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MIONTUAIRISC NA FIANAISE(Minutes of Evidence)Déardaoin, 11 Feabhra, 1971Thursday, 11th February, 1971.The Committee met at 11.20 a.m.
DEPUTY P. HOGAN in the chair. ORDER OF DÁIL OF 1st DECEMBER, 1970.Mr. E. F. Suttle (An tArd-Reachtaire Cuntas agus Ciste) was in attendance in an advisory capacity.Examination of Captain James J. Kelly continued.7278. Deputy Keating.—I have got the feeling in the last few days in regard to myself that I was getting a masterly grip of the inessentials of this whole matter so I do not want to talk about what I might call the small print of the accounts today. The first thing I want to talk about is the question of the actual ownership of the money, step by step, without reference to any quantities of money. You said yesterday, and have said a number of times, that as far as you are concerned the money in the Dixon and O’Brien accounts belonged to the North of Ireland people? —That is right, yes. 7279. You know, money always belongs to somebody, but the money we are investigating started off in the Department of Finance and went from there to the Red Cross and went from there to the Belfast Fund for the Relief of Distress and went from there to the Dixon and O’Brien accounts, and I want to take you through that chain of money ownership to try to clarify the points at which ownership changed in your mind. When it was in the Department of Finance and the Government made its statement of 16th August, 1969, “The Minister for Finance will make funds available for the relief of victims”, et cetera, a departmental suspense account was established. That money belonged to the State and was in the control of the Department of Finance. That is clear, I think. Can we agree on that? —Yes. 7280. It was then paid by the Department of Finance to the Irish Red Cross which, as you know, is a statutory body in the sense that it was set up by an Act of the Oireachtas, and is of very considerable standing and is greatly respected in the community, so that nobody in the Department of Finance would have any reservations about making orders payable to the Red Cross, especially in view of the fact that it had been announced that the Red Cross would administer these funds. Can we agree that at that stage it belonged to the Red Cross? —I would say so. As I said before, as regards the technicalities of this money I was not very deeply involved. 7281. I appreciate that, but you will appreciate that in fact our job is to see that the money was properly handled and properly transmitted, which was paid by the Red Cross to the Belfast Fund for the Relief of Distress. The bank account of this fund was either in Clones or in Dublin and the persons operating the fund were Messrs. F, G and H, who were known to the Red Cross and who were people of standing and were respected in the Northern Ireland community. Is that a fair description? —That would be fair, yes. 7282. Then that money, or as much of it as had been transferred, was then in the control of these people in the Belfast Fund for the Relief of Distress? —Yes. 7283. So that far we are clear. Then moneys were transferred, which in fact we can account for pretty accurately with cheques and bank statement, from that to the Dixon account. We will ignore the O’Brien account for the moment because it was fed mostly from the Dixon account. We will just look at the transfer from the Belfast Fund for the Relief of Distress to the Dixon account. By the time it arrived in the Dixon account you have told us that in your view it belonged to the Northern Ireland people? —Yes. 7284. I do not want to fish too much here about exactly what you mean by that, but you mean something a good deal wider than belonging to Messrs. F, G and H, I take it. Am I correct? —Yes. 7285. So that the key transfer into the hands of other people that we will not name took place between the Belfast Fund for the Relief of Distress and the Dixon account. And by the time it got to the Dixon account, in your view it was then money in the control of people outside the jurisdiction, people that we do not know? —Yes. 7286. You have agreed this far. You may not agree with the last bit: people who were not Messrs F, G and H? —It was not under their control. 7287. I wanted to be clear about your understanding of this chain because what we have to do—— —You see, the point is this, I cannot say exactly what degree of co-operation among these people there would be. 7288. I realise this and I am not really concerned with it. What I am concerned with is that when orders were written out for payment in the Department of Finance it was then public money for which we are accountable. When cheques were drawn on the Dixon account it was then in the control of people in the North of Ireland. Somehow or other, by a series of steps, it had got from one to the other and we have to look at those steps and see which are valid and which are not. I want to be clear about what is in your mind, and I want to get it on the record that if I do not pursue these steps that is no guarantee that I accept the validity of them. I am just anxious to get a clear understanding of them. Deputy FitzGerald explained to you yesterday that as far as this Committee is concerned and as far as our statutory function is concerned we have to see that the money was spent in line with the intention for which the Dáil voted it, that in fact moneys could not be taken from one account, which we voted for one thing, and used for something else. But we will leave that aside. I was just referring to that point made by Deputy FitzGerald yesterday. The supposition that has been used to justify the spending of Dixon and O’Brien moneys on arms or the Voice of the North is that comparable amounts of money were made available in Northern Ireland which were spent for the relief of distress? —That is my understanding. 7289. If this scheme was clearly thought out before any of the switch started, in fact if it was clearly though out before early November when the Dixon and O’Brien accounts were established, then it would have been easy to set up an account in Belfast? —Yes. 7290. And when a payment for arms or the Voice of the North was taken out of the two subsidiary accounts a payment comparable in size, we would not say on the same day but around the same time, should be made into a Northern account from other funds? —Yes. 7291. You will see what I am leading to. It is possible to validate a set of accounts, once the news became public six months afterwards, by saying “Well, a switch was always intended and here are the accounts. We spent the money on the relief of distress”, but is there any harder documentation than we have currently seen to indicate that any switch at all was taking place? —I do not think there is any documentation as such; and from what I gathered from my contacts, the people who were concerned with this account destroyed what they had. They were afraid. To be quite honest, they were afraid there had been a certain amount of collusion. 7292. We appreciate the way their minds could well have been working. —This is how it was explained to me. 7293. But you will understand that from the point of view of being clear as to exactly where responsibility lies it would make the position of a number of people here within the jursisdiction of the State very much easier if such documents could be produced? —I do not think they have them. I do not know. I do not know what answers they will give the Committee themselves. 7294. I think the Committee has published some accounts we got about expenditure, from which it would seem that more money was replaced than was taken out and spent. We know over a certain period people were given money for time lost at work, and various things. —Yes. 7295. But this is the sort of thing that could easily be put together afterwards to cover a situation, you see? —Yes. 7296. If one wanted to put a bad construction on it, one could say “Sure, this is uncheckable” and put it together afterwards; whereas if a switch were clearly thought out before November 1969 it would be very easy to document it and say “OK, it was illegal, but it was absolutely correct in a cast-iron sense and here is the bank statement to show that moneys were paid”? —Yes. 7297. That was not done, so far as you know, was it? —I do not know, but as far as I know, what I have heard, there are people who can more or less explain this. 7298. I have realised that you, after you got an order confining you to the Republic, would not be in a position to have participated in any of this. I was simply seeking a guide to lines we might pursue. —I was not there after the account was opened, certainly. 