Committee Reports::Special Report - Seanad Electoral (Panel Members) Bill, 1937 together with the proceedings of the Special Committee::21 October, 1937::Proceedings of the Joint Committee

2. Present: The President of the Executive Council (in the Chair): the Minister for Industry and Commerce; the Minister for Agriculture; Deputies Anthony, Costello, Fitzgerald-Kenney, Kissane, McGilligan, Moore, Norton, W. O’Brien, J. M. O’Sullivan and Smith.

4. Deputy Norton addressed the Committee in support of his alternative proposals (which had been circulated) for the nomination and election of Panel members.

Deputy McGilligan promised to commit these proposals to writing for consideration at the next meeting of the Committee.

6. The Committee directed that the proposals of Deputies Norton and McGilligan should be annexed to the Minutes of Proceedings of this day’s meetings.

ANNEX A.

Proposals by Deputy Norton for the nomination and election of Panel members proposed in substitution for those set out in the Bill.

1. That the vocational character of the Seanad panels be retained. It should be pointed out, however, that

(a) the fact of a candidate fulfilling the conditions laid down in the Bill regarding nomination for the several panels affords no guarantee that he is detached from polities;

(b) political views properly understood are not a disqualification in the case of a person who seeks to become a member of a legislative assembly; and

(c) no matter what plan is adopted for the nomination and election of Seanad candidates, politicians and only politicians will become Senators.

2. What must be aimed at if the Seanad is to secure national approval for its continuance is the creation of a legislative body consisting of competent people able to interpret popular opinion and to secure for the nation well-balanced legislation which has been subjected to informed scrutiny before being inserted in the Statute Book.

But the method of nominating and electing that body must be well understood and be free from the accusation that it is capable of being manipulated in the interests of a particular Party or to achieve a purpose which is in conffict with public sentiment as expressed in popular elections.

3. The method prescribed in the Bill for nominating Seanad candidates is cumbersome and is not likely to provide a Panel of candidates from which a selection can be made that will give satisfaction to the people. Too much is left to chance. Unless the Bill can set out in precise terms the names and qualifications of the nominating bodies, there can be no assurance that the spirit of the Constitution will prevail in regard to the composition of the Seanad. The method of election proposed in the Bill is indefensible.

4. As an alternative method of nominating the Seanad candidates, it is proposed that candidates be nominated only by Deputies and that two Deputies be entitled to make one and only one nomination. The nominators should be required to certify that in their opinion the candidate whose name is proposed possesses the qualifications prescribed to entitle him to be nominated a candidate for a particular Panel. The same person should not be nominated for more than one Panel. Thus, the maximum number of nominations would be 69 for 43 vacancies.

5. The nominations made by the several Deputies to be submitted for examination by a Committee of the Dáil representative of all Parties. This Committee (with the Ceann Comhairle as Chairman) would decide whether a candidate was eligible for election as member of the Panel for which he was nominated. If it were decided that a candidate was not so eligible but that he would be eligible for election as a member of some other Panel, the Committee would be empowered to transfer the nomination accordingly. On the other hand, if the Committee were to decide that a particular candidate was not qualified for election as a member of any Panel, the nomination would be disallowed and the total number of valid nominations reduced accordingly.

6. If it were found after the Committee mentioned above had scrutinised the nominations submitted to them that the number of candidates nominated for a particular Panel was less than the number of vacancies in respect of that Panel, they would report the fact to the Dáil. In that event the Dáil would decide the manner in which the deficiency would be made up.

7. The Deputies would be constituted an Electoral College, each Deputy having a single transferable vote. The proposal regarding postal voting to be retained.

8. The candidates would be placed on a single ballot paper irrespective of and without reference to the Panel for which nominated and Deputies would be free to use their preferences throughout the ballot paper without regard to the allocation of candidates as between the panels. Thus a voter may give his first preference to a candidate nominated for Panel A and his next preference to a candidate nominated for Panel B, and so on.

9. When the votes are counted, the candidates on each Panel receiving the largest, number of votes (including transfers). would be declared elected until the total number of vacancies in that Panel are filled. All other candidates nominated for a Panel that has been filled would be eliminated even if they or some of them had received more votes than other candidates nominated for panels that still remained to be dealt with.

10. In the event of a vacancy arising between the normal election dates, the Seanad should be permitted to fill it by the method of co-option subject to the principle of proportional representation.

ANNEX B.

Proposals by Deputy McGilligan for the selection of members of the Seanad, in substitution for those set out in the Seanad Electoral (Panel Members) Bill, 1937.

