|
|
|
|
HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTASReport of the Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Balkans (Kosovo)Based on the meeting of Wednesday 25th March, 1998.May, 1998 CONTENTS
IntroductionThe Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs was established following Orders of the Dáil and Seanad of 23rd October 1997. In addition, Standing Orders state that the following powers may be conferred on a Committee:- “(1)power to take oral and written evidence and to print and publish from time to time minutes of such evidence taken in public before the Select Committee together with such related documents as the Select Committee thinks fit;”. This Report of the Joint Committee on the Balkans (Kosovo) was agreed at its meeting on _________________________ Desmond J. O’Malley, Chairman. May, 1998. AN CHOMHCHOISTE UM GHNÓTHAÍ EACHTRACHAJOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS.Dé Céadaoin, 25 Márta 1998. Wednesday, 25 March 1998. The Joint Committee met at 4 p.m. MEMBERS PRESENT:
! Apologies received from Deputy T. Ahearn, Deputy A. Deasy, Senator E. Haughey. DEPUTY D. O’MALLEY IN THE CHAIR.Situation in the Balkans.Chairman: I welcome Mr. Richard Townsend, Assistant Secretary at the Department of Foreign Affairs, and Mr. Tom Bolster, Counsellor in the Department, to the meeting and thank them for attending. The committee agreed earlier this year to discuss the situation in the Balkans, but the troubles in Kosovo started since then. These troubles have the potential to spread and destabilise the entire region unless the international community can intervene quickly and successfully. Regarding the last Yugoslav crisis, it has been said that the international organisations ended up pursuing a policy that was reactive rather than anticipatory of events. Perhaps Mr. Townsend and Mr. Bolster will tell the committee what preventative steps the international community, including the European Union, is taking to contain and put an end to the current troubles. The committee can then discuss measures considered necessary or appropriate to aid political stability and economic development in the area. I ask Mr. Townsend to give the committee a short presentation, which will be followed by a question and answer session. One of the difficulties in relation to the Kosovo problem in particular is that the full facts of it are not known. It is believed that upwards of 60 people, and perhaps several hundred people, have been killed in the last two weeks. There is little access for the media to Kosovo and the uncertainty of the position there gives rise to particular concern. It is obviously serious, but it may be more serious. The president of the European Union, Mr. Cook, from the United Kingdom, visited Belgrade recently in connection with Kosovo. By all accounts, he did not get on well and was very disappointed with the reception he received in Belgrade. Some EU member states have suggested consideration of the reintroduction of sanctions against Serbia. This is not the universal view of the Union but consideration may have to be given to such a move in the coming weeks if there is no improvement in the situation. We are usually concerned about the manner in which minorities are dealt with by majorities, particularly if they are of two different ethnic backgrounds. This situation is very unusual in that the small minority of Serbs in Kosovo - approximately 10 per cent - appear to be treating the considerable Albanian majority of approximately 90 per cent extremely badly. Over the past number years, there has been a concerted effort by many Albanian Kosovars to pursue their grievances and complaints through non-violent political means. Unfortunately, they have had very limited success in their dealings with the Serbs. This led to the outbreak of violence which, in turn, has led to some apparently considerable repression by the Serbs of the Albanian majority. An example of the manner in which the Albanian majority is treated is the fact that all the universities and senior colleges in Kosovo have been closed for the past seven years. This is an intolerable situation and deprives a whole generation of younger people of their rights of access to education and, in particular, to higher education. Because of the uncertainties of exactly what has been happening there over the past two weeks in particular I ask Mr. Townsend to outline as much as the facts as he can. Perhaps he would be good enough to express his views as to what might be done to deal with the situation. I will then invite Members to ask questions. Deputy Briscoe: I wish to put one question. It took physical force, I think by NATO, the last time to stop the Serbians. Has Mr. Townsend reason to believe that not using physical force to stop the Serbians will have any more hope of success than it did the last time? Chairman: That is certainly one of the obvious questions which arises because it was only when some considerable force was threatened and in fact used to a limited extent that the Serbs began to heed the EU on 2 March. It may well be correct to deduce the same attitude will have to be taken in relation to their activities in Kosovo. There is also the factor that if this repression of the majority continues there is likely to be a considerable exodus of Albanian refugees to Albania and Macedonia. That will cause great hardship and difficulties for those other two countries. Mr. Townsend: I will do my best to provide the Committee with an up to date briefing and assessment. As the Committee is meeting, a number of things are happening. There is a major Serb demonstration in Pristina this afternoon. There has also been a meeting of the Contact Group. In a few minutes I will say something about