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HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTASReport of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs on Partnership for Peace
HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTASReport of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs on Partnership for PeaceContents
PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACEREPORT BY THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRSIntroduction1The Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs held a number of meetings over the last 8 months on European Security Architecture, with particular reference to Partnership for Peace. In the Dail on 28 January, The Taoiseach announced that he envisaged that, all going well, Ireland would join Partnership for Peace in the second half of 1999. This report explains the nature of Partnership for Peace, records the main points made by guest speakers who appeared before the Joint Committee and concludes by quoting the Taoiseach’s justification for his proposal that Ireland will join the Partnership before the end of the current year. What is Partnership for Peace2.Partnership for Peace (PfP), which was launched by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in 1994, on foot of an initiative by President Clinton, is a cooperative security initiative designed to intensify political and military cooperation in Europe, to promote stability, to reduce threats to peace and to build strengthened relationships by promoting practical cooperation amongst its participants. PfP provides for practical cooperation in areas of interest to countries involved, including joint planning, training and exercises for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The central aspect of PfP has been self differentiation i.e. each country determines the scope and extent of its participation in PfP activities. Participation in PfP does not require membership of NATO. Membership3.Most countries which are members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) participate in PfP. The current membership of 43 countries includes the 16 NATO members and 27 other countries, including Russia and all but one of the States of the former USSR, European countries with a tradition of neutrality (Austria, Sweden, Finland and Switzerland), the six Central and Eastern European countries and the three Baltic States. 4.There are eleven OSCE member countries, including Ireland, which are not in PfP. The other ten are: Andorra, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Yugoslavia, Holy See, Monaco, San Marino, Malta and Tajikistan. Main Features of PfP5.PfP is a cooperative security initiative that involves the European States which are not members of NATO entering into bilateral agreements with NATO to cooperate in specific areas of mutual benefit. It involves developing capacity for cooperation and training in agreed areas such as UN peacekeeping, humanitarian operations, search and rescue and environmental protection. PfP does not involve membership of NATO or the assumption of any alliance commitments. As indicated above, the PfP concept is a flexible one, with each participant in the Partnership deciding on the level and extent of its own involvement in PfP activities. Obligations6.PfP participants are expected to subscribe to a Framework Document, which sets out the basic purposes and objectives of the Partnership. 7.The purposes include the protection and promotion of human rights, rededication to the principles of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, the safeguarding of freedom, justice and peace, the preservation of democracy, the upholding of international law and the fulfilment of the obligations of the UN Charter and OSCE commitments. 8.The objectives include matters such as democratic control of the armed forces, reflecting the initial focus of PfP on the emerging Eastern European States. They also focus on maintaining readiness to contribute to peacekeeping operations mandated by the UN or OSCE and on joint planning, training and exercises to strengthen States’ abilities to undertake peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations. Partnership Document9.A participating State presents to NATO its “Partnership Document”, which is essentially its own agenda and sets out its approach to PfP and identifies areas of PfP in which it is interested. The participating State then develops a customised and individual Partnership Programme, which would set out a practical programme of cooperation in areas of interest to it. Enhancement of PfP10.In May 1997, NATO, in consultation with the states participating in PfP, decided to broaden and enhance cooperation within the Partnership framework, in view of the growing role and importance of PfP as an element in the European Security Architecture and, specifically, the lessons learned from the efforts of the international community in Bosnia. 11.This enhancement is guided by three principal aims: i) strengthening of the political consultation element to include, inter alia, crisis management, regional issues, arms control and disaster relief. ii) development of a more operational role for PfP, which would allow the PfP participants who so wish to participate in Partnership exercises to enhance preparedness for peacekeeping and crisis management operations. iii) greater involvement of partners in PfP planning and decision making which would facilitate involvement by non-NATO PfP states in planning for so-called Petersberg-type operations. (Note: The Petersberg tasks, which will be brought within the scope of the European Union by the Amsterdam Treaty, are defined as: Humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking). Discussion on PfP at Joint CommitteePresentations by representatives of European countries with a tradition of neutrality (Switzerland, Austria, Sweden, Finland) who are PfP members 12.The Ambassadors of Switzerland, Austria, Sweden and Finland addressed the Joint Committee on PfP on 1 July 1998 at the Committee’s request. They all expressed satisfaction with their countries’ experience of PfP. The following are quotes from their presentations which summarise their countries’ experience of PfP. 13.Switzerland: “The experiences made in the first year of PfP have indeed been very encouraging. Without creating a direct link with NATO itself, we have been able to establish a pragmatic co-operation in certain areas of our own exclusive choice. We were able to introduce our own ideas about security policy. The principle of choosing ‘a la carte’ has proved to be workable and compatible with our neutrality. Our contribution seems to have been appreciated abroad and keeps being solidly supported by our own public opinion and most political parties. The cost incurred is very modest if compared with the gain in military proficiency, useful exchange of ideas, promotion of mutual confidence and insight in our partners’ way of approaching common problems”. 14.Austria “Experience of the last years shows that international crisis-management has changed its profile. Among other aspects, demand for peace-keeping forces has changed, as may be seen from the former UN-SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s remarks in 1996 with regard to UNPROFOR, that ‘a mandate for peace- keeping by lightly equipped forces’ can hardly any longer meet its purpose. In the light of this development, and in continuation of Austria’s traditional commitment to international solidarity, it became imperative to achieve and improve ‘inter-operability’ of Austrian peace-keeping forces with other participants in such missions, mostly from NATO countries. In Austria’s view, Partnership for Peace must be seen as the most appropriate instrument to achieve this goal”. 15.Sweden “Sweden’s cooperation with NATO under the PfP programme does not change our chosen security policy of military non-alignment, and poses no real problem since we exclude the military security guarantees of Article Five in the Washington Treaty. The defence of our own territory is entirely a matter for ourselves and we do not extend military security guarantees to others. Yet we are able to give a substantial contribution to the ongoing development of a pan-European and Atlantic security system. Our participation in Bosnia-Hercegovina is a practical manifestation of our firm belief that European security is indivisible”. 16.Finland “....some of the benefits accruing (to Finland) from Partnership for Peace...From a political point of view, participation in...PfP is for Finland a means, firstly, to promote international security, stability and co-operation; secondly, to obtain information and ensure our own influence in decisions that concern us and, thirdly, to show that Finland does her share when it comes to crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic Region....PfP’s value is widely recognised in Finnish society. The policy of non-alignment has actually become more credible thanks to our participation in Partnership for Peace”. Presentation by Prof. Patrick Keatinge, Department of Political Science, TCD 17.Prof. Keatinge also addressed the Joint Committee on 1 July. Referring to the possibility of Ireland joining PfP, he said: “It has been suggested by some that neutrality is somehow at stake. In my opinion this view is misconceived. The values we in Ireland often associate with neutrality (political rather than military means, rights of small states, human rights in general) are also values associated with cooperative security. But the category of ‘neutral state’ has little direct relevance to the European security architecture. It does not inform European debates on the goals to be pursued or the means to be adopted. It has no meaning in the context of military crisis management in Bosnia, and is not usually taken to preclude a voluntaristic form of association with military alliances. Where cooperative security is concerned there is precious little to be neutral about, and nothing is achieved by abstention”. Presentation by Mr. Richard Kirby, Political Affairs Division, NATO 18.Mr. Kirby was invited to address the Joint Committee on 15 July 1998. In relation to PfP he stated, inter alia: “The Partnership for Peace is an open, inclusive and flexible programme directed at genuine security co-operation with all interested states for the benefit of all participating states....A principal focus is military co-operation in the fields of peace-keeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations and it may extend to other areas which are agreed..... Fundamentally, Partnership for Peace is based on co-operation between individual partner states and (NATO).. which is based on an agreed individual partnership programme between each partner and (NATO). Each of those programmes is tailored to reflect the individual interests and capabilities of the partner states concerned. This is the principle of self-differentiation which applies to all partners. Each can select from a broad menu of issues and applies to all partners. Each can select from a broad menu of issues and activities for co-operation, those which they wish to include and pursue through their own individual partnership programme. PfP partners also have the ability to influence the overall menu of activities and a principal objective of the enhancement of Partnership for Peace in the past year has been to increase the involvement of partners in decision making within the Partnership...Partnership for Peace provides an excellent unrivalled framework for peacekeeping training and exercises”. Strategy Statement of the Department of Foreign Affairs: Presentation to the Joint Committee by the Secretary General of the Department, Mr. Padraic MacKernan 19.The Secretary General appeared before the Joint Committee on 28 October. The question of PfP arose in the course of a general discussion. The Secretary General said: “When answering questions (on PfP), the Minister said he wished to stimulate a debate on Partnership for Peace and the desirability of Irish participation.. ..It has obvious advantages, not just in regard to making a contribution to the security architecture of Europe. For example, there are advantages for our Defence Forces and peacekeeping capacities. Increasingly the training, formation and inter-operability of such forces will be a factor in the selection of or requests for Irish participation in peacekeeping...Without prejudging decisions which must be made by the Government and the Oireachtas, I feel there is much to be said for participation in PfP...Partnership for Peace, stripped of the distorted overtones attached to it because it was originally sponsored by NATO and which has almost universal participation in Europe, should be actively and sympathetically considered by the Government”. Presentation by Mr. Roger Cole, Peace and Neutrality Alliance. 20.Mr. Cole addressed the Joint Committee on 17 February 1999 on PfP. He stated: “The PfP involves an agreement negotiated directly with NATO. It operates under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s supreme body chaired by by the NATO Secretary General. The PfP can go beyond peace-keeping and humanitarian missions and in 1997 was ‘enhanced’ to include peace enforcement/crisis management ‘much more robust, complex military-to-military cooperation’ (Senior NATO official, June 1997)...The Irish Government can choose which aspects of the PfP it wishes to adopt. However, it’s important to note the broadness of the PfP and to question for how long Ireland could confine its involvement. And as a PfP member, would Ireland not be associated with those PfP actions it did not take part in?...PfP can go beyond Europe and won’t necessarily have a UN mandate. NATO is putting the mechanisms in place to police the world.. Irish troops would participate in joint exercises with NATO forces, under the direction of NATO and possibly on Irish territory. And the line separating NATO military exercises from those of the PfP can be easily blurred” Taoiseach’s Statement in the Dail, 28 January 1999 21.Speaking in the Dail on 28 January 1999 on the question of Ireland’s joining PfP, the Taoiseach stated: “As a Government, we must consult not only our respective party political instincts but make a judgement on what best serves the national interest. I have in my time set out the case against joining, and I respect the position of those who remain opposed....I now believe on balance that the case for joining is stronger and I am not afraid to move on. We should in this respect, as in others, take our place among the nations and work with other like-minded countries, which broadly share our outlook and objectives. We are not ex-colonial powers interested in exerting power for its own sake but we want to work with others to promote a more humane, civilised and democratic world, and in broadening zones of peace, stability and reconciliation. We desperately need a framework for human development in impoverished countries...I would envisage, all going well, that Ireland will join Partnership for Peace on a mutually agreed basis in the second half of this year, and the Government will be working towards that timetable. Those of us who are attached to the maintenance of a meaningful Irish neutrality must be prepared to adapt it to new situations. Partnership for Peace will allow us to keep a credible, viable and constructive neutrality, which has always been the character of our foreign policy. It does not mean that our foreign policy will be uncritically aligned with NATO. We shall continue to work with our EU partners and with like-minded countries in all parts of the world to defuse conflict and create a greater sense of harmony and solidarity among countries with often different traditions and interests.” Conclusion22.The Joint Committee welcomes the Taoiseach’s expectation that Ireland will be in a position to join Partnership for Peace in the second half of 1999. It notes that the Minister for Foreign Affairs has expressed similar views. The Committee has made a significant contribution to the debate over the last number of months and notes that many of the arguments put forward at its meetings as to the desirability of Ireland joining the PfP have been taken on board by the Government. We hope that the timetable set out by the Taoiseach will be closely adhered to.
