Committee Reports > List of Committees > Dáil > 1986 > Select Committee on Criminal Lawlessness and Vandalism > Report No. 11 - Disturbance at Fort Mitchel prison, Spike Island on the 1st September 1985

1. Introduction

1.1The Committee was seriously concerned about the events surrounding the riot which took place on Spike Island on 1st September, 1985. Because of the implications of a situation where prisoners took over the Island, and where civilians, prison officers and the Gardai on the Island were virtual prisoners of the criminals, the Committee decided to investigate what happened on that night, the circumstances which gave rise to such a situation and the use of the prison on the Island.

1.2Members of the Committee welcomed the opening of Fort Mitchel Prison on Spike Island when it was first established. They saw it as an attempt to cope with the problem of overcrowding in the prisons and the unwarranted early release of prisoners. They were specially pleased to note the announcement by the Minister for Justice that, for security reasons, only “selected prisoners” would be held on Spike Island. This was confirmed to members of the Committee when they visited the prison on 13th May, 1985. It was understood to mean non-violent “trusted” prisoners.

1.3Following the riot on 1st September, there was widespread media coverage to the effect that prisoners, convicted of serious offences, ranging from armed robbery and burglary-with-violence to manslaughter, and others who had served previous sentences and/or had a history of violence in other prisons, were accommodated on the Island. It appeared that the selection process had broken down and that the plans for dealing with any emergency situation were hopelessly inadequate.

1.4In addition to the type of prisoners held on the Island, there was considerable evidence that the arrangements for dealing with any emergency were almost non-existing - it took about five hours for adequate Garda reinforcements to reach the prison.

The Defence Forces did not arrive until about eight hours after the disturbance occurred. These delays occurred despite an assurance, which the Committee was advised by the Prison Office Association was given to them by the Department of Justice, that back-up (Defence Forces) would be available within five minutes in the event of a disturbance or emergency (Appendix C, Page 30). The Committee had also been given similar assurance at the time of their visit in May, 1985.

1.5Because of the seriousness of these matters, the Committee requested information from the Minister for Justice, the Garda Commissioner, the Prison Officers’ Association, the Garda Representative Association and the Association of Garda Sergeants and Inspectors. While each of these individuals and organisations responded, the Committee was extremely disappointed with the response from the Minister for Justice (Appendix D). The Committee was particularly disappointed that the Minister did not allow his officials to attend a meeting even in private; that he did not accept an invitation to attend a private meeting himself and that he did not furnish his observations on the material submitted to the Committee by the Garda Representative Association (Appendices O, P and Q).

1.6The Committee decided to prepare and present this Report to Dail Eireann.

2. Visit to Spike Island by the Select Committee on 13 May 1985.

2.1Six members of the Committee visited Spike Island on 13th May, accompanied by the Governor of Cork Prison, who was also responsible for this new prison, and an official from the Department of Justice.

2.2The accommodation on the Island was taken over from the Department of Defence (Naval Service) on 29 March and work commenced immediately on providing accommodation for prisoners. The facilities available on the Island were of a very poor standard and required considerable renovation most of which was performed by prisoners and prison staff.

2.3The accommodation consisted of large dormitories each of which accommodated fourteen prisoners. At that time, the intention of the authorities was to provide accommodation for up to 196 prisoners in dormitory type accommodation, in one building.

2.4The members of the Committee were of the view that the acquisition of Spike Island was in the nature of a temporary and/or emergency reaction to the problem of overcrowding. They welcomed an effort to tackle the problem, which was caused by a severe shortage of prison accommodation, and which saw prisoners being released without serving their sentences because of the lack of accommodation.

2.5At the time of the visit, the members of the Committee who saw the facilities considered that Spike Island could be retained on a long-term basis to serve as a prison; that there was adequate space within the walls of the complex to develop a major prison, and that it could be used to relieve the pressure in other prisons, or, alternatively, to cater for future increases in the prison population.

2.6During the visit the members of the Committee were advised that, due to the fact that it was an open prison, for security reasons, prisoners were specially selected for Spike Island. This was in line with the statement made by the Minister for Justice before the prison opened.