the latest developments. At the outset I will briefly refer to the information which the Department of Foreign Affairs has made available to the Committee. In late February, on the eve of the latest troubles, we provided a detailed background note on the situation. Further copies of that are available, if required. We have provided a short update to which two key documents are attached: the statement of the EU on 2 March and the text of the Contact Group’s statement on 9 March. A number of other statements have been issued and we will be happy to provide the Committee with any other information that would be useful. Apart from our assessment, and the information we can provide, we should consider the options for the international community and how the Irish contribution can be most effective. As regards the overall assessment, first of all, an extremely bleak picture has been painted in media reports, suggesting that Kosovo is on the edge of an abyss and that the consequences of the situation are likely to be extremely serious. The Chairman has already mentioned some of them, including the overspill into neighbouring countries like Bosnia, Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. There may be wider implications for the whole region. As regards current developments, as recently as yesterday we saw further deaths and shootings. That suggests that the pattern we saw earlier this month is, in fact, being maintained. We concur with the view that the situation is highly dangerous and perhaps even explosive. It has been a source of public concern throughout Europe. We have also seen a number of public demonstrations on the subject, including one today outside Iveagh House. That is an indication of the concerns being expressed. Against that background it is perhaps somewhat ironic that up to late February there were some indications that President Milosevic and the authorities in Belgrade were a little bit more open to dialogue. Since then, however, there has been a dramatic escalation in tension. There are three or four reasons why that increase in tension occurred in late February. The first is the linkage to the holding of what were termed the parallel elections, which took place last Sunday. These were elections held by the Kosovars. They had earlier held elections, in 1992, which were not recognised by Belgrade. The political climate engendered by these elections was certainly a factor. Perhaps more significantly there was a movement toward extremes. We have seen that in Serbia, particularly with the Serbian population in Kosovo. Yesterday. that movement towards extremes was reflected to some extent in the inclusion of ultra nationalists in the Serbian Government. The new Deputy Prime Minister is Mr. Seslj. The implications of that need to be looked at carefully. On the other hand, on the Kosovar side, we are seeing a movement towards support for extremists and supporters of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), simply because moderates did not appear to be making any headway. Effectively, the middle ground seemed to be coming under pressure. The immediate spark that triggered off the latest problems was an ambush by the KLA on 28 February. That set off a train of events including considerable repression by Serb forces. We have detailed that in the update we circulated. Two days later, the EU issued a statement condemning the use of violent repression and terrorism. We then had a further ten days in which there was massive use of force. A number of villages were attacked. I do not know if I need to go into the details. The facts have not been clearly established, for the reasons which I stated. There are various figures but it is absolutely clear that there were a large number of deaths, including women and children. There are claims that prisoners were summarily executed and that international observers and members of the Red Cross did not have access. At that time, the EU President-in-office, Minister Cook, visited Belgrade. As the Chairman mentioned, the authorities there would not talk to him about Kosovo. They said it was an internal problem. It is also worth mentioning that, within Serbia, the actions of President Milosevic appeared to have strong support. This was also a bad sign that there was polarisation. The State media was putting across a view which was not being challenged. This led to a situation, on 9 March, where the Contact Group - consisting of France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Britain and the United States - met in London. It issued a statement which we have circulated to the Committee. In the statement the Group identifies four key measures to be taken: consideration by the UN Security Council of a comprehensive arms embargo; refusal to supply equipment to the FRY, which might be used for internal repression; denial of visas for senior FRY and Serbian representatives; and a moratorium on Government financed export credit support. There has been some debate as to what these measures will actually add up to. In addition, it was clear that one member of the Contact Group - the Russian Federation - had some difficulties in going along with even those rather limited measures. There is a possibility of further measures. The Contact Group indicated that, if President Milosevic did not take the steps called for, there would be a reassessment on 25 March of what further international measures might be needed. So far as the EU was concerned, we had quite a discussion at the European Conference which took place in London on 12 March. This was the inaugural meeting of a conference bringing together the Heads of State and Government, and Foreign Ministers, of the applicant countries with those of the EU. Kosovo figured quite largely