Committee Reports > List of Committees > Dáil > 1971 > Committee of Public Accounts > Final Report - Northern Ireland Relief Expenditure

MIONTUAIRISC NA FIANAISE

(Minutes of Evidence)

Dé Máirt, 30 Samhain, 1971

Tuesday, 30th November, 1971

The Committee met at 7.30 p.m.

DEPUTY P. HOGAN in the chair.

ORDER OF DÁIL OF 1st DECEMBER, 1970.

Mr. E. F. Suttle (An tArd-Reachtaire Cuntais agus Ciste) was in attendance in an advisory capacity.

Colonel Michael Hefferon in attendance.

12290. Chairman.—Now, Colonel Hefferon, you have asked that you be given an opportunity to cross-examine Deputy Gibbons, the Minister for Agriculture. We communicated your request by letter to Deputy Gibbons and we received the following reply:

Dear Deputy,

I have received your letter of the 24th November, 1971. Since I have already given evidence of all matters in my knowledge relevant to your inquiry I do not propose to attend before your Committee again.

Yours faithfully,

James Gibbons.

Colonel Hefferon, you are under oath. You understand you are continuing under oath.

—Yes.

12291. You are entitled to make any statement that is relevant and you may touch on anything which you consider damaging to your character. Within that broad field you are fully entitled to make any statement. If you will give us some indication of when you are testifying as against when you are making a simple observation it might help us. You may proceed now.

—Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do understand of course that any new evidence I produce will be under oath but as most of what I will be dealing with will concern itself with evidence already given, I will try as I go along to indicate to you where I think there is new evidence not already covered by me and try to indicate to you that it is new evidence.

To begin with, I regret very much that Deputy Gibbons did not see fit to come here this evening to be cross-examined by me. I think, as a member of this Parliament which set up this Committee, he should have come from courtesy if nothing else. He very recently, as most of you are aware, took occasion to launch a bitter personal attack on me when under Parliamentary privilege. I would have welcomed very much a chance to get him here and to jog his memory, which he has admitted before the court at times as being defective, and to jog it on many matters which are at issue between us. However, he has not come and therefore, I propose with your permission to now address the Committee on the matters about which I came here this evening.

The first matter that I will take up is this question of the authorisation of training by Mr. Gibbons of certain citizens of Northern Ireland, ordinarily resident in Derry. Mr. Gibbons has stated before your Committee that:

Certain Derry men were recruited into the FCA. This is not an unusual practice. They were recruited and attested into the FCA and trained as such in uniform.

In reply to a further question he stated:

It is by no means unusual for young men from the Six Counties to join the FCA. The FCA is a military force and they recruit and the only stipulation is that they be of good repute.

Attestment for enlistment into the FCA is governed by a Defence Force Regulation; R5 is the number of it, I think. This lays down the conditions which govern attestation of recruits and general conditions for service in An Forsa Cosanta Aitiúil. This regulation expressly forbids the enlistment or enrolment of persons living normally outside the jurisdiction of this State. I think there is only one exception to that and that is where students who are attending colleges here may be attested. They are the only exception. Therefore, the taking in and the training of these Derrymen—far from what Mr. Gibbons says, that the FCA is a military force and they recruit, the only stipulation that they be of good repute—is quite illegal because this regulation, in case it might be argued that a Minister who makes a regulation may and has authority to over-ride that regulation, I would remind you that Defence Force Regulations are countersigned by the Minister for Finance in cases where public moneys are involved.

Now I go on to Mr. Gibbons’ knowledge of the existence of this Regulation. I quote hereunder part of cross-examination of Mr. Gibbons at the second arms trial on the afternoon of October 9th.

Counsel.—I take it you would agree with me, Mr. Gibbons, that it (the FCA) is not intended for the purpose of training people living outside the Republic of Ireland?

Mr. Gibbons.—Not strictly speaking.

Counsel.—And do you agree with me that the enrolment of citizens of Derry on your order, in September, 1969, into the FCA for the purpose of giving them training in Fort Dunree, was an unorthodox method of achieving what you thought was a proper objective?

Mr. Gibbons.—Yes.

Counsel.—And it was making use of the defence forces so as to assist a minority in Derry to be in a position to defend themselves.

Mr. Gibbons.—Yes.

Later in the exchanges with Mr. McCarthy, which culminated in Mr. Gibbons excusing his evasion on this matter in Dáil Éireann by merely saying that “this was a Dáil debate”, he is being queried about the induction of Derry citizens into the FCA.

Mr. McCarthy.—Does not that mean that this was a subterfuge or device to enable the Army to train them for the defence of the Bogside?

Mr. Gibbons.—I admit that this was a device to enable Derrymen to join the FCA and to obtain training.

In my reply to Question 8580, dealing with the circumstances leading up to the sanctioning of the training for the Derrymen, I have been at some pains to emphasise the method by which the request was made by them and its transmission through the regular chain of command to the Chief of Staff. The routine discussions up along the line—and remember this was started at a fairly low level—would, of course, have highlighted the existence of the debarrment clause in the regulation and it is inconceivable that the Chief of Staff would fail to apprise the Minister of the difficulty it presented. From the Minister’s own admission in court, the Derrymen were recruited and trained by a device, yet his evidence to the Committee implied in the strongest possible manner that recruiting and attestation of Six County residents into the FCA is a legitimate exercise.

Finally, the Army officers who took part in this episode—and they are many—can, no doubt, be made available to the Committee, if it should so desire. The point that I am making there again is that this was an illegal attestation and that they were, for all practical purposes, civilians.

This I regard as highly important in view of the twist that has been given to it by Mr. Gibbons.

