Committee Reports > List of Committees > Joint > 1998 > Committee on Foreign Affairs > Report - Nigera, Cambodia and Burma

HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS

Report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs on Nigeria, Cambodia and Burma

Based on the meeting of Wednesday 25th February, 1998.

May 1998

CONTENTS

Introduction

The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs was established following Orders of the Dáil and Seanad of 23rd October 1997. In addition, Standing Orders state that the following powers may be conferred on a Committee:-

“(1)power to take oral and written evidence and to print and publish from time to time minutes of such evidence taken in public before the Select Committee together with such related documents as the Select Committee thinks fit;”.

This Report of the Joint Committee on Nigeria, Cambodia and Burma was agreed at its meeting on 3 June 1998.

_________________________

Desmond J. O’Malley,

Chairman.

4 June, 1998.

JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Dé Céadaoin, 25 Feabhra 1998.

Wednesday, 25 February 1998.

The Committee met at 4 p.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Deputy D. O’Malley in the Chair.

Chairman: We have some visitors today from three countries courtesy of Trocaire which is having a conference tomorrow which will be addressed by speakers from those three countries and others. I welcome Mr. Ledum Mitee from Nigeria, Mr. Thun Saray from Cambodia, Mr. Harn Yawnghwe from Burma and Mr. Éamonn Meehan of Trócaire to this meeting of the joint committee. I thank our visitors from abroad for making themselves available to the committee to give us up to date information on the political, economic and social conditions in their countries, with emphasis on the principles of democracy, respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law. I also thank Mr. Éamonn Meehan, Head of Overseas Development in Trócaire, and Trócaire itself for arranging the presence of these speakers. I hope their 25th conference tomorrow will be very successful.

Ledum Mitee is acting president of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, an indigenous people in Nigeria. Thun Saray is president of the Cambodian Human Rights Development Association. In 1997, he became the first representative of the board of directors of the Cambodian Committee for Free and Fair Elections. Harn Yawnghwe is the advisor to the Prime Minister of the exiled National Coalition Government of the Union of Burma. He is the director of the European office for the development of democracy in Burma and is currently involved in publicising the human rights situation in Burma and advocating action by the international community.

I shall ask each of our visitors to give a presentation of approximately ten minutes and this will be followed by a question and answer session with the members. Is that agreed? Agreed. I now ask Mr. Ledum Mitee to make his presentation, followed by Mr. Thun Saray and Mr. Harn Yawnghwe.

Mr. Mitee: I am delighted to have this opportunity to address the committee. I place on record our appreciation of the committee’s past efforts, especially the strong resolutions it has taken. It has been possible to have Shell answer questions about its activities in Nigeria and we are deeply grateful for that.

We would like the primary European interest in Nigeria to be to ensure genuine democracy is in place and that the rule of law respects human rights. It is only after these are guaranteed that other interests, including economic interests, can become sustainable. If this goal is taken as a primary interest, we would like to see some decisive efforts in pursuing it. Nigeria is an important player in the African continent. Any message sent, either by action or inaction, has an impact on the African continent. If Nigeria gets away with gross abuse of human rights and military dictatorship and the international community does not do anything decisive to check that, it inadvertently gives the impression to other people in the West African sub-region and the African continent who take their cue from Nigeria that they can do the same as it. That will not have a good effect internationally.

As regards the executions of Ken Saro Wiwa and eight others in 1995, I was a lucky escapee as I shared the same cells and was in the dock with them in that notoriously flawed trial. Following it, there were worldwide condemnations and concern was expressed about what happened. Some steps were taken, including European Union countries recalling their Ambassadors from Nigeria, and small sanctions were put in place in the hope of seeing some change in Nigeria. While it was hoped that would have happened, I regret that the situation has worsened considerably since then. More people are now detained.

As regards the Ogoni situation, it continues to be a standard by which one can measure oppression in Nigeria. A military task force is specially stationed in the region which occupies the place and visits the disease of repression on the people. Six different roadblocks must be crossed to get into the region. Matters are so bad that they continue to shoot people, rape women at these roadblocks and detain people. In the past months, six people have been killed.

On 4 January, which is Ogoni day, 36 people were brutally tortured and detained, including my younger brother who was so badly beaten that people fear for his survival. We do not know his whereabouts since January. My law offices and his business were closed down. It did not stop there. They went to my former home. I spoke to one of the lawyers today who told me they went to the military commander who said, if I criticised Nigeria, there was no reason I should expect to own anything in that country. This is only one example of the state of things. The situation is so bad that even the bodies of those who are killed are confiscated because they want to hide the evidence. If a relation dies a natural death, such is the absolute control over the freedom of assembly, even to gather to bury the dead, the permission of the military must be sought and a bribe must be paid before people can be buried.

People ask why they do not hear about the Ogoni situation. It is a combination of two factors. One is a total blockade on information and free access to independent journalists, both foreign and local, into the area, except those sponsored by Shell and the military. Two, the public relations initiative of Shell, for which it has hired the best public relations firms, shows that Shell continues to view the matter as a public relations exercise. Once it is removed from the front pages, it is the end of the matter. Shell also flies in journalists and brings them on guided tours of Ogoni. It replies to people who make inquiries saying things have changed, that the company has changed, that it is taking over the hospitals and is organising projects here and there. Most of its claims only exist in its papers, not in reality.

It mentioned the Terabor hospital in Ogoni which is supposed to be one of the things it has done. They only gave contracts to those witnesses who testified against Ken Saro-Wiwa to supply medicines to hospital at rates up to 200 times the going rate in the market. Of course, no person can access it. This represents the current position. They have also added the aspect of bribing people, even those who have claims of compensation for the pollution of their farms. It is made contingent to sign papers saying Shell should return to the area before payment is made. People now seem prepared to accept Shell’s claims and their terms of reform, including that of the Nigerian regime. This is quite sad.

The Nigerian regime says it is becoming a democracy. It is painful that elections amount to nothing more than selections because people are disqualified without reason - the executive determines who stands in elections in the context of those who sing the praises of the Government. The five political parties which exist following a decree of the Government have said they support Abacha as the sole candidate. Traditional rulers have joined the queue. The Government has made it compulsory that 5 per cent of allocations to local authorities must be given to traditional rulers. Last week a couple of traditional rulers were fighting among themselves in a bank when withdrawing the money for themselves. They have declared their wish to see Abacha as the sole candidate. I wish the committee to appreciate that genuine progress towards democracy may not be seen in the context of this type of election or selection.