31st March 1999 AUSTRIAN EMBASSY The Development of the Austrian Security Policy since 1955 1. Neutrality and constitutional law aspects One of the main turning points for an independent Austrian security policy was the signing of the state treaty on May 15, 1955 which re-established a sovereign, independent and democratic Austria. After the signing of this treaty, Austrian Parliament passed on October 26, 1955, the federal constitutional law on the neutrality of Austria; its Article I states as follows: (1) For the purpose of the permanent maintenance of her external independence and for the purpose of the inviolability of her territory, Austria of her own free will declares herewith her permanent neutrality which she is resolved to maintain and defend with all the means at her disposal. (2) In order to secure these purposes Austria will never in the future accede to any military alliances nor permit the establishment of military bases of foreign States on her territory. As was promised by the Austrian Government before signing the aforementioned state treaty, the text of the federal constitutional law on the Austrian neutrality was notified on November 14, 1955, to all 65 states that had diplomatic relations with Austria at that time. These states were invited to recognise Austria’s new status, which some of them did explicitly others implicitly. Thus the permanent neutrality was declared de iure on Austria’s own free will. Politically, however, it was conditioned to Austria’s endeavour to regain full sovereignty and with the then international situation (in particular Austria’s status as an occupied country; this entailed the withholding of free decisions in all matters of international security and the narrowing of action in foreign policy matters). Austria’s permanent („everlasting“) neutrality amounts to a legal status and was not declared with regard to a specific situation. Neutrality applies instead to all future wars, which were, of course, not foreseeable at the time of declaration. „Permanent“ neutrality, however, does not mean that Austria’s status is „not changeable“. Already at peace time, a permanently neutral state is not allowed to enter obligations, which in wartime would prevent this state to apply the provisions of international law concerning neutrality. Therefore, it was necessary for Austria to develop in full sovereignty her own policy of neutrality with regard to matters not directly covered by international neutrality law, but which might indirectly influence her neutrality. Austria’s permanent neutrality does not include an obligation to „ideological neutrality“ (this was explicitly stated already by Federal Chancellor Julius Raab in his government declaration from October 26, 1955). Austria has always declared herself to be a member of the community of pluralistic-democratic states; and as a member of the UN, to accept international law as the basic element for peace. Therefore, Austria has always condemned any infringement of the political democratic principles, the charter of the UN and international law in general. As permanent neutral country Austria is also obliged to have a military defence force. In the Austrian state practice, the understanding of the obligations of a Permanently Neutral has clearly changed since it had first been developed during the 1950s (on the basis of a doctrine by J.L. Kunz and A. Verdross), but there is no doubt that Austria can decide on her own about the status of her security policy. While there was, initially, a rather extensive understanding of neutrality, this changed during the early 1990s, reducing it to what is now called „Kernbestand der Neutralität “ (core-principles of neutrality), i.e. nonparticipation in war, non accession to a military alliance, non-acceptance of foreign troops and bases on her territory. Considering •- that the structural stalemate within the UN Security Council appeared to have ended during the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, making the system of collective security operational again; and •- that the UN Security Council had authorised under chapter VII of the charter the use of military sanctions against Iraq; Austria’s legal opinion on these matters came to the conclusion that obligations under article 103 of the UN charter are on a higher level than the special obligations of a permanently neutral state. Therefore, Austria took the position that measures decided by the Security Council under chapter VII of the charter of the UN should be regarded as actions of the UN, and should not be regarded as a „war“ in terms of international law. These UN actions, therefore, cannot be seen to be in breach of the law of neutrality. In the light of this understanding, and within the context of the Iraq-Kuwait conflict and the respective SC resolutions, Austria gave for the first time permission to foreign armed forces to fly over and transit Austrian territory on their way to the conflict-zone. 2. Austria’s participation in UN-peace keeping Taking part in peace keeping operations within the UN is one of Austria’s priorities in this world organisation, ever since the Congo crisis in 1960. Currently, Austrian soldiers and executive officers take part in 11 peace keeping missions of the UN (i.a. in Cyprus, the Golan heights, Iraq, Kuwait, Western Sahara, Tajikistan, Georgia and Eastern Slavonia). In the statistics of UN member states supplying troops for peace keeping tasks, Austria is ranking in the top class. Besides peace keeping tasks which are conducted by the UN itself, Austria supported during the last years a number of other multinational operations authorised by the SC: in the case of the Gulf war she granted permissions for transporting, belt on land or in the air, through her territory; to Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as to Albania, Austria sent her own contingent. In addition, Austria is part of the „stand-by-arrangement-system“ (based on an initiative of the GS of the UN in the year 1994 in order to facilitate the planning for peace keeping operations and the registration of necessary resources) and was the fifth state to sign a memorandum of understanding with the SG of the UN for participation. In this context, Austria takes part - together with Denmark, Canada, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden and the Czech Republic - in the preparation of the establishment of a multinational brigade, the „UN Stand-by Forces High Readiness Brigade“ (SHIRBRIG). This brigade should be operational in a case of emergency within 30 days in order to carry out peace keeping tasks for up to 6 months (but not for operations under chapter VII of the UN charter). Austria will participate in this brigade - subject to a decision case-by-case - with a transport and infantry company (Jägerkompanie) of about 400 men. 3. Austria and OSCE Austria has always supported the deepening of the comprehensive security dialogue in the OSCE. Today it is one of her priorities to strengthen the capacity of the OSCE in the areas of early warning, conflict prevention, crisis management and the rebuilding of civil structures after conflicts. Therefore, Austria supported during the crisis in Albania in 1997 - for the first time in an international endeavour - the participation of the OSCE as a „coordinating framework“ for measures of other international institutions (in particular the EU, the deployment of police forces of the WEU and the involvement of the Council of Europe). Austria took prominently part in the successful initiative of the OSCE (which was accompanied by the multinational peace operation ALBA, headed by Italy) by having former Federal Chancellor Dr. Franz Vranitzky as personal representative of the chairman in office of the OSCE. Austria also takes part actively in peace building measures of the OSCE in Bosnia, Croatia, as well as in other member states (for instance by sending election monitors, or participating in long-term missions). Austria already declared in 1994 to take part in the then discussed, but until now not implemented peace keeping operation in Nagorniy Karabach (under the guidance of the OSCE). However, Austria in the meantime takes the position - like most of the other member states of the OSCE - that as a matter of principle, peace keeping operations should not be conducted by the OSCE, but rather by other organisations. Austria believes, however, that the OSCE could be the authorising organisation for peace-keeping operations, issuing a mandate to other entities as may seem appropriate. 4. Austria’s participation in CSFP Austria became a member of the European Union as per 1 January 1995 and has until now been in a position to actively, joint and unreservedly take part in the CSFP; in partivular, Austria is well committed to article J 4 of the Maastricht Treaty, which specifics the scope of CSFP, including „all questions related to the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might in time lead to a common defence. “Recognising the interrelationship between EU and Western Europea Union (WEU), as stipulated in the Maastricht-Treaty, in particular that the EU could request the WEU to elaborate and implement decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implication, Austria became an observer to WEU on 1 January 1995. However, it should be considered that section V of the Amsterdam treaty foresees a further development of the CSFP, which could have implications for the special Austrian legal status. In particular, the incorporation of the WEU’s so-called Petersberg-tasks into the EU treaty amounts to a further development of the legal situation, as it gives the Union the possibility - after an unanimous decision - to avail itself of the WEU in order to carry out „tasks of combat in crisis management, including peace-making measures“. For this reason the Austrian federal government sent a bill to parliament for amendment of Art, 23 f of the Federal constitution (concerning Austria’s participation in CSFP) together with the bill for ratification of the Amsterdam treaty. It should be mentioned, however, that Austria belongs to the EU-member states which have during the IGC repeatedly supported the inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the EU-treaty in order to strengthen the capacity of the EU in the field of crisis management. Austria would have been prepared to subordinate the WEU for the Petersberg tasks explicitly under the directives and instructions of the EU. However, it was finally agreed - in a less binding formula - to „avail itself of„ the WEU and to have the possibility of politically established guidelines agreed by the European Council. On the field and since March 1995, Austria takes part in the „European Community Monitoring Mission/ECMM“, which was established in the framework of the then European political co-operation. Scope of the ECMM is to help to find conflict solutions in the territory of the former Yugoslavia and Albania by means of reporting, mediation and supporting confidence building measures. 5. Austria as a member of the „Partnership for Peace“ (PfP) Experience of the last years shows that international crisis-management has changed its profile. Among other aspects, demand for peace-keeping forces has changed, as may be seen from former UN-SG Boutros Boutros-Ghali’s remarks in 1996 with regard to UNPROFOR, that „a mandate for peace-keeping by lightly equipped forces“ can hardly any longer meet its purpose. In the light of this development, and in continuation of Austria’s traditional commitment to international solidarity, it became imperative to achieve and improve „inter-operability“ of Austrian peace-keeping forces with other participants in such missions, mostly from NATO-countries. In Austria’s view, Partnership for Peace must be seen as the most appropriate instrument to achieve this goal. By signing the framework-document for participation in PfP, on 10 February, 1995, Austria stressed her political commitment to work together with other partners towards the scopes of the partnership for peace (PfP). From an Austrian perspective, these include in particular „the maintenance of the capability and readiness to contribute to operations under the authority of the UN and/or the responsibility of the OSCE, subject to constitutional considerations“; this scope includes as well „the development of co-operative military relations with NATO, for the purpose of joint planning, training, and exercises, in order to strengthen the ability of Partners to undertake missions in the fields of peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian operations and others as may subsequently be agreed“. This partnership mechanism envisages that every participant lays out in an introductory document the steps the participant „will take to accomplish the political aims of the partnership“. With regard to the current „Austrian presentation document“, approved by the Austrian federal government on May 23, 1995, the co-operation with NATO, its member-states and other (in particular central- and eastern-European) PfP-participants has its focus in particular in co-operating in peace keeping operations, humanitarian operations, disaster-relief as well as search and rescue. The actual selection of activities in which Austria would like to participate, or which Austria herself would like to include in the partnership programme, is agreed by an individual partnership programme (IPP). This is a political declaration (political undertaking), which has to be reassessed on a yearly basis. One of the main points of the Austrian IPP for the years 1997 to 1999 - altogether it includes approx. 