On the question of the termination of the first course in Fort Dunree, there is a direct conflict of evidence between the evidence given by me both before the courts and the Committee, and that given by Mr. Gibbons. In the answer to Question 8580 I state that I cancelled the course “of my own authority” on Friday, 3rd October, because I had become aware that the newspapers were “on” to it. Perhaps it would be helpful if I explained that the Press and publicity section of the Army come directly under the Director of Intelligence and they accept queries from the Press and answer them. From this it follows that the section is well qualified to assess the bona fides or otherwise of an enquirer. I think it is admitted that the courses in Fort Dunree were to be continuous; in other words the first course was a seven-day one; another course was due to come in.

It is provable that a further 20 persons from Derry were to report on the Saturday morning, 4th October. This is the course that was cancelled, and no other course was held.

When we come to Mr. Gibbons’ account of this in his evidence before the Courts (afternoon of 9th October) after denying that the training was stopped owing to the danger of newspaper publicity, he went on to say:

The Taoiseach was at that time on leave, and I sanctioned the training on my own initiative and, on his return, I acquainted him of the fact, and the Taoiseach advised that it be discontinued, and it was.

Later during the same cross-examination, being queried as to the machinery for stopping the training, he replied:

The machinery was that I went to the Taoiseach and told him of this affair, and he considered it and decided against its continuation. I conveyed this decision to the Army and it was there——

Counsel: To whom?

Mr. Gibbons: As far as I can recall it was either to the Chief of Staff or Colonel Hefferon—I am not sure which.

As I have stated many times during the course of these proceedings, a further course of some 20 persons was due to report into Fort Dunree on the morning of Saturday, 4th October, and in view of imminent danger of disclosure to the Press, and my inability to contact either the Chief of Staff or the Minister, I took steps to cancel the incoming course.

I want to say here that the date on which the course was stopped, was Friday the 3rd. The second course was due in on Saturday, 4th. It was stopped by me. I could not get the Minister or the Chief of Staff and I was acting out of a sense of responsibility, because for many reasons it was apparent to me that a disclosure of this information would be highly embarrassing, particularly at that time. You are all familiar with the speech made by the Taoiseach on 20th September in which he laid down the guidelines for policy in regard to the North. It was against the background of this that I took what was unprecedented action. I had not authorised the course to begin. I had no authority to do so. I took authority to stop it because I was concerned with the effects disclosure of this information would have—that it might be embarrassing to the Government. There seems to be a direct conflict as to who stopped the course, so I will refer you to a number of people whom you are at liberty to call in regard to what I have said.

First of all, the liaison officer in the Donegal area at the time, whom I ordered by telephone to contact immediately the Derry group who were organising the course, and peremptorily to cancel it. I ordered him to contact me by scrambler telephone from the office of the Chief Superintendent in Letterkenny to my office telephone at Red House, which was also equipped with a scrambler telephone, to report compliance. This he did as he can no doubt verify. It is possible that post office records for that night will still show that such a call was made from Letterkenny to my office number, 771993 at 10 o’clock that night.

No. 2, the Officer Commanding Western Command, whom in my recollection I rang that night, to inform him of the steps I had taken.

No. 3, The Chief of Staff, General S. McKeown, to whom I reported the matter personally on Monday morning, 6th October, assuming full responsibility for my actions. In my presence he rang the O/C Western Command to get a report from him on the affair, which call will no doubt be recollected by both these officers.

No. 4, two senior officers of my own staff who were on a tour of inspection of Fort Dunree and other places in Donegal on that day and who were made au fait with the situation by the liaison officer and with whom I discussed the matter on their return.

No. 5, records which exist in the Intelligence Branch and in the enlisted Personnel Section which I am sure throw light on the matter of enlistment and the termination of training.

There are, of course, numerous other witnesses, such as the Officer Commanding at Fort Dunree at that time, whose preparation for the reception of the incoming course on Saturday would have reached an advanced stage of readiness, seeing he was to take them in in the morning, training staffs, instructors et cetera. At a later stage, I believe on 27th or 28th November, I gave at his request a report of the whole episode to an Assistant Secretary in the Department of Defence. I understood him at that time to be preparing material to form the basis of a reply to an anticipated Parliamentary question. There are, of course, the people in the North who organised the course but it is as well not to mention them in the present climate.

One final point which is not without relevance is that Deputy Gibbons stressed that the Taoiseach was on leave and that when he returned he reported to him. The Taoiseach is reported in the daily Press very widely as having made an important policy speech in Tralee on 20th September. The Derrymen assembled for training on the weekend of 27th/28th September. The arrangements for running the course, the choosing of volunteers by the organisers and other preparations would have taken some time. My memory of the time is that the Cabinet were meeting twice a week. Finally, The Taoiseach, in a speech in Cork on 24th April, 1971, is reported by the Press as saying:

I want to say in this connection that since I became Taoiseach, whether in Dublin or away from it, I have at all times been in touch with the prevailing situation and was always available for consultation.

There was apparently plenty opportunity for ascertaining the Taoiseach’s views, for some time prior to 3rd October and as I have pointed out somewhat painstakingly, the training was stopped by me on the evening of that date. After all I have said, that Deputy Gibbons’s statement that he told the Chief of Staff or me to stop the course is all bunkum.

The next point I want to make is in relation to the expression “cover story” and of Captain Kelly’s intention to go abroad in order to vet arms. Replying to Question No. 11046 which inquires:

Am I to take it that you did not know that he was going to vet arms?

Deputy Gibbons replied:

Yes, and you can take it further that I did not understand him to be seeking my endorsement or otherwise in the matter. He conveyed his general anxiety about Captain Kelly to me.