in the discussions and a statement was issued. At Edinburgh, the Foreign Ministers continued their discussions, as a result of which the EU has adopted a Common Position. That Common Position basically addresses the four areas of sanctions. They have now been adopted by the EU. The EU has also appointed Felipe Gonzales as Special Envoy to the FRY which coincides with his reappointment by the OSCE as special representative of the Chairman-in-office. His brief has been extended to cover Kosovo. There has been a mixed reaction from the Serbs. There is some evidence that they were taken aback by the speed of the international reaction. At the same time there are serious doubts as to whether there is any substance to their statements about curbing the special police forces. This is difficult to verify but yesterday’s events would call this into question. The Serbs indicated that they sent a delegation to Pristina to open dialogue. This was seen as propaganda by the Kosovo side and no meeting has yet taken place. The parallel elections took place last Sunday. There had been some concerns that there could be major splits and moves towards extreme elements of the political spectrum. However, it seems that Dr. Rugova has received a large mandate. I understand that he had a discussion with President Chirac today and that the President asked him to take the initiative. I am not certain what that will mean but it is important that a real dialogue start between the Kosovar leadership and Belgrade. The signing of an agreement to allow for the return of Kosovar students to public education establishments might be seen as a positive development. Our assessment is that this is too little too late and it has encountered local Serb opposition. A meeting of the Contact Group took place today. We do not have extensive information but the Group has postponed a decision on imposing extra sanctions for four weeks. We do not know who had problems and I should not make comments in the absence of firm information. It seems that the Group has asked Dr. Rugova to pledge himself to a policy of non-violence and to renounce calls for independence. I would like to focus on some of the underlying issues which affect the response of the international community to these developments. The key issue is how far is it credible for the Serbs to claim that Kosovo is an internal matter and how far can we say that international concerns override this view? Kosovo is part of Serbia. Previously it was an autonomous region. That autonomy was withdrawn in the late 1980s and Kosovo has been under martial law, direct rule, since. The international community does not envisage a change in the international status but there is general agreement that Kosovo’s autonomous status should be reactivated. There are a number of areas in which it is clear that there is an international dimension. The clearest of these relates to the gross abuses of human rights which appear to be taking place. There are a number of international human rights instruments and this is an area in which the international community can legitimately claim involvement. Another area is that of refugees. It is not simply a question of future refugees. We have already had a massive outflow of refugees, the figure of 1,000 per month has been quoted. I believe I am correct in saying that the total population of Kosovo is in the region of 1.8 to 2 million, but we do not have accurate figures. However, the number of Kosovars outside Albania, a mixture of emigrants and refugees, is probably close to 1 million. A great many of these are in countries such as Germany and neighbouring countries. Obviously a massive refugee exodus causes difficulties which are linked to the threat to regional peace and stability. The efforts of the international community in Bosnia to implement the Dayton agreement could be affected by what happens in Kosovo. There are a number of other problems in the region which has suffered from volatility. For example, one needs to consider the implications of the international dimension for the handling of the work of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. The Contact Group raised this issue at its previous meeting and asked the Prosecutor to examine the issue. If people are guilty of crimes which fall within the remit of the tribunal there is a duty on the part of the international community to see that they are brought to justice. We see Ireland’s involvement taking place through the multilateral organisations in which we are participating. I have already spoken about the EU. We already have a well developed policy governing the union’s relations with Serbia which involves strict conditionality. One would see this policy continuing. We will be working with our partners on the common position which I have mentioned. The Union’s efforts in Bosnia are also a factor. We are also examining what assistance can be provided for Albania and FYROM. One area would be the EU’s Monitoring Mission. We have been doing relatively little in the OSCE because its long term mission for Kosovo has been excluded. The UN Security Council has been involved but it has not been a matter for the General Assembly of which we are a member. Mr. Townsend: Deputy Briscoe’s question in regard to the use of force was a very pertinent one. One needs to see this issue in its context. The difficulty with Kosovo at the moment is that excessive force is being used internally by the Serb authorities and by elements who have been described as terrorists. In essence, the aim is to move away from the use of force and pressure is being exerted towards that end. There is a certain difficulty surrounding international involvement in the situation. I believe that possibilities for international