Committee Reports > List of Committees > Joint > 2004 > Committee on Transport > Report No. 01 - Report on Proposal for a Dublin Metro System

Tithe an Oireachtais

An Comhchoiste um Iompar

An Chéad Tuarascáil

Tuarascáil ar Thogra maidir le Córas Meitreo i mBaile Átha Cliath

Bealtaine 2004

Houses of the Oireachtas

Joint Committee on Transport

First Report

Report on Proposal for a Dublin Metro System

May 2004

CONTENTS

Chairman’s Forward & Acknowledgements

Conclusions of the Joint Committee on Transport & Recommendations

Appendices:

Appendix A Membership of the Joint Committee

Appendix B Joint Committee’s Terms of Reference

Appendix C Consultants Report to the Committee

Appendix D Correspondence received

Foreword

One of the hallmarks of any progressive capital city is an efficient, safe and accessible public transport system. Ease of movement of large numbers of people is important not just for the economic and environmental life of a city but also for the quality of life of its citizens.

Dublin has been growing steadily over the last fifty years and has experienced particularly rapid growth and change in the last twenty years. However, its public transport system hasn’t kept pace.

Ours is now the only capital city in Western Europe without a rail link to its airport, which is also the main gateway into this country. The main arteries to and from the city are gridlocked at critical times and traffic is choking the business and social life of the capital.

There is general agreement that Dublin needs, as a matter of urgency, an efficient transport system that will

• carry large numbers of commuters at peak times
• ease traffic congestion on our streets
• bring life back to the city centre by taking cars out of it
• be safe, comfortable and attractive to users
• alter, over time, the unsustainable outward suburbanisation of Dublin.

It was in this context that the Joint Committee commissioned a study to examine the feasibility of a metro system for Dublin. In broad terms, the study examined

• the viability and sustainability of a metro system.
• the benefits of such a system
• the alternatives to such a system
• project management issues in the delivery of a metro system.

The study strongly recommends a metro system for our capital that will not only connect the city to the airport but also to Swords, one of the fastest growing towns in the country. The study concludes that the significant cost of providing such a system is more that justified by the economic, environmental, and social benefits that it would bestow on the capital city and its inhabitants and, by extension, the country as a whole.

I would like to acknowledge the work of O’Reilly consultants in carrying out this study on behalf of the Committee. I also wish to thank the members of the Joint Committee for their unfailing and diligent work in compiling this report over the last six months. This study now stands as a valuable contribution to the development of public transport policy for Dublin.

Eoin Ryan, T.D.,

Chairman,

Joint Committee on Transport

Conclusions of the Joint Committee and Recommendations

The Joint Committee notes with some disappointment and regret the refusal of the Rail Procurement Agency (RPA) to allow, for confidentiality reasons, publication by the Joint Committee detailed financial and other information in respect of its case to government for the building in Dublin of a metro and the similar denial by the Department of Finance of access by the committee’s consultants to the content and analysis of its own consultant’s (Goodbody Economic Consultants) report and assessment of the metro proposal. The Joint Committee notes the restrictions on the options available to it in this matter arising from its Terms of Reference.

The Joint Committee notes the principal conclusions of its consultants in respect of their evaluation of the cost benefit analysis (CBA) prepared by the Rail Procurement Agency (RPA) as part of an outline business case (OBC) to government of a proposed metro link from Dublin city centre to Swords via the airport, that the CBA shows

• “The Cost Benefit Analysis prepared for the Railway Procurement Agency shows benefits in excess of costs” (page 15);
• “In general the cost benefit analysis prepared for the Rail Procurement Agency understates the benefits that the metro will bring to users of its services” (page 15);
• “On the basis of the RPA cost benefit analysis of taking the Metro to Swords, the metro should terminate in Swords” (page 21); and
• “The building of a metro is a suitable project for use of a PPP.” ( page 47)

The Joint Committee draws attention to the view of its consultants that “The cost of ‘do nothing’ is considerable in respect of the benefits not achieved and of traffic congestion. Doing nothing will impact on Dublin’s ability to be an internationally competitive capital of an internationally competitive country.”

The Joint Committee supports, in light of the expectation that Swords will double in population and conscious of the funding pledges made by Fingal County Council, the proposal that the Metro would be extended to cover Swords.

The Joint Committee accepts the conclusion of its consultants that some proposals made by other bodies in respect of the design and routing of a metro merit examination and evaluation in particular that it be routed through Glasnevin Junction thus linking the metro with all national heavy rail lines.

The Joint Committee also accepts the conclusion of its consultants that the bus alternatives they examined will not provide the same range of benefits as a metro service between the airport and the city centre. However the Joint Committee also observes in passing that a publicly operated bus-based public transport system must for the foreseeable future remain at the heart of the greater Dublin public transportation system.

The Joint Committee notes the assessment of its consultants that the Iarnrod Eireann proposal under its rail development plan, while having significant merit in its own right, is not a satisfactory alternative to the metro proposal of the RPA for a service between the airport and the city centre.

The Joint Committee notes that the elements of the RPA’s OBC (Outline Business Case) examined by the Joint Committee consultants is in respect of an “indicative route” only; the view of the RPA reported by the Joint Committee’s consultants that “it is impossible to determine the final route until a preferred routing is debated through a public consultation/public inquiry”; and the conclusion of the Joint Committee’s consultants that the RPA construction cost estimates are now “competitive with international Metro project costs.” ( page 18)

The Joint Committee expresses its concern that the cost revisions proposed by the Railway Procurement Agency while achieving lower costs may also reduce service & customer quality. The Committee accepts the case for single bore tunnelling. The Joint Committee considers that the methodology adopted by Professor Melis in terms of parallel contracts, etc., should be adopted in Dublin. The Joint Committee feels that this methodology, having seen it in operation, leads to cost reductions without compromising safety or passenger comfort.

The Joint Committee further notes the remarks of its consultants that no allowance has been made in the RPA analysis for inflation during the construction of the metro and that various other assumptions made by the RPA in compiling its CBA may be questioned although in the view of the consultants these queries do not significantly damage the calculations.

