it was illegal?

8198. Chairman.—Could the Deputy perhaps give the reference?

8199. Deputy H. Gibbons.—The Irish Press, 14th October, 1970. Do you still consider that the operation was illegal?

—No. I would like the reference to that fully. I have no recollection of that question. Did I agree that the operation was illegal?

Mr. McKenna.—And further, did you make it clear to him that if he wished to become or stay involved, he would have to resign from the Army?

—I did.

Was not your reason for so telling him that Captain Kelly had made it clear to you that the help he proposed to give was help in the illegal importation?

—I looked on the whole matter in this light.

8200. Then you go on to say “If the Army wished to purchase arms, through special channels through which arms could be and were purchased——”. This is the quotation. I think it remains whether you think it is correct.

—Yes, well, I think against the background of Mr. McKenna’s question on that one, I take it it refers to the operation which Captain Kelly wanted to carry out in mid-January, that I looked on the whole operation at that stage, if the Army wanted to import arms, they would not import arms in that way.

8201. Yes. I think this is the point I wanted to make. There is another aspect of this which I would like to put to you, Colonel Hefferon. Captain Kelly has stated that he told you everything and he also stated that he told the Minister everything. Again, Deputy FitzGerald put this to you and I do not wish to labour it. We, the observers here, are in this difficulty. Colloquially, Captain Kelly had three hats. He was an Intelligence Officer, which was his occupation; he was a liaison officer, appointed for the administration of a fund earmarked by the Government for aiding the North; and, thirdly, he was taking part in the importation of arms. Now, I think it would be true to say that from time to time the hats were changed as different situations were presented but, further, there were two aspects of this importation of arms. Once would be the importation of arms with definite proof here that money was supplied for the North. The other would be the importation of arms with the allegation being made here that money was supplied from the South. In all this I think at times we are becoming confused. To get back to the point I put, to try and separate those things and the question of information, I think you said at some stage that Captain Kelly did not tell you the whole story about his journeys at Frankfurt.

Again, this has been put to you, the use of the word “suspect”—I must say I took the same interpretation as Deputy FitzGerald has taken—you have given an answer and I will not press you upon it. Secondly, you did state that he did not tell you where the money was coming from. He did not tell you specifically where the money was coming from, you had your own ideas. Deputy FitzGerald dealt with this also. The third point that you made was that he did not tell you about the shipment of arms until it actually failed to arrive. This is another point where full information was not given. A fourth point is, he did not tell you to whom the arms were consigned. This became a very important matter for discussion afterwards. Now, another aspect of this was that in the middle of January you said that his only involvement up to this time was to give advice of a technical nature. I think you have said this on two occasions. Another point, I do not know if it is of any importance, was at some stage he did not tell you Mr. Luykx was going with him. Those are some real six points. I would suggest to you it is reasonable to draw a conclusion from this that Captain Kelly did not tell you everything about this importation——

8202. Chairman.—Deputy, I suggest you put these questions one after another regarding the six points you have elaborated to the witness and get an answer yes or no from the witness.

8203. Deputy H. Gibbons.—I want to avoid repetition. I will take up the third point, the other two were dealt with by Deputy FitzGerald. You were not told about the shipment of arms until they arrived?

—Not to my recollection. Until they failed to arrive, you mean?

8204. Failed to arrive, yes. You were not told to whom the arms were consigned?

—No.

8205. Up to the middle of January, you thought that this help was of a technical nature?

—This was my impression when Captain Kelly approached me.

8206. Captain Kelly did not tell you about Mr. Luykx going to the Continent with him?

—No.

8207. Another important statement of yours which has a bearing on this is taken again from the court statement. You answered in reply to a question that you did not think it was your job to keep the Minister informed. I can see from your point of view that if this was an illegal importation of arms, you did not see it as your job, or perhaps even as a legal importation of arms, but this is the statement you made in court. On the other hand, Captain Kelly told us different, that you did keep the Minister informed. Do you still confirm that this was the situation?

—I am afraid I did not follow the latter part there, that Captain Kelly had stated he did keep the Minister informed and I stated he did not. Is that what you said?