involvement exist under the Charter of the United Nations where it is established that a threat to international peace and security exists. However, that course of action is really only viewed as a last resort. One must also consider the question of containment. A number of states, such as the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Albania, have issued requests to NATO to establish whether it might be possible to station forces along borders. That would help to maintain stability and limit spill-over effects. I understand that possibility is being considered. People are awaiting the outcome of today’s meeting of the Contact Group. In the light of what has happened in Bosnia, I believe there will be great concern to see that an international consensus is maintained. That effectively means that it would be necessary to obtain Russian agreement. Deputy Briscoe: I understand that the essential difference is that Bosnia had an international boundary whereas Kosovo does not. Chairman: I believe it is important to consider the history of Kosovo vis-à-vis Serbia and to elicit the extent to which one could suggest that Kosovo is now, or ever was, an independent country. As I understand it, Kosovo was not one of the republics of the old Federal Republic of Yugoslavia under Tito but was an autonomous region within the then Republic of Serbia. At what stage was it annexed by Serbia and what were the circumstances surrounding that? Mr. Townsend: I am not an expert on Serbian history but my understanding is that Serbians have a very long attachment to what they view as the cradle of their civilisation which goes back to the fourteenth century. There is a feeling that Kosovo is an intrinsic part of Serbia. Control of the actual territory was only actually regained in 1913 when the Ottoman Empire was retreating. From an emotional viewpoint, this issue runs very deep indeed. I am not sure that I should comment much further on that. A series of principles under what was the CSCE or the Helsinki Final Act, now the OCSE, deal with issues relating to borders and their peaceful change. I believe that the recognition of states at the time of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia formed the basis of existing republics. This is an extremely sensitive issue and the re-establishment of autonomy status would seem to be the immediate step to be worked towards. Chairman: Where is the Contact Group meeting being held? Mr. Townsend: It is being held in Bonn. Chairman: Is Mr. Townsend aware whether the meeting has concluded? Mr. Townsend: My understanding is that it has and that it has effectively postponed taking any further decisions for four weeks. Chairman: The fact that it should have postponed any decisions, particularly in regard to sanctions, is a point of concern to me. I believe that will give the Serbs an opportunity to consolidate their position in a way which might prove regrettable. Has Mr. Townsend any idea whether the six states in the Contact Group were unanimous in their views? Mr. Townsend: We have not seen any reports on the meeting although we would hope to get some feedback on it. Although I am only being speculative, I believe it was very clear that the Russian Federation expressed major concerns at a previous meeting of the group. We believe that Mr. Primakov attended today’s meeting although his own position in the Russian Government may be somewhat uncertain. It is likely that the Russians had some difficulty taking a decision on the imposition of further sanctions. A further point which I believe would also have been a matter of concern relates to the incorporation of ultra-nationalists in the Serbian Government. That could have repercussions in terms of the attitude of Serbia or Belgrade to events in Bosnia. Serbian elections are scheduled for September and Mr. Dodik has shown quite a degree of openness in attempting to meet obligations under Dayton. I imagine there is some concern about the implications of these latest developments, not only for Kosovo but also for events in Bosnia. Chairman: Mr. Townsend referred to the fact that the Contact Group postponed taking a decision on further sanctions which implies that some limited sanctions are already in force against Serbia. Could you describe them briefly? Mr. Townsend: The further measures would be additional to the four measures which the Contact Group agreed on 9 March. The first is consideration by the Security Council of a comprehensive arms embargo against the FRY. That measure is already in place within the EU so, as far as the EU is concerned, it is not an additional measure. The second is a refusal to supply equipment to the FRY which might be used for internal repression or for terrorism. That is also something EU countries would not have been doing under the EU policy on exports of sensitive equipment. The third measure was denial of visas for senior FRY and Serbian representatives responsible for repressive action by FRY security forces. The EU has now acted on that. The fourth measure is a moratorium on government financed export credit support for trade and investment, including government financing for privatisations. That measure will probably cause most concern in Belgrade. The Russians said on 9 March that they had difficulty with the last two measures and I am not sure if they have adopted them. However, the Russians would not be providing money for Serbia. The bulk of the money would come from western sources. Chairman: Has the fourth measure been implemented by the EU since 9 March? Mr. Townsend: A Common Position has been adopted which implements it. With regard to the outer wall of sanctions, or the sanctions that remain in effect, the FRY still does not have access to international