Committee Reports > List of Committees > Dáil > 1971 > Committee of Public Accounts > Final Report - Northern Ireland Relief Expenditure

MIONTUAIRISC NA FIANAISE

(Minutes of Evidence)

Dé Máirt, 16 Feabhra, 1971

Tuesday, 16th February, 1971

The Committee met at 11 a.m.

DEPUTY P. HOGAN in the chair.

ORDER OF DÁIL OF 1st DECEMBER, 1970.

Mr. E. F. Suttle (An tArd-Reachtaire Cuntas agus Ciste) was in attendance in an advisory capacity.

The Committee deliberated.

Mr. Brendan O’Donnell sworn and examined.

7484. Deputy FitzGerald.—Mr. O’Donnell, there are a few points on which you might be able to help us. They arise in the evidence around Question 3100. Have you got a copy?

—No, I have not.

7485. It is Volume No. 6, Page 237?

—Yes.

7486. In reply to a question from me, I think, Mr. Fagan gave an answer which related to the question of Captain Kelly knowing the Minister before he himself came in contact with him. He identified in reply to these questions the time as being in October and that this occurred either at his first meeting around the 7th to 9th October or at the latest at his second meeting, with Captain Kelly?

—Yes.

7487. On that occasion it would, therefore, have been either at the beginning of October or probably around the middle of October, but not significantly later than that, he spoke to you on the subject and asked you out of curiosity as to whether you knew Captain Kelly. He said that your reply was, “He has been in and out there for the past few months.” That, in fact, was the actual wording. This would seem to indicate that it could have been later than mid-October. This was the phrase used. In other words, having said that he realised there was a kind of a conflict and a doubt in his own mind, but he did come back, I think, later to saying that it was in October, anyway?

—Yes.

7488. Now, could you clarify this point? There appears to be some conflict as to when Captain Kelly first came to see the Minister?

—Yes. Perhaps if I said that my first acquaintance with these events was, say, around the middle of September and the first person that I remember coming in contact with the Minister was Colonel Hefferon and that was towards the end of September. I think it was the 25th September. It was definitely after that that Captain Kelly came to see the Minister. So Mr. Fagan, you know, is not correct there when he says that I said a few months. As he says, I may have used it loosely. It may have been a few weeks. As far as I am concerned Captain Kelly could not have seen the Minister certainly before the end of September.

7489. Yes. That was my impression. I thought there was a misunderstanding here. I just thought we should clarify this in order to avoid any confusion.

—Certainly I would not have put it before the end of September.

7490. That is quite clear. The only other point then which arose in Question 3107 is on the complicated question of the delegation of authority down the line. I asked a question of Mr. Fagan quoting what the Minister, Mr. Haughey, had said in Court: “I was always in close touch with the Taoiseach and if he were going away for holidays or for a weekend his secretary would let my secretary know and when the Taoiseach would be away he would expect me to cope with any emergencies or anything else that might arise in his absence”. I asked Mr. Fagan: “Is the reference to ‘my secretary’ there to you or to Mr. O’Donnell and he said “Mr. O’Donnell”. Can I ask you whether that statement is a correct one, that statement of Mr. Haughey’s is a correct one?

—I must say that I have no recollection of that ever happening. I have seen your question to the Taosieach in the Dáil Debates on this and I have seen the supplementaries which arose and the only thing that I can say is that, you know, there was always quite close liaison between the Taoiseach’s office and our own office. As you know, the Department of Finance provides a lot of secretarial service for the Taoiseach’s Department, and there was always a considerable amount of coming and going between the two offices. I certainly remember the Minister asking me on a number of occasions to check would the Taoiseach be available at week-ends or on other occasions and I did that and sometimes, you know, I got the information. Other times I did not, but I have no specific recollection of traffic in the other direction, as it were, of the Taoiseach’s private secretary ringing me up and saying: “The Taoiseach will be away and would you ever tell the Minister and he is expected to deal with emergencies, and so on.” I have no definite recollection of that. I am not saying that it could not have happened but I just do not remember it happening.

7491. Certainly it could not have been a regular practice or you would remember it in any event?

—If it was a regular practice I should remember it. Again, of course, the office is a pretty busy office and there are things happening all the time, and people coming and going, and so on, but I should say, if it was a regular practice, I would expect to remember it, but I just don’t remember.

7492. It would be a matter of some importance, and remain in your mind, if the Taoiseach were delegating his functions to the Minister. It would be very important if the Minister were in that position during the week-end and it is not a thing you would be likely to forget?

—Well, no. If a message was conveyed to me that the Taoiseach was going away and the Taoiseach was delegating his functions to the Minister in his absence—it is again a thing that would stand out in your mind, I agree; on the other hand, if I may express a personal opinion here, I do not think that is the sort of thing that would be conveyed through a private secretary really. I think it would be something that the Taoiseach would say direct to the Minister, if it arose, you know.

7493. The Minister’s suggestion was that——?

—I know that.

7494. Is there any possibility of confusion because of the Taoiseach asking Mr. Haughey to do a particular thing for him over the week-end?

—This happened on a number of occasions. As you can imagine, like, the Taoiseach may have been attending a function and something may have happened and the Minister might have had to step in for him and read his speech, or something like that. That happened all right.

7495. But not coping with emergencies?

—I have no recollection of that in those terms.

7496. Finally, you say the Minister checked that the Taoiseach would be available over the week-end. What was that in connection with? In the ordinary way why would he need to know that?

—On occasions he would ask me to see— “Well, I want to see the Taoiseach” and would I check with his private secretary as to what his movements are and, on checking, the Taoiseach would be away for the week-end, and that type of thing, you know.

7497. I understand.

The witness withdrew.

Gearóid Mac Eoin sworn and examined.

7498. Chairman.—Mr. Mac Eoin, you know Captain Kelly, do you?

—There are very few people who do not know Captain Kelly now, I would say. Yes, I do.

7499. When did you first get to know him? In what circustances?

—It is very hard to be specific in this, you know, because of the company I kept. I saw Captain Kelly very often within the period, say, from 12th August onwards. The first time I saw Captain Kelly was in the corridor of Government Buildings outside Mr. Blaney’s office when I left Mr. Blaney’s office. I just cannot be specific as to when. Somebody said to me: “This is Jim Kelly”. I got to know him intimately previous to the proceedings in the district court. I particularly got to know his family circumstances and got involved in his family circumstances and, as you probably know, Chairman, I was his bailsman in the district court and in the subsequent proceedings.

7500. Had you any familiarity with the Baggot Street accounts?

—With Baggot Street accounts?

7501. Did you know any of the operators?

—No. In that sense I had no familiarity with the accounts.

7502. You have made a submission here about a cheque?

—Yes.

7503. In fact that is why you are here; a cheque for £1,200. This is a cheque—you took this cheque, I understand, at the end of April, 1970 from a Mr. F?

—Yes. Chairman.

7504. He has the——

—I have the code, yes.

7505. You have, yes. He could not get it cashed at the time and you cashed it for him, that’s correct is it?

—Well, I—if I may, Chairman—I would like to expand on that because, unfortunately, you know, I have been cast by the public as a sort of sinister influence in this whole affair, perhaps because of my physical infirmity and the fact that I wear this eye patch but the circumstances were quite simple in that I had an appointment—I was asked to meet Mr. F in either the Shelbourne Hotel or my own home, which wasn’t for me unusual because I had met him on previous occasions because of the company I kept. And it was round about the time when the banks were working short time. Now I don’t think he knew this and he arrived in Dublin when the banks had closed and he told me that he had a cheque for £1,200, that he needed money urgently and he wanted to know could I do anything about it. I told him that I felt confident that from the sources available to me that I could provide a large proportion of the amount involved and I left, whether it was my home or the Shelbourne, I am not quite sure. I went and I got £1,000 which I gave him within a hour or an hour and half of the first meeting with him. Subsequently, perhaps the following day or a day later, I went to the Baggot Street branch of the Munster and Leinster Bank with this cheque which was the traditional Munster and Leinster Bank green cheque and I approached a friend of mine, Mr. Ó Muirgheasa, and I identified—he is a personal friend of mine. I presented the cheque and he passed it for payment and I got £1,200 and I gave the balance of the £200 to Mr. F.

7506. Yes. You have known Mr. F for a number of years, have you?

—No, you see—again, you know, he is cast in the same role in this drama as Captain Kelly in that he came down regularly from Belfast because of his committment in Belfast to Dublin to see certain people. I was in the company of these people when he arrived but he didn’t come to see me but I got to know him and obviously I was identified to him as a person who, perhaps, had access to ready cash. I didn’t know him in the sense that, you know, I wasn’t an intimate friend of his. I am now but at that time I wasn’t.

7507. Did you come to any knowledge as regards the importation of arms?

—Did I come to any knowledge?

7508. Yes.

—No. In fact, I welcome the question, Chairman, because I have been so blackguarded by so many people since late 1968 to November last that you know it’s pleasant for me to sit here and say that so many lies were told about me. It was published in the Dublin press that I provided £80,000 from my own resources for the purchase of arms. This is not true. I provided no money and asked nobody to provide money for the purchase of arms. I was involved in no way in the purchase of arms.

7509. And you knew nothing about what was going on?

—Well, you see it is very difficult for me to know how much I knew then and how much I know now as a result of all the evidence in the High Court but you know, I do not want to appear obsequious about this but my hands are clean in regard to this, in regard to the purchase of arms. Because of my connections people said that—I am a director of Kerry Airways and they said that arms came in at Farranfore and that it was I did it or something. This is not true. I was vice chairman of Palgrave Murphy during this period. They said I used my office to facilitate the importation of arms. This is not true. I am a chairman of Irish Shipping. I never abused my office in any way.

7510. You have heard of the names White, Loughran and Murphy, the names that were down as the principals in the main account in Baggot Street; you have heard these names, have you?

—I didn’t, no. The only names I have heard is Anne O’Brien and George Dixon and I am not George Dixon, and neither am I Anne O’Brien.

7511. You do not happen to know who they are?

—No, I don’t, no.

7512. You do know Mr. Patrick Haughey?

—Mr. Patrick Haughey, yes.

7513. And you know him for a number of years?

—Quite a long time, yes.

7514. And you never had any discussion as regards the importation of arms with Mr. Patrick Haughey?

—No.

7515. Deputy Burke—Can you remember what signature was on the cheque you cashed for Mr. F?

—I don’t remember, Deputy, no. I knew I was going to be asked this question and I checked back on my diaries and my notes and I wracked my brains but I didn’t. The only reason I can give is this, that it was a Baggot Street branch cheque and it was a Munster and Leinster Bank cheque and, you know, I felt quite certain I was going to get money for it. So I wasn’t terribly precise, perhaps, very unbusinesslike in the manner in which I did this transaction. I don’t remember the signature.

7516. Not even to the extent of knowing whether it was a cheque with one name or two?

—No. Well, that could be checked in the bank, of course, because it would be debited against the account of George Dixon.

7517. Were you aware of the purpose for which this money was required?

—No. I don’t want to appear evasive on this but I think I should very briefly give my background on this. You know I didn’t discover the North of Ireland in August, ’69. I have been associated intimately with the North of Ireland since late 1968 and, you know, help for the people in North of Ireland was for me not something like help for Biafra. It was, in fact, help for people I knew and help for people that I was concerned about. And when Mr. F came to me it was quite obvious to me, you know, that a serious situation existed at the time and he wanted money urgently and I had this commitment to people and I felt that, you know, this was an opportunity of again doing something to help. So I did it gladly and at the time I am quite certain that I felt that this was needed for the relief of distress in the North.

7518. In facilitating Mr. F, had you any knowledge at the time that he had in fact been getting money from, perhaps, this source, from the Baggot Street account for the same type of operation?

—Excuse me—no, as a matter of fact, you know I have been on the griddle you know for some time now and I have given this a lot of thought. The first time I became aware that there was any money involved, you know, Government vis-à-vis the North of Ireland, was subsequent to the 12th August, 1969 which for me was a traumatic experience. I was with Mr. Blaney on the night of the 12th and the 13th at his home. I told him that I wanted to go to Derry to see for myself, you know, how things were going and how my friends were faring out and could I do anything. Perhaps it is an indication of the type of man he is that in the car going up—he travelled in my car—we discussed the historical background of the North of Ireland affair. He expressed views as to how possibly it could be solved. But I have a distinct recollection that when we arrived in Strabane the natural thing we would do is go over the bridge at Lifford and into the 26 Counties and then back over Bridgend into the North. And I said “No, we’ll stay in the North of Ireland.” And the conversation from Strabane to Derry—I don’t know whether you know the route—you go down and then you have to come over Craigavon Bridge which we knew to be heavily guarded by the military and I said to him that I thought he was taking an unnecessary chance as a Minister to do this. But anyhow he insisted on coming with me. But I have a distinct recollection of going down in the car with him and he spoke to me about the distribution of money. We spoke about the efforts being made by a well-meaning citizen of Ireland to collect blankets and clothes and suchlike for the people of Derry. I remember he said to me, “It is not clothes and blankets which they need because they are in Derry. What they need is money to buy them.” He mentioned names of people in Derry to me. What he was searching for was not an Eirianean. He was looking for a man of integrity and an honest man, who would distribute money for him. That was the first occasion that I became aware there was money available from Government sources for the relief of distress in the North.

7519. Deputy FitzGerald.—Did all that occur on the 12th and 13th August?

—I was with Mr. Blaney in the House here on the 12th August and he asked me to drive him home.

7520. It was on that night that you went to Derry with him and mentioned money being available?

—No. I was with him the night of the 12th and 13th. I intimated to him on the day of the 13th that I proposed to go to Derry. He said he would go with me.

7521. This conversation about money being needed, when did that occur?

—I would have thought it would have been on the 14th or 15th August when we got to Derry.

7522. I see. You said earlier that your name has been brought into matters and put in an adverse light from late 1968 to November last. Did you mean late 1968 or late 1969?

—The first trouble started in Derry in 1968 and from 1968 until 4th November 1970 I have been involved in this and I have been continuously involved in it from the time Mr. Blaney was removed from office. There was hardly a day I did not meet him.

7523. Involved in what precisely at the end of 1968?

—That was the beginning of the troubles in Derry, 1968. I recall distinctly the Minister was in Rathmullen and I rang him because I had not had a telephone call from him telling me what was happening in Derry. The trouble really started in 1968.

7524. I appreciate that. I am not clear what your involvement was in 1968.

—I had made the point I had not recently discovered Northern Ireland but that since the late 1940s I had built up friendships in Belfast.

7525. I appreciate that. I understood you to say you had been blackguarded, or words to that effect, from late 1968 until November last?

—Perhaps the time span is too great for blackguarding. I do not mind if the Deputy in the House calls me Long John Silver. What the Deputy should remember is that I have young children who have to go to school and listen to that.

7526. It is the use of “late 1968” that is bothering me. Are you suggesting your name was brought in as the subject of public criticism in late 1968?

—No. I am making the point that I have been involved in the affairs of Northern Ireland from 1948 and that I was very deeply involved since 1968.

7527. I accept that. I want you to qualify the statement that you were blackguarded from late 1968 till November last year. We are aware that your name was brought into these affairs from May onwards. Indeed Mr. Blaney probably increased the amount of reference to you. Are you suggesting that that existed before May last?

—No. As a matter of fact it is a good point. I have been in politics for 25 years. I have worked quietly and, I hope, efficiently as a backroom boy in the Fianna Fáil party for certainly 20 years. We probably met at by-elections and had a few drinks and so on. I was one who wanted to do normal political work. I found I had perhaps embarrassed people by discovering that there was such a thing as loyalty and I thought my place was near the man for whom I had great regard.

7528. I understand that. I want to clarify one point. I think perhaps you caused some confusion by saying late 1968 in relation to the blackguarding. You said you did not know who Ann O’Brien and George Dixon were. Have you had any suspicion or any reason to think you might be able to guess who they are?

