Committee Reports::Report No. 05 - Report on the Summary of Senior Counsel Opinion::01 February, 2006::Report


Tithe an Oireachtais


An Comhchoiste um Chumarsáid, Muir agus Acmhainní Nádúrtha


An Cúigiú Tuarascáil


Tuarascáil maidir leis an hAchoimre ar Thuairim Abhcóide Sinsir


Feabhra 2006


Houses of the Oireachtas


Joint Committee on Communications, Marine and Natural Resources


Fifth Report


Report on the Summary of Senior Counsel Opinion


February 2006


Contents


Chairman’s Preface


Acknowledgements


Considerations of the Joint Committee


Summary of the opinion of Senior Counsel


Appendices


Appendix A Members of the Joint Committee


Appendix B Terms of Reference setting up the Joint Committee


Appendix C Letter to Marine Minister Pat ‘the cope’ Gallagher T.D.


Appendix D Reply from Minister Noel Dempsey T.D., Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources.


Chairman’s Preface

The Joint Committee on Communications, Marine and Natural Resources has a wide remit. However, the Marine portfolio is an area that has particularly exercised the Joint Committee. This is due, in no small part, to the fact that the survival of peripheral costal communities is predicated, in the main, on a sustainable fishing industry.


It would be a very poor reflection on how Ireland has managed its great natural marine resource and that of the wider European Union marine resource if we are the last generation to enjoy wild fish as part of our diet. The Joint Committee has always welcomed the opportunity of engaging with the fishing industry and when the Joint Committee became aware that new legislation was being proposed it was considered important that the stakeholders were given an opportunity to have their views reflected in how the legislation was cast.


Recognising the importance of the views of the stakeholders and cognisant that the primary function of the members of Dáil Éireann was that of legislators, the Joint Committee agreed to engage the stakeholders so that value could be added to the legislative process by giving a measure of focus to the legislation that would be proposed. This became an imperative for the members of the Joint Committee as the stakeholders had not been consulted prior to publishing the Bill.


Among the various sections and subsections contained within the Sea-Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Bill 2005 there were a number of provisions that it was considered would cause concern. To assist the Joint Committee in its deliberation the Joint Committee engaged a Senior Counsel to prepare an opinion for its consideration. The Joint Committee, aware of the client lawyer relationship have decided not to publish the full opinion, rather, the Joint Committee have decided that a summary should be published.


Therefore, as Chairman of the Joint Committee I am pleased to see the Joint Committee agree to publish this report.


In closing I would like to extend my appreciations to the other members of the Joint Committee Deputies Thomas Broughan, Bernard J. Durkan, Martin Ferris, Dr. Dermot Fitzpatrick, Peter Kelly, Tom McEllistrim, Denis O’Donovan, Fiona O’Malley, John Perry, Eamon Ryan together with Senators Michael Finucane, Brendan Kenneally, Marc MacSharry and Kathleen O’Meara for their commitment, dedication and the expertise that they brought to the considerations of the Joint Committee which has led to the preparation of this Report.


I would like on behalf of the Joint Committee to pay a special thanks to staff of the Houses of the Oireachtas, the staff in the Office of the Editor of Debates, the staff in the Broadcasting Unit, the sound engineers, the Director of Committees, Mr. Art O’Leary, the Deputy Director Mr. Padraic Donlon, the Clerk to the Committee, Mr. Ronan Lenihan and all the staff of the Committee Secretariat in particular, Mr. Peter Malone, Mr. David Alwright and Ms. Siobhan Murtagh for all their hard work and assistance to the Members in bringing this report to finality.


Noel O’Flynn T.D.


Chairman of the Joint Committee on Communications,


Marine and Natural Resources


February, 2006


Acknowledgements

The Joint Committee wishes to thank those listed below, for the assistance they gave the Joint Committee.


