Committee Reports::Report - Sub Committee on the UN on Peacekeeping/Enforcement In the Light of UN Reform::01 April, 1997::Report

Subsequent to the introduction of the first Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs in 1993 the Sub-Committee on the United Nations was set up later in August that year. It was decided that the Sub-Committee would examine and report on Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement in the light of UN Reform. To gather evidence the Sub-Committee made visits to New York, the Lebanon, Somalia and Geneva between 1993/94.

During what was to be his final week in Dáil Éireann, Brian Lenihan reviewed the report which was being prepared by the Sub-Committee on Peacekeeping/Peace Enforcement in the light of UN Reform and asked that it should be completed. It was to be one of his final acts in Dáil Éireann.

After he had been selected as Chairman of the Sub-Committee on the United Nations in June 1995 he had thrown himself into the task of completing the report on peacekeeping in the UN to which, Ireland has committed so much over the years. In the months which followed up to the time of his death Brian Lenihan devoted a great deal of time in the compilation of an outline report. Unfortunately he was unable to complete this task: having courageously fought against serious illness for several years he finally succumbed and died on 1 November 1995. Deputy Lenihan, who had been Tanaiste as well as holding several Ministerial portfolios including Minister for Foreign Affairs and was the first Chairman of the newly formed Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs, was always committed to his work in the Oireachtas. During his many years in the Oireachtas he was regarded with great affection by Members of all political parties. He was beloved as an exceptional colleague.

Now the Members of the Sub-Committee, in recognition of long service to the Oireachtas and to commemorate his work in the Sub-Committee dedicate this report to their friend and colleague Brian Lenihan TD. Ar deis Dé go raibh a anam deilis.

I was privileged to be elected Chairman of the Sub-Committee in succession to my late colleague Brian Lenihan and to be able to carry on the work of the Sub-Committee. The Sub-Committee renewed its examination of this subject in the latter part of 1996 and in February 1997 I led a delegation to UN Headquarters in New York to complete the report.

The report looks at the background to the UN from its inception in 1945. It looks at peacekeeping in a number of areas of conflict where Ireland has, and is, playing a major role and it examines changes and the suggestions where reforms might be useful. The report also looks at peace enforcement and the UN’s response to change as more conflicts become intra-state rather than inter-state. It looks at the lessons learned from Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement and on the benefit of stand-by of rapid reaction forces and training. It examines other elements in UN peace activities e.g. peace-building, regional co-operation and disarmament and the areas within the UN which might be reformed.

The report also outlines the conclusions and recommendations of the Sub-Committee on peacekeeping/peace enforcement and reform of the UN. It acknowledges the singular role which the UN has played over the past half century and should continue to play in the future as the foremost organisation of nations committed to the fostering and preservation of international peace, stability and human rights. This having been said however, the Committee is fully cognisant of the strengths and weaknesses of the structure of the organisation and that, without the goodwill and cooperation of its component members, the UN’s achievements will fall far short of what is feasible

LIST OF MEMBERS

SUB-COMMITTEE ON UNITED NATIONS

Summary and Conclusions

Charter Background - The Resolution of Conflicts / Ireland’s Role

The report examines the question of reform of the United Nations with particular reference to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. It looks at the Charter background of the UN when it was established 52 years ago and particularly notes the Chapters dealing with resolution of conflict.

Chapter IV provides for the General Assembly to discuss questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security.

Chapter VI establishes procedures which both the Security Council and the General Assembly may use in attempting to resolve disputes. Under this Chapter, the Security Council mandates peacekeeping operations.

Chapter VII says that the Security Council may take preventive or enforcement measures if other measures such as diplomatic persuasion or sanctions have failed. Originally, this latter Chapter was not used because the Permanent Members were locked into a Cold War. Attention is now focusing on peace enforcement as a means to end hostilities so that negotiations can begin.

Ireland has played an important role in the UN particularly in peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. The Irish public have always supported our involvement in these operations and are committed to our continued help for areas in need.

Irish defence forces have had a continuous presence in UN peacekeeping since 1958 mainly in the Middle East. However, Irish military and civilian personnel have served the UN with distinction in many parts of the world, especially the African Continent. The Gardai have also served with distinction since 1989. The total number of Irish personnel serving in UN peacekeeping operations as at January 1997 were 746.

The extensive Irish participation in peacekeeping continues to be regarded in very positive terms by the Government, the Defence Forces, the Garda Siochana and the Irish public and has promoted a positive image of Ireland both within the international community and among all sides in mission areas. Unfortunately, service to the international community is not without cost, and to date 77 Irish personnel have died whilst serving on peacekeeping operations.

Traditional Peacekeeping Methods

The traditional role of the General Assembly and the Security Council in peace and security was guided by Chapter VI of the UN Charter. The basic principle of peacekeeping, as outlined by the Secretary General in 1995, are consent of the parties to the conflict, impartiality and the use of force only in self defence.

The peacekeeping model is looked at through the Irish experience in Lebanon. The Committee believes, after visiting the UNIFIL operations, that the Irish troops in Lebanon act in a totally impartial manner between both sides and over the years have played a major role in endeavouring to bring peace to the area.

Response to Change in Peacekeeping

The nature of peacekeeping has changed over the years with intra-State conflict now posing the biggest difficulty for the UN. It makes peacekeeping more complex, more difficult, more expensive and time consuming with serious implications for field deployment and increased burdens on headquarters staff.

The former Secretary General, Dr Boutros Ghali identified the following as the most important instruments for controlling and resolving conflicts: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building, disarmament, sanctions and peace enforcement. The first three can be used only with the consent of the parties to a conflict. In case of intra-State conflict consent has also to be secured for peace enforcement.

Preventive diplomacy and peacemaking offer excellent solutions to resolving conflict especially if problems are dealt with in a timely fashion before they escalate out of control. These methods, if carried out efficiently and on time, would save lives, prevent economic turmoil in the countries in conflict and in the long run be far less expensive for the international community. However, the former Secretary General drew attention to the difficulty of finding senior people with the right background from the international community, to serve as special representatives and also to the need to establish a budgetary and legal basis for small field missions to carry out this work.

Much greater focus is now being given to the question of the causes of strife worldwide. It is now understood that quite often the root cause of conflict is lack of development The Secretary General in his annual report to the General Assembly (September 1994) pointed out that the foundation of peace lies in the realm of development. However, the international community has not responded in a concerted manner to development needs. Dr Ghali said that if the sources of conflict were tackled the UN would in fact, fulfill the original aims of the Charter, ie peace, justice, human rights and development.

A new kind of peacekeeping operation involves mandates which seek to help the parties to a dispute to implement a comprehensive settlement already negotiated (e.g. Namibia., Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique). Both military and civilian matters are involved, supervision of ceasefires, demobilization, reintegration into civilian life, destruction of weapons, de-mining, return of displaced persons, humanitarian assistance, institution building, human rights, elections and economic reconstruction.

An example of Irish involvement in a multifunctional operation was the participation of Irish military and police in the UN operations in Cambodia and in Namibia which have been acknowledged as successes for the UN.

A very important element in UN development is the consolidation of knowledge which is gained from their various operations. The Lessons Learned Unit, which has only been set up by the UN in the past number of years, is producing basic criteria that will be invaluable for future operations.

Response to Change in Peace Enforcement

The former Secretary General identified the use of United Nations forces to protect humanitarian operations particularly in lawless and chaotic conditions as another important qualitative change. This has led in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Somalia to a new kind of operation. These kinds of operations have involved a combination of peacekeeping and peace enforcement both in terms of mandates and in terms of activity in the field. There is also the use, by the UN, of regional forces like IFOR to carry out the enforcement mandate for the UN.

Sanctions

Enforcement can be effected either through sanctions or militarily. Article 41 of the UN Charter prescribes the use of economic methods when diplomatic means at persuading states to comply with the UN’s demands fail. In the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace, Secretary General Ghali pointed out that the purpose of sanctions is to modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security not to punish or otherwise exact retribution.

Sanctions get only a passing mention in An Agenda for Peace but have been highlighted in the recent past in the lead-up to and aftermath of the Gulf War and in relation to the former Yugoslavia. Arms embargoes have been imposed against South Africa in 1977 and Rhodesia in 1966. At present arms embargoes apply to Libya, Somalia, Rwanda and Yugoslavia (Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The former Secretary General in the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace said that the objectives of sanctions regimes and objective criteria for their fulfilment need clear definition. The following principles should apply:

-the impact of sanctions on neighbouring states to be assessed before imposition, means of assisting them explored, the application of sanctions monitored, their effects measured and delivery of humanitarian assistance assured. Sanctions Committees have been established by the Security Council to implement sanctions resolutions but to date these are finding it difficult to keep up with the work entrusted to them.

Somalia

The Committee visited the UN mission in Somalia and were pleased with the Irish operation there. However, the enforcement operation in Somalia showed up problems, with contingents appearing to take orders from their respective capitals rather than from central UN Command.

The UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) ended on 5 March 1995. While there were undoubted successes in the operation, including ending the starvation in the country, there were many problems. The newly formed Lessons Learned Unit attached to the Peace-keeping Department set up a review of the various aspects of the operation in Somalia and in December 1995 issued a report. It identified 15 basic lessons which will be applied in future operations.

Former Yugoslavia

After the break-up of former Yugoslavia, the UN sent lightly armed peace-keepers (UNPROFOR) into the area to provide military assistance for humanitarian operations. However, the mandate ultimately took on elements of peace enforcement with the air exclusion zone, permission for troops to use military force if their movements were impeded, and the protection of safe havens. With the escalation of violence particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the UN was unable to cope and there was a call for stronger measures.

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1033 of 15 December 1995 a Multinational Implementation force (IFOR) acting in co-operation with NATO but with the co-operation of 16 other countries including Russia, was set up to implement the military provisions of the General Peace Agreement which was signed in Paris on 14 December. The UNPROFOR mandate was terminated on 20 December 1995. The Peace Agreement backed by IFOR has generally enabled the ceasefire to be maintained.

Under UN Security Council Resolution 1035 of 21 December 1995 the UN established a mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina which combines three elements,

1)UN civil affairs to help refugees, defuse conflict and to help in political development in the area

3)International Police Task Force (IPTF), under the command of Assistant Garda Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald, to protect civilians and return the area to a safe and secure environment.

The role of the UN simply as a peacekeeper and not a peace enforcer was brought sharply into focus. While former Yugoslavia is an extraordinary complex region and the humanitarian situation, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was desperate, the matter was only resolved by bringing the threat of a very powerful international force into the region. The IFOR force which thankfully has the support of NATO and the OSCE has successfully carried out the Security Councils mandate and has allowed the General Peace Agreement to take effect.

Peace Enforcement Lessons

In January 1995, the then Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council, a Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, which extended his original proposals to take into account developments in peacekeeping since 1992 in Somalia, Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The main points made by him in his Supplement include the following;

•International action to resolve conflicts must address not only the immediate causes of a particular conflict, but also its root causes, which often arise from socio-economic injustices; such action should therefore extend beyond traditional peacekeeping into reconstruction and the re-establishment of effective government.

•Preventative diplomacy and peace-making are preferable to undertaking a major politico-military effort after a conflict has broken out. Insufficient resources are currently devoted to these activities.

•Experience has shown that peacekeeping operations should not be given enforcement tasks; if enforcement tasks are deemed necessary, a separate peace-enforcement operation should be established.

•Regional organisations have a role to play in the maintenance of peace and security

UN Secretary General Views

Secretary General Annan, who took up office at the beginning of 1997 and was previously responsible for peacekeeping, said that it is difficult for the UN to put together a peace enforcement operation. He admitted that the UN operation in former Yugoslavia, particularly in the so called “safe havens”, was a failure. The Security Council, he said, gave a mandate but no resources and the small contingent of UN troops there could do nothing to prevent the slaughter which occurred. However, the primary failure was their lack of intelligence on the ground in former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, he pointed out that a well equipped force like IFOR, the regional force currently in place in former Yugoslavia, can perform the tasks set out for them and make a major contribution to peace.

He will be seeking the continuation of IFOR in that region when its mandate runs out shortly. The Secretary-General believes that this type of operation, where the UN is able to mandate a regional force to carry out peace enforcement on its behalf, can fill gaps in UN operations.

The Committee received the views of a cross-section of people in the UN who in the main agreed on the need for (i) clear mandates from the Security Council (SECCO) with agreed interpretations, rules of engagement and command structures based upon them, (ii) operations to abide by ethical standards and to adhere to clearly defined principles particularly in offensive situations and (iii) a formal operations centre at UN Headquarters.

Special Committee for Peacekeeping (SCPK)

The Vice-Chairman of the SCPK told the Sub-Committee delegation in New York in February 1997 that the SCPK report, issued in May 1996, entitled “Comprehensive Review of the whole questions of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects”, has the agreement of the General Assembly and it reflects the preoccupations of the SCPK. He pointed out however, that some Member States, particularly developing States, are not keen on peacekeeping as they are unhappy that the Security Council, and especially that the five permanent Members of the Council, have exclusive control over this area. Tension exists, he said, in this area of the UN, especially between the non-aligned countries and the Western countries. The Report does try to produce guidelines but he agreed with the delegation that they are rather weak. In order to prevent the problems in Yugoslavia and Eastern Zaïre (the latter precipitated by the earlier influx of refugees from Rwanda) from reoccurring, the report argues that adequate resources must be made available to carry out mandates. On rapid deployment, he said, Canada and Ireland, among others, were keen on advancing this but a number of non-aligned States were unhappy with it a they feel it gives too much authority to Western countries.

Mobilisation/Standby Approach

The Secretary General in 1993 concluded that a rapid reaction force is necessary as a strategic reserve for the Security Council in times of emergency. He also established a Stand-by Arrangements System [UNSAS] whereby troop contributors agree to have certain units on standby for UN peacekeeping service. However, the actual deployment of such troops and equipment remains subject to the normal domestic procedures, including parliamentary approval. To date, 62 countries including Ireland and most traditional troop-contributing countries have formally indicated their willingness to provide resources totalling 80,000 personnel to be called on by UNSAS. The EU has given its support to UNSAS.

Some countries, such as Canada, Denmark and The Netherlands have proposed ways to enhance the speed of deployment of rapid reaction force. One suggestion is to have a permanent UN operational-level Headquarters in New York staffed by 30/50 personnel to organise and control the operation of a 5,000 strong force which could be deployed immediately.

Friends of the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (FORD) which Ireland joined in 1996 have agreed to help in the effort to set up the Headquarters in New York. Ireland has agreed to commit 850 personnel to UNSAS overseas operations including the participation of the Garda Síochána and the provision of two military officers to a rapidly deployable mission headquarters in New York.