—I do not think, I am here to express my suspicions.

7529. Can you help us in any way?

—Not in any way. I can say, and I am on oath, I have no idea who George Dixon is and I have no idea who Ann O’Brien is. Everybody in town, of course has a name for each of them, at least one.

7530. I do not think I have heard that one. You were asked when did you first hear of the arms purchases or arms imports and I think you said you had difficulty in remembering. Were you aware that there were arms importations contemplated or attempted prior to this whole thing becoming public in May last?

—No. I became aware of these things at the same time as the public became aware of them. I am sure Mr. Blaney, perhaps, knew from his position as Minister that there was something in the wind. He and I had a very high ethical association. He never discussed Government matters with me.

7531. In your discussions with Mr. Blaney the question of arms importation never came up? From January until April the question of arms importation never came up in the discussions?

—No.

7532. I see. Thank you very much.

7533. Deputy Keating.—I simply wanted to be clear on the time sequence that has already emerged in the testimony. You said that in relation to a cheque of April 1970 you had no knowledge of what the money was for. This is the cheque you cashed. This is your testimony before us this morning, that you had no knowledge of what the money was for. You said in the last sentence: “At the time I gave Mr. F the moneys in respect of the cheque I was under the impression the moneys were referred urgently for the relief of distress in Northern Ireland.” That was in April 1970. Had you any knowledge of requests to the Government or to individual Ministers for aiding arms purchases prior to that occasion, prior to that time?

—No knowledge whatsoever. Let me be quite explicit. If this transaction falls within the scope of the investigations of the Committee into the 100,000 debt or appropriation of the Grant-in-Aid, this is the first and only time I was involved, even in the loose way in which I phrase it here, in the expenditure of public money.

7534. Yes. I appreciate that and I have read your submission. You have said in the submission that as far as you are concerned the money was required urgently for the relief of distress in Northern Ireland.

—Yes.

7535. You have told us you were in Derry in the week following 12th August 1969.

(The witness nodded).

7536. I have now asked you if you had any knowledge of request of arms whether to the Government or individual Ministers prior to April 1970 and you have just told me you had no knowledge whatsoever. Had you any knowledge of any effort to import into this part of Ireland prior to April 1970?

—No, no knowledge, whatsoever.

7537. You have spoken of loyalty and you have mentioned in that context the name of Mr. Blaney. Do you feel a specific personal loyalty to Mr. Blaney or would it involve some of the other persons who have been— for example, what about the situation with Mr. Haughey? Is it specifically Mr. Blaney because of traditional friendship, long association, or does it apply to other persons of like mind?

—No. I am glad you asked me that because I would like to clarify. My knowledge of Mr. Blaney was one of friendship built up over the years. Perhaps he and I felt the same politically, had a “yen” for organisational work, as some Deputies here know. The first indication of a bye-election I would be packing my bag, telling my wife I was off, packing my toothbrush and razor. We had built up this friendship and it is really only when trouble comes that you realise how deep friendships can be. And I would have to ask myself, or look into myself, and say “Do I do this or do that?” I reacted intuitively to a situation which arose and I have no doubt in my own mind that my place was with this man. This relationship did not exist— to give you a specific answer—go the same depth, say, with Mr. Haughey or with others involved in this sad affair.

7538. Only one further question, in relation to loyalty, Mr. Chairman, and it may not be anything in fact that Mr. Jones would like to comment on, but one can be loyal to things, to organisations and to principles as well as being loyal to people. Was the loyalty he spoke about in reference to a person or does he want to make any comment at all on that? This is a sort-of backwards question of mine.

—In answer to Deputy Keating, either this man is a Jekyll and Hyde or I am a bad judge, or something, because to me he is an extremely gentle man, he is a wonderful organiser, a great friend. This occasion of going to Derry, he was looking for a man of integrity to distribute money. Another time, because of my contacts, I was asked to set up a meeting. I always felt that one of the bedevilling factors in our national life was that we were going into the South and creating a ghetto, and you had well-meaning people in the North of Ireland who were kept on the edge of this bailiewick. I was constantly helping that at National Executive level and in discussions. I constantly helped Mr. Blaney. And eventually I was asked to set up a meeting in a Border town to meet a cross-section of the community. I arranged this meeting and there were people coming from commerce, from business, from local administration, titled people, Protestants, Catholics. No one asked me to set up a meeting with revolutionaries. He met these people. He was never concerned about revolutionaries. He was terribly concerned about the people in relation with him. He never asked me to get up a meeting to have a few revolutionaries at all.

7539. Deputy MacSharry.—Mr. F came to you with this cheque that he failed to have cashed because the banks were closed. He had to get back to Northern Ireland that particular day had he?

—In fact my recollection is that I handed him the money and he thanked me and left to go back. I cannot remember the specific circumstances. I should have gone to the newspaper office to see what had happened at that time. But I do know that he was exceedingly concerned with the fact that he had a cheque and could not get it cashed, and he wanted to get back.

7540. He did not mind how you gave him the money, so long as it was cash?

—No.

7541. He did not mind whether it was in pound notes, or anything else. You felt what you were giving to him was for distribution to people in distress in Northern Ireland—that is what you honestly think?

—That is what I honestly think.

7542. Deputy Nolan.—You did mention that you forgot about who signed the cheque and what was on it. I have a photostat of it here.

(Photostat handed to the witness). This is the photostat of that particular cheque. Looking at that, you will see where the figures are entered a figure of £2,500 was originally in that particular space and it was amended to read “£1,200”. Would this amendment be due to the fact that you had not sufficient cash to give him £2,500, do you recollect?

—No. I am quite clear in my recollection that the cheque I cashed—I am surprised it is not endorsed. No, my recollection is quite clear that it was £1,200.

7543. Except that it is not £1,200?

—Oh, I missed your point. I would not know that. It was not changed in my presence. There is no alteration in the writing. I would suggest that it was an error really, because normally when one is writing a cheque one writes the words first, then puts in the figures. Obviously a mistake was made in the figures. The words are right.

7544. It was not due to shortage of cash on your part?

—No.

7545. Deputy Treacy.—Mr. F was obviously in urgent need of money on the occasion when you had to come to his aid. It was prior to a week-end I should imagine?

—I would not know, but my recollection about the situation is quite clear. It was the time that the bank was working short hours every day. It was just prior. The cheque was cashed on 30th April; it was immediately prior to the bank strike.

7546. You say you had no knowledge at all of the account in question or the purpose for which this money was intended?

—None whatsoever.

7547. Do you normally keep large amounts of money in your home, to the extent of £1,000, say, ready cash?

—No. I think I would like to word it like this, Deputy, that at any time there are sources available to me, cash sources, and I would feel confident at any time that I would be able to cash a cheque for round about £1,000. No, I would have a few pounds myself and a few in the office, and friends would possibly——

7548. In this instance was there not the likelihood of a request that this currency should be in English rather than Irish currency?

—No. Of course there was free exchange of Irish currency in the North.

7549. You have already told us of your longstanding interest in Northern affairs. Did you participate actively, say, in the distribution of money, clothing, food-stuffs and assistance generally to the victims of the troubles in the North at that time?

—Well, even though I feel it is not entirely relevant to what is being investigated, I think, if I were to give an answer, perhaps people would put a false construction on this. The situation, Deputy Treacy, is this: perhaps I have hidden my light under a bushel too long and should now shine out before all men, what I really did. Anywhere I went to the North and found there was privation and need, I met it as far as I could from my own resources, and I admit, openly and readily, that I gave money to people in Derry, in Belfast and in other places in the North who were in need of it. I never looked for kudos or publicity and I never asked people whether they were Protestants or Catholics, Unionists or Nationalists, but I did it purely from the motive of charity. Similarly, at this side of the Border I came across people coming down, married men with families, with just the clothes they stood up in. I got them, as far as I could, homes, clothed them, fed them, kept them and got them jobs.

7550. Yes?

—For no other reason other than the motive of Christian charity.

7551. This is fully appreciated. I am concerned—we are concerned here primarily as to the kind of money used for these otherwise very normal, very charitable and very humane purposes. Are we to take it, sir, that none of the money you were using was out of this State fund of £100,000 we are concerned with here?

—Any money I spent in the North of Ireland on relief, or any money I spent on relief of distress endured by the North of Ireland people in the South, was my own money, from my own resources, and I got nothing back, and I sought nothing back from State resources. So, it was a clean deal as far as I was concerned.

7552. Well, would it be too pertinent or perhaps, too embarrassing a question to ask you precisely how much money did you expend out of your own pocket on assisting people in the North?

7553. Chairman.—I do not think the witness should be pressed to answer that question. If he wants to, he may.

7554. Deputy Treacy.—I want to assure the Chairman and the witness that I was trying to be kind and helpful in relation to this question because I think it is only fair that if one assisted actively and made payments of this kind one should get some benefit for it?

—I appreciate that but if I answered in a big sum of money it would be boastful and if I said too little poeple would say I was being parsimonious.

7555. Deputy Keating.—You cannot win.

7556. Deputy Treacy.—In respect of Mr. F, were you aware that Mr. F did have financial resources of his own to campaign in Northern Ireland?

—In the atmosphere of the time, you know, I did not ask many questions. I was in a peculiar sort of limbo. I was moving in the corridors of power and still I had no part of it. I knew his reputation and his standing in the North, and I accepted him for what he was, at the time. I have since got to know him intimately.

7557. You have already said—it has been alleged against you that you may have used your positions in Irish Shipping, et cetera, to assist in the importation of arms. Could I ask you if you were ever specifically asked to use your position in these various important companies to so import arms?

—I think the people who know me, Deputy, know that I am not approachable in that sense. I think, and, I hope, that I have this reputation that I would not use or abuse my responsibilities in Irish Shipping or Palgrave Murphy or Kerry Airways for the purpose of importing arms, so specifically nobody did approach me.

7558. Apart from your trips to the North, did you make any trips abroad in connection with this whole business?

—No.

7559. One newspaper attributed the intention of your going abroad at one stage for the purpose of bringing back witnesses, I think?

—You know, that time was very funny except, of course, that when you are in the dock, with all due respect to my friends in the press, they do make the most of very little. What happened reminded me, in fact, of when Dylan Thomas arrived in America and he was asked why he was there and he said it was in furtherance of a search for a native woman in a wet plastic coat and I think this is what I said to the fellow in the beginning. This young fellow came to me and said: “It seems extraordinary that you are going out of Ireland at this time.” I was going over to Amsterdam to be collected by some principals in connection with an industrial development which has, in fact, been successfully concluded since, and he badgered me with questions, you see, and he asked me what I intended doing that night. I did not tell him because I would not tell even you what I intended doing that night if you asked me. Eventually he asked me where was I going to finish up and I said it could be Amsterdam, it could be Rotterdam, or it could be Madrid. He then asked me: “If you find any witnesses will you bring them back”— you would think I was going out to Africa looking for baboons or something.

7560. You had no serious intentions with regard to witnesses?

—None at all. I would be the last person to be sent to look for arms anyway because of my appearance.

7561. Deputy Treacy.—I think, Chairman, that I am satisfied.

7562. Deputy Tunney.—Just one or two questions referring specifically to the money, the cheque which you got. Could you say whether Mr. F had a cheque book when he gave you the cheque?

—No, he had not. It was a single cheque.

7563. Was it somewhere around the 28th that he gave it to you?

—Honestly, Deputy, I could not be specific. I do know, because I checked it in my diary, and the date the 30th is entered as the date I cashed the cheque so, being the prudent type of a southern business man that I am, I am quite sure I did not delay very long from the time I got the cheque until I cashed it. It would be a day or two at the most.

7564. That makes it rather difficult for me because I am trying to get a picture of how this money was being handled. As I said to Captain Kelly, the cheque which you cashed was cheque 4069 out of that cheque book. It was not cashed until the end of April, whereas cheque number 4070 was cashed on 17th April and cheque 4071 was cashed on 24th April. Yours, 4069, which, one would imagine, would have come earlier than the other two was not cashed until the end of the month. I am concerned with trying to get a picture of who was handling the cheque book, were cheques being given out to people from this, as far as you are concerned, you would have the feeling that you did not delay too long about cashing it?

—It would not be my custom. If I give cash for a cheque I move fairly fast to get the cash back.

7565. Apart from giving you the opportunity of saying, notwithstanding your involvement with these people in the North, you were not aware of any moves towards the importation of arms?

—No, not at all.

7566. You were not aware of any move on the part of anyone to use the account here as a decoy for some other moneys?

—No knowledge.

7567. Deputy Tunney.—That is all, Chairman. Thank you.

7568. Deputy Barrett.—Mr. Mac Eoin, when you cashed the cheque or got the cheque from this gentleman were you aware who these two signatories represented, or whether they were genuine or not?

—I think in answer to a previous question, Deputy, I made it quite clear that, not alone did I not know who signed the cheque, but I did not know whether there were one or two signatures on it. I have no recollection of that.

7569. At the time you got the cheque from Mr. F you were not aware—you must have looked at the cheque?

—Obviously, yes.

7570. You knew at that time that there were two signatories even though you did not remember it afterwards?

—I was asked whether there was one signature on the cheque or whether there were two signatures. My answer was that I could not recollect.

7571. I appreciate that but when you did actually receive the cheque you appreciate that you must have looked at it?

—Oh, yes, of course.

7572. Well, were you aware at that time who these two signatories represented? In other words, were you aware that Mr. F might be one of the signatories, that the first signature may represent Mr. F. Were you aware of that?

—You know, if I cannot recollect how many signatures were on the cheque it would be difficult for me to answer your question. To be quite honest about it, I got a cheque from Mr. F for £1,200 which seemed to me to be a negotiable instrument—that it was properly filled in and properly signed. I cannot say who signed it or the number of people who signed it. So far as I was concerned, I was happy to accept this in exchange for £1,000 in cash.

7573. I appreciate that for a man in business to the extent to which you are, but I think, my own way of looking at it, if I handed out a £1,000 for a cheque I would ask who were the signatories or who they represented. That would be my reaction?

—That is probably the difference between a Cork man and a Clare man.

7574. Possibly?

—No, I just do not recollect.

7575. Deputy Barrett.—Thank you.

7576. Chairman.—Mr. Mac Eoin, you were involved in transport business, I understand, shipping and any other form of transport?

—Well, I am involved in the national transport in the sense that I am involved in Irish Shipping. We have our own private shipping business and we have the building business, which, Deputy MacSharry would know, involves heavy duty trucks, et cetera, et cetera, and a mechanical engineering firm which has its own, you know, transport.

7577. You have boats and marine vessels and that?

—Oh, we have, yes. But you would not like to ask any questions as to whether these ships were used for the importation of arms, would you, because they were not.

7578. If it gives you an opportunity to say “No”, I will put the question to you?

—I would not like to leave that one suspended in mid-air.

The Witness withdrew.

Mr. Seamus Joseph Brady sworn and examined.

7579. Chairman.—Mr. Brady, you have been associated with the publication The Voice of the North?

—That is right, Sir.

7580. Did most of the finances for that venture come through Captain Kelly?

—Pardon? Did most of them through?

7581. Captain Kelly?

—Yes, from Captain Kelly.

7582. Were there any other sources of finance?

—Not in the period under inquiry. You have the return for June 10th there. You know there is an overdraft up to that period. So there’s no fear that came from public funds, if it ever came from public funds.

7583. Captain Kelly, did he pay you always by cheque or did he pay you by cash?

—No. I think I will go back to my statement there, Chairman. Captain Kelly’s first payment to me was by cash, £600—that would be either November 6th or 7th—because I had the money lodged by the secretary of our firm, all moneys I had got, in an account which I opened on the 25th September in the Bank of Ireland, Ballymun, where I have my own account and my firm’s account. He gave me £600 cash on November 6th or 7th and he gave me £600 cash some time later that month. The date you have in the statement. And, on November 17th, he gave me £1,000 cash, but I had asked him to try and get back moneys which I had put in on behalf of my firm when I started the paper. The printer naturally wanted to be paid weekly, if possible, so there were three payments made to the printer, or, at least, three weeks’ payment was paid before I got any money from anyone because I was under the assumption from the start that this was to be an official underground operation on behalf of the Government propaganda unit, which I had been asked to be a member of at the time in August, 1969. Would it be best if I went back over the whole of that period, Chairman?