What are the benchmarks against which democracy or a democratic process is assessed? Are people free to form political associations? Have people due process within the system? There is a total absence of political space for anybody to do anything. One can only join the queue for Abacha. These are frightening things.

The EU has taken some measures, including recalling ambassadors, sanctions, etc. People ask why such measures are not successful. The answer is that such measures were limited in scope and were not tied to certain benchmarks. I recommend that benchmark measures should be established. For example, there should be an immediate release of political prisoners and laws which limit the basic freedoms of people should be removed - people should be free to express their views. The transition process, which is exclusive, should embrace all aspects of society. This process will not lead to any degree of democracy and Nigeria should not fool others by trying to enter Sierra Leone only to be praised by others. The same force which people say is doing fine in Sierra Leone is that which is stifling the march towards democracy in Nigeria.

Some practical measures can be undertaken in order the help the development of democratic structures in Nigeria. The civil society should be assisted and aid should be directed towards it to help it prepare for democracy. The EU has granted ecu3 million. We appreciate this, but I am worried by the idea that this will only be available in January which means Abacha will have done what he wants to do. Civil society will not have the capacity in order to make the desired impact.

Shell says the claims we are making are exaggerated. Given such claims, a truly independent assessment of the situation, recommending measures to be taken, should be embarked upon. We continue to ask for this but Shell refuses to commit to it. However, it is funding a survey, the chairman of which has joined the Abacha party. The Ogoni people are under a military occupation. Perhaps the committee will consider such issues.

A serious issue is that the repression has led to 1,140 Ogoni refugees who are now in camps in the republic. In spite of the fact they have crossed an international border they are still being harassed by Nigerian security agents. Of this number, 164 are graduate students including professional lawyers and doctors. One of the practical means of helping these people is for countries who are concerned about the changes in Nigeria to resettle some of these people or find them positions in schools or provide scholarships for them to be educated. This would be a practical demonstration of solidarity with these suffering people.

I thank the committee for providing this opportunity to discuss the issue.

Mr. Thun Saray: Cambodia has had neither a lengthy nor a continuous democratic tradition in its history. Under the French colonial rule democracy was introduced in Cambodia in 1947 by a group of Cambodian elite, when the first constitution was adopted. A decade later, and two years after independence from France, King Norodom Sihanouk was victorious in the first election after independence, in 1956. After his victory, Sihanouk abdicated and created a unique movement to lead the country. For this movement, politicians were hand-picked, freedom of the press was limited and other parties were banned. In 1970, Lon Nol came into power and he subsequently became a dictator, installing a military régime. ln 1975, the Khmer Rouge took power and all institutions of the State were completely destroyed and competent civil servants were mostly killed. The Vietnamese overthrew the Khmer Rouge in 1979 and installed a new government. After two decades of war, genocide and all kinds of human rights violations, there were major obstacles to the democratisation process after the UN intervention in 1992-3. In spite of the reintroduction of a multi-party system, its emergence and the emergence of civil society, especially the establishment and development of local NGOs over the last few years, the Cambodian People’s Party (CPP) succeeded after the 1993 elections in pressuring the FUNCINPEC party, the Royalist Party which won the election, to share power.

While sharing power after the 1993 election, the two prime ministers did not collaborate with one another, instead each tried to obtain full power. The uneasy coalition finally broke up with the armed coup of July 1997 and the break-up showed that the real power lay with the CPP and its leader Hun Sen. The focus is now on the forthcoming elections rescheduled for 26 July 1998. The elections will not be a panacea to solve the political conflicts which exist. However, free and fair elections are recognised by the international community as the most appropriate way to solve the conflict between the different parties. For this to happen certain conditions must be met. These are the setting up of an appropriate legal and institutional framework; achieving real competition among all parties who wish to participate including equal access to the media and ensuring a smooth transfer of power.

The National Assembly recently adopted the Political Party Law and the Electoral Law. These are regarded as acceptable by national and international opinion. However, at present the composition of the national election commission (NEC) is still a matter of public dispute. The main question is whether the NEC members are neutral and independent. lndependence and neutrality of the NEC are the main criteria for free and fair elections.

To ensure real competition between contesting political parties in the elections we must ensure the return of all politicians who went into self-exile after the July events and allow them participate freely in the elections. In this case Hun Sen now agrees to permit the return of Prince Rannaridh after he was tried in his absence and after the Prince received an amnesty from the King.

Up to now the media, especially the electronic media, is still under the control of the ruling party. The international committee and the civic organisations tried to push the National Election Commission to provide equal access to the media during the election campaign but there is still difficulty in doing that.

Since the July coup people are very scared and they are afraid to express their political opinions in public. We tried to give the Human Rights organisation and the UN Centre for Human Rights some information about human rights violations after the coup. Up to now the government have not punished the perpetrators since the July coup.

Recently the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mrs. Mary Robinson, visited Cambodia. Thomas Hammerberg, the special representative of the UN for Human Rights in Cambodia, urged Hun Sen to punish the perpetrators of the 41 cases submitted by the UN Centre for Human Rights. But Hun Sen did not recognise the UN’s report and stated there was not enough information in the report. The UN inquired why four people were killed during the coup. This fact was stated in their report. After the UN investigation they said they made a mistake in one case but they stated again that the three other people mentioned in their report disappeared. The government will not punish the perpetrators. I also worry about the political climate of the pre-election period. The police and military are under the control of the ruling party CPP and they could intimidate or harass the supporters of the opposing political parties.

Impunity is now the main concern of the legal observers, human rights advocates and the general public. If impunity continues to be widespread and the government allows the situation to go unchecked, how can anyone say violence, intimidation and human rights violations will not occur during the upcoming election? There are many causes for the atmosphere of impunity in Cambodia, including: the non-punishment of the Khmer Rouge leaders which has created a precedent of impunity for human rights abuses which have continued since its reign of terror; the weakness of the present judicial system; the culture of impunity which exists is also a result of the tolerant spirit of some people in response to situations of violence.

History does not augur well for the smooth transfer of power when one considers the outcome of the 1993 election, where the CPP refused to give up power and forced FUNCINPEC into a coalition government. There is palpable concern that history will repeat itself if the CPP loses in the July elections. Thus it is vitally important that international observers and the local monitors should, therefore, remain until the new government takes office. Thus, the election process in Cambodia faces a lot of difficulties, obstacles and uncertainties.