organisations. It is not a member of OSCE and is not able to take a seat at the United Nations. It also has not had access to international funding, for example, from the IMF or the World Bank. In addition to those sanctions, there is also a policy of conditionality in terms of the EU’s relations with Serbia. It has not received benefits from the EU which other countries have received under regional programmes. Senator Lanigan: The more we hear about this problem, the more complex it becomes. How do you envisage the development of the autonomy concept for Kosovo coming into effect? The Contact Group supports neither independence nor amendments to the status quo. What does that mean? The groups says the autonomous status of Kosovo should be reinstated but it does not support its independence. It supports an enhanced status for Kosovo within the FRY. What does that mean in practical terms? The groups says such a status should protect the rights of the Albanians and certain other residents in Kosovo. That appears to be hogwash. How does one delve into that? How can autonomous status enhance a situation where the population is 90 per cent Albanian and 10 per cent Serbian? In recent years this Committee has discussed Rwanda, the problems between the Hutu and Tutsi people and how a majority can keep a minority under control. The international community appears to be aiding the Serbs in repressing the 90 per cent of the population of Kosovo which is Albanian. We do not know how many people have been forced to flee. Are they economic refugees? Kosovo is probably one of the most deprived areas in Europe and the economy of Albania is diabolical. At what point does a refugee from Kosovo become an economic refugee or an asylum seeker? Is any effort being made by the European Union or by the Contact Group to increase the possibility of economic growth in Kosovo? If nothing is done in terms of the region’s economic situation, there will be a constant exodus of people. This statement from the Contact Group about the retention of the autonomous status is gobbledegook. The Serbs will not want the situation in Kosovo to be brought into the international arena as an international problem. They will claim it is an internal matter. Mr. Townsend: The EU has been pressing strongly to establish a presence, particularly an office, in Pristina and this has been blocked steadily by Belgrade. There is no EU representative in Kosovo. However, the US has an information office there. What is involved is a series of interlocking vicious circles. Where 90 cent of the population is of one ethnic group and it is dominated by the other 10 per cent which is not of the same ethnic group, it is inevitable that the 10 per cent will dominate in a way that prevents access to education, employment and a range of other areas. That leads to severe economic deprivation which will generate economic refugees. They are the result of the political situation. There might be refugees who are fleeing persecution or likely imprisonment or torture but it is sometimes difficult to draw a line between the categories. When one speaks of autonomy, one is also talking about a democratic system. That means the affairs of Kosovo would be managed on a daily basis by the majority. There would be the maximum extent of devolution to them of responsibility for their own affairs. Limits would probably be imposed in areas such as external relations, where it would be likely that the federal authorities would wish to retain responsibility. There is a complicated structure in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It consists of two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, and Serbia has three areas which have in the past had extensive minorities and limited degrees of autonomy. In addition to Kosovo there is Vojvodina, where there is a sizeable Hungarian minority, and Sandjak. The key to addressing the economic problems in Kosovo has to be linked to the establishment of control over their own affairs within the framework provided by the Federation. I cannot see Kosovo having the same status as a republic in the manner of Montenegro. The EU is already looking at a series of programmes which can be applied for civil society in Kosovo. One area being looked at is the funding of small and medium enterprises. In order to do that there must be access and the European Union does not have that at present. Senator Lanigan: What do you think of the status of the elections which took place in Kosovo in 1992? It was mentioned there has been some attempt to upgrade educational facilities - schools and universities had been closed but are now being reopened. If there are attempts being made in that area, are there any in any other areas? Education would be the last thing on which the system would concentrate if it wanted to keep the Albanians down. Why is it that the concentration seems to be on education to the exclusion of everything else? Mr. Townsend: The 1992 elections were unofficial, they were not given recognition by Belgrade and the crux of the problem remains in Belgrade. It is clear there is a strong wish on the part of the Kosovars to establish and operate democratic institutions. That was reflected not only in the 1992 elections but those which took place on Sunday. The difficulty is that they have been prevented from putting these institutions in place and operating them. There are areas such as health and social services where, along with education, it is important that there should be access on an equal basis for the population in Kosovo. One of the planks of EU policy, linked to the conditionality on Serbia, is to press Belgrade to take steps to address these problems in Kosovo. If there is to be a dialogue which will produce results it is