7584. Yes, if you wish to—if you feel you can——?

—Pardon?

7585. Yes?

7586. Deputy FitzGerald.—We have a submission.

7587. Chairman.—We have the submission, of course. What I am really trying to get at is trying to reconcile—you have the little blue book there, the little pink book there?

—The green book, yes.

7588. No, the pink one. What I am really trying to do is to try and see if you can reconcile the payments from that pink book?

—What page is that?

7589. Page 11?

—Yes.

7590. You have seen that before, have you?

—Yes.

7591. You have had it before, have you?

—Yes.

7592. According to Captain Kelly that Ann O’Brien account was used to finance The Voice of the North?

—Yes. I have read that in his evidence, but I did not know that until now, of course, because he did not tell me. You see, I should point out when Captain Kelly came to me, he told me the people in the North wanted the paper kept going; to subsidise it, he gave me cash. I had no knowledge of any account anywhere at that time. I was aware from my contacts with the propaganda unit and the work I did there that moneys were being provided through different trustees in the North in accounts which, I understood, had been opened either on this side of the Border or the other, but I was not sure from where. I came back, this would be on the Monday after the battle of the Bogside ended, from holiday in Derry and Donegal and I told Mr. Haughey the people of Derry did not want suits of clothing or tins of milk, which they were getting; they wanted cash to pay for families whose bread earners could not go outside the barricaded area for fear of being arrested and he told me the British at that stage were objecting to the Irish Red Cross going into the North of Ireland and actually setting up relief centres and he was sending Mrs. Barry, the Chairman of the Irish Red Cross, to Geneva to take this matter up with the International Red Cross. I subsequently found out from him that the British were upheld and he said, therefore, he would have to open these accounts, so I remember making the remark to him at the time that it would mean the money would go to people who did not deserve it and he said that was not the point as long as those who needed it got it. I realised, and I think the Minister realised at that time, that it was not the best way of doing things. The fact that accounts were opened in Dublin was all the more reassurance to me that these were not public moneys, as I understood them, because why would public accounts be opened in Dublin? When Captain Kelly brought me the first cheque, the Ann O’Brien cheque—I think I gave you the date there— it was in December I got it—and, naturally, I asked him who was Ann O’Brien and, in hindsight now, I should like to ask the question now because she seems to be the one medium missing in all this story, and that is sex, and he said it was a cover and naturally, knowing he was an intelligence officer for the Army, engaged on intelligence work in the North, I accepted that and asked no questions. You see, I had no knowledge of the drawings out of the account. I did not know anything about George—I never heard of George Dixon until this matter came up before the Committee, and I did not know anything about the Clones accounts because——

7593. You got some money in the form of cash from him and some in the form of cheques?

—Yes. To the best of my recollection, the bank return from The Voice of the North account shows that the first lodgment was £10 on 25th September, which I opened the account with in my own money. £650 was put in by the firm of whom I am a director. The first payment lodged on 7th November, 1969, was £600 which, to my recollection, was cash; again, on 26th November, £600 cash. Both these payments came from Captain Kelly. The £1,000 cash he gave me was not put into the bank because the secretary of our company was pressing me to get back the £600 plus expenses the firm had incurred in distributing the first three or four issues, sending two vehicles up each week from Dublin through Cavan, running accounts and that sort of thing, until such time as the Northern people had got a committee set up to run the paper. You see, I should point out that after the third or fourth issue there was a committee in Belfast, with an editor, appointed. The names, I do not suppose, are relevant here but it included a leading businessman, a clergyman, a solicitor, a college professor, and these people were to act, decide the content and run their end of it. The printing had to be done down here for security reasons. That was one of the things decided by myself and Mr. Neeson at the time, the Director of the Government Information Bureau, and it was not easy to find a printer who would be adjacent to the Border and who had the proper equipment for doing this. The Anglo-Celt in Cavan had a web-offset plant and was properly equipped to produce a weekly newspaper. This is why they were chosen. As a matter of fact, they secured riot insurance before they took on the Voice of the North. I think they are the only paper in this island that did obtain riot insurance at the time after the troubles in the North of Ireland. This Committee took over and they organised distribution and the writing and the material. I undertook to train the editor in the ordinary mechanics of newspaper production, lay-out and that sort of thing so that after December I never went back to Cavan. I didn’t have very much to do with the running of the paper except to make sure the printer’s bills were paid and he billed me, not them, again for security reasons.

7594. Mr. Brady, could you tell me the total amount of money you received from Captain Kelly?

—Well, I received £5,100, in all, over a period from Captain Kelly, plus a £1,000 cheque which was returned to me after the bank strike ended marked “R.D.” and not paid. I wasn’t aware of that until the end of the bank strike.

7595. How much of that £5,100 was in cash?

—£600 and £1,000: that would be £2,200. I must check that again from my statement here.

7596. £600, £1,000——?

—Sorry, by cash from Captain Kelly— sorry, I have it here in a figure, by cash from Captain Kelly, £1,200, plus the £1,000 cash, £2,200 in cash and by cheques from the Ann O’Brien account £3,900, from which must be deducted the £1,000 cheque, Ann O’Brien cheque, which was returned “R.D.” So the nett total I received in cash and cheques, per Captain Kelly, was £5,100.

7597. Had you any idea that this money was coming from the Grant-in-Aid money? You had no idea?

—No, none at all. As I explained, why should I assume that Grant-in-Aid money was lodged in an account in Dublin. It would seem very natural to me—the Northern people that I did know had money from some other sources, both inside this State and outside it——

7598. And you thought this was just——?

—And I would naturally assume, in the circumstances, that this money was being placed there for security reasons by the Northern people. I had no knowledge of any accounts being placed in Dublin at all from the Grant-in-Aid.

7599. Deputy FitzGerald.—Looking over your statement, Mr. Brady, you mention at the top of page 3 that you were asked to meet the Director of Intelligence, Colonel Hefferon and his personal assistant, Captain Kelly, at McKee Barracks following a private report on the Northern situation that you had submitted to the Director of the Bureau for the Taoiseach. Who asked you to meet Colonel Hefferon and Captain Kelly?

—I think I was approached by a member of the team, Colonel Breen, who was working on a propaganda unit and who was on secondment to some one of the State bodies and I was told that Colonel Hefferon would like to see me. This followed a report I put in, a secret report about the situation in the North which I supplied to Mr. Neeson for the Taoiseach and apparently this went to the Cabinet, I heard afterwards. As a result of that, the Army Intelligence people asked to see me. I may say I had very good contacts in the North having been twenty years working both sides as a journalist. I mean I had contacts in the Special Branch in Belfast and in the IRA, the Special Branch in London as well as the Special Branch here. It was my job to have them as a newspaper man, of course. So I was able to supply a fair amount of information that normally would not come except possibly through security services and our security services certainly knew nothing about the North of Ireland, I discovered in August, 1969. They had not been in touch at all, either the Special Branch or Army Intelligence.

7600. Well, then, you say a little lower down that you were asked to assist Captain Kelly by introducing him to various contacts in parts of Northern Ireland?

—That is right.

7601. Who asked you to do that?

—Pardon?

7602. Who asked you to do that?

—Colonel Hefferon.

7603. Colonel Hefferon—as I thought. You then go on to say that you mentioned to Mr. Haughey whom you casually met some time early in September, the need for propaganda inside the Six Counties and he said he would discuss it with Mr. Neeson. “Some days later I discussed this matter with Mr. Neeson.” At this stage you were already on the payroll, so to speak?

—Yes.

7604. From 19th August, isn’t that right?

—Yes.

7605. You were working for the Bureau officially at that time?

—Yes, I was, yes.

7606. And this was a proposal to do something the Bureau had not been doing up to then. Is that right?

—Yes. I had brought a deputation from the North that wanted to meet Mr. Haughey about funds, about aid, from Belfast actually at that time and I took the opportunity of bringing up this point, that some of them had made as well, that while this propaganda effort which, in the end, by the way, cost £75,000 more than we are discussing here, was directed abroad. They felt that there was a need for propaganda within the Northern Ireland territory and this was why they asked for this type of paper. Indeed, they also asked for a radio station and that was discussed but never got——

7607. The North asked for it?

—The Northern people, yes.

7608. Are these the Northern Defence Committees?

—Pardon?

7609. Are these the Northern Defence Committees?

—The Northern Defence Committees, yes.

7610. Well, this discussion with Mr. Neeson—could you be more precise about what was involved? You say: “I was instructed by him to arrange for the printing of two booklets.” Well, now, this was a specific instruction to print them for the Bureau on the basis that the Bureau would pay part of the cost?

—No, the first one was “Terror in Northern Ireland” as it was called. That was an account taken down by some civil rights workers and relief workers in Belfast, Belfast people, during or immediately after the trouble there and it was eye-witness accounts of victims of the shootings and that sort of thing and I thought it was a very moving little document and it was given to me by a member of one of the Belfast Central Citizens’ Defence Committees with the request that we would get it out in pamphlet form so that it could be distributed at the British Labour Party Conference at the end of September in Blackpool. I brought this back to Mr. Neeson who at that time was directing this team. You see one of the difficulties that I found in the team was that when I first reported to Mr. Neeson we were given a briefing that night by Mr. Colley, who was in charge of the team, and a very good briefing it was, at which he told us that the Government was keeping all its options open; that they were keeping pressure up in Westminster; that Dr. Hillery was going to the United Nations but that privately we didn’t expect to get anywhere there because the only country supporting us was Spain and that was probably only over Gibraltar, but, when I came back a week later from Belfast with a lot of information, I discovered that Mr. Colley had disappeared from the team and the Taoiseacn had taken over but we never got near the Taoiseach, you see. We had to work through Mr. Neeson and I found that rather difficult at times, because there were things I wanted to speak to the Taoiseach about privately that I found in the North and that I thought he should have known and I had to put these through secondhand. For example, the private report I sent in about the situation in the North which dealt with arms and men training in arms and shipments of arms then by the UVF and information I had got from a Special Branch contact in Belfast. I felt that should have gone direct to the Taoiseach. So I gave a copy, to cover myself, to Mr. Haughey. You notice, gentlemen, I kept copies of everything through this because I thought I was going to deal with public money at the start and therefore this is why I went to the trouble of, when I opened that account for the Voice of the North I got my partner, who has got nothing to do with this, to sign as a second signatory because I felt I was going to deal with funds from the propaganda unit.

7611. Yes, I must say all your financial documentation is very full, Mr. Brady, which is not true of all the other financial documentation we have but what record have you of Mr. Neeson’s instructions about printing these two booklets?

—Well, I haven’t any record actually of instructions but I think this is where I should go through the period. I met Mr. Neeson some time prior to the 21st September—it could have been three or four days before that: I am not too sure on the date—I discussed this matter with him, at his request I should tell you, because Mr. Haughey had by this time spoken to him about the Northern newspaper which the Northern people felt they wanted—and also the discussions which I had with Colonel Hefferon about the proposal for a radio station on the Border. That never got any distance. It was purely a request of the Northern people who felt they would be required in the end—in fact they were already being jammed by British Army radio equipment—to close down the pilot radios that were running in Free Derry and Free Belfast as they were then known. There was also one running in the Shankill, of Orange Free Belfast, as well. I discussed this with him and I discussed various printers and pointed out that it would have to be done this side of the Border for security reasons and so forth. He authorised me to go ahead and make contact. I contacted the Managing Director of the Anglo-Celt and got quotations for printing which I showed him. I then wrote to him resigning. I resigned, mind you, for two reasons. One was I did not agree with the way this unit was being run and I thought it was a waste of public money. Secondly, I felt in view of this operation in which I was going to be involved, I could not involve the Government openly in clandestine radio stations or in running a newspaper, which was not going to be a Fianna Fáil newspaper but an anti-Unionist newspaper. That was in fact one reason. I was told—and this is the only hearsay I propose to give you because I think there has been too much hearsay here— that the Taoiseach objected to a picture of Mr. Patrick Devlin, MP appearing on page 1 on the third issue, which I have, because Mr. Devlin had attacked him personally that week. I am not offering that as evidence but certainly after the third issue I was told the Taoiseach was not going to back this. Whether the Taoiseach knew of the existence of that at all I do not know. He may not have. Mr. Neeson certainly knew about it. I was sending copies of each issue over to the Bureau for Mr. Neeson. However, to continue, Deputy, what you were asking, I wrote to Mr. Neeson on the 21st September telling him I was resigning from the Bureau and would close up whatever work I had to do in the Bureau team. I got a letter back on the 23rd in which he said that it came as a surprise to him and he did not anticipate that I could be taking this step as I had not mentioned it on the Thursday when we spoke— that would be the day on which I discussed these things with him. However, he assumed, you have decided on this course in view of the work that will arise from the other matters we discussed all too briefly at the time. He asked me to meet him for lunch in the Royal Hibernian Hotel on the 25th September. I think he said, “We left it on the basis that you would give me an outline on paper which I could process”. That was printing costs, what I thought writers would cost, and distribution which was the heaviest thing. I said it would mean going round these areas in Fermanagh giving out small quantities of paper which was not economic. So that day when I met him for lunch was the day I opened the Voice of the North with £10 in the bank at Ballymun. I afterwards met Mr. Neeson for lunch. These dates were significant. I am not seeking to make a case against Mr. Neeson here. I think it is all water under the bridge. I wrote back to him that evening sending my expenses to date on the payroll, as you say, and I suggested I came off the payroll as from that date and worked on the basis we discussed, that I submit my fee and expenses that arise in the weekly detailed account which I will funrish to you on the undercover arrangement. The cover arrangement was this—I can understand why it was stated—I would submit a true bill of expenses each week to the Bureau but, as well as that, I would send in a bill in which I would say “to preparing manuscripts for the Bureau, so and so.” That was the same process I was required to do in regard to printing the booklets. To go back to the booklets, the first booklet was approved for printing in a brief form and I had it done by a printer at Mr. Neeson’s request outside the Bureau and brought him a bill. The copies were given to Mr. Devlin, who was going over to attend a Labour Party Conference, who gave out the copies at the Conference. I think this is a good little booklet. It will be excellent propaganda abroad. It is very well written. So it was at the time, I thought. There were eye witness accounts of the actual period. I held the matter tight and proposed that we should print off a certain number. He agreed to take half of those and give the others to the Belfast Citizens Advance Committee as propaganda to get rid of them. At the same time, when I was working for the Bureau, I had contacted Mr. Corrigan, Civil Rights Leader, at Dungannon and he dictated to me a tremendous amount of material, because he was one of the few men, I discovered, who had attended practically every Civil Rights demonstration in the North from the Derry, October 1968 period. In some of these he had taken part. He was in the original one in Coalisland, where it began, from Coalisland to Dungannon. He was able to give a fairly accurate account of how the authorities up there had allowed the RUC to be misused in relation to these demonstrations. I came back and gave these tapes to the Bureau and they were typed by the girls in the Bureau. I took them away and edited them because they were rather too long. That was produced in a booklet at Mr. Neeson’s request. I was required to put in two types of bill, one giving the true printing and actual costs and the other giving a cost as per sale to the Bureau to cover the costs. I was finally paid in, I think, February 1970, after some trouble, if I may say so.

7612. You were talking of the booklets. The question of the Voice of the North financing is a separate issue which we will come to now. You were paid for the booklets. How were you paid? By the Government Information Bureau?

—By cheque.

7613. The standing problems you have now relate therefore to the Voice of the North?

—That is right.