Training is an essential prerequisite for both rapid and effective response to crisis situations. The UN at present trains for peace keeping operations and is involved in the preparation of training manuals/materials and the development of a code of conduct to be shared with troop contributing nations.

Other Elements in UN Peace Activity

Post Conflict Peace Building

A further change identified by the Secretary General is the need to establish coordinated programmes after a negotiated settlement has been implemented to ensure that the original causes of the conflict are eradicated. Measures which can be used in post conflict peace-building are demilitarisation, de-mining, control of small arms, institutional reform, human rights monitoring, electoral reform and social/economic development. The process requires integrated action between the UN and the parties.

The UN has underlined the potential for co-operation with regional organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU).

Disarmament

The Secretary General points out in his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace of January 1995 that the Security Council summit in 1992 committed itself to making the UN more effective in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation and nuclear non-proliferation.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty was opened for signature in New York on 24 September, 1996. Ireland was one of the original signatories of the Treaty and to date, over 140 countries have signed the Treaty including Israel, one of the three so-called “threshold” nuclear weapon states, but not India or Pakistan. The Treaty will prohibit any nuclear weapon test explosion and any other nuclear explosion, thereby constraining the development of nuclear weapons. It represents one of the most sought-after nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measures in the history of the United Nations Organisation. While certainly not the end of the process of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, its adoption was the essential next step.

The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force on 29 April 1997, but has yet to be ratified by either of the two declared possessor states, the United States and Russia.

Following the Ottawa Conference in October 1996, the United States, in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, canvassed an ambitious new Resolution urging States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, with a view to completing the negotiations as soon as possible. No fewer than 155 countries cast a positive vote for the total ban proposal in the Plenary vote on 10 December, 10 countries, admittedly including some major players in this context, abstained; none voted against.

Institutional Reform

During the 50th General Assembly in 1995 a resolution was adopted which formally established a high level open-ended working group to look into the strengthening of the UN system. Its aim is to draw a consensus on reform from an examination of the different studies and reports without duplicating the work of other working groups. An intern report giving differing views was submitted at the 51st General Assembly in 1996. The Working Group is to report at the 52nd General Assembly in 1997.

The question of reform in the General Assembly is being considered. However, the priority area for reform is where security decisions are taken ie the Security Council.

The main questions at issue are the extension of SECCO membership and the use of the veto. Reform of SECCO would require amendment to the UN Charter and this in turn would necessitate the consent of the five permanent members, and the approval by a two thirds majority of the General Assembly (membership now 185). Pressure is being exerted for permanent membership for Japan and Germany, given their economic importance. However, the Committee was informed in New York in 1997 that a number of other large developing States are also seeking Permanent Membership. There is widespread agreement, however, that the Council should be increased to 25 Members.

Reform of the UN Secretariat consists of two phases, the first launched in early 1992 and the second in March 1993. In the first phase the then Secretary General abolished his own Cabinet in favour of a Departmental approach. He proposed a more streamlined and coherent structure with four main groupings, Political, Economic, Administration and Public Affairs. Peacekeeping was included in the Political structure reflecting a linkage between early warning, prevention, peace-building, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Fourteen top level posts were cut.

The budget crisis in the UN has forced it to rationalise. Already 1000 posts have been eliminated in the past two years. The US in particular are seeking further reductions. However, already the morale in the organisation is low and consequential to the staff reductions, some people have had to take on additional work on already over-loaded work areas.

The main Irish interests in the Secretariat reforms are to ensure that peacekeeping and humanitarian and human rights activities are streamlined and made more effective. Ireland, in common with other non permanent members of the Security Council, would wish to see genuine rotation of posts as distinct from the national fiefdoms which operate at present.

UN Finances

The UN has been experiencing a financial crisis for some time. Many Member States do not pay their assessed Regular Budget and Peacekeeping contributions in full and on time, as required by the UN Charter. This has resulted in cutbacks in PKOs, and delays in reimbursing Member States for costs resulting from their participation in such operations.

The UN is financed by contributions from its Member States to the Regular Budget and peacekeeping budgets. Assessments to these budgets is made on the basis of percentage global net national product. As at 31 December, 1996, the UN is owed US$2.15 billion in outstanding assessed contributions, of which approximately US$1.5 billion is owed for peacekeeping and approximately US$500 million is owed to the Regular Budget. The major debtors as of that date are as follows;

It should be noted that in the case of some Member States who are debtors, arrears from previous years are involved, whereas others have financial procedures which involve delays in payment on a current year basis. Ireland pays its assessed contributions in full and on time.

Whilst the US Administration strongly opposes the severity of the Congressional proposals, there is an ongoing US policy to link payment of arrears to reform of the UN system, particularly in its budgetary and financial aspects. The election of Mr. Kofi Annan as the new Secretary General was widely viewed as diplomatic coup for the US, and hopes were raised that this might prompt the US to pay its substantial arrears. During its visit to the UN in February 1997 the Secretary General briefed the Sub-Committee on his meeting with the US President and with Capitol Hill. He felt that some progress had been made and the US are satisfied with the proposal to reform and indicated they will pay the outstanding debt. While the delegation was in New York, the US paid an instalment of $100M.

Ireland’s UN Contributions

The Regular Budget Scale of Assessment for 1995-97 has provided for an increase in our assessed contribution, as follows;

Assessments for peacekeeping operations arise at various times during the year on the basis of Security Council resolutions and decision by the various financial bodies of the UN. Our 1996 contributions to the UN regular, peacekeeping and international criminal tribunal budgets were IR£1,451,439, IR£1,590,544, and US$38,404, respectively, amounting to a total Irish contribution to the UN for 1996 of IR£3,090,417. This compares with a 1995 total of IR£5,528,362, of which IR£1,415,975 was paid to the Regular Budget and IR£4,097380 went towards peacekeeping and the international criminal tribunals.

UN Arrears Owed to Ireland

As at 31 December, 1996, Ireland was owed approximately IR£12 million by the UN for costs arising from our participation in UN peacekeeping operations, with a breakdown as follows;

The Department of Foreign Affairs continues to pursue the issue of peacekeeping arrears owed to Ireland on a regular basis with the UN Secretariat. Ireland and her EU partners are firm in their view that notwithstanding the current financial crisis, the UN has a clear obligation to make an early and full settlement of the arrears owing with regard to peacekeeping to Member States.

Perception of Ireland Within the UN

Ireland is seen as making a distinctive contribution on a range of issues and as influencing our EU partners in this context. During the Committee’s visit to New York in 1997 there was widespread praise for Ireland’s peacekeepers from the Secretary General and others at U.N. Headquarters.

Conclusions

The Committee acknowledges the singular role which the United Nations Organisation has played over the past half century and should continue to play in the future, in the fostering and preservation of international peace, stability and human rights. This having been said however, the Committee is fully cognisant of the structure of the organisation and that, without the goodwill and cooperation of its component members, the UN’s achievements will fall short of what is feasible.

Security Council (Secco)

The Committee is of the view that the membership of the Security Council should be extended, but in a balanced way e.g. a balance should be struck between the regions, the small and large nations, North and South and with rotating membership within identified groupings.

The Committee supports the retention of a veto within certain limits. It should be confined to the present 5 permanent members and only to Chapter VII matters. In addition, a veto should only have effect if at least one other veto member supports the measure.

General Assembly

The General Assembly’s role relative to peace activity outside the peace enforcement area should be enhanced. A specific mechanism should be established to keep members closely informed of matters under consideration by the Security Council.

Secretariat

The Committee recommends that a strong, central unit charged with coordinating and planning all peace related humanitarian, political and military activities be established. The Committee also recommends that a similar unit be established to coordinate information from all UN and other agencies both for the purpose of crisis prevention and for effective operations. The Committee is pleased with the valuable work of the Lessons Learned Unit and feel more resources should be put at its disposal. It acknowledges that a good deal of reform has already taken place within the Secretariat. It urges further reform to make the organisation more effective and to take account of equal opportunities for men and women.

UN Finance

In its fifty-second year, the United Nations Organisation faces a difficult financial situation. A small number of larger member states are responsible for the bulk of the arrears on the UN Regular Budget and on the Peacekeeping Operations Budget. However, the US have entered negotiations with the new Secretary General, Mr. Kofi Annan and have made an initial payment of a part of their arrears with a promise that the rest will be forthcoming by 1999. Ireland pays its assessed contributions to the UN in full and on time, as all Member States are required to do so under the Charter.

The Committee appeals particularly to the larger member state countries to pay their mandatory contributions in full and on time. The Committee recommends that there should be some means which the UN can use to convince the defaulting countries to pay these assessed contributions.

The Government should continue to seek the re-imbursement of monies owed to Ireland for its peacekeeping missions. However, in the meantime neither this non-payment nor the failure of other Member States to make their contributions should detract from Ireland’s commitment to the UN and particularly our participation in peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

Preventive Diplomacy

The Secretary General should consider a more enhanced diplomatic service dedicated to preventative diplomacy with a specific budget. Ireland should examine its resources to establish if it can assist the Secretary General in his need for special representatives. The Committee supports the Tánaiste’s proposal for the establishment of a Mediation Body, with expert staffing, to which difficult issues could be referred. To enable the UN to establish a unit for the prevention of conflicts the Committee recommends the temporary secondment, for short periods, to the UN of experienced diplomatic staff from Member States.

Intra-State Conflict

The Sub-Committee were reminded during their visit to U.N. Headquarters in New York that even where there is bloody conflict intra-state the UN cannot be involved unless it is invited by the authorities of that State. The Committee believes that some way must be found to allow the UN to intervene in such cases. To bring this about the Committee suggests that a reformed Security Council or the setting up of a specially designated UN Court to deal with such cases should be considered.

Sanctions

Where preventative means fail, the imposition of sanctions should be a first step prior to the consideration of military intervention. The Committee supports the Secretary General’s principles relative to the imposition of sanctions, including the need for clearly stated objectives, criteria for fulfilment, and equity in burden sharing vis-à-vis affected countries. The Committee also accepts the need to define the timescale for success in realistic terms and to have it incorporated in mandates. Sanctions must always be applied with the consent of the UN and on a universal not unilateral basis.

Peacekeeping

The Committee, aware that peacekeeping is seen by the public to be the primary role of the UN and acknowledging that the UN has performed great services to humanity through its activities in this area, fully supports the UN’s continued use of peacekeeping as a means of resolving conflicts. The Committee is unanimous in supporting the continuing and the strengthening of Ireland’s role in UN peacekeeping.

Peace Enforcement

Specific criteria should be drawn up defining the parameters for intervention and addressing, in particular, the relationship of grave violations of human rights to the question of the inviolability of sovereignty. Peace enforcement operations should only be considered when peacekeeping has not been successful and after the specific criteria have been met. Peace enforcement operations should not only attempt to carry out humanitarian objectives e.g. the relief of starvation and the protection of civilians in cases of grave violations of human rights e.g. genocide but, should also attempt to bring about a workable political settlement or stop a major war. Its operation in former Yugoslavia for the Paris Peace Agreement was a success and it was considered for Eastern Zaïre.

The Committee agrees that the UN, when lacking its own resources, should use the resources of regional organisations to carry out its mandate in the case of peace enforcement.

The Committee supports the use of peace enforcement in certain cases. However, it is strongly of the view that

-troops selected for peace enforcement or peacekeeping must be trained for the task and must be adequately equipped to perform the tasks set for them.

-the Security Council should not give a mandate for peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations without providing proper resources to carry the mandate through to completion.

-there should be one central command in the field for operations which should be directly responsible to the UN Secretary General and

-the Security Council should retain control of the political objectives of the mission.

Military Intervention

The UN should attempt, as far as possible, to maintain impartiality between the warring parties in peace enforcement operations. Military intervention should be used only where there are well-defined objectives.

Somalia

The UN has post-withdrawal obligations in Somalia. The Committee recommends that a peace re-building plan should be put into operation parallel to that in operation in Cambodia.

Former Yugoslavia

The UN’s early role in Bosnia-Herzegovina proved wanting at crucial moments. It failed miserably to protect the so-called “safe havens”. However, its humanitarian efforts through UNHCR and support troops alleviated a great deal of hardship and saved lives. IFOR on the other hand, has proved very successful. The use of this model of regional forces acting for the UN in peace enforcement, should be considered for future UN peace enforcement operations. Peace enforcement and peacekeeping elements must be clearly distinguished and separated.

Lebanon

The Committee is very pleased with Ireland’s UNIFIL operation. It is obvious that our troops have built up an excellent rapport with the local people while acting in a completely impartial manner. UNIFIL continues to make a useful contribution to South Lebanon and thus the Committee recommends that Ireland should maintain its commitment in the Lebanon until the UN mandate has been fulfilled.

General

The Committee accepts that peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations should be clearly separated. It is not possible in any meaningful way to mix the consensual approach of the smaller countries with the assertive approach of the larger countries. The dynamics of peacekeeping and peace enforcement are incompatible.

The lessons learned from the operation in Somalia can be applied in most areas of conflict and should form the basic criteria for peace-keeping operations in the future. The Committee agrees with the 15 Lessons outlined in by the UN but would suggest that in addition Lesson 2 could be expanded to read that transition from Chapter VII to VI or vice versa should be undertaken with resources, personnel and equipment which are correct for the task they are called on to perform. With regard to Lesson 3, while the Committee fully accepts that the UN does not currently have the mandate to involve itself intra-State unless it is requested by the parties involved in conflict, it is of the view that the changes, as mentioned previously under Intra-State Conflict, should be made to the UN terms of reference to allow the organisation’s involvement into intra-State conflict in certain cases.

Relative to multifunctional operations, informal general parameters should be established which would indicate the level of commitment necessary for success in the various functional areas of an operation, military, police and civilian.

Rapid Reaction/Deployment

The Committee supports a Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS) and welcomes Ireland’s commitment to the Rapidly Deployable Mission HQ (FORD). The Committee believes that early reaction, using the criteria of lessons learned by the UN, to crisis situations arising will allow the UN to separate warring factions before situations get out of hand.

Training

The Committee recommends that the training of army battalions should include a course on local cultures and the need to understand and respect them. A Training Unit should be set up which could interact with national training units and assist in establishing standard manuals for various kinds of operations and for cooperation between agencies.

Disarmament

The Committee recommends that commitments to nuclear and chemical\biological weapons nonproliferation, nuclear and chemical/biological weapons disarmament, the reduction of conventional forces in Europe and to the reduction of trading in arms of all kinds must be reinforced. It is pleased with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty signed by over 140 countries and sees it as an historic step in the process of nuclear disarmaments.

The Committee calls for stringent measures to be taken to control the sale of arms especially to countries in conflict. It reiterates its constant call for the banning of all anti-personnel land-mines and laser blinding weapons.