necessary that the Serbs recognise the aspirations of the Kosovars One should distinguish between the sensitive area of independence and autonomy. It is clear there is a widespread aspiration in Kosovo for independence. The Serbs are using this as an excuse for not moving on autonomy. There is scope for dialogue, if one goes back six weeks there were some hopeful signs. At present there are indications of an escalation in violence and it appears the Kosovo Liberation Army is gaining many recruits and weapons. Last year there was a major problem resulting from the implosion in Albania. Consequently there was a great deal of weaponry circulating in the region and it seems some of this may have found its way into Kosovo. These are factors which are making it more difficult to return to a situation where Belgrade, under international pressure, takes the steps to make dialogue possible and that dialogue would hopefully lead into a restitution of meaningful democratic structures and autonomy for Kosovo. Deputy Briscoe: The term New World Order is so often espoused by people. It would be a good idea if there was a protectorate system where areas of the world, finding themselves in the same situation as Kosovo, would be taken in by an organisation like the UN, thus protecting people in area like this from the degradation about which the world seems unable to do anything. Is there any hope we could move in that direction, to adopt areas through the UN as dependencies or protectorates? We do not want the United Nations becoming a colonial power but because of the ethnic frustrations arising from international borders it is happening all the time. We are talking and innocent people are suffering. Has that idea ever been espoused and does it have any merit? We are talking in a vacuum where we feel helpless to do anything positive other than hope that a four week delay may lead to something. Mr. Townsend: There has been a considerable amount of thought, in the context of Bosnia in particular, to see how the institutions set up under the Dayton Agreement can be built up, supported and made self sustaining. It would be an oversimplification to say the international community, having undertaken the task, and given that in many cases it is evident these institutions are not yet self-sustaining, cannot then take away the support. That led to a situation where there is acceptance of the need to retain a continued presence of a body such as SFOR to underpin what is happening on the civilian side. One sees this in Bosnia. I do not think governments are at the stage where they are prepared to take on long-term expensive commitments. The policy objective is to try to ensure these institutions can sustain themselves but there is recognition that one cannot pull the plug on the life support machine. This is the case in Brcko where there has been international arbitration and there is a feeling the international involvement needs to be prolonged because otherwise this flashpoint could lead to much worse. We have conflict prevention and peace keeping exercises. In places such as Lebanon and Cyprus, having separated warring sides, the United Nations cannot always afford to interpose a force and preserve a stand-off situation indefinitely. Moves must be made to reach solutions. The EU has developed a range of programmes to assist countries. This is done on a case by case basis where needs are identified. Neo-colonialism and negative aspects were mentioned. It is particularly important that we avoid a situation where the natural development of political institutions might be impaired. Chairman: This discussion is degenerating into an academic examination of a particular area of the Balkans. Many lives have been lost. It is reported as recently as this morning that 20 people have been killed in a town in Kosovo. They were all, I understand, Albanians. The situation therefore is disimproving and while it does not have an international dimension at the moment it will very soon. If the level of refugee movement continues Albania may feel obliged to intervene even though it is in a very weak position. The consequences in Macedonia are difficult to foretell but great problems will be created for Macedonia and that country may well feel obliged to intervene. This problem has been foreseeable for some time. It is, if anything, surprising that it has taken so long to blow up. If the Serbs continue their present course of action the problem will escalate and we will be faced with another problem similar to that in Bosnia a short distance to the south. As a result of Serbian action, primarily in Bosnia, scores of thousands of people are dead and hundreds of thousands, if not millions are displaced. It is very disappointing to hear the outcome of the Contact Group meeting. We do not have time to assess it because we do not know exactly what views were expressed there or why the group took the decision they did but it is regrettable that they postponed all of this for four weeks. This is particularly regrettable on the day when at least 20 more people were killed. Senator Avril Doyle: Apart from the decision to postpone all action for four weeks is anything else on the international horizon being considered? Is it possible to summarise briefly what should be done next about the Kosovo crisis? I find it difficult to accept that nothing is on the international agenda for the next four weeks. Chairman: Very little is happening. There is a lot of talking but the people who are in a position to do something concrete are the Contact Group. They began well. I agreed with their statement of 9 March although it could have gone further than it did but they have made no progress since then. Bosnia teaches the lesson that it is only when sanctions