3. The Riot - Events on the night of 1st September, 1985.

Events leading up to the riot

3.1Within days of the Committee’s visit, six prisoners escaped on a raft (May 16th); four more escaped from the Prison on May 28th, but were recaptured before they could leave the Island. On June 20th, five prisoners barricaded themselves in their dormitories, demanding transfers back to Dublin. In August, there were two more escapes - on August 3rd, a man convicted of armed robbery escaped and on August 8th, two more prisoners escaped.

3.2In the first four months there were four escapes, involving thirteen prisoners.

3.3Despite all these actual escapes and the apparent ease of escape from the prison complex, no steps appear to have been taken to prevent any serious disturbance in the prison. Also, as the number of prisoners on the Island increased, the select procedures seem to have become less stringent.

The Riot*

3.4Shortly before mid-night the Assistant Chief Officer (A.C.O.) in charge became concerned about the behaviour of prisoners in Dormitory 5 of the A Block. He instructed the staff on duty in the A Block to keep the prisoners in that dormitory under close observation. He left the Block to carry out other duties. When he returned to the A Block a few minutes later (but after 12 midnight), the prisoners in Dormitory 5 were creating a disturbance. To meet the situation, he decided to (a) retain on duty the staff due to finish at midnight,

(b) alert the sleeping-in staff and (c) to discuss the situation with the Deputy Governor. At about 12.15 a.m., while the A.C.O. was speaking by telephone to the Deputy Governor, he was told that the prisoners in Dormitory 5 were at that stage breaking out of the dormitory. The Deputy Governor instructed him to telephone the Gardai at Cobh to ask for assistance and to contact off-duty staff, who were known to be staying in a hotel in Cobh.

3.5The staff on duty at Fort Mitchel Prison, Spike Island, on Saturday, 31st August, 1985 at 12 midnight comprised:-

1Assistant Chief Officer (Supervising)

6Basic Grade Officers

4Evening Guards (4 p.m. to 12 midnight duty) who were requested to stay on duty

10Basic Grade Officers were in the Staff Quarters (“sleeping-in”) at the time of the disturbance

4Gardai who were on duty on Spike Island.

3.6At about 12.38 a.m. Cobh Garda Station was informed by telephone by a prison officer at Fort Mitchell that 30 prisoners had broken out of their dormitory and were free within the prison compound. Shortly afterwards the telephone lines went dead, due to a fire at the prison. The four Gardai on duty on the Island, who had been advised by radio from Cobh Garda Station of developments, alerted the civilian residents on the Island as to the situation. At about 1.15 a.m. a message was sent to Union Quay Station, Cork that there was a full-scale riot in progress in Fort Mitchel and reinforcements were urgently required.

3.7The 21 Prison staff on duty on the Island were not in a position to contain the prisoners within the A Block which was set on fire. The prisoners from A Block prevented the staff from using fire hoses to quench the blaze by throwing stones and other implements at them and by cutting hoses. Using a van, which they had forcibly taken over from staff, they then tried to break out through the Inner and Main Gate, but failed. The prisoners from A Block then went to the rampart dormitories and released the prisoners there.

3.8By this time, staff from Cobh had arrived on the Island and joined the staff on duty in the Fort, bringing the total staff to 29. The 4 Gardai on night duty on the Island were calling on the residents advising them to leave the Island. Most of the residents declined; some went to the pier to leave, but decided to remain. At about 1.20 a.m. the Deputy Governor, accompanied by a party of 1 Sergeant and 5 Gardai from Cobh, as well as one prison officer, arrived on the Island. The ferry returned to Cobh to collect additional Gardai.

3.9The Deputy Governor went to the prison and saw a number of prisoners climbing over the outside wall. He returned to advise the Gardai at the pier. Some discussions took place with some prisoners and it became clear that the prisoners did not intend to harm any of the civilian residents. The prisoners were armed with a variety of implements; the Gardai and the Deputy Governor had no option but to make their way to the prison for their own protection and to assist the staff within the complex. They closed the main gate and reinforced it by placing vehicles behind it. The fire hoses were also brought to the gate. Some of the prisoners returned from the pier with a JOB and attempted to break down the main gate of the prison. The prisoners made a number of such attempts, but were frustrated by the staff who displayed great courage. However, the prisoners succeeded in setting fire to parts of the main gate area using petrol obtained from naval stores on the Island; one officer suffered burn injuries during this incident.