7614. This arose at this luncheon meeting of Mr. Neeson and yourself. In your statement you say he arranged with you that your fee would remain at £200 per month although you were no longer with the Bureau, you had resigned at this stage, and you would submit a weekly true bill of all expenditure and a covering bill for the amount made out against preparation of the manuscripts for the Bureau. I wonder if you would clear the relationship of these. What exactly were you to get? Was it £200 per month plus the true bill disguised as payment for the manuscripts?

—Yes, £200 a month plus the cost of printing, whatever costs would arise for the Voice of the North.

7615. That latter amount, the true bill of expenditure in connection with a newspaper over and above the £200 a month, was to be paid for as preparation of manuscripts for the Bureau?

—That is right.

7616. This was the luncheon discussion. You have no direct documentation about that although you still submit other letters that are connected with it.

—I gave some papers at the time to Mr. Neeson. He may have them, I do not know. I have not discussed this matter with him.

7617. We have this apparent conflict of evidence here. You will appreciate the statement that the Director of the Bureau had no advance information of the activities of Mr. Brady in the period and that consequently the question of support, financial or otherwise, for such activities did not arise. We have that quotation here.

—You have also from me documentation dated 3rd November 1969 where I am sending full detailed accounts of money spent on the Voice of the North. I am also sending with that the cover on the same date at 29th November to preparing manuscripts in the Bureau. I was not doing all this——

7618. I am just trying to clarify this. There would appear to be some misunderstanding. Can you suggest how the misunderstanding might have arisen on Mr. Neeson’s side?

—I think Mr. Neeson had better explain that, I do not know.

7619-20. You have given us all your documentation?

—I have.

7621. And a very full statement. Moving on to the point where Mr. Haughey communicated to you that the Taoiseach had decided not to advance money from the Bureau Propaganda Unit to the newspaper, the middle of your page 6, could you tell us more about precisely what Mr. Haughey said on that occasion? I think this is important.

—This is recollection. I cannot give you the exact conversation. I was in the position about this time where I was getting quite worried. I was spending money at the printers and seeing no Government money at all. I did not know what was going to happen. So I went to Mr. Haughey as Finance Minister and asked him what was going to happen. He said he would take it up with the Taoiseach. He came back and said the Taoiseach ruled that no Government money should be given for this. He said, “you had better hold it. I myself will see you all right with what you have spent if it comes to that.” I left that on that basis. I then went to Captain Kelly to tell him the paper had got to fold as no money was coming in for it. I contacted one of the persons by telephone to tell him.

Committee adjourned at 1 p.m. and resumed at 4 p.m.

7622. Deputy FitzGerald.—I cannot exactly recall my last question. I think you were in the middle of answering. Shall we start again?

7623. Deputy Nolan.—It was a question of Mr. Q.

7624. Deputy FitzGerald.—That is right. I did not catch the reference. I think I was asking the question, what were the terms of this communication to you that the Taoiseach had decided that there should be no more money for the newspaper?

—I think I was beginning to answer. I said, I think, the Taoiseach had decided that it should not be supported, should not be subsidised from public funds, or words to that effect; that the Bureau would not support it as part of its propaganda operation. I did not ask him why. I was quite annoyed. I said I had had considerable expense and involved my company in considerable expense, and he said “If it comes to that I will see you right personally on that”. I took that to mean that he was going to put his hand in his pocket and pay this £600, whatever expenses were involved at that time, and I immediately contacted Captain Kelly, since I knew he was in liaison with the Northern Defence Committees, and told him that the situation had arisen and that the paper might have to be closed down. I also rang Q, who, at that time, had taken over as editor and manager of the paper, regarding the production of the newspaper, the ordinary techniques of layout and that sort of thing. Captain Kelly came to me a few days later to say that the Northern people wanted this paper kept going, they considered it was doing a very good job, and that they were prepared to subsidise it and they would like me to go to Belfast and explain what the costs involved would be, because I had not discussed these with any of the Northern people. I attended a meeting in a Belfast hotel, of seven or eight people drawn from all over the Province of the North—when I say “the Province” I mean the nine counties, because R was also there at that meeting.

7625. Who?

—R. R was also at that meeting. He and I explained that to produce a newspaper like this without advertising revenue would mean that it would have to be subsidised, and at a cost of sixpence, and they agreed to go ahead and try and attempt to provide for the payment of writers. A lot of writers, of course, were not paid; they were acting voluntarily. But the distribution was one of the biggest problems. This was very costly. There is something around 1,500 miles every week to be travelled in the Six Counties alone between one run and another. The distribution costs were one of the major cost factors here because, naturally, in a place like Fermanagh there is something like only 3,000 or 4,000 copies distributed through about 22 centres. For example, I do know that distribution to Roslea means a 16 miles round journey to leave only about eight copies— this type of thing, which could not be economic even for a modern newspaper. So what they decided was that they would try and make sales pay for distribution and they added the cost of the editor—that was paid by them— and what they were concerned about was that the printing should be handled down here, for security reasons.

7626. And paid for here?

—And paid for from here. And that is what happened.

7627. Did you have any further communication with Mr. Haughey on this subject at any time?

—I think I met him afterwards, briefly, and I said the Northern people had fixed me up on this and were prepared to go ahead. He was aware of it, so there was no discussion beyond that really. He had obviously heard from someone that the Northern people were going ahead with this.

7628. You told us earlier that you were aware of bank accounts?

—I was.

7629. I will put to you what I think you said and see if I have got it right. Were all the bank accounts in the names of trustees through your contacts in the Government Information Bureau? When did you become aware of that and exactly what did you become aware of?

—These specific bank accounts? I knew nothing at all.

7630. The bank accounts in the names of trustees?

—I was not aware of any specific bank accounts. As I explained I was aware that, because of the attitude of the British Red Cross, it was impossible for the Red Cross to go openly into the North. And probably I was one of the first people to come and ask for financial aid for the Derry Citizens Defence Association. I was on holiday in Derry and I met these people. I went to school with one of them. Therefore they certainly approached me and said “Could you held up?” and I said “Certainly”. Apart from that, I got this message from my home that I was required to report back to Government Buildings as soon as possible, and I got back on the Monday.

7631. We are wandering a bit. You made reference to the bank accounts and the trustees that you became aware of through the Government Information Bureau. I made a note of that.

—Is that in my statement?

7632. Unless I have got confused between you and the previous witness—I have this note of its having been said to us here today but maybe I am wrong. No, it must be you, Mr. Brady, because the reference was to your contacts in the Government Information Bureau. It could not have been Mr. Jones. It was you, in fact, who said this—I took a note of it at the time—and I am wondering what bank account you are referring to.

7633. Deputy Barrett.—I think it was the trustees of the funds in Belfast.

7634. Deputy FitzGerald.—That may be. That is what I want to know. What funds are they?

—I do not think I said that; if I did, I was in error. I would not know from the Government Information Bureau about bank accounts. It was from Mr. Haughey that I knew anything about bank accounts but I did not know why they were specifically opened. I knew that aid was being given, a Grant-in-Aid, and that it was being administered through bank accounts which had been opened in certain areas around the Border. I did not know whether it was on this side or the other side of the Border they were opened, but I presumed that they were opened on this side for security reasons but I was not aware from the Bureau of any of that.

7635. You said it was through the contacts you had at the time with the Government Information Bureau?

7636. Deputy MacSharry.—That is what he did say.

—From my contacts in the North I was aware that they were getting money from other sources.

7637. Deputy FitzGerald.—You may have said that it was through the contacts you had while you were in the Bureau and there may have been contacts in the North that you met.

—I was working in the Bureau at the time and it was from contacts in the North that I was aware.

7638. This knowledge was that there were bank accounts into which aid moneys were being paid from the Northern Aid Defence Fund?

—I think we are slightly at cross-purposes here, if you do not mind my saying so. I was aware that they had obtained funds from sources other than the Grant-in-Aid—I think I will leave it go at that—but I did not know they were putting them in bank accounts. The first time I became aware of the Ann O’Brien account was when Captain Kelly brought me a cheque in an envelope, sometime in December, 1969. I assumed from his reply that it was a cover, that these were Northern Funds hidden in a bank account for security reasons.

7639. You were aware of the Northern Aid Fund?

—Yes.

7640. And that it was being paid by some method to a committee in the North associated with the Northern Defence Committees?

—I understood more than that—I understood that it was paid to various people. For example, I prepared a report on the activities of Trench House and recommended that they should get some aid.

7641. It was paid to a number of people but a large part of it—the bulk of it, as we now know—was paid to a committee, or intended to be paid to a committee, associated with the Belfast Defence Committee?

—That is right.

7642. And you were aware that the money coming for the Voice of the North was coming from the Defence Committees?

—Yes.

7643. The same group of people?

—Yes.

7644. You did not associate these two facts in any way in your mind?

—I did not, no, because I was aware that they had other moneys which they had raised elsewhere. I made the point earlier—and I think it is a logical one—that one would not associate being told that accounts were being opened close to the Border for these Defence Committee people with the Grant-in-Aid. … that the Grant-in-Aid should be put into a bank in Dublin. I did not know anything about this until——

7645. I accept this. Did you discuss the matter of the financing of the Voice of the North with Mr. Blaney at any time?

—No. Mr. Blaney had absolutely nothing to do with the Voice of the North. Mr. Blaney knew very little about newspaper production and he is the last man I would go to for advice on such a matter. I did discuss it with Mr. Haughey on the occasion I was out with him.

7646. You had no discussion with Mr. Blaney about the problem created by the failure to finance it?

—No, nor with Mr. Boland either. The United Irishman allegations—this is a canard. There is no suggestion that I was acting as a mercenary for three Fianna Fáil Ministers and receiving vast quantities of Fianna Fáil gold. I did some work for Fianna Fáil when I was press officer——

7647. We have that in your statement?

—And they do not overpay. Like any other political party they have to watch their money.

7648. Did Captain Kelly ever indicate to you that this money had any particular source— that it came from the Government or via the Red Cross?

—I did not know Captain Kelly until I was invited to meet him that time when I went up to see Colonel Hefferon. I accepted that he was an Army Intelligence Officer and I knew the type of mission he was engaged in. I did not ask him questions which I felt I should not ask when he came to me with this cheque, I simply asked who was Ann O’Brien and he said that this was a cover. I never asked any more. I assumed that that money was Northern funds.

7649. Were you not surprised that an Army Intelligence Officer should come to you with money from a Northern group?

—No. I was aware from my activities with him in the North, when I was asked to assist him, that he was acting for the Northern Defence Committees here. I saw him very frequently around the House—with deputations from the North and meeting various Ministers—so why should I be surprised if he came to me on behalf of the Northern people?

7650. The fact that he was in touch with the Northern people as part of his intelligence work would not in the ordinary way have led you to believe that he was acting for them. Investigating and finding out about them is one thing but acting for the people you are investigating is a bit surprising?

—I do not quite get the implication of the question.

7651. It did not surprise you that here was an Intelligence Officer who has told us that his job in the later months of 1969 was to get information about what these people were doing especially in relation to the import of arms. That being so, that being his function— to get information for our Government about the activities of people in areas part of another State—did it not surprise you that he should be acting for these people whom he was investigating?

—Why should it? Here was a man who, to my observation anyway, has become so involved on behalf of the Government here that he now introduces delegations and speaks for them——

7652. Speaks for them?

—And he spoke to me for them and I would accept that because you could not have a person coming down from Belfast every day to give me cheques. I assumed that this was a reasonable arrangement and that whatever he was giving me was with their consent and that cheques were drawn with their consent. I believed, and I still do, because I have not found any evidence yet to disbelieve either Captain Kelly or the Northern Defence Committees —but it is only my opinion—that these were funds they had raised themselves. I had no idea that there was any Grant-in-Aid involved here at all.

7653. I understand your position but I am putting it to you: was it not surprising that an Irish Army Intelligence Officer should appear with Northern funds and be financing the operation down here?

—Here was an Army captain of G.2— Military Intelligence—who was frequently in the House here, in the company of Ministers, delegations of people whom I knew to be closely involved in the Defence Committees in the North, and therefore there was no necessity for me or no point in my questioning his bona fides. The only point I raised was who was this Ann O’Brien which was, I felt, the only question to ask at the time. He had come to me and said that the Northern peole wanted the paper kept going and that they would pay for the printing of it, when I told him that it would have to be closed and that they wanted to keep it going and he gave me £600 in cash—not in cheques.

7654. This was your view of Captain Kelly as early as the 6th or 7th November when he handed you the £600?

—Yes.

7655. Did you ever visit the Munster and Leinster Bank in connection with this financing?

—No. I never heard that he had any account there until the trial.

7656. Deputy Keating.—I was in the House earlier and so I missed the first part of your testimony. I wanted to ask you a few questions about the document you submitted to us?

—Yes.

7657. You have a copy in front of you?

—Yes.

7658. On page 3, in the second paragraph, you say: “I should like to make it clear that I was fully aware of the nature of Captain Kelly’s work for Army Intelligence.” Now you know we have a lot of hindsight now about what Captain Kelly’s work for Army Intelligence was?

—I mean of the nature of his work in the Six Counties. I had no knowledge of his work down here, needless to say, but I was asked to give him certain introductions to people in the Six Counties and I did that.

7659. In fact, that work in the Six Counties ended quite abruptly in October, 1969?

—No, it would be August and September, 1969.

7660. Yes?

—He did not enter the North, as far as I discover now, from the end of September.

7661. So, in fact, the nature of his work refers to the period August and September?

—That is right.

7662. And to work in the North?

—Yes. I had left the Bureau from 21st September actually and I had no reason to assist him after that.

7663. Yes. You say in the third paragraph, in the last sentence, that you met Mr. Haughey casually some time early in September?

—Yes.

7664. And that you had raised the question yourself of the urgent need for propaganda inside the Six Counties?

—Yes.

7665. Is it your impression the whole idea of the Voice of the North originated in your mind and was carried on between Mr. Haughey and yourself?

—Oh, no.

7666. I mean, was that the genesis of it?

—Oh, no. I mean, after all, why should I after 30 years in journalism want to go back to a weekly paper. I left journalism for public relations, but this was put to me very strongly by these people in Derry and in Belfast and in Tyrone—that they felt the propaganda machine down here was being misdirected, that the propaganda that was wanted largely in the Six Counties because the Unionists at that time were, and still are to my knowledge, running a very powerful propaganda machine. They have even appointed a junior Minister in charge of it. The Northern people at that time felt that they needed propaganda to keep their own people together and to keep their support, as well as maintaining it; as a matter of fact, one of the things they insisted on, this should not be a Fianna Fáil paper or any other type of paper and, in the first three issues, I found it very hard to get copy to fill and I fell back on the resource of using a rather interesting speech that Mr. de Valera made in December, 1953, in the Seanad in reply to Senator McDermott on the North and I was bitterly attacked by the Northern defence people for running this article at all; they considered it was far too profane for it, so there was no question of this being a Fianna Fáil paper. In fact, the editor of one Dublin paper since made the comment that he got the Voice of the North regularly— that there appeared to be no evidence since there were so many points of view. I may point out that, after the third issue, I did not produce any material for it. The Northern people were then able to produce their own material; quite a kaleidoscope, I can tell you, of political opinion, left to right. The only reason I brought this up with Mr. Haughey at the time was that I happened to have a deputation who wanted to see him about relief for Belfast who had come to me when they discovered I was up there for the Bureau team and I brought this up—I mentioned they had already discussed this, but I was not very anxious to get involved in producing a newspaper at all, but I regarded this as being part of the job they wanted done. I may say from hindsight I would have been far better off to have stayed in Derry instead of coming back to join the propaganda team.

7667. At page 4, in the fourth paragraph, you say: “I was also asked by Colonel Hefferon to prepare costings for a possible mobile radio station”. This request came from the Head of Army Intelligence to you. Was it in any capacity as somebody on the staff of the Government Information Bureau? It is a rather peculiar request?