7299. We will leave that for a moment. In fact, last night I had not really intended to ask you very much when my turn came, but I was extremely interested in a line of questioning that Deputy Hugh Gibbons— we have to be clear which Deputy Gibbons —Deputy Dr. Gibbons, raised with you last night. I do not have a transcript, but we were all here so that we have a recollection and I have the journalist’s report of it. Of course we all appreciate, and we have been on it over and over, how significant the question of authority and authorisation is in the whole matter. We are not, as a Committee, making any sort of moral judgments. We just have to see that the proper, due procedures were adopted and if they were violated where and by whom. Dr. Gibbons was pressing you about whether the whole thing had been legal and then was illegal, or had been legal all along, or whether it was illegal and then legal, and various thing of this sort. Then there is the question which was raised between you and which I wanted to follow up, where Dr. Gibbons, asking you in relation to his namesake, the now Minister for Agriculture, said: What did he change his mind about? You said in reply:, About the operation he had authorised. Dr. Gibbons said to you: What was the point in changing his mind about a legal operation? You said in reply to that: The only conclusion I can come to is that it was a power play within the Government itself. (The Irish Times, Thursday, February 11th, 1971, page 5, columns two and three). That statement was not pursued, but I am in the position that I think every member of the Committee is in, that we have vast amounts of conflicting facts and we have the greatest difficulty in building any sort of structure that will carry these facts and help us to know which are true and which are false, and guide us through a maze of confusion. I had better say at the beginning that as to your thoughts on power play within the Government, I am not for a moment saying I accept this. What I am trying to do is to find out if you have thoughts which would help us to elucidate or verify or make likely facts, or what to believe and what not to believe, and also to guide us to ask new questions. So I will ask you if you could develop that thought a little. When you say “a power play within the Government”—starting when? I do not want to lead you on this, but presumably it would be between the Taoiseach on the one hand and the dismissed Ministers on the other hand. Do you have anything to go on? Let me make it a bit more precise. You have said to us over and over that the Government knew? —Yes. 7300. You suggested to me that the Taoiseach knew of the Bailieboro meeting within a few weeks of it. This is the sort of thing we like because ws can check it. That is a hard accusation. It may be true or false, I would not judge, but it is something we can check. You said that, without being certain about it, in your opinion Deputy Haughey and Deputy Blaney knew about the subsidiary accounts and their use? —Yes. 7301. But they are far from being the Government. These are three persons. You say that the Government knew. Let us start here: there was a sub-committee of four people? —Yes. 7302. Of two of those four you say you cannot be cast-iron about it but you believe they knew of the whole operation, you say, from the autumn of 1969? —Yes. 7303. Of the other two people, Deputy Brennan, Minister for Labour, I believe, is on the sub-committee. Have you any reason to think he knew anything? —No, I had never any discussion with him, so I do not know. 7304. The fourth of the people who, I understand, are on the sub-committee is Deputy Faulkner. —Never met him. 7305. Let us see who else. Perhaps we should not expect you to volunteer information—it is not your job to do so—but Deputy Hillery——? —I only met Deputy Hillery once on 3rd March, when I sat in on a discussion with Northern Ireland people. 7306. Did your participation in this discussion lead you to the conclusion that Deputy Hillery knew of the effort to bring in arms to the Republic and get them to the people in the North? —I could not categorically say that at all. 7307. I do not want to go through a catalogue. I cannot remember who was in the Government. What about Deputy Colley? —I never met Deputy Colley either. But you might refer back to a reference you made earlier about “power play.” I have my own theory on this. 7308. I do not want, for this Committee, that we should, any of us, indulge in our theories. But can you give me any facts? If you are now suggesting that in some way Deputy Colley knew of these events, I do not think that the theory is fair, with respect, because we could all do that. I certainly have a theory but I do not feel entitled to use the committee to tell the country what it is at this stage. Do you know anything that leads you to believe it? I do not think it is proper for you to say “I believe such and such” unsupported. But I feel it would be proper for you to say “I draw the inference, without a certainty, from events A, B and C.” I think that would be proper. Do you get my point? —I do. Deputy FitzGerald, who is not here this morning, made a statement in Dáil Éireann at one stage. It must have been during the long debate that took place. He was trying to reconcile a statement of the Taoiseach’s with a statement of Mr. Gibbons in This Week. He put forward the theory and, as he said, the only conceivable reconciliation he could arrive at was that Mr. Gibbons was giving information to the Taoiseach through an intermediary, so that the Taoiseach could then make whatever statement he had made at that particular time. This struck a chord with me because after I had been arrested, some days afterwards, and before my name had become public knowledge, I was visited by a newspaper reporter who told me that the paper he was working for was writing the Gibbons’ side of the story. This man told me he was writing the Gibbons’ story, or that he had the Gibbons’ story, and that he would like to get my story to go alongside it. As far as I recollect, more or less the suggestion was “This is an opportunity to clear yourself.” In view of what had happened on 1st May and in the last days of April, I was very chary and suspicious about this. I asked this man where he got his information from concerning my name and how he knew my name. He said he got it from a Minister. So I asked who the Minister was, and naturally he would not tell me: “As a journalist you do not give your sources,” that type of thing. Therefore I said if he would not tell me who the Minister was I could not give my story, and anyhow I did not think it was the time to give my story. The point was that I was very surprised that this man had got my name from a Minister. 7309. Did that story ever appear? —The Gibbons’ story appeared in This Week. My story did not appear because I did not give it. 7310. I see. Are you aware that the story which was to have appeared in This Week did not appear, at the last moment? —Do you mean the story concerning me? 7311. Yes. —I gave him nothing. I said I had no story to tell. 7312. You are now discussing the This Week incident, are you? —Correct. This struck me as very funny at the time and then, I realised—I do not know whether one should say this; this is pure supposition—— 7313. We have had some supposition here already. If it is clear then I think it is fair to say it. —This was a brother-in-law of George Colley. My assumption was that he got it from Mr. Colley—that he either got the story from Mr. Colley or Mr. Gibbons. The assumption I made at the time was that there was some project on to “con” me into giving my story in line with the effort that had been made on 1st May and that had been made through this, what you would call, arrest, but what I call intimidation in the Army on the last days of April, and that this was a follow up. 7314. I want to go back to your general thesis. Before I do that there are some questions that arise from what you have just said in relation to this remarkable day when you were arrested. First am I correct in my recollection that Mr. Gibbons told you to tell everything you knew? —That would be a summary I think. Those were his first words, or something similar. 