200 individual projects - will be the standardisation of PfP armed forces and civil units as well as the participation in pertinent joint exercises. The aim of a higher inter-operability of the Austrian army with the armed forces of the NATO member states and other participants does also serve the participation of the PfP planning - and review process (PARP), in which Austria does take part since May 1996. In this context, Austria agreed with NATO on specific „inter-operability objectives“ which cover i. a. language teaching, cartography as well as the military profile in the priority co-operation fields (peace-keeping operations, humanitarian operations and disaster relief as well as search and rescue). Another very important topic of the Austrian PfP co-operation is the civil emergency planning. Of the overall PfP activity in this field, 30% comes from Austria. In this area we are dealing with a comprehensive exchange of experiences as well as joint exercises (for instance in the field of protection against radioactive contamination). A multilateral agreement on transboundary civil co-operation respectively civil transit is also envisaged; the pilot position of Austria in this field results on one hand from our geopolitical position, on the other hand from the fact that Austria is NATO’s most active partner in the field of civil emergency planning. As PfP partner Austria has been invited by NATO to take part in the multinational peace mission in Bosnia (IFOR/SFOR) which operates under the leadership of NATO. Experiences drawn by NATO and its PfP partners from these operations - which eventually exceeded the scope initially envisaged by PfP - encouraged NATO to further develop the PfP concept. Thus in the framework of an „enhanced PfP“ there is now a possibility for all partners to achieve inter-operability in the military field for the whole spectrum of peace supporting measures; this means also in the field of peace enforcing operations. NATO has accepted, however, that Austrian military co-operation will be concentrated for the time being on the fields explicitly mentioned in the Austrian presentation document (peace keeping, humanitarian operation and disaster relief as well as search and rescue). Politically and institutionally speaking, the further development of the Partnership for Peace will be marked by the creation of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Austria participates in this multilateral forum since its establishment in May 1997 and co-operates fully in the specific work of this particular consultation forum. In contrast to the North Atlantic Co-operation Council (NACC) - where Austria only had an observer status - Austria is a full member of the EAPC since its creation in Sintra/Portugal in May 1997. Of course, we actively support the work to be done within the Action Plan and the priority areas of co-operation and consultation with a focus on SFOR related issues and regional co-operation. Austria maintains diplomatic relations with NATO and accredited a Permanent Representative with the Alliance in November 1997. As in the case of Sweden and Finland, for the time being the Austrian Ambassador to Belgium is also accredited to NATO. Dublin, 30 June 1998 Austrian 1997 PfP Activities Review Introduction The following data represents the compilation of facts, figures and conclusions drawn out of the Austrian PfP-participation in 1997 and previous years. The data compiled does not include Austrian NACC and EAPC meetings participation. Main PfP headlines in 1997
Austrian Offer and Participation in PfP 1997 was Austria’s third year in PfP participation. Austria has contributed 54 activities as national input to the NATO-PfP/PWP 97-99. Austria herself participated in 227 activities each including one or several events. Thus all together Austria attended 283 events involving more than 700 people within the framework of the “NATO/Partnership for Peace” program. Two of the events (i.e. the two C/PASS-workshops) were planned and hosted at very short notice. From governmental side four ministries were involved - Federal Chancellery, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Defence. The 1997 Individual Partnership Program (IPP) envisaged a participation in 309 activities thus representing an increase rate of 49 % compared to 1996. A realisation quota in 1997 of some 74 % was reached representing an increase of 4 % compared to the 1996 IPP. The higher quota was achieved due to significant personnel reinforcements by two desk officers in MOD/Vienna between October 1996 and May 1997 thus reaching a permanent PfP management staff of seven personnel: four in International Affairs Division, one in Training Division A, one in Operations Division and one desk-officer for standardisation in the Military Strategic Planning and Doctrine Division. Furthermore it is obvious that the PfP-management skills of the personnel involved in PfP in divisions of the MoD is steadily growing. Double-hatted personnel remained by 17. During 1997 the PfP-activities participation as well as PWP-activities planning was formally regulated in the “PfP-ParticipationAct” given by the CHODS on July 30, 1997. Consequently the MoD co-ordinates 18 areas of co-operation while the MoI co-ordinates 3 areas of co-operation (CEP, CRM, ERT). Each area of co-operation is co-ordinated by a designated point of contact (POC). The POCs are integrated in an formal information exchange network (IPOC) and receive updated information on all PfP-activities by the PfP-permanent staff. The IPOC system serves as the main information multiplier on PfP-affairs within the MoD. In depth analysis showed that a higher realisation quota in 1997 was not manageable due to the following reasons: External Reasons: (all together 83 activities) ➢No receipt of invitations/information concerning various activities by the proposing bodies (57 activities) ➢Cancelled activities by the proposing bodies (14 activities) ➢Scheduled activities have been transformed by the proposing bodies into bilateral or regional activities (three activities) ➢Postponed activities from 1997 to 1998 (four activities) ➢Shortage of course slots (two activities) ➢Activities were finally not open for Austrian participation (three activities) National Reasons: (all together 20 activities) ➢Too little interest based upon information presented in the invitation (eight activities) ➢Illness of participants or short-term schedule collision (four activities) ➢Activities were picked out of the PWP into the IPP twice, because of different PWP reference numbers (two activities) ➢Austria was not able to send participants to activities because of personnel shortage (three activities) ➢Scheduled activities have been postponed from 1997 to 1998 (two activities) ➢Activity has been cancelled because of shortage of participants (one activity) This analysis proved that more than 80% of the non-realised activities were due to management problems out of Austrian responsibility. Especially the non-receipt of invitations with more than 50% of all missed activities shows significant shortages in PfP-management capacities. The envisaged increase of staff personnel (i.e. the PSE) will help therein. But further analysis proved also that the majority of non-realised activities were located in the field of civilian activities. This proves that a similar additional partner staffing for the civilian side would be helpful. For the first time Austria participated in all of the 21 areas of co-operation. Main focus was given to: ➢Training and Doctrine (TRD) (47 activities), ➢Standardisation (STD) (34 activities), ➢Training and Exercise Activities (TEX) (27 activities), ➢Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) (21 activities), ➢Defence Policy and Strategy (DPS) as well as ➢Peace-Keeping (PKG) (14 activities each). Exercises Exercises remain the top priority of PfP and attract the most political supervision. Austria participated in exercise events as follows: ➢3 exercises with one observer each ➢7 exercises with a total of 19 staff officers in multinational units and ➢3 field exercises with units involving a total of 87 participants. In addition Austria took part in three “in the spirit of PfP-exercises” with a total of 128 personnel.
NATO/FAPC RESTRICTED PARP PARTICIPANTS ONLY ANNEX II to EAPC (PARP - C) D (97) 1 SUMMARIES OF PARTNERS’ PARP ASSESSMENTS Austria 1.Austria attaches considerable importance to the PfP concept which it seas as contributing to Euro-Atlantic security without creating new barriers. The role of PfP in the development of a comprehensive European security system as well as enhancing stability and security of Austria’s neighbours is, by consequence, important for Austrian security. The main thrust of activities in PfP cooperation are at present directed to standardization and civil emergency planning. In addition to these PfP activities Austria conducts an intensive bilateral cooperation programme with 18 Partner and NATO countries which totals more than 600 activities per year. 2.For the 1997 to 1999 cycle Austria is making available a number of specialized units: one mountain mobile infantry battalion, one mountain mobile independent infantry company, one APC-equipped infantry battalion, one APC-equipped independent company and one transport unit are available for peacekeeping missions. One air unit consisting of two aircraft and four helicopters is available for search and rescue operations. For humanitarian operations a field hospital, an engineer unit and a disaster relief unit are available: the air unit mentioned above could also be made available for search and rescue. In addition to the above, a number of smaller elements which provide either support or special functions for larger units could be made available as independent units. 3.Peacetime military strength is approximately 40,000. In addition there are some 8,700 civilian personnel, many of when also serve in the militia. 15,000 of the armed forces are designated as “rapidly available forces”. Of these, 10,000 are standing forces and 5,000 are on-call reserves. Defence expenditures for 1996 were ATS 21.6 billion (USS 2.1 billion) (0.86% of GDP), and are forecast to be ATS 21.8 billion (0.88 of GDP) in 1997 and ATS 24.6 billion in 1999. 