He was referring to me. In reply to Question No. 11185, Deputy Gibbons replied:

The expression “cover story” is absolutely new.

On the morning of 25th September, during the first Arms Trial, under cross-examination by the defence Deputy Gibbons was more candid:

Counsel: Did the Director of Intelligence also tell you that his (Captain Kelly’s) real reason was to go and deal with this question of arms?

Deputy Gibbons:—He suggested this in a rather critical way. He said: “I have an idea his real purpose may be to vet—that is the expression he used—to vet arms”.

Counsel.—To vet arms?

Deputy Gibbons.—Yes.

Counsel.—So that the Director of Intelligence told you and I suggest that this would have been sometime about the middle of February——

Deputy Gibbons.—Probably.

Counsel.——that Captain Kelly he believed was going to vet arms and that he was giving as cover or ostensible reason for that the vacation to his sister—a trip to his sister in Frankfort?

Deputy Gibbons.—Yes.

From the above piece of evidence under oath in the courts it is quite clear that Deputy Gibbons was familiar with the term “cover story” and that he did not tell the truth to the Committee.

Further, on a point referred to by Deputy Gibbons that he did not understand me to be seeking his endorsement or otherwise in the matter, there was no need to go to him at all if I were not seeking his endorsement. There is a well defined procedure for making application to obtain permission to leave the State. The Adjutant General’s Branch deals with such matters. It will be, however, recalled that Captain Kelly had requested his retirement from the force to be activated from 13th February for the purposes of giving him a slightly higher rate of pension and it was against this background that the conversation took place. Here I may say that from the evidence Deputy Gibbons quite clearly stated that when I went to him at the end of January to tell him about Captain Kelly’s intention to assist Northern people and that I advised him to send in his resignation, he denied all knowledge of this. The reason I went to him on that date was to apprise him of the fact that Captain Kelly was going or intended to go and that I had asked that the resignation be made effective from 13th January. This is the only thing that makes sense.

12292. Deputy R. Burke.—May I interrupt the witness for a moment? Perhaps he overlooked to read it, but he omitted a paragraph from page 7. It states:

Secondly, he admits there that he had heard from me clearly and unequivocally that I believed Captain Kelly was going to vet arms.

Did the witness omit that deliberately?

—No. It was not my intention to omit it. Further, on a point referred to by Deputy Gibbons that he did not understand me to be seeking his endorsement or otherwise in the matter. The Government directive of 6th February had been promulgated at that time. Now I wish to refer to Captain Kelly’s continuing involvement and plans for future action in the matter of the importation of arms. Deputy Gibbons told the Committee in answer, I think, to Question No. 10888:

Captain Kelly … told me towards the end of March of an abortive attempt that had been made to import guns through the port of Dublin but he was talking about a thing that had already occurred. He told me nothing of his intentions in the future.

Before the Central Criminal Court on September 25th, Mr. Finlay queried Mr. Gibbons:

Mr. Finlay.—Did Captain Kelly also inform you that on that occasion the importation of the arms was being arranged in some other way?

Mr. Gibbons.—Yes. I said to him at the time and I hoped as well that this would be true but I said something like this: “I suppose that assignment is gone west anyway”; and he said: “No, it is not. It will be possible to retrieve it in one way or another.”

Mr. Finlay.—Am I right in understanding that he made it clear to you that he was going on assisting in the attempted importation?

Mr. Gibbons.—This was clear at that stage, yes.

Mr. Gibbons has told the Committee: “He told me nothing of his intentions in the future” and it is quite clear from his evidence before the court that Captain Kelly had told him about his intentions in the future.

Later statements during the arms trial by Mr. Gibbons add a good deal of circumstantial detail to his conversation with Captain Kelly on this matter, culminating in Mr. Finlay querying on 28th September, I think:

Mr. Finlay.—Did you know then, Mr. Gibbons, that this officer still serving in the Intelligence Section of the Irish Army was intending to continue participating in the importation of arms?

Mr. Gibbons.—Yes.

I think some of this is already covered by Mr. Sutherland’s evidence before the Committee, too. Mr. Gibbons is telling one story, apparently, to the court and another, the direct opposite, to the Committee.

I come on to the availability of arms in March, 1970. At the morning session of the second arms trial on 9th October, 1970, Mr. Gibbons was being closely interrogated by counsel for defendant, John Kelly, about the promises of arms alleged to have been made by Mr. Gibbons, among other Ministers, in particular to the delegations who were received at Government Buildings and Leinster House on 3rd and 4th March, 1970. In evidence he stated:

I made it clear to them, I think, that no arms would be provided for them by the Irish Government, that the arms simply weren’t available.

In the afternoon session on the same day, under cross-examination by, I think, Mr. Finlay for the defence—I pause here to commend the study of this long examination to anyone who wishes to get some idea of Mr. Gibbons’s style of evasive answering—Mr. Gibbons, asked whether his reply to Mr. Sorohan that morning that no arms were promised to the delegation because no arms were available was drawn from his imagination or his recollection replied:

It was neither from my recollection or from my imagination, but from my knowledge of the facts.