7315. Did that surprise you? —It surprised me completely. 7316. Did it surprise you because you realised that, if you told it like it was in your understanding, you would be incriminating the Government as well as people down here, and that you did not wish to do? —If I told the story as it stood, the person who would be most deeply incriminated, if there was anything illegal taking place, would have been Mr. Gibbons himself. 7317. We shall leave that. You then refused to make a statement although you had been urged to do so by the Minister for Defence? —Yes. 7318. And then Chief Superintendent Fleming asked you to talk to the Taoiseach, or something. Anyway you got to see the Taoiseach? —I did. 7319. We will not go into the exact details of who asked you. The Taoiseach urged you to make a statement. Is that correct? —In the beginning he urged me to make a statement. He said that he had his secretary standing by as a witness and that I had asked to see him to make a formal statement. I said I had not, and that I had made up my mind earlier on that day in view of the remarks of Mr. Gibbons to Chief Superintendent Fleming. 7320. Did the Taoiseach’s reiteration of what Deputy James Gibbons had already said to you surprise you; when he said that Deputy Gibbons had already said “Tell everything,” and then the Taoiseach said that? —At this stage my assumption was that this was all completely set up and arranged. 7321. You have said things like that before, with respect, and in my view it is not fair to say “set up” and “arranged”. It is not that I do not want you to say it but I want you to say it more clearly, which is better than hinting at it. What was set up and arranged, when, by whom, and so on? Do you know? —The point is this I claimed privilege, when I was arrested, under the Offences Against the State Act. I told the police to get the Minister for Defence down here, “he can explain everything”. They went off. That was around lunch time. At 2 o’clock I was brought to see the Minister for Defence or the Minister for Defence was brought to see me at Dublin Castle. Our conversation was on the lines “tell everything”. I said “Do you realise what is involved in this? Why tell everything?” I was amazed. Actually I suggested to the Minister, could I speak to him in private; and the Minister so far as I could see, deferred to the Chief Superintendent. They nodded to each other and the Chief Superintendent said “No”, that I was under arrest. That amazed me still further. 7322. Was it that time that the idea of political power play started to dawn on you as an explanation of these events? —No. It dawned on me on 23rd April. It dawned on me on the 23rd April when Mr. Gibbons made a reference to me at a meeting in Mr. Blaney’s office, attended by Mr. Blaney, Colonel Hefferon, myself and Mr. Gibbons. He said “You are in the hot seat”. This was my first indication that there was something funny going on. 7323. You are so close to these events and you know so much about them that sometimes the bare outline, which is what we want to get, is often hard to draw from you in a clear way. You often give us too much detail. I do not want to lead you or to put words in your mouth but you have said in the line of question and answer with Deputy Dr. Gibbons here about what was called “power play” within the Government itself—I want to be clear as to what you meant by that. In October is it your belief that the importation of arms to the Republic and their transmission for defence to people in Northern Ireland was Government policy? —Not in October. 7324. I see. When? —I got it clarified finally in January but I believe, apart from getting it clarified— I believe from certain things which came to my notice that the Government were, without having any definite plans, willing to assist—from certain things that happened. 7325. OK. Let us say that early in the new year it was Government policy, in your view? —Yes. 7326. Am I correct in thinking that it is therefore your thesis that at some stage a major portion of the Government withdrew from that position leaving other persons who were then Ministers in an exposed position and manoeuvred them into an illegal position for the sake of an internal political power play in order to get rid of them, and that you got trapped in that withdrawal of the legality of that operation? —This is the only explanation I can offer as such—the only feasible explanation because the point—this lends some credence to it—why should an operation which had been fully reported and had been brought to the notice of the person who was responsible, to whom I was responsible, the Minister for Defence, why otherwise should it be necessary to make it into an illegal operation because all that had to be done at that stage if the Government wanted to merely change its mind was to change its mind and say “We cannot go on with this” and the Minister for Defence could have come to me as an Army officer and say: “This is stopped. We have changed our policy”. For instance, these arms which were coming in, it would be a simple thing to bring them into Dublin and to bring them into any Army barracks. Nothing would have been done about it. It would have to have been accepted as such, but this was not done. 7327. I propose to puruse this very little. I have to think out the questions that arise and the implications which arise and the ways which this Committee might verify or disapprove it. Just to be clear, I put this question to you: Is it your contention that if, for example, on 25th March the Government had decided to abandon the whole undertaking that it could have done so then without in any way damaging, incriminating or ultimately isolating those Ministers who were subsequently dismissed? —This is my conception of the thing. 7328. Is it then your suggestion that the permitting of events to roll on until early May until they burst open was for the purpose of trapping those persons? —From hindsight this is the only thing one can say. 7329. I have no comment whatever to offer, Captain Kelly. It is a hypothesis that one can think of ways of checking. I do not propose to pursue it at all at this moment. I just wanted to turn very briefly— I do not know if you have been furnished with a copy of Chief Superintendent Fleming’s evidence? —I got it this morning. 7330. I have been through a bit of it, I am in the same situation as yourself. I say to you and to my colleagues on this Committee—I know you are anxious to be taken through it and to make some observations— that this is something I do not propose to do. If other members of this Committee want to do it they should start getting ready. I want to refer to one other set of circumstances—— 7331. Chairman.—Perhaps I should point out that Captain Kelly has been furnished with a photostat copy of the evidence given by Chief Superintendent Fleming on Tuesday but this is an unedited version. The official version will not be available until the usual green booklet is published. There could be mistakes or errors in it. It is not edited. Subject to that, the matter is before you. 7332. Deputy Keating.—I was indicating to my colleagues that I do not propose to take Captain Kelly through this. I just want now to talk about the story in The Irish Times of 10th February of this year—the Dick Walsh story—headed “Abortive London Arms Deal” and to ask you a few questions about that to see if you have information that either validates that or shoots it down. Did you ever meet Liam Walsh? —No. 7333. You see the thread in that story? —I read through this quickly and I see the thesis that is here. All I know is this came to the notice of the people who went to London at that stage and I know that on the night before the chief person concerned, who was the Northern representative, was convinced that there was something funny about this and his attitude was that he should take the opportunity of going and verifying if, in fact, this was a plant because he felt very annoyed about previous incidents which had happened. This was his own personal attitude. 