  1. The Commanding Officer, Commodore Frank Lynch, of the Irish Navel Service, Haulbowline
  2. Mr. Art Kavanagh & Mr. Kevin McCourt of Allied Irish Bank.
  3. The Irish Fishing industry representatives
  4. Mr. Sean O’Donoghue, Killybegs Fisherman’s Organisation


    Mr. Frank Doyle, Irish Fishermen’s Organisation


    Mr. Lorcain O'Ceinnede, Irish Fish Producers Organisation


    Mr. Jason Whooley, Irish South and West Fisherman’s Organisation


    Mr. Michael Walsh, South and Eastern Fishermen’s Organisation


    Mr. Tom Geoghegan, Irish Fish Producers and Exporters Association


  5. Mr. Jacques Pichon, F.R.O.M. Bretagne (Funds regional of organization of the market of fish - Brittany Area)
  6. Mr. Giorgio Gallizioli; Head of Unit "Control and Licences" - EU Commission.
  7. The Marine Minister Pat ‘the cope’ Gallagher T.D.
  8. Mr. Patrick Tabone, Chief de Cabinet, Commissioner Joe Borg
  9. Members of the EP Fisheries Committee including Mrs. Elsbeth Attwoll MEP (Coordinator ALDE Group), Mr. Ian Hudghton MEP (Coordinator Green-EFA Group) and Mr. Paolo Casaca MEP (PSE Group)
  10. Ms. Carmen Fraga Estevez - coordinator for the EPP Group in the EP Fisheries Committee
  11. Irish MEP’s Brian Crowley, MEP, Simon Coveney, TD, MEP, Avril Doyle, MEP, Bairbre de Brún, MEP, Marian Harkin, TD, MEP, Jim Higgins, Senator, MEP, Sean Ó Neachtain, MEP, Mairead McGuinness, MEP, and Kathy Sinnott, MEP
  12. Mr. Alain Laurec - Director - Control and Enforcement/DG Fisheries
  13. Mr. Struan Stevenson MEP, Former President of the EOP Fisheries Committee

The minutes of evidence taken in public together with any related submissions and presentation are available on the Oireachtas web site.


Considerations of the Joint Committee

In June of 2005 the Joint Committee, having been made aware by representatives of the fishing industry of concerns relative to legislative proposals that may be contained in the Sea-Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Bill 2005, wrote to the Marine Minister Pat ‘the cope’ Gallagher T.D. and the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources, Noel Dempsey T.D. and requested that the publishing of the Bill be delayed until the Joint Committee had an opportunity to review, with the stakeholders, issues of concern.


The Ministers responded in the positive on the proviso that the publishing of the Bill would be on the 1st of October. However, over the summer period there was mounting public concern over the Corrib Gas Field Project. Accordingly, in order to consider this issue it became necessary to defer to the 12th October the Joint Committee’s consideration with the stakeholders on the issues that were of concern. On the 3rd October the Sea-Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Bill was published.


The Joint Committee considered this fortuitous as when the Joint Committee engaged with the stakeholders the provisions of the Bill were fully known. In engaging with the stakeholders the importance of several issues became evident, namely the consideration of the imposition of administrative penalties for minor infringements, the statutory confiscation of catch and fishing gear on conviction on indictment, the confiscation of a fishing vessel for persistent infringements and the incorporation of provisions permitting firing at or into a vessel.


The Joint Committee wishes to put on record, in the strongest possible terms, that those who infringe the rules of the Common Fisheries Policy must be held to account; however, the Joint Committee was concerned that in seeking effective and dissuasive legislation regard was not had to the third pillar of the EU Commission’s position – that is, in the need for such measures, Member States should have regard to the measures being ‘proportional’, ‘effective’ and dissuasive’. It struck the Joint Committee that the provisions of the Sea-Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Bill were not proportional and by not being proportional could they not be effective and dissuasive if the stakeholders did not have confidence in the measures proposed.