What are the facts? Replying to a parliamentary Question on 28th April, 1971, the Minister for Defence, Mr. Cronin, spells out quite clearly the quantities of surplus arms and spare parts available in March and indeed for some considerable time before that. The question references in the Dáil debates are Nos. 46 and 48. From Mr. Cronin’s answer it is quite clear that some 13,000 rifles, 1,800 revolvers and 32 machine guns were offered for sale by tender in the previous November as well as a quantity of accessories and spare parts. The arms were not sold, according to the reply, because the Government decided to hold them against the so-called “Doomsday” situation arising. It is interesting to note, in passing, that in a speech in Cork already referred to, on 24th April, the Taoiseach, Mr. Lynch, in a broadside, replying to Mr. Blaney’s Arklow speech, remarked, according to press reports:

It is normal practice for our defence forces to dispose of surplus arms from time to time. On this occasion the Government decided that they would not be sold but held against the possibility of the so-called “Doomsday” situation arising. This is already public knowledge, having been given in evidence in the arms trial.

The directive of 6th February did indeed refer to surplus arms being made available. These are they.

The Department of Defence have a file—not one of any high security sensitivity, indeed it is a file mainly dealt with by the Contracts Branch—and should be readily available to the Committee for perusal. It deals with the intended sale of these surplus weapons. It should contain a short minute by myself asking to be kept informed. This was due to an inquiry from Belfast. In fact, the agent visited Clancy Barracks to inspect the weapons. However, the Government did decide to hold them against the “Doomsday” situation arising, largely against the contingency of armed attack on the minority in a chaotic situation. For Mr. Gibbons to say that “No weapons were available” in March is contrary to the fact, and as he himself was presumably advising the Government when they made the decision not to sell but to hold against the “Doomsday” situation, his knowledge of the position must, of necessity, have been total.

Now, in replying to Question 10899, and indeed on several other occasions, Mr. Gibbons professes ignorance of the fact that the withdrawal of intelligence officers from Northern Ireland was known to him. On other occasions at the trials he has said:

I had never been apprised of the fact that Captain Kelly had in fact been instructed by Colonel Hefferon to stay out of the North. I, on the other hand, was under the impression that Captain Kelly carried out all his work in the North of Ireland.

In later exchanges Mr. Gibbons uses the curious expression:

They must be blind if they are not on to him by now, and Colonel Hefferon agreed with me that this was so.

Records exist in general headquarters which prove beyond yea or nay that officers went to Border areas early in the period immediately following the turmoil in Derry and Belfast with assigned Intelligence missions. Their acquaintance with these areas, local conditions on both sides of the Border and normal military duties, were factors affecting the choice. Their written reports still filed in the Intelligence headquarters detail clearly their journeyings into Northern Ireland and my briefings of the Minister quite naturally reflected this state of affairs. I wish to emphasise here that these officers operated under a direct and written warrant from the Chief of Staff setting out the scope and responsibility of their mission. Additionally, as I have already given evidence of, a Government instruction sometime around mid-August had assigned specifically to “Intelligence officers” the task of gathering evidence from refugees, needing in many instances reference back to sources within Northern Ireland.

From all this it must be clearly apparent that the operation of intelligence officers within Northern Ireland was an officially approved, highly significant factor in the field of public policy. The decision to withdraw them then, in the October-November period, was one of such gravity that to suggest the Director of Intelligence would do it without consultation with his superiors, civil and military, is straining the credulity of even the very naive.

The underlying reason for taking what was at that time a drastic step is, of course, closely ound up with national security, so I am unable to elaborate on it here. The decision, depriving as it did the Intelligence service of opportunities for developing their business, was obviously one which would be recommended with extreme reluctance by any director of that service. The circumstance that forced this decision to recommend withdrawal, was itself of such a nature that I was bound by longstanding and invariable custom to acquaint the Minister as well as the Chief of Staff of the matter. Perhaps I shall have something more to say in a later submission about it.

I have not had any access to the Intelligence archives since my retirement, but I am certain supporting documentation does exist there, as well as in the Plans and Operations Branch of G.H.Q.

The chain of command—replying to a question by the Committee as to the method by which the Director of Intelligence reports, I replied:—

I am in some difficulty, Mr. Chairman, about this matter because the operation of the Intelligence section is a matter which is naturally closely involved in national security; to give a proper picture of it, I think it would mean going into detail, not only on this matter but on many other things which are matters of Intelligence.

At that time I was under the impression that the Committee would wish to take evidence in private from me on matters affecting the national security. This did not, in fact, happen. However, Mr. Gibbons, replying to a question by Deputy Hugh Gibbons on the question of the administration of the Army, which specifically mentions the Director of Intelligence, has this to say:

No, the Chief of Staff, the Quartermaster General and the Adjutant General, are all soldiers, but the link between the Department of Defence as such and the Army as such is made through that channel. This is the way it works.

Now the truth is that the Director of Intelligence has had the right of access to the Minister for the past 30 years at least. Not alone has he the right but he has also the obligation to seek out the Minister in connection with certain matters and talk to him without benefit of intermediary. In my seven-and-a-half years as Director, I operated in this fashion with Mr. Gibbons’ predecessors, and the documentary proof of the legitimacy of this modus operandi is amply provable by the Defence archives. I think I won’t say any more about that.

The frequency of visits by the Director of Intelligence to the Minister for Defence—in question 11093 Mr. Gibbons is asked if Colonel Hefferon had reported to him often about Captain Kelly’s activities. He replies I am quoting, by the way—“I could not pin it down; he showed up from time to time, and sometimes he gave me information of a general kind about the political situation in the North.” Later, in further evidence before the Committee, Mr. Gibbons is being posed the query:

“And frequent visits by Colonel Hefferon?” He replies—

“They were not all that frequent at that time.”

The very first visit I paid him, as I believe I have already stated, was on July 17, which I must emphasise was at his request and was for the purpose of briefing him more especially on the Northern Ireland situation.