Building democracy between and beyond elections is a key role of civil society. However, achieving democracy requires much more than holding free and fair elections, albeit that these are essential. It also necessitates building up a strong civil society which can participate in a national democracy and hold the structures of government and the administration accountable to it. In this regard there are signs of hope. Over the past few years there has been a rapid growth in the number of civic organisations that have been established and they have developed very fast. Now more than 200 NGOs have been set up covering different fields of activity and operating at a variety of levels such as grassroots, middle range and national. Increasingly, these NGOs are building links to others in the region and in the wider international development sphere. They play an important role in society, in the new era of Cambodian history which has as its framework a democratic constitution, and aspires to building a culture of human rights and peace in the peace and democratisation process in tackling poverty and in the promotion of respect for Human Rights.

In conclusion, the democratic tradition in Cambodia is very young and has proven to be unstable and violent at times. The introduction of a free market economy, the reforms to the system of public administration and the democratisation process initiated by the international community through the UN, are three major changes which sent shock waves through Cambodian society. The upcoming elections in July 1998 will be an important test to see whether the infant democracy can grow into a young adult with a newly elected government capable of managing the development process. The government, civil society, and the international community all carry responsibilities for creating a society free from violence, intimidation and discrimination, and for putting in place the necessary institutions and policies to make the elections as free and as fair as possible.

A key lesson learned back in 1993 is that election day is not the final destination at which point all stakeholders in Cambodian democracy can leave sole responsibility for its effective functioning of the newly installed government. It is of utmost importance to first, make sure that the election result is honoured, meaning that the winning party or parties take office. Second, the public administration must be reformed in order to be impartial, competent and accountable, and to serve all the population rather than the interests of one group or party. A huge task lies ahead in terms of building a proper legal system and an independent judiciary.

Finally, all members of the new assembly must take their function as legislators seriously. By taking such an approach democracy will be strengthened in Cambodia both between and beyond elections. Recommendations to the committee are:

That Parliament requests the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to monitor closely the use of EU funds for the election in Cambodia. The EU has given US$11 million to the Cambodian Government to prepare and organise the election. Some criticise the EU for not stipulating the return of the Prince as a precondition for this aid. Public opinion would like the EU to press the Government to organise a free and fair election. Parliament should ask the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to collaborate with the EU to ensure that international observers are present during the election. The observers should make a joint statement about the result of the election and the international community should have a common position on the result. Up to now there has been some division among the international community on the evolution of the election process. We are concerned that the CPP will not transfer power if it loses the election and that the division in the international community will allow it to do so.

Mr. Yawnghwe: I am grateful for this opportunity to address the committee. One year ago it was my honour to address the committee and I hope that I can update you on what has happened since then. Like my friend from Nigeria, I would like to thank the committee for the strong support shown by the Irish people for the people of Burma in their struggle for democracy.

After independence from Britain in 1948, Burma enjoyed a brief period of democracy for about 14 years. In 1962 the military took power and since then we have been ruled by military Governments. The current Government came to power in 1988 after putting down a massive demonstration by the people for democracy. Since then the human rights situation in Burma has been well documented. For the past seven years both the UN Human Rights Commission and the UN General Assembly have passed unanimous resolutions condemning the human rights situation in the country. In 1990 the military organised and lost a general election. The military-backed party won 2 per cent of the seats in Parliament and the National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi won more than 82 per cent of the seats.

Since last year a number of important developments have taken place. In February/March 1997 President Clinton imposed sanctions on new investment in Burma. In addition, the EU lifted trade preferences from Burma under the generalised system of preferences because of the forced labour practices used by the military. On the negative side, Burma was welcomed into the Association of South East Asian Nations in July. Another significant event was the opening of investigations by the International Labour Organisation into forced labour practices in Burma.

In November 1997, the military junta known as the State Law and Order Restoration Council, reorganised and changed its name to the State Peace and Development Council. It also moved a number of generals aside. I would like to give the committee a brief analysis of the consequences of these events and how we see things unfolding this year.

When the military took power in 1988 all foreign aid was cut off because of the brutal suppression of democracy and the mass killings. At that time the military decided to replace foreign aid by opening the country to foreign investments. It also hoped to attract tourists. Both these plans have failed. Apart from the international descriptions of events in the last year, the economic plan embarked upon by the military did not work out and things got worse; there were shortages of rice, staple commodities and the population became restless. There were student demonstrations in December 1996 which caused universities to close. More than 30 institutions of higher learning are still closed, affecting 500,000 students. In March the Buddhist monks were unhappy at how the military was handling religious matters. The military channelled this dissatisfaction towards Muslims and we have since had a number of strikes by Government and factory workers and miners.

The pressure has been growing on the military. Investments which it had been depending on came from the ASEAN countries. However, the collapse of these economies in the latter part of 1997 brought about the collapse of the economic plans for Burma. The military has now changed tactics. It has reorganised, it has a new name and it is hoping to capitalise on two areas. It has turned to the drug warlords for finance. Two well known drug lords, Lo Hsing Han and Khun Sa, have become legitimate business men in Burma in spite of the fact that Khun Sa is under indictment in the United States. Their investments range from building deep sea ports and having shares in airlines and highways to being involved in transportation, taxi companies and so on. Those are just some of the military’s financial interests. The military is also hoping to raise finance by capitalising on Burma’s urgent humanitarian needs. Part of the reason the Burmese economy is so bad is that there were very bad floods last year. Varying reports state that between 20 and 50 per cent of the paddy fields were destroyed. If that is the case, we will face rice shortages in May or June of this year. The military is hoping to use that to avail of humanitarian aid which it will divert and use for other purposes. That is its financial plan.

On the political side, the military has been trying to draft a constitution since 1993 and is attempting to finish that off. The constitution would give the military a legitimate and leading role in the government. The military will also try to call new elections saying that, as the 1990 elections took place almost eight years ago, people may no longer support the democracy movement. It will attempt to ensure victory in the new elections. The military’s political plan involves it legitimising itself while ensuring it has access to cash. We do not believe it will be successful in either endeavour.

It is possible there will be a good deal of social unrest in Burma this year. We are concerned that such unrest would not explode as it would provide the military with an opportunity to crack down. If that were to happen, not only would people be killed and scared off but investors might see that the military had control and support it. We are trying to control the unrest in order that pressure will grow on the military to negotiate as there would be no target on which it could crack down.

We would like to request the international community to sustain external political pressure on the military so that it would engage in negotiations. That would strengthen the hand of Aung San Suu Kyi and she could say that if the military would back down on certain issues, aid could be obtained from European countries to help improve the situation in Burma. Aung San Suu Kyi must be able to bargain from a position of strength.