To inform the Joint Committee on the views of the EU Commission, the Joint Committee agreed that a delegation should visit Brussels. Accordingly, on the 9th November a delegation comprising Deputies Noel O’Flynn, Denis O’Donovan and John Perry together with Senator Brendan Kenneally held a series of meetings with MEP’s Commission Officials, Irish MEP’s and Mr. Patrick Tabone, Chief de Cabinet to Fisheries Commissioner Joe Borg. The visit established that the EU Commission favored administrative penalties over criminal sanction and while there are 7 cases outstanding against Ireland in the European Court of Justice for infringements of Ireland’s obligations under the Common Fisheries Policy, most are technical in nature and relate, in the main, to deficiencies in the management of the enforcement and control regime and reporting obligations imposed by the Common Fisheries Policy.


The Joint Committee makes the observation that these cases will be considered by the European Court of Justice under the Irish legislation in place at the time of the infringements occurred, not under the provisions expressed in the Sea-Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Bill 2005. Accordingly, the Joint Committee considers that if Ireland is to face the imposition of very large financial penalties from the European Court of Justice, the level of such financial penalty will not be mitigated by the Sea-Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Bill. The Joint Committee accepts the argument that if Ireland continues to be recalcitrant in how it manages its enforcement and control obligations under the Common Fisheries Policy then the taxpayer is potentially exposed to having to bear any financial penalty imposed and this should be avoided as a matter of not alone good governance but proper, prudent management of public monies. However, the Joint Committee has a concern that while there are some deficiencies, post the Supreme Court rulings of 2003 and 2005 in the Browne and Kennedy judgments, the primary difficulty is not legislative, but rather how Ireland manages its fisheries control and enforcement obligations under the Common Fisheries Policy.


To assist the Joint Committee it was decided that a Senior Counsel should be engaged to prepare an opinion for the Joint Committee on the matter of the Supreme Court rulings in the Browne and Kennedy Judgments of 2003 and 2005 [these judgments found certain legislative instruments and provisions to be ‘ultra vires’] and if, under the provisions of the Irish Constitution, a regime of administrative penalties could be introduced. It had been advised to the Joint Committee that under Articles 34, 37 and 38 there was a Constitutional impediment to the introduction of a system of administrative penalties.


The Joint Committee cognizant of the lawyer-client relationship has decided that the full opinion of Senior Counsel should not be published. However, having regard to the issues, the impact on the fishing industry and the potential impact on the public purse the Joint Committee has agreed to publish and lay before both Houses of the Oireachtas this report which contains a summary of the opinion of Senior Counsel, the letter to the Marine Minister which details the questions the Joint Committee considered should be addressed by the Minister following the Joint Committee’s consideration of the opinion and the reply of Minister Noel Dempsey T.D., Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources.


LEGAL EFFICACY OF ENFORCEMENT BY ADMINISTRATIVE SANCTIONS
OPINION OF SENIOR COUNSEL

1. Overview

On careful examination of our established constitutional jurisprudence, there is no particular institutional, juridical or constitutional prohibition or imperative as makes the preference of the European Commission that the Common Fisheries Policy in Irish waters be enforced by a system of administrative sanctions (rather than criminal penalties) impossible. Analysis of Articles 15 and 37 of the Constitution is key.