In my evidence, Question 8375, I state— “Well, Government policy as far as I was concerned, would be translated to me by the Minister for Defence for the time being, well, by the Minister for Defence, by meeting him every week.” This is, in fact, a conservative estimate. For the period February/April, which apparently Mr. Gibbons is referring to when he says my visits were not all that frequent at that time, I am not aware of any reduction in the cycle of visits.

Evidence which will go far to clear this point can be given by the civil servants who acted as private secretary to Mr. Gibbons during the period. Now I just want to say that, far from flitting around as a shadowy figure who appeared and disappeared now and again, that my visits to the Minister were so frequent that they became rather a source of embarrassment to me because it is not easy to be—when you stand around or when you visit too often they are wondering what you are discussing— but the point I am making here is that the visits were, indeed, very frequent, sometimes twice a week in the period August-September-October.

The next point—the status of Captain Kelly after the 8th April, 1971—that is the date on which I retired—on the 28th September, 1970, in the Central Criminal Court, Mr. Gibbons, in reply to the President, and on at least one occasion in reply to Mr. Finlay, stated:

“I wasn’t quite certain, my lord, of his (Capt. Kelly’s) status after Colonel Hefferon’s retirement.”

Firstly, let me quote in full Question 4309, and my answer to it:

Question: In other words, you did not brief your successor either on the up-to-date situation for this very reason? You felt it was not your place to brief your successor as to what were your activities as Director of Intelligence or as to what your men were up to?

Answer: This is over-simplifying the matter. In my last interview with the Minister for Defence—I think this was on the 8th—it was either the day before I retired or the day on which I retired, we had a discussion before going in to the Minister for Defence, in which the question of staff came up. My successor mentioned that he did not want to carry Captain Kelly any longer on the Intelligence section and that unless he got him removed from Intelligence he could not take some new person in, because the vacancy he had in mind would not be there. I think he mentioned that he had in mind bringing in some particular officer for that post, and that he wanted to bring this up with the Minister for Defence. Having made the introduction and so on, I remember the last thing that I said was that there is now only one problem, and that is the problem of Captain Kelly.—

This was said in the office. There were only the three of us there and I was finishing up my career, my time in the Army and having discussed the various other points we had to bring up, I said: “There is now only one question, Minister, and that is the problem of Captain Kelly”.

That day or the next—and I believe the civil servant who was the private secretary to Mr. Gibbons at the time may be able to verify this, orders were given by the Minister to “set the machinery in motion” for the secondment of Captain Kelly to the Department of Agriculture. The “machinery” in question fell within the province of the Adjutant General’s branch.

On the morning of the 29th September, Commandant Treacy, a staff officer of the Adjutant General’s Branch, giving evidence before Mr. Justice O’Keeffe, in the Central Criminal Court, stated that he had received a document dated the 13th April—mark the date, 13th April—and received by him on the 17th April, from Captain James Kelly, giving his consent to being seconded to the Department of Agriculture. The document read:

I agree to secondment to the Department of Agriculture, as requested”.

and was signed by Captain Kelly. In cross-examination, Commandant Treacy stated that he had been in touch with Captain Kelly some days before the document about secondment was sent in—at any rate it had to be before the 13th.

In view of all this fuss at very high level, can it be accepted that Mr. Gibbons had any doubt as to the status of Captain Kelly from the 8th April until his retirement?

The next point I wish to deal with is Deputy Gibbons’s awareness that Colonel Delaney had been installed in C2 (Intelligence) for at least a month. In replying to Question 10907 as to whether details of Captain Kelly’s activities had been passed on to Colonel Delaney, Deputy Gibbons states:

… I was also unaware of the fact that Colonel Delaney had been installed in C2 for at least a month. I did not realise that he had arrived in C2 at all.

The announcement that Colonel Delaney was to succeed me in the Directorate of Intelligence was published, as far as I can recall, in the newspapers as far back as 17th January. Some three or four weeks later Colonel Delaney reported to C2 in order to understudy the job until my retirement. The Minister for Defence, of course, approves these appointments—so that even if he had not been reading the newspapers at the time he must of necessity have known that I was retiring and that my successor was Colonel Delaney. In view of events which were then happening, involving Intelligence personnel, the Minister must be presumed to have displayed some interest in the incoming director—to put it at its mildest. The implication is, I think, fairly clear that in some way this fact was concealed from him. The fact that Colonel Delaney was attached to the Directorate of Intelligence for five or six weeks before he took over was known to literally hundreds of people who worked in GHQ. He himself (Colonel Delaney) had worked for years in the Planning Section of GHQ before his assignment to the Military College some 12 months before. In the takeover period he accompanied me to several staff briefings, and indeed dealt with certain matters in my absence with other heads of departments, civil and military up to departmental secretary level on the civil side and, of course, Chief of Staff on the military side. However, there exists stronger evidence than this of his real knowledge of this matter.

On 20th and 21st March both I and my successor, Colonel Delaney, travelled outside the jurisdiction on Intelligence business. In conformity with the standing rule I approached the Minister for his permission to travel, briefing him completely on the purpose of the visit and, of course, getting the necessary permission also for my successor, Colonel Delaney, to travel with me, as a necessary part of the briefing process which had been going on for some weeks. The permission was readily accorded, and on my return I reported to the Minister, again in accordance with invariable practice, the result of our visit. Finally, a few days before I retired I made an appointment with the Minister to bring in Colonel Delaney formally to meet him on the 8th, when we again discussed his likely competency and in which I gave a full run down on the general form of his work during the understudying period.

I believe I have in my possession documents which can substantiate the visit abroad on the 20th and 21st March.