—Yes. During that time, you see, I was in a rather extraordinary position, as I now see it, because I was the only one of a Bureau of 22 public relations or publicity men that was sent across the Border and I was put in a rather invidious position. This is one of the things that destroyed my confidence in the whole operation, as I had moved in the Royal Avenue Hotel in Belfast. I was among Fleet Street colleagues, Dublin newspaper colleagues. Ostensibly I said I was there to write a book which, of course, I am in the process of writing, but that was beside the point; but on the fourth day of my visit there I was astonished to be rung up by a colleague there from one of the Dublin newspaper offices in Belfast, the branch office, and he said you have been telling us a lie, you are just a spy for the Southern Government. It was already published in the Belfast Telegraph that I was a member of this team. Up to that time I was quite effective in that I could go around at press conferences with other newspaper men and use their sources and their contacts, which were very valuable. At 7 o’clock that evening in the hotel I got a telephone call from the switchboard and a voice said: “We are on to you. If you are not across the Border by midnight we will put you across in a bag”. Now I, myself, felt it was one of the pressmen taking a rise out of me, but at that time, in Belfast, you did not stop to ask questions and I moved into a guesthouse on the Antrim Road that night and carried on but my effectiveness in obtaining human interest material for the propaganda men who were abroad was destroyed from that moment.

7668. Yes, but what I was really getting at, Mr. Brady, was why you should be advising Army Intelligence on the costings of a mobile radio station. We know you are experienced as a journalist but this was a slightly different area?

—No. I think I should explain that. I do not think you should get the impression that went any distance. It was only a very preliminary discussion and how it arose was, after my first meeting with Colonel Hefferon, at that time the “Voice of the North” project was already being processed. with Mr. Neeson and myself. This was before I resigned from the Bureau. Colonel Hefferon sent for me subsequently and said he had a request from the Northern people —they were very worried about this radio war that was going on and they felt that if a station was set up somewhere on this side of the Border that would beam over the Derry/Belfast areas, that this might be something that would be required in the future. So I said I would go and get costings and spoke to Mr. Rory O’Farrell, who is the film editor of “Seven Days” and a friend of mine and he actually contacted a man out in Bray about hiring a studio and found out what that would cost. I worked out the costings of scriptwriting etc. but it never got beyond that because I never heard any more about it.

7669. Yes. On page 7, you say on the top of the page, “Captain Kelly continued to provide me with funds as required.” What was the mechanism of transmitting the requests? There are various dates on page 11 of this pink book. The cheques have been all set out, occasions on which you received either cash or cheques, but you know he would not just come along out of the blue and say: “The purse is getting a bit empty. There is a bit more to be going on with.” You must have transmitted requests to him in a——

—No, no. I would telephone Captain Kelly and say: “I have so much in printers’ bills and I need more funds.” As you know, after the initial £600 in cash he gave me another £600 in cash and at the same time I said: “By the way I want to clear off—the secretary of our company has pressed me about this £650 plus expenses we have incurred on the first three or four issues.” So he came back and said: “This £1,000, you can use this now to clear what you are owed.” Now, the cheques——

7670. But in fact you felt free to call him and ask for money when ever you wanted it?

—Yes. The cheques were in an envelope with my name on it and he gave me that. I didn’t see any cheque books. I saw no cheque book at all.

7671. If I understand your testimony you thought that all of this money was coming from sources inside the Six Counties?

—Yes, I accepted what Captain Kelly and what certain members of the Defence committees told me.

7672. Can I make the assumption that you have been following the transcript, the now rather large transcript of this committee’s proceedings earlier on?

—No, I have only been following the reports in the newspapers. I didn’t see the transcript.

7673. I wanted to refer to some events that we discussed with Mr. Fagan. This relates to an account which was sent by Mr. Haughey, I think. I do not remember the exact pathway of who gave it to whom but, anyway, the Taoiseach saw it and gave a decision that the public moneys under his control, Department of the Taoiseach, and Government Information Bureau moneys were not to be made available and then this document went back to Mr. Haughey and Mr. Fagan said that he saw it for some time on Mr. Haughey’s desk and that then Mr. Haughey said: “That’s been taken care of.” Mr. Haughey said to Mr. Fagan that in fact the matter of this account for expenditures by the Voice of the North had been taken care of. This arose when we asked Mr. Fagan how he knew of a connection between the Voice of the North and these accounts and he told us of these events. Did you have any knowledge of the Taoiseach’s decision on this matter, when it was taken?

—It was taken, certainly, in the first few days of November because that bill you are referring to, I have it in my documents here, 3rd November 1969——

7674. That is correct?

—And I rang up the next day to know: “Look, I need this money. I am getting a bit worried about the situation” as I was. And I went across and saw Mr. Haughey either, by the 4th or 5th of November to the best of my recollection. I could not be very sure of the date.

7675. Did he tell you then that the Taoiseach had seen this bill and had said: “This is not going to be paid——”?

—I don’t know that now. I think it went to Mr. Neeson but I don’t know. I sent—Oh, sorry, I sent the bill to Mr. Neeson.

7676. You sent it to Mr. Neeson?

—Yes.

7677. And Mr. Neeson would have——

—It came back to Mr. Haughey.

7678. I see. So the pathway would have been from you to Mr. Neeson, to the Taoiseach, to Mr. Haughey and then from Mr. Haughey, to Captain Kelly?

—Yes. You see I was following my instructions there. I sent a full detailed true account of all expenditure up to November 3rd and I also sent on 29th October—sorry, on the same date—I had sent the cover arrangement account whereby I am asking for £1,000 for manuscripts prepared with the Bureau. Those both went together to Mr. Neeson. That was his instruction to me.

7679. But the point I am asking you was did you know of the Taoiseach’s decision——

—I don’t know. Mr. Haughey certainly said to me not to worry about the £660 or others——

7680. I appreciate that he said, you know, you told us, I think this morning, that, if necessary, he would make it—see that you would not be at a loss, that he would make it good himself?

—Yes. Whether he meant that was what was taken care of, I don’t know.

7681. But it was clear then, when you went to him, that it was going to be paid but did you know, in fact, that the Taoiseach had become aware of this bill and had said that it was not going to be paid from the moneys available to the Government Information Bureau?

—Yes, the Taoiseach must have been aware of this when he said it wasn’t going to be paid.

7682. I know he must have been aware of it, Mr. Brady, but did you know that he had seen it and had given his decision on it?

—Yes, Mr. Haughey told me. That’s why the conversation followed then he said either he would cover me——

7683. Yes. You therefore knew that the source was not the Department of the Taoiseach or Government Information Bureau moneys?

—I assumed it wasn’t going to be public funds at all, straight off.

7684. When you say that it wasn’t going to be public funds, did you make the assumption that there was no other possible source of public funds?

—No, not public funds because I then assumed the paper would have to close down. I thought that would be the next thing. Then I contacted Captain Kelly to advise him it would have to close down and I rang Q who at this time had taken over as manager and editor and I told him there was a possibility that it might be closing down. And then Captain Kelly came back to me—I think it was a day later; certainly things happened fairly quickly on this—to say that the Northern people wanted it kept going and were prepared——

7685. Would Captain Kelly have known of Mr. Haughey’s conversation with you very soon after it took place?

—I would certainly have told him of it.

7686. You would have told him of it?

—Yes, certainly.

7687. So he therefore would have known at that time that the Government Information Bureau source of moneys was closed?

—Yes.

7688. Just in parenthesis, can I ask you: Did you take it for granted when you went into the venture that the Government Information Bureau moneys would be a source of revenue for you?

—I certainly took it for more than granted; I had no doubts about it that it was going to become available by an undercover arrangement. All the letters and documents would indicate the reason why the Government would not want to be publicly identified with a blatent anti-Unionist document which it——

7689. But you had, in fact, furnished a mechanism by the two sets of bills which could get over that?

—Yes. That is true.

7690. You therefore looked on the decision that subsequently through Mr. Neeson and by a decision of the Taoiseach that you became aware of shortly after it was taken, you knew that it would not then be paid for through GIB sources?

—That is true.

7691. And Captain Kelly knew of that at about the same time or very shortly afterwards?

—Yes. You could break this into two streams if I may use the phrase. There was the booklets which I was working on before I left the Bureau and which were produced very shortly after I left it and delivered to 65 Merrion Square which was the headquarters the Bureau team was using. But I was paid for those. But the other operation started after I had left the Bureau though it was in process, you know, on paper before I finished up there——

7692. Do I understand the next step correctly then? Mr. Haughey said the GIB avenue is closed for money. You then discussed it with Captain Kelly and you made clear to him in fact that this was a crisis and that the thing would close?

—Yes, there was a crisis, to put it that way.

7693. Then am I correct in understanding your testimony to indicate that he came to you with money then without subsequent suggestions or requests on your part?

—Oh, no. I did not suggest to him that he should give me money or some support at all. I thought the venture was going to stop at this stage.

7694. In fact, he then came to you with £600 in cash?

—He said the Northern people wanted it kept going and were prepared to subsidise it and he gave me £600 in cash.

7695. From then you took it that these moneys were, in fact, Northern moneys, is that correct?

—Yes. That is what I understood all along. That is what I’d been told.

7696. But as somebody very familiar with the situation in the Six Counties you would have been aware of the fact—mention this to Captain Kelly, you know, fairly sharp divisions inside the minority, let me put it that way and therefore——

—No. I think you will remember there you know that these only began to appear after some months. There were certainly no sharp divisions in August and September and October, 1969. The picture you know, in the north——

7697. I recall a fairly sharp adverse reaction to the Voice of the North as well as one of support——

—From a certain quarter——

7698. There was by no means unanimity?

—Which for some reason of its own set out to destroy this publication. Why, I don’t know. The allegation that I was attempting to take over the Civil Rights Movement, of course, is absolutely preposterous. The Civil Rights Movement, as a writer, Desmond Fennell, rightly described it over the week-end, is only a red herring. In fact I don’t meet many members of the executive of the Civil Rights Movement at all.

7699. Was there any surprise on your part in November when in fact there had been, as well as a reaction of support for the Voice of the North there was also an adverse reaction even as early as November? I think it is fair for me to say that?

—Yes, the method of attack certainly caused some adverse reaction among people on the Defence Committee in Belfast. There were those who disagreed.

7700. Were you therefore surprised that you should get £600?

—I have not got——

7701. The point I am making is they came to your aid even though among the different stands of opinion represented in the Defence Committee there would have been by no means unanimous support for the Voice of the North, were you not a little surprised?

—I was not dealing in the Voice of the North with the Defence Committee as such. I was dealing with a small committee set up to run the paper. There were disputations, if I might put it that way, of which I was conscious. For example, there were two or three in all because they were not geting on very well among themselves. Certainly on the political side in the North, and the Opposition side, there were differences of opinion about its content. I had no control over its content after the third or fourth issues.

7702. The point I was trying to get at was whether you had any reason to be surprised at their coming to your aid, firstly, pretty promptly and, secondly, with very substantial sums of money?

—No, because at that time there was no question of any—after all, the paper had not been produced. They had not seen it. There was no argument about its contents at that time.

7703. What was the date of your first issue? The 12th October? I was talking about mid-November by this stage.

It was November when this criticism appeared.

7704. It was also about the 4th November, some day like that, when you got the £600?

—Yes.

7705. You got it on the 7th November?

—Yes, the 6th or 7th.

7706. So in fact the paper had appeared and you were coming out presumably regularly weekly at that time?

—Yes. The reaction to the first three issues from the people of the North was quite good. The only criticism I got was running the de Valera piece. I was criticised for getting involved in politics down here which they did not want to do. I agree in the months that followed there were diverse views about this.

7707. You see my point. Because of a certain amount of conflict and a certain amount of difference of opinion inside a minority community—in fact you have explained this by saying it was not a committee representaitve of a wide range of committees, it was a special committee.

—I went up and said if you are going to get an editorial committee together and appoint someone fulltime——

7708. You took it those moneys were coming from them, did you?

—No, not from this. I was aware that there were trustees. My belief was that the money was coming from them. I do not know all the trustees, you see. In that sense, I do not know who the trustees are. I know some of them by hearsay now. I was not quite sure who was controlling the money from the northern point of view.

7709. I want it to be clear. Firstly it was your belief that all the moneys were coming from the North?

—Yes.

7710. And, secondly, this occasioned you no surprise?

—Pardon?

7711. Secondly, did this cause you any surprise—the £5,000 odd?

—No, not at that time.

7712. I refer to Document No. 2, a letter by you to Eoin Neeson of the 15th January.

—That referred to the two booklets.

7713. I realise this. I just want to refer to one phrase in the first sentence which is “which you authorised last August”.

—Yes.

7714. You can imagine, I expect, that there will be a bit of “to-ing and fro-ing” about this authorisation. Therefore I would like you to expand it a little.

—In that sense, I accept that the copies were distributed abroad through the Press Attaché and they were paid for in 1970. That was work on which I was engaged while on the Bureau staff.

7715. Do you think from August—you were then writing the letter in January and they paid in February. There was a good deal of travelling to get that payment?

—I had a lot of trouble.

7716. Was that partly because the organisation was not completely clear in their minds and they said you have produced them and we accepted them so we will pay you for them?

—I would agree that seems obvious.

7717. In Document 3, there is a mark “Personal” at the top of the page, Owen Neeson to you again. Was there any date on that? It was submitted, according to you, on the 21st February. The date is not actually on it.

—That is right, yes.

7718. Could I ask you about this? We have copies of letters——

—My solicitor has got that copy of a letter of the 23rd September——

7719. What has happened here is this is clearly a photostat of a letter. Was a copy of a letter typed by someone else first and——

—Yes.

7720. It is not the original letter?

—No. It is a copy made by a typist. I can get the letter if you want it.

7721. No. I just wanted to be clear on that. Would the same be true of Document 11?

—I called to get it but the girl could not find it and the solicitor was out.

7722. As I was reading these, I said to myself, “These were typed in the same style or the same typewriter.” What has happened is somebody has taken the original letters and made typed copies of them and then photostated the results.

—Yes.

7723. In relation to Document 11, this is the occasion when the Taoiseach was going to say thank you to a number of people, 9th December 1969, Document 11 of your submission to us?

—Yes. That was a dinner which the Taoiseach was giving to thank the members of the Propaganda Unit and Mr. Neeson had written to me. I have not got the letter, maybe there is some reason, inviting me to that function. Perhaps I was telephoned by one of the staff. He then sent this letter to say the venue was changed.

7724. You were included in the list of people?

—I was, yes. That only proves I was persona grata at this time.

7725. Yes, it does. Let me refer to one particular issue of the Voice of the North, the issue of the week ending 12th April, 1970. If it is somebody on this list, I do not want to know. Who, by and large, at that stage of the proceedings was writing the editorials?

—Could I see this for a second?

7726. Yes. (Paper handed to witness). It is an editorial, in fact it is the marked passage in which I am specifically interested.

—It is not on the list.

7727. Can I ask if it was you?

—No.

7728. Did you know of the content of those editorials?

—At that stage very often I did not even get a copy of the issue. It had got to that stage where they were getting it out themselves.

7729. The point I am interested in here, if I can follow on my thought, is that—I think it is only fair to call it an editorial— it is pretty well an editorial sort of article from its position.

—You are asking about that one on the left hand side of the page?

7730. Yes.

—I was aware that they consulted me about it before it was published.

7731. It says the facts are neither the Fianna Fáil Government nor the Fianna Fáil Party have subscribed one penny towards the Voice of the North. We will leave the Party out of this. It is not a Party issue, I accept this. But, in the light of current knowledge, the statement that the Fianna Fáil Government had not subscribed one penny towards the Voice of the North, in the light of present knowledge, is simply not true. We know the source of £100,000. We have traced it through a number of bank accounts and we have traced the Ann O’Brien account to you. Therefore there is £5,000 odd, in fact, of Government money—we will not call it Fianna Fail Government but just Government— subsidising the Voice of the North, which went to subsidise the Voice of the North. Therefore the statement in that editorial is not true. I want to know, did the people know at the time what the source of the money was? Did they say that in good faith?