The Joint Committee is of the view that, taken together with the information that the route analysed by the RPA is “indicative”, the financial figures in absolute terms must be treated with some caution but, as concluded by its consultants, “It is important to focus on the direction of the costs, benefits, and the cost benefit analysis result, rather than the absolute accuracy of the numbers which after all, are themselves best estimates at the time of preparation” [emphasis by consultants].

The Joint Committee accepts that should the case for a metro be sustainable from a rational public policy perspective, as seems likely from the evidence before the Joint Committee, the total recurrent costs of any metro will ultimately depend on the adopted funding approach but may involve an annual payment from the exchequer. The Joint Committee notes the consultant’s statement that “it is possible, therefore, to envisage a proposal that would not cost the taxpayer any long-term availability payment. However, this depends on many actions being taken by Government to facilitate the Metro and on a consortium being willing to take on the risks involved”, and recommends that the Government assess the ongoing financial implications of a PPP prior to proceeding with the project. Such an assessment should consider all available avenues for generating the finance for the project including State borrowing, subject to the provisions of the Stability and Growth Pact. The Joint Committee believes that the objective of no long term availability payment should form part of the tendering process.

The Joint Committee urges the need to factor in operating costs over the 30 year period be examined. The RPA assumes that these will not increase significantly, but it is likely that over 30 years there will be maintenance costs and renewal costs which must be considered.

The Joint Committee advocates that operational targets/requirements through a negotiated process would be developed and enshrined in Bylaws overseen by the Department of Transport.

The Joint Committee therefore recommends on the basis of the report of its consultants that an indicative route now be selected for full-scale evaluation – allowing for the possibility of some variation arising from the detailed public consultation. Such evaluation should conform to the Department of Finance document of March 2004, Public Private partnerships. The Assessment and Procurement Process (including the calculation of the Public Sector Benchmark and the Affordability Cap provided for in those guidelines).

The Joint Committee further recommends that the evaluation route selection process should be done so as to best integrate existing public transport services to maximise usage; that Glasnevin Junction be included in the route selection for evaluation; that consideration be given to the development potential (commercial, housing etc.) of the route since development levies may provide a source of funding for the project; and that the evaluation line should be assumed to run underground to a point at least north of Ballymun. The inclusion of Swords in the evaluation should not affect the construction time calculated for the evaluation line from the city centre to the airport.

The Joint Committee recommends that any option of a PPP to fund the construction and operation of the Metro project, must adequately examine what revenue could be sourced from commercial developments along the routes and/or in stations etc. The Joint Committee recommends that information on average revenue takes realised in other cities, with a comparable Metro system, particularly in the EU, where commercial property prices, rents, costs etc are similar, should be provided.

The Joint Committee recommends that the platform length of the stations should facilitate the expansion in the capacity of the metro in line with population and Airport customer projections and rejects the planned two carriage platforms.

Should the full-scale evaluation prove positive, the Joint Committee recommends that a suitable project management methodology for the construction of a metro also be determined, such methodology to allow for

• active consultation with all relevant interested parties on an ongoing basis;
• the early identification of potential problems affecting timescales and/or costs; and
• the full involvement of relevant local authorities and affected communities.

The Joint Committee recommends that should the evaluation prove positive and be adopted the body then to be entrusted by the state with the project management should have a demonstrable experience of delivering a project of this nature to the satisfaction of all interested parties and be selected by the state through an open and transparent procurement process, in conformity with national and EU procurement rules.

The Joint Committee recommends that the contract approval process should be two stage, to include further Cabinet approval on receipt of the full evaluation and prior to entering into a binding contract.

The Joint Committee accepts that a key factor in the delivery of such major infrastructural projects depends upon reducing the construction time and land acquisition costs for the project. Accordingly, the Joint Committee strongly recommends that critical infrastructure legislation should be enacted to facilitate the construction of such projects in the shortest possible time, while in conformity with the constitutional rights of citizens. The Joint Committee feels that this is a necessary prerequisite to the completion of this project on time and within budget.

Report to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on Transport

The Proposed Metro from St. Stephen’s Green to Swords via Dublin Airport

Prepared for the Joint Committee by O’Reilly Consultants 11 Hume Street, Dublin 2 Ph. 01-661 8322

info@orc.ie

www.orc.ie

17 May 2004

CONTENTS

Abbreviations

Chapter One - Introduction and terms of reference

1.1 Terms of Reference for Consultants Study

Chapter Two – Costs and Benefits of RPA Proposals

2.1 Cost Benefit Analysis

2.2 Passenger patronage projected

2.3 Passenger numbers per kilometre

2.4 Costs

2.5 Evidence from the Railway Procurement Agency

2.6 Assumptions in Cost Benefit Analysis

2.7 Assessment

2.8 Conclusions

Chapter Three – Cost Competitiveness

3.1 General Comments

3.2 Comparison of Dublin Metro costs to other European experiences

3.3 Assessment

3.4 Conclusion

Chapter Four – The Metro to Swords

4.1 Consideration of Swords

4.2 Assessment

4.3 Conclusion

Chapter Five – Bus Alternative

5.1 Introduction

5.2 Is a Bus Based Solution Better?

5.3 Solution based on a typical Dublin Bus double-decker

5.4 Solution based on the bus system operated in Curitiba, Brazil

5.5 Assessment

5.6 Conclusions

Chapter Six – Iarnrod Éireann Alternative

6.1 Background

6.2 Provision of a Fully Integrated Greater Dublin Rail System 2004-2010

6.3 Stage 5 - DART link to Airport M1 and Malahide Rd. Park & Ride stations 35

6.4 Assessment

6.5 Conclusion

Chapter Seven – ‘Do Nothing’ Scenario

7.1 Project costs avoided

7.2 Impact of continuing as now – no Metro services

7.3 Disbenefits and financial impact

7.4 Assessment

7.5 Conclusion

Chapter Eight – Dublin Metro Group Proposals

8.1 Introduction

8.2 Summary of Presentation by Dublin Metro Group to the Joint Oireachtas Committee in May 2003

8.3 Submission by Dublin Metro Group 15^th November 2003

8.4 Meeting with Consultants on 20^th January 2004

8.5 Proposal 5^th March 2004

8.6 Consideration of Dublin Metro Group Proposals

8.7 Competition

8.8 Conclusion

Chapter Nine – Views of Other Interested Parties

9.1 Platform 11

9.1.1 Background

9.1.2 The D-Connector – the final link in Dublin’s heavy rail transportation network

9.1.3 Assessment

9.2 Chamber of Commerce

9.2.1 Background

9.2.2 Views of the Chamber of Commerce

9.2.3 Assessment of Chamber’s Views

9.3 Mark Bishop

9.3.1 Background

9.3.2 100% integration with no underground travelator in 3 realistic simple steps 49