Earlier in the same question (10907), Deputy Gibbons refers to the fact that I had “over-stayed”, had foregone “pre-discharge” leave, and that I remained there 20 days longer than I need have. The explanation of this of course is that an officer retiring on the grounds of having reached the age limit for his rank is permitted to avail of 28 days pre-discharge leave, before finally separating from service. It is normally a period availed of by the departing officer for desk clearing and attendance to private business before the final break, unless as sometimes happens the officer has to take up civilian employment on a certain date. In my own case, the Easter period—always one of high security sensitivity in Army circles— coincided with the latter part of my pre-discharge leave. In response to a request by the Chief of Staff I undertook to be on the job during that period. After 38 years service with the colours, I could do no less.

On 2nd April, I was being given a presentation in McKee Barracks (see the national newspapers of the 3rd April). It will be remembered that the crisis resulting in the sending of 500 rifles to Dundalk happened on that evening, that is the Thursday of Easter Week. The rest of the period has been accounted for adequately by evidence before the Committee. Practically all of it has been commented on in the present submission.

The next point relates to Captain Kelly’s impingement on the consciousness of Deputy Gibbons. On the afternoon of 9th October, 1970, in the Central Criminal Court, Deputy Gibbons under cross-examination admitted that from August, 1969, he was aware of the fact that “Colonel Hefferon had a person to whom he referred to as ‘my young man’ within the Six Counties carrying out intelligence functions.” He goes on to say that as time passed he came to realise that this young man’s name was Kelly. In further questioning:

Counsel: Did you know him as Captain James Kelly?

Deputy Gibbons: I suppose so.

Counsel: Have you any hesitation about this, Deputy Gibbons?

Deputy Gibbons: I have. I cannot recall chronologically how he came into my consciousness as Captain James Kelly. There was a Captain Kelly.

Counsel: And did you think there was another Captain Kelly?

Deputy Gibbons: No.

I now quote Question No. 11155:

You were apprehensive because Colonel Hefferon told you of contacts between these two Ministers and Captain Kelly. It arose out of the fact that you heard from him that they were in contact?

Deputy Gibbons: Colonel Hefferon and Deputy Haughey had a meeting. In fact, it had my approval at the time. I think it was round October, 1969. …

Deputy Gibbons’s recollection as to the date is slightly at fault, not very much, just slightly. The date is, according to a diary I kept at the time, 25th September, and as the Minister has indicated I received his sanction and approval beforehand. My record also indicates that I reported back to Deputy Gibbons that very evening after returning, and gave him a verbal report of the meeting. It will be recalled that this meeting was the one to which Deputy Haughey had asked that I bring Captain Kelly along with me and at which he requested and received sanction for financial support for the forthcoming meeting held on the weekend 4th/5th October. You have the evidence of the lead-up to this meeting in Bailieboro’ in some detail already, so I do not propose to go any further into it. The whole point that emerges from it is that meeting with Deputy Haughey, approved of by Deputy Gibbons, almost entirely centred around Captain Kelly’s briefing of Deputy Haughey, and his recommendations for getting a meeting of representatives of the Northern Defence Committee organised as soon as possible.

I saw Deputy Gibbons again, according to my record some time around 5.30 p.m., and put him completely in the picture. To suggest that I would give him an account of the proceedings and omit to mention Captain Kelly by name in reporting to my own Minister on such an important meeting is absolutely irresponsible.

In conjunction with the timing of this meeting of 25th September, I would remind the Committee that the very weekend following, the Derrymen assembled at Fort Dunree for the course which I have dealt with at some length already in this submission. So, on 25th September the Minister did hear of Captain Kelly and was aware of the fact that the Minister for Finance had sent for him and what was discussed there.

About this curious expression “my young man” which Deputy Gibbons has attributed to me so often throughout these proceedings both before the courts and the committee, a few words would be in place. Apart from the fact that the expression would be completely uncharacteristic of me, a description of Captain Kelly in these terms could be completely innacurate. In fact, of all the Intelligence Officers operating in the field, as distinct from desk officers, he was one of the oldest, with 20 years service.

A more important reason for the improbability of this phrase being used by me in reports to Deputy Gibbons is the fact that in my understanding he (Deputy Gibbons) would be reporting to the Government on the matter. Therefore he was entitled to know without concealment or ambiguity the identity and assessment of the source. And especially so as Captain Kelly’s operations were relatively open and the Minister was his boss as well as mine. In fact I am not aware in all my dealings with Deputy Gibbons of having at any time refused to divulge a source, when required by him or by what I considered the special requirement of the current situation.

Though in my own mind quite certain that Captain Kelly as well as his role was known to Deputy Gibbons as far back as mid-August, I would need to have access to the Intelligence archives in order to prove this. I am confident I could do so.

The Committee will no doubt have noted my evidence as to having Captain Kelly’s alleged behaviour at Bailieboro’ being brought to my notice by Deputy Gibbons, because the Taoiseach had got a complaint from Mr. Berry, then a patient in a Dublin nursing home. This would be in an October/November setting as far as memory serves me.

One final quote from Deputy Gibbons on this subject: Answer to Question No. 11162— “I did not know anything about Captain Kelly until after Christmas.”

The next point is Deputy Gibbons’s knowledge of reports sent or made by Special Branch. Before the courts on the afternoon of the 9th October, 1970, Deputy Gibbons is questioned by Defence Counsel about his sources of information on Northern Affairs. After dealing with the Army Intelligence Service, Counsel asks:

Had you access also to these reports sent back by the Special Branch personnel that had been operating in the North?

Mr. Gibbons: I had no connection whatever with the Special Branch.

Counsel: Had you seen the reports, or even heard of them by hearsay—of the contents?