—If they had consulted me about that, they would not have known anything about the accounts. They would not have known the trustees. One of them is “L” and the other a Roman Catholic clergyman.

7732. Yes, but would they have been in a position to know? We have, of course, to admit the possibility of confusion in circumstances like this. You thought that it was Northern money?

—Yes.

7733. They thought it was what sort of money? They would have been in a position to know it was not Northern money, surely. They would have been in a position to know that there was not £1,000-odd transmitted from the North?

—The people concerned would have known of the accounts only what I would have told them.

7734. I see.

—First of all, they were not Belfast citizens; they were not Belfast Committee people; so I do not think they would have known anything about this, to be absolutely fair. If I had known otherwise at the time I would certainly have mentioned that to them.

7735. Can I, just to be clear about your position in the matter, ask you did you know that this fund, the Belfast Fund for the Relief of Distress, existed?

—Yes, I did. I knew there was £100,000 by Grant-in-Aid and I was aware that money was being disbursed, as I understood it, to different groups of trustees in the North—not just in Belfast. I did not know why, of course, or who the trustees were.

7736. Did you know, were these moneys being available to the Voice of the North?

—Nothing was said to me ever.

7737. Are you satisfied, from documentation you have seen since, that that was the case.

—I do not know. I have been told. Again, it is only hearsay. Surely this is what the Inquiry is about? It is not for me to bring it in. It is your responsibility.

7738. Sure. But, you know, on the face of it we have a transfer from the Department of Finance to the Red Cross, to the Murphy, White and Loughran accounts to the Ann O’Brien——

—It is quite clear that this was money from the Grant-in-Aid, but I am also told that they switched funds which they had themselves, which I was aware they had, to make up the difference. But I am only giving an opinion. I accept their words.

7739. This is what it comes to, because this is what we are investigating: we have a nice clear chain of transfer of money from the Department of Finance, under the £100,000 Grant-in-Aid, into the Ann O’Brien account and then to the Voice of the North.

—Yes.

7740. That chain is clear. We have been told of a switch and we have some very general accounts which seem to account for too much money, in fact, which have been published from the North. But have you any evidence? Obviously, from the point of view of yourself and the Voice of the North it would be very—perhaps advantageous is the wrong word but it would validate your position even more if it were clear that there was a switch.

—I do not know anything about it. The first time I heard of a switch was when the thing came up here. I had no access to accounts. I did not handle money. Any money I got from Captain Kelly I accepted on the basis that this was from Northern funds. I did not connect it with the Grant-in-Aid. I had no reason to.

7741. You had no knowledge of a switch at all?

—No knowledge of that. I kept my records and, as you see, I accounted for the money—which I am jolly glad I did, because there are all sorts of malicious innuendos about who was supposed to have got money out of it. I had nothing to do with the functioning of the accounts at all.

7742. Is there any suggestion you could make to the Committee to enable it to validate the existence of a switch? You see, if we can prove a switch, rather than as something thought of subsequently to validate actions nobody thought would ever be discovered—. You see, there are two possibilities: it might have been done completely bona fide at the time, all down the line, in which case there would be a moral justification as distinct from a sort of accountant’s justification.

—I cannot go any further than I have done. Certainly I would be very glad to clear the position, but I had no access to knowledge of the accounts. I certainly was only given cheques in an envelope. I never saw cheque books and never saw anyone sign cheques.

7743. You asked who Ann O’Brien was, and you got a vague answer?

—It was a natural question. No woman had turned up.

7744. You referred to a briefing by Mr. Colley of the group that had been set up under the umbrella of the Government Information Bureau. Is that correct?

—Yes.

7745. When would that have been?

—That was on the night of the Tuesday. It would have been one week after the Battle of the Bogside. That would be the 19th August. That evening——

7746. Bogside was a Sunday night, so this is Sunday night again?

—This was a Tuesday night.

7747. Nine days later would that be?

—Seven days.

7748. I thought Bogside started on a Sunday?

—Tuesday, 12th August.

7749. I see. I had the day wrong.

—The Relief of Derry was the 12th August.

7750. So it was Tuesday the 12th and Tuesday the 19th he was talking to the people. That must have been fairly rapidly recruited people who were going?

—Yes, some of the members had come only that day, some would be coming in that night for the first time. The idea was, more men had already been allotted to various Press Attaché posts abroad. I went to Belfast next morning—I had been in Derry on holiday—and I gave them a very full account.

7751. I think we saw each other, Mr. Brady, in the City Arms?

—That is right. I gave them a fairly good account of it, including the activities of the Derry Defence Committee. I was asked to do that. I spent the Tuesday at that, before the meeting that night.

7752. This means that in fact in that week a fairly rapid decision in regard to information was made?

—That is right. I got the phone call on the Sunday in Derry. I came down on the Monday and reported to Mr. Neeson at 5 o’clock on the Monday, after coming back from Derry, and I was asked to make out a report; and I reported at 8 o’clock for the briefing, which was very thorough, I may say. It was fairly confidential information, I felt, disclosed to the entire team.

7753. In regard to that, this morning, you used the phrase “in the briefing we were keeping all its options open”. That phrase will show up in the transcript and it might be fair to give you an opportunity to amplify that a bit?

—The Government was keeping all its options open.

7754. Yes. What did you understand that to mean? You remember that as well as I do?

—If further trouble broke out there was the possibility that the Army would have to move into certain areas. I thought this was what he meant by it. The Bogside was still on then.

7755. Yes. This, again, we want to have clear—you will see the relationship—whether there was Government involvement or individual involvement.

—I am sorry, you are inaudible.

7756. Your understanding at that briefing was that the option of the Army going into the Six Counties was a real option in the mind of Mr. Colley—is that correct?

—Yes. The diplomatic démarche we were about to make—I explained this—was not going to have any effect. They would not expect to get anywhere with Dr. Hillery going to London. They would not expect to get anywhere with the request for United Nations action.

7757. There were people saying the same thing at the same time.

—Nor would they expect to get anywhere with demands they were making at the diplomatic level. They were to keep up the propaganda war and train and recruit what friends we could get internationally and maintain full pressure on the Westminister Government over Partition. It is Partition we were talking about that night, not civil rights.

7758. But the Government, in the meantime, was keeping all its options open?

—I understood that to mean that since we had troubles on the Border by this time and there was still a threat of further escalation of the troubles in the North, the Government was prepared, if the need arose, to mount an operation for defence in the North. There was certainly no question of invading the North, but if the need arose and the British Army proved inadequate they might have to go in.

7759. You say that this is what you assumed but was that, in fact, so?

—He gave us a very thorough and very good briefing and I felt that if he had remained as the Minister in charge of the propaganda team, it would have rendered it much more effective in the aggregate. I am not expressing any criticism of the Taoiseach here. I am only saying that we had no operative Minister you could go to with points and this type of thing.

7760. Deputy Nolan: Who was out of pocket as a result of the £1,000 cheque bouncing?

—It is slightly more than that—it is £1,500. I have covered it with my bank at the moment. I am raising funds from friends to clear it.

7761. It is actually you yourself who are ....?

—Yes, I have been left sort of responsible for this because I opened this account in my own name and my partner’s name. I did not want to involve the Government or anyone else for security reasons. In addition, I felt I should make sure that I accounted for every penny I got because I believed I was getting funds direct for the Government.

7762. So that the actual amount of money … apart from the £1,000 cheque that bounced, there is a further £500 as well?

—Yes.

7763. Deputy Treacy: I would just like as ask Mr. Brady how did these various publications work out commercially—Voice of the North and the booklet Terror in Northern Ireland, and the other one by Aidan Corrigan? To what extent were they given out free or was there a charge made for them?

—What Mr. Neeson decided with me in August when these booklets were to hand was that the Information Bureau, or the propaganda team, which at this time had 12 or, I think, 14 men abroad at various posts would use half the print order for distribution abroad and that the other half would be given to the particular writer in lieu of a fee. They did not get paid anything for these—either Mr. Corrigan or the group in Belfast who compiled these eye-witness accounts—and the idea was that they could sell these off. The Citizens Defence Committee did sell off their booklet, I believe.

7764. What charge per booklet? What did they charge for the booklet Terror in the North?

—Terror in the North was sold at retail cost of 2/- by them and the Corrigan booklet was retailed at 2/6d. Mr. Corrigan, I should mention, asked me to hold the type and had 15,000 copies printed off at his own expense and succeeded in selling them in the North. The 5,000 copies of his booklet printed on behalf of the Bureau … half of those were given to him and the others distributed by the Bureau.

7765. Have you any idea how they worked out commercially?

—How Mr. Corrigan’s worked out commercially?

7766. The other booklets?

—On the sale of them?

7767. Yes?

—Since the Defence Committee got them free and sold them at 2/6d, I presume they got 1/8d back from the newsagent.

7768. Where did this money go?

—To the Defence Committee. They were given the copies to sell in lieu of a fee for the writing.

7769. Were any accounts kept?

—I know nothing about that. I only sent them: I gave them the proof to look at— themselves and the printer. I did not handle them in any way. I arranged for the printer, the Cityview Press, to deliver 2,500 of each copy to the Government Information Bureau and I arranged with the Northern people to pick up these copies and get them across themselves.

7770. To what extent was the Voice of the North distributed free, free of charge?

—That is true enough, that for some time at the start they had some difficulty with street sellers and that they were, I think, giving it away for nothing in various parts of Belfast so they had no real accounts of their own up there. I did not go in very deeply into how they were running their operations because I do not think they had bank accounts for obvious reasons, but there were 600 copies sent free to M.P.s— 640—each M.P. at Westminster—for quite a period at the request of people in the North. I think that was done from the very start. Some of them had requested that it should be sent to Westminster.

7771. I have not read many copies. I understand from the talk between yourself and Deputy Keating that there was obviously some criticism of certain articles in the various editions of the Voice of the North? You did say earlier that booklets were circulated quite a lot in Britain—at the Labour Conference, for instance?

—That is how that booklet Terror in Northern Ireland originated. The Belfast people actually compiled that and I was given the manuscript by the person I mentioned who requested that it should be got out in pamphlet form to enable him to distribute it, which he did do. He was attending as an observer, you see.

7772. Was this the booklet you referred to as a European, well written——

—It is a very fine account.

7773. How effective was it?

—I do not know that. I do know that the person who distributed it was very pleased with the reaction, because he told me so afterwards, but I would have nothing only second-hand information on that.

7774. Could I ask you, Mr. Brady, if you can elaborate now as to why Mr. Eoin Neeson or the Government Information Bureau refused to support your various propaganda efforts, though he seemingly had rather committed himself to a very large extent to your various proposals?

—I do not think he was refusing to support them, as you put it. I think what happened was that after the third issue the Taoiseach decided not—whether the Taoiseach saw any earlier issues or not I do not know—but I made sure that issues went to the Bureau from the very start. I regarded it as a Bureau operation.

7775. You had great difficulty in being reimbursed by him for your various activities—you had to go to Mr. Haughey, in fact, the then Minister for Finance?

—Yes.

7776. Why was this?

—I found great difficulty in contacting him on the telephone—he was either away or was not available, et cetera.

7777. Was there any significance in the fact that the Taoiseach also declined to allow the Government Information Bureau to be associated with your various propaganda devices?

—I am afraid you will have to ask the Taoiseach that. I cannot answer—I do not know.

7778. You have said in your submission to us that you were very angered about this?

—Yes, I was. I felt that I had been let down. Needless to say, I had encouraged my partner to get himself involved in expense which we need not have incurred at all. I did not really want to produce a newspaper. It was one of the last things I wanted to do and I personally felt quite annoyed at the time.

7779. You were not in fact reimbursed by either Mr. Neeson or Mr. Haughey—or indeed by the Taoiseach—in respect of your outlay up to that time—some £650 expenses, I should think?

—I was reimbursed from that £1,000 paid by Captain Kelly. That was paid back to the company.

7780. The only time you seem to have secured some worthwhile money was when you contacted Captain Kelly. Captain Kelly gave you an allowance of £600 in cash on the 6th and 7th November. This was the first worthwhile amount of money you received?

—That is right.

7781. Were you not, to say the least, suspicious of the fact that your work was not being refunded by the Government Information Bureau or the Department of Finance proper but that rather you had to resort to Captain Kelly? How did you feel about accepting money from Captain Kelly? Where did you think this money came from?

—I had no reason to be suspicious at that time. I am afraid you are looking at this from this side. Try to look at it from the point of view from which I saw it at that time. I had been dealing with Northern Ireland people and a request was made to me to keep the paper going, and against my own wishes, because I did not want to get involved in a newspaper, I decided to help them. So it was not a question of just if the Bureau refused to back the Voice of the North, it would die. The Northern people wanted it kept going and I said “Yes, I will help you, but you will have to produce it yourselves and get your own editor. I am not going to get involved.” I did not make these arrangements, I mean. I was asked to make them. I did not suggest them.

7782. Did you make any inquiries as to the source of the money from Captain Kelly at this juncture? You were not worried about the source at all. Did you believe it was a Government source?

—You mean back in September, October and November?

7783. Yes?

—No. Why should I? He told me that the Northern people were providing this money to keep the paper going.

7784. You mean there was money supplied by the Northern Committee?

—Yes.

7784(a). You referred earlier to the feasibility of establishing a mobile radio station to be beamed from and around the Border. You did, in fact, submit some proposals along these lines. Why was this turned down in preference to the other media?

—I could not—I do not know. I presume the Bureau, or the Taoiseach, or someone could give you the reasons. As I say, it never was taken any distance at all. I only bring it in to establish the bona fide position I was in at the time—that I was asked to go ahead with this under-cover operation.

7785. You tell us in page 5 of your submission that Mr. Gleeson arranged with you that your fee would be £200 per month and that you would submit a weekly true bill to him of all expenditure in connection with the newspaper. He also instructed you to submit to him a covering bill each week for the amount laid out. We have some documentation. Do we have some information along these lines from you?

—All I can refer you back to is that was the fee I was originally paid while I acted for the Bureau team. There was no great discussion about it. Everybody at that stage was doing their best to help old Ireland, as you might say. It was a very hysterical period and no one asked questions at this time. After I got my first pay order I discovered I was being paid £200 a month. Now that fee was to continue, as I understood from Mr. Neeson, because I was supposed to be producing this paper. There was no question of the Northerners doing it at this time. There was no question of any committee being set up. It was to pay writers. After all, most writers operated later on on the basis of doing it voluntarily, but that was to be my fee for getting the paper out, organising the writers, arranging distribution. You can see from the period that overlapped, for the whole period, all I got out of it was £30, which was recompense for travelling to Cavan on some occasions.

7786. 1 see. I recollect you saying you did not meet many members of the Civil Rights Movement in the North of Ireland?

—No, not particularly. The sort of people I was in contact with mainly would be newspaper people and, say, politicians on the opposition side at the beginning.

7787. You, in fact, were the editor of the Voice of the North?

—No.

7788. Who was the editor?

—You have the figures there. Q was the first editor in the code. I only really was responsible for the first three or four issues, because it was important that they should produce the stuff themselves because I did not know what was going on in the North, being down here. I did not know what was going on once I left the Bureau and I rarely visited the North at all. For the five or six weeks I was working for the Bureau team, I was most of my time in the North and only came down here on Sundays. The Bureau was operating on Sunday, you see. I would get down on Saturday night and report to him.

7789. You did arrange for various articles to be submitted?

—Yes.