Ireland’s Role

Ireland should increase its present commitment to UN peace activity. Ireland should participate subject to the following conditions:

Ireland upholds the rule of international law, the peaceful resolution of conflict and is committed to human rights for all. In its future policy on peace activity, Ireland must balance these imperatives with the skills it has acquired to date and its international reputation for impartiality. Ireland’s skills lie in the areas of peace keeping/observing/building and in related humanitarian activities. Ireland should best contribute to international peace by continuing to provide personnel for peacekeeping and humanitarian missions for which there continues to be an undiminished demand. Ireland should also respond to the change in the nature of conflict which demands more assertive intervention on the part of the UN within the limits which our Constitution allows.

CHAPTER I - BACKGROUND

SUBCOMMITTEE DECISIONS

The Subcommittee was established to consider the reform of the UN. However as the scope of reform encompasses all of the major UN Institutions and most of its activities the Sub-Committee decided that its report should focus on peacekeeping/enforcement and the relevance of UN reforms to it.

Reforms have been underway for some time at an institutional level in the UN i.e. in the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Secretariat. Each of these institutional areas has a role to play in the UN’s peace activity. The Secretary General’s Agenda for Peace of 1992 set the terms of the debate. In it he addressed the respective roles of preventative diplomacy, peace keeping and peace enforcement. The extent of Security Council Representation and its decision making process as well as a new enhanced role for the General Assembly are major institutional questions with implications for UN peace activities.

3The Subcommittee wished to identify and clarify, inter alia, the policy basis and criteria for Irish participation in peacekeeping/enforcement and the longer term consequences for Ireland, the criteria for UN intervention and its adequacy, and the adequacy of the resources provided for it.

(i)Meetings with Department of Foreign Affairs officials, with special reference to peace issues and further meetings to discuss outcomes and voting patterns.

(iii)Visits to a peacekeeping and peace enforcement area viz Lebanon and Somalia.

SCOPE OF THE REPORT

The first section of the Report will deal with the UN’s peace activity, a term intended to encompass the range of activity from peace making to peace enforcement. The report will consider the implications of broad reform at the institutional level for UN peace efforts will draw conclusions and make recommendations.

In dealing with the UN’s peace activities the report will look first at the Charter background, the initial evolution of UN peace activity, the emergence of the traditional model of peacekeeping and Irish involvement in the Lebanon.

The report will outline the dramatic change which has come about since 1988 and its implications both for the nature of conflict and the nature of the UN’s response. The peace enforcement model will be looked at in the light of the Irish experience in Somalia and the experience of the UN in former Yugoslavia. The new multifunctional model involving military, police and civilian participation will also be examined in the light of Irish involvement in Cambodia and Namibia in particular. The report will also look at the interaction between the military and humanitarian aspects of peace activity. The reform of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the UN Secretariat will then be examined.

8In dealing with each section the Report will take account of the Secretary General’s views, the evidence heard by the Committee either in formal meetings or through visits to the UN, New York, UN Geneva, Somalia and the Lebanon and the outcomes of UNGA. It is also intended to note Government policy on each area and to highlight the questions which arise.

CHAPTER II - CHARTER BACKGROUNDAND THE RESOLUTIONS OF CONFLICTS/IRELAND'S ROLE

Origin of the UN

2.1The United Nations Organisation was established just over fifty years ago in San Francisco at the end of the second world war. It replaced the League of Nations and it was designed to try to prevent further war, to protect Human Rights, the rights of individual men and women, the rights of nations, and to promote economic development and social justice world wide. The Charter which was signed by 51 countries (excluding Ireland) in San Francisco stated that the United Nations Organisation would:

-develop friendly relations between nations based on respect for the principle of the equal rights and self-determination of people and

-strive to achieve international continued-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion.

The Security Council, (SECCO) the General Assembly, and the Secretary General were each given important roles although the role of the Security Council was paramount.

2.3The Security Council is mandated to take decisions on behalf of the member states of the UN. These decisions are binding on all members under the Charter. SECCO has a narrow agenda concentrating in particular on peace issues. The General Assembly has a broader agenda. Decisions by the General Assembly are not legally binding but have political and moral weight.

CHAPTERS IV AND VI

2.4Chapter VI of the Charter is entitled the “Pacific Settlement of Disputes”. It establishes procedures which both the Security Council and the General Assembly can use in attempting to resolve disputes. The Security Council can call upon the parties to a dispute to settle it by peaceful means and recommend appropriate procedures to this end. It may investigate any dispute to determine if it endangers the maintenance of international peace and security. If all the parties to any dispute request it the Security Council can make specific settlement recommendations to them with a view to a specific settlement of the dispute.

2.5Chapter IV provides that the General Assembly may discuss questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security (Article 11). It may make recommendations to the States concerned, to members of the United Nations generally or to the Security Council. Any question on which action is necessary must be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. Article 12 precludes the General Assembly from making recommendations on matters of which the Security Council is already seized.

CHAPTER VII

2.6Chapter VII of the Charter is entitled “Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression”. The Security Council may take preventative or enforcement measures and the clear intent of the Chapter is that this should be done in a graduated manner. The Security Council first determines the existence of a threat to the peace. It may then call on the parties to comply with provisional measures. In the event of failure, it may decide on measures including economic sanctions and the severance of diplomatic relations. Article 42 establishes the basis for armed intervention. The Security Council may take necessary action by air, sea or land forces to maintain or restore international peace and security. These may include blockades and operations by air, sea or land.

2.7Article 43 provides that all members make available to the SECCO by agreement the armed forces, assistance and facilities necessary to maintain peace and security. Article 45 provides that in order to enable the UN to undertake urgent military measures, members would hold immediately available national airforce contingents for combined international enforcement action. A Military Staff Committee, consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members, was established to advise and assist the Security Council on all matters relating to its military requirements. The MSC was to be responsible for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. No command structures were legislated for.

ORIGINAL FAILURE TO UNDERTAKE PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

2.8The five permanent members of the Security Council, are Britain, France, China, the Russian Federation (successor to the Soviet Union) and the United States. Each has a veto on decisions ¹. Almost at the very outset of the organisation the permanent members became locked into the Cold War. This prevented SECCO from undertaking peace enforcement operations in the manner originally envisaged under Chapter VII. Because of the Cold War the permanent members could not agree on the armed forces necessary for the UN and no special agreements between member States and SECCO were negotiated. The Council therefore during this time found it very difficult to declare that international peace and security was threatened or breached because of the use of the veto by the permanent members.

2.9Between 1945 and 1990 the Security Council made only five explicit declarations including Palestine in 1948, Korea in 1950 (in the absence of the Soviet Union) and South Africa in 1977. The use of force has been authorised on only five occasions, in Korea, the Congo, 1961, Rhodesia 1966 (sea blockade) and it gave its backing for the action against the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and for the IFOR action in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

IRELAND IN THE UN

2.10Ireland joined the United Nations Organisation on 14 December 1955. Since that time we have been very supportive of the Organisation’s endeavours to live up to its mandate and we have played an important role particularly in United Nation’s humanitarian and peacekeeping efforts. The Irish public have always supported our involvement in these operations and are committed to our continued help for areas in need.

Irish Contribution to Peacekeeping

2.11Ireland has had a continuous presence in UN peacekeeping operations since 1958, mainly in the Middle East. However, following the end of the Cold War and the resultant change in the incidence and nature of conflict situations, Irish military and civilian personnel have served with the UN in many other parts of the globe, notably Former Yugoslavia and Africa. The extensive Irish participation in peacekeeping continues to be regarded in very positive terms by the Government, the Defence Forces, the Garda Siochana and the Irish public and has promoted a positive image of Ireland both within the international community and among all sides in mission areas. Unfortunately, service to the international community is not without cost, and to date 77 Irish personnel have died whilst serving on peacekeeping operations.

2.12From 1960 to the present, the Defence Forces have continuously provided an armed contingent to the UN, with the exception of a brief period in the 1970s. These contingents usually comprise an infantry battalion of approximately 600 personnel or an infantry group of over 400 personnel. Currently, the Irish contingent is stationed in South Lebanon with the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), where it has been since the inception of UNIFIL in 1978. The high-standing of the Defence Forces within UN peacekeeping is reflected in the senior positions to which Irish military personnel have been appointed in the past, including Force Commanders to the Operation des Nations Unies au Congo (ONUC) in what is now Zaïre, the UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNIFICYP), and UNIFIL. Since 1958, over 42,000 military personnel have served on UN peacekeeping operations.

2.13Although Irish military personnel have served on UN peacekeeping operations since 1958, Gardai have only done so since 1989, when a 50-strong contingent was sent to Namibia with the UN Transitional Assistance Group (UNTAG). Since then, approximately 400 members of the Garda Siochana have served with various UN mission throughout the world. This service has brought tributes not only from the UN but also from the local communities where Gardai have been based. It is because of this high reputation that Chief Superintendent Murphy was appointed by the UN as Commissioner of the UN civilian police component in Somalia in 1994 and that Assistant Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald was appointed Commissioner of the UN International Police Task Force (IPTF) in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1996.

2.14Until 1993, participation in UN peacekeeping operations by Irish military and civilian personnel was governed by the Defence (Amendment) Act of 1960 and the Garda Siochana Act of 1989, respectively. However, with the establishment of the UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) in 1992 - the first UN peace-enforcement as opposed to peacekeeping operation - changes to legislation were required to allow Irish personnel to serve with this mission. The result was the Defence (Amendment) Bill of 1993.

Current Irish Peacekeeping Commitments

2.15Currently, Irish military and civilian personnel serve with nine UN peacekeeping operations, the largest single commitment being to UNIFIL, with which a troop battalion is stationed. Irish peacekeeping personnel, as at January 1997, serve as follows;

CHAPTER III - TRADITIONAL MODEL/PEACEKEEPING

ROLE OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

3.1In the absence of agreement at the Security Council level the central role originally envisaged for the Security Council to a certain extent was fulfilled by the Secretary General and the General Assembly. Thus the practices process and general philosophy of peacekeeping evolved in accordance with the provisions of Chapter VI of the Charter. Peace activity became consensual both in terms of organisation and of implementation. The General Assembly involved itself in a relatively close relationship with the Security Council which has the responsibility of making decisions involving military intervention.

THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

3.2Under the UN Charter (Article 24) the Security Council holds primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, decisions relative to conflict situations made by the Security Council, were based on the provisions of Chapter VI rather than on Chapter VII. The Security Council urged and persuaded rather than ordered and enforced. From time to time it authorised the use of military personnel which were provided by member States, directed by the Secretary General and funded in part by the UN.

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING PEACEKEEPING

3.3The Secretary General in his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace of January 1995 outlined the basic principles underlying peace keeping operations as follows, consent of the parties, impartiality and the use of force only in self defence. Deployment could take place only with the permission of the host state. Peacekeepers were to observe ceasefires, separate the combatants and assist in maintaining internal law and order. They could use force only in self-defence. Observers were to be unarmed.

THE IRISH EXPERIENCE OF PEACEKEEPING/LEBANON MODEL

3.4In order better to understand the elements of both peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations the Subcommittee sent, in February/March 1994, a delegation, consisting of a member of each House and a member of the Secretariat, to visit Irish troops in the Lebanon and in Somalia respectively. The Committee also heard evidence from the Departments of Foreign Affairs and Defence on both operations.

3.5Relative to the Lebanon the Committee received evidence both in session and in the field on the nature of peacekeeping itself, the specific mandate, its interpretation, its relationship to questions of command and control, the skills required for its implementation and its level of success.

THE UNIFIL MANDATE

3.6Lt. Col. Martin* said that in Southern Lebanon the UN mandate is to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, to restore peace and to restore Lebanese authority. A further responsibility is to facilitate humanitarian aid. Major General Furuhovde, the then Force Commander of UNIFIL defined UNIFIL’s role as “military supportive action to peace making”. He said it was the responsibility of the various adversaries to resolve the political problem.

3.7 The UN mandate is implemented in the field in a variety of ways including:

(i)Comprehensive foot and mobile patrols conducted in the area of operations (AO);

(iii)Checkpoints controlling traffic and deterring movement of armed elements in the AO;

Command and Control

3.8The line of command was clear. The Battalion was under the operational control of the UN force commander located at Naquoura. The Battalion Officer Commanding worked for and to the force commander. Lt. Col. Martin said that UNIFIL policy was to maintain a unified approach and to avoid operations in isolation.

Background on the Irish Battalion

3.9An Irish Battalion (IrishBatt) has served in Southern Lebanon since June 1978. Contingents consist normally of about 700 personnel mainly concentrated in one infantry battalion which is located in the South East sector.

3.10IrishBatt mans nineteen observation posts, eleven check points and patrols night and day. It also administers a humanitarian programme which is financed by the Department of Foreign Affairs, general UNIFIL support and its own fund-raising. The delegation visited each company area including a number of observation posts and checkpoints. It was briefed both at Battalion HQ and at each company HQ. This is probably the most difficult area politically in Southern Lebanon.

3.11The Irish Batt area is about 100 square kilometres and has a permanent population of about 30,000 people. It is bounded East and South by Israel. A ridge of Lebanese hills is occupied by the Israeli backed De Facto Forces. Lebanese Armed Elements within the area are principally Amal (which wishes to see Israeli withdrawal) and Hezbollah (which opposes the existence of the State of Israel). Relations with Amal are good. However Hezbollah does not recognise UNIFIL authority and the De facto Forces resent their presence. During a visit to Israel in January 1997 military authorities complained of impartiality by the Irish troops in South Lebanon. While this was withdrawn later by the Israeli political authorities it nevertheless shows the tension in the area and the difficulty for our troops.

Military activity/security risks

3.12The main problems are occasioned (i) by Lebanese Armed Elements (AE) attacks on De Facto Forces (DFF) compounds. The latter are located on high ground and return fire into the villages (ii) by the De Facto Forces/Israeli Defence Forces from mobile and other incursions and retaliatory shelling (which includes UN positions). On the AE side the main danger to UNIFIL forces arises from confrontations at checkpoints especially with active units of Hezbollah. Roadside bombs intended for Israeli targets are an additional threat. The delegation saw damage to housing and mosques which resulted from previous bombardments. Many local people have shelters attached to their housing where they can take refuge during bombardment. On the day the delegation departed, Hezbollah killed a number of people associated with the DFF in the Israeli controlled area and the DFF opened up on the IRISHBATT area with indiscriminate fire.

3.13Since the deployment of the first Irish troops in UNIFIL in 1978, 36 soldiers have died there. Of these, six died of natural causes. Of the 30 who were killed, 16 were on active service. Of those killed on active service the DFF were responsible in 7 cases and Armed Elements in 6 cases. One Irish soldier, in addition to the 36 who died, is missing presumed dead.