31% of the defence budget was devoted to capital expenditure in 1996. This is forecast to rise to 33% over the planning period. Costs for PfP activities are met from within the defence budget. In 1996, expenditures for multinational operations was ATS 673 million (USS 64 million) of which ATS 130 million (USS 12 million) was reimbursed by the UN. NATO/EAPC RESTRICTED PARP PARTICIPANTS ONLY SECURITY ARCHITECTURE IN THE GREATER EUROPEAN CONTEXT: A SWISS VIEW (Comments by the Swiss Ambassador to Ireland offered at the JCFA meeting of July 1st, 1998, Kildare House, Dublin 2) Chairman O’Malley, committee members, Ladies and Gentlemen, let me begin by telling you that I feel greatly honored to be invited before you today and it is with pleasure that I shall share with you, within the limits of the time available, some thoughts on the subject of what has become to be called, in today’s parlance, European Security Architecture. If I may say so, the subject has occupied us Swiss for centuries, since my country sits right in the middle of a continent which has been shaken by violent conflicts ever since the dawn of History. That we have managed to escape most of those conflicts, particularly since the Westphalian Peace Agreement of 1648, may to some degree also stem from the fact that we have learnt, over time, to make proper assessments of our own security interests and requirements; assessments of which our policy of permanent neutrality has become the cornerstone and best-known feature internationally. So, how do we Swiss see today’s security situation in Europe after the profound changes which took place during the last ten years? Speaking in classical terms: we’ve never had it so secure, with the end of east-west-confrontation, the collapse of the offensive potential of the Warsaw Pact and the emergence of an increasingly efficient, if by far not perfect, system of multilateral crisis management both on diplomatic and military levels. We are also witnessing the disappearance of the ideological schism which has plagued the continent for the best part of this century and which has prevented the regional powers from working together in good faith in their search for security in Europe; however, as the stabilizing effect ot the Cold War is gone, there is clearly a risk of smaller, not ideologically motivated conflicts with potentially very serious consequences. With specific regard to my own country, and for centuries, the conflicts where our Neutrality came into play happened, or threatened to happen, literally at our very doorstep, which explains why Neutrality was for so long the centrepiece, some critics say: the only piece, of our Foreign Policy and that in the mind of many Swiss, it actually became elevated from a means to an end. Today, we note that the probability of having to be neutral in a European conflict has become remote, in political as well as in geographical terms. As a consequence, our Foreign Policy no longer needs to focus to the same extent on Neutrality, and we should be grateful for such a development. At the same time, we make a more conscious distinction between, on the one hand, Neutrality as such, a set of rules applicable in conflict situations only, and, on the other hand, a permanent Policy of Neutrality whose purpose is to convince the international Community of our determination to remain reliably neutral should a conflict occur. Such a policy, while always bearing in mind the eventuality of adopting a neutral stance, offers considerable space for actions which not only are compatible with a strictly interpreted Neutrality, but can actually reduce the risk of this classic “Neutrality scenario” ever to become reality. As the XX century draws to and end, the threats to most European countries today are non-military, but nonetheless very serious; they do not recognize borders or Neutrality and no European country can eliminate them on its own, even with classical military means: I’m thinking of terrorism, civil wars, drugs, mass migrations, environmental disasters, misuse of means of mass destruction, to name a few. In our fight against these problems, we feel increasingly enmeshed in a continental community of destiny, clearly not neutral, but a party with own legitimate interests to defend alongside likeminded neighbours. As the networks to defend such interests are expanding geographically, they are also getting tighter and more interwoven with each-other. NATO, Partnership for Peace, the EU with its “Common Foreign and Security Policy” as well as with the WEU, an OSCE which specializes in preventive diplomacy and promotion of Democracy, the COUNCIL OF EUROPE as a promotor of human and civic rights; furthermore, there is UNO which not only supports a presence of about 10’000 personnel in the OSCE-area but also provides legitimacy for coercion measures in the interests of Peace and Democracy. With the exception of Partnership for Peace, PfP, these security elements are not new. What is new, however, is the increasing convergence not only in their aims, but also in their pragmatic co-operation. It is no coincidence, for example, that the PfP framework document, before stating the practical aims of the Partnership, re-affirms general principles of democracy and human rights previously adopted by the UNO and the OSCE. PfP’s practical aims, as you know, put the emphasis on transparency and civilian control over armed forces as well as on the use of military forces for purposes not so much military or unilateral in the traditional sense, but essentially political and humanitarian, always on the basis of large consensus. In our view, its widespread membership, including all previous Warsaw-Pact members as well as Russia and Ukraine through special arrangements, would make it very difficult indeed for anybody to claim that PfP is incompatible with Neutrality. Then, there is the fact that it offers a large menu of activities where each participant can choose according to his own needs and interests; thus, not new international obligations are created except those which a country explicitely seeks, and even those are limited to three years. There is also the fact that PfP remains clearly separated from NATO and participation does not imply any security guarantees by that organization. After a thorough study of all aspects of PfP, the Swiss Authorities in line with the main political parties concluded that it corresponded very well to both our political and our security priorities. Switzerland intends to remain neutral and does not view PfP as a waiting room for NATO, as some people have said, but rather as an independent and durable option. The creation, in May 1997, of the so-called “Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council”, which opened avenues for enhanced co-operation for those interested, has not altered our position in this respect. Our co-operation with PfP is being developped gradually and with due respect for our public opinion. When choosing the areas in which to cooperate, we privilege the fields where we feel we can contribute something for the common good based on our previous experience (for details see annex). In our first three-years program, and under a system of rolling planification, we are initially offering our partners 18 different activities for participation, whereas we ourselves are participating in 47 activities offered by partners. The total cost of all these activities for Switzerland, including the creation of the necessary infrastructure, was about 1,3 million Punt. The experiences made in this first year of PfP have indeed been very encourageing. Without creating a direct link with NATO itself, we have been able to establish a pragmatic co-operation in certain areas of our own exclusive choice. We were able to introduce our own ideas about security policy. The principle of choosing “a la carte” has proved to be workable and compatible with our neutrality. Our contribution seems to have been appreciated abroad and keeps being solidly supported by our own public opinion and most political parties. The cost incurred is very modest if compared with the gain in military proficiency, useful exchanges of ideas, promotion of mutual confidence and insight in our partners’ way of approaching common problems. On the basis of these positive experiences, Switzerland intends to offer for the second Individual Partnership Program 34 activities and to participate in some 200 activities abroad. Maybe I should stop here, Chairman, and keep myself available for comments or questions from yourself or committee members. Thank you very much for your attention. First Swiss IPP (1997/99): Main areas of activities offered (total: 18) and attended (total: 47) in 1997 -Civilian and military search and rescue (5 /11) -Democratic control of Armed Forces (3 / 5) -Training in security policy (4/7) -Arms control and disarmament (1 / 7) -Medical services (2/2) -Humanitarian international law (1/0) -Crisis management, security and stability in Europe (1/15) -Military Observer courses (SUNMOC) (1/0) Total number of participants: 196 Swiss, 488 Foreigners (Plus 122 Swiss scientists participating in non-military NATO research programs) Total cost for Switzerland in 1997: ca. 2,8 mio SFr.
Statement to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, July 1, 1998 1. I am honoured to have been asked by the Joint Committee to present the view of Sweden on the the security architecture in the greater European context, with a particular emphasis on the reason for and benefits accruing from membership of the Partnership for Peace. Let me first, by way of introduction, briefly state a few basic principles of our own security and foreign policy. •Sweden pursues a policy of non-participation in military alliances. This policy is not an end in itself. It is a means of safeguarding our freedom and our independence. It is combined with active participation in strengthening security in our surrounding world. The end of the cold war has not changed this fundamental policy choice, but it has dramatically increased our freedom to act constructively in building a more secure Europe. •Our membership in the United Nations and commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations remains a cornerstone in our foreign policy. Through the Unted Nations we participate in developing the norms of international law which ultimately insures our security. •We strongly support the notion of conflict resolution by peaceful means and by dialogue and mediation. Respect for human rights and democracy are essential elements. We believe that disarmament, and in particular nuclear disarmament, must continue to be pursued vigorously. •We want to contribute to the building of a comprehensive, pan-European security order, in which the European countries, both alliance members and countries that do not participate in military alliances, cooperate to deal effectively with new, post-cold war challenges to our security. For us, the EU is the basis for these endeavours, but the OSCE conflict prevention and crisis management also plays an important part. •The all-European security order must have a trans-atlantic dimension. Therefore, other important elements in the emerging pan-European security order is the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the enhanced Partnership for Peace and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. 2. Our policy of non-participation in military alliances excludes participation in any activity related to the defence of our territory and military security guarantees. We retain a strong military defence to safeguard our own territory. Strictly adhering to a military non-alignment does not, however, in any other way restrict Sweden from fully participating in the emerging, multi-faceted Euro-Atlantic security cooperation. Swedish security policy in the new situation is characterised by a full and active participation in the work towards the goals that today are shared by all European states. Accordingly, it is important that we preserve our freedom of action to develop our participation in the Euro-Atlantic security cooperation as it emerges. 3. As you know, the purpose of Partnership for Peace is to increase the participating countries’ capability and readiness to take part in international peace support operations, to improve search and rescue operations, to improve efficiency of civil defence and emergency planning and to strengthen democratic control of armed forces. Sweden participates in PfP on the basis of its policy of military non-alignment. We decide ourself upon the level and scope of our involvement. 4. The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), formed at the Sintra summit last year, gives the practical PfP cooperation a political dimension in order to further develop the PfP and to consult on a broad agenda, from peace-support operations to civil emergency matters. In addition, EAPC will allow the PfP countries a greater say in peace-support operations to which they contribute troops. The totality of the change in NATO, the enhanced PfP, the EAPC and the founding act between NATO and Russia, are positive and important steps towards a Euro-Atlantic security order. The experiences from Bosnia-Hercegovina proves that NATO and partner countries are able to work together for European security. The practical cooperation within the PfP framework serves the important objective of avoiding new dividing lines in Europe. If a state wants to share the responsibility for European security, it has to prepare itself for these tasks The enhanced Partnership for Peace program is an essential tool in this respect. It contributes to a practical development of peace-support issues, and is in itself a confidence - and security building measure. 