9.4 Conclusions

Chapter Ten – Comparison between State Funding and PPP

10.1 UITP and Funding Metros

10.2 Project Investment- Capital funding

10.3 Comparison to Government funding

10.4 Conclusion

Chapter Eleven – Future Finance Implications of PPP

11.1 PPP : Annual Availability and Usage

11.2 Assessment

11.3 Conclusion

Chapter Twelve – International Experience of Metros for Cities

12.1 Comparable European cities to Dublin

12.2 Comparison to Newcastle on Tyne

12.3 Cities in Europe of comparable size

12.4 UITP summary view of Metro experience

12.5 Conclusions

Chapter Thirteen – Structure and Management of Metro Project

13.1 First option of Metro being developed and managed by a State agency 63

13.2 Second Option – Competition for Franchise to Design, Build, Finance, Operate and Maintain

13.3 Government Actions

13.4 Conclusions

Chapter Fourteen – Critical Infrastructure Bill

14.1 Conclusion

Chapter Fifteen –Conclusions and Recommendations

15. 1 Chapter conclusions

Chapter Two – Costs and Benefits

Chapter Three – Cost Competitiveness

Chapter Four – The Metro to Swords

Chapter Five – Bus Alternatives

Chapter Six – Iarnrod Éireann Alternative

Chapter Seven – Do Nothing

Chapter Eight – Dublin Metro Group

Chapter Nine – Views of Others

Chapter Ten – Comparison between State Funding and PPP

Chapter Eleven – Future Finance Implications of PPP

Chapter Twelve – International Comparisons

Chapter Thirteen – Structure and Management

Chapter Fourteen – Critical Infrastructure Bill

15.14 Importance of Decision to be made

15.15 Recommendation to Proceed

Appendix One – Detailed Assumptions

Appendix Two- Assumptions on benefits

Can the Metro carry the passengers?

Appendix Three Definition of a Metro

Appendix Four - DTO Strategy / vision for Dublin

A4.1 ‘A Platform for Change’ November 2001

A4.2 Latest experience on the Dublin transport scene

A4.3 DTO Projected solutions

A4.4 Projected benefits

Appendix Five RPA Detailed Costs

Savings Summary Sheet

Listing and Risk Assessments

Appendix Six - Comparison to the Madrid experience

Appendix Seven – Analysis of EU Capitals

Appendix Eight State Funding

A8.1 The mitigation of expenditure to public-private partnership (PPP)

A8.2 Forces that will increase pressure on Governments to spend more

A8.3 What is a Public Private Partnership?

A8.4 Private Finance Initiative (PFI)

A8.5 What are the drawbacks of PPP?

A8.6 What are the arguments for PPP?

Appendix Nine - Benefits of a Metro

Appendix TEN - DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR RAILWAY SAFETY CASES

1. Introduction
2. BACKGROUND to Railway Safety Regulation
   2.1 Proposed Legislation
   2.2 Safety Case regime
   2.3 Railway Undertaking’s Safety Case
   2.4 Revision of Safety Cases
3. contents of a RAILWAY SAFETY CASE
4. REFERENCES
5. Glossary

Abbreviations

CBA – Cost Benefit Analysis

DML – Dublin Metro Limited

DMG - Dublin Metro Group

DTO – Dublin Transportation Office

EIS – Environmental Impact Statement

PPP – Public Private Partnership

RPA – Railway Procurement Agency

UITP – International Association of Public Transport

Chapter One - Introduction and terms of reference

The Oireachtas Joint Committee on Transport appointed O’Reilly Consultants to prepare a report in relation to the proposed Metro for Dublin in October 2003. O’Reilly Consultants presented a draft report on 26^th November (November Report). This was considered by the Joint Committee on 17^th December 2003. Following the meeting, O’Reilly Consultants proposed additional terms of reference. After consideration by the Joint Committee revised terms of reference for an additional study were notified to O’Reilly Consultants on 20^th February 2004. These terms of reference are given below:

1.1 Terms of Reference for Consultants Study

1. Review and hold discussions with Dublin Metro Group, Dublin Chamber of Commerce and Platform 11, all of whom have made submissions to the Joint Committee.
2. Obtain and report on the cost benefit analysis prepared by the RPA for St. Stephens Green/Airport [Route Central 3(b)] giving details on:
1. costs,
2. benefits,
3. assumptions
3. Examine the cost competitiveness of the proposed RPA construction cost estimates for the Metro to Dublin Airport by comparison with international Metro project costs.
4. Consider the case made for the extension of the Metro from Dublin Airport to Swords.
5. Consider the possibility of a bus alternative to the Metro.
6. Consider the possibility of an Iarnrod Éireann alternative to the Metro.
7. Make an assessment of a “do nothing” option, including implications of disbenefits.
8. Provide a comparison between and report on the implications of State funding and a PPP approach.
9. Assess the ongoing financial implications of a PPP approach for the State once the Metro is operational e.g. availability / usage payments.
10. Present the arguments for and against the Metro by international comparison to a comparable size city such as Newcastle or other city, excluding Copenhagen.
11. Give views on how the Metro project should be structured and managed so as to ensure the most effective implementation of the project.
12. Give views on the measures needed in the proposed Infrastructure Bill in order to ensure timely delivery of the project.

Having considered all of the above -

1. Form a reasoned judgement on the viability of the Metro project
2. Prepare a draft report for consideration by the Committee
3. Prepare a final report which reflects the Committee’s views.

The terms of reference for the consultants were very specific. The Railway Procurement Agency (RPA) prepared a number of detailed analyses of potential routes from St. Stephen’s Green to Dublin Airport. Of these cost benefit analyses, Route 3 (b), Dublin Central Route, was selected for examination of the results of the cost benefit analysis and the assumptions. The selection of Route 3 (b) does not imply any preference of the Joint Committee or O’Reilly Consultants for this route.