We are afraid that people may not be aware of what is happening in Burma. International governments may not be able to respond in time to give Aung San Suu Kyi added strength in her negotiating position if social unrest occurs. Perhaps the committee could look into possible ways in which Burma could be assisted if social unrest were to occur. We would also very much appreciate if Mary Robinson - whom I met last year - would, in her new capacity as High Commissioner for Human Rights, pay special attention to the position in which Aung San Suu Kyi finds herself. Although she is supposed to be free, she is really quite restricted. She cannot meet the people she wants to meet and she cannot function properly as a leader. In the two years since she was released from house arrest, at least six of her closest aides have been arrested with the result that she is even more isolated and has nobody on whom she can depend. These are some of the areas in which we would welcome the assistance of the international community.

Deputy Spring: I welcome our visitors and thank them for their presentations which certainly help us to understand the difficulties of their three experiences. Although each of their experiences are different, they have some common features in terms of the lack of democracy and human rights abuses being experienced under the military control in Burma and in the struggle of the Ogoni people in Nigeria. Other speakers may have different priorities but I am somewhat more familiar with the situation in Burma although I have had some involvement in the Nigerian situation.

I had the very uncomfortable pleasure of having a number of meetings with the Burmese Foreign Minister some years ago on behalf of the European Union. I conveyed the views of the EU to him in very strong terms but did not exactly win the argument. The Foreign Minister was determined to withstand the pressure being put on him. I take heart from Mr. Yawnghue’s request that international pressure on Burma be sustained. It is very important that we provide every possible assistance to Aung San Suu Kyi as the proper leader of the Burmese people.

SLORC maintained that there were 16 ethnic areas within Burma but that these were not homogenous in terms of their support for the alternative regime and so the possibility of revolution was not very far away. I was not in a position to counter those arguments as I did not have the necessary local knowledge. Ireland will maintain the position it has adopted over the years in each of these three situations and the committee will discuss what action Ireland and the EU might take in this regard.

Mr. Yawnghue: There are currently seven ethnic states in Burma along with the major state. These states have always had their own territories but, in order to divide the opposition even more, the military tries to assert that there are more than seven ethnic states. It alleges that there are more than 300 ethnic groups in Burma. Although that may be true, the seven ethnic states are not recognised by the military.

The seven ethnic states agreed to join the union to form the present day Burma and the sixteen groups referred to by the Deputy are groups which have formerly held arms against the military but have signed ceasefires with it. Most of these groups want to negotiate a political settlement and the military signed an agreement with the first of them in 1989. Almost ten years have passed since then but there have not been any political settlements to date. If the military system continues, more and more peace agreements will be signed but no solution will be arrived at. However, the democratic government has agreed in principle that the eight states I referred to will operate together as a federation with each one having equal rights. It is moving towards resolving the problems through political negotiations rather than armed might. Combined with the federal platform is the democratic system of government. We do not want a federation of eight dictatorships - we want a federation where the different states are equal. The official platform is that there will be democratic government in each state. I believe we have a more practical solution to the problem than the military has.

Deputy G. Mitchell: What steps can the international community, including Ireland and the EU, take to ensure the national election commission in Cambodia is fair and independent in its work?

In regard to Burma, why do ASEM and ASEAN take the views they do? There seems to be an attitude at meetings of ASEM that Europeans do not really understand the human rights situation in the region because it is different to that in Europe. I am also struck by the point that the SPDC might divert humanitarian aid. What steps can we and the European Union take to ensure humanitarian aid reaches its destination in Burma?

What is the current attitude of Shell to the Ogoni people in Nigeria? Democracy is one thing but the level of pollution and the treatment of the local people seems to be extremely uncivilised for such a major international company. What is the current status of Shell in the region and what attitude is it now taking to the Ogoni people’s suffering?

Mr. Saray: The national election commission is in favour of the CPP party. But how can impartiality and neutrality be maintained? Up to now the president, the chair and the vice chair of this commission have said many times to the public that they would like to organise a free and fair election and to show a position of impartial neutrality to the international community. This should empower this national commission and also allow for correction of the position of that national commission if it does something which is not impartial.

The national commission must ensure that all supporters of opposition parties can conduct their activities, such as electoral campaigns and networking, freely. If they do not allow that, especially if they intimidate or kill opposition supporters - I recently received information that they declared that this was not political killing but a mandatory case - their work should be closely followed.

Mr. Mitee: The difference between the image people had of Shell before the executions and now is that its public relations have become more sophisticated. It looks at the whole issue as a public relations one. Instead of being present when the military is repressing people it stays behind and says it is not behind the military.

However, in a recent case some communities which had oil spillages on their land took Shell to court. Soldiers came to intimidate them and told them to withdraw the case and accept whatever Shell had to offer. Shell’s lawyer said in one of his letters to them that he was surprised and that he did not think Shell knew anything about it, but that when he went to see someone in Shell’s office he found that Shell already knew about this incident. When you call them they say “did you see us there?”, but they are getting the benefits. If someone says “do not go to court, accept what is offered”, what did they do to stop that? That appears to be the attitude it is taking now.

The sad aspect is that Shell has gone even further to sponsor divisions among the people. It bribes them by giving them some sort of benefits and says “you are the person we will deal with, do not mind the others”. That creates division which leads to other problems in the society. In so far as it sees the matter as one of sponsoring divisions, getting it off the pages of newspapers and being comfortable with the military dictatorship, which it thinks will be able to get what it wants for it, it is only postponing the doomsday. Whatever happens at the end of the day, Abacha cannot make sure he succeeds himself. He can for some time but eventually Nigerians will be able to determine their governments and Shell will be confronted with the people directly and not through the military. When that time comes the price will be higher than it is now.

These matters are very much linked with the whole democratic process. It is not just a question of business, which is exactly what Shell wants people to say. How is the whole repressive apparatus of the state oiled and made to work? What keeps it together? This is what Shell continues to do, not only in Ogoni but in other parts of the area also. People in the whole of the Niger delta are getting restive.

When some communities in the western division held Shell workers hostage in September over this issue, the head of Shell in the western division wrote to the military saying that if the government did not check the unrest it would stop production. Nigeria depends solely on the production of crude oil. Shell’s business in Nigeria accounts for 14 per cent of its global profits, which is quite significant given that it has a presence in over 150 countries.

These problems continue today. Shell still types letters. The only difference I see when I compare them to the letters Shell wrote in 1971 is that the letters are longer now. However, they say exactly what they said to our people in 1971.

Chairman: Thank you. I must meet Shell shortly in connection with this matter. Can Mr. Mitee give me the name or the location of the case where soldiers intimidated the plaintiffs who had sued Shell?