  • The Constitution has always allowed a delegation of certain legislative functions for expert adjustments in certain trades and industries, but the illustrations (which repeatedly pass constitutional muster and might, to a certain extent, be availed of here, e.g. AnCo Levies), excite little legal, academic or political controversy.
  • Article 37 has always permitted non-judges, away from the Courts, to exercise “limited functions and powers of a judicial nature” so long as these were ”in matters other than criminal matters”.
  • Much then depends upon how “criminal matters” are defined.
  • Our Game and Fisheries laws trace their origins back over centuries to laws enacted when there was no bureaucracy, central or local, and the only enforcing authority were private informers, Justices of the Peace, and occasional military yeomanry; they developed at a time when administrative sanctions were unknown and simply could not have existed.
  • There are many schemes of administrative sanctions which have all passed constitutional challenge in the Supreme Court regulating inter alia Gardaí; solicitors; veterinary surgeons; nurses; medical practitioners; the greyhound industry; livestock marts; Diseases of Animals’ Act compensation payments; prison discipline. There is no particular reason why such could not be applied to the owners of licensable fishing vessels.
  • European Regulations under the CFP have expressly left it open to Members States in the enforcement of its common objectives as to a choice between administrative sanctions or criminal penalties.
  • The Commission in Brussels on this issue expressly prefers administrative sanctions over criminal penalties.
  • Any system introduced by an Act of the Oireachtas is entitled to and enjoys the presumption of constitutionality: McDonald v. Bord na gCon [1965] IR 217; Ryan v. Attorney General [1965] IR 294 (water fluoridation case). Even without EU membership, such administrative sanctions limited to Irish or EU fishing vessels have a fair prospect of constitutional validity provided rules of natural justice, which are now well understood, are followed by the administrative authority concerned.
  • Even if some potential constitutional infirmity could be conceived (without minimising that weighty presumption of constitutionality) such a relatively uncomplicated administrative scheme is probably nevertheless redeemed by Article 29.4.10 ° of the Constitution in being “laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the European Union or of the Communities.”
  • Similar on-the-spot fines without criminal penalty have been enacted and continue to be observed for:
  • The Landfill Levy;
  • Certain road traffic offences, notably speeding;
  • Litter Pollution fines; and last but not least
  • The Inland Fisheries (Payment in Lieu of Prosecution) Regulations, 2003.

2. Current Issues

  • “The Commission is of the opinion that an administrative sanction like the suspension of an authorisation to carry out a professional activity may be a very effective tool to increase compliance with CFP rules due to the fact that it could be quickly applied. It is therefore regrettable that the majority of Member States do not use this tool more often.” Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, 30th May 2005 (COM (2005) 207 final);
  • For reasons historical, but not constitutional, the preferred route for sanctions in Ireland has been by criminal process despite many practical drawbacks, particularly at a time of rapid technological compliance developments, including GPS and satellite monitoring, and despite cumbersome enforcement machinery, unequal application or enforcement of the law and penalties, and effective discrimination against Irish flag vessels.
  • The implementation of the quota system devised in Ireland markedly discriminates against individual Irish fishermen;
  • Other Member States do not sub-divide the State quota beyond their producer organisations, in sharp contrast to the individualised Irish model;
  • The Naval Service can therefore never have the requisite suspicion to detain any foreign vessel hoovering up a large individual catch because the overall quota for the entire producer organisation will not be declared until that vessel has safely steamed out of the Irish Exclusive Economic Zone.
  • Fishing activities not systematically unlawful are nevertheless branded as criminal for effectively regulatory offences of strict liability, and without criminal intent, for accounting or record-keeping errors due to overruns of catches or insufficient segregation of species records;
  • Criminal process should be reserved for systematic criminal intent and not fishing ventures having to cope with unpredictable weather and hazardous sea conditions.

3. Necessity that sanctions be criminal?

The Committee has been repeatedly told that the many draconian provisions of the Sea Fisheries and Maritime Jurisdiction Bill, 2005 impinging harder upon Irish fishermen to the exclusion of foreign-based predators, is the only possible way of dealing with the judgments of the Supreme Court in Vincent Browne and Thomas Kennedy. That assertion is partially correct if, but only if, it be thought that the only way that sanctions may be imposed is by the criminal process. This comfortable orthodoxy favouring criminal prosecution as avowedly the only effective way of achieving the desired result has arisen by historical accident, rather than constitutional imperative. It is too commonplace to think that because something has been repeatedly so, then therefore it can only be so.