Humanitarian activities

3.14Irish Batt supports the local orphanage in Tibnin, sewerage work, and hospital services. It provides cover for harvesters in the fields and helps to repair damaged buildings. No formal training in development work is provided and much of the work is done by the troops on a voluntary basis.

Fulfilment of the mandate

3.15Major General Furohovde said that although UNIFIL had not been able to oversee an Israeli withdrawal it had absolutely succeeded in the following:

3.16The Irish side concurred with the above. The UN mandate and presence had not only provided protection for the local population and enabled them to remain in their home areas but has assured the ultimate integrity of the Lebanese territory.

3.17UNIFIL policy was now to normalise Southern Lebanon as quickly as possible and the remit of the Lebanese army was being extended southwards. Irish naval vessels on resupply duties were among the first to call at Beirut port after it was reopened. This was deeply appreciated by the Lebanese who are rapidly rebuilding their economy. Economic opportunities are already opening up to Ireland and the ESB has gained the supervisory consultancy on rehabilitation work being carried out in the electricity sector.

Political progress

3.18The then Force Commander said that in the year previous to March 1994 the Israeli attitude had changed. The Israelis were making a definite effort to educate their troops about the meaning of peacekeeping. Now international law was accepted as applying to both sides. Both the Force Commander and the Irish side felt that Syria which supported Hezbollah was the key to peace in South Lebanon.

Irish concerns re. honouring of mandate

3.19The Irish side, at the time of the Committees visit in 1994, voiced some concern that a Syrian/Israeli peace agreement might tolerate a continued Israeli presence in South Lebanon in return for a continued Syrian presence in the Bekaa Valley thus frustrating the UN mandate. The Force Commander would not put a time limit on UNIFIL involvement in Southern Lebanon. He felt that factionalism would continue and that the next generation would see peace work. In this context reconstruction and in particular youth education would be crucial.

Delegation views

3.20The delegation was convinced that the UNIFIL presence in Southern Lebanon remains essential despite the gradual reintroduction of a Lebanese Army presence in the South. It also felt that the Irish contribution, based on the skills acquired during many years of peacekeeping, was an important one in a particularly difficult area. The delegation was convinced that the Irish contribution should continue until the UN mandate has been fulfilled. The Committee believes that Irish UNIFIL troops act in a totally impartial manner between both sides and over the years have played a major role in the endeavouring to bring peace to the area.

Troop Conditions

3.21The delegation noted that while Irish troops face a real risk of death or injury, the Irish battalion is well protected both with armour, when necessary, and with bunkers. The delegation was not impressed by the housing conditions of the troops. Accommodation was erected more than sixteen years ago on a temporary basis and at the time of the visit had not been improved upon. It contrasted unfavourably with the suitably adapted accommodation provided for the troops in Somalia. The delegation noted that work on a new and more safely located base camp was under way. (This new camp has since been completed and Battalion HQ is now located there.) Nevertheless it felt that urgent improvements in troop accommodation throughout the Irish Batt area were called for.

Morale

3.22The delegation was impressed with the high level of morale in both Lebanon and Somalia. However it felt that the monthly five minute phone call to Ireland afforded to each serving member was inadequate. It also felt that the basis for allowances should be examined to ensure its appropriateness relative to UN contingent standards generally and to in-country conditions in particular. Getting out leave, particularly in the context of an isolated mission like Baidoa in Somalia, was another area that the delegation felt deserved examination.

OBSERVER MISSIONS

3.23Observer missions are also an important aspect of peacekeeping. Ireland has been involved in observer missions since 1958. At present 42 officers are serving in five different missions.

3.24The conditions applying to observers are that they be self sufficient, unarmed and operating with the consent of the parties. Peacekeeping experience is usually a requirement. Tasks performed include monitoring ceasefire agreements and troop dispositions.

CHAPTER IV-RESPONSE TO CHANGE/PEACEMAKING

INTERNATIONAL CHANGES

4.1In 1987 President Gorbachev introduced a more cooperative approach within the Security Council and since then the Security Council has developed a significant role in dealing with international disputes. Since the demise of the former Soviet Union SECCO has increased its use

of the wide range of methods available to it in the Charter.

4.2Ironically the fall of Communism has also presented the Security Council with a host of new and complex problems. The end of the Cold War had profound effects in countries bordering Russia. Ethnic tensions came quickly to the surface and rapidly developed into open conflict. At the same time many older conflicts in Africa and Asia, whose protagonists had been armed and encouraged by the Superpowers for their own ends, continued to fester, bereft of their geopolitical significance.

UN’S RESPONSE TO CHANGE

4.3In January 1992 The Security Council met for the first time at Head of State and Government level. The Secretary General was requested to make recommendations on how to strengthen and make more efficient the capacity of the UN for preventative diplomacy, peacemaking and peacekeeping. The result was the Secretary Generals Agenda for Peace. This dealt with all three problems and added the related concept of post conflict peace-building. It also referred in passing to peace enforcement.

EVOLUTION OF UN PEACE ACTIVITIES

4.4The former Secretary General last year analysed the evolution of UN peace activities in response to change in a document entitled “Supplement to an Agenda for Peace” issued in January 1995.

4.5In quantitative terms there has been an enormous increase in activity. In 1987 the Security Council adopted fifteen resolutions, in 1994, seventy eight. In the year preceding 1987 the UN was actively involved in eleven disputes, five peacekeeping operations and had 9,570 military personnel deployed along with 35 police and 1516 civilians. In 1994 the Security Council adopted seventy eight resolutions, the UN was involved in twenty eight disputes and had seventeen operations. In 1997 the number of peacekeeping operations are sixteen and 25,000 personnel (military and civilian) provided by 71 Member States are deployed. The cost was 3.3 billion dollars. The UN had no electoral involvement in 1986/7 but was involved in twenty one electoral activities in 1994. Involvement in sanctions regimes has risen dramatically.

4.6Operations have also changed in qualitative terms. A great majority of disputes are now Intra-State and extraordinarily complex. UN forces are called upon to protect humanitarian operations. Operations in the field have become multifunctional and are designed to implement agreements between conflicting parties. Some operations now involve post conflict peace building to ensure a permanent state of peace among the parties.

INTRA STATE CONFLICT

4.7Intra state conflict poses particular difficulties. In 1988 of the UN’s five peace keeping operation four related to inter-state wars and one to intra-state conflict. Of the twenty one operations established since then, eight have related to interstate wars and thirteen to intra-state conflicts. Most of the operations established since January 1992 relate to intra-state conflicts. These intra-state conflicts are characterised by undisciplined militia, targeting of civilians, an increase in refugees and the collapse of state institutions. In response international intervention now extends beyond military and humanitarian tasks and includes the promotion of national reconciliation and the reestablishment of effective government. Thus peacekeeping has become far more complex and more expensive and time consuming with serious implications for field deployment and hugely increased burdens on headquarters staff. Moreover, the involvement by the UN in intra-State Affairs has to be by invitation.

INSTRUMENTS FOR PEACE AND SECURITY

4.8The former Secretary General identified the following as the most important instruments for controlling and resolving conflicts: preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace building, disarmament, sanctions and peace enforcement. The first three can be used only with the consent of the parties to a conflict.

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY AND PEACEMAKING

This report has already dealt with the classic peacekeeping model. It will now look at the UN’s response to the challenge of change particularly at the key issues of preventative diplomacy and peacemaking.

4.9While it is axiomatic to say that prevention of conflict is better than peacekeeping after hostilities have broken out, it has proven quite difficult for the UN to introduce a system of preventative diplomacy. Among the barriers to the introduction of the system are lack of funding and the current reluctance of parties in dispute to ask the UN to mediate a settlement.

-The possibility that the concept of territorial sovereignty may have its limits.

-In the case of intra-state disputes the concept of sovereignty should also include good internal government and in democracies, majorities must respect minorities and minorities must accept obligations (non-violence in particular)

Charter background

4.10Under Article 99 of the Charter the Secretary General may bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which may in his opinion threaten the maintenance of international peace and security. To fulfill this obligation the Secretary General has engaged in fact-finding missions, and in Good Offices diplomacy without a formal mandate from the political organs.

Response to change

4.11The Security Council in its declaration of 31 January 1992 (S/23500) mandated the Secretary General to give priority to preventative and peacemaking activities. A first response at the administrative level was the creation of a Department of Political Affairs which is now organised to follow political developments closely in order to provide early warning of impending conflicts. To date the actual administrative structures necessary to implement preventative measures have not been put in place in any comprehensive or meaningful manner.

4.12 Preventive Deployment

One of the new preventive measures introduced by the United Nations is preventive deployment where UN troops are placed between States in dispute in an endeavour to prevent the escalation of terrorism between both sides into armed conflict. Currently the United Nations has deployed troops for this purpose in the former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia. Assistant Secretary General Eisele in the Peace-keeping Operations Department told the Sub-Committees delegation visiting the UN in 1997 that this force, UNPREDEP, has been successful and has helped the situation in Macedonia.

A UN Diplomatic Service

4.13The former Secretary General drew attention to the difficulty of finding senior people to serve as special representatives and the need to establish a budgetary and legal basis for small field missions. A basic question is whether or not the Secretary General should have a form of diplomatic service and the scope of such (universal or in sensitive areas only). A UN diplomatic service might be headed by the SG’s own representative, who would coordinate the activities of all UN agencies present on the ground and who would have the right to fact-find on any matter covered by the Charter in particular, relative to minority, economic and human rights. The composition of delegations could vary in their skills according to the nature of the problems encountered. If this investment were undertaken it could be argued that significant amounts of money presently being demanded for peace activities involving the military could be avoided. Because of the budgetary problems within the UN there is no funding for this currently.

Information systems

4.14Another question which arises is whether the Secretary General’s information system is in fact adequate. Is there sufficient cooperation between the specialised Agencies and the Secretary General’s Office? Is there a means of gathering or sharing military intelligence and how effectively is this being done? Erskine Childers (formerly a member of the UN Secretariat) pointed out the need to radically improve the UN’s ability to anticipate crisis by building early warning networks at regional level, among the NGOs and in the Secretariat itself. His view was that with instant global communication no crisis simply erupts without warning. An alert organisation should be able to facilitate conciliation before crises such as Rwanda or IRAQ/Kuwait get out of hand. In its response to the Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Ireland has already put on record its support for the effective early warning role which UN Agencies and in particular ECOSOC can play.

4.15The former Secretary General stated in his report that the greatest problem encountered thus far is not a lack of information but a lack of willingness to accept UN help. If preventative diplomacy is to succeed a request for or at least acquiescence in UN action is legally and politically a sine qua non.

Mediation Body

4.16Another preventative possibility, mooted by Ireland at UNGA 49, and again raised in 1995 at UNGA 50, is the creation of a Mediation Body, with expert staffing and properly resourced, to which the Security Council and the General Assembly could refer difficult issues. The Government believes that in time this body could enhance the peacemaking capabilities of the United Nations.

International Court of Justice

4.17The Secretary General in this Agenda for Peace recommends that all UN member States should accept the ruling of the Court as a means of resolving inter-State disputes.

AGENDA FOR DEVELOPMENT/ROOT CAUSES OF CONFLICT

4.18Much greater focus is now being given to the question of the causes of strife worldwide. The Secretary General in his annual report to the General Assembly (September 1994) pointed out that the foundation of peace lies in the realm of development. However, the international community has not responded in a concerted manner to development needs. The Secretary General said that if the sources of conflict were tackled the UN would in fact, fulfill the original aims of the Charter, ie peace, justice, human rights and development.

4.19UNGA 49 in 1994 discussed the Secretary General’s second report on the Agenda for Development. In general, third world countries found the report weak on the debt problem and on the international financing of development. They wish the UN to have a stronger role in the policies of the Bretton Woods institutions. Erskine Childers pointed out in his paper to the White Paper Seminar on the UN organised by the Department of Foreign Affairs that the General Assembly which is charged in the Charter with “the economic and social advancement of all peoples” was intended to adopt policies to guide the specialised agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank and the World Trade Organisation. In the event, he said, the great powers and not the UN are effectively in control of these organisations. While one in four of the world’s population lives in absolute poverty the IMF’s structural adjustment policies are, in his view, endangering the gains made in health, educational services thus leading to upheaval. Unless UN economic leadership for the advancement of all is effective progressive international convulsion will overwhelm the UN’s peacekeeping capabilities. The UNDP Administrator Mr. Gus Speth told the delegation visiting New York in 1997 that, while the UN tries to adopt a co-ordinating role in helping post conflict regions with the various world agencies, like WHO, UNICEP, IMF etc., sometimes it is not as effective as it might be because some of the agencies are not amenable to direction.

MULTIFUNCTIONAL OPERATIONS

4.20The nature of the UN operations in the field has changed dramatically since 1987. UN operations have been predominantly military in nature and were normally deployed after a ceasefire and before settlement of a conflict. Now a new kind of peace keeping operation involves mandates which seek to help the parties to a dispute to implement a comprehensive settlement already negotiated (e.g. Namibia., Angola, El Salvador, Cambodia, Mozambique). Both military and civilian matters are involved, supervision of ceasefires, demobilization, reintegration into civilian life, destruction of weapons, de-mining, return of displaced persons, humanitarian assistance, institution building, human rights, elections and economic reconstruction.

CAMBODIA/NAMIBIA

4.21An example of Irish involvement in a multifunctional operation was the participation of Irish military and police in the UN operations in Cambodia and in Namibia which have been acknowledged as successes for the UN.

4.22The Cambodian operation was the largest ever undertaken by the UN with over 20,000 personnel (including 485 military observers) at a cost of two billion dollars. The main difficulty was Khmer Rouge disruption. UN Military Observers were involved in the planning and layout of registration/polling sites in the absence through fear of many electoral personnel.

Irish Involvement/Cambodia

4.23Lt. Col. Whelan in his evidence to the Subcommittee said that he was charged to head the task force in Cambodia and to organise and supervise the new Cambodian Armed forces. Col. Whelan said that the operation succeeded in large measure because sufficient resources were allocated but also and crucially because the UN force, which was numerically significant, reacted in self defense to Khmer Rouge attacks in the Northern areas with the result that the Khmer Rouge backed off. This claim was disputed by a Geneva based UNHCR representative (Mr. Anne Willem Bijleveld) who briefed a Subcommittee delegation on UNHCR operations in both Cambodia and former Yugoslavia. He said it was not correct to say that a major turning point in the operation was when UNTAC faced up to the Khmer Rouge. Skirmishes were often elevated by the media into major confrontations.

UNHCR/Cambodia

4.24In Cambodia the UNHCR became involved subsequent to the peace agreement. Its task was to repatriate up to 350,000 refugees so that they could participate in the elections. Peacekeepers provided security to convoys of refugees to reception centres and to their destinations.