7334. Can I ask you from your professional experience—these are things within your professional competence—about the matter of them believing that they saw a woman with a walkie-talkie outside the Oxford Street office? They believed they saw themselves being shadowed when they were in London. Would good professionals —and we must presume the British Secret Service are good professionals—would they be visible if they were watching people like that? This strikes me as a little unlikely. If good professionals were watching people —if they had a tip off they were coming and knew that they were there surely they would be able to watch them totally invisibly? —This surprised me at the time when this Northern fellow told me his story, but knowing the man’s background I suppose it is not surprising. 7335. He is a good professional? —He is a good professional also. It was he who spotted this thing straight away and actually he could tell me how he stood behind a woman with a shopping bag and he described to me the first man they saw when they arrived and they walked into a shop. This amazed me because I would not realise it, and he came out a half an hour afterwards and he still saw the same man. 7336. The fact that he was able to spot these people would not indicate they were so slipshod and careless that they were unlikely to be British Secret Service? —No. 7337. Do you think it true that they were, in fact, Secret Service? —They were some agency keeping in touch with the movements of the people concerned. 7338. You see the connection through Martin Casey with the late Liam Walsh, with Saor Éire? At the time we are speaking of—after all you were an officer of military intelligence and this is relevant stuff to you professionally—do you happen to have any knowledge of this connection with Saor Éire? —No, and I did not believe there was any connection as such. What I heard was that there was a man in Dublin here who had told these people that there was a possibility of buying this stuff. It was conveyed to me that they thought that this was not a right operation and this Northern fellow got this information and he said he was going to go to check it out and his reason for going was the reason I have given, that he felt that this had happened in England too often—this was his belief—and that he wanted to go, find out once and for all and he took a risk. 7339. Yes, sure? —This is it and knowing the man’s background he felt it was incumbent upon him to do it. 7340. The reason I am asking about the Saor Éire situation is that in the spring of 1970 it was repeadedly rumoured, it was in fact put in the Dáil in speeches by Deputies, that there was knowledge of Saor Éire in the hands of the authorities here but that they were not been moved against because, in some mysterious way or other that none of us knew at the time, there was a tie-in and it would have been embarrassing to get them into court? —I recollect this, yes. 7341. This all relates in fact to the death of Garda Fallon and to the subsequent search, the manhunt et cetera? —Yes. 7342. The reason I am asking about this is to ask you had you any knowledge because were this the case, if one did not want to blow the lid off the whole matter of the arms importation in March or April of 1970, that would be a reason to leave the Saor Éire people alone because, of course, if you got them into court God knows what they would say, you see. That would be a validation of things that were widely rumoured? —I understand what you are getting at yes. 7343. Have you any reason to think it is so? —I do not think so and I have no reason to think so. 7344. I see. One final question. I will leave that completely. Séamus Bray’s evidence, page 6—Deputy FitzGerald talked to you about this yesterday: On November 6th or 7th, 1969, he came to me with £600 in cash. “He” being you. The Dixon and O’Brien accounts were not operative. Where did you get £600 in cash to give to him? —I would have got £600 from nowhere only from the Northern people as such. 7345. When you say from the Northern people is it your explanation then that they drew it from the Clones account, that they had some large float from the Clones account, and they gave you some of it? —This would be the only explanation. I got money from no other source. I know that. 7346. You see as I understand it—— —This is a question of dates overlapping? 7347. Yes. You see it is no good for the Main account in Baggot Street because it was opened on the 12th November, O’Brien and Dixon the 14th November. Now Clones was opened on the 9th October? —Yes. 7348. And there are drawings, none of them by you. They are on page 9 of the pink book? —Actually I had no operation of the Clones account at all. 7349. No, I thought that. But then I just want to be clear about this channel. You were able to give Seamus Brady this £600 because they had drawn money and given you some of it to give to him? —Well, certainly the money, the £600, came from the North and that is it and I would assume that they gave me—it must have been out of the Clones account is all I can say at this stage. 7350. Deputy Keating.—Yes. I know that you want to talk about the Fleming evidence, Captain Kelly, and I am not sure what procedure the Committee will adopt about it but as far as I am concerned, Chairman, that is all the questions I want to put. Thank you. 7351. Chairman.—Deputy MacSharry. 7352. Deputy MacSharry.—Captain Kelly, there are two or three questions. When this Grant-in-Aid was first announced, set up, were you under the impression at that time that this money was for the purchase of arms? —I was not under the impression that it was for the purchase of arms at that stage. 7353. At that stage? —I will tell you. I knew that people from Northern Ireland were looking for arms and I think anyone with money that was going to Northern Ireland, people looking for arms, would be foolish to think that there was not a possibility that it might be used for the purchase of arms. 7354. Who were these people? ——But I had no—who were these people? 7355. Yes? —They were, I suppose you could number them in the hundreds in Northern Ireland. 7356. They were in Northern Ireland, all of them? —They would be, yes. 7357. So as far as you were concerned you had no impression, doubt, suspicion that this money was being put there solely for the purchase of arms? —No. There was nothing concrete about the arms thing until this, when was it, date in November. 7358. Nevertheless it was directly or indirectly used for the purchase of arms? —Well I have explained this to the best of my ability. 7359. You have not, since yesterday or last week, had any further recollections of expenditure from this fund other than what you have already stated? —I think I have accounted for, as far as I can see, all that is in the fund. 7360. Prior to the setting up of these accounts were you handling funds from the Northern people? —I never handled any money other than the money that is mentioned here. 7361. Yes, but I mean prior to the funds? —Prior to the funds? 2362. Prior to this account being set up were you as a liaison between the North and people here—— —No. 7363. Were you handling funds prior to the accounts being set up? —No. 7364. Just one final thing to clear up, in my own mind, and it is the question of your reporting to Colonel Hefferon and his knowledge of the whole affair. In his evidence on page 311, question 4128, 4129 and so on he was asked: But you were not aware that he was in a position to do that or was actually doing it? This is operating the account or assisting in the operation of the account. He said: At what time? He was asked: Were you aware that he was in a position to do that or was actually doing it? He answered: No. Colonel Hefferon was not aware that you were—is that true? —Not aware of what exactly there? 7365. That you were handling funds for the Northern people through the Baggot Street account? —This would relate to the £3,000 you imagine and the £10,000 and this sort of thing, is it? 7366. It is a general type of approach to the accounts in Baggot Street and your involvement or your assistance with the Northern people? —And he was asked did I assist the Northern people in the accounts? 