3.10At 2.20 a.m. 15 Gardai from Cork and surrounding Stations left Cobh, by launch. They had a few riot shields, but no other equipment. The radio hand sets they were issued with were unable to transmit or receive messages. An adequate supply of riot shields did not arrive from Cork until 2.25 a.m. Due to the tide conditions and the fact that the prisoners were in occupation of the only landing place, the pier, these members were unable to land on the Island. At 3 a.m. a further twenty five Gardai properly equipped took a second launch from Cobh for Spike Island. This was one hour and forty minutes after the Cork. Divisional Headquarters had been notified of the urgent need for reinforcements. There were now about forty Gardai on the two launches going to the Island. At this stage, the original four Gardai, plus the six local Gardai who had gone to the Island when the alarm was first raised, and the Prison Officers, had barricaded themselves inside the main gate of the prison. Spike Island was at this stage in the hands of approximately seventy masked and well-armed dangerous prisoners who had broken into the prison store and armed themselves with all available weapons.

3.11The prisoners successfully forced the reinforcing party of Gardai to call off an attempted landing on the pier by throwing rocks and stones at the launch. The prisoners then returned to the Fort by which time staff and Gardai had withdrawn to the centre of the square, allowing the prisoners to enter the compound by the main gate. On entry the prisoners then walked up the rampart of the Fort and then to the roof of the officers’ quarters which is at the back of the compound. They also set fire to the administrative offices which were destroyed, but staff were able to prevent the fire spreading to the remainder of that building (kitchen and dining area) by using the fire hoses. An earlier attempt to set fire to the officers’ quarters was also dealt with by staff and those prisoners not involved in the riot (about 45).

3.12Between 4.30 a.m. and 5.00 a.m. a total of 45 Gardai landed on the Island and regained control of both the Island and the Prison. The prisoners remainded on the roof of the officers’ quarters until about 6.40 p.m. that evening.

3.13There was widespread destruction of State-owned property during the riot. The Minister for Justice is reported to have acknowledged that the Prison was “gutted”. The dormitory accommodation in A Block, the administration area, the main gate and reception areas were all set on fire. In addition, a hut at the pier was destroyed.

4. Examination by the Committee into the circumstances of the riot

4.1The Committee decided to seek reports from the various interested bodies to enable it to carry out an examination of the events surrounding the riot. The Committee obtained detailed statements from the Prison Officers’ Association (Appendix C; Page 29); the Garda Representative Association (Appendix J; Page 59); a summary of the events of the night of the riot from the Minister for Justice (Appendix D; Page 49), and a statement from the Garda Commissioner that he had no jurisdiction in the operation of the Prison (Appendix B; Page 28).

4.2The Committee also requested the Minister for Justice to send an official or officials from his Department, together with the Governor of the Prison, to attend at a private meeting of the Committee. The Minister responded by stating that he was not prepared to allow his officials, or the Governor, appear before the Committee (Appendix D; Page 49).

4.3The Committee then decided to request the Minister to attend a private meeting (Appendix E; Page 54), but the Minister declined that invitation (Appendix F; Page 55).

4.4The Committee sent a copy of the submission, which it had received from the Garda Representative Association, to both the Garda Commissioner and the Minister for Justice (Appendices M; Page 70 and O; Page 73). The Commissioner’s reply is at Appendix N; Page 71. The Minister for Justice sent a reply (Appendix P; Page 74) indicating that he regretted that, because of other pressures which had arisen, it had not been possible to furnish a reply as quickly as had been requested by the Committee. A letter issued again from the Committee further inviting the Minister’s comments (Appendix Q; Page 75).

4.5On 24th January, 1986, the Committee again invited the Minister to a meeting to discuss the riot (Appendix T; Page 7 This invitation was accepted on 11 February (Appendix U; Page but there was a change in Ministers on 13 February. On 27 February the new Minister was invited to a meeting but this meeting has not yet taken place (Appendix W; Page 81).

4.6The Committee concluded that it was not going to make any further progress on this matter and decided that it should submit this report to Dail Eireann.