Differences in UNHCR/Military Ethos

4.25In principle the process of cooperation worked well. The main problem was the differing management structures of both the UNHCR and the military. The UNHCR works in a decentralised manner, is grass-rooted and had to be flexible in dealing with immediate and localised problems. The military is highly centralised and inflexible when under orders. Both sides had to work hard on establishing a modus vivendi. However, military rotation intervened and the process had to constantly restart. Some elements of the UN military force had problems dealing with the local cultures and misunderstood the UNHCR approach. The UNHCR was now working on devising a curriculum for peacekeepers to promote understanding of the UNHCR and the nature of humanitarian operations.

Police Operations

4.26This represents a new element in UN peace activities and Ireland has been actively involved in it from the outset. Assistant Commissioner Fitzgerald gave evidence to the Subcommittee about the nature of Irish police involvement in UN peace activities. During the Namibian elections he was District Commander in Ovamboland. In Cambodia he was chief of operations. He also prepared a report on El Salvador which became the basis for a successful police operation there in the context of ending the civil war. He headed the UN police operation in Bosnia Herzegovina.

4.27The main function of the 3,600 UN police in Cambodia was supervisory. Where efficiency demanded some major investigations were taken over from the local police. Problems were caused by a lack of forward planning on the part of the UN, ill defined job descriptions and rankings and a lack of management with sufficient logistical skills.

Mandates

4.28UN mandates in Namibia and Cambodia differed. In Namibia the UN Police were mandated to monitor or control the election process and the South African police in particular. In practice they were unable to exercise control. With this experience in mind the UN mandated the UN police in Cambodia to monitor and control the election process. Although both operations were ultimately successful the latter mandate proved much more satisfactory than the former. Differences in the formulation of the mandates are explicable in part by differences in the approach of the receiving Governments to agreements with the UN.

Human Rights

4.29Responsibilities in Namibia included monitoring breaches in human rights, returnees, supervising elections, registering voters and monitoring polling stations. Responsibilities were similar in Cambodia but with a stronger human rights element. A Human Right Officer was appointed in each province. Monitors discovered on arrival that the rule of law was almost non existent. They interpreted their mandate broadly in order to pressurise successfully for a court system and for due process. They also took the decision to remain unarmed. The upshot was that by the time of departure arbitrary arrest, incarceration, and execution at the hands of heavily armed and uncontrolled police had ceased and a normal judicial system relying to an extent on unarmed local police was operating.

LESSONS LEARNED UNIT

4.30While in New York in 1997 the Sub-Committee were briefed on the Lessons Learned Unit which has been set up in recent times. The Unit studies peacekeeping operations with a view to making future operations more efficient and effective. The studies are carried out as comprehensively as possible with the vertical (total operation) and horizontal (cross section) views being considered. So far they have issued reports on Somalia in 1995 and Rwanda in 1996. A mid-mission report will be issued on Haiti and Angola will be reported on in 1997 as a result of this exercise. They have produced a set of basic criteria for the assessment of peacekeeping operations. Already positive results, are flowing from such exercises, eg. it used to take 6/8 months to deploy peacekeeping troops now it is reduced to 3/4 months.

COMMENT

4.31The above clearly exemplifies the capacity of the UN to mount a successful operation and to learn both in the field and by its mistakes. The Lessons Learned Unit through their studies have proved this. The Mandate in Cambodia was carefully drawn up and sensibly interpreted on the ground. The problems arising at that time are also clearly defined, lack of forward planning by the UN, lack of definition in role and function, lack of expertise in logistics and the need to establish a common understanding in multifunctional operations between the military and other Agencies. There was a powerful argument for enhancing the UN’s planning capacity and the Lessons Learned Unit helps to fill part of this need. This Unit appears to have already proved its usefulness and the Committee feels it should be adequately funded and staffed to allow it to continue its work. The Committee were pleased to learn at UN Headquarters that, unlike the past, future operations will not take place without adequate resources.

The question of training for all agencies (including the military) involved in multinational operations is also important. Perhaps representatives of every agency should be involved in the training for each sector.

CHAPTER V - RESPONSE TO CHANGE/PEACE ENFORCEMENT

BACKGROUND

5.1The Secretary General has recently identified the use of United Nations forces to protect humanitarian operations particularly in lawless and chaotic conditions as another important qualitative change. This has led in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in Somalia to a new kind of operation. These kinds of operations have involved a combination of peacekeeping and peace enforcement both in terms of mandates and in terms of activity in the field. There is also the use, by the UN, of regional forces like IFOR to carry out the enforcement mandate for the UN.

5.2Before considering the former Secretary General’s views on change in this area the report will outline the general background to peace enforcement operations, views on the peace enforcement and the evidence the Subcommittee has received on the peace enforcement operation in Somalia as well as in former Yugoslavia.

SANCTIONS

5.3Enforcement can be effected either through sanctions or militarily. Article 41 of the Charter prescribes the use of economic methods when diplomatic means at persuading states to comply with the UN’s demands fail. In the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace the Secretary General points out that the purpose of sanctions is to modify the behaviour of a party that is threatening international peace and security not to punish or otherwise exact retribution.

Sanctions activity

5.4Sanctions get only a passing mention in An Agenda for Peace but have been highlighted in the recent past in the lead-up to and aftermath of the Gulf War and in relation to the former Yugoslavia. Arms embargoes have been imposed against South Africa in 1977 and Rhodesia in 1966. At present arms embargoes apply to Libya, Somalia, Rwanda and Serbia, Montenegro and Bosnia.

5.5In former Yugoslavia the UN has invoked Chapter 7 in imposing an arms embargo. Sanctions have been used in Bosnia to prevent the escalation of the war between the Serbs and the Bosnian Government. This came under bitter criticism from the latter. Bosnia claimed that it was deprived of the means to assert and protect its independence by the UN which is Charter bound to uphold and protect the independence and sovereignty of Member States. Economic sanctions have been used to put pressure of Serbia to support international peace plans. The WEU and NATO as appropriate regional organisations have been involved in imposing sanctions in the area both on the Danube and in the Adriatic.

Principles to be applied

5.6The Secretary General in the Supplement to An Agenda for Peace said that the objectives of sanctions regimes and objective criteria for their fulfilment need clear definition. The fact that the Security Council has changed the objectives over time leads to imprecision and makes it difficult to agree the point at which objectives have been achieved.

Problems in implementation

5.7Sanctions are a blunt instrument. They can frustrate humanitarian agencies in their objectives by denying them necessary supplies. They can also have severe effects on neighbouring countries. The Secretary General says that costs to neighbouring states should be borne equitably by all member states. The International financial institutions have been approached but have not agreed to make special provisions for such cases. The Secretary General has suggested that the following principles should apply:

Comment

5.8Ireland has expressed its support for the principles outlined above. Ireland’s commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict would also imply its support for the imposition of sanctions as a necessary step prior to military intervention, for the necessary mechanisms to determine if sanctions are working, including sufficient time to enable them to become effective and for their universal and not unilateral application.

MILITARY INTERVENTION

5.9Armed intervention is the ultimate sanction and rarely has been used in a direct sense by the UN. The operation against Iraq in 1991 was a case of direct military intervention with the sanction of the Charter. Two other cases where peace enforcement has been used, Somalia and the former Yugoslavia, are complex in nature. Both began as peacekeeping operations with a humanitarian objective. IFOR, now with a mandate from the UN, has taken over the role of peace enforcer in former Yugoslavia.

SOMALIA

5.10The UN reacted in the first instance to a humanitarian crisis. The genesis of the famine problem lay in the fact that the Somalia agricultural system on a four to five year cycle with secure food stocks to carry the population through anticipated rain failures. In Somalia famine occurred when food stores had either been looted or destroyed in the Civil War and thus the population had become highly vulnerable. Stocks needed to be built up again to establish food security but this required the maintenance of order. However the situation was chaotic and Government had ceased to exist.

Deployment

5.11The Security Council deployed a large scale military force to ensure that its decisions relative to a ceasefire and to the distribution of humanitarian aid were affected Security Council Resolution 794 invoked Chapter VII and authorised US led forces to use all necessary means to fulfill the mandate UN forces successfully secured the port and airport which were key to the transport of humanitarian supplies. Conditions were established which enabled humanitarian aid to be distributed widely throughout the country. The visiting delegation saw the results of the UN operation in Baidoas. It seemed to be successful.

Problems

5.12However, the UN appears to have abandoned its normal stance of impartiality by identifying General Aideed's faction as the principal stumbling block to peace. This, confined with the military ethos of the American forces which lacked the skills to deal with factionalism, led to Somalia accusations of partiality and ultimately to confrontation. Serious difficulties in terms of command and control were encountered during the operation. The US, as a lead nation, does not appear to have liaised closely with the Secretary General. Several of the contingents appeared to take their orders from their respective capitals rather than from central UN command. Ultimately, domestic pressure resulted in American withdrawal.

Delegation visit

5.13A delegation from the Subcommittee visited Somalia at a time when the first Irish contingent was about to rotate and thus was able to meet both the outgoing and incoming commanders at Baidoa, Comdt Maurice O’Donoghue and Comdt Dermot Conway respectively. The visit also came in the aftermath of a significant change in the UNOSOM mandate and at a time when American and all other European troop contingents were withdrawing.

Change in mandate

5.14Although the mandate was renewed under Chapter VII of the Charter the UN mission in Somalia took on more of a peacekeeping complexion. It was clearly recognised that the onus was on the parties to the conflict to achieve a political solution. UNOSOM was to assure the security necessary to enable political advances to be made but would not actively intervene in politics. UN legal, human rights and administrative experts, present in Somalia, were to assist with the latter. UNOSOM would however under Chapter VII authority retain control of ports and airports and was authorised to respond robustly if threatened with attack.

Visit to Mogadishu

5.15The delegation met Irish military personnel attached to UNOSOM HQ including the senior Irish representative, Lt. Col. Feardorcha Lee, UNOSOM Senior Staff Officer to the Chief of Staff. It also met Ambassador Richard Bogosian, Head of the U.S. Liaison Office, Stephenson McIlvaine, Deputy Head and other US diplomatic and military personnel.

Political Situation

5.16The US side gave an upbeat assessment of the political situation and appeared to have decided to use the carrot of financial inducement rather than the stick of military might to achieve progress. It was placing its faith in the reconstitution of a Somalia police force which it was heavily funding. US diplomats and Irish military informants felt that progress was being made in reconstituting Somalia administratively at district and regional level.

5.17Irish informants were measured in their assessment of the prospects for reconciliation at national level. The delegation noted that a new Developmental Plan for Somalia had been agreed by most factions which would require substantial input from abroad and close coordination among the various international and non-governmental agencies.

Visit to Baidoa

5.18The delegation met and stayed with the Irish company in Baidoa. The company was a logistics unit whose role was to transport supplies from Mogadishu for the five thousand strong Indian contingent of peacekeepers in Baidoa province. The contingent was responsible for the maintenance of order in the area, a condition that was vital to the effectiveness of humanitarian activities. Transport was effected by the Irish company under armed Indian protection. The company did not participate in peace enforcement activities directly.

5.19The delegation was impressed with the excellent organisation of the camp and of the contingent’s activities. It also noted the evident enthusiasm of the troops in response to a new kind of challenge. The Irish camp was viewed as a model of its kind in Somalia and attracted much favourable notice among other contingents stationed there. Relations with the Indian contingent, which appeared well organised in terms of layout and material, were excellent.

5.20The delegation noted that the UN contingents in Baidoa were isolated to a great extent from the local communities. Security considerations, because of the volatility of the factions, was a primary consideration. There was little scope, apart from engagement with the Orphanage and the Hospital for the use of the kinds of de-escalatory skills which were in evidence in the Lebanon and which have been until recently a marked characteristic of UN operations.

Humanitarian

5.21The delegation visited the orphanage and the hospital in Baidoa. Both institutions were being assisted directly by the Irish contingent in medical and material terms. Conditions in both institutions were grim. Food supplies were minimal. Medical attention was less than basic. The hospital had running water for three hours per day. (The Army had rigged up a more effective supply for the maternity unit). As no central Government existed no salaries were being paid and workers in both institutions were operating on a voluntary basis. The delegation felt at the time that Irish aid could have been increased to both institutions either via the Irish contingent or through the NGOs.

Concern/Development

5.22The delegation also visited the Concern HQ and met with a number of volunteers. Concern said that it had a generally good relationship with the local communities and was not unduly worried about the safety of its personnel at the time. Concern had, in effect, undertaken the funding of the educational system in Baidoa in the absence of a central administration. Twenty five thousand pupils were attending in the school system supported by Concern. There was coordination between the various NGOs on both a sectoral and geographical basis. There was a certain reluctance on the part of the NGOs to become closely identified with the UN forces possibly because of the history of UN engagement with the factions up to that time.

LESSONS LEARNED

5.23The UN operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) ended on 5 March 1995. While there were undoubted successes in the operation, including ending the starvation in the country, there were many problems. The newly formed Lessons Learned Unit attached to the Peace-keeping Department set up a review of the various aspects of the operation in Somalia and in December 1995 issued a Report. The following 15 Lessons were identified²:

2.Chapter VII and VI should not co-exist and transition from Chapter VII to Chapter VI must be smooth.

3.Peace-keeping forces should not enter a conflict area if there is no political will among the parties towards reconciliation.

5.Integrated planning is essential in order to deal with multi-dimensional problems in peace-keeping operations.

6.Operations in the field should be based on a fully developed, integrated structure headed by the Special Representative of the Secretary General.

9.Command and control must be unified and channel of command and directives clear.

13.There must be clear guidelines for disarmament and demobilisation and these activities must be carried out with the agreement of the parties.

14.The diplomatic community in the mission area is an essential part of the operation.

15.The humanitarian component is essential to the success of peace-keeping operations.

COMMENT

5.24The Committee wholeheartedly support the work of the Lessons Learned Unit and call for funding to be made available to carry out its valuable work. The lessons learned from the operation in Somalia can be applied in most areas of conflict and should form the basic criteria for peace-keeping operations in the future. The Committee would suggest that Lesson 2 could be expanded to read that transition from Chapter VII to VI or visa versa should be undertaken with resources, personnel and equipment which are correct for the task they are called on to perform. With regard to Lesson 3, while the Committee fully accepts that the UN does not currently have the mandate to involve itself intra-State unless it is requested by the parties involved in conflict, it is of the view that changes should be made to the UN terms of reference to allow the organisation’s involvement into intra-State conflict in certain cases.

FORMER YUGOSLAVIA

5.25After the break-up of former Yugoslavia the UN sent lightly armed peace-keepers (UNPROFOR) into the area to provide military assistance for humanitarian operations. However, the mandate ultimately took on elements of peace enforcement with the air exclusion zone, permission for troops to use military force if their movements were impeded, and the protection of safe havens. With the escalation of violence particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina the UN was unable to cope and there was a call for stronger measures.