Article 37.1 provides:


“Nothing in this Constitution shall operate to invalidate the exercise of limited functions and powers of a judicial nature, in matters other than criminal matters, by any person or body of persons duly authorised by law to exercise such functions and powers, notwithstanding that such person or such body or persons is not a judge or a court appointed or established as such under this Constitution.”


In McDonald v. Bord na gCon [1965] IR 217, 239 Walsh J delivering the sole, seminal judgment of the Supreme Court analysed the Greyhound Industry Act, 1958, there under constitutional attack as having “many different but related objects. … [the] fundamental purpose of the Act is to develop, improve and regulate an industry. … In addition the Act deals with the question of betting and levies, and to the subject of irregularities and abuses.” There are many parallels I believe, between the greyhound and sea fisheries industries specific to the issue of enforcement by administrative sanctions.


Section 47 permitted the Board with the consent of the Coursing Club to exclude a person from being on any greyhound race track; any authorised coursing meeting; or any public sale of greyhounds. Answering objections Walsh J at p 241 pointed out that the Exclusion Order powers were permissive and not mandatory. Significantly the Exclusion Order was not directly enforceable by the Board itself.


“Before the finding of any such investigation can be relied upon as the justification for an Exclusion Order, it must have been conducted in accordance with the dictates of natural justice and have been decided objectively. … the bodies or persons conducting the investigation under ss 43 or 44, while bound to act judicially, are not constituted judicial persons or bodies nor do they exercise powers of a judicial nature within the meaning of Article 37 of the Constitution. … In particular … the investigating authorities do not themselves by virtue of anything in ss 43 or 44 affect any right or impose any penalty or a liability on anybody. So far as the Board is concerned in the exercise of its power under s 47, or the Club [likewise], they are not constituted judicial bodies or do not exercise powers of a judicial nature as they would only satisfy one of the tests referred to. In the opinion of the Court the submission that the Act in s 47 violates the provisions of Article 34, 37 and 38 of the Constitution fails.”


This type of exclusion order, upheld for the greyhound industry by the Supreme Court, is desired by the Commission, see Communication of 30th May 2005, above.


Commenting on the fivefold index of “the administration of justice” in that case Professor J.P. Casey of UCD in 1975 observed in an influential article “the test provided by these criteria is far from infallible … The licensing of publicans and auctioneers has long been a function of the Court; but to argue that such licensing is therefore of necessity a judicial function would be to ignore the fact that this jurisdiction was originally given to the Courts for reasons simply of convenience. No-one presumably would wish to freeze historical accident into constitutional dogma. The problem is crystallised by considering disputed Parliamentary elections. It was only in 1868 that the courts acquired jurisdiction over these [by the Parliamentary Elections Act, 1868]; before that they were dealt with by parliamentary committees.”


4. So in Keady v. Garda Commissioner [1992] 2 IR 197, 209 and 213 the Supreme Court rejected a challenge to the validity of a Garda disciplinary enquiry which had found the Plaintiff guilty of disciplinary breaches. Acquitted of criminal charges arising for the same incidents, he then argued the Garda enquiry had transgressed Article 37, as the breach of discipline constituted “criminal matters” within the meaning of Article 37, and thus were excluded from such a tribunal:


“The reference to Article 37 … excepting ‘criminal matters’ must mean that there can be no trial of a person on a criminal charge save as provided for in Article 38. This cannot be held to exclude allegations of criminal conduct in other circumstances. Clearly many cases taken in the courts on the civil side may involve allegations of criminality: allegations of dangerous driving, fraud and perjury are random examples. There is no constitutional basis for saying that such allegations cannot be aired before administrative tribunals or before enquiries which have a statutory basis or at other domestic tribunals or enquiries. … There is now a place a well chartered system of administrative law which requires decision-makers to render justice in cases brought before them and sets out procedures that should be followed, which procedures will vary from case to case and from one type of tribunal to another and which, of course, subject to judicial review: [Tormey v. Ireland [1985] IR 289.] Similarly, the rules of evidence may not necessarily be applied to the same strictness as in a court of law provided the decision-making body keeps in forefront of its deliberations the necessity to come to a correct and just verdict having regard to the complaints that have to be investigated; the determination to be made and the consequences such determination may have for another party or parties appearing before it.”