5. Views of the Committee

5.1The Committee is very concerned that a situation existed on Spike Island where a group of marauding prisoners could, and did, take control of Spike Island in the aftermath of a prison escape and extensively destroy State property. Civilians, members of the Garda Siochana and Prison Officers were virtual prisoners of the escaped criminals, some of whom were highly dangerous.

5.2The Committee is thankful that nobody on the Island suffered serious personal injury. This was mainly due to good fortune rather than any other factor.

5.3The correspondence from the Prison Officers’ Association (Appendix C; Page 29) shows a complete lack of understanding, on the part of the Department of Justice, of the problems being raised by the Association in relation to the operation of Spike Island. The Committee was concerned to note that a letter of 20th May from the POA to the Department of Justice expressing concern about the selection procedures for Spike Island brought no response, despite a reminder on 23rd July. Despite specific and express warnings by the Prison Officers’ Association (see Appendix C) to the Department of Justice, nothing seems to have been done to provide the very basic and essential needs for an Island Prison. Immediately after the announcement of the bringing into use of Fort Mitchel as a prison, the Prison Officers’ Association expressed concern to the Department of Justice about the security arrangements for the prison. They mentioned, specifically, the essential need for an adequate radio link between the Island and the mainland. This was only provided after the riot. In the same way, calls for a proper alarm system and adequate lighting met with an inadequate response. Similarly, a request for a fire pump to be located near the A Block was never implemented.

5.4The Committee considers that these failures to provide the minimum essential requirements raise serious questions in relation to the operation of a prison on Spike Island and the attitude of the Department of Justice towards the serious situation developing on Spike Island.

5.5There are a number of specific questions which the Committee has considered, but to which it has failed to obtain satisfacto answers, namely:-

(i)Why was the selection procedure changed from the original position adopted by the Minister for Justice who gave assurances that a rigorous selection process would operate for Spike Island? Who was responsible for this change and for the transfer of criminals convicted of serious crimes involving personal violence to an open-style prison where security was almost non-existent?

(ii)Why was there no co-ordinated plan to deal with an emergency situation such as a major jail-breakout? The Garda Commissioner, who is not responsible for the running of the Prison, acknowledges that no specific Garda emergency plan was drawn up for Spike Island. The Committee considers that the absence of an emergency plan to deal with a riot at the prison represented a major failure on the part of the Minister, particularly when regard is had to the type of prisoner being housed on the Island and the ease with which previous escapes took place. It is an essential element in the management and con of any prison that there exists a contingency plan to deal with major disturbances; so much more so then, when dangerous criminals are housed in an insecure prison.

(iii)If the Department of Justice assured the Prison Officers’ Association that emergency back-up (Defence Forces) would be available within five minutes, what action was taken by the Department to ensure that this would, in fact, happen?

(iv)Why was there no adequate alarm system or radio system in operation in the Prison? Again, it appears to the Committee that these are basic requirements, but sufficient serious consideration does not appear to have been given to these matters.

(v)Where does authority and responsibility lie for the problems which contributed so much to the riot? Is it with the Governor, the Minister for Justice or his officials? It is to be expected that in any prison there will always be a certain number of prisoners who will be anxious to escape and who will use any and every available opportunity. The opportunities on Spike Island were many and varied and the authorities were well forewarned of the ease with which prisoners could escape. Yet, no co-ordinated plan seems to have been prepared to deal with such an inevitable eventuality. Somebody must shoulder the responsibility; yet a smokescreen was raised by suggesting that, since nobody was seriously injured, the riot and destruction were not a real problem. The Committee considered that this was not a satisfactory response to this serious situation

(vi)The Minister is not prepared to put a figure on the cost of the damage caused during the disturbance. This contrasts with the approach adopted by the Minister following the riot in Mountjoy Prison in November 1983 when full details were made available to the Dail. The Minister merely states that the cost will be included in the cost of rebuilding the prison on Spike Island.