O’Reilly Consultants produced a draft report for the Joint Committee on 19 March 2004.

The Joint Committee discussed the report with the consultants on 7 April and now publishes the report on the proposed Metro between St. Stephen’s Green and Swords.

Each chapter of this report deals with one of the terms of reference. At the end of the report, we summarise our conclusions and give our overall recommendation.

The background to the proposal to build a Metro in Dublin is given in Appendix Four, DTO Strategy/Vision for Dublin.

Chapter Two – Costs and Benefits of RPA Proposals

The Joint Committee on Transport has been provided with the detailed RPA calculations for the costs and benefits of the proposal. RPA, however, refused to allow certain information to be published stating their belief that it is commercially sensitive and that release of the information would be in breach of the Freedom of Information Act. The deleted RPA information has been replaced by [refused permission to publish].

2.1 Cost Benefit Analysis

RPA has, in conjunction with its advisors, prepared a detailed Cost Benefit Analysis for the first revision proposal. The following costs and benefits were taken into account:

Costs

Project infrastructure costs

Project fees/risk

VAT

Operations costs

Benefits

Mode transfers – Public transport

Mode transfers – Cars

Mode transfers – Park and ride

Road congestion – Fuel reductions

Road congestion – Accident reductions

Taxation revenues

Non-user benefits

Although the RPA has deemed the figures for each of these costs and benefits to be commercially sensitive information, they have permitted the cost benefit ratio to be published. There is a positive cost benefit ratio of 1.31 to 1 – benefit value of [refused permission to publish] million over cost value of [refused permission to publish] million. A positive cost benefit ratio means that the proposal is viable. This is an encouraging result demonstrating that the Metro project is a worthwhile proposal.

The data used by the RPA is conservative and there is every likelihood that the real result will be better. The levels of passenger carryings are based upon historic performance that has already been demonstrated as too low. Further, the anticipated growth once the Metro is operational is modest. Experience of other European Metros being introduced has clearly demonstrated how railway planners have underestimated the effect of a successful Metro system.

The view on benefits is also modest in that the lowest levels of transfer have been used, based on what is now known to be outdated information. Road usage is significantly higher than the DTO forecast used by RPA.

One would wish to be assured that the Metro will not be a burden upon the State once it is operational - in other words will its revenues pay for its operational cost?

The following were taken into account when calculating the operating ratio:

Revenues from “farebox”

Operating costs

Net operating surplus

Although the RPA has not permitted us to publish the data underlying these figures, they demonstrate that there is a projected surplus of revenues over costs of operations expressed as an operating ratio of 1.1 to 1, or 110%. Many operating ratios of railways – both Metros and heavy rail suburban / urban – have operating ratios well below 100%. This is acceptable where the State or the local Government authority accept and / or prefer to have the services operating as a public social service and amenity. The deficit is subsidised on the basis that the subsidy is value for money compared to not having a Metro or heavy rail system, but having greater levels of road usage and congestion.

The role of developing, constructing, and operating (maybe through a contractor) the Metro network has been placed with the Railway Procurement Agency (RPA).

The RPA has concentrated initially on a first phase starting with the northern end of the north - south corridor, namely, Dublin Airport to the City Centre.

The routing into Dublin city centre has similarly been the subject of frequent debate following a RPA review of three potential routings based upon a central corridor from the Airport to the City Centre, and two variations to the west and east of the central corridor. The routing in the city centre has also been debated at length with a view to maximising interchange with major centres in the inner city centre.

The RPA view is that it is impossible to determine the final routing until a preferred routing is debated through a public consultation / public inquiry. However, for initial planning evaluation, RPA has set a route called option 3b as an indicative route. This option evaluates the Metro along the following route -

• Airport - Metropark -Ballymun North - Ballymun South – Dublin City University - Botanic Road - Mater - O’Connell Street - Trinity - St Stephen’s Green.

The route would be underground from St. Stephen’s Green until north of Ballymun.

2.2 Passenger patronage projected

RPA have specified a passenger service of 15-30 trains per hour using, initially, two-car train sets and later three-car sets, which cover the distance from the Airport to St Stephen’s Green in 17 minutes.

In the peak hours, this will provide capacity to meet demand in excess of 18,000 passengers per hour with an interval between trains planned as every 4 minutes, and in the off peak hours an interval of every 8 minutes. As demand grows, the interval period can be reduced to a more frequent service availability - such as every 90 seconds in the peak period.

The passenger demand has been prepared by RPA using a model to forecast future ridership. The model is similar to that used for other new Metros and light railways in the UK, and has been audited independently. Additionally, the modelled results have been benchmarked against other European cities with Metro train facilities.

It is predicted that around 18.35 million passengers will be carried annually in the first year of operation, year 2010. This will rise to 24.28 million in year 2016, and 29.73 million in year 2039. These figures are seen as conservative as they do not take into account the effect of additional demand arising from new developments following the start of operating the Metro route and that arising from future line extensions and additional demand from other transport developments such as congestion charging for private car usage.

The analysis shows movement to the Metro from other modes of travel as follows expressed as passenger journeys (millions) per annum -

2.3 Passenger numbers per kilometre

A comparison with Metros in other countries shows the proposed usage of the Metro line from St. Stephen’s Green to Dublin Airport.

The table above shows that the projected passenger numbers for the Metro from St. Stephen’s Green to Dublin Airport/Swords are low by comparison with other capital cities. However, UK regional Metros, such as Tyne and Weir, Manchester and Sheffield have lower passenger numbers per kilometre. It must be remembered that some of these Metros made considerable use of existing railway infrastructure and much of the system is above ground.

The statistics above have been obtained from web-sites and may not be strictly comparable and may contain some inaccuracies.

2.4 Costs

For the cost benefit analysis for the illustrative option 3B, RPA has produced a series of estimated costs for the option. RPA conducted a first revision (green) and then a second revision (green/amber) in order to reduce costs. These produced cost savings in relation to the following items:

Tunnelling

Stations

Structures

Depots

Rolling Stock

Other Works

Fees etc.

Risk Allowance

The RPA has deemed the figures for tunnelling, stations etc. to be commercially sensitive information. However, they have permitted the figure for direct construction costs to be published. This figure is now down to €1.08 billion – this is very close to the estimate of the Spanish expert, Professor Melis of €1.05 billion.