8208. I will have to go back again to quoting the Irish Press of the 14th October. Mr. Finlay put it to you:

“Did you keep the Minister for Defence fully informed as to what Captain Kelly was doing?”

“No, I did not feel it was my job to keep the Minister so informed because I felt he was dealing directly with the Minister with the matter and with some other Ministers concerned.”

So I put it to you that you did not keep the Minister fully informed.

—I had reports from Captain Kelly at the time that the Minister was fully informed of this matter over a period.

8209. But, you see—and this is why I put in the introduction to where we were kind of bogged-down in the hats situation that it would be absolutely true for Captain Kelly to say to you that he kept the Minister fully informed on what were his legal duties, but it does not follow from that that he kept the Minister informed on what were illegal operations. I think this was put to Captain Kelly and as I say, he sought refuge in saying “well, this was an intelligence operation,” a security operation and this is right away where we get bogged down in this situation on words. What I want to put to you, Colonel Hefferon, is: by virtue of the fact that Captain Kelly did not keep you fully informed and by virtue of the fact that you did not keep the Minister fully informed, I think it is a fair inference to draw that, to put it mildly, the Minister was inadequately informed. Would you accept that?

—I am afraid not. First and foremost, I had to rely on reports on this matter, on the reports I had been getting about the Minister’s reception of delegations here and his presence at delegations on the 3rd and 4th of March, and the fact that I had the information I had given him about Captain Kelly’s activities from mid-January onwards, so with the whole chain of events, I think he should have been pretty well informed about it. At any stage he could have asked my advice about it.

8210. You will agree if, as I present the case is any way like the truth, that there could be some gaps in the information reaching the Minister?

—This was possible, of course.

8211. You agree that one of the things Intelligence would be interested in was the question of the legal or illegal importation of arms? This was a particular time in our history when this was of some importance—and was there any report made on this question at that time? I do not intend to go into details on it because I agree that you may be prohibited from doing this?

—A report made on the importation or the attempted importation?

8212. You may wonder why I put in “legal,” but it is quite possible that you could have a situation where a Minister for Defence who is the man entitled to take in arms legally, might have the intention of using them illegally in the State, and for this reason I feel it would be in the interest of the security of the State to know all about the arms coming in, legally and illegally. The other thing that interests me is this, that you state that your staff was never up to full capacity, but still Captain Kelly, who was one of the most important members of it, had plenty time for work other than intelligence work. Would you like to comment on that?

—Well, he had, above all the people I had at my disposal at that time, contacts in the North that nobody else had and I think he could do his intelligence work better by doing the other work in conjunction with it.

8213. Another thing which I think we did not get absolutely clearly from you was, when did you learn that State moneys were being used illegally? I think you said that you did not learn this until the whole thing broke? Is this correct?

—No answer.

Adjustments to recording equipment having been carried out.

8214. The other question I would like to ask you about—you used the word again, going back to the word “suspect” on the 19th February. At what time did you become sure that this operation of taking in those arms was going on?

—Some time in mid-March I think.

8215. There is another aspect of this that I would like to deal with. There is the inference made—you made it here in reference to some people down with the Minister—“I inferred very strongly that they were promised support”—and you mentioned the same thing again in respect of people coming to the Minister. Are you suggesting Colonel Hefferon, that by virtue of those visits, they were in fact promised arms by the Government— those people coming down from the North?

—Well, all the Government Ministers were not at these meetings so I cannot say about that, but the Ministers who did receive them— I understood from the reports I had—and let me say that in this case Captain Kelly was my main informant—that they had been promised support.

8216. That they were promised arms?

—Certainly by some Ministers, in March.

8217. Now, the other thing I would like to put to you is that in answer to Deputy FitzGerald, you said that he “kept you informed about all I wanted to know about”, and again getting back to the duties of an intelligence unit, the question of taking in arms, either legally or illegally, would be of some importance. Would you not have sought information from him about this?

—About the taking in of arms?

8218. Yes?

—Oh, yes.