7367. It is exactly this: Were you aware that he was in a position to go in with a cheque, hand it over the counter and come out with money in his pocket? Colonel Hefferon’s answer was: No. —All I can say was that if I got a cheque I could get it changed. 7368. I know but the point, Captain Kelly, I am trying to say is that Colonel Hefferon’s evidence to us here seems to be other than what you said about reporting fully to him? —All I can say is this: that at all times I reported fully to him and I said this here before. 7369. While I accept that, Captain, you may have been reporting your intelligence involvement? —Ah well, I would have reported this also. 7370. Nevertheless in evidence he said he had no knowledge of it? —Well I think that in other evidence that he has said that I reported to him in detail. 7371. This is something I want cleared up in my own mind. Further on he was asked: And when did you become so aware? This is difficult to say because in, I think, January — mid-January—Captain Kelly told me for the first time that the Northern people were interested in importing arms. He did not say—there was no question of where they would be imported into, but that they were interested in importing and that they had asked him to assist. I understood that the assistance was to be more or less in the nature of technical assistance, in the sense that they would know a good deal about weapons and he would be presumed to know about the type of weapons and all that. This is the important bit: On this occasion I advised him that he could not continue—that he could not do this as an Army officer and then he said that if he could not do it, he felt he would have to retire, so at this stage I did advise him not to do anything hastily, that his family had to be considered and so on and to go away and think about it for a few days. This you did, and you came back and decided to retire? —Colonel Hefferon’s attitude was that this could not be done by an Army officer and he gave various reasons why. He thought it would be better if I had an undercover job as such. 7372. This is not what he said here in evidence to us? —I do not care. What proves the point is that I gave him my retirement forms fully filled out on the understanding that he would go to the Minister about it. He went to the Minister and he came back and there was no question of my resignation. I was to carry on with the job in future in full Army service. So the point at issue was whether this job could be done as an Army officer, whether the Army would be willing to accept responsibility for it if it broke, and the Minister was ready to accept this. Once it was brought to the Minister’s notice and he was told that Colonel Hefferon had my resignation in his pocket if it was necessary to resign, my understanding was that I would get another job in State service, a cover job. 7373. Deputy Treacy.—I understood that Captain Kelly was being brought back before this Committee this morning to hear from him an important submission with regard to what he considered to be the up-to-date position regarding his own personal situation, in particular in relation to the statements made by Chief Superintendent Fleming. 7374. Chairman.—The Committee decided that they would complete their questioning and if Captain Kelly wanted to make a statement afterwards it would be dealt with. 7375. Deputy Treacy.—The questioning of Captain Kelly has gone round this twelveman table some three times over. I consider it to have been detailed, exhaustive and to a large extent repetitive. As far as I am concerned I would wish very much that the Captain be afforded the opportunity of making his submission so that the questioning might continue in a more enlightened atmosphere. I have no questions at this juncture. 7376. Deputy Tunney.—I will not keep you too long, nor will I interfere with my colleague’s anxiety to get less repetitive information. However, there are one or two things I should like to ask you. I think that when talking to Deputy Keating you explained that when Mr. Gibbons told you to “tell everything” you thought Mr. Gibbons, the man who was responsible for all this, did not realise what he was telling you? —He realised fully what he was telling me, but what game he was playing I do not know. 7377. You said that you said to him “Do you realise what it means if I tell?” —Well, I was trying to talk to him in the presence of the Superintendent, a man I had spoken to on four, five or six occasions previously, when we had discussed this whole question of arms. 7378. But when you said “Do you realise what it means?” did you mean for Mr. Gibbons or for myself? —For him, and for the whole background to the thing. 7379. It did not at all indicate that perhaps you were doing something which Mr. Gibbons did not know about? —There is no question of that. Mr. Gibbons has admitted it in court himself. 7380. Again, Captain, you tell us that even in circumstances where Mr. Gibbons knew about something only later on that gave you justification for doing it? —Nothing concrete was done until it was brought to Mr. Gibbons as a precise proposal, and this is the important point of the whole thing. Deputy MacSharry was talking about my resignation in January or February and if Mr. Gibbons at that stage had said this should not continue there would have been no question of its continuing. On the contrary, he said it should continue. 7381. I am afraid we are wandering again and I hope neither of us will wander too much. I said to you that you have been making the case today that your involvement in this was known by Mr. Gibbons at the time of whatever you were doing or at least later on and that you accepted that as authority? —I put the point at which I became directly involved in this as my first trip to the Continent. Mr. Gibbons was advised of this. From then on he was fully advised and kept in the picture as to what was going on. If this was not authority I do not know how one can operate any machinery of State. 7382. You are suspecting that my question is leading to something else? —Well, there is no point in saying there was no authority at this stage. 7383. The point I was going to make is that according to all your evidence this is the first occasion on which Mr. Gibbons gave you a definite order and it was the one which you refused to obey? —I was a civilian at that stage having retired from the Army the night before because, as I have said here previously, of the machinations of the Minister for Defence. I think this has been explained very clearly. I was brought before the Director of Intelligence and given a very specific order. I went to the Minister for Defence and he told me to ignore the order. I put it to the Minister for Defence, “Do you really think this order that Colonel Delaney gives me means nothing? If I do as you suggest and continue my contacts I will be on a courtmartial charge, and as far as I can see it is a set-up.” He said, “No, it is all right, it will work out.” But he gave no answer as to why he arranged this set-up. That is why I resigned from the Army, and Mr. Gibbons was in no position to give me any orders after that. 7384. You had all the documentation connected with the accounts and everything which would have clarified the position here for us as to your private involvement in it? —I had the accounts, as I understand it, of what had been spent on arms as such, expenses and so on. 7385. As far as the expenditure of the money was concerned, would it be true to say that in quite a few of these accounts it is possible that blank cheques were issued to people, that there was not the one person holding this cheque book? —I do not think so. 7386. Would you explain this, then. In one case there is a cheque ending with the numerals 71. I think this is on the main account. Look at cheques 69, 70 and 71. You will see that cheque 71 was cashed on 5th April and cheque 69 was not cashed until 28th April. Normally anyone using a cheque book would use them as they come to them? —I do not know. I cannot explain that. 7387. It would not suggest that cheque No. 71 had been given to a person—you see it in the bank statement, Captain? —Yes. I see the point. Number 69 was cashed after Number 71 was cashed. 