Mr. Mitee: I will be very happy to write to you. I have the letter and I will also be happy to give you the documents I have compiled on the Shell Corporation and the military which might be useful.

Mr. Yawnghwe: In terms of the argument about Asian and European human rights only the leaders of the ASEAN countries say human rights in Asia are different from those in Europe. The ordinary people would not say that. They are protecting their own turf. It is claimed that in Asia, which is true to a certain extent, the value of the good of the society comes ahead of the good of the individual. To a certain extent one could compare Singapore with the United States in regard to individual freedoms but Europe might be different. We are not arguing for that. We are not saying the Burmese should have individual freedoms like the Americans but we want the rule of law. We want accountability of the Government officials; we want transparency. That is not extreme human rights. We do not want to be picked up in the middle of the night and disappear. They are very basic rights which are not different from those in Europe, Asia or Africa. The argument does not hold. If possible, we do not want the EU or other countries to give aid - even humanitarian - to the military regime because it will not get there; it can be diverted. There have been cases where relief packages were found on Burmese soldiers. It is very difficult to refuse humanitarian aid but I suggest it be delivered by well known and respected NGOs with integrity. They must have access to those with the greatest need for aid. Most of the NGOs who try to get work in Burma are being directed by the military to work in areas which are not the most needy.

Senator Norris: I find it rather poignant that three such distinguished people should appear before this Committee as if there is very much we can do. I am afraid there is very little but what little there is I am sure we will do. Perhaps we can take their advice on this. Some of you have provided small practical areas. For example, Mr. Mitee gave the name of a case to the Chairman and there were suggestions from Mr. Harn Hawnghwe on the administration of relief resources. Those matters can be considered and addressed but, unfortunately, we do not have huge capacity to influence these world events. We can influence public opinion and perhaps this should be considered.

Although the three cases are separate and distinct there are some common features. International cynicism is a major feature: the repeated national history of aborted elections in all three countries, a massive violation of human rights was carried out with complete impunity by self-appointed leaders of the country and, interestingly, the constant reiteration of the name of Mary Robinson. That suggests in her difficult job she is at least having some impact. Therefore, in the interests of all of you we ought to strongly support her and the human rights programme of the United Nations. I hope all European countries, particularly this one, will do so.

Some questions I would have asked have been answered. One that interests me is the question of the relationship between inward investment and human rights. I am inclined to be extremely cynical but when Mr. Ali Alatas is involved in the negotiation for human rights and a resolution from where do we think we are coming in the light of events in East Timor? Has the delegation comments to make on the question of inward investment? I wonder is it practical to tie it to human rights and what should we do as a member of the European Union which was formed, primarily, as an economic unit? Ireland’s impact will be small. We are dealing with some extraordinary cynical people like our neighbours, the United Kingdom and France, who have no sense of public morality in matters of arm sales, deals or whatever else they are involved in. We can, perhaps, put public light on some of these issues. Perhaps if a channel could be found to provide us with information on the most specific things of interest in terms of investment we would try to be practical and assist.

The Chairman of our Subcommittee on Human Rights, Deputy Mitchell, is here this evening. Unfortunately it comes on the day when we learn, as we had suspected, that Ireland has backed off shamefully and disgracefully from the human rights issue on China and the relaxation on Tibet’s position although we were all given undertakings it would not happen. You will in a sense rely on rebellious committees such as this and you will have to appeal to the insurrectionary instincts of individual members of Parliament throughout Europe to get these issues on the agenda. If we are given the information we will do our best but I do not want to raise hopes which are not realistic. If you continue to feed us information in those small practical ways we will do what we can despite Governments, including our own.

Chairman: The Minister did not announce his new approach to human rights in China until he arrived there.

Deputy O’Kennedy: It is a very important matter and I will not take issue with my good friend Senator Norris on that point. We should consider serious consideration when we have the full information.

Deputy Spring: I suggest we put down Ireland’s/EU’s attitude to human rights in China and the position on Iran for the next meeting.

Chairman: We have been aware of the Ogoni problem for several years. I had a very difficult meeting, as part of this committee, with the Shell Corporation. They were very hostile to criticism, as you probably know. I have arranged, in conjunction with some others in the Irish/Ogoni movement to meet the Shell Corporation within the next few days. Apparently they objected strenuously to my being present but have agreed now. The meeting has taken a long time to arrange for that reason.

I have found in the past when dealing with problems such as this where the Shell Corporation denies constantly anything is wrong or that they have contributed to it that the only effective way to deal with it is to talk in terms of advocating a boycott of their products. Suddenly the whole atmosphere changes. They become much more anxious to try to meet the problem. It is something which both this committee and those interested in supporting the Ogoni people and the various NGOs will have to think in those terms. It is often trade boycotts which are the most effective form of action as we know from the case of South Africa and various other places. The matter which has just been referred to is an instance of trade policy and human rights policy colliding and, as is frequently the case, trade policy tends to prevail. That is not just the case in Ireland but in the EU generally.

Shell seems very vulnerable to any exposition of the facts of what is taking place in Ogoni. It is difficult for neutral observers to get there or, indeed, any observer not prepared to tow Shell’s line. Shell offered to take me there a year or two ago provided that I did not talk to anyone other than those whom Shell approved.

Deputy G. Mitchell: Did they offer to bring you back?

Chairman: Apparently when Shell take journalists there on that basis they simply fly them over the damaged areas. I do not think flying over an environmentally damaged area, where there are oil leakages, is very informative. It would be much better if people could visit the area. However, that remains to be seen. I am looking forward to the opportunity to have a meeting. It is a fact that Shell see this as nothing more than a public relations problem. If it was not occasionally brought up in newspapers, Shell would not see it as a problem. It is disturbing to see them being such a major part of the support for the regime in Nigeria. It is a major oil company supporting a regime kept in existence by little other than oil and gas revenues. The remainder of Nigeria’s trade seems to have disappeared which is a serious matter for the long-term interests of the Nigerian people. They cannot always live from oil. They need to redevelop their traditional exports.

I was interested to hear what was said with regard to Cambodia. It is interesting that Mr. Saray placed emphasis on the election on 26 July next. He does not refer to any major or significant breaches of human rights there. However, I think there are parts of Cambodia where there are severe breaches of human rights and where no law holds. It is to his credit that he concentrates heavily on the forthcoming election, displaying his anxiety that it would be properly conducted and, as he puts it, that the monitors do not disappear the day the votes are counted, but remain to see that the result of the election is also implemented. Cambodia, like other countries including Burma and Nigeria, has had a tradition of having elections which were held properly and freely, yet where the result did not suit the incumbent regime and was cancelled. That is at least as bad as not being able to hold elections at all. I can understand why there is anxiety to avoid that happening again in Cambodia.