5. In this context I should add that Sweden also makes important contributions to the regional cooperation in the Baltic Sea area within the framework of the Baltic Sea cooperation and the enhanced Partnership for Peace program. To us, the PfP cooperation has a very important confidence and security building dimension, not least in the Baltic Sea region. That is why it is a primary objective for Sweden to involve the three Baltic countries and Russia as much as possible, as well as the United States and other European countries. Our bilateral cooperation with the Baltic countries is also extensive. One of our objectives is to help build normal security functions for democratic states in today’s Europe. A key security policy issue in our immediate vicinity now is the earliest possible EU membership, according to agreed and objective criteria, for the Baltic states. Here, Sweden, as an EU member, has possibility to influence decisions. We shall in every way contribute to extend EU cooperation with these states, until they are welcomed as members. The “security dividend” of EU membership should not be overlooked. 6. Our cooperation in the PfP-programme is very much in line with our work within the European Union. During the Inter-Governmental Conference Sweden and Finland proposed a strengthening of the conflict management capacity of the European Union. Through this joint Swedish-Finnish initative the ‘Petersberg tasks’, i.e. humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and tasks on combat forces in crisis management will become part of EU’s treaty responsibilities under the Treaty of Amsterdam. The WEU will be the instrument for their execution. 7. Our cooperation with NATO involves several different areas. Firstly, our participation in various PfP-activities has increased both quantitatively, as well as qualitatively since its inception in 1994. This voluntary, bilateral and self-differentiating cooperation, the Individual Partnership Program, IPP, is updated regularly in direct dialogue with NATO. At the Sintra summit in 1997, Sweden also endorsed the enhanced PfP which involves all types of activities apart from those related to article five of the Washington treaty, i.e. the mutual defense commitment. Last year, Sweden participated in 15 different PfP field exercises, and hosted three of them. Most of these exercises had a wide participation, some of them including Russia. In addition, a number of exercises were held “in the spirit of PfP” on a bilateral and multilateral basis. This year, for the first time, a Russian military unit participated in the PfP peace-support exercise “Cooperative Jaguar” in the Baltic Sea. We foresee that the PfP exercises will develop further, both in scope and complexity. In addition, we have established a regional PfP training centre in Sweden. One important role for the centre is to enhance the capacity of the Baltic States to participate in PfP exercises. The centre is also tasked to provide many different types of courses with broad participation from many PfP countries. Officers from the three Baltic states as well as Russia will participate in several different courses related to peace-support issues. Secondly, participation in NATO-led peace support operations requires a higher degree of interoperability than previously. It is a question of effectiveness, unity of effort and not least the security for soldiers. The experiences from Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as from PfP exercises in recent years, underlines the importance of improving cooperation with military units from other countries. Another factor to take into account are the substantial changes in the operational environment of today’s peace-support operations. In order to address this, Sweden recently decided to adopt 35 different goals of interoperability within the PfP Planning and Review Process (PARP). To be specific, these interoperability goals are agreed upon and updated regularly in bilateral dialogue between NATO and the PfP country in question. For our part, the main points of interest in this cycle regards training, command and control issues, medical resources and logistics. Thirdly, to handle the increased contacts and exchange of information, we have done two things. We have sent Swedish officers on secondment to different NATO staffs on various levels. Some of these officers serve as liaison officers to NATO to handle issues mainly related to the SFOR operation. Four other officers currently serve as international officers in so-called Partnership Staff Elements within NATO staffs. Their main task is to handle the often complicated technical matters in the field of interoperability, planning and development related to PfP activities. On the diplomatic side we have substantially increased our contacts. Since September last year, our ambassador to Belgium is also accredited to NATO and the WEU. A part of the embassy has been seconded as a delegation to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, to work exclusively with NATO and EAPC-related issues. Fourthly, one of the main objectives of Swedish policy in this field is the development of a Political-military Framework for NATO-led peace support operations. We have put a considerable political effort into this work. If we are expected to put our soldiers in harms way we also have to take part in the planning and conduct of these operations. In general terms, countries that are members of Partnership for Peace should be able to consult with NATO in the planning and conduct of operations in which they participate with troops. Partner countries should be allowed an opportunity for decision-shaping, especially if you take into account that NATO-led peace support operations without PfP countries is unlikely today. I wish to underline that a UN or OSCE mandate is necessary in case of a peace-support operations to which we will contribute troops. In order to develop the concept of a Political-military framework, we recently hosted a workshop with broad participation from NATO headquarters, national delegations to NATO, as well as most of the Partnership for Peace member states. We believe that there is fair amount of understanding for our position. The workshop generated substantial input to the ongoing process. It is our belief that the Political-military framework for Peace-support operations will be endorsed at the Washington summit in 1999. I would like to point out that this work has a very practical-operational side to it. Our wish to develop this concept stems from our experiences from the IFOR and SFOR operations. Sweden, as you no doubt are aware, continues to contribute to the ongoing SFOR operation with one mechanised battalion, together with our Nordic neighbours and Poland in a joint brigade, in the American division Finally, I would like to emphasise the contribution this wider Euro-Atlantic cooperation gives to security in Europe in general, and to the states around the Baltic Sea in particular. Confidence- and security-building measures of different kinds are indeed a positive contribution, but the practical work in the enhanced PfP, the Planning and Review Process, the Partnership Staff Elements and the efforts toward a Political-military Framework for peace-support operations are all powerful contributions to create a greater understanding and helps us all deal with the different crises and challenges that we may face in the future. To sum up, Sweden’s cooperation with NATO under the PfP program does not change our chosen security policy of military non-alignment, and poses no real problem since we exclude the military security guarantees of article five in the Washington treaty. The defence of our own territory is entirely a matter for ourselves, and we do not extend military security guarantees to others. Yet we are able to give a substantial contribution to the ongoing development of a pan-European and Atlantic security system. Our participation in Bosnia-Hercegovina is a practical manifestation of our firm belief that European security is indivisible. Address given by H.E. Timo Jalkanen, Ambassador of Finland Finnish Security Policy In her security policy since the end of the Cold War Finland has pursued a policy of military non-alliance based on a credible national defence capability. However, it is appropriate to point out that an inseparable element of this policy is that Finland reserves the right to consider all security options, including joining a military alliance. From the perspective of Finland, the European Union, NATO and Russia are the most central actors in the security development in Europe. They are all in a state of transformation and affect security and stability in Finland’s environs in Northern Europe. Membership of the European Union has clarified to and strengthened Finland’s international position. Although membership does not entail security guarantees, it does entail mutual solidarity. Finland supports strengthening of EU’s foreign and security policy and participates constructively in the development of the Union’s security and defence dimension. Part and parcel of Finnish security policy is the opportunity to make independent choices and safeguard the country’s own interests. It is Finland’s aim to ensure that she is equipped with the best possible means of safeguarding her security in all circumstances. Security problems in Europe require solutions, which are based on the principles of the United Nations and the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Co-ordination with EU partners has proved its great value. In this connection I would like to express Finland’s appreciation for the good cooperation we have had with Ireland when preparing to join the European Union. In the field of security policy I would like to add that Ireland’s example as a non-allied EU country was particularly valuable for us when Finland was arranging her relations with WEU. Finland supports political and economic reform in Russia as well as efforts to commit that country more firmly to co-operative security. Increasing Russian participation in European and Transatlantic cooperation is vital. If a different course were chosen by Russia, many achievements would be put to test. For Finland as a neighbouring country, management of security problems associated with Russia and enhancement of military stability in Northern Europe are particularly important questions. In this context I would like to mention the Northern Dimension initiative of the EU which seeks to address questions of integration and regional cooperation with the means available to the European Union. Due to the special historical relationship between Finland and Sweden and the similarity of their interests co-operation between these countries is growing closer also in the area of security policy. Both countries are members of the EU, observers of the Western European Union (WEU) and active non-allied participators in the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). Finland is carefully following the effects of NATO enlargement in the Baltic Sea region. Strenghtening of the sovereignty of the three Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania is essential for the stability and security of the region. Transparency and respect for the principles of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in the relationship between NATO and Russia will guarantee that the security interests of all countries, large and small, are duly taken into consideration. The Transatlantic link remains at the core of European security. Loosening it would mean less predictability in the European security landscape and consequently more room for various conflict scenarios to gather strength. The United States and Russia will continue to dialogue in any case. It is important that European countries are involved as much as possible. Security structures in Europe are developing in a way which may cause some overlap and produce a blurred picture. From Finland’s point of view it is only natural that the excessive clarity of the bipolar Europe is followed by a period when institutions interlock, cooperage and sometimes compete. But they all reinforce each other operating on the basis of shared values and objectives. Finland’s contribution to NATO co-operation As regards military security, the network of cooperation being built around NATO - and based on UN and OSCE principles - would be difficult to replace with anything else. Therefore, it is our interest to strengthen participation in this cooperation and to contribute to the improved functioning of the network as a whole. It is Finland’s view that partners share the security dividends of NATO cooperation also without the need to strive for membership. International military co-operation is a growing part of Finnish security policy. Participation in international crisis