5. Conclusion

A scheme of administrative sanctions is constitutionally valid, feasible and realistic. Nor does it ignore the Realpolitik of the seas. Irish and Community waters are sadly not enclosed. Maritime marauders, most from overseas, will (as before) face immediate criminal and merited punishment without administrative intervention. Cheats who carry weapons of offence, viz. gear or equipment incapable ever of innocent use (e.g. illegal driftnets or customised secret hatches for systematic quota excesses) must seek mercy, if any, from the criminal courts. Criminal penalties will also be a necessary backup to administrative sanctions for business otherwise lawful, which fails to match regulatory compliance standards, and where those proportionate administrative sanctions, imposed after natural justice, continue to be flouted. So, breaches of the procedures of the Restrictive Practices Commission and of the Labour Court are each a criminal offence, but triable in the Courts.


In the result, it is a brave lawyer who asserts without fear of contradiction that there is no valid power in Irish law to impose sanctions upon Irish or EU Member State flag vessels, other than by recourse through the criminal justice system. The Irish Reports are profuse with cases in which administrative sanctions, notwithstanding wide-raging legislative and constitutional challenges, were upheld. That these validated sanctions, imposed otherwise than as convictions, sentences and penalties in public courts by Judges appointed in accordance with law and the Constitution, nevertheless had sufficient “bite” to deter the objects of those sanctions is attested to by the repeated, and generally doomed, efforts to have them declared null and void. I therefore see no valid legal objection to the introduction of such a scheme of administrative sanctions into Irish law, given that the criminal offences and sanctions now under investigation are not desired by the European Commission.


Appendix A

JOINT COMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATION,
MARINE AND NATURAL RESOURCES

List of Members


Deputies:

Thomas P. Broughan (Lab)

Bernard J. Durkan (FG)
Martin Ferris (SF)
Dermot Fitzpatrick (FF)
Peter Kelly (FF)
Thomas McEllistrim (FF)
Denis O’Donovan (FF)
Fiona O’Malley (PD)
Noel O’Flynn (FF) (Chairman)
John Perry (FG) (Vice-Chairman)
Eamon Ryan (GP)

Senators:

Michael Finucane (FG)

Brendan Kenneally (FF)
Marc MacSharry (FF)
Kathleen O’Meara (Lab)

Appendix B

Joint Committee on Communications, Marine and Natural Resources
Orders of Reference

Dáil Éireann on 16 October 2002 ordered:

    1. That a Select Committee, which shall be called the Select Committee on Communications, Marine and Natural Resources consisting of 11 members of Dáil Éireann (of whom 4 shall constitute a quorum), be appointed to consider -
      1. such Bills the statute law in respect of which is dealt with by the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources;
      2. such Estimates for Public Services within the aegis of the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources; and
      3. such proposals contained in any motion, including any motion within the meaning of Standing Order 157 concerning the approval by the Dáil of international agreements involving a charge on public funds,

      as shall be referred to it by Dáil Éireann from time to time.