(vii)What consideration has been given to the economics of building and maintaining a prison on an Island, particularly, in view of the difficulties experience during the night of the riot? Is it an economically viable proposition or would it be better to ensure that adequate custodial accommodation is provided on the mainland. There are special costs attributable to the maintaining of a prison on an island, including the cost of transport, to and from the island, for staff, prisoners and their relatives, supplies and materials. These events have also demonstrated the difficulty of providing adequate security and back-up with sufficient speed. The Committee considers that economics of maintaining a prison on the Island should be examined carefully and the Dail advised of the outcome. The Committee recognises that there is a difference in this regard as between the short-term needs to keep people in prison and the longer term period when other accommodation could be provided. In this connection, the Committee noted the comments Whitaker Report on the Penal System to the effect that “Spike Island should not be envisaged as permanent ( distinct from reserve) accommodation for any class of

6. Historical note on Spike Island

6.1Over its long history Spike Island has been tied into the great events of the day and has played some part or another in almost every important era of our past.

The first known use of Spike Island is a monastic settlement when a religious community was established on the island in the Seventh Century. From the ninth century, the area of Cork harbour came in for frequent Viking raids while the Norman invaders gained possession of the island in the 12th century. Shortly afterwards it passed into the hands of the friars of St. Thomas Abbey in Dublin. Over the next few centuries ownership of the island rotated between various laypersons and religious institutions.

6.2During the 17th century, at the end of the Cromwellian wars, the island became briefly a place of imprisonment. The prisoners were mostly women and children, the families of exiled Irish troops, who were held on the Island awaiting transportation as slaves to the West Indies.

6.3Certain fortification work was undertaken in the eighteenth century but was not completed. However, by 1790 the island was again being fortified, this time on a much larger scale. The new fort was to have a hundred guns and ample accommodation. By 1806 the barracks, then known as Fort Westmoreland, on the Island had been completed and the first regular garrison moved in. It became the headquarters of the South Irish Coast Defences. A great deal of work still remained and the Island’s defences were not completed until 1865.

6.4In 1847 Spike Island was called upon to fulfill a new role, that of a prison. By the mid 19th century the practice of transportation of convict prisoners was coming under increasing pressure. The Colonies to which prisoners were sent became more and more reluctant to accept them while at home the reformist movement exerted strong pressure for its abandonment. Faced with this situation the authorities began the establishment of penal institutions to which convicts could be sent. Mountjoy male and female prisons were constructed at this time and completed in 1850. The basic task of the prisoners on the Island, at least up to 1865, was work on the fortifications. Spike was essential a transfer prison. Its occupants would first serve eight months in separate confinement in Mountjoy before being moved to the Island.

In the beginning, as many as 2,200 prisoners were confined on Spike crowded together in large barrack rooms. Within a few years, however, the population had been reduced to about 500 and corrugated iron and wire netting had been used to provide separate cells.

6.5The scale of the work on Spike was enormous, without the benefit of machinery or power tools the contours of the island were changed, massive masonary structures put up an a large dry moat dug out. Prisoners were engaged for about eighteen years at this task. When the fortification of Spike was completed, a new task was found, namely the construction of Haulbowline dockyard. This was another major operation in that it involved considerable reclamation and other work. In order to facilitate the movement of the convict workforce from Spike to Haulbowline a wooden causeway was constructed between the two islands. This has long since disappeared.

6.6By 1883 a reduction in the overall number of prisoners led to the closure of the prison and it once again reverted to a purely military establishment.

6.7The War of Independence again saw Spike Island in use as a prison and internment centre for men of the Irish Volunteers. Up to 500 were held on the island although not always successfully for, on two occasions, parties of prisoners managed to escape.

6.8As part of the treaty establishing the Irish Free State a number of coastal defence installations, including Spike, remained in British hands, until the 11th of July 1938, when the last British troops departed the Island.

After the Second World War most of its guns were removed. In the nineteen seventies Spike became a military detention centre. Subsequently the naval service used it as a training centre.

In October 1985, the remaining guns on Spike were removed by the military.

8. Acknowledgement

8.1The Committee appreciates the assistance given to it by the Minister for Justice, the Garda Commissioner, the Prison Officers’ Association and the Garda Representative Association in furnishing material to the Committee; and the historical note provided by the Prison Officers Magazine.

8.2The Committee also appreciates the work of its Clerk, Mr. F.J. Brady and its Secretary, Miss G. Murphy, in the preparation of this Report.

Dr. Michael Woods T.D.

Chairman.

23rd July, 1986.

9. LIST OF REPORTS PUBLISHED BY THE SELECT COMMITTEE

* The times given are approximate.