7388. Nearly three weeks after? —I do not know. This depends on the person who had the cheque and for what purpose he had it. That is all I can say. 7389. We have cheque 69 cashed on 28th April, for £1,200. Cheque 68 is OK. The third cheque, 70, cashed on the 17th. That would suggest to me that it was not the same person issuing cheques on it, or else cheques were being issued to different people. —Actually, after 6th April, after I made out this cheque to Mr. Luykx, I had no further involvement with any cheques. 7390. But while you did, did you have knowledge of them? —I had no knowledge of who was drawing money from the main account after that, because I was involved in other things. I was involved in the arms importation. 7391. On the question of importation, you would not look upon yourself as being in any way the architect of the importation, of the scheme? —I do not know how you can—— 7392. I only want you to say yes or no. That is all I want. —It is this sort of thing. This is a captain who is working in Intelligence, who is reporting to his superior authority, who is reporting to the Minister for Defence. There is a chain of command for defence. The Minister for Defence is the architect. That is my answer. 7393. I am talking about the people in the North and yourself. —It is an Intelligence officer’s duty to find out. It was reported. It came to the notice of the Minister of Defence and was given his blessing, if I could describe it that way; therefore he is the architect. As I said previously, when it was put to him what was going to take place he did not say “No, it is not Government policy. We will not do this.” Instead of that he said “Certainly; carry on.” 7394. It was, Captain, already in train before he knew anything about it? —This is nothing in train, except that the thing was there, set up, ready. This was the time to stop it. We had definite information. We knew what was likely to happen. Mr. Gibbons himself said that when he was approached on 19th February, or whatever date it was; that it was nebulous information. The situation was nebulous to the extent that—— 7395. Captain Kelly, on your evidence which you have given here—— —Excuse me. I want to explain. I want to clarify. Let me explain exactly. It was brought to the Minister’s notice. He said himself that it was nebulous at that stage, but what I say is that this purported or proposed plan was brought to the Minister’s notice, reported correctly to him. At this stage it was quite a simple matter for him to say there would be no importation of arms. No arms had been imported at this stage, mark you. We were not sure the arms would be even imported. So it was reported to him before anything concrete had happened. 7396. Though you are being, shall we say, most uncomplimentary to the Minister, the most we can blame him for is not having stopped something. We cannot say he started something. —I have been in the Army for a good few years and I know if a corporal or a sergeant or any officer of junior rank to me reported to me certain things I would feel it incumbent upon myself to take action in line with those reports. If, for instance, a corporal said to me he had some information, he knew what was going on and he gave me some plan, I would find it incumbent on me to direct him. Anyone in authority has that responsibility. The Minister had the responsibility and he accepted the responsibility, until he changed his mind at the end of April. 7397. OK, Captain. This question refers directly to the money. This last cheque, for £300, on the Ann O’Brien account, it was cashed by you in Crumlin Cross? —Yes. 7398. In the matter of these cheques, you went to Ann O’Brien and got her to write out this cheque for you. Is there any significance in the fact that you got this one cashed in Crumlin Cross, as against the branch that would be nearer, at Stephen’s Green? —There is no significance at all. 7399. That is where, we were told, Ann O’Brien lived, Stephen’s Green? —Yes. 7400. Do we assume from that that she did not live in Stephen’s Green? —I do not think so. I do not know. If you make that assumption that is fine. 7401. If she were there, would you agree, and you got the cheque from her, it would be handier to cash it at Baggot Street than at Crumlin Cross? —Not really, if I was going home that night. Crumlin Cross is the nearest to my home, if I went home that night. There is no connection there at all. 7402. Up to that point all the transactions had been in Baggot Street. —Well, this was suitable. 7403. We have been working here on the assumption that moneys which were forwarded for relief of distress in Northern Ireland were spent on arms; and we have all here been indicating that we were concerned that this money should be recovered from the Continent? —Yes. 7404. This might come as an anti-climax in the matter of questioning, and this is why I was anxious to get, if I could, the nature of your real involvement in it. You tell us you are quite sure of the money that was spent on the arms. Would you be as sure that the arms never came in? —I am quite positive about that. 7405. Even after the 1st May, after the 1st June? After any date? —This was a fully official operation, and the arms never came here. 7406. You have been near enough to the scene to know that at no time since did they come? —I have not been near to it at all but my belief is that there would be no question of the arms coming here. 7407. You told me that your last connection with the accounts and the whole lot was way back on the 5th April, and many days have gone past since? —Yes. But I do not believe they came here. I would say, from the arrangements I had made, that were made with Herr Schleuter, there would be no question of the arms being sent. 7408. Without notifying you? —He would have notified me I imagine. 7409. And the money is still there on the Continent? —The position stands as it stood on the 1st May. 7410. Chairman.—Captain Kelly, when were you last in Northern Ireland? —It was September or October of 1969. I was not in Northern Ireland from the time Colonel Hefferon gave an order that Intelligence Officers were not to go into Northern Ireland, which relates, I might remark at this stage in passing, to a statement by Chief Superintendent Fleming that he was worried about me being picked up by the UVF. As far as I know, the reason that officers were not to go to Northern Ireland was that some people had been named up there. My name was not on it— just as a matter of interest. 7411. Had Mr. Padraig Haughey access to the funds in Baggot Street. —No access whatever. 7412. Did you ever give him any money? —I never gave him any money. 7413. Will you tell us, as far as it is within your knowledge, whether he ever got any money from the funds? —He never got any money as far as I know; and I could say positively that he never got any money. 7414. How can you be sure of that? —I would probably have heard of it, if he did. 7415. You could not say positively? —I can be as positive as I can that he did not. He certainly got no money from the George Dixon account, I would say, or the Ann O’Brien account. 7416. On other occasions you have told us here that it was difficult for you to explain everything in respect of these accounts as so many people had access to them. —I am talking about the George Dixon and Ann O’Brien accounts. Many people had access to the other accounts. As far as I am aware the money in these accounts was spent on the purposes for which it was intended. I do not see how he could have got any money out of them. 7417. Do I gather from you now that you have complete knowledge of the disposition of all the money from the George Dixon and Ann O’Brien accounts? —Mr. Chairman, you are twisting slightly—— 7418. I am asking a question. ——what I said when I was making this statement. Yesterday I handed in my recollection of these accounts as they stand. I explained fully that it was my recollection of these accounts. I am now saying that Padraig Haughey, so far as I am aware, did not get money out of those accounts. I am nearly positive of this. 7419. You have been to Cavan town? —I have been in Cavan town on numerous occasions. 7420. Were you there in October 1969? —It is quite possible that I was in Cavan in October 1969. I have a sister living there and I visit her regularly. 