8219. And what did he tell you any time you sought information from him about it?

—Well, he told me just before he left every time that he wanted to go, where he was going to and that he was looking after this purchase of arms.

8220. He paid four visits to the Continent, I think?

—Yes.

8221. The first, on 19th February, you suspected that he was going to vet arms, but at what time did you concretely—on the other hand, you said that he told you nothing about the arms coming in until they failed to arrive.

—This is my recollection. I know Captain Kelly has said that he told me before that, but I do not have a recollection of his telling me before. My recollection is that he told me afterwards—that is, after the 25th March.

8222. So that you had some knowledge then that the arms would be coming in before the 25th March, I think, it was?

—Yes.

8223. Volume 8—just two small points: at Question 4215, in your answer, the fifth line, you say: “I requested my representative to find out”. Now, I do not wish to have another name thrown into the ring here, but I would like to ask you who was your representative on this occasion when the Clones account was moved. Would it be an Army officer, or a civilian, or somebody like that, or Captain Kelly?

—This is question 4215, is it?

8224. 4215?

—This has nothing at all to do, of course, with the Clones account. This has to do with the Monaghan office.

8225. Yes, I am sorry. That is my mistake. Who was your representative? I do not want the name now.

—No, I do not want to mention the name, but it would be an officer.

8226. One of your own officers?

—Yes.

8227. At 4217, in your answer:

—“For reasons completely outside our control the office and the people who were running it had their own differences and eventually it folded up”

would you be in a position to enlarge on the differences or would it be a question of privilege?

—Oh, I would have to claim absolute privilege on this.

8228. Chairman.—Perhaps the witness would tell us, or give us, some indication as to why he claims absolute privilege?

—Because, I mean, if I go into this matter I think it may involve me in mentioning people, or so, and I do not want to do that.

8229. Is it a question of State security or something like that?

—It is. First and foremost, as you know, I was very reluctant to have this office at all on account of the people who founded it and, on that account, privilege is very important.

8230. Dr. Gibbons.—Mr. Chairman, I will not press the point. To sum up, Colonel Hefferon, I think it is true to say, or, rather, I do not think it is true to say, that our actions speak louder than our words because I think many of us find ourselves on occasions having to use words to explain our actions to others and even to rationalise our actions for ourselves: Deputy Keating, I think, introduced a very happy phrase—an attitude of mind— which I think covers what I want to ask. Throughout this period of three or four months what was your attitude of mind to Captain Kelly? To shorten the thing, I have a feeling it was something like this, or, otherwise, I cannot understand anything at all rationally: that you were suspecting that Captain Kelly was engaging or might engage in the vetting of arms, supplying technical information on arms, perhaps importing arms; you assumed this was going on and that the money for this was coming in from the North of Ireland people, but that you never suspected, until the thing broke, that this was coming from what we call the triple account or the switched funds. Would this be your attitude of mind at this time?

—I did not know anything about the switched fund or the special arms account. I did know there was an account in Baggot Street, the main account.

8231. Did you ever suspect that these funds were being used illegally to take in arms?

—Well, the funds that I suspected were being used for the arms were the funds at the disposal of the Northern committees which, possibly, would include some of these funds.

8232. Deputy Keating.—I wonder, Chairman, before I start to question, it is just two hours now since Colonel Hefferon took the stand, and I would be very happy to go on until we finish, but I think it would be only fair to ask him first how he feels about going on. He has been answering questions for a long time now.

8233. Chairman.—Captain Keating is anxious to know——

8234. Deputy MacSharry.—Is that promotion or demotion?

8235. Chairman.—Deputy Keating is anxious to know if you would like a break? Would you like a break of ten minutes or a quarter of an hour?

—Well, I do not mind.

8236. Chairman.—We will adjourn for ten minutes. Would that suit?

Deputy FitzGerald.—Yes, and finish at a quarter past ten, half an hour.

8237. Deputy Keating.—Colonel Hefferon, the 12th August 1969 was an important date in the North because it was the day on which the battle of the Bogside erupted. Now, how soon after that did you come to know of requests coming from Northern Ireland for arms?