1. The proposals outlined in this Memorandum are an endeavour to find a more satisfactory system for the selection of Senators while still keeping within the limits fixed by the Constitution. The Constitution has laid down certain principles and the Committee is not empowered to depart therefrom in considering this legislation. Consequently the views here expressed in refernce to the constitution of a Seanad must be taken as recognising the existence of these limitations and attempting to work within them but not as an endorsement of the type of Seanad embodied in the Constitution.

2. If a Seanad is to be of any value as part of the legislative machine it must be constituted on some principle, and the principle should preferably be different from the principle on which the main body of the Legislature is based. The Dáil, which is the main organ of the legislative machine, is based upon the principle of popular election by the widest electorate possible. It is a provision of the Constitation that the new President shall also be elected by means of popular election and universal suffrage. It is desirable, therefore, and even essential, that the Seanad should not be a body which will be a mere reflex of the Dáil, claiming with the Dáil the authority of popular election. Some new principle for its constitution must be found other than that of popular election. In the following proposals for the composition of the new Seanad the fact that the method of selection or election of Senators is not based entirely on the votes of the people should not be regarded in any way as a defect in the system. What is required is to obtain a body of persons possessing specialised knowledge and experience—the aim is to secure the special representation of intellect, character, political knowledge and valuable experience. The scheme outlined in this Memorandum does not therefore endeavour to provide a body which will represent the people according to geographical grouping and political division and the absence of popular election and the presence of occasional plural voting are not considered defects in the scheme.

3. Having regard to the time limit fixed by the Constitution for the establishment of the first Seanad it is obvious that it would be difficult if not impossible to work out in all its details a comprehensive scheme for a permanent Seanad. It is therefore proposed to have a separate scheme for the constitution of the First Seanad and a scheme for the constitution of a permanent Seanad.

4. With regard to the first or transitional Seanad it is suggested that the best method of obtaining that Seanad would be by the establishment of a limited body of persons on whom would be imposed by law the power and the duty of electing the first 43 members of the transitional Seanad. It would be desirable if it were possible that that electing body should be composed of a small number of individuals— not exceeding six or seven—of approved experience, capacity and the strictest integrity. It would only be possible to trust the task of nominating the first Seanad to such a body if agreement could be found between all Parties in the Dáil as to the personnel of that body. If the persons constituting such an electoral group could be definitely agreed upon, the duty could be imposed upon them of nominating and receiving nominations for the new Seanad and of finally selecting in their own complete discretion the 43 members who would compose the first or transitional Seanad. Preferably, the individuals composing this group should be holders of public positions, but whether selected ex officio or appointed on individual merit once they were backed by the unanimous approval of Dáil Eireann they would have to be trusted to make the best selection in the interests of the country. If unanimous agreement could not be found on the personnel of that small body, a larger body would have to be established by a different method. It is suggested that such a body might be composed of 21 citizens elected by the members of the Dáil. In carrying out that election it would be essential to introduce certain devices with the object of securing a certain balance of view within the group of 21 and of preventing the selection of merely partisan groups. In the case of the Labour Party in the present Dáil it would be essential that they should be entitled to elect to this electoral group of 21 a greater number of individuals than their mere numerical strength in the Dáil would now justify. Having regard to that numerical strength they would not have sufficient voting power to secure that their particular point of view would be properly represented on that Committee. Otherwise the electoral group would roughly correspond to the Party strength in the Dáil.

A second device is suggested. It is assumed that on a possible electoral group Fianna Fáil might be entitled to a quota of 9 representatives, Fine Gael to 7, Labour to 4 and Independents to 1. (The figures as to Party strength are taken merely to exemplify what follows, and not as a calculated determination as to voting strength in the Dáil). It is proposed that each Party would be bound to bring before the Dáil a list of nominees double the number of that Party’s quota. From such list the final selection of a Party quota would be made by the other Parties, voting on P.R. lines, excluding the Party whose nominees were being voted upon. On the representation figures given above the Fianna Fáil Party would have to nominate 18 persons and from the 18 so nominated the Deputies comprising the Fine Gael, Labour and Independent groups would make the final selection of the 9 to represent Fianna Fáil on the electoral group.