5.26Under UN Security Council Resolution 1033 of 15 December 1995 a Multinational Implementation force (IFOR) acting in co-operation with NATO but with the co-operation of 16 other countries including Russia, was set up to implement the military provisions of the General Peace Agreement which was signed in Paris on 14 December. The UNPROFOR mandate was terminated on 20 December 1995. The Peace Agreement backed by IFOR has generally enabled the ceasefire to be maintained.

5.27Under UN Security Council Resolution 1035 of 21 December 1995 the UN established a mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina which combines three elements,

1)UN civil affairs to help refugees, defuse conflict and to help in political development in the area

3)International Police Task Force (IPTF), under the command of Assistant Garda Commissioner Peter Fitzgerald, to protect civilians and return the area to a safe and secure environment.

5.28In addition to the above the Security Council also established a) UNTAES to oversee the demilitarisation, returning refugees and organise elections in Eastern Slovenia, Baranja and Western Sirmium, b) UNMOP, to monitor the situation in the Prevlaka peninsula and c) UNPREDEP in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and along the borders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Albania. UNPREDEP, has a military component of over 1,000 troops and is the first preventative force deployed by the UN.

5.29At the outset the UNHCR was the leading UN Agency in former Yugoslavia. There was no tension between the UNHCR and the UNPROFOR mandate. Originally the lack of a UNHCR input into military decision-making posed a problem but this was subsequently remedied. Humanitarian assistance could not have been rendered without the assistance of the military.

5.30The delegation which visited UN New York in 1993 heard General Morillon’s (former UN Commander in Bosnia) views on operational difficulties. The fact that the UNHCR was in charge had created a unique situation. The military was operating in a non traditional manner with light arms in hostile situations. There were new military tasks to be tackled, the maintenance of corridors, mediation between the warring factions, and assessing and prosecuting the correct level of assertiveness in effecting tasks.

5.31The UNHCR representative said that the Red Cross and other NGOS were critical of UNHCR for its closeness to the military. The former felt that their operations were more effective without military participation. The UNHCR view was that NGO methods (which rely on payments to the factions) can work in the delivery of small quantities of aid but not in the case of large amounts. UNHCR succeeded in delivering from 50% to 70% of its supplies.

5.32After the Paris General Peace Agreement the UNHCR, in addition to its ongoing humanitarian activities, took the lead with respect to the return of refugees and displaced persons.

5.33The UNHCR budget is one billion dollars per year. In 1993 Ireland’s formal contribution was a half a million pounds. In 1994 its contribution amounted to £850,000. By 1996 this was raised to £1.1m.

COMMENT

5.34The UN operations in former Yugoslavia were proved wanting at crucial moments. The role of the UN simply as a peacekeeper and not a peace enforcer was brought sharply into focus. While former Yugoslavia is an extraordinary complex region and the humanitarian situation, particularly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, was desperate, the matter was only resolved by bringing the threat of a very powerful international force into the region. The IFOR force which thankfully has the support of NATO and the OSCE has successfully carried out the Security Councils mandate and has allowed the General Peace Agreement to take effect.

The use of such a regional force for this type of UN enforcement operation eg. in Eastern Zaïre will probably be model for the future.

CHAPTER VI-PEACE ENFORCEMENT LESSONS

PEACEKEEPING VIS-A-VIS PEACE ENFORCEMENT

6.1A principal difference between peacekeeping and peace enforcement mandates lies in the mission or tasks assigned to troops on the ground. (Lt. Col. Martin) The primary difference lies in the amount of force authorised. In peacekeeping minimum force for self defence is used. In peace enforcement force is authorised to attain specific objectives. There is a commonality between both kinds of operation in terms of logistical and operational needs. A soldier is basically prepared for an operational or fighting role and is thus in fact trained for peace enforcement. Peace keeping is more difficult and requires more restraint.

UN VIEWS

In January 1995, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council, a Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, which extends his original proposals to take into account developments in peacekeeping since 1992 in Somalia, Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The main points made by the Secretary-General in his Supplement include the following;

•Experience has shown that peacekeeping operations should not be given enforcement tasks, if enforcement tasks are deemed necessary, a separate peace-enforcement operation should be established.

•Regional organisations have a role to play in the maintenance of peace and security

6.3The Secretary General in his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace says that the logic of peace keeping flows from political and military premises that are distinct from those of enforcement. The dynamics of the latter are incompatible with the political process that peace keeping is intended to facilitate. Over a period of time the political process permits confidence building and negotiated solutions to long-standing difference. He says that it is necessary to resist the temptation to use military power to speed them up.

6.4The then UNIFIL Force Commander, Major General Furuhovde told a Subcommittee delegation that he was not enthusiastic about peace enforcement operations He said that the their level of success was questionable. They were inclined to generate new conflicts. Political goals needed to be well defined before they are translated into military tasks. A successful peace enforcement operation needed to intervene early, act quickly and be backed by substantial military force. It also needed to analyse the risks and uncertainties beforehand. The latter was missing in the Somalia operation. He said that he considered Ireland, with its "clean past," a steadying influence in the Lebanon. Small nations understood the basics necessary for peacekeeping and Irish units in the Middle East did an excellent job.

6.5In February 1997 a Subcommittee delegation to the UN New York heard a variety of officials on the UN’s peace activities.

UN Secretary General Views

6.6Secretary General Annan, who was previously responsible for peacekeeping said that it is difficult for the UN to put together a peace enforcement operation. He admitted that the UN operation in former Yugoslavia, particularly in the so called “safe havens”, was a failure. The Security Council, he said, gave a mandate but no resources and the small contingent of UN troops there could do nothing to prevent the slaughter which occurred. However, the primary failure was their lack of intelligence on the ground in former Yugoslavia. On the other hand, he pointed out that a well equipped force like IFOR, the regional force currently in place in former Yugoslavia, can perform the tasks set out for them and make a major contribution to peace.

Other Views

6.7Assistant Secretary General, General Eisele at the Department of Peace-keeping Operations, said, the UN ran into trouble in Somalia and Yugoslavia by trying to combine Chapter 6 and Chapter 7 activities. The change over to enforcement from peace-keeping in Bosnia, where UN troops were kept hostage, was a serious error. Enforcement operations, he said, require different equipment and different training. However, he feels that, properly resourced, the UN can carry through peace enforcement effectively. He believes, for instance, that the peace enforcement operations in Macedonia UNPREDEP has helped the situation there. However, he said the number of Member States willing to become involved in enforcement operations are few. He made the point that enforcement is the only means to resolve some conflicts. In this regard the UN is very pleased that regional forces like IFOR are able and willing to take on the peace enforcement role.

6.8Among the other points made by heads of UN Department Units and Representatives in the Security Council and General Assembly were:

-Many developing countries are not over-keen on peace-enforcement because they say they do not have a say in the Security Council and enforcement is usually carried out by Western States.

-The Nordic States, Netherlands and Canada are keenest to have peace enforcement for certain conflicts.

-The UN has not proved itself good in the undertaking of peace enforcement operations. In the case of Burundi the UN wrote to 86 Member States looking for troops. They received only 12 replies, 6 of which were positive but these latter States all lacked the equipment to do the job. Regional organisations should fill the gap for the UN, but only under UN mandate.

-The OSCE, OAS and NATO should be asked to help but they should work within a UN mandate.

-The UN currently have to stand back and allow warring factions within countries to inflict great blood-shed on their communities as they are prevented for intervening in intra-State matters.

Secretary General’s Views on Recent Mandates

6.9The former Secretary General highlighted three aspects of recent mandates that, in his view, have undermined the viability of peacekeeping operation and endangered its personnel. These were (i) the need to protect humanitarian operation during continuing warfare, (ii) the need to protect civilian populations in designated safe areas and (ii) the tendency to press the parties to achieve national reconciliation at a pace faster than they are ready to accept. In his view these have led peace keeping operations to forfeit the consent of the parties, a fundamental condition to date for the success of the traditional type operation.

6.10He cited Somalia and Bosnia as instructive in this respect. He says that in both cases existing peacekeeping operations were given additional mandates that required the use of force and that therefore could not be combined with the original mandates which required the consent of the parties, impartiality and the non-use of force. New tasks were imposed without the military capability to enforce them.

6.11The Secretary General has identified several practical difficulties which have arisen relating to command and control, availability of troops and equipment and the information capacity of operations.

Command and Control

6.12In the area of command and control three levels of authority can be distinguished:

(b)executive direction and command which is the responsibility of the Secretary General

(c)command in the field, given by the Secretary General to the chief of mission, either a special representative or the force commander/chief military observer.

6.13The former Secretary-General said that the experience in Somalia has underlined the necessity for a peacekeeping operation to function as an integrated whole. The parties to the conflict must not be allowed to distinguish between contributors in terms of partiality. Neither must troop contributing Governments attempt to provide guidance or give orders to their contingents on operational matters. This can create the impression among the parties that the operation is serving the policy objectives of the contributing Governments rather than the collective will of the UN.

Commanders in the field are instructed to consult commanders of national contingents to ensure a coherent approach in line with the Security Council’s mandate.

6.14A Chief of Mission should not attempt to formulate the missions overall political objectives. Neither should the Security Council attempt to micro manage peacekeeping operations.

6.15All Subcommittee informants seemed agreed on the need (i) for clear mandates from SECCO with agreed interpretations, rules of engagement and command structures based upon them, (ii) for operations to abide by ethical standards and to adhere to clearly defined principles particularly in offensive situations and (iii) a formal operations centre at UN Headquarters.

Role of Secretary General

6.16A dissenting view in the UN has been expressed about the role of the Secretary General in command and control of peace enforcement operations. There is a view within the UN secretariat that the role of the Secretary General should be confined to peacemaking/peacekeeping. It is felt that this is necessary in order to preserve the Secretary General’s capability for engaging in effective preventative diplomacy and effective humanitarian operations. This view would confine the management of peace enforcement operations to the Security Council. The potential of the Military Staff Committee in this context could be examined.

Special Committee for Peacekeeping (SCPK)

6.17The Vice-Chairman of the SCPK Ambassador Karsgaurd (Canada) told the Sub-Committee delegation in New York in 1997 that, while he still believes proper guidelines for peacekeeping are not yet in place, he believes the special committee is one of the more productive Committees within the UN.

6.18He referred to the SCPK report, issued in May 1996, entitled “Comprehensive Review of the whole questions of peacekeeping operations in all their aspects”. He regarded it as an important step in that it has the agreement of the General Assembly and it reflects the preoccupations of the Committee. He pointed out however, that some Member States, particularly developing States, are not keen on peacekeeping as they are unhappy that the Security Council, and especially that the five permanent Members of the Council, have exclusive control over this area. Tension exists, he said, in this area of the UN, especially between the non-aligned countries and the West. The Report does try to produce guidelines but he agreed with the delegation that they are rather weak. In order to prevent the problems in Yugoslavia and Eastern Zaïre from reoccurring the report argues that adequate resources must be made available to carry out mandates. On rapid deployment, he said, Canada and Ireland, among others, were keen on advancing this but a number of non-aligned States were unhappy with it a they feel it gives too much authority to Western countries.

MOBILISATION/STANDBY APPROACH

6.19The former Secretary-General said that availability of troops and equipment has declined relative to the UN’s requirements. In May 1994 when the Security Council decided to expand the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), of the 19 Governments who had previously agreed to have troops on standby not one was willing to contribute. It is also clear that when troops were offered eventually by African countries necessary air transport was not made available readily by western countries with the requisite capability. UN Headquarters informed the Sub-Committee in 1997 that UN personnel deployment is down from 70,000 to 26,000 over the past number of years.

Rapid Reaction Force

6.20The Secretary General in 1993 concluded that a rapid reaction force is necessary as a strategic reserve for the Security Council in times of emergency. The Secretary General suggested that battalion size units each stationed in their home country would be trained to the same standards, use the same operating procedures, be equipped with integrated communications equipment and take part in joint exercises at regular intervals, They would be maintained in a high state or readiness. It would also be necessary to have adequate equipment and training in its use available. The Secretary-General has also established a Stand-by Arrangements System [UNSAS] whereby troop contributors agree to have certain units on standby for UN peacekeeping service. However, the actual deployment of such troops and equipment remains subject to the normal domestic procedures, including parliamentary approval. To date 62 countries including Ireland and most traditional troop-contributing countries have formally indicated their willingness to provide resources totalling 80,000 personnel to be called on by UNSAS. The EU has given its support to UNSAS.

Rapid Deployment

6.21Some countries, such as Canada, Denmark and The Netherlands have proposed ways to enhance the speed of deployment of rapid reaction force. One suggestion is to have a permanent UN operational-level Headquarters in New York staffed by 30/50 personnel to organise and control the operation of a 5,000 strong force which could be deployed immediately. The force would be specially set aside as an advanced standby by Member States. The Canadians were in the process of organising such a force for Eastern Zaïre which included Ireland, when it was stood down because of the situation there eased when the refugees began to return to Rwanda.

FORD

6.22Friends of the Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters (FORD) which Ireland joined in 1996 have agreed to help in the effort to set up the Headquarters in New York. Ireland has agreed to commit 850 personnel to UNSAS overseas operations including the participation of the Garda Síochána and the provision of two military officers to a rapidly deployable mission headquarters in New York.

TRAINING

6.23Training is an essential prerequisite for both rapid and effective response to crisis situations. The UN at present trains for peace keeping operations and is involved in the preparation of training manuals/materials and the development of a code of conduct to be shared with troop contributing nations. The Nordics have developed a regional training system and have invited other countries to participate. So far thirty two have. Peacekeeping operations often require both military and civilian personnel and training for both is required.

COMMENT

6.24The Joint Committee welcomes the establishment of UNSAS and Ireland’s commitment to FORD. While taking into consideration the lessons learned from previous operations we should be willing to respond to conflict situation in good time to enable early resolution of problems and to prevent conflict moving out of control. It also welcomes the establishment of the UN Training School at the Curragh. It urges that the lessons learned in former Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Somalia be taken aboard. It also urges that Ireland share its experience with other countries by establishing courses for the purpose at the UN Training School and welcomes the recent holding of the first international course for UNMOs in the school. Ireland should likewise learn from the experience of others and through interaction with their UN schools.

The Committee supports the use of peace enforcement in certain cases. However, it is strongly of the view that

-troops selected for peace enforcement or peacekeeping must be trained for the task and must be adequately equipped to perform the tasks set for them.

-the Security Council should not give a mandate for peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations without providing proper resources to carry the mandate through to completion.

-there should be one central command in the field for operations which should be directly responsible to the UN Secretary General and

-the Security Council should retain control of the political objectives of the mission.