Mr. Gibbons: I had never heard of any contact with the Special Branch.

Counsel: You did not know that at that time the Special Branch had been operating in the Six Counties area. Is that the position?

Mr. Gibbons: No.

Counsel: That had been kept from you?

Mr. Gibbons: Yes.

However, during the morning session of the courts on the 29th September, defence counsel, cross-examining Mr. M. O Morain, the former Minister for Justice queries:

Counsel: As a result, then, did you have to send by any chance some of the Special Branch on duties to try and find out what was going on in view of the fact that military intelligence were giving such a small amount of information about it?

Mr. O Morain: It wasn’t because of that, m’Lord, but eventually there was Cabinet decision taken at a period directing me to send officers to the North of Ireland.

Counsel: To what?

Mr. O Morain: There was a Cabinet decision taken by which I got authority to send special officers to the North of Ireland.

Counsel: Special Branch?

Mr. O Morain: Special Branch Officers.

Later on in the examination, dealing with their reporting and operations in the Six Counties, Mr. O Morain has this to say:

They (Special Branch Officers) were there some weeks. There were reports which Mr. Gibbons will remember, there were reports from these men which came before the Government.

Mr. Gibbons’ statement that he did not know that Special Branch men had been operating in the Six Counties made little sense against this evidence. Additionally, there were frequent briefings of the Minister for Defence based in part on information supplied by the intelligence link at garda headquarters as well as certain other sensitive contacts with garda Intelligence, in part based on specific authorisation by the Minister personally, and that Minister was Mr. Gibbons. As the contact with the Special Branch headquarters was a daily one, Mr. Gibbons’ statement that he had never heard of any contact with the Special Branch is just incomprehensible. All of this can be verified by documentation in the archives of military intelligence.

In answer to question 11449, Mr. Gibbons states:

I spoke to Colonel Delaney on the Monday. This was the Friday afternoon. On Monday I asked Colonel Delaney to prepare a full report about the whole affair. This took from Monday to Friday to prepare. I asked Colonel Delaney on the Wednesday if he had it ready and he said he had some details to collect.

However, on the 24th September in the Central Criminal Court, Mr. Gibbons, in reply to counsel, stated that he remembered the 23rd April because it was the occasion of the opening of St. Endas and that he thought the Dail adjourned early in order to let the Deputies attend the opening. After retailing the details of the meeting in Mr. Blaney’s office, he states:

I should state that on the previous day I had instructed Colonel Delaney to prepare a report on the whole affair for the people and on the morning of the meeting I told him to prepare it with all haste.

The previous day was Wednesday, the 22nd April, not Monday. Mr. Gibbons implies a great degree of urgency as being attached to the investigation, allegedly begun on Monday. However, the report was not apparently ready until Friday, which was a long time for the preparation of an urgent report commissioned by the head of the Government. There is a direct contradiction between the dates given to the courts and those given to the Committee, which seems inexplicable in view of Mr. Gibbons’s firm association of the day of the meeting with the opening of St. Endas. I have something further to add.

12293. Chairman.—Would you like ten minutes rest?

—I do not think I will be very long.

12294. I am only thinking of you.

—Seeing that Mr. Gibbons has denied so much from what I know to be the real course of events between us the importance of certain written reports submitted by me to him in his capacity as Minister for Defence have become an important factor. These reports were highly secret. When I tell you that only three copies of these reports were made out, one for the Minister for Defence, one for the Chief of Staff and the third for the Intelligence file it will give you some idea of their sensitivity and their importance, highly secretive, I say and dealing largely with political matters. These reports signed “postage”, I think that is the word I would use——

12295. Deputy FitzGerald.—Sorry, I could not hear what you said.

—Signed “postage”, away ahead for a solution of the Northern problem, and peaceful, now in such a tragic mess. The sources were unimpeachable, built up painfully over years and the reports themselves called for consideration and action at the highest level. I have not kept any copies of these reports but I know of two—one four typed pages and dated 8th September, 1969 and one two typed pages dated 6th October, 1969. Copies of these documents exist in the Intelligence Branch and they carry on the face of them the seal of their importance, absolute reliability of sources and an indication of the urgency of continuing to tap these sources. They were so continued right up to the time I retired. Reports were sent in writing but quite a lot of them were verbal but I cannot refer to these, of course. We have evidence, you have evidence before you, evidence was given in the courts certainly that certain Special Branch Officers were sent to the North and these reports were read out in Cabinet. You have evidence before you that at least one correspondent had his reports circulated to all Cabinet Members. I do not know what happened to these reports but I think you should seek them out because they give you an insight into many of the matters you are inquiring into which otherwise would be incomplete.

Another matter which I would like to refer to is this question of authority and in that I will just give you one quote.

On 28th September, in the Central Criminal Court, Mr. Michael Moran, Minister for Justice during the period August 1969 to April, 1970, during his examination by counsell states—I quote—“Certainly, at one of these stages I thought it was an official importation. It would be a few days before April 18th”.

I think, Chairman, I don’t have any more to say in this submission.

12296. Chairman.—Anybody wishing to ask the Colonel any questions?

12297. Deputy FitzGerald.—There are a couple of points I want to clarify. In the account you have given us, Colonel Hefferon, in relation to the termination of training at Fort Dunree, you explained how you got in touch with various people to cancel the course. It seemed to me that you were suggesting that the fact that you had got in touch with them and the evidence they could give about you having got in touch with them would in some way show whether or not you were doing this on the authority and instructions of the Minister. But I wonder whether this in fact is the case. In fact, the Minister’s statement was that he had got in touch with either you or the Chief of Staff on the matter—I think I am right in saying that is what he said, as far as I can recall—with either the Chief of Staff or Colonel Hefferon—I am not sure which—that he conveyed the decision that he claims was made about the termination of the course; but it is not possible that your getting in touch with these people to terminate the course is consistent with the Minister’s statement that he got in touch either with you or the Chief of Staff on the matter? I am not clear how in other words, the fact that you got in touch with people invalidates the Minister’s claim to have issued the instruction?