7421. Did you pass any money to anybody within the jurisdiction from the fund apart from Seamus Ó Brádaigh? —This is Chief Superintendent Fleming’s lies. I passed money to no one, only what I have told the Committee here already. I am annoyed about this insinuation. 7422. Just say “yes” or “no”. —It is not your fault, I know, Mr. Chairman. 7423. I have to ask these questions. You have got the bank statements? —I have explained this on at least three occasions. 7424. Will you say “yes” or “no”? —I got the bank statements. I do not know whether it was one statement or two statements. All I know is that I had an envelope in my house with bank statements and cheques in it. 7425. Did the statements cover the three accounts? —I assumed they did. That is all I can say at this stage. 7426. You are not quite sure? —I am not positive. 7427. I take it from you, as you told us, that you did not pass any money to Mr. Harry Blaney? —There is no question of any money going outside of the confines I have explained to you; absolutely no question. 7428. Would you be able to find that bank in Dortmund, if you went there again, where you put the £10,000? —I am sure I would. 7429. You stayed at the Kaiser Hotel and you said it was fairly near the Kaiser Hotel. —Yes. 7430. Would you be able to find that bank again? —Yes. 7431. Would you be prepared to accompany, say, a member from this Committee to go to Germany? —Yes. 7432. To locate the bank and check up on this lodgment of £10,000 which you say you put there? —I suppose this could possibly be done in certain circumstances. 7433. What would those circumstances be? —I will put to you one case in point, as regards the recovery of this money. Because of the chicanery of the Government in regard to the whole operation I now owe a sum of £13,000, and if the Government were to reimburse my £13,000 I would be more inclined to go. 7434. Is that the condition or the proviso which you are now giving us for going to check up? —I put that forward because I feel sore about this. That is why I owe so much money. I mean, I would have to be reimbursed, I think. 7435. You have stated that you lodged £10,000 in the bank in Dortmund. If you went there could you find your way to the bank? —Yes. 7436. You do not know the name of the street or the bank and you have destroyed any receipt of this money? —Yes. 7437. So you have no documentary evidence to offer to get back this money, and the arms for which you paid the money are still in Germany. That is our evidence so far. —I think that the evidence from Mr. Luykx—he is the accredited agent—is that he made an offer to go and see what he can do. He would tell you that he got this money. 7438. You handed over the money over the bank counter in English ten pound notes. I am asking you whether you would accompany a member of this Committee to locate that bank, verify this, and see what other steps can be taken to have this money reimbursed. —I do not see any reason why I should not, but at the same time I do not see why, if anyone is going to see anyone else, they should not go and see Herr Schleuter and get the whole story. 7439. Would it not help to establish the credibility of your claim in so far as you have no supporting evidence? —If Herr Schleuter says he got the money, he is not going to say it unless he did get it. If he says he got the money then that will establish it completely. 7440. Herr Schleuter is outside our jurisdiction. —Herr Schleuter is in West Germany, which is all outside the jurisdiction; he lives in West Germany. 7441. You lodged this money in a German bank? —Yes. 7442. You are not asking the State to give you £13,000 to go over to Germany to establish your credibility? That seems to be a rather unusual proviso. —The whole thing has been very unusual so far as I am concerned. 7443. Deputy Briscoe.—You explained in a little more detail this thesis about “con man,” “power play” and so on to Deputy Keating this morning. You will recall that I raised this question with you some days ago. Can you give me any reason why this matter should now cause less repercussions, reverberations and reactions today than it did when I raised it the other day. Is there any fundamental reason as to why that should be so? —Do you mean why I should bring it up? 7444. Why should they react to it less today than on the other day? —I am at a bit of a loss. What do you mean by “the other day”? 7445. It was put to you, and you answered. —I said I thought it was power play. 7446. You said there was power play in the media and elsewhere. Today you gave your exposition more fully. There is no reason why it should not cause the same reverberation and reactions today as then? —I do not know. 7447. Deputy H. Gibbons.—I said last night that each time you provided us with more material. You were talking about the newspaper man who interviewed you. Did you say “the last days of April”? —No. It was after my arrest. 7448. The last days of May? —No. It would not be that. It would be between my arrest and the public announcement in Dáil Éireann on 6th May. 7449. It was just that I wanted to clear this up. I thought you said “the last days of April”? —No one knew about it at the stage when he came to me, except myself. 7450. It is a question of fixing up the date. In your answer to Deputy Keating you made some reference to Government policy, away back in January. Could you define exactly what you understood Government policy to be at that time? —As regards the arms importation? 7451. As regards the arms importation in the North? —It was put to the Minister for Defence at the end of January, beginning of February, and as far as I am concerned he confirmed Government policy and he said that these arms importations should go ahead. 7452. That is the answer you made to Deputy Keating; it confirmed Government policy. Therefore you knew Government policy to be something or other. This is what I want to get from you. What exactly did you understand this Government policy to be? —If I am working as an Army Officer and I report to the Minister—— 7453. I am sorry. You see, if you get some reply from a Minister, which you state confirmed what Government policy was, if you get that on X day, then on X minus one day or X minus two days you knew Government policy to be something. —Yes. 7454. This is the situation. What did you understand Government policy to be before you went to the Minister on X day? —All the indications were up until that —I think this was common knowledge—that there was a general attitude down here that there would possibly be assistance to people in Northern Ireland. 7455. Wait now. I agree a “general attitude”, but a “general attitude” is not Government policy. Again, I do not wish to argue about this. I would prefer you to say “Just beyond that I cannot define what Government policy was..” —The only answer I would give to that is that the 6th February directive confirmed—officially confirmed—Government policy. 7456. You are opening the sluice gates to further words, but we are talking about —in answer to Deputy Keating you were speaking about before 6th February? —Yes. 7457. Again I put it to you that if the Minister confirmed to you Government policy, you had some idea what Government policy was, and I am asking you to define for us what you considered Government policy to be at that point in time which I call X minus 1 or X minus 2 days. —If Government policy on 6th February was as the directive then issued indicated I am quite sure it was the same in December, November, October and so on. I have no reason to believe otherwise. That is all I can say. 7458. The directive—I put this to you last night—that there was nothing in the directive that suggested or sanctioned the importation of arms legally or illegally so far as we have what was in the directive made available to us. —I think you are wrong, with all due respect. I think I have a quotation here which will prove this conclusively. I just got this this morning and it happened in the High Court on 12th October when Mr. McCarthy, Counsel for Mr. Haughey, was cross-examining Mr. Gibbons and Mr. McCarthy asked: “Did you issue a directive to the Chief of Staff to prepare contingency plans?” and Mr. Gibbons replied: “Yes.” Mr. McCarthy said: “Did you instruct or issue instructions to obtain surplus arms?” and Mr. Gibbons said: “I instructed the surplus arms to be concentrated in certain areas.” Mr. McCarthy said: “Obtained, I suggest?” and Mr. Gibbons replied: “Obtained.” Mr. McCarthy said: “Yes,” and then Mr. Gibbons asked a question: “Does Counsel mean to purchase new arms?” Mr. McCarthy—you will understand that I am reading from rough notes here, and this can all be verified—made some comment to the effect: “However one obtains them,” and Mr. Gibbons said: “This was a matter that had to be discussed.” Then Mr. Gibbons went on to state: “Mr. Haughey and I got instructions from the Government to discuss together the obtainment of further supplies of arms,” and then Mr. McCarthy goes on concerning the minutes of this meeting and he asked Mr. Gibbons had he seen them since the previous trial. Mr. Gibbons indicated that he had. He was asked where they were, were they in GHQ, and asked where he got them. He said he got them from official sources. He was asked did that mean from the Army and the judge at this stage said: “You do not have to answer any further questions,” and Mr. Gibbons finished up saying: “From official sources.” This is Mr. Gibbon’s summary of the directive, as given in the High Court. 