—Well, that is a difficult question because I think the request for arms began to come in almost immediately, certainly after the 15th, I would say.

8238. After 15th August, 1969?

—Yes.

8239. Would I be right to say that these requests came from almost every part of Northern Ireland where there were significant minority communities?

—Yes.

8240. So, already before the 1st September, it was clear that there were very widespread requests being made in the South for arms for the North?

—Yes.

8241. Would I be right in saying that the people who came from the North were looking for arms inside the State here, inside the jurisdiction of this State?

—Yes.

8242. And also in America?

—Yes, we had reports of that.

8243. And in the United Kingdom?

—Yes, we had reports of that.

8244. And in a number of countries of Continental Europe?

—Yes.

8245. I suppose, and I don’t wish to refer to a bitter thing, but I am sure, I am convinced that it is relevant, I suppose that it is an essential part of your task as the head of Army Intelligence to protect those arms which are in the hands of the Army from getting into the hands of the IRA? That is a very important part of your work. Is that correct?

—It is, yes.

8246. In fact, I venture the thought that a lot of your work is overshadowed by a bitter recollection of a Christmas early in the war when in fact a major coup was carried out by the IRA. This must be the thinking of every Intelligence officer. Is that correct?

—Yes, I suppose this is fairly——

8247. So that protecting the arms of this State and the arms of this Army from falling into the hands of the IRA is a central part, a continuing part of the work of Army Intelligence. Is that correct?

—That is right.

8248. And the responsibility for doing that would have fallen primarily on the person who was head of Army Intelligence, namely, at the relevant time, yourself?

—Not primarily, because every commanding officer is responsible for security of arms under his own control, but we would have an overall responsibility for it.

8249. The responsibility for uncovering efforts to get those arms from the Army would be primarily your responsibility?

—Yes.

8250. So that it would be fair to say that a sort of battle of wits with the IRA is a continuing part of the work of Army Intelligence?

—I suppose that in a general way one could say that.

8251. Could one justly say that when these events erupted in August, 1969, that one of the first places that would have occurred to the IRA to get arms would be from the hands of Irish soldiers?

—Yes.

8252. Would you tell us what you thought was the policy of the Government in regard to the IRA in the period of the summer of 1969?

—I did not see any change of attitude on the part of the Government during that time.

8253. If there was no change of attitude, would you state what the continuing attitude dating over—what?—a decade was towards the IRA?

—Yes.

8254. Could you say briefly what that attitude was?

—The attitude was that arms should not be in the hands of anybody except the legal forces of the State.

8255. Would it also be part of your knowledge, as head of Army Intelligence, that there has been a long tradition of making efforts at illegal importation of arms into the State?

—Oh, yes.

8256. And the struggle against this, from what you said of your understanding of Government policy, would have been a significant part of your work?

—Yes.

8257. I wanted this as background, as I must say your answers have been as I expected, but I wanted it as background to questions that I wish to come to later. I take it that an army is designed to function effectively in the circumstances that everyone hopes will never occur, namely, in the circumstances of crisis and of war?

—Yes.

8258. You have offered as an explanation of certain confusions that occurred from August, 1969, the thought that there were special circumstances and that this was an extraordinary time?

—Yes.

8259. Is it not precisely for times of confusion and extraordinary times that the structures of armies are designed to cater?

—Well, they should cater for peace and war, both.

8260. But they must be able to stand up to the stresses of war and of extraordinary situations?

—Yes, I would hope so.

8261. Is it not more essential in times of crisis and in times of war that the chain of command should be absolutely clear. It is necessary at all times, of course, for armies but surely it is necessary in times of crisis, more necessary than in times of calm?

—Well, it is equally necessary, anyway.

8262. From your testimony—I am now offering an opinion, but if I offer an opinion you can comment on it—from your testimony and from the testimony of Captain Kelly it seems to me that the clear chain of command, if I climb up the chain it would run, Captain Kelly to you, to the Chief of Staff, to the Minister for Defence, that that clear chain of command became blurred and confused during the period of the events we are now investigating, specifically from October, 1969 to April, 1970? Is that a fair comment?