Using the RPA second revised estimate, it is apparent that the reductions in cost are due to a shorter alignment, fewer stations, 24 hour tunnelling, reduced specifications (esclatators etc) and monotube tunnels. It should be noted that the draft Irish Railway Safety guidelines specify that railway tunnels longer than 1km must be twin tube.

The figures included in the Cost Benefit Analysis are based upon the first revision.

From our review of the cost estimates and the reductions, we are satisfied that they have been assessed on the best data available to RPA at the time of preparation. A concern might be that in pursuit of revised cost, particularly between the first and second revisions, reductions in facilities to achieve lower costs may jeopardise service and customer quality.

2.5 Evidence from the Railway Procurement Agency

RPA categorises the benefits as follows -

• City and Regional Economy will benefit from the proposed Metro as it will provide a means of filling the capacity gap in public transport provision. This will help alleviate road traffic congestion, particularly at peak times. Accessibility will be improved, so aiding the city centre economy for employment and retail shopping. It will facilitate development of industry and employment opportunities in Greater Dublin, especially in the region of the Airport.
• Economic Regeneration is facilitated by opening up access to new areas of employment and associated housing development. RPA feels this will benefit the areas through which the Metro travels.
• Environmental benefits are largely dominated by the Metro (as compared with road, bus and diesel rail) causing a net improvement in air quality as a result of the significant transfer of car users to rail transportation.
• Accessibility and Social Inclusion are expected from the Metro which will be able to move large numbers of passengers each day, each hour. Improved access will be available to about 100,000 residents, including many who are potentially socially deprived such as low income families, those with impaired mobility, and those who may not have alternative modes of travel (and are thus confined to their own locality). An example of this would be one car families where the breadwinner takes the car as a means of getting to and from their place of employment each day.

Whilst this study has obtained a lot of information and data from RPA, it should be noted that much of the RPA information has been prepared by advisers who have been engaged by RPA in the early period of proposal building.

It should be noted that the evidence has come from reliable sources as follows–

• Steer Davies Gleave
• Parsons Brinckerhoff

Additionally, the Department of Finance commissioned a review by Goodbody Economic Consultants to examine the costs of the projected proposal. RPA were not able to give us a copy of the report. Contact was made with the Department of Transport and the Department of Finance, but again we have not been allowed to access this report.

2.6 Assumptions in Cost Benefit Analysis

We give detailed information on the assumptions contained in the Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) in Appendix One and Appendix Two. Preparation of the Cost Benefit Analysis is inherently difficult and it is necessary to make many assumptions about what will happen over a period of 30 years.

In the appendices we show the principal assumptions behind the calculations of the Cost Benefit Analysis. In this chapter we give an overview of these assumptions. The most important assumptions are as follows:

1. A discount rate of 5% per annum (the rate specified in the Department of Finance Guidelines)
2. The decision not to allow for inflation in the calculation of costs or benefits
3. The numbers of passengers
4. The capital costs of establishing the Metro
5. The costs of operating the Metro

In general, we are convinced that the assumptions in relation to:

-the number of passengers,




-the capital costs of the Metro, and,




-the operating costs

are reasonable, although they may be conservative.

However, we believe that the calculation of the benefits has been distorted by using a discount rate of 5% per annum and not allowing for inflation.

The effect of these assumptions is to significantly understate the value of the benefits that may be expected from the provision of the Metro.

As the CBA already shows positive benefits for the provision of the Metro, we have not attempted to re-calculate the cost benefit of the CBA based on other assumptions that may be made in relation to the discount rate and inflation.

We have, perhaps inevitably, found some aspects of the assumptions to be questionable.

In particular, we highlight the following:

1. Value of work time

It is assumed that only 5%of those travelling on the Metro would be doing so as part of their work. If this percentage was increased to 10%, there would be a very substantial increase in the benefits to be obtained. In particular, as the Metro is serving the Airport, it would seem likely that a number of persons will be using the Metro as part of their business activity. Present congestion is likely to deter travel as part of work. However, a reliable Metro service may bring about travel for work purposes.

2. Cost of Fuel

The amount assumed for the cost of fuel per litre now seems low. It seems likely that fuel costs in future will be significantly higher than in the past. Consequently, full cost savings will be higher.

3. Project/Policy Assumptions

The assumption is made that the Iarnrod Eireann interconnector (a 5.2km railway tunnel linking Connolly Station/Spencer Dock with Heuston Station) will not be built and, therefore, that the Maynooth and Kildare electrification will not take place. If the inter-connector is built, this is likely to generate additional passengers for the St. Stephen’s Green to Airport line. It is to be noted that the metro and the interconnector are complementary and that their construction is not an either/or option.

4. Demand Management

It is assumed that demand management will not be enforced so as to reduce the numbers of cars coming into the city and to impose an additional price, apart from the toll charge, to users of the M50. If either of these measures was introduced, it is likely that the passenger numbers on the Metro would increase.

5. Bus Network

It is assumed that a competitive bus network, a complementary bus network and a feeder bus network will not commence. A feeder bus network is likely to generate additional traffic for the Metro. A competitive bus network may, however, reduce the number of passengers on the Metro, but, as we see in the chapter on the bus alternative, it is unlikely that buses will be able to compete effectively with the Metro.

6. Operating Cost

It is assumed that there will be no increase in operating costs year on year. This assumption is in line with the assumption made in relation to benefits. It is an unreasonable one when a discount rate of 5% is being applied. Realistically, as the Metro matures, there will be periodic renewals and heavy maintenance needs, and, therefore occasional increases in cost provision.

7. Opening year

The assumption is made that the Metro will be open for business in 2010. If the Metro could be opened more quickly, the costs of construction would be lower and the benefits would be achieved more quickly. The overall balance of benefits to costs would therefore improve.

8. GNP Growth

The assumption is made that the growth level between 2005-2010 would be 4% and thereafter 3%. These estimates were obtained from the ESRI in its mid-term review of 2001. While these forecasts may be in line with economic projections, there is the possibility that, with the accession of ten new members of the EU, Ireland’s growth rate could accelerate significantly. The demand for the Metro, would, if this were to happen, significantly increase.