are imposed against them that the Serbian are prepared to see sense. It proved necessary to impose those sanctions by force in Bosnia and only then were they effective. The uneasy peace in Bosnia is due to the presence of SFOR troops. If they were withdrawn, which is not now likely, the peace would disappear overnight. The possibility of the introduction of troops into Kosovo to guarantee the rights of the population will have to be considered. This problem does not yet have a sufficiently international dimension to come within the Charter of the United Nations. Is that correct, Mr. Townsend? Mr. Townsend: I would agree, Chairman. The lesson of Bosnia in the past few years is that it took very sustained and direct pressure on Belgrade, including the use of military force, to achieve results. There has been a high degree of unpredictability in applying the traditional instruments and levers of diplomacy to Serbia. They do not always have the expected results. Sticks and carrots have been used, and there have been occasions when neither sticks not carrots have had the desired result. This reflects certain complexities in the situation. It is suggested that more use should be made of diplomatic sticks but the economic situation in Serbia is extremely difficult although not as dire as in Kosovo. Economic measures may not lead to the desired political objective but they may have the unintended effect on the population of bringing them back behind the Serbian leadership. Because of a government controlled media the situation in Serbia is looking even more dangerous at present. Chairman: I thank Mr. Townsend for the very helpful information he has given to the Committee. The situation is fluid and is developing for the worse rather than the better each day. I suggest that this Committee pass a resolution calling for the re-imposition of full economic sanctions against Serbia in addition to the four matters outlined by the Contact Group. Senator Avril Doyle: I second that proposal. Senator Lanigan: What effect will the imposition of full sanctions against Serbia have on the people in Kosovo, the most economically deprived area under Serbian control? If sanctions are imposed against Serbia their first impact will be on Kosovo. The very people we want to help will suffer most. Kosovo is the most deprived area. The people they hear talking about helping will be those the Serbians will eliminate from their area of help. Chairman: The logic of that argument is that a bully should be allowed get away with his activities as he will cause suffering among the weakest people. On the basis of that argument a number of European and North American countries came out against economic boycotts being imposed on South Africa. With the value of hindsight we know that the most valuable thing in bringing about an end to apartheid was the economic boycott. This is what the African people most wanted. Senator Lanigan: The Chairman is referring to economic sanctions working in an area where there was a hugely charismatic and popular president of the ANC, itself a very powerful organisation which was able to counter sanctions. There is no point in trying to suggest that because something works in South Africa it will work elsewhere. This argument is raised every time we talk of sanctions. The situation in South Africa was not the same as currently pertains in Serbia, Cuba or Angola. Economic sanctions, which possibly worked, could not have done so without the help of the black majority in South Africa. I do not want South Africa held up as an example every time sanctions are mentioned. There were a number of elements which brought about the recovery in South Africa. Chairman: The proposal has been seconded by Senator Doyle. Deputy Briscoe: I am sure Serbians have large exporting markets and this is where they can be hurt most. I am willing to support the proposal on the grounds that it may be a contribution to the situation. The Contact Group believes it will. Chairman: Is the proposal agreed? Agreed. The committee notes Senator Lanigan’s dissent. The Joint Committee adjourned at. 5.50 p.m. RESOLUTION PASSED BY THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS (25 March 1998)“The Joint Committee gives its full backing to the measures to be pursued immediately endorsed by the Contact Group countries (USA, Russia, France, UK, Germany and Italy) at their meeting in London on 9 March, namely: -UN Security Council consideration of a comprehensive arms embargo against the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), including Kosovo; -Refusal to supply equipment to the FRY which might be used for internal repression, or for terrorism; -Denial of visas for senior FRY and Serbian representatives responsible for repressive action by FRY security forces in Kosovo; -A moratorium on government-financed export credity support for trade and investment, including government financing for privatisations in Serbia. The Joint Committee also called for the immediate reimposition of full economic sanctions against the FRY.”. APPENDIX (i) EU Declarations of 9 April 1996, 19 December 1997 and 2 March 1998 APPENDIX (ii) Statements of Contact Group of 24 September 1997, 8 January 1998 and 9 March 1998 APPENDIX (iii)Members of the Joint CommitteeMEMBERS OF THE JOINT COMMITTEEDEPUTIES AHEARN, THERESA AYLWARD, LIAM BRISCOE, BEN CALLELY, IVOR CREED, MICHAEL DEASY, AUSTIN (Vice Chairman) DE ROSSA, PROINSIAS KITT, MICHAEL P. MITCHELL, GAY O’KENNEDY, MICHAEL O’MALLEY, DESMOND J. (Chairman) SHATTER, ALAN SMITH, BRENDAN SPRING, DICK SENATORS DOYLE, AVRIL HAUGHEY, EDWARD LANIGAN, MICK MOONEY, PASCHAL NORRIS, DAVID TAYLOR-QUINN, MADELEINE * In substitution for Senator P. Mooney. |
||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