7459. I put all this to you last night in a different context. I made the point which, in my interpretation—and this more or less still bears it out—that you admitted yourself there were surplus arms available to the Army here and that they were serviceable—you made this point yourself— and that those arms were distributed to points where they might be needed. I also put it to you and you accepted it last night that, in fact, on 25th March some stuff came into the Army and I also put it to you that those two things themselves —No. 1, the surplus arms which were already available and, No. 2, the fact that stuff came in which may have followed the directive—I am not denying this—came in legally, but those two together would suggest to me that a third effort should not be necessary on the part of the Department of Defence to make a third consignment of arms available. I did put the point that had it been purely ammunition that it would be acceptable because you could well imagine the large amount of ammunition being available for those surplus arms which have been in the State over a time. This statement from the High Court, as I see it, only confirms what my theory was which I put to you last night. There is another thing which has been running through my mind. I think it should be put to you. Deputy Garret FitzGerald—I have not the quotation here before me—put to you the suggestion of what the Minister’s attitude was to you. I think the effect of it was that he led you along up the garden path. Would that be a fair interpretation of it? What I am putting to you is based on one or two premises—I hope you do not cut in on me while I make the premises. Firstly, that it is quite possible that the Minister did not know everything that was going on. Secondly, that so far as my knowledge goes, the Minister could not take punitive action against you in connection with this until arms actually arrived in this country. In other words you could not be charged in the court with importing arms or attempting to import arms until the arms arrived in the country. In other words, if I go down-town thinking of doing something and disclose this to someone I do not think I can be charged with this. The charge of conspiracy is a different thing. I put it to you that whatever inkling the Minister had in this case that he, as Minister—and I think there is some evidence on this—that he had some benevolent interest in your future and that rather than do anything drastic that he wished to transfer you to some other situation. —Ah, no. 7460. Let me finish. It is a recognised thing in the State services and in other services than the State that if certain people may not be getting on well where they are that you do not take punitive action against them—that you transfer them to some other place. I put it to you that at this stage this, in fact, was how the Minister was dealing with you. Could you just say yes or no? —I would say your first premise there as regards that I would not be charged on the knowledge the Minister had is completely and utterly ridiculous. Officers have been thrown out of the Army for a hell of a lot less. 7461. Are you misunderstanding me— I said charged in court? —You would be charged in the Army and you would be courtmartialled. 7462. Anyway, you do not accept that? —No. I do not. This thing about the Minister being benevolent to me is completely ridiculous. 7463. There is the other thing I intended to put to you last night and I decided it was not your business but you raised the exact point this morning. This is it: Mr. Lukyx came in and asked that he be reimbursed by the Government and this morning you raised the same thing. The case has been put here that in fact all this money came from Northern Ireland funds. Therefore, should this reimbursement not be sought from North of Ireland funds? —My reimbursement would be sought from official sources down here. 7464. Thanks very much. —Thank you. 7465. Chairman.—Captain Kelly, I think you wanted to make a submission? —I did, but—— 7466. Have you it in writing? —Unfortunately I have not it in writing because I did a lot of checking on various things and I did this quickly and I do not think I would be able to make it before 1 o’clock if you are rising at one. 7467. Deputy R. Burke.—Take as much time as you like. Captain Kelly—If it is not necessary for me to write it I can go through it. 7468. Deputy E. Collins.—Chairman, I feel that in view of the importance of the submission he should be at least entitled to the week-end to consider the matter. 7469. Deputy R. Burke.—I think so, yes. 7470. Chairman.—Yes. Very good. Then we adjourn. —OK. I want to make one other statement here before I go which I dug out last night. I just want to get it. You will bear with me for a minute until I dig it out. I wrote it down somewhere. Yes. This again was brought to my notice last night. Evidence from the court. It concerns money. Mr. Gibbons was asked in evidence concerning money. He said that on the 1st day of May was the first intimation that he got. He was asked from whom did he get this intimation and he said he got it from Captain Kelly. This could not have happened on the 1st of May because the only time I met Mr. Gibbons on the 1st of May was in the office of Chief Superintendent Fleming when I was under arrest but it reminds me of when I did tell him and that I did tell him where the money was coming from because he asked me at one stage, which would be around March, about this money and I remember my reply to him was something on the lines and how I remember it so distinctly was that the Minister laughed at the good of it at the time. I had forgotten about it until I read this. He asked me about the money. I said that the northern fellows were supplying the money operating under the cover of the Grant-in-Aid and he made some laugh about using Charlie or using Mr. Haughey or something like that, and that was it. 7471. Chairman.—Have you any witness to that? —I have no witness to this, but I think also that he should mention the 1st of May as significant. 7472. Where did this conversation take place? —This was in evidence in the High Court on oath. 7473. What day? —I cannot give you the day. 7474. But I mean you had this conversation with? —Mr. Gibbons. Prior to the 1st of May when I was discussing with him—— 7475. Can you tell us the month? —I would say March. 7476. And where did it take place? —In his office. 7477. In his own office? Nobody present but you and he? —There was no one present at that stage. Most of my meetings with Mr. Gibbons there was no one present. 7478. Deputy Briscoe.—Ask him what part of the court evidence this is. 7479. Deputy E. Collins.—Surely he could include it in his submission next week? 7480. Deputy Briscoe.—No, get it now. 7481. Chairman.—You could not give us the reference and the court’s reference where that appears? Captain Kelly—I could dig it up certainly and find out. 7482. Chairman.—You could incorporate it in your submission next week as an addendum? —I could have it next week, yes. 7483. Thank you very much, Captain Kelly. —Thank you. Captain Kelly withdrew. The Committee adjourned at 1 p.m. until Tuesday, 16th February, 1971. |
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