—I don’t think so. I think the chain of command operated normally, fairly normally.

8263. The chain of command operated normally, in your opinion. You gave it as your opinion under questioning from Deputy FitzGerald very recently that Captain Kelly accepted and acted on instructions, not orders but instructions, from the Minister for Finance?

—Yes.

8264. Are you able to reconcile that statement with the statement that the chain of command operated normally?

—Well, the situation that faced the Minister for Finance, in my understanding, was how to apply these funds in Northern Ireland to the best advantage. Captain Kelly was somebody who had got himself a special knowledge of that area and I did not see anything wrong in his operating with the Minister for Finance in this capacity.

8265. I want to resume the subsequent questions in a moment, but I want to turn aside for a second to ask you why, in your opinion, in view of the fact that the Red Cross could not legally operate inside Northern Ireland— the Government had queried this and found that it could not do so—why, in your opinion, a perfectly open, publicised committee of leading persons was not set up in Northern Ireland to whom the £100,000 could have been formally, publicly, openly transferred if the intention of this grant in aid was a bona fide one? Why another mechanism than a totally open mechanism?

—This I could not answer.

8266. Does it not strike you as in any way peculiar that a sub rosa mechanism which subverted the Red Cross and permitted £100,000 to get out of the hands for whom it was intended should have been set up if the intention was merely to channel funds into Northern Ireland?

—I cannot answer that. This is a matter within the responsibility of the Minister for Finance.

8267. Can you see any difficulty with naming three eminent people in Northern Ireland and simply saying sums had been handed to them publicly for relief? In your experience as an Intelligence Officer, is there any difficulty in that process?

—I do not know, Deputy Keating. I think you are asking me there something which is outside my competence.

8268. O.K. I accept that answer, and revert to the question of the chain of command. You said that you saw nothing, as I understand it— I am perhaps paraphrasing you—nothing wrong and nothing irregular in a mechanism whereby instructions were given to a subordinate of yours by a Minister of another Department—is that correct?

—Yes.

8269. If the Minister for Finance had told the Minister for Defence, who had told you so that you could instruct Captain Kelly, would that have been a superior mechanism to the mechanism of the Minister for Finance short-circuiting both the Minister for Defence and yourself and going straight to Captain Kelly?

—I suppose it would; yes.

8270. But you see nothing inacceptable in what the Minister for Finance did in regard to your subordinate?

—No, I do not see anything unacceptable in it. My interest, as I have explained here time and again, was in Intelligence itself, and Captain Kelly had been working closely with these people from Northern Ireland and the fact that the Minister for Finance knew this and that he was in a position to advise him on this matter was one that I did not see I should interfere with in any way.

8271. But, Colonel Hefferon, with respect, the question of responsibility arises at this time, because someone who was under you in this chain of command, who was your subordinate, in fact as a result of acting on instructions through a mechanism that you do not find objectionable set in train events which resulted in £100,000 being used in a certain way, ministers’ losing their jobs, Court cases and a whole lot of things. To say you were only interested in Intelligence, it seems to me, is to cast aside responsibility for what persons in a job subordinate to you actually do.

—I do not see that it follows at all.

8272. But surely the chain of command exists as a thing evolved in all armies over a very long period because it is found to be essential for their efficient functioning—is that fair enough?

—Yes.

8273. The chain of command was set aside in this case—is that not true?

—I do not entirely agree, because the Director of Intelligence has functions which the chain of command does not operate, entirely always through the right structure——

8274. Yes. I do not wish to interrupt your answer, but as I understand it you may occasionally skip a link but you resume the chain. Specifically, you may go directly to the Minister for Defence without going through the Chief of Staff. Is this what you refer to?

—This is true.

8275. But surely the issuing of instructions by another Minister is not a comparable action to the omission of one link in the chain?

—Well, this was for a specific purpose. This was for administering the fund, these instructions that were given by Deputy Haughey.