management operations strengthens Finland’s military interoperability and enhances her defence preparedness. Within the European Union, Finland emphasises that crisis management is part of the Union’s common foreign and security policy. Finland has filed her UN standby forces with the Forces Answerable to WEU list and the PtP programme. Both have also been notified of the availability of Finnish units for international rescue operations. Finland sees NATO as a central factor in shaping security in Europe. We joined the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) as an observer in 1992, Partnership for Peace (PfP) in 1994, the Planning and Review Process (PARP) in 1995 and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) at its inception in 1997. Finland’s mission to NATO was opened a bit more than half a year ago, and the first Finnish officers have started their work at the Partner Staff Elements in NATO commands this year, at the beginning of June. The EAPC has the potential to develop into a forum where member countries can voice their concerns, present their ideas and seek solutions together. Its agenda and working methods are still being developed. Finland is one of the most active countries in this work. Some practical questions related to the Baltic Sea are among those we would like to be discussed in the EAPC, as was proposed by Finland - together with Sweden - last April. NATO’s record in crisis management during the past few years has been impressive. IFOR and SFOR have added a whole new dimension also for our co-operation with NATO. Finland’s capabilities in peacekeeping continue to be used in Bosnia. At the same time, partner participation in SFOR brings useful experiences for the development of the NATO led crisis management operations in the future. Benefits accruing from the Partnership for Peace To list some of the benefits accruing from the Partnership for Peace I would like to mention the following points: - from a political point of view, participation in the EAPC and the PfP is for Finland a means. firstly, to promote international security, stability and co-operation, secondly, to obtain information and ensure our own influence in decisions that concern us, and thirdly, to show that Finland does her share when it comes to crisis management in the Euro-Atlantic Region. - in participating PfP’s Planning and Review Process (PARP) we have been able to develop our interoperability of forces in crisis-management activity which is essential in participating a NATO led mission - by sending officers to the Partnership Staff Elements Finland has an opportuninty to participate in joint planning of operations within NATO Headquarters and our staff officers will be able to familiarise themselves with NATO planning procedures. I would like to end this brief presentation by emphasising that in just a few years Finland’s co-operation with NATO has become everyday activity. In addition to the Foreign Ministry and the Defence Ministry many other sectors are involved. The Finnish Parliament has currently a status of an Associate Delegation of the North Atlantic Assembly (NAA). PfP’s value is widely recognised in the Finnish society. The policy of non-alignment has actually become more credible thanks to our participation in the Partnership for Peace. Presentation to the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, 1 July 1998 Security architecture in the greater European context Patrick Keatinge Department of Political Science, Trinity College Dublin Introduction The metaphor of “security architecture” has been widely used since the end of the Cold War to describe the attempt to build a new European order on the basis of cooperation rather than confrontation. I am commenting on this process as an academic observer rather than as a spokeperson for any official agency or unofficial group, with a view to offering a general appraisal of some of the questions which the Joint Committee is considering. The structure of the presentation is as follows: * a broad assessment of the current situation; * a more detailed comment on three institutional elements in the security architecture- (i) the OSCE, (ii) NATO and (iii) the more familiar context for this country’s foreign and security policy, the EU; * some general conclusions. The security environment in Europe There are several positive features in the current condition of European security. First, instead of focusing on the prospect of nuclear Armageddon in a partitioned Europe, we are attempting to construct an inclusive cooperative security regime. This is based on the presumption of peaceful resolution of conflicts, by states which for the most part subscribe to the values of liberal democracy. Second, the concept of “security” - i.e. the definition of the issues and policy instruments to deal with them - has broadened. We seem more ready to move away from a mind-set which automatically emphasises confrontation, coercion and military means to one which is open to the development of common interests, rules and the instruments of “civilian power”. Third, multilateral diplomatic structures and procedures are being developed to provide an institutional and operational base for this approach of cooperative security. Highlighted by the Paris Charter of 1990, a complex network of “mutually reinforcing institutions” allows all European states, large and small, access to this process. This regional security approach is a fully endorsed sub-set of the UN system of world security. Unfortunately, an objective assessment of the security environment cannot stop there. A basic principle of this security order, that “security is indivisible” in “Europe”, does not always seem to apply. Too often there appear to be three “Europes”, not one. The long established “security community” or “zone of peace” in western Europe is at one end of the spectrum; at the other end, most former republics of the Soviet Union, most Balkan countries and non-EU states in the Mediterranean region are prone to serious political violence in the context of weak state authority. In between, the countries of central and eastern Europe aspire to the western model, but how long can they keep it up? Outside “Europe” (however defined) there are familiar challenges to international security, not least in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Given this differentiation of risks, it is all to easy for those, like ourselves, in the more secure part of Europe to assume that securing the rest of Europe is someone else’s business. Yet - sooner rather than later - the negative connections between different geographical areas and different types of risk can threaten us all. We are also frequently reminded that international security institutions are only as effective as their member states allow them to be. In particular, nothing serious happens without a consensus of the larger states. Even the major members of the EU are not always at one. The engagement of the USA and Russia cannot be taken for granted. Successive American administrations have to rediscover their European vocation in the context of global demands and internal indifference. Russia can be the source of revanchist rhetoric and constructive engagement almost in the same breath. In these circumstances, it is not surprising if the search for cooperative security through multilateral institutions often bears the familiar, if muted, mark of competitive power politics. In order to keep this competition muted, and to exploit its constructive potential, it is all the more important that all states exercise their right to participate in multilateral institutions as fully as they can. Finally, we also see that attempts to incorporate the rest of Europe into the western-style security framework (via the enlargement processes in the EU and NATO) are problematic. In the short to medium term it often seems divisive (a regrouping of “ins” and “outs”), and imposes strains for all concerned, including the original membership of these institutions. Yet no serious alternative has emerged. Overall, then, after nearly a decade of the new European order we might conclude that the glass is half full rather than half empty. But nothing is assured, in what can only be termed a tentative form of cooperative security. The security architecture requires constant attention, and the adaptation of its principal institutions is best regarded as a work in progress. The Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) The most distinctive characteristics of the OSCE are, first, its inclusive membership (54 participating states, covering all three “Europeas” and the major external influence the US): second, its comprehensive scope (security, economic cooperation and humanitarian issues): and, third, its dependence on consensual procedures rather than tight legal obligation. These characteristics contribute to one of the principal functions of the OSCE - to provide a forum for agreement on underlying principles and on the rules of the game. The OSCE is thus a prime source of legitimacy for cooperative security. In this regard, its role is enhanced by its connection with the universal source of legitimacy, the United Nations Organisation, where it is has the status of a regional security organisation as explicitly envisaged under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter. More specifically, there are three fields in which the OSCE contributes to cooperative security. First, it promotes democratisation in the broadest sense of that term, especially through the promotion of respect for national minorities and standards of electoral conduct. Second, it has an important role in the promotion of military transparency, for example through its oversight of important arms control agreements, such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Third, the OSCE has a low-profile role in crisis management, through the development of procedures and instruments for early warning of crises and preventive diplomacy through ad hoc missions. However, in the latter context we see the limits of the OSCE as an action-oriented institution. In particular, it has no military or police capability in crises where an enforcement or peacekeeping mission is deemed necessary. In this respect the OSCE relies, both in principle and practice, on other institutions (UN for authorisation, NATO and WEU for implementation) or on adhoc arrangements as seen in Albania in 1997. Here we see the realisation of the concept of “mutually reinforcing institutions”, a central feature of the current security architecture. It is sometimes asked why the OSCE is not as it were the crowning dome in the edifice. The answer largely lies in its very inclusiveness. Its extensive geographical scope contains a political diversity at odds with a clearcut regional identity; in these circumstances its reliance on consensus seems to most governments a recipe for immobility, particularly in response to the acute but often localised conflicts we now see in the OSCE area. One way round that difficulty would be to develop the OSCE along the lines of the UN, with a mini-security council in which the larger countries would have a privileged role through the power of veto. This would bring the OSCE closer to being the over arching instrument of European security but few OSCE governments see this as a viable solution. Larger states are wary of the implications of a formal veto at the European level and smaller states see it as marginalising their influence. Overall, then, the development of the OSCE is likely to be gradual rather than dramatic. This does not detract from its utility or potential, and there is a case for giving it more political recognition and material resources than it currently enjoys. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) The institutional framework of the European security architecture has taken the form of adaptation of institutions created during the Cold War. This was true but unremarkable with respect to the OSCE, but perhaps more surprising in the case of NATO, a military alliance whose original purpose seemed to have disappeared with the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, in the face of political violence in several parts of the OSCE area the need for military cooperation persists, and NATO persists as the focus of this need. NATO’s original goal remains as a formal hedge against future threat but the corresponding military posture of collective territorial defence (via deterrence) no longer holds pride of place on the alliance agenda. By far the greater part of NATO’s political and military activities take the form of crisis management, the most visible manifestation being in Bosnia. Here NATO is responsible for a UN-authorised military presence (SFOR), some 35,000 strong, in the context of a division of labour with other institutions (UN, OSCE, EU-WEU) and involving contributions by non-NATO members, including Ireland. Bosnia is one of the most striking examples of “mutually reinforcing institutions” in practice. It has been fully supported by the UN Secretary General as an example of regional peacekeeping. But there is nothing automatic about the involvement of NATO in specific crises. The legally based guarantee of collective action in the context of general war involving a NATO member does not apply; thus we may expect differences within an alliance based on decision-making by consensus. There are bound to be difficult debates about the political direction to be adopted and the consequent definition of the military mission. Domestic publics vary in their demands to “do something”, but in the understandable context of the least possible risk for their personnel. NATO is also changing in other ways. The least visible (for a non-member in which contemplation of military alliance is still not quite politically correct) is in its internal structures. Two changes are at stake - the reconstruction and multinational rationalisation of members’ forces, and the political balance between American and European influence within the alliance. The former is a response to the considerable de-militarisation of NATO countries over the last ten years; the latter is a reminder that decision-making in NATO is based on a consensus which cannot be taken for granted. The most contentious adaptation of NATO is its enlargement. The case for extending membership to countries in central and eastern Europe rests mainly on their wish to consolidate their independence of Russian influence, the stabilisation of their relations with their neighbours and support for their democratic transition. The case against rests mainly on the argument that, seen as a threat by Russia, it may lead to a counterproductive spiral of insecurity. Faced with this dilemma, NATO governments have attempted to square the circle. A partial enlargement (Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary) has been balanced by forms of inclusion and association with any non-NATO member in the OSCE area. These include the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (now defunct), Partnership for Peace, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and - especially important in the light of Russian anxieties - the privileged relationship of politico-military consultation which Russia has with NATO under the Founding Act of 1997. So far as Ireland’s security policy is concerned, the most relevant of these forms of association with non-NATO countries are the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). The PfP was launched in 1994 and has become the most inclusive arrangement for military cooperation in the new European security architecture, being open to all OSCE states whether they want eventually to join NATO or not. Its scope is limited to those purposes agreed between the individual partner and NATO; in practice the main emphasis has been on devising military doctrine and procedures relating to cooperation in crisis management, and conducting joint training and exercises in peacekeeping. Since July 1997 these bilateral NATO-Partner relationships have been complemented on the multilateral level by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC). At its most recent meeting at the end of May, for example, its 44 members discussed Bosnia and the extension of SFOR, the crisis in Kosovo and nuclear proliferation. The PfP-EAPC network has thus developed over the last four years as an expression of political inclusiveness, and in so far as it gives the lie to fears of drawing new lines of division it serves as a confidence-building measure. On the operational level, it may well prove to be the benchmark of best international practice in the regional approach to military crisis management, including peacekeeping. The continuing adaptation of NATO, then, reflects the view of most European governments that there is a significant need for effective military cooperation, and that American involvement remains essential. And for many of these governments, particularly the smaller ones, it is preferable to have American involvement in a relatively open multilateral context rather than in the form of bilateral deals between the larger states. The European Union (EU) and the Western European Union (WEU) Formally, Ireland participates in the OSCE as an individual member state, and is likewise free to decide what relationship it has with NATO. In practice, however, the institutional framework in which our voice on European security is most often heard - and sometimes amplified - is the European Union, and also in the WEU (in a more reserved way, as an observer). We thus have the privilege - and the corresponding responsibilities - of being present in one of the core agencies in the security regime. This is familiar ground, but it is important briefly to recall the main ways the EU and the WEU fit into the security architecture. First, EU enlargement has an important security dimension. The widespread aspiration for membership has already given some leverage to those arguing for higher standards of behaviour, for example, with regard to the treatment of national minorities; eventual membership will be equivalent to membership of the established “peace zone”. Thus Ireland’s policy on enlargement should not be calculated solely on a cost-benefit analysis of direct material advantage in the short term. It is an investment in the security of future generations. Second, the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy is the regular framework for a consideration of the compatibility of Irish and common European interests. Following ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty our contribution to military crisis management may now be framed and carried out within an EU-WEU context (the so-called “Petersberg Tasks”). However, as long as American engagement in European security is seen as essential the EU-WEU context is likely to complement rather than replace the Euro-Atlantic network. Any large-scale WEU peacekeeping mission may depend on NATO assets (commands, communications and logistics). Conclusions * The issues underlying the European “security architecture” (order-building, conflict prevention, crisis management) are of the highest importance for all European states. The current security environment provides an opportunity to develop a cooperative security regime, but progress to date has been tentative. * The institutional elements in the architecture are based on the adaptation of established frameworks (OSCE, NATO, EU). One of the key tasks here has been to find practical ways of realising the “mutually reinforcing” division of labour between the major institutions. If this process is neither complete nor always effective, that is more likely to reflect the weakness of commitment by participating states rather than the design of the institutions. * Finally, we may ask in what ways and to what extent Ireland should contribute to the security architecture? In the context of our membership of the UN, the OSCE and the EU the answer is evident. We participate in political consultations in order to agree on common interests and decide collective policies; to pursue these, we take diplomatic positions, allocate financial resources and contribute our Defence Forces and Gardai to peacekeeping missions. Our abstention from the remaining major element in the security architecture, the evolving PfP-EAPC network, is all the more anomalous by contrast. It has been suggested by some that neutrality is somehow at stake. In my opinion this view is misconceived. The values we in Ireland often associate with neutrality (political rather than military means, rights of small states, human rights in general) are also values associated with cooperative security. But the category of “neutral state” has little direct relevance to the European security architecture. It does not inform European debates on the goals to be pursued or the means to be adopted. It has no meaning in the context of military crisis management in Bosnia, and is not usually taken to preclude a voluntaristic form of association with military alliances. Where cooperative security is concerned there is precious little to be neutral about, and nothing is achieved by abstention. R.P. KIRBY NOTES FOR A PRESENTATION TO THE JOINT FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE OF THE IRISH PARLIAMENT IT IS A SPECIAL HONOUR AND PRIVILEGE FOR ME TO BE HERE TODAY: MY ANCESTORS IN BOTH MY PARENTS FAMILIES WENT TO CANADA FROM IRELAND FOUR OR FIVE GENERATIONS AGO: THE KIRBYS FROM MAYO AND THE REDMONDS, MY MOTHER’S FAMILY, FROM WEXFORD. SO IT IS A GREAT PERSONAL THRILL FOR ME TO BE BACK AGAIN TODAY IN THESE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES. THE FALL OF THE COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS THROUGHOUT CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE MARKED THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND THE DISAPPEARANCE OF THE IDEOLOGICAL, POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIVISIONS THAT WERE THE BASIS FOR THE ADVERSARIAL BIPOLAR SYSTEM ON WHICH SECURITY IN EUROPE DEPENDED THROUGHOUT THE COLD WAR PERIOD. A NEW OPPORTUNITY WAS CREATED FOR A MORE POSITIVE SECURITY SYSTEM BASED ON DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND FREEDOM OF CHOICE FOR ALL COUNTRIES: AN OPPORTUNITY TO BUILD A EUROPE WHOLE AND FREE. I WANT TO DO TWO THINGS THIS MORNING: FIRST. TO GIVE A BROAD BUT BRIEF OUTLINE OF THE WAYS IN WHICH NATO HAS CHANGED IN THE NEW SECURITY CLIMATE AND, SECOND, TO DESCRIBE MORE SPECIFICALLY THE MAIN FEATURES OF NATO’S OUTREACH PROGRAMME OF PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION WITH NON-MEMBER STATES THROUGH THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. IN THE 1990’S, NATO HAS BEEN UNDERGOING A PROCESS OF PROFOUND TRANSFORMATION BOTH INTERNALLY AND IN ITS EXTERNAL RELATIONS. THE THREAT OF ANY LARGE SCALE ATTACK ON THE ALLIANCE TODAY OR IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE IS REMOTE. DEFENCE BUDGETS HAVE FALLEN, READINESS TIMES FOR ALLIED FORCES HAVE GONE FROM SOMETHING LIKE TWO DAYS TO MORE LIKE TWO MONTHS, THE STOCK OF ALLIANCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS DECLINED BY MORE THAN 80% LEAVING ONLY A LIMITED NUMBER OF GRAVITY BOMBS WHICH WOULD NEED TO BE DELIVERED BY AIRCRAFT. THE EMPHASIS IN ALLIANCE MILITARY PLANNING HAS SHIFTED FROM MASSIVE DEFENCE CONCERNS TOWARDS SMALLER, FLEXIBLE, RAPIDLY DEPLOYABLE FORCES TO DEAL WITH SMALLER CRISES WHERE PEACEKEEPING, HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS OR OTHER PEACE SUPPORT ACTIVITIES MIGHT BE REQUIRED. THE ALLIANCE HAS ACCEPTED THAT SECURITY IN EUROPE IS INDIVISIBLE AND MUST BE VIEWED IN A VERY BROAD CONTEXT. ALTHOUGH THE PROSPECT OF ANY WIDE SPREAD CONFLICT IS REMOTE, SECURITY RISKS AND CHALLENGES REMAIN WHICH COULD UPSET PEACE IN EUROPE: ETHNIC ANIMOSITIES, VIRULENT NATIONALISM, SOCIAL TENSIONS, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, THE RISKS OF PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION COULD ALL POTENTIALLY CAUSE INSTABILITY OR CONFLICT THREATENING TO PEACE IN EUROPE AND HENCE TO NATO ALLIES, AND OTHERS ALIKE. THE CONFLICT IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA AND, MORE RECENTLY, IN KOSOVO - THE AREA IN WHICH SIMILAR TENSIONS SPARKED THE FIRST WORLD WAR - SHOW THAT COMPLACENCY ABOUT PEACE IN EUROPE WOULD NOT BE PRUDENT. SUCH CONFLICTS HAVE THE POTENTIAL TO ESCALATE AND TO SPILL OVER WITH THE RISK OF BROADER CONFLICT WHICH WOULD EFFECT THE SECURITY OF ALLIES AND OTHERS AS WELL. THE EMPHASIS OF NATO’S POLICY IN THE 1990’S TO PRESERVE PEACE IN EUROPE HAS THUS CONCENTRATED LESS ON COLLECTIVE DEFENCE OF MEMBER STATES AND MORE ON PROJECTING SECURITY AND STABILITY BEYOND THE NATO AREA: FIRST, WITH THE AIM OF CONFLICT PREVENTION AND SECOND, IF THAT FAILS, TO BE PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE CRISIS MANAGEMENT TO PREVENT CONFLICTS FROM ESCALATING OR SPILLING OVER. THE COLLECTIVE DEFENCE ABILITY TO PROTECT THE SECURITY OF ALL ALLIES REMAINS AT THE CORE OF THE ALLIANCE. ALL ALLIES WANT TO MAINTAIN THAT. IT PROVIDES AN ULTIMATE, REASONABLY PRICED SECURITY GUARANTEE - A MODEST INVESTMENT IN A NATIONAL SECURITY INSURANCE POLICY; BUT THE ALLIANCE’S EMPHASIS ON DIALOGUE, PARTNERSHIP