5. When this body is established it would be entitled to receive nominations from any two citizens who would fill up a simple nominations paper as proposer and seconder and set out the qualifications of the person nominated. It might be urged that such a simple method of nomination would result in an undue number of nominations being received by the Committee. To discourage too numerous nominations or the nomination of persons not properly qualified it might be considered desirable that each nomination be accompanied by a small deposit of, say, £5 or £10, returnable if the Committee considered that the person nominated was in fact qualified within the meaning of the constitutional requirements but to be forfeited if the Committee thought the nomination frivolous or unmeritorious or the person nominated not qualified. It would be the duty of the Committee to examine into the qualifications of the persons nominated and it would be within their absolute power and discretion from those nominated to select the 43 persons qualified to occupy the position of Senators in the first or transitional Seanad. It would also be the duty of the Committee when presenting their final list of selected Senators to state opposite the name of each person selected the qualifications entitling him or her to be selected. In order to meet the difficulty of casual vacancies the Committee might nominate to each Panel or category in the Constitution a supplementary list, in order of merit, of person who should be elected to fill casual vacancies arising on each category.

6. It would be essential that no member of any electoral group, whether appointed by agreement or by election of the Dáil to select the first or transitional Seanad should himself or herself be capable of being elected as a Senator. It is also essential that no members of the Dáil should be elected on to any such electoral group.

7. With regard to the permanent Seanad the suggestion is put forward that such a Seanad should be constituted by means of a system of special registers. The Constitution provides that Senators are to be chosen to represent five categories. It is suggested that a register or registers should be established for each category on which would be entered as on a given date the names of the persons or bodies entitled to vote for the election of a Senator elected by the votes of the persons or bodies on such register.

8. On the Cultural and Educational Panel, the national language is envisaged by the Constitution as entitled to representation. It is suggested that a register should be formed on which should be entered the names of persons who on a given date have passed the necessary tests for and are entitled to wear the Fáinne. The persons on that register would be entitled to elect one Senator; the election to be carried out by secret postal ballot according to the Constitution.

9. On the same Panel various cultural groups would appear to be given recognition in the Constitution. It would be difficult for all the bodies coming within that category so to act cohesively and satisfactorily as to elect five Senators from their body. It is suggested that three further registers should be prepared. One one of these should be set out the names of those persons who on the given date are engaged as Primary Teachers, Secondary Teachers, and Vocational Teachers; a second will contain the names of all those who on the said date were serving on Vocational Education Committees or on Technical Education Committees or who were Managers of National Schools or Heads of Secondary Schools. One Senator would be elected by the voters on each of these registers. The third of these registers should include the members of the following bodies, institutions and societies: the Royal Irish Academy, National Institute of Journalists, National Gallery, Royal Hibernian Academy, Incorporated Law Society, King’s Inns (i.e., practising barristers), Royal College of Surgeons, Royal College of Physicians, Royal College of Veterinary Surgeons, Pharmaceutical Chemists, Dentists. The voters on this register would elect two Senators.

10. Agriculture is entitled to representation in the Seanad. It is suggested that a register should be formed on which should be entered as on a given date the name of the ratepayer of each agricultural holding without regard to valuation or, if thought desirable, of a certain valuation, and that the persons on that register should by secret postal ballot elect 11 Senators.

11. Labour representation could be secured by the formation of a register on which would be entered the names of all persons who on a given date were entered on the list of the National Health Insurance Fund contributors, no division being made between organised and unorganised labour. These entered thereon shall elect 11 Senators.

12. The category of industry and banking, etc., would cause a difficulty. It is not clear for instance what must be included in the term “finance” or whether, for example, shopkeepers would fall within the description of “industrialists.” A register should be formed on which would be entered only the names of incorporated bodies falling within the constitutional description or category; one vote being given to each such incorporate body.

13. Further registers should be formed of practising engineers, architects and accountants. Each Bank shall be registered and one vote associated with each. The 9 Senators apportioned to this category should be sub-divided among the interests represented. With regard to the administration and social services category it is suggested that the number of Senators selected to represent this category should be selected by members of the Dáil voting on principle of proportional representation. Any two members of the Dáil should be entitled to nominate for election any person with the necessary qualifications. In addition ex-Senators, ex-members of the Dáil, members of Local Authorities, ex-Civil Servants and persons nominated by any Civil Service staff organisation should be entitled to be placed on the Panel for possible election.

14. It is to be observed that any body of persons on any of the registers would not necessarily be bound to represent these persons on that register.

IMEACHTA AN CHOISTE SPEISIALTA.

PROCEEDINGS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE.

Déardaoin, 21adh Deire Fómhai, 1937.

Thursday, 21st October, 1937.

ANNEX A.

ANNEX B.