The Committee are of the view that peace enforcement should be undertaking by the UN in cases where it is believed it will have a positive effect and where it is satisfied all other methods of peacekeeping will not work. Regional organisations like the OSCE have proved to be effective in peace enforcement and these forces, properly mandated and supervised by the UN, can provide the necessary effective forces to carry out UN peace work.

The Committee endorses the call for reform of the Security Council to give, inter alia, a wider voice to countries and regions who feel they have little current input to the Council. It also believes that some way must be formed to allow the UN to intervene in certain intra-state disputes where they are not invited by the parties in conflict. It is suggested that a reformed Security Council or the setting up of a UN court to deal with such cases might allow such intervention.

CHAPTER VII - OTHER ELEMENTS IN UN PEACE ACTIVITY

POST CONFLICT PEACE BUILDING

7.1A further change identified by the Secretary General is the need to establish coordinated programmes after a negotiated settlement has been implemented to ensure that the original causes of the conflict are eradicated. Measures which can be used in post conflict peace-building are demilitarisation, de-mining, control of small arms, institutional reform, human rights monitoring, electoral reform and social/economic development. The process requires integrated action between the UN and the parties.

7.2Two situations are envisaged, (i) a multifunctional peacekeeping operation which implements a comprehensive negotiated settlement (ii) peace-building either preventative or post-conflict without the deployment of a peacekeeping operation.

7.3In the first instance the modalities of the departure of the actual peacekeeping operation and the transfer of peace-building functions to other UN agencies must be effected in full consultation with the Government concerned. At this juncture it may also be necessary to transfer decision making responsibility from the Security Council to the General Assembly which may have responsibility for the peace-building activities concerned.

7.4In the second case the former Secretary-General saw a role for resident coordinators who might be in a position to analyse some of the indications of an impending crisis. However, he felt the actual early warning responsibility must be with UNHQ, acting on the basis of all information available to it. The Secretary General could act on the basis of an early warning by sending a mission to the country in question with the Government’s agreement.

REGIONAL CO-OPERATION

7.5The UN has underlined the potential for co-operation with regional organisations such as the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organisation for African Unity (OAU). Cooperation could consist of formal or informal consultation, diplomatic support through regional initiatives or in technical matters, operational support, (eg IFOR in former Yugoslavia) co-deployment (eg Liberia and Georgia) and joint operations e.g. Haiti, UN/US. The UN feels that co-deployment may become a new model for peace activities in some cases with the main burden being met by regional organisations which would be monitored by small UN groups. However, Chapter VII states that strong efforts by Regional organisations should be undertaken in harmony with the UN itself and in accordance with the UN Charter.

7.6The Secretary General offers UN expertise to regional groupings and identifies the following principles on which the relationship might be based:-

7.7Ireland has stated it fully subscribes to the above principles and The Sixth Committee at UNGA 49 (1994) has approved a declaration drafted by the Charter Committee on enhancing the relationship between the UN and regional organisations.

7.9Inter-regional cooperation with UN participation, is also a possibility. Various proposals have been made for EU co-operation in the peacekeeping field with African countries. EU assistance might be provided in four phases as follows:

(i)Preliminary - an early warning system. The UN and OAU would establish links to share information

(ii)Preventative diplomacy - both organisations would reinforce one anothers efforts. The UN could supply the necessary logistics and joint UN/OAU representations could be developed

(iii)Development of peacekeeping capabilities, training, restocking of equipment, logistics. In this regard regional peacekeeping centres under UN/OAU auspices could be established as well as basic logistic centres. The European Union could lend support through training in particular.

(iv)Emergency deployment of peacekeeping forces. This might, in particular, concentrate on assisting African states to develop a rapid reaction capability under UN/OAU auspices.

Disarmament

7.10The Secretary General points out in his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace of January 1995 that the Security Council summit in 1992 committed itself to making the UN more effective in the areas of disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation and nuclear non-proliferation.

Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty

7.11The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty was opened for signature in New York on 24 September, 1996. Ireland was one of the original signatories of the Treaty and to date, over 140 countries have signed the Treaty including Israel, one of the three so-called “threshold” nuclear weapon states, but not India or Pakistan. The Treaty will prohibit any nuclear weapon test explosion and any other nuclear explosion, thereby constraining the development of nuclear weapons. It represents one of the most sought-after nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament measures in the history of the United Nations Organisation. While certainly not the end of the process of nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, its adoption was the essential next step.

Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

7.12In April 1995 the State Parties to the Non Proliferation Treaty agreed to extend the life of the Treaty indefinitely. They also agreed to strengthen the Review Process of the Treaty and agreed a set of “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”. The decision on the strengthened review process provided that conferences to review implementation would be held automatically every five years, with meetings of a more substantive Preparatory Committee in each of the three years prior to the Review Conference viz NPT review activity in four out of five years of the cycle. The first preparatory meeting for the 2000 Review Conference will take place in New York on 7-18 April, 1997.

Chemical and Biological Weapons

7.13The Fourth Review Conference of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in December 1996 gave added impetus to the work in hand to strengthen the BTWC and it is now generally believed that agreement will be reached on a new Verification Protocol to the Convention. The Chemical Weapons Convention entered into force on 29 April 1997 but has yet to be ratified by either of the two declared possessor states, the United States and Russia. The European Union is working with the US Administration to encourage approval by the US Congress so that the US can ratify the Convention before it enters into force.

Anti-Personnel Landmines

7.14Political support grew rapidly in 1996 for an international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines. The Irish Presidency succeeded in achieving agreement at the General Affairs Council on 1 October on a new Joint Action articulating European Union policy on anti-personnel landmines. The Joint Action solemnly enshrines, for the first time, the commitment of the Union to the goal of the total elimination of anti-personnel landmines and its pledge to work actively towards the achievement at the earliest possible date of an effective international agreement to ban these weapons worldwide.

Canada hosted an International Strategy Meeting on Banning Anti-Personnel Mines in Ottawa from 3 to 5 October which was undoubtedly a landmark event, launching the “Ottawa Process”. In the Ottawa Declaration, the 50 countries attending the Ottawa Conference agreed to work together to ensure the earliest possible conclusion of an international agreement to ban anti-personnel landmines. An Agenda for Action adopted on the responsibility of the Chairman of the Conference listed concrete actions designed to move the process forward in preparation for a follow-up Conference to be hosted by Belgium at he end of Jun 1997. The Canadian Foreign Minister has invited participants back to Ottawa in December 1997 to sign a total ban Convention. Work is continuing in the framework of the Ottawa Process to further this aim. Austria, Belgium, Germany, Ireland and Netherlands, along with Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Mexico, Philippines and South Africa form a “core group” which may expand.

Following the Ottawa Conference, the United States, in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly, canvassed an ambitious new Resolution urging States to pursue vigorously an effective, legally-binding international agreement to ban the use, stockpiling, production and transfer of anti-personnel landmines, with a view to completing the negotiations as soon as possible. No fewer than 155 countries cast a positive vote for the total ban proposal in the Plenary vote on 10 December, 10 countries, admittedly including some major players in this context, abstained; none voted against.

Micro Disarmament

7.15The former Secretary-General pointed out the need for “micro disarmament” in conflict situations particularly of automatic assault weapons, small arms and anti-personnel mines. He asked for the register of conventional arms to be developed into a universally applicable and non-discriminatory mechanism.

IRELAND’S POSITION

7.16At the Review and Extension Conference of the Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Ireland supported the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the Conference the Tánaiste outlined Ireland’s objectives as follows:

-an assurance that nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons technology states do not pass on such weapons or such technology to non-nuclear weapons countries;

-an end to the production and stockpiling of materials, in particular plutonium, for use in the manufacture of nuclear weapons;

-the effective tackling of environmental, health and safety issues associated with the nuclear industry.

7.17All States, with the exception of India and Pakistan, have now agreed to a Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

-that the process for review of implementation of the Treaty shall be strengthened; and

-a set of principles and objectives for nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament.

COMMENT

7.18The Committee supports the Government in its efforts to push for UN Treaties on nuclear and chemical/biological weapons test bans, and non-proliferation. The Joint Committee has over the past number of years expressed itself strongly on the above and has called for immediate action to prohibit the manufacture and sale of anti-personnel landmines.

CHAPTER VIII - INSTITUTIONAL REFORM

GENERAL ASSEMBLY REFORM

8.1In 1993 reform was focused on the General Assembly’s Committee system and its agenda. The financing of the UN, peacekeeping, and the work of humanitarian UN bodies were important issues. Environmental issues were assuming more importance on the economic/development agendas. Debate at committee level was underway on the UN Charter. Ireland was active on the working group dealing with the revitalization of the General Assembly and the Secretary General’s Agenda for Peace. There was also debate in the General Assembly and the Charter Committee on the reform of the Security Council, in particular on the extension of its membership and the use of the veto.

General Assembly, 48th Session

8.2The reform of the General Assembly itself was high on the agenda for UNGA 48 (1993). The focus was on the changes needed to enable the UN to respond more effectively in the areas of humanitarian assistance and conflict resolution. The General Assembly wished to concentrate more on security matters although this was opposed by the five Permanent Members of the Security Council.

8.3Decisions by the General Assembly are not legally binding but have political or moral weight. Decisions by the Security Council are binding under the UN Charter. An Open-Ended Working Group of the General Assembly has for the past two years been considering the question of equitable representation and increased membership of the Security Council.

8.4The General Assembly cannot deal with specific SECCO matters and some UN Member States are not happy with this situation nor with the level of communication between SECCO and itself. The Treaty on European Union provides that EU Member States which are also members of the Security Council will concert and keep other EU Member States fully informed. The two EU Member States which are permanent SECCO members are also to ensure the defence of the positions and the interests of the Union without prejudice to their responsibilities under the UN Charter. These provisions provided for the first time a Treaty basis for mutual consultation on issues before SECCO and for the representation of the Union’s position there. However, the Committee was informed that in practice the Permanent members keep their own Council and vote along their own national lines in SECCO.

Irish Position

8.5The Government is of the view that there should be better interaction between SECCO and the General Assembly and more transparency in the SECCO decision making process given the latter’s increasingly active role. The Government welcomed the measures for SECCO consultation with troop contributors announced in November 1994 as a step in the right direction and particularly the provision for further review in this area.

Comment

8.6The Committee would like to see more co-operation between the EU Permanent Members of SECCO and the EU Members Particularly those in the Council.

Possible Reform

8.7In UNGA 49 there was a broad consensus among the general membership in favour of the enlargement of the Security Council. There is now apparently a general willingness for an enlarged Council of perhaps twenty five with the extra seats being assigned on a regional basis.

(ii)Peacekeeping operations from the perspectives of command and control, finance, and safety.

(iii)The (successful) campaign to establish the post of High Commissioner for Human Rights.

(iii)The creation of a UN standing peacekeeping force. This was widely supported but no new funding was agreed upon

(iv)The enlargement of the Security Council on which there was consensus in principle

UNGA 50

8.9During the 50th General Assembly a resolution was adopted which formally established a high level open-ended working group to look into the strengthening of the UN system. Its aim is to draw a consensus on reform from an examination of the different studies and reports without duplicating the work of other working groups. An intern report giving differing views was submitted at the 51st General Assembly. The Working Group is to report at the 52nd General Assembly in 1997.

REFORM OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

8.10SECCO has a narrow agenda concentrating in particular on peace issues. Decisions by SECCO are binding under the UN Charter. Proposals for a wide revision of the Charter have been considered.

8.11The UN General Assembly established an Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) in January 1994 to consider all aspects of the question of equitable representation on and an increase in the membership of the Security Council (SECCO) and related reforms. The work of the OEWG continues to the present, but no agreement on reform has yet been reached. Any changes in the composition of SECCO would necessitate an amendment to the UN Charter, requiring the support of a two-thirds majority in the General Assembly and of all five permanent members of SECCO.

8.12In September 1996, the Vice-Chairman of the OEWG, the Permanent Representatives of Finland (Ambassador Fredrik Wilhelm Breitenstein) and Thailand (Ambassador Asda Jayanama), submitted an interim report on the work of the Group which was adopted during the 51st Session of the UN General Assembly. Since the OEWG has been unable to reach substantive agreement on the main issues under discussion other than on the basic position that the Council should be enlarged, the interim report simply sets the differing views on each of the issues. The work of the Group will continue in 1997, with the first meeting of the year scheduled to take place on 10-14 March.

8.13Main points of note in that interim report were that the OEWG has deepened its consideration of working methods and transparency of the work of SECCO as well as the relationship between SECCO and the general membership and other principal organs of the UN. While strong support was expressed for the formalisation or institutionalisation of the measures taken by SECCO to improve its working methods and transparency, some Member States expressed opposition or reservation. The interim report also reaffirmed that expansion of SECCO should ensure equitable geographical distribution, taking into account the substantial increase in the membership of the UN, especially of developing countries, as well as important changes in international relations.

8.14The decision-making procedure within SECCO, including the question of the veto currently enjoyed only by the five permanent members of SECCO, continued to be an important element in the discussions of the Working Group. Various proposals to limit the scape and use of the veto enjoyed wide support in the course of discussions, but opposition was also expressed, most notably by the permanent members of SECCO.

8.15The main questions at issue are the extension of SECCO membership and the use of the veto. Reform of SECCO would require amendment to the UN Charter and this in turn would necessitate the consent of the five permanent members, and the approval by a two thirds majority of the General Assembly (membership now 185). Pressure is being exerted for permanent membership for Japan and Germany, given their economic importance. However, the Committee was informed in New York in 1997 that a number of other large developing States are also seeking Permanent Membership. There is widespread agreement, however, that the Council should be increased to 25 Members.

Broader Representation

8.16In 1993 a general review by the General Assembly of SECCO was originally a possibility. This could have concentrated on the issue of accountability. However the five Permanent Members rejected the Secretary General’s preliminary ideas on the issue. A more narrowly drafted Singapore paper asked for a report to be made to the 49th session. This addresses the expansion of SECCO only. There is a strong view within the UN secretariat that SECCO cannot operate without the participation of the Great Powers. The problem is to ensure that they operate under the aegis of the Charter.

Veto

8.17The veto has emerged as an important issue in the work of the Open-ended Working Group of the General Assembly on Security Council reform over the past year.

8.18A majority of states (including a majority among the Western countries) have indicated that they would approve a modification of the veto system. There is strong resistance to expanding the veto to new permanent members.

Comment

8.19Subcommittee members expressed the view that the singular veto was no longer tenable. Some modification of the veto arrangements was a necessity to facilitate more effective decision making and ensure greater representation and control for the smaller nations. One suggestion was that if a veto is to be exercised the support of two members at least should be required for its exercise. Various possibilities have been considered to date at UN level, abolition, restriction, confinement to certain Charter areas (e.g. Chapter 7 matters).