8276. Have you any thought as to why the Minister for Finance at the time, Mr. Haughey, would have chosen to go directly to Captain Kelly and not regularise things by using a very easy mechanism, namely, through his colleague the Minister for Defence and down the line through you?

—They have done this, I do not know. But certainly when I visited him in the last week of September he was aware of Captain Kelly’s activities in the North of Ireland and he was aware also, or he appeared to be aware. that Captain Kelly would be able to help in administering the funds.

8277. Am I right in thinking that Captain Kelly first entered Northern Ireland in August 1969?

—Yes, as far as I know.

8278. And in September 1969 the then Minister for Finance asked you specifically to bring him with you when you went to visit him?

—Yes.

8279. Do you know why he chose Captain Kelly?

—I do not know. Captain Kelly was one of the best-informed people available to me at the time.

8280. Concerning Northern Ireland?

—Concerning Northern Ireland.

8281. On the basis of experience which started on the 12th August?

—The situation developed very suddenly.

8282. He had built up his expertise in one month, at the outside six weeks, to a level that surpassed anything that could be offered by any of your other people?

—This is true. I did not have anyone else with anything near the level of knowledge of Northern Ireland and the problems which had erupted as a result of the troubles there in August, the 12th and 13th.

8283. Yet we are clear that Captain Kelly’s experience started by an accidental visit while on holiday in the week starting August 12th.

—Yes.

8284. You are telling us that on a day in September, a day when the then Minister for Finance asked you to bring Captain Kelly to visit him at his home he had developed an expertise which could not be matched by anybody else in your Service?

—I do not think it is a question of expertise entirely, but he had contacts in the North, in both Derry and Belfast, which could not be matched by anybody, certainly, known to me.

8285. I look on this as a very remarkable answer about the nature of our Military Intelligence, I am bound to say. However, I do not want to pursue that. Am I to understand absolutely clearly that you are convinced Deputy Haughey’s reason for wishing Captain Kelly to be brought with you was because of the level of Captain Kelly’s information on the North of Ireland?

—He certainly gave me that impression.

8286. Apart from the fact that he was giving you that impression, you must be aware of the fact that Intelligence people sometimes give you an impression which you would not necessarily accept. I did not ask you what impression Deputy Haughey gave to you. I asked whether you thought it was Captain Kelly’s expertise which accounted for his being singled out in this way by name by a Minister of another Department?

—I think so; yes.

8287. Do you feel you have any responsibility for the events which subsequently arose due to the fact that the chain of command in relation to someone subordinate to you became blurred?

—This is an all-embracing question.

8288. Yes, but it is a very important event in the life of this whole nation, and in that Captain Kelly was your subordinate and was central in all these events I am asking whether in this evolution do you feel you have anything to reproach yourself with for permitting this chain of command to become blurred?

—I do not think so.

8289. Did you know of any importation of arms into this country in the autumn of 1969 through Dublin airport?

—No.

8290. Do you know of such now?

—Except from hearing and reading about it, the report of Chief Superintendent Fleming’s evidence here.

8291. Is it only through Chief Superintendent Fleming’s report to this Committee a few days ago that you became aware of this?

—Yes.

8292. You believe such importation could have taken place without your knowledge?

—Certainly.

8293. In view of your position as head of Army Intelligence at the material time—you were head of Army Intelligence?

—I was then. I think I made it clear already that we were working with a very small staff. We did not have surveillance capacity.

8294. Do the different sections of Intelligence of this country conceal things of this importance from each other?

—I would not say so. But I certainly did not hear of any importation.

8295. Would it have been normal, if Chief Superintendent Fleming knew of these events, for him to have informed your organisation, as a parallel agency in the country? The illegal importation of arms into this country at this period was an extraordinarily serious thing?

—Yes.

8296-7. Do I take it that Army Intelligence was not informed by the Special Branch of any arms importation?

—I should have heard about it if such happened.

8298. Do you believe that any such importation of arms took place in the autumn of 1969?

—I do not know. I must answer that question honestly because it has been said that it did take place.

8299. And you heard other suggestions that it took place prior to the evidence of Chief Superintendent Fleming at this committee in the very recent past?