—I must not have made it as clear as I thought it was, perhaps, because I know so much about it. Quite clearly it was sparked off by this Press query on Friday evening when the Minister was not available and when the Chief of Staff was not available and it was a question of time and a question of great urgency that this course, which was coming in on the following morning, would be stopped. Therefore, these are the instructions that I gave and when I had given the instructions I rang the O/C Western Command and I reported on the Monday morning to the Chief of Staff who, I take it, did report—I cannot, of course, give first hand evidence on that—but my understanding was that he went immediately to the Minister and reported the whole matter to him.

12298. And you told the Chief of Staff that you had acted on your own initiative?

—That I had acted on my own responsibility.

12299. That you could not contact either him nor the Minister?

—I quite well realised that I could in fact be in hot water over it.

12300. But the people whom you contacted, the liaison officer and the O/C Western Command, would not necessarily know whether you had done this on your own initiative or whether the Minister instructed you to do it?

—No, but they would be able to give their evidence that on that night at a certain time they did get instructions from me to do this and the chain would follow clearly through them to the Chief of Staff on the Monday morning.

12301. Yes, I see that.

—That when I told himabout it, he asked did I get the Minister’s decision and I said: “No, I could not get him”. Then we had some talk. He rang the O/C Western Command and had a chat with him about it and having assembled all the facts he went off to the Minister. There was no question of any instruction from the Minister about it.

12302. I just wanted to clarify that point. I was not clear on your line of reasoning.

—I am sorry, I thought I had made it absolutely clear.

12303. Secondly, you said in relation to your meetings with the Minister they were frequent and I think you more or less suggested that they were weekly. Is that right?

—Yes. It is very difficult to put a time to it because I haven’t a diary of them all. Certainly, hardly a week went by and sometimes it would be two and three times a week, certainly at the period of maximum pressure and turmoil in August and September.

12304. I was just going to ask you: you did refer to a diary in another context for a date in September. Have you any diary covering part of this period which would show your meetings which you would like to submit to us in evidence?

—No, I don’t think it would—the best evidence on that is the diary with the Civil Servants, I think there were three of them in all who acted as private secretaries at the time.

12305. Yes, I understand that but I just wondered had you anything you might wish to submit as documentary evidence from your side?

—No, it would be the internal evidence of other documents that I would get where I was concerned with that.

12306. Did your diary terminate, then before this period? You mentioned having this diary in September?

—I did, yes. It happened that in this particular diary that this particular matter was covered fully, this visit to Mr. Haughey.

12307. But this diary or other diaries don’t contain references to the Minister?

—No. There are—sometimes they do but they don’t cover them all, not by any means. Quite often in this matter of visits to the Minister it would be for a very short time, possibly when he would be in a hurry to a Government meeting or something like that. It would be at short notice.

12308. That is all right. I just wanted to see if there was anything you wanted to offer there in the way of documentary evidence. The last point I wanted to ask you relates to what you said about your meeting and Captain Kelly’s with the Minister for Finance. I think you said this meeting was one at which Captain Kelly requested and received sanction for financial support for the forthcoming meeting held on the weekend 4th and 5th October and you said to us that we had the evidence leading up to the meeting at Bailieboro’ already and you went on to say: “The whole point that emerges from it is that that meeting with Mr. Haughey, approved of by Mr. Gibbons, almost entirely centred around Captain Kelly’s briefing of Mr. Haughey and his recommendations for getting a meeting of representatives of Northern Defence Committees organised as soon as possible”. That is your statement?

—That is the Bailieboro’ meeting.

12309. I wanted to ask you about this because the Minister for Finance’s recollection appears to be, on the face of it, somewhat different. I will just read you his statements in reply to Questions 9226 and 9227. I was putting the case at Question 9226:——

“We have had the evidence of the other two people at the meeting”

I meant yourself and Captain Kelly

“——at the meeting suggesting that the £500 was entirely for the Bailieboro’ meeting and other meetings.

—I do not think so.

You have said this morning it would be for Bailieboro’ and Colonel Hefferon——

—I cannot comment on what Colonel Hefferon or Captain Kelly said, I can only tell you what my recollection is and I understood that Colonel Hefferon needed this money for the assistance of refugees. That is all I can comment upon.…

There does seem to be a conflict of recollection on this point. Would you like to comment?

—Well, all I can do is give the evidence which I have already given.

12310. Can you suggest any way of reconciling the two? Is there any possibility of a misunderstanding at that meeting between you and the Minister?

—Yes. I think I could see possibly there was, as you recollect well from my evidence, there was a further £500 which was drawn for the Monaghan office and which was for the refugees certainly. The Minister may have been under the impression that this was the £500.

12311. He did, of course, say, in fairness: “I have some vague recollection of some secret service money that was used in connection with the meeting but whether that is the Bailieboro’ meeting you are referring to or not I do not know.” What I want to be clear about is that at that particular discussion you and Captain Kelly told him about the Bailieboro’ meeting with the Northern Defence Committees and that he, you know, knew that was what you were talking about at that time, even if his recollection may have been different?

—I cannot add anything to what I have already said on the matter.

12312. Chairman.—That concludes the meeting. Thank you very much, gentlemen.

The Committee adjourned.