Mr. Saray refers to the election monitors being organised by the EU. Perhaps the UN may also be involved. It should not be a matter for the EU only but the UN should be involved. I am glad plenty of notice is being given about it because it is an election which should be carefully monitored, if possible, in all parts of the country. People will need a good deal of notice to arrange that.

It was useful to have a description of the situation in Burma. In spite of what we are told officially there is no improvement there. Although, we are told that Aung San Suu Kyi is officially supposed not to be under house arrest, in practice she is not allowed to fulfil her constitutional or political duties. She is not able to hold meetings, to travel freely within the country or to leave it. If she leaves she will not be able to return. She was not just marginally or narrowly elected, rather she got an overwhelming majority. The fact that she was elected seven or eight years ago does not invalidate her election. I hope she will not accept the view of SLORC that she can no longer be regarded as validly elected and that there should be further elections, which it would ensure it did not lose. I would prefer to see her installed as the democratically leader of Burma.

Again the question of whether trade sanctions on a wider scale should be advocated. Those who oppose sanctions will say it is the ordinary people who suffer. However, I think it has been the case that in every instance the ordinary people, if given the opportunity, would prefer to suffer to some degree in the short term in order that they might win their freedom. That was the case in South Africa. The biggest opposition tends to come from the regime which might be the subject of the sanctions. If it is necessary to give humanitarian aid as a result of what has happened, I am sure the committee concurs with Mr. Yawnghwe’s suggestion that it only be given through international NGOs which will be able to ensure that it is given directly to those who require it and who will benefit from it. Otherwise it will go to the wrong people.

Mrs. Robinson is anxious to visit Burma. If she did and she were to meet Aung San Suu Kyi there that would be a major event. We will do what we can to assist that because it would be of great importance. Whether the regime will allow it to happen is doubtful because it would get a great deal of coverage.

Senator Norris: It is impractical for us to imagine that we can substantially affect the operations of major companies such as Shell in their operational areas in Nigeria. However, Shell has a manifestation in Europe on stock exchanges. I do not know if it is quoted in Ireland but it is quoted in London. Would it be possible to acquire, on the Chairman’s behalf, a share in Shell and send him over to London with a list of questions for the directors compiled by the committee? It would certainly provide the oxygen of publicity if the Chairman turned up with a list of serious questions. It might force Shell into a situation whereby, because it has a formal representation here through being quoted on the stock exchange, we could cause it some discomfort. Would that be of interest?

Chairman: If we were to do something like that a much more distinguished performer such as the Senator should be the shareholder.

Senator Norris: I might be inclined to gamble on the stock exchange and to disappear.

Chairman: There are two Shell companies - Royal Dutch Shell in the Hague and Shell Transport and Trading in London. They are quoted separately but they are linked. Together they form the Shell empire. Decisions are made by both companies. Irish Shell is of no significance. I remember on an occasion having difficulties in the late 1970s with Shell world-wide. I was trying to make the case that Shell Ireland should be getting much larger quantities of fuel than were being allowed to it by Shell. I was told by Shell in London that Shell Ireland was smaller than Shell in south Manchester because south Manchester had a bigger oil market than the whole of Ireland.

Senator Norris: Pimples can be painful.

Chairman: The decisions are made in London and the Hague. Shell is very publicity conscious and because the “Shell” brand is used throughout the world, unlike other companies which change brand names in different countries, Shell is particularly sensitive to criticism, wherever it happens.

Senator Norris: Perhaps that could be considered.

Chairman: It could. I do not think one needs to be a shareholder to criticise it.

Senator Norris: It can help at meetings. Greenpeace did something similar to good effect.

Mr. Mitee: Last year a group of shareholders went to the AGM in London to raise questions. They sponsored a resolution to ask that Shell have an external audit of its practices. They were voted down by the majority shareholders. However, there is a group of minority shareholders who tried to pursue that line. I agree with the Chairman that a boycott might have an impact on Shell. It would be good not just to boycott Shell but to inform the company why we will not buy its fuel. That would send a message.

I am aware that there may be a cost with a loss of jobs. We regret that but the important question is what sacrifices we are prepared to make. For example, the world is determined to check Saddam Hussein’s threat of the use of weapons of mass destruction. I would not imply that it a less serious matter but we are also faced with weapons of mass destruction, albeit less sophisticated ones than chemical weapons. If the weapons in Iraq are destroyed some people will lose their jobs but that is the price to be paid.

Senator Norris: Most of their raw materials came from Europe anyway.

Chairman: Mr. Éamonn Meehan, Trócaire’s international officer would like to say a few words to the committee.

Mr. Meehan: With regard to Senator Norris’s points, we could write to the committee with a few modest but clear cut recommendations for action. The submissions have significant lists of recommendations but we could shorten them to identify a few which it might be appropriate to follow up. The Chairman made a point about coherence and the fact that the EU is an economic union. The Council of Ministers adopted a coherence declaration in, I think, June 1995 to the effect that trade and other policies had to be coherent with fundamental principles of human rights and justice. That is a start at least and there may be an incremental process of building on that.

Chairman: I think that is related to association treaties with some of the applicant states and not primarily with trade policies.

Mr. Meehan: The three people who have spoken to the committee this afternoon are defenders of human rights in their own situations. Two of them live in exile. They and many others like them who work with Trócaire and whose work we support are in danger as defenders of human rights. This is a point which we will make strongly at our conference tomorrow.

In 1984 the UN Human Rights Commission decided to begin work on drafting a declaration to protect defenders of human rights, yet 14 years later the discussion on that declaration is still ongoing because it is being blocked by some countries which are members of the commission. Ireland is on the commission at the moment and will be until 1999. The membership comprises about 50 states. The declaration to protect defenders of human rights has a number of key elements, but the two most important are, first, to ensure that the declaration guarantees recognition of the fundamental rights and freedoms of persons engaged in the struggle for the promotion and defence of human rights and, second, the appointment of a special rapporteur on human rights defenders.

We ask the committee to use its influence with the Irish Government to encourage work to be done in 1998-9 to ensure the adoption of this declaration on human rights defenders. The work of human rights defenders around the world is crucial. In many cases they are in danger. However, there is evidence of successful work done by many defenders over decades, in Central America and South Africa for examples.