    2. For the purpose of its consideration of Bills and proposals under paragraphs (1)(a)(i) and (1)(a)(iii), the Select Committee shall have the powers defined in Standing Order 81(1), (2) and (3).
    3. For the avoidance of doubt, by virtue of his or her ex officio membership of the Select Committee in accordance with Standing Order 90(1), the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources (or a Minister or Minister of State nominated in his or her stead) shall be entitled to vote.
    1. The Select Committee shall be joined with a Select Committee to be appointed by Seanad Éireann to form the Joint Committee on Communications, Marine and Natural Resources to consider -
      1. such public affairs administered by the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources as it may select, including, in respect of Government policy, bodies under the aegis of that Department;
      2. such matters of policy for which the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources is officially responsible as it may select;
      3. such related policy issues as it may select concerning bodies which are partly or wholly funded by the State or which are established or appointed by Members of the Government or by the Oireachtas;
      4. such Statutory Instruments made by the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas as it may select;
      5. such proposals for EU legislation and related policy issues as may be referred to it from time to time, in accordance with Standing Order 81(4);
      6. the strategy statement laid before each House of the Oireachtas by the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources pursuant to section 5(2) of the Public Service Management Act, 1997, and the Joint Committee shall be so authorised for the purposes of section 10 of that Act;
      7. such annual reports or annual reports and accounts, required by law and laid before either or both Houses of the Oireachtas, of bodies specified in paragraphs 2(a)(i) and (iii), and the overall operational results, statements of strategy and corporate plans of these bodies, as it may select;
      8. Provided that the Joint Committee shall not, at any time, consider any matter relating to such a body which is, which has been, or which is, at that time, proposed to be considered by the Committee of Public Accounts pursuant to the Orders of Reference of that Committee and/or the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act, 1993;


        Provided further that the Joint Committee shall refrain from inquiring into in public session, or publishing confidential information regarding, any such matter if so requested either by the body or by the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources; and


      9. such other matters as may be jointly referred to it from time to time by both Houses of the Oireachtas,
    2. and shall report thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas.


    3. The quorum of the Joint Committee shall be five, of whom at least one shall be a member of Dáil Éireann and one a member of Seanad Éireann.
    4. The Joint Committee shall have the powers defined in Standing Order 81(1) to (9) inclusive.
  1. The Chairman of the Joint Committee, who shall be a member of Dáil Éireann, shall also be Chairman of the Select Committee.”.

Seanad Éireann on 17 October 2002 ordered:

    1. That a Select Committee consisting of 4 members of Seanad Éireann shall be appointed to be joined with a Select Committee of Dáil Éireann to form the Joint Committee on Communications, Marine and Natural Resources to consider –
      1. such public affairs administered by the Department of Communications, Marine and Natural Resources as it may select, including, in respect of Government policy, bodies under the aegis of that Department;
      2. such matters of policy for which the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources is officially responsible as it may select;
      3. such related policy issues as it may select concerning bodies which are partly or wholly funded by the State or which are established or appointed by Members of the Government or by the Oireachtas;
      4. such Statutory Instruments made by the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources and laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas as it may select;
      5. such proposals for EU legislation and related policy issues as may be referred to it from time to time, in accordance with Standing Order 65(4);
      6. the strategy statement laid before each House of the Oireachtas by the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources pursuant to section 5(2) of the Public Service Management Act, 1997, and the Joint Committee shall be so authorised for the purposes of section 10 of that Act;
      7. such annual reports or annual reports and accounts, required by law and laid before both Houses of the Oireachtas, of bodies specified in paragraphs 1(a)(i) and (iii), and the overall operational results, statements of strategy and corporate plans of these bodies, as it may select;
      8. Provided that the Joint Committee shall not, at any time, consider any matter relating to such a body which is, which has been, or which is, at that time, proposed to be considered by the Committee of Public Accounts pursuant to the Orders of Reference of that Committee and/or the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act, 1993;


        Provided further that the Joint Committee shall refrain from inquiring into in public session, or publishing confidential information regarding, any such matter if so requested either by the body concerned or by the Minister for Communications, Marine and Natural Resources;


        and


      9. such other matters as may be jointly referred to it from time to time by both Houses of the Oireachtas,
    2. and shall report thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas.


    3. The quorum of the Joint Committee shall be five, of whom at least one shall be a member of Dáil Éireann and one a member of Seanad Éireann.
    4. The Joint Committee shall have the powers defined in Standing Order 65(1) to (9) inclusive.
  1. The Chairman of the Joint Committee shall be a member of Dáil Éireann.”.

Appendix C

Appendix D