—There were all sorts of reports that there were arms coming in to various places, but that they had got some at Dublin Airport— I certainly do not remember hearing any report on that one.

8300. But you accept the fact that it could have happened without coming to your knowledge?

—I would, yes.

8301. Would you feel annoyed in a professional sense if it happened and you did not hear about it?

—I do not know, I suppose I would. I rather felt that the people who were aware had good reasons for not passing it any further. I would have to accept that.

8302. Are you familiar with the evidence that has been put before the committee of a trip to England in November, 1969 for the purpose of the attempted purchase of arms?

—This is——?

8303. Well, the George Dixon account. A London bank was advised to make £11,450 available for this mythical George Dixon when he appeared at that time in London and Chief Superintendent Fleming gave names and dates, an article in the Irish Times gave names and dates and Captain Kelly suggested people.

—Yes.

8304. The question was, when did you first know of these activities in November, 1969 about the purchase of arms in England and bringing them to Ireland?

—I think I got a report from Captain Kelly some time in November, as far as I remember, that certain people had been to England to purchase arms, had been in touch with some people over there, and that a certain gentleman came across here and appeared to be a national provocateur who—at that stage I wrote to Special Branch and asked what was known about this man. Eventually I got a report, not a very long time afterwards either, to say that he was, generally speaking, a bad hat and——

8305. I was less interested in the person who came to Ireland to sell the arms than the persons who went to England to purchase them. Were you aware that Captain Kelly had been in discussion with one of these persons, according to his own evidence, on the night before he went?

—This was a person from the North of Ireland.

8306. No, a person from within the jurisdiction. Captain Kelly advised him not to do it, but this person persisted in doing it? Were you aware of that?

—I think I became aware of it some time around that, when exactly I do not know.

8307. Let us say, anyway these events were of the order of the 18th November, the middle of November?

—Yes, put it like that.

8308. You would have got to know of it some time in November, some time later on in the month?

—Yes.

8309. What would you normally do in such circumstances when information of that sort came into your possession?

—In this particular case I think I directed Captain Kelly to keep in touch with the situation to see what was happening. When I got the report back, I informed him that it would be well to keep clear of this man, not to trust him.

8310. To which man are you referring?

—This is the man who came across to the Gresham Hotel.

8311. I just said I was not interested in the man who came to Ireland as agent provocateur, I was interested in a person who went to England.

—Yes.

8312. This was at least one person, possibly two, who went with someone from Northern Ireland to try to purchase arms in Britain.

—Yes.

8313. I am asking what action you took at the chain of command to be more specific. I do not want to know what action you took in regard to Captain Kelly in this chain of events.

—I do not think I took any action at that time. The whole thing did not come to anything.

8314. Moneys were expended on travel. A London bank was instructed to make £11,500 available, but because they did not actually bring in any arms, is this the reason you are suggesting you took no action?

—Yes.

8315. Is that the only reason you took no action?

—I did not feel it necessary to take any action in this case, any further action.

8316. In the light of hindsight do you think that was a correct decision?

—I do not know. I am not fully acquainted with all the angles of this thing even yet.

8317. I just want to be clear on your testimony. You learned within weeks of its happening that some person, one from the North and two from the South, one with extremely powerful connections, after discussions with one of your subordinates, went to England to purchase arms, financed quite well in regard to that purchase, and you did not think it necessary to report this?

—I did not know where the finance was coming from. I assumed the finances were——

8318. People who have £11,500 have clearly got something going for them, you know they are not just insignificant.

—No. There was a good deal of money collected in various places in both England and the North of Ireland, and in America.

8319. You said you did not know where the money came from? Did you know the amount they had?

—You mean, came out of the fund, the Northern Aid Fund?

8320. I was not asking if you knew where it came from. I am asking you now did you know they had that much money? Did Captain Kelly tell you the amount of money?

—No, he did not tell me about the amount of money.

8321. Chairman.—We will adjourn till tomorrow morning.

The Committee adjourned at 10.20 p.m. until 11 a.m. on Thursday the 18th February 1971.