7790. To what extent were you selective in your choice of personnel for the list of authors?

—I think you have got the wrong end of the stick here. I was not responsible editing the Voice of the North after about the fourth or fifth issue. I did not even go to Cavan. I did not even see it some weeks, so I did not know what was going into it, nor did I see it some weeks. They were doing this themselves. All I can accept responsibility for is really the first three issues when I found it very hard to get copy but, after the third issue, was going very strongly and had a team of writers there. Some of them he was paying and some of them were writing voluntarily for him and there was a question then of having more than he could put into the eight pages, so I did not have to select the stuff at all after that.

7791. Well, precisely what part did you play from there on?

—Providing for the payment of the printer was the major part after that.

7792. Just one last question: I note the cheque was returned to drawer here—the cheque for £1,000 which was marked RD?

—Yes.

7793. Is that still the position—there has been no recoupment of any kind so far as you are concerned?

—Sorry. I do not hear Deputy, too well.

7794. You tell us here you received further cheques from Captain Kelly drawn on the Ann O’Brien account. These were lodged in the Voice of the North accounts as follows: £500 December 31st; £600 January 14th; £500 February 12th; £500 March 3rd—all 1970 with the exception of December, 1969—and finally £1,000 drawn March 26th. This is the £1,000 referred to drawer?

—That is right. I first got notification of that being RDed on the 28th October. The bank manager sent it back to me. He rang me on the telephone and he said he was sending it back to me.

7795. That is the position?

—Yes.

7796. Is this the total amount you are out of pocket as a result of the whole transaction?

—I am not out of pocket. It has been made up for me by some kind people. I had to go around and ask people to help me and take up funds for it so I am not out of pocket.

7797. Deputy Tunney.—Just one or two questions. I notice in your documentation on the cheques you refer to The Voice of Ulster?

—That is why I opened the account. The Northern people objected to the word “Ulster” afterwards and insisted the paper should be called the Voice of the North, but on 25th September, when I called it The Voice of Ulster, I did not know it was going to be printed in Cavan, which is in the province of Ulster, and I just simply described it as The Voice of Ulster. That is the only significance there.

7798. There is just one other small point and, having heard your evidence, you might want to change it slightly. In your statement on 25th January, page 8, you state that when you first heard the name Ann O’Brien you did not question this in any way?

—I mean, you know, when he told me “It is a cover” I did not go beyond that. That is what I mean by that. Once an army intelligence officer whom I had met recently and seen him in operation and knew what he was about, I did not go beyond that. I did ask him jocosely who was Ann O’Brien and he said that was a cover. That is as far as it went.

7799. In respect of the cheques which you got, were any of these cheques blank when you got them?

—No. The cheques I got were signed and were in an envelope. Captain Kelly used come to my office. I would ring him and I would say I need to pay such and such a bill for the printer and I would show him these bills, of course, and he simply gave me an envelope with the cheque inside, folded over.

7800. And, as far as the Voice of the North is concerned, you took this as being a continuation of the propaganda which had ceased from the Bureau?

—I am not saying that, no. The Northern people asked for it as a sort of propaganda effort that they wanted done. They wanted the Government, I presume, to pay for it. I am not saying it was a continuation of the propaganda which was wound up towards the end of November, as far as I recollect. I do not think it was. This was to be an undercover operation, as I understand it. Their attitude was that the propaganda being done in Canberra and Madrid and Rome and those places was all right but they wanted propaganda directed at the Unionist Government to reply to this stuff.

7801. It actually was acting on behalf of the people of the North, as far as you are concerned?

—Yes.

7802. My final question: You need not answer this, if you do not wish. If, in the circumstances, you had realised that the money was coming from elsewhere, would you have been happy about it or would it have caused you any botheration?

—No, I would not. Naturally, if I had known this was public funds, coming from public funds, I would have been quite astonished.

7803. You would have been astonished?

—Yes, I would. But I appreciate also— I have been told, and I accept this until such time as it is proved otherwise—that this money was being covered for in the accounts which they were operating for the relief of Belfast.

7804. If that covering had not been there, in the circumstances, you would have resigned?

—Well, I don’t know how I would have reacted but all I can tell you, Deputy, in reply to your question is that nobody at any time suggested to me from any source, Government Information Bureau or Cabinet level or the Northern people or Captain Kelly, that this was public funds.

7805. Chairman.—Thank you very much, Mr. Brady, that is all. You are finished—

—I beg your pardon, Deputy Burke.

7806. Deputy Burke.—I only want to ask one question in relation to what you said to Deputy Keating. You said: “I know there was £100,000 Grant-in-Aid.” You could not possibly have known that because the amount of money wasn’t specified?

—Well, I didn’t know what the fund was, but I knew moneys were being provided——

7807. Just a small correction, I think, would be in your own benefit?

—Yes. I mean the sum was only mentioned, I think, afterwards when the House sat and the actual Grant was approved.

7808. That was what made me wonder.

—It was only a lapse of the tongue.

7809. Chairman.—Thank you.

Mr. Brady withdrew.

The Committee adjourned the public session and went into private session at 5.25 p.m.

The following evidence was taken in private. The witness concurring, the Committee decided to publish this evidence.

7810. Chairman.—Captain Kelly, I understand you want to see us for five minutes.

Captain Kelly.—It concerns Chief Superintendent Fleming’s evidence. As far as I am concerned, all—and I think I am safe in saying “all”—that he said concerning me, especially what he said concerning my lending money to certain persons, is a complete and utter lie, so I want an opportunity to say something which may give him some indication that this in fact is a lie. As you realise, when an accusation like this is made out of the blue one cannot give any proof as regards the actual accusation because one knows nothing about it. It is as simple as that. I would like to have an opportunity of making a case and stating certain facts that would disprove to a certain extent the validity of Chief Superintendent Fleming’s evidence and I would like to have the opportunity of doing so in public because Chief Superintendent Fleming’s evidence has got a lot of publicity in various papers, not only here, but also in Northern Ireland and in England. As you realise, he is quoted as saying that Captain Kelly gave so-and-so to so-and-so. It does not say “I am aware”, or “As far as I know”, or “I think” or anything else. As far as people are concerned it comes across as straightforward evidence. I would like an opportunity in public of counteracting this evidence as best I can.

7811. Deputy FitzGerald.—Is that the reason why you say this is in private?

—This morning I was talking to Mr. Tobin. I said I would like to get into the Committee in private to say this.

7812. I thought there were some special reasons.

—I want to say it in public.

7813. Deputy Keating.—I think that is a reasonable request. I make one proviso— that it does not last too long.

—I will make it short, an hour I suppose.

7814. Do not make it an hour. It is teatime. We would like to have it and then break for something to eat.

—I think it will be an hour.

7815. Deputy MacSharry.—Can you help us in any way in regard to expenditure? Do you say you can substantiate what you are going to say in relation to what Chief Superintendent Fleming said?

—As regards the money itself it would give no indication except I would deny that any money which you accuse me of giving can be mentioned. I have got to try and prove these things. I think this is the greatest accusation that has been made.

7816. It will not in any way help us—you said there were certain points—you know yourself you withdrew from the bank and handed something over to whoever it was. Can you in any way tell us that £2,000 was withdrawn satisfactorily?

—The point is, this evidence of Chief Superintendent Fleming has absolutely no validity at all.

7817. I am trying to help you on this. If you can tell the Committee, maybe from memory, from recollection or from fact, that all of the money that you actually handled you can vouch for that you gave to so-and-so A, B, C, D, E, F or G and therefore they were no other funds available to you, you would be substantiating your claim that you could not have given money to others. Can you, in your submission to us, help in that way?

—I can help you to that extent. As you realise Captain Kelly handed £7,000 to Cathal Goulding. As far as I am concerned this is a lie. How can you disprove a statement?

7818. Chairman.—May I help you in this way. It is better if you did not use the word “lie”. It is better that you use the words “I do not accept it” or “It is not correct”.

—I was not trying to be so polite, I must admit.

7819. It would be better, I think.

—As far as I am concerned a lie has been perpetrated against me in the public media. I am sorry to use the term “lying’. This is what it amounts to in effect. If there were some dispute, if for instance I had £7,000 I gave to someone else who was not a Cathal Goulding, all right, I can prove I did. When a thing is taken completely out of the blue you just cannot——

7820. Deputy Keating.—I suggest we go ahead and he makes his statement.

7821. Deputy MacSharry.—To get one thing straight before we do, is it crossquestion or——

7822. Chairman.—A statement.

7823. Deputy MacSharry.—He ad libs, nobody interrupts.

—If I may make a suggestion, I have some notes. I will go through as far as I can and possibly any questions can be asked.

7824. We do not want to get bogged down for a day or two.

—I understand. To me this is the most serious part of the Committee as far as I am concerned.

7825. We accept that.

7826. Deputy Treacy.—Having regard to its importance, Captain, in so far as you personally are concerned, have you given any consideration to the feasibility of your submitting this evidence to us in writing?

—The point about this is that it is nearly impossible to counteract this type of thing in writing and I think you will find that you will have to ask me questions about it. I have it here roughly in writing, but to give a summary in writing is practically impossible.

(The public were re-admitted).

7827. Chairman.—Captain Kelly, we are ready for you.

—There may be some repetition, so perhaps I may be excused. First, I never met Cathal Goulding in Virginia, Co. Cavan, and in fact Mr. Goulding has denied any such meeting. Number two, I did not attend an I.R.A. meeting in Cavan in the first week of October 1969 or in any other place or at any other time. Number three, I did not pay £7,000 to Cathal Goulding or anyone else on 7th October, 1969, nor did I pay him or anyone else £1,000 in the last week of November. I did not pay £1,500 to Cathal Goulding or anyone else in December, 1969.

Firstly, I had not access to £7,000 on 7th October, 1969 and at no stage had I control over any money other than £500 that I obtained to finance the Bailieboro meeting. And here I might make reference to Mr. Fleming’s evidence, where he uses such terms as “as far as I know” and, “again I am not sure but I think”, in giving his evidence which to a large degree invalidates it as positive evidence. But further—and I think this is the important point—if there was even a suspicion of a serving Army officer or soldier behaving in such a manner as Chief Superintendent Fleming suggests, he would, to put it at the lowest, be questioned, and it is not too much to say that if there was any validity whatever in this evidence I would have been court martialled, because this is one of the most serious crimes that any serving soldier can commit, to associate with certain subversives in these circumstances and to hand over actual money. A further point: such evidence, as far as I am aware, and I am quite positive of this—it can be verified by the man himself—was never brought to the notice of the Director of Intelligence, which is in itself unusual if there is any validity in the evidence. It cannot be understood, because this is one of the first things that would have been brought to the notice of the Army authorities if any member of the Defence Forces was associating in any way with a subversive organisation. To give some proof of this I will mention two recent cases that took place in the Army, two officers who were removed from the Army for what might be described as less heinous offences in the context of serving in the Defence Forces. One was an officer who dumped ammunition in a canal here in Dublin. He was court martialled and fined and later removed from the Army completely by the President of the country here. His commission was removed from him. Secondly, another officer whose only crime as far as I know was alleged association with subversives. He was removed from the Army and as far as I know he is in Dublin at the present time on the dole and as far as I am aware there was no evidence against him at all.

Chief Superintendent Fleming just cannot have it both ways. The conduct he attributes to me would not be tolerated from any serving soldier and—I am repeating myself here a bit, I suppose—any association with alleged subversives would merit instant and very stiff disciplinary action—in effect, one would be thrown out of the Army, probably after a court martial, lose pension, lose everything.

This is only as it should be, I suppose, but if Chief Superintendent Fleming or the Garda authorities had such information as they claim and did not bring it to the notice of the Army authorities, the evidence Chief Superintendent Fleming gave, all it amounts to, is that he or the people he reported to in the police are guilty of a grave crime against national security in this country. They could be held in grave dereliction of their duty if what Chief Superintendent Fleming said is true. Arising logically from this, if they are not guilty of this crime of withholding information that should be brought to the relevant authorities, the only other explanation is that the evidence is false. These are a few other points. As regards what was said when Mr. Gibbons was leaving Mr. Fleming’s office on 1st May, what I told the Committee is accurate. I just wonder how Chief Superintendent Fleming quoted the exact words in this case, nine months later, of what could only have been for him a comparatively trivial comment.

And also I do not think for one moment that Mr. Gibbons was so free with the juniors as Chief Superintendent Fleming seems to indicate. In the first place, it would not have been politic for him to show such easy familiarity. Further, on the 2nd May, when I refused to name Ministers in Chief Superintendent Fleming’s office, he said he could name them himself and I am in no doubt about the three names he gave. He gave Haughey, Blaney and Gibbons. He says that he gave Boland as the third man. If he gave Boland, I would certainly remember it because it would have been so ridiculous as to be practically laughable.

I can go on—this is extra evidence in a way—and say that I had a long discussion with Chief Superintendent Fleming that morning. For instance, Chief Superintendent Fleming introduced An Taoiseach into the conversation and asked me, or suggested to me that An Taoiseach was aware of what was going on, and I remember it distinctly because my answer to him was—I said: “I do not think so, because if one takes into consideration what has happened over the past few days, it would not be logical”. He still, to my surprise, persisted in putting forward this suggestion. His reasons I will not attempt to explain, but this happened. Also at this stage he was talking about the arms importation itself, were the arms intended for the North, and so on and I distinctly remember in his office going over to a map and pointing out the North and the South and he seemed to be worried that they were going to be kept here, for some reason or other. I remember explaining to him that as a last resort these arms were to be held here to go into Northern Ireland. To an extent here I am repeating myself a bit.

Chief Superintendent Fleming says that he reported to the authorities on my alleged activities. If I was doing what he suggested here the last day, is it conceivable, logical or possible that no action was taken? Is it conceivable that nothing of this should get to the Army authorities? Just another small point—he suggested in his evidence that I would be picked up by the U.V.F. and was worried about my operations in Northern Ireland and that there was no cover. I was not in Northern Ireland after early October, 1969 at the latest, so there was no need for this. This is just thrown in to colour the story. This question of meetings with I.R.A. members on four or five occasions—all I can say to this is that it is simply not true. I never attended any I.R.A. meetings, although I had knowledge of one in Monaghan and that is the closest I ever came to an I.R.A. meeting as such. Mr. Fleming says “Nobody told me” whether I was working officially or otherwise. He said this in his evidence—“nobody told me”. To me, I find this a remarkable answer to give. It is practically inconceivable —if a Chief Superintendent of the Special Branch in this country had this information about an Army officer, is he going to sit back and come up nine months afterwards and say when asked was it official or unofficial, “nobody told me”?

He is guilty of not doing his duty on his own evidence here before this Committee and, in effect, I would say that he leaves himself open to a charge of dereliction of duty in his capacity. Then there is this other point, as regards his comment that he made inquiries on his own and that Colonel Hefferon replied “Pure poppycock”. If Colonel Hefferon did not know about these allegations, how could he reply “Pure poppycock”?

There is then this question of the Bailieboro meeting. This is something that comes out in a very peculiar manner in Chief Superintendent Fleming’s evidence. He says at one point that the first he heard of me was at the Bailieboro meeting in early October. I would accept this as being incorrect. Then he goes on to say: “I was told he was operating in the Six Counties at this stage. That was the first information I got of Captain Kelly’s existence”. That is OK in itself, except that I was not operating in the Six Counties after the first week in October. I never met Rory Brady. I can only describe this as a mis-statement of fact, and actually I see where Mr. Brady has denied this also in a public statement. There was this question of the airport importation of arms and at one stage he suggests—I think he is talking in the plural at this stage when he talks about airport importations—that I might have been involved in it. He goes on of course then and says this is speculation or rumour. I think this is nothing more than —I do not know what word one would use to describe it—an attempt to drag me into something with which even on his own evidence I had no concern whatsoever.