Chairman: I thank Mr. Meehan and Trócaire for arranging to have our three invitees speak to the committee. It is useful to hear at first hand the position in three important countries where there has been a prolonged breach of human rights and democratic principles. Happily, in each of the three countries, there is a substantial number of people who want to put that right but they need help from outside in publicising the injustices being suffered and the lack of democracy. I hope this committee will be able to help by publicising what is happening and by taking specific steps along the lines suggested by the three speakers. We should send some volunteers as election observers to Cambodia in July. It is important those elections are properly supervised under the auspices of the UN and the EU. It would be useful if we could do anything to facilitate a visit by Mrs. Robinson to Burma, although it remains to be seen whether she can get there. It is a measure of her effectiveness that she is becoming persona non grata in certain places. She is not allowed to visit a number of places.

I thank you all again and I hope you have a successful conference tomorrow.

The committee adjourned at 5.45 p.m.

Appendix (i)

Burma (Myanmar)

Political Background Note

Political Background

1.In the 1990 parliamentary election in Burma t he National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi won 82% of votes cast but the ruling military junta, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), refused to recognise the result and has since used a combintion of intimidation, harassment and quasi-legal devices to defer installation of democratic rule.

2.The NLD secretary-general, Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, was released from house arrest in July 1995, but the SLORC has so far refused to begin talks aimed at reaching national reconciliation. In November 1995 the NLD walked out of the National Convention; this body, charged with drafting a new constitution, is the only forum in which the SLORC will agree to meet the NLD.

3.In mid-November 1997 the four most senior generals of Burma’s ruling military dissolved the SLORC and replaced it with the State Peace and Development Council. The implications of this have yet to emerge but the continued presence of the four generals on the new executive does not give rise to optimism about improvement.

Human Rights

4.The human rights situation in Burma remains grave. Over the past year there have been widespread arrests of elected representatives of the NLD and their supporters; the SLORC has introduced draconian legislation in relation to freedom of association and freedom of assembly; Daw Aung San Suu Kyi’s freedom of movement has been increasingly restricted in ways that at times represent de facto house arrest; and the death in custody, on 22 June 1996, of Mr James Leander Nichols, the Honorary Consul of Denmark, provoked outrage most particularly in the Scandinavian countries. In late October 1997 a sixth member of the NLD died in custody. Police have also attempted to prevent the NLD meeting in places other than Aung Su Kyi’s compound.

5.In addition, there is considerable concern over the mistreatment of ethnic Karen refugees on the Thai border and of alleged conditions of forced labour being employed by the Burmese authorities. The EU has decided to suspend the Generalised Scheme of Preferences in respect of Burmese agricultural and industrial products as a result of the latter problem.

EU Common Position

6.The European Union Common Position on Burma, which was first adopted on 28 October 1996 and recently renewed in October 1997, deplored “the practice of torture, summary and arbitrary executions, forced labour, abuse of women, political arrests, forced displacements of the population and restrictions on the fundamental rights of speech, movement and assembly.”

7.The Common Position provides for:

(a)confirmation of

•expulsion of Burmese military personnel from EU-based representations and withdrawal of EU military counterparts from Burma

•embargo on arms, munitions and military equipment, and suspension of non-humanitarian aid or development programmes, and

(b)the introduction of

•a ban on entry visas for the State Law and Order restoration Committee (SLORC) senior members and their families

•a ban on entry visas for senior security force members who formulate, implement of benefit from policies that impede Burma’s transition to democracy, and their families: and

•suspension of high-level bilateral (political director and upwards) visits to Burma.

Ireland’s Position

8.Ireland supports in principle the taking of additional measures against Burma, should all partners agree that this is desirable. At the 6 October General Affairs Council Ireland, the UK and Denmark to introduce additional measures against Burma failed to achieve agreement. Consensus on such measures remains eleusive.

EU-ASEAN Relations

9.The General Affairs Council of 2 June issued a declaration on the accession of Burma to ASEAN in which it:-

•re-affirmed its commitment to the EU-ASEAN dialogue, and to the promotion of shared values, including respect for human rights and democratic principles, and

•expressed a view that it trusted that membership of ASEAN will further these aims in the new member states and in particular in Burma/Myanmar, where the situation remained of serious concern to the international community.

10.On 26 June 1997 the EU Genaeral Affairs Council adopted conclusions in which it said, inter alia, that the EU-ASEAN dialogue should be used to discuss the Burma situation; the extension of the EU Common Position precluded starting negotiations on the possible accession of Burma to the EC-ASEAN Cooperation Agreement; Burma’s ASEAN membership does not automatically imply Burma’s right to membership of ASEM.

Recent visit by British Foreign Secretary Cook to South East Asia

11.UK Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, visiting S.E.Asia in September, criticised Burma for its involvement in the global heroin trade.

Asia Section,Political Division

Question No.

To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs if his attention has been drawn to the ongoing house arrest of Ms Aung San Suu Kyi; and if he will make a statement to Dáil Éireann on interventions, if any, made by himself or his EU counterparts in this matter.

- William Penrose. (Nominated by: Dick Spring).

For ORAL answer on Thursday, 19th February, 1998.

Ref No: 4327/98

Question No.

To ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs his views on whether the newly named regime in Burma (Myan Mar) should be ostracised and the efforts being made at EU and UN level to isolate the regime and encourage the restoration of democracy.

- Jim O’Keeffe.

For ORAL answer on Thursday, 19th February, 1998.

Ref No: 4268/98

DRAFT REPLY

With your permission, a Cheann Comhairle, I propose to take questions number 40 and 66 together.

The Government is deeply concerned about the curtailment of the political freedoms of Ms Aung San Suu Kyi whose National League for Democracy party won 82% of the vote in the 1990 parliamentary elections in Burma. Although her house arrest was formally ended in 1995, her freedom of movement, association and expression continues to be severely restricted by military roadblocks around her residence and by other measures.

On 28 October 1996, under the Irish Presidency of the Council, the European Union adopted a Common Position on Burma/Myanmar which currently remains in force. As a result, the EU has placed an embargo on all arms, munitions and military equipment to Burma and suspended all non-humanitarian aid or development projects. In addition, all Burmese military personnel attached to diplomatic Missions in the EU have been expelled, visa restrictions against members of the governing regime put in place and high-level bilateral visits to Burma suspended.

The EU Common Position is directed at the absence of progress towards democratisation and at the continuing violation of human rights in Burma. All Member States of the EU are committed to doing all in their power to persuade the Burmese authorities to meet the conditions called for in the Common Position. Likewise, at the United Nations, the General Assembly has unanimously called for an improvement in the human rights situation in Burma.