AND COOPERATION IS A MEANS TO TRY TO ENSURE CONFLICT PREVENTION AND IF NEEDED, EFFECTIVE CRISIS MANAGEMENT. THE ALLIANCE ALREADY IN 1992 OFFERED TO UNDERTAKE PEACEKEEPING MISSIONS ON A CASE BY CASE BASIS UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED NATIONS OR THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE OSCE. THE SUCCESSIVE NATO-LED PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA UNDER UN MANDATE, WHICH INCLUDE MILITARY PERSONNEL FROM ALL NATO ALLIES AND FROM 21 NON-NATO STATES, INCLUDING IRELAND AND A FEW COUNTRIES FROM OUTSIDE EUROPE, ARE THE PRIMARY EXAMPLES OF THE ALLIANCE’S NEW ENGAGEMENT IN PEACEKEEPING, AND OF THE KINDS OF SIGNIFICANT SECURITY RISKS THAT STILL EXIST IN EUROPE FOR WHICH ADEQUATE RESPONSES ARE REQUIRED. NATO IS PURSUING A COMPREHENSIVE EFFORT (“EXTERNAL ADAPTATION” OF THE ALLIANCE) TO BUILD COOPERATIVE SECURITY IN EUROPE FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL COUNTRIES ELEMENTS OF THIS EFFORT ARE: --THE ENLARGEMENT PROCESS TO OPEN THE ALLIANCE TO ADDITIONAL MEMBER STATES --THE NEW EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL, REPLACING THE FORMER NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL --THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, NEWLY ENHANCED — EFFORTS TO DEVELOP A STRONG, STABLE AND ENDURING PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA --DEVELOPMENT OF A DISTINCTIVE PARTNERSHIP WITH UKRAINE --THE DEVELOPMENT OF DIALOGUE WITH A NUMBER OF NON-NATO, NON-EUROPEAN MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES ALL OF THESE COMPONENTS ARE COMPLEMENTARY AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING BUT NONE IS DEPENDENT ON ANY OF THE OTHER COMPONENTS. OVERRIDING OBJECTIVE SINCE 1990 HAS BEEN TO HELP BUILD A COMPREHENSIVE, COOPERATIVE, INCLUSIVE SECURITY SYSTEM FOR WHOLE OF EUROPE LET ME NOW FOCUS SPECIFICALLY ON THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE. THE PREDECESSOR OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL (EAPC) THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL (NACC), ESTABLISHED IN 1991, WAS DIRECTED AT OVERCOMING THE IMMEDIATE DIVISIVE HERITAGE OF THE COLD WAR PERIOD, TO REPLACE THE OLD ADVERSARIAL RELATIONSHIP OF THE NATO-WARSAW PACT STAND-OFF WITH GREATER MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING, CONFIDENCE AND COOPERATION IN DEALING WITH SECURITY ISSUES. THE NORTH ATLANTIC COOPERATION COUNCIL WAS HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL AND LAID THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE LAUNCHING OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE BY THE NATO SUMMIT IN BRUSSELS IN JANUARY 1994. THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, LIKE NATO ITSELF, IS FOUNDED FIRMLY ON INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND PRINCIPLES, INCLUDING THOSE ENSHRINED IN THE UN CHARTER AND IN OSCE DOCUMENTS AND IN JOINING THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, STATES REAFFIRM THEIR COMMITMENT TO ALL THOSE PRINCIPLES AND VALUES. THE INVITATION FROM NATO TO JOIN THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE WAS, AND IS, ADDRESSED TO ALL STATES IN THE OSCE WHO ARE PREPARED TO SIGN THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT OF THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE WHICH I HOPE YOU ARE ALL FAMILIAR WITH. THE PFP IS AN OPEN, INCLUSIVE AND FLEXIBLE PROGRAMME DIRECTED AT GENUINE SECURITY COOPERATION WITH ALL INTERESTED STATES FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL. 27 STATES HAVE JOINED WITH NATO ALLIES IN THE PFP AND EACH PARTNER SHAPES AND DECIDES ITS OWN INVOLVEMENT IN THE PROGRAMME. IN MY VIEW, THE FACT THAT AUSTRIA, FINLAND, SWEDEN AND SWITZERLAND, ALL WITH VERY STRONG TRADITIONS OF “NEUTRALITY” IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, HAVE ALL JOINED PFP IS PERHAPS THE BEST PROOF THAT PFP IS GENUINELY OPEN AND INCLUSIVE. I KNOW THAT RECENTLY YOUR COMMITTEE HAS HEARD THE VIEWS OF THOSE STATES ON THEIR PARTICIPATION IN THE PFP. ALL STATES THAT JOIN THE PFP BY SIGNING THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT BECOME MEMBERS OF THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL WHICH PROVIDES THE OVER-ARCHING FRAMEWORK WITHIN WHICH PFP FORMS A DISTINCT ELEMENT FOR PRACTICAL COOPERATION IN THE MILITARY AND DEFENCE RELATED FIELDS. THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL PROVIDES FOR ONGOING, REGULAR CONSULTATIONS AT VARIOUS POLITICAL AND WORKING LEVELS: MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENCE, AMBASSADORS AND OTHER DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIVES, CHIEFS OF DEFENCE STAFF AND MILITARY REPRESENTATIVES; EAPC ALSO HELPS TO GUIDE AND DESIGN THE ENTIRE RANGE OF PRACTICAL COOPERATION ACTIVITIES INVOLVING ITS MEMBER STATES. THE MOST IMPORTANT FEATURE OF EAPC CONSULTATIONS IS THAT THEY ARE ONGOING: THEY INCREASE TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE AND HELP TO REDUCE OR ELIMINATE MISUNDERSTANDINGS OR PROBLEMS; THEY CAN PROMOTE CONFLICT PREVENTION OR SERVE AS AN EARLY WARNING MECHANISM ABOUT POTENTIAL CRISES; THEY EMPHASISE AND ENGAGE ALL MEMBER STATES IN COOPERATIVE AND INCLUSIVE APPROACHES TO SECURITY ISSUES FOR THE BENEFIT OF ALL ITS MEMBERS. AS ONE EXAMPLE, A EURO-ATLANTIC DISASTER RESPONSE COORDINATION CENTRE (EADRCC) HAS RECENTLY BEEN ESTABLISHED TO COORDINATE IN CLOSE CONSULTATION WITH THE UN-OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS (OCHA), THE RESPONSE OF EAPC COUNTRIES TO DISASTER RELIEF WITHIN THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL GEOGRAPHICAL AREA; ON THE BASIS OF RELIEF REQUIREMENTS DETERMINED BY THE UN OFFICE. ON AN EXCEPTIONAL BASIS, THE EADRCC IS SUPPORTING UNHCR-LED OPERATIONS TO DEAL WITH THE REFUGEE SITUATION PRODUCED BY THE PRESENT CRISIS IN KOSOVO. A PRINCIPAL FOCUS OF PFP IS MILITARY COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF PEACEKEEPING, SEARCH AND RESCUE AND HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS AND IT MAY EXTEND TO OTHER AGREED FIELDS. INDEED, SINCE PFP WAS LAUNCHED, THE RANGE AND SUBSTANCE OF ACTIVITIES UNDER IT HAS EXPANDED DRAMATICALLY INTO SUCH AREAS AS CIVIL-EMERGENCY PLANNING AND CIVIL MILITARY AIR SPACE COORDINATION. FUNDAMENTALLY, PFP IS BASED ON COOPERATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL PARTNER STATES AND THE ALLIANCE - A 16+1 RELATIONSHIP - BASED ON AN AGREED INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME BETWEEN EACH PARTNER AND THE ALLIANCE WHICH IS TAILORED TO REFLECT THE INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AND CAPABILITIES OF THE PARTNER STATE CONCERNED IN COOPERATION WITH THE ALLIANCE. THIS IS THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DIFFERENTIATION WHICH APPLIES TO ALL PARTNERS. EACH CAN SELECT FROM A BROAD MENU OF ISSUES AND ACTIVITIES, THOSE WHICH THEY WISH TO INCLUDE AND PURSUE THROUGH THEIR OWN INDIVIDUAL PARTNERSHIP PROGRAMME. PFP PARTNERS ALSO HAVE THE ABILITY TO INFLUENCE THE OVERALL MENU OF ACTIVITIES AND A PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVE OF ENHANCEMENTS OF THE PFP AGREED JUST OVER A YEAR AGO HAS BEEN TO INCREASE THE INVOLVEMENT OF PARTNERS IN RELEVANT DECISION-MAKING. SWITZERLAND, FOR EXAMPLE, HAS INTRODUCED THE PROMOTION AND DISSEMINATION OF KNOWLEDGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND ACTION INTO THE PFP PROGRAMME. THE 16+1 BASIS FOR PFP COOPERATION DOES NOT MEAN THAT THERE ARE SIMPLY 27 16+1 RELATIONSHIPS OPERATING IN PARALLEL, INSULATED FROM EACH OTHER. MANY ACTIVITIES, PARTICULARLY PEACEKEEPING AND OTHER EXERCISES AND TRAINING, ARE PURSUED IN A MULTINATIONAL FORMAT, BRINGING TOGETHER SIMULTANEOUSLY MILITARY PERSONNEL AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES FROM MANY OF THE PARTNER STATES. LET ME NOW DWELL A LITTLE MORE ON COOPERATION IN THE PEACEKEEPING FIELD UNDER THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, RECOGNIZING IRELAND’S LONG AND DISTINGUISHED ENGAGEMENT IN INTERNATIONAL PEACEKEEPING UNDERTAKINGS. IT IS IMPORTANT TO RECALL THAT NEITHER OSCE NOR THE UNITED NATIONS HAS A STANDING CAPABILITY TO RAPIDLY UNDERTAKE A MAJOR MULTINATION MILITARY OPERATION FOR PEACEKEEPING OR PEACE SUPPORT. NATO, MORE OR LESS UNIQUELY, HAS STANDING REQUIRED CAPABILITY, BUT IT IS CLEARLY IMPORTANT THAT THE POOL OF CAPABLE PEACEKEEPING RESOURCES THAT ARE ABLE TO WORK EFFECTIVELY TOGETHER ON SHORT NOTICE BE AS WIDE AS POSSIBLE. WITHOUT THE EARLY EXPERIENCE OF PFP PEACEKEEPING COOPERATION, IT WOULD HAVE BEEN MARKEDLY MORE DIFFICULT TO PUT TOGETHER THE HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA INVOLVING 37 NATO AND NON-NATO STATES. EXPERIENCE IN PFP SINCE, AND ESPECIALLY THE LESSONS OF BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, ARE BEING USED TO MAKE PFP PEACEKEEPING COOPERATION MORE EFFECTIVE. IT SEEMS HIGHLY LIKELY THAT ANY FUTURE PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION WILL, LIKE THOSE IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA, INVOLVE NATO ALLIES AND PFP PARTNERS ALIKE. THE BETTER PREPARED WITHIN THE EAPC FRAMEWORK AND MORE INTEROPERABLE ARE THE FORCES CONCERNED, THE MORE EFFECTIVE ANY FUTURE PEACE SUPPORT OPERATION WILL BE, AND THE SAFER FOR THE PEACEKEEPERS INVOLVED. THAT SEEMS TO ME A VALUABLE AND FUNDAMENTAL ASSET OF PFP COOPERATION. IN ADDITION, A POLITICAL-MILITARY FRAMEWORK FOR PREPARING AND CONDUCTING ANTO-LED PFP OPERATIONS IS ALSO BEING PREPARED WITH ALL PFP PARTNERS TO GIVE ALL STATES PARTICIPATING IN ANY SUCH OPERATIONS AN APPROPRIATE VOICE ON HOW THEY ARE MOUNTED AND CONDUCTED, BUILDING ON THE AD HOC MODEL OF ALLIED. PARTNER CONSULTATIONS WHICH HAS BEEN USED REGARDING THE BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA OPERATIONS. FOR SOME TIME ALREADY, THERE HAS EXISTED WITHIN THE PFP, A PLANNING AND REVIEW PROCESS (PARP) IN WHICH MANY, ALTHOUGH NOT ALL PARTNERS TAKE PART, WHOSE BASIC OBJECTIVE IS TO MAXIMISE INTEROPERABILITY BETWEEN AND AMONG PARTNER AND NATO ALLIED FORCES. THERE IS OF COURSE, MUCH MORE TO PFP AS I HOPE I HAVE INDICATED. PARTNERS CONTRIBUTE AND BENEFIT IN DIFFERENT SPECIFIC PRACTICAL WAYS ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN SITUATION AND INTERESTS, BUT THE INTERACTION, TRANSPARENCY AND CONFIDENCE THAT WORKING TOGETHER THROUGH PFP ENGENDERS IS, I THINK, OF IMMEASURABLY GREAT VALUE. TODAY WE HAVE 38 PARTNER OFFICERS FROM 13 COUNTRIES SERVING IN INTERNATIONAL POSITIONS WITHIN NATO MILITARY STRUCTURES AND 6 OTHERS FROM 5 COUNTRIES IN THE PARTNERSHIP COORDINATION CELL WHICH HANDLES THE MILITARY PLANNING FOR PFP EXERCISES. ALL THESE OFFICERS SERVE THE INTERESTS OF ALL PFP PARTNERS, NOT JUST THOSE OF THEIR OWN COUNTRY. IN ADDITION, VIRTUALLY ALL PARTNER COUNTRIES HAVE ALSO ESTABLISHED DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ACCREDITED TO NATO TO PURSUE THEIR VARIOUS INTEREST IN RELATIONS WITH THE ALLIANCE. LET ME CLOSE, AS I BEGAN, ON A SOMEWHAT MORE PERSONAL NOTE. MY DIPLOMATIC CAREER HAS SPANNED THE LATTER PART OF THE COLD WAR PERIOD AND THE NEW PERIOD OF POSITIVE OPPORTUNITY AND COOPERATION IN THE SECURITY FIELD. THE OLD DIVISIONS ARE GONE; THEY SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO COME BACK. BALANCE OF POWER, MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION, SPHERES OF INFLUENCE, COMPETING ALLIANCES, BUFFER ZONES HAVE BEEN FREQUENT SECURITY CONCEPTS IN RECENT EUROPEAN HISTORY - ALL OF WHICH SOONER OR LATER HAVE, WITH THE FORTUNATE EXCEPTION OF MUTUALLY ASSURED DESTRUCTION - RESULTED IN A MAJOR CONFLICT IN WHICH MILLIONS OF EUROPEANS HAVE DIED, INCLUDING MANY IRISH, AS WELL AS SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS OF CANADIANS AND AMERICANS. IN MY VIEW, WE HAVE AN EXTRAORDINARY NEW OPPORTUNITY ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE 21 ST CENTURY TO BUILD A COMMON SECURITY CULTURE IN THE EURO-ATLANTIC AREA BASED ON DEMOCRACY AND POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT IN CONSTRUCTIVE COOPERATION WHICH CAN BENEFIT ALL. NATO IN THE 90’S HAS BEEN ACTIVELY LEADING IN PURSUING THAT KIND OF VISION. THE EURO-ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL AND THE PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE, THE PURSUIT OF STRONG DISTINCTIVE PARTNERSHIPS WITH RUSSIA AND UKRAINE AND THE DIALOGUE WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN STATES, ARE ALL EXPRESSIONS OF THAT VISION, OF NATO’S DESIRE FOR CLOSE, PEACEFUL POSITIVE RELATIONS WITH ALL ITS PARTNERS AND OTHER NON-MEMBER STATES IN THE INTERESTS OF A PEACEFUL, PROSPEROUS AND MORE INTEGRATED EURO-ATLANTIC AREA WHICH WILL NOT REQUIRED NEW WAR CEMETERIES AND MEMORIALS. THANK YOU.
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