9. Growth in Car Usage

This level of growth seems low when compared with the growth in the number of cars over the past ten years. Ireland continues to have a lower than average ratio of cars to population. It is reasonable to assume that the number of car journeys will continue to increase unless there is the provision of public transport services such as the Metro.

10. Vehicle Operating Costs

These assumptions have been based on information supplied by Parsons Brinckerhoff.

11. Growth in Value of Time

The value of time savings are a significant part of the total benefits of the Metro. The assumptions in relation to the value of the time saved are particularly important. The assumption is made that the value of time will increase at a rate of only 2% per annum from 2005 to 2016. This is based on the ESRI estimate for GNP growth.

It is arguable that this assumption significantly understates the benefits to passengers of the Metro.

2.7 Assessment

It is our view that the cost data and information supplied by RPA is satisfactory and professionally prepared by them in conjunction with their advisers.

Whilst one might have another view on some of the data, it is, in reality, detail that inevitably moves with the passage of time. It is important to focus on the direction of the costs, benefits, and the cost benefit analysis result, rather than the absolute accuracy of the numbers which, after all, are themselves best estimates at the time of preparation.

Starting at the end, the cost benefit analysis in net present value terms is conservative and still produces a satisfactory result of 1.31 to 1. It is our view that as the Metro system is further progressed and numbers / estimates become more definitive, the cost benefit ratio may be bettered.

The costs have been successfully reduced by RPA and are now comparable to what is achieved elsewhere. The costs may still be modestly overstated and, if a quicker time plan can be adopted, cost will be reduced automatically.

Benefits have been assessed on a realistic basis which has brought in degrees of caution and are potentially conservative. This is understandable as the responsibility to deliver the benefits is beyond the control of RPA. In all probability, the level of benefits will be significant and will not always be capable of being financially evaluated.

2.8 Conclusions

1. The Cost Benefit Analysis prepared for the RPA shows benefits in excess of costs.
2. In general, the cost benefit analysis prepared for the Rail Procurement Agency understates the benefits that the Metro will bring to users of its services.
3. Many of the assumptions appear to be conservative.

Chapter Three – Cost Competitiveness

3.1 General Comments

We give a comparison between the Madrid costs and the RPA estimates in Appendix 6. The appendix shows that there were clear differences in approach, meaning there were inevitable difficulties in understanding why RPA quoted a high cost, Professor Melis from Madrid quoted a much lower cost, and Dublin Metro Group quoted another low cost. The definition of what was included as cost differed and the price levels used were different - all of this meant that it was unfair to compare one figure to another. Appendix Six analyses the individual figures and, as far as possible, brings them to a common price level and common content. Compared with Madrid, the RPA estimates have been prepared on a reasonable basis.

3.2 Comparison of Dublin Metro costs to other European experiences

A comparison of costs of other European Metro construction experiences has been undertaken. It is difficult to obtain information that can be comparable, as the available data is often restricted for reasons of commercial confidentiality and may be compiled on differing bases. Examples of the difficulties are:

• Differing price levels.
• Differing scope of proposals.
• Alternative views on what are costs.
• Estimates based on preliminary designs, detailed designs, contracted agreements, etc.
• Varying definitions in use on Metro and Light Rail meanings.
• Variable geological and subterranean conditions.
• Involvement of archaeological investigations.
• Differing treatment of moving essential services.
• Alternative ways of procuring land use.

To ensure strict comparability would need a review which investigated more deeply the content of available data, discussions with the authors of the data, conversion of data to one common currency and one common price level, and the use of weighting factors to level out discrepancies.

Despite all of these difficulties, a limited review has been undertaken starting off with a consideration of information provided by RPA.

Comparisons were made by RPA with five European Metro developments and two American Metro developments. The results are as shown below, all at the constant price level of year 2002:-

The comparisons for America revealed a project in San Francisco with a Cost per Km of €110 million, and Baltimore €148 million - both Metros with mixed underground, elevated, and surface sections being constructed.

RPA drew the conclusion that their proposal sat in the middle of these comparisons.

Further research, but limited in scope because of time limits on the study, revealed the following additional information on European Metro developments :

Other examples were reviewed but are not quoted as they may well be light rail solutions, but called Metros. Other differences were that they were surface railways, often using existing, or no longer in operational use, infrastructure.

RPA in reviewing their comparisons demonstrated that these can only be seen as indicative costs per kilometre, as many factors can influence the derived average cost factor. These factors include the following:

• physical and geological conditions
• degree of tunnelling, elevated sections, and surface building
• station sizes and capacities
• land acquisition
• market conditions for contractors
• labour and material costs
• diversion of utility services
• financing arrangements including VAT inclusion or exemption
• environmental considerations
• planned timescales for delivery

3.3 Assessment

It is concluded that the direct construction costs quoted by Madrid at €1 billion and the revised and reduced direct construction costs by RPA at €1.08 billion are now very similar and do not warrant further investigation.

It is important to review the level of reduced costs proposed by RPA to meet Government requests, as they remove some important features that bring a customer focus and benefit e.g. two stations taken out, removal of street to subway escalators, reduction in automatic ticketing machines and barrier gates.

The other cost elements not mentioned by Madrid and apparent to RPA are real and need to be considered - they will reduce, providing progress is made more swiftly and the construction period is significantly reduced by adopting the 24/7 working and the mono-tube boring for the tunnels.

The actual cost will be determined by the bidding process. Until the bids are received, all costs must be seen as indicative estimates only.

On international comparisons we consider –

-Access to reliable comparative data and usable information is not easy.




-Interpretation of what appears to be comparable information must be seen as indicative, and is capable of being misread as a true benchmark of what the cost of construction in Dublin should be.




-Many Metro providers are reluctant to reveal estimated costs as they feel the information is commercially confidential. Also the content of a project may not be fully exposed - infrastructure cost but not rolling stock cost as an example.




-There is confusion in terminology between Metro railways and Light Railway Transits and Tramways. The general view is that a Metro has a dedicated infrastructure routing which cannot be used by other transport users. However, many LRT and Tramways also claim to have dedicated rail routes, albeit a segregated section alongside a roadway. Some rail developments now permit mixed usage of heavy rail and Metro railways.

3.4 Conclusion

The RPA construction cost estimates now appear to be comparable with international Metro project costs.

The actual cost will be established by open tender for which international companies will bid. We are not aware of any reason why the costs of building a Metro system in Dublin should not be similar to those in other countries.

Chapter Four – The Metro to Swords

4.1 Consideration of Swords

Swords, located to the north of Dublin Airport, is a community with a population of 28,000 which is expected to nearly double by year 2016. Being near to the M1 Motorway corridor, the area north of Swords is also seeing extensive development. Approximately 26% of Airport employees live in Swords.

To the east of Swords, the area of Malahide is nearly fully developed. Immediately south east of Swords between open lands surrounded by the M1 and N1 roads, there is much development in the area of Nevinstown.

The potential extension of the Metro from the Airport to Swords is seen as of strategic importance by Fingal County Council. The improved transport access and close proximity to the Airport will assist optimising land use. Around the proposed site of the Swords Metro station, it is considered there will be extended town centre commercial and civic area development, and higher density housing development.

RPA has examined the effect on costs and benefits of extending to Swords from the Airport, through their option 3A. It is estimated that the cost of extending would be between [refused permission to publish] million, depending on whether the route is at grade or an elevated alignment. Benefits have been assessed at 159%, or in CBA terms 1.59 to 1, made up as follows –

• user benefits 160% arising from -

  -Public Transport transfers 188%

  
  

  -Car Passenger transfers 143%

  
  

  -Total transfers 166%

  
  

  -Accident savings 141%

  
  

  -VOC savings 141%

  
  
• non user benefits 148%

Fingal County Council has offered to part-fund the extension of the Metro to Swords.

4.2 Assessment

While the case for the St. Stephen’s Green to Dublin Airport route has been examined in detail, a similar examination of the possible extension to Swords has not been made.

As the RPA will have used the same Cost Benefit Analysis methodology to make its assessment, we see no reason why the Metro should not run from St. Stephen’s Green to Swords via Dublin Airport.

4.3 Conclusion

On the basis of the RPA cost benefit analysis of taking the Metro to Swords, the Metro should terminate in Swords. It is noted that Fingal County Council has offered to part-fund the extension of the Metro to Swords.

Chapter Five – Bus Alternative

5.1 Introduction

The coming into operation of a Metro service will lead to significant reductions in demand for bus transport along the proposed route of the Metro.

Table 1 shows the estimated fall in demand in the ten years following the opening of the Metro, with demand falling by approximately 8%.

Table 1 – Demand for Buses (millions of passengers per annum)

Consequently, there will be a need to adjust bus capacity following the introduction of the Metro. However, this can undoubtedly be planned for, as the approximate date of commencement of the Metro will be known for some time prior to its introduction, therefore, bus investment planning can be rationalized.

5.2 Is a Bus Based Solution Better?

In examining the case for the Metro, other transport solutions must also be considered. Bus transport is arguably a cheaper and more quickly realised alternative. It can be up and running in the short term as against the longer roll out time for Metro. Buses also have the advantage of being road-based with an expansive geographical reach that can respond easily to shifts in demand caused by changes in demographics.

We must also look to the examples put forward by other countries. For example, in Curitiba, Brazil, a bus system operates with similar features to that of a tram, which will be discussed further below.

In considering whether a bus based solution is better, two scenarios are considered below. The first scenario is based on the use of the typical Dublin Bus double-decker type bus, while the second draws upon the experience of Curitiba, Brazil.

5.3 Solution based on a typical Dublin Bus double-decker

The main advantage of this type of bus based solution is that it has a relatively short lead in time. It will not involve significant infrastructural investment, with the exception of the acquisition of additional buses, the upgrading of some QBCs and, perhaps, the realignment of some road markings. Therefore, this type of bus based solution should be substantially cheaper than the proposed Metro. However, a bus network will need frequent investment to continually renew the fleet of vehicles. Buses have a six year life, at best eight years, whereas Metro rolling stock lasts for 30 to 40 years.

It is estimated that the Metro will need to carry 6,528 people per hour at peak time in one direction in 2016. A Metro carriage will carry 156 people, seated and standing. A typical Metro will have three carriages. It will, therefore, carry 468 people. Fourteen Metros per hour are therefore required at peak time in one direction. A total of 24 Metros with 72 carriages will be needed to meet peak demand in both directions. As there can be a Metro every 90 seconds, there can be an increase in capacity of 2.85 times.

A typical Dublin double decker bus holds up to 94 people. Hence five buses with five drivers are required to carry the same number of passengers as one Metro and its driver.

To carry the same capacity by bus as by Metro at peak time, approximately 70 buses an hour or seven buses every six minutes are needed. This implies a huge increase in the volume of buses on our roads along the proposed Metro route, which has implications for traffic congestion along the route. The 46A route has a bus about every four minutes at peak times.

Seventy buses an hour at peak time will make it difficult for other road users such as taxis and other public service vehicles to use the bus lane.

With dedicated “bus ways”, however, and the virtual exclusion of other vehicles this would be possible. It would also be possible to increase the number from seventy but not increase it by 2.85 times as is possible with the Metro system.

The journey time for the proposed route by bus will depend upon a number of factors including, for example, the time of day, traffic congestion levels and the volume of people on the bus. The Metro, on the other hand, is less influenced by these factors. Consequently, journey times by Metro are more reliable. However, Metro is more adversely affected by problems on the Metro line, for example, the breakdown in service of a Metro will adversely affect all other Metros running on the line.

The bus based option has a number of other perceived disadvantages over the Metro alternative. For example:

• The increase in volume of buses required to carry the same capacity as a Metro will absorb valuable road space at the expense of other public service vehicles.
• Many Metro passengers will be prepared to travel standing for 20 minutes, whilst bus passengers will not be willing to stand for 40 minutes.
• Electricity powered Metros last longer and are more environmentally efficient than diesel powered buses.
• Passenger comfort is of a higher standard on Metros than on buses.
• Load time for a bus is longer than the Metro, as tickets are bought or checked prior to boarding the Metro.

Furthermore, the present way in which our road network is used would not yield optimal results from a bus based alternative to the Metro. For a bus solution to work, innovative approaches must be embraced. For example, QBCs would have to be extended and providing preferential treatment for buses at traffic lights would have to be considered.

The new “kneel down” buses are excellent for the elderly and disabled, as accessibility in Metro stations tends to be less than optimal for such passengers but where there are lifts to the underground stations and the trains are designed so that wheelchair users can board the trains without assistance, the Metro may be more wheelchair friendly.

5.4 Solution based on the bus system operated in Curitiba, Brazil

Some of the disadvantages of the Dublin Bus double-decker solution mentioned above could be alleviated by a system similar to that which operates in Curitiba, Brazil. The key features of this system are that –

• passengers board through “tube” stations, having already paid their fare,
• passengers interchange between feeder and express buses for a single fare,
• buses are 25 metres long,
• buses can carry up to 270 passengers,
• buses have five doors
• buses have a load time of 20 seconds.

A Curitiba type bus system would probably have a longer lead time than the Dublin Bus double-decker type system, but a shorter time than the Metro. The construction of “tube” stations and bus ways with limited stops, which may delay the lead time of the system, would impact upon the system’s success.

Twenty-four Curitiba type buses are required to carry the same capacity of passengers as the Metro, as opposed to 70 Dublin Bus double-decker type buses. This should have less of an impact on traffic congestion than the Dublin Bus double-decker type system.

5.5 Assessment

The proposed Metro, although more costly and having a longer lead time, offers many advantages over bus based alternatives. For example, the proposed Metro would take approximately 20 minutes to travel from St Stephens Green to the Airport. This travel time estimate is more reliable than the travel time for a bus based system. Furthermore, the Metro will not take up valuable road space, nor add to traffic jams and it is more environmentally friendly as it is more energy efficient than buses.

Table three – Bus system v Metro system – Advantages

5.6 Conclusions

Bus transport will not provide the same range of benefits as a Metro service.

Chapter Six – Iarnrod Éireann Alternative

6.1 Background

Iarnrod Éireann, part of the State-owned CIE group of companies, provides passenger rail and rail freight transport services. In the Greater Dublin Area, in addition to the DART service, which operates between Greystones and Howth/Malahide, the company also provides suburban rail services between Arklow, Drogheda and Maynooth, as well as the Arrow service to Kildare. At the last budget, five year “envelope funding” similar to the multi-annual funding given to the National Roads Authority was allolated to Iarnrod Éireann. Having secured this allocation and with competition for rail funding coming from the LUAS and Metro projects, Iarnrod Éireann further developed its plans for an integrated Greater Dublin Area commuter rail system. The eight-stage plan would bring about a significant increase in rail capacity in the Greater Dublin Area. Most of its stages do not conflict with the Metro, indeed, it may complement it.

6.2 Provision of a Fully Integrated Greater Dublin Rail System 2004-2010

The objective of Iarnrod Éireann’s “Provision of a Fully Integrated Greater Dublin Rail System 2004-2010” is “to increase peak rail capacity within an expanding commuter belt.” According to Iarnrod Éireann, since 1995, commuter numbers have risen by 30%. Iarnrod Éireann’s efforts to solve the congestion problems caused by rapid economic growth have been hamstrung by rail capacity constraints at key points in the existing network and by the lack of interconnection between key nodes of the network.

Iarnrod Éireann believes that the existing network suffers from three key limitations:

• The lines from the north and west as they approach Connolly and between Connolly and Pearse are operating at capacity. Thus additional train services cannot be provided from the existing city stations to the rapidly growing commuter areas along the Drogheda and Maynooth lines.
• It is not possible to provide for commuter stations along the Kildare line, without major disruption to Inter City services from Heuston in the evening.
• Heuston itself is remote from the City Centre and other main business districts and is thus an unattractive destination for commuters and indeed Inter City passengers.

To solve these problems, Iarnrod Éireann has developed its 8-stage plan, “Provision of a Fully Integrated Greater Dublin Rail System 2004-2010”. The stages are as follows:

According to Iarnrod Éireann, stages 1-4 of the plan can be met out of the envelope of funding allocated at the last Budget. They believe that the DART link from the Airport to Grange Road (about 1km north of Howth Junction) could possibly be paid for out of these funds.

Stages 1-4 and Stage 6 are welcome developments. They do not relate directly to the Metro and would not have a negative impact on the project. Indeed, the increased flow of rail passengers through Dublin would probably result in increased patronage numbers for Metro. As there is no conflict between the Metro project and these aspects of the Iarnrod Éireann plan, there is no need to evaluate them further.

Stages 7 and 8 of the Iarnrod Éireann plan serve a different purpose and a different area of the city to the Metro project and so do not fall to be considered as alternatives to the Metro. Undoubtedly, the Interconnector would make a very significant contribution to the carrying of passengers in the Greater Dublin Area.

There are, however, choices to be made as between the Metro project and Stage 5 of the Iarnrod Éireann plan.

6.3 Stage 5 - DART link to Airport M1 and Malahide Rd. Park & Ride stations

The Iarnrod Éireann proposal is as follows:

• The proposed DART link would join the existing Northern Line at a new station at Grange Road, which is on the electrified section between Howth Junction and Malahide.
• The Airport link would continue on either side of the existing line to Mayne Road where a grade separation crossing would be constructed to minimise service conflict with regular commuter services to / from the Northern suburbs.
• The Airport-DART link, involving 8 km of new rail alignment, would then run in a virtually straight line under the main runway flight path to the M1 where a rail over bridge and station is proposed.
• Two options are available between the M1 and the Airport terminal involving a 1.3 km tunnel and underground station or a 1.7 km bridge structure with an elevated station adjacent to the multi-storey car park.
• The elevated option is favoured on cost grounds. However, both options will have to be considered further in the context of the Aer Rianta Master Plan and Airport related safety restrictions.
• The potential for two intermediate park and ride stations has been identified along the spur at the M1 and Malahide Road.
• The proposal is essentially based on relocating the Howth DART Terminus to the Airport.
• The running time from the Airport to Connolly Station would be around 30 minutes.
• Between 4 and 6 services per hour would be provided, depending on the time of day.
• The cost is estimated at between €350 million and €440 million depending on the routing option through the Airport campus. The lower cost estimate relates to the elevated option. These initial capital cost estimates include construction, rolling stock and land acquisition. There is no provision for fees, project management, risk or financing charges.
• It is believed that a 20-25% air passenger market share could be achieved subject to parking restrictions at the Airport and wider car restraint policies. It is believed that between 