END

Cambodia

Political Background Note

Politcal History: Independence to Khmer Rouge

1.Cambodia gained independence from France in 1953. Two years later the Sangkum Reastr Niyum party led by Prince Norodim Sihanouk (who had abdicated from the throne and temporarily reduced his own rank to Prince to allow himself run in elections) had a runaway victory in the elections. Prince Sihanouk dominated Cambodia’s politics until his overthrow in 1970 in a coup d’etat led by Prime Minister Lieutenant-General Lon Nol who abolished the monarchy and became President.

2.A coalition of forces led by Sihanouk and including the Khmer Rouge deposed Lon Nol in April 1975 despite cosiderable American military and economic intervention. But Sihanouk was quickly marginalised by Pol Pot’s Khmer Rouge who proclaimed a new Democratic Kampuchea, a worker-peasant revolutionary state. The new government, in a disastrous campaign to achieve autarky, emptied whole cities by moving the population into rural workcamps for forced labour and indoctrination.

Vietnam invades

3.Following border clashes and confrontation Vietnam invaded Cambodia in 1978, pushed the Khmer Rouge back to the remote west and installed a puppet govt of KR defectors in the renamed People’s Republic of Kampuchea. Non-communist resistance groups emerged and in 1982 Sihanouk’s National United Front for a Independent Neutral Peaceful and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC) joined others including the Khmer Rouge in fighting the PRK government led by Prime Minister Hun Sen.

4.In 1987, following the Soviet Union’s decision to withdraw assistance from the PRK pressure for negotiations. After little progress, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council began to negotiate a settlement leading to the 1991 Paris peace accord. The country was renamed the State of Cambodia and in February 1992 the UN began a massive peacekeeping operation.

5.The 1993 elections were marred by the murder of political figures and the refusal of the Khmer Rouge to disarm. In an 87% poll turnout victory went to FUNCINPEC who were led by Prince Rinaridhh, son of (reinstated) King Sihanouk. In October 1993, to counter separatist moves, FUNCINPEC and the Cambodian People’s Party led by Hun Sen formed a coalition government. The two party leaders were designated joint Prime Ministers.

Recent political developments

6.Relations between the coalition parties were poor. Tension deteriorated into violence as the parties moved into preparing for the 1998 elections. Clashes broke out in November 1996 between troops and militia loyal to either CPP and FUNCINPEC. Despite attempts to keep the armed elements neutral, by June 1997 heavy fighting had broken out in Phnom Penh. On 8 July Hun Sen’s forces prevailed. Prince Rinariddh had fled to Paris just before the fighting and vowed resistance. He has since been charged in absentia by a military court of smuggling weapons and negotiating with the Khmer Rouge. Hun Sen has said Prince Ranariddh may participate in the 1998 election if the court acquits him of the charges. Hun Sen denies staging a coup and has said he will work with replacement FUNCINPEC co-Prime Minister Ung Huot whom he appointed on 16 July.

Japan-brokered peace deal

7.This month (February 1998) both Hun Sen and Rinarriddh are reported as accepting a peace proposal mediated by Japan which envisages the Prince being allowed to return to Cambodia, after being tried in March in absentia and immediately pardoned by the King if found guilty. However, Rinariddh will have to apply for pardon and there are concerns that he feels making such an application would be tantamount to an admission of guilt.

European Union stance

8.On 7 July 1997 a European Union declaration unreservedly condemned the violence in Cambodia and supported the initiative of King Sihanouk to initiate consultations with the two co-Prime Ministers. The declaration also referred to the undertaking by the Cambodian government to hold legislative elections in May 1998 (since deferred to July 1998). The EU has curtailed all development aid until the installation of a democratically-elected government. An electoral assistance programme was, however, put into effect by the EU Commission of this year.

9.There are widely expressed fears that the elections scheduled for the end of July will not be held in a free and fair manner. The Netherlands is particularly concerned about the possible intimidation of candidates, lack of access to the media and the return of exiled politicians from abroad (Ranariddh Sihanouk). It has proposed that EU Commission funding for electoral assistance should be suspended unless the situation improves and realistic guarantees are provided by the Hun Sen government in Phnom Penh.

ASEAN

10.ASEAN had been deeply involved in efforts to end Cambodia’s civil war, culminating in the 1991 Paris peace accords. Attempting to solve this new crisis, a group of ASEAN Foreign Ministers, led by Mr Ali Alatas, have held separate talks with King Sihanouk, Prince Ranariddh and Mr Hun Sen. Cambodia was to have become a full member of ASEAN in July 1997 along with Burma and Laos but following the coup Cambodia’s accession was postponed. ASEAN at first continued to recognise Prince Rinnaridh as a legitimate co-Prime Minister but now tacitly accept Ung Huot.

United Nations

11.Hun Sen assured the UN Secretary General by letter on 22 October 1997 that his Government is committed to ensuring that the May 1998 Cambodian elections will be organised in the “most democratic and fairest manner possible”.(The elections are now set for July 1998). Assurances were also given regarding the return of exiled political leaders that no arrests will be made in respect of acts done prior to the July coup or acts done in respect of electoral activities subsequent to their return.

Human Rights

12.Mr. Thomas Hammerberg, the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, published a memorandum on 5 September concluding that during and in the wake of the seizure of power by Hun Sen there appeared to be a deliberate pattern of execution and torture of military officers and officials of the overthrown ruling party.The government promised an independent enquiry to investigate the allegations but no such investigation has yet taken place. The UN High Commissioner for human rights, Mrs. Mary Robinson visited Phnom Penh in January but appears to have received little in the satisfaction from the Hun Sen government. However, despite government criticism of the activities of the UNCHR office, agreement was reached on the continued presence of a UN Human Rights Office in Cambodia after March.

Political Division, 24 February 1998

Appendix (ii)

MEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE

DEPUTIES

AHEARN, THERESA

AYLWARD, LIAM

BRISCOE, BEN

CALLELY, IVOR

CREED, MICHAEL

DEASY, AUSTIN (Vice Chairman)

DE ROSSA, PROINSIAS

KITT, MICHAEL P.

MITCHELL, GAY

O’KENNEDY, MICHAEL

O’MALLEY, DESMOND J. (Chairman)

SHATTER, ALAN

SMITH, BRENDAN

SPRING, DICK

SENATORS

DOYLE, AVRIL

HAUGHEY, EDWARD

LANIGAN, MICK

MOONEY, PASCHAL

NORRIS, DAVID

TAYLOR-QUINN, MADELEINE

* In substitution for Senator P. Mooney.