Decision-making

8.20In 1993 the process by which SECCO was arriving at its decisions led to the growing isolation and alienation of non-members. SECCO appeared to conduct its substantive business behind closed doors in informal consultations which were called in response to requests from member states involved in disputes or interested parties. SECCO would then hold a public meeting which in effect rubber stamped decisions already taken. Information emerged in an unsatisfactory manner through the texts of resolutions, Presidential statements and statements to the Press. A monthly document issued by SECCO listed matters of which it is seized. Members of Regional Groupings who are members of the Security Council were not keeping their memberships adequately informed.

8.21To ensure close consultation and good information flow the Secretary General has recently appointed a Special Adviser as his personal representative to the Council. The Secretary General recognises the importance of keeping troop contributing Government fully informed and is now providing them with regular briefings. The Irish Government is consulted by the Security Council on matters pertaining to operations in which it contributes troops or participants and has recently welcomed signs of greater openness in this area.

Human Rights and the Security Council

8.22The delegation which visited the Human Rights Commission in Geneva heard the view that there had been a long history of excluding human rights questions from the Security Council. However there is now a movement to bring human rights into closer focus at Security Council level. SECCO has included the human rights dimension in El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti and also in Cambodia. The lifting of sanctions on Iraq is tied to improvements in human rights there.

Irish Policy

8.23Ireland actively participates in the work of the OEWG. In February 1995, we collaborated with several smaller, like-minded European States (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Iceland, Portugal, Slovenia) to produce a discussion paper detailing a common position on SECCO reform, which was presented to the Group in July 1995 and which still represents Government’s thinking on the subject. The discussion paper proposes the following;

•The development of a Council that is more representative of the general membership of the UN whilst preserving the possibilities for smaller Member States to serve on the Council.

•An increase in the number of permanent members by 2-5 seats, with their selection based on global influence and their capacity and willingness to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security. It considers Germany and Japan amongst the likely new members of SECCO.

•An increase in the number of non-permanent members to result in a Council of not more than 25 seats. It does not favour the establishment of a special privileges rotational arrangement for medium size countries, as proposed by the Italians.

•A limitation on both the current use of the veto and the veto right of new permanent members of the Council.

•An enhancement of the relationship between the Council and the general membership and an improvement in and, where appropriate, a formalisation of the working methods and procedures of the Council.

8.24Opportunities for small countries to serve on the Council must be maintained. Ireland will seek election to the Council for he term 2001-2002.

8.25The Security Council should remain effective in its decision making capacity. In this regard Ireland would favour a restriction of the veto e.g. to Chapter Seven (peace enforcement) items. The Security Council needs to maintain legitimacy for its actions and should answer to the general membership for the discharge of its duties. Openness in its dealings was also important particularly consultation with interested parties, and troop contributors. The Security Council also needed to recognise the important roles of the General Assembly and of ECOSOC.

UN SECRETARIAT

8.26The Secretary General’s reform consists of two phases, the first launched in early 1992 and the second in March 1993. In the first phase the Secretary General abolished his own Cabinet in favour of a Departmental approach. He proposed a more streamlined and coherent structure with four main groupings, Political, Economic, Administration and Public Affairs. Peacekeeping was included in the Political structure reflecting a linkage between early warning, prevention, peace-building, peacemaking and peacekeeping. Fourteen top level posts were cut.

8.27The major element in the second phase is the creation of three departments to address economic and social issues. These would replace the Department of Economic and Social Development. There would be a further reduction in high level personnel and some functions and personnel would be transferred between the various UN Institutions in New York, Vienna, Geneva and Rome. The Sub-Committee delegation visiting New York in February 1997 were told that the UN will de-centralise some tasks and give the directors in the field more responsibility for day-to-day control of their own operators.

Human Resources Management

8.28Mr. Denis Halliday, is the most senior Irish official in the UN Secretariat. Since his appointment in 1994 he has devoted much of his time to reform of a previously centralised and bureaucratic system.

He said, the budget crisis in the UN has forced them to rationalise. Already 1000 posts have been eliminated in the past two years. The US in particular are seeking further reductions. However, already the morale in the organisation is low and consequential to the staff reductions some people have had to take on additional work on already over-loaded work areas. They have got so called “gratis people” from some Member States; mainly from the US and Europe (there are two senior army officers and one Department of Defence official from Ireland). This has caused upset among some developing countries, who see the West gaining additional control through the placement of such staff, and also with the permanent UN staff. He feels the organisation cannot go on accepting more of these people. They hope to be able to manage the problem by arranging for a situation where for each gratis officer donated to the UN, the donor Member State would also give a sum of money to a trust fund which would allow the UN to recruit staff from Developing Countries.

-the UN will try to decentralise its organisation and allow more decisions to be taken at field level. They will try to eliminate unnecessary overlapping. The staffing at headquarters and other centres such as Geneva will consequently shrink.

8.29The main Irish interests in the Secretariat reforms are to ensure that peacekeeping and humanitarian and human rights activities are streamlined and made more effective. Ireland, in common with other non permanent members of the Security Council, would wish to see genuine rotation of posts as distinct from the national fiefdoms which operate at present.

UN FINANCES

8.30The UN Regular Budget for the biennium 1994-95 was approximately US$2.6 billion. It was financed through mandatory assessments on Member States, according to a percentage Scale of Assessments which is agreed for three years at a time. In December 1994, the Fifth Committee of the UN General Assembly (which deals with administrative and budgetary affairs) agreed a new Scale of Assessments for the Regular Budget, to cover the triennium 1995-97. The Scale is based on Member States’ capacity to pay. The floor, or minimum percentage assessment has been set at 0.01%, and the ceiling or maximum at 25%. The Scale is based mainly on the Gross National Income of Member States, but is adjusted to take account of additional criteria such as per capita income and external debt ratio

8.31A different Scale of Assessments is used for the financing of UN Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs). It is based on the Regular Budget Scale but it provides for substantial reductions for less developed countries. The resultant shortfall is balanced by higher assessments for the Permanent Members of the Security Council (US, UK, France, Russian Federation and China), and the 25% ceiling does not apply. Separate assessments for each PKO are sent out to each member State from time to time.

8.32An Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group to consider the question of capacity to pay was established by the General Assembly in November 1994 and reported in May 1995. It’s interim report to the 51st UNGA showed no consensus was available. It will continue its work in 1997.

UN Financial Crisis

8.33The UN has been experiencing a financial crisis for some time. Many Member States do not pay their assessed Regular Budget and Peacekeeping contributions in full and on time, as required by the UN Charter. This has resulted in cutbacks in PKOs, and delays in reimbursing Member States for costs resulting from their participation in such operations.

8.34The UN is financed by contributions from its Member States to the Regular Budget and peacekeeping budgets. Assessments to these budgets is made on the basis of percentage global net national product. As at 31 December, 1996, the UN is owed US$2.15 billion in outstanding assessed contributions, of which approximately US$1.5 billion is owed for peacekeeping and approximately US$500 million is owed to the Regular Budget. The major debtors as of that date are as follows;

It should be noted that in the case of some Member States who are debtors, arrears from previous years are involved, whereas others have financial procedures which involve delays in payment on a current year basis. Ireland pays its assessed contributions in full and on time.

US Position

8.35Since the Republican Party gained control of both the US House of Representatives and the US Senate in mid-term elections in 1994, the US Congress had been adopting an increasingly hostile attitude towards international organisations, including the UN, and has proposed severe cuts in US contributions to UN peacekeeping and UN agencies.

8.36Whilst the US Administration strongly opposes the severity of the Congressional proposals, there is an ongoing US policy to link payment of arrears to reform of the UN system, particularly in its budgetary and financial aspects. The US maintains that a “ceiling” should be imposed on the Regular Budget assessment for any Member State of 20 percent, which would represent a reduction in the current maximum of 25 percent paid by the US. The US contends that this would allocate the burden for financing the UN more broadly, while eliminating over-reliance on contributions from any one Member State. The US also wants a rate cap of 25 percent on peacekeeping contributions, which would represent a reduction from the present maximum of 31 percent it pays.

8.37A key stumbling block to the US paying its arrears to the UN is the progress of reform within that Organisation, with Congress often expressing its dissatisfaction with the pace of the process. In recent years, this dissatisfaction was focused on then UN Secretary General Dr. Boutrous Boutrous-Ghali, who has seen by many in the US as uncommitted to the reform process and ineffectual in attempts at reorganisation and restructuring. It was argued that only the presence of a new Secretary General could persuade Congress to pay its arrears. The US subsequently voted Dr. Boutrous-Ghali’s nomination for a second term as Secretary General, despite his having the almost unanimous backing of the entire membership of the UN. The election of Mr. Kofi Annan as the new Secretary General was widely viewed as diplomatic coup for the US, and hopes were raised that this might prompt the US to pay its substantial arrears.

8.38To this end, Mr. Annan accepted invitations from President Clinton and Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to meetings on 22-24 January to discuss his plans for the UN and the possibility of the US honouring its financial obligations to the organisations. The only approach which seems to have been discussed is one based on payment of US$100 million in 1997 and US$900 million in 1999, provided the US is satisfied with the reform process at that stage. Senator Helms suggested the setting of benchmarks of reform which, as they were met by the UN, would result in payment of US arrears. The Secretary General indicated that he was not opposed to benchmarks if they were reasonable ways of measuring progress, but not if they were demands. During its visit to the UN in 1997 the Secretary General briefed the Sub-Committee on his meeting with the US President and with Capitol Hill. He felt that some progress had been made and the US are satisfied with the proposal to reform and indicated they will pay as described above. While the delegation were in New York the US paid $100M as agreed at the above meeting.

The Regular Budget Scale of Assessment for 1995-97 has provided for an increase in our assessed contribution, as follows;

8.40Assessments for peacekeeping operations arise at various times during the year on the basis of Security Council resolutions and decision by the various financial bodies of the UN. Our 1996 contributions to the UN regular, peacekeeping and international criminal tribunal budgets were IR£1,451,439, IR£1,590,544, and US$38,404, respectively, amounting to a total Irish contribution to the UN for 1996 of IR£3,090,417. This compares with a 1995 total of IR£5,528,362, of which IR£1,415,975 was paid to the regular budget and IR£4,097380 went to wards peacekeeping and the international criminal tribunals.

UN Arrears Owed to Ireland

8.41As at 31 December, 1996, Ireland was owed approximately IR£12 million by the UN for costs arising from our participation in UN peacekeeping operations, with a breakdown as follows;

PERCEPTION OF IRELAND WITHIN THE UN

8.42At the 1995 White Paper Seminar on the UN Ireland’s then Permanent Representative to the UN Mahon Hayes, stated that the balance of UN membership has changed dramatically from the Fifties. The result is that now the Western Countries can easily be outvoted and outmaneouvered in the General Assembly. At present confrontation is on North/South lines and not East/West. Ireland is generally perceived by the Third World as part of the EU which has achieved about 90% voting solidarity in the General Assembly. However, we are also seen as making a distinctive contribution on a range of issues and as influencing our EU partners in this context. During the Committees visit to New York in 1997 there was widespread praise for Irelands peacekeepers from the Secretary General and others at U.N. Headquarters.

-positive influence on the EU relative to some nuclear issues and to conventional weapons

-favours and enhancement of the General Assembly through the use of Charter powers

¹ Note: Currently the Non-Permanent Members are 1996-97 Chile, Egypt, Guinea Bissau, Poland, South Korea. 1997-98 Costa Rica, Japan, Kenya, Portugal and Sweden.

² See the “Comprehensive Report on Lessons Learned from UN’s operations in Somalia” April 1992-March 1995.

TITHE AN OIREACHTAIS

Tuarascáil ón bhFochoiste ar na Náisiúin Aontaithe den Chomhchoiste um Ghnóthaí Eachtracha maidir le Coimeád/Feidhmiú na Síochána ag féachaint d’Athchóiriú na Náisiún Aontaithe

HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS

Report of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs Sub-Committee on the United Nations On Peacekeeping/Enforcement In the Light of UN Reform

FOREWORD

LIST OF MEMBERS

SUB-COMMITTEE ON UNITED NATIONS

CONTENTS

Summary and Conclusions

Charter Background - The Resolution of Conflicts / Ireland’s Role

Traditional Peacekeeping Methods

Response to Change in Peacekeeping

Response to Change in Peace Enforcement

Sanctions

Somalia

Former Yugoslavia

Peace Enforcement Lessons

UN Secretary General Views

Special Committee for Peacekeeping (SCPK)

Mobilisation/Standby Approach

Other Elements in UN Peace Activity

Post Conflict Peace Building

Disarmament

Institutional Reform

UN Finances

Ireland’s UN Contributions

UN Arrears Owed to Ireland

Perception of Ireland Within the UN

Conclusions

Security Council (Secco)

General Assembly

Secretariat

UN Finance

Preventive Diplomacy

Intra-State Conflict

Sanctions

Peacekeeping

Peace Enforcement

Military Intervention

Somalia

Former Yugoslavia

Lebanon

General

Rapid Reaction/Deployment

Training

Disarmament

Ireland’s Role

CHAPTER I - BACKGROUND

SUBCOMMITTEE DECISIONS

SCOPE OF THE REPORT

CHAPTER II - CHARTER BACKGROUNDAND THE RESOLUTIONS OF CONFLICTS/IRELAND'S ROLE

Origin of the UN

CHAPTERS IV AND VI

CHAPTER VII

ORIGINAL FAILURE TO UNDERTAKE PEACE ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

IRELAND IN THE UN

Irish Contribution to Peacekeeping

Current Irish Peacekeeping Commitments

CHAPTER III - TRADITIONAL MODEL/PEACEKEEPING

ROLE OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THE ROLE OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING PEACEKEEPING

THE IRISH EXPERIENCE OF PEACEKEEPING/LEBANON MODEL

THE UNIFIL MANDATE

3.7 The UN mandate is implemented in the field in a variety of ways including:

Command and Control

Background on the Irish Battalion

Military activity/security risks

Humanitarian activities

Fulfilment of the mandate

Political progress

Irish concerns re. honouring of mandate

Delegation views

Troop Conditions

Morale

OBSERVER MISSIONS

CHAPTER IV-RESPONSE TO CHANGE/PEACEMAKING

INTERNATIONAL CHANGES

of the wide range of methods available to it in the Charter.

UN’S RESPONSE TO CHANGE

Tuarascáil ón bhFochoiste ar na Náisiúin Aontaithe
den Chomhchoiste um Ghnóthaí Eachtracha
maidir le
Coimeád/Feidhmiú na Síochána
ag féachaint d’Athchóiriú na Náisiún Aontaithe

Report of the
Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs
Sub-Committee on the United Nations
On
Peacekeeping/Enforcement
In the Light of UN Reform