Another point is that, talking of the importation through the airport, he informed Deputy FitzGerald here, when Deputy FitzGerald asked whether “Captain Kelly was not connected with that operation” and he replied… I think he answered no to this question—this can be verified from the booklet anyhow—and to me this evidence is just disgraceful. You had the contradiction and even in the contradiction, at one stage he says no and then he attempts to drag me into it and he refers to it as speculation and rumour. Is this evidence from a Chief of Police? There is mention here before about Pádraig Haughey and George Dixon. All I can say is that that is wrong. However, there is a point here now which I think very important. On the question of the trip to England of Pádraig Haughey and J, Superintendent Fleming was asked, “do you have any knowledge as to who they were in negotiations with or where the arms were coming from in England”? and he answered no.

Further on, he was asked if he had any information of why the affair apparently went wrong and he answered, “No, I have no information on that”. This to me is very difficult to understand—how the Chief of the Special Branch could give such answers, because this episode involving as it did a suspected English agent at the time, posing as Peter Markham Randall, was reported by me and brought to the notice of the Garda authorities, and further, some time in February or March 1970, a photograph was brought to me taken from the files in Garda Headquarters—officially brought to me—to identify one of the men who were involved in this incident. The photograph was of the Northern man and I was told that there was another photograph on the file of Pádraig Haughey and from this photograph it was quite clear—I made inquiries about it—that these people were photographed as they walked up from the Tube on their first arrival in London, in Oxford Street. If the Garda people have got this file, which I am sure they must have got from the British authorities, how can Chief Superintendent Fleming come in here and answer questions concerning that incident as he did? Is it possible?

I have hesitated—I have said this before, or I have suggested it—to bring this into the open previously because I believed it was concerned with the State security, but he has left me no other option only to bring this clearly out.

The next paragraph here—I suppose I have denied it already and there is no point in going through it again: I have no association with the I.R.A. I said that categorically here in answer to the Committee, and that is correct, other than the three meetings I had with Cathal Goulding which were merely obtaining, or hoping to obtain, information, and they were carried out under authority, and this was clear to Garda headquarters also, that I would be talking to such people and it finished in the first week in October. Actually, I think this possibly shows the type of bias in Chief Superintendent Fleming’s information. It is not a hard contradiction by me of what he said but, in answer to Deputy Tunney, he said: “I would like”—no—yes —“I would like to clear up that one. Had he met one of them on his own”—obviously he was referring to the I.R.A.—“I could agree that he might have been getting information but to meet them two or three at a time, definitely not. An intelligence officer should not act in that way.”

I mean, I do not accept this statement, apart from its only being just thrown in. It means nothing. He is only just trying to give a bit of colour—that it would be wrong for an intelligence officer to do that. It is not intrinsically wrong for an intelligence officer to do that. Reading through Chief Superintendent Fleming’s evidence, he becomes very vague on it and states, in reference to complaints emanating from the Department of Justice concerning that meeting, he states categorically: “Not regarding that meeting, unless it came from some member of the Garda”—he qualifies that—“or others”. I mean, gentlemen, should he not know? He definitely did not get it from me. Actually, further on this very same point about the Bailieboro meeting, he does give a categorical denial. when asked: “As far as you were concerned, this is not the meeting from which these complaints regarding Captain Kelly’s association could have come?” he answered “No”.

Once again, I reiterate this is the only meeting I had in Bailieboro. It was not a meeting with the I.R.A. I reported this to my director in the normal way and some three weeks later this complaint came back to me through the director, who told me that he had got it from the Minister for Defence, who had got some type of complaint from An Taoiseach, who had received a complaint from Mr. Barry. I am quite positive that this is what was brought to me by Colonel Hefferon. This matter was cleared up. It was reported back on to the Minister for Defence and I presume it went back all the way and it was forgotten about. It was never mentioned again until Mr. Gibbons brought it up to me personally, so I think there is something very curious in his evidence, that this one specific meeting that did take place, that he is now trying to suggest that it was not the subject of the complaints. I know it was the only meeting that could be the subject of complaint. I know, and Colonel Hefferon will verify this, that it was the subject of a complaint. Why is Chief Superintendent Fleming coming in here before this Committee and trying to indicate that this meeting was not. I will leave it at that, gentlemen.

Yes, there is one other point which may go some of the way towards helping to show you the type of Chief Superintendent Fleming’s evidence. I have not covered all his evidence point by point, but I have picked out what I think are the main factors in it on which I can indicate to the Committee that he was not, in effect, telling the truth. You may remember that in the Four Courts there was some conflict between Mr. Ó Moráin’s evidence and that of Mr. Berry and Chief Superintendent Fleming. Mr. Ó Moráin stated that there was a Cabinet decision taken directing him to send officers —these would be officers of the police force —into the North. I will quote to you the same bit of evidence:

Mr. Ó Moráin: There was a Cabinet decision taken from which I got authority to send special officers to the North of Ireland.

Mr. Sorohan: Special Branch?

Mr. Sorohan was counsel for John Kelly.

Mr. Ó Moráin: Special Branch officers.

This evidence was denied by Mr. Fleming.

Mr. Sorohan: Is it right to say that several members of the Special Detective Unit had to go there on the instructions of Mr. Ó Moráin?

Mr. Fleming: No, my lord, that is not correct.

Mr. Sorohan: And if anyone said that it would be quite wrong?

Mr. Fleming: Quite wrong.

Later, Commissioner Lincoln was called in to sort out the conflict and what it boiled down to, to put the best complexion on it, was that a technical truth was being told, that officers sent into Northern Ireland were not officers associated with the Central Detective Unit here in Dublin, but they were officers associated with the Criminal Branch down the country who, in this branch, were concerned with political activity and actually when Mr. Lincoln was asked to explain what a Special Branch officer was, he said there was no statutory distinction between them and an ordinary guard.

The people who were in Northern Ireland were wearing civilian attire and were doing political work. When Mr. Lincoln was finally asked if these officers were not now in the Special Branch had they ever served in the Special Branch, he claimed privilege. So I will just put that at its best, that it was possibly a technical untruth or mistruth, whatever the correct wording is. However, on the occasion of the court trial, when I left the court on that day—and this is something I once again hesitate to bring out and I have never brought it out before—but there at that court was a person from Northern Ireland, a quite well-known figure and he had listened to this evidence concerning the Special Branch and he was convinced, believed, that the Special Branch had been in Northern Ireland. I would accept, however, that they were the type of people I detailed. And he went further and he said that these people, when they were up there, were offering arms and ammunition that they alleged to have captured in 1956-62 for information. And he gave me a case which happened in County Fermanagh of one man who was there and let it be known that he had this arms and ammunition available to him. These people went from Belfast to meet him and they collected from him 50 rounds of ammunition in return for information. This is very sinister in this way: you can realise the type of information this was that was brought back. This is the information that has been put in front of the Cabinet here on the basis of the High Court evidence. Furthermore, I will go further than that, the officer was named to me and his home station was given to me. I went to the trouble of verifying it and the name was correct. I am not going to name him here in public. He can be named in private if the Committee so desire. All I can say, gentlemen, is that I don’t think I need go any further to disprove the evidence given by Chief Superintendent Fleming. His technical truth in the Four Courts upset me, but I will just say this—and I must say this—his lies told to this Committee——

7828. Chairman.—Captain, you must modify, I mean you are not entitled to say “lies”; incorrect statements, if you wish.

—Mr. Chairman, I will qualify it in this way, that as far as I am concerned and as far as their effect is concerned and in the manner they have been reported to the public, the public looking upon Chief Superintendent Fleming as the head of the Special Branch in this country accept what he has said as the truth. It is not the truth. So it is just a question of definition. That would finish my submission on the Chief Superintendent Fleming point. However, I have one other point to make. I was asked the last day to give a reference to something I said here concerning the knowledge of Mr. Gibbons concerning money. You may remember at the end of my evidence here the last day I mentioned this in passing and I think you, Mr. Chairman, suggested that I should get the reference and I think it is very, very important in view of the work that this Committee are undertaking, that this evidence should be put in very precisely because as far as I can see it largely undermines the reason why this Committee was formed at all. I am not saying this with any disrespect to the Committee and I think you will possibly understand it when I read out to you the piece of evidence concerned. It is from the trial again and it is the morning paper of 9th October, when Mr. Wood was cross-examining Mr. Gibbons: he makes a reference to the Baggot Street accounts and Mr. Gibbons said he had never heard of any such—of them:

Mr. Wood: And do you know about any drawing or dealings from them?

Mr. Gibbons: I know absolutely nothing about any drawing or dealings from them.

Mr. Wood: Did anybody approach or consult you in relation to them?

Mr. Gibbons: On the first day of May was the first intimation I got.

Mr. Wood: The 1st May of the present year?

Mr. Gibons: Of the present year was the first intimation I got from Captain Kelly as to the source of the money which evidently paid for arms.

Mr. Wood: The 1st May was the first you knew?

Mr. Gibbons: The 1st May was the first I knew about it.

Now, Mr. Chairman, previously when I was here I said I could not have told him on 1st May; I told him earlier. However, what I want to state here is that the Minister for Defence, by that statement, indicates that he knew where the money was coming from for the arms on 1st May, having been told by me. As far as I know, and I am subject to correction here, later, in the months later, and I think the Taoiseach said this coming back from New York, that he knew nothing about where the money came from until he heard of Captain Kelly’s evidence in court. But this is a member of his own Cabinet who knew about it on his own admission on 1st May. So this is the point I want to make: to me it seems that if a member of the Cabinet knew about it on 1st May, there was absolutely no necessity for this inquiry. And I emphasise it, that he got it from Captain Kelly as to the source of the money which evidently paid for them. I leave it to you, gentlemen. There is one other point I would like to go on to. It is not as of grave importance as the other two points, I think. It is concerning—I was reading back on the evidence here and I think it was during questioning by Deputy Briscoe of Colonel Hefferon the impression was created from this that I was an inexperienced and, one might think, incompetent intelligence officer. So, I would like just to give you a rundown on my intelligence experience as such. It is probably professional pride on my part.

7829. Chairman.—Would you give the reference, Captain? You are quoting from some——

—No. 8, page 323. I think I can give it from recollection. The thing was that he said I was in a military secretariat capacity. I was opening envelopes and this type of thing.

7830. Deputy Briscoe.—If I might say something here, Mr. Chairman. Any of the members of the Committee who asked a series of questions and solicited certain answers to them or answers to the questions, I think that now that they should be cross-examined on the questions they asked is a little bit ridiculous and as far as Captain Kelly’s feelings are concerned, any answers I was given to questions which I asked about your experience as an intelligence officer, the kind of answers that were given were not, shall we say, my fault——

—I appreciate this. I am not saying this.

7831. Deputy Briscoe.—I think that if we are going to take up time being cross-examined on every single point—I see you have quite a batch——

—Oh, no, there is no cross-examination. It is a matter of just reading this thing out into the record of my experience which I think if anyone reads page 323 will see clearly that the indication is that I was an inexperienced officer and I think Mr. Briscoe, with all due respects, you put the question to me: “Was this your first assignment?” at one stage. Furthermore, you made a remark about my service in the Middle East, that I was running guns between the Arabs and the Jews, which I did not get a chance of taking up, or words to that effect.

7832. Deputy Briscoe.—I don’t think I said that. It doesn’t matter now, anyway. You said you were liaising between the Arabs and Jews. I was about to ask you actually did you speak Arabic and Hebrew.

—But this remark was made. It was probably made in a joke but as far as I am concerned I was carrying out my job as a professional officer in the Army and the general impression created from reading what is there is that I was incompetent and I just want to state—there is no cross-examination at all—just state my experience. It is as simple as that.

7833. Chairman.—Will you state it very very briefly? We don’t want your whole life history.

—Well, no, I won’t give my whole life history, but I have to explain it. Maybe it’s my own personal thing, but however, I have been with intelligence section since November, 1960. I was first in the press and publicity subsection of that section. I spent a further period in combat intelligence subsection and later, shortly afterwards, I was appointed as personal assistant to the Director and at that stage I was briefed on the operations of security subsection. This is away back in 1960-61 and in fact during the Congo operation I operated in security subsection in addition to carrying out my duties as personal assistant. At a later stage I was appointed editor of An Cosantóir in addition to my duties as personal assistant. This was the situation when I went to the Middle East in 1963. After one year there I was appointed Officer-in-Charge of Kuneitra Control Centre in Syria. In this position I found myself in a position of authority over officers from the rank of colonel down because of which, I believe, there was some representation made to have me promoted to a higher rank, and the following which I will read to you is an extract from my terminal report signed by General Odd Bull and forwarded to me on completion of my U.N. duties in 1965 and the reason I read this is because that there was some comment made on counting bullets and so on.

I can show this to the Committee if you like. This is a terminal report when one finishes U.N. duty, signed by General Odd Bull, who was the Chief of Staff of U.N.T.S.O. at that period. A copy is forwarded to New York for submission to the authorities concerned and a copy is given to the officer concerned. I will read the last part of it. “The officer is rated according to U.N.T.S.O. standards as follows: Above average. Remarks: During his second year of service with U.N.T.S.O., Captain Kelly performed his duties in an excellent manner. He is a sincere, warm and friendly officer, well liked and respected by his associates. He possesses a sharp wit and astute intelligence. He is a clear, logical thinker, cool and unruffled in emergencies. He plans ahead, weighs the consequences and implications of events and actions, arrives at some conclusions and takes timely decisive and appropriate action. As Officer in Charge of the Kuncitro Control Centre, he maintained cordial and productive relations with the Junior Syrian delegate, thereby rendering further valuable service to this commission”. That is the end of it. I wanted to read it out to clarify what my duties were in the Middle East.

Upon my return from the Middle East, I was immediately reappointed personal assistant to the Director of Intelligence, and after some time became editor of An Cosantóir again. It may seem at this stage I am going to go into stuff that is irrelevant but something that should be understood about an intelligence officer is that 80 per cent—I have not the exact figure here but it is very very high in the 80s—of intelligence work, or information one reads from open sources, from what one hears, from what one evaluates from public knowledge—I want to make this point as regards my experience. During this period, articles I wrote brought me in contact with various people including Liddell-Hart who, as I think most people are aware, has been one of the foremost writers on military affairs. In effect, an article I wrote in August 1957 on British defence policy was used by the Department of the Air Force, U.S.A., as educational material at the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell Air Base, Alabama. This is on British defence policy. Further, there is a magazine in Germany which each month recommends worthwhile reading and at various times they recommended two articles by me “Khe Sanh and the Nuclear Threat”. I am sorry to concentrate on this. It is not for any purpose of boasting. The point I want to make is that this large percentage of intelligence is gleanced from public sources and one cannot write letters in their field without being analytical and capable of at least formulating feasible conclusions. If one is capable, as I put it, of writing these articles, it illustrates that one is 80 per cent on the way to being a competent intelligence officer. That is the point I wanted to make.

Furthermore, as regards courses, I have done the normal Army courses including the commanding staff course which qualifies one for the rank in the Army and intelligence is an essential aspect of these courses. Furthermore, as regards this personal assistant to the Director of Intelligence, I would merely state that is a position for which an officer is specially selected, discretion, trust and reliability being major requirements. Making appointments and taking letters, as has been suggested here, is only a minor aspect. I should mention the Director of Intelligence has a confidential typist. I would just put it that I was not completely an amateur in the field when I went to Derry in August, 1969. I think I am not being unfair when what has emerged from what I have called it here did suggest this. Thank you very much.

7834. Deputy Keating.—I do not wish to ask Captain Kelly any questions. I would like to indicate my own wish that he would write down for the benefit of the Committee the name and the station of the person to whom he referred. This is if the Committee wishes. Captain Kelly mentioned an officer and he said he checked on him and said he would not give his name in a public sitting. I think the Committee might have that, if that is agreeable. Is that all right?

7835. Chairman.—Yes. I think that is all. Thank you very much.

Captain Kelly.—And thank you very much for hearing me.

7836-37. Chairman.—The hearing of evidence for today is now concluded.

The Committee adjourned at 6.25 p.m. until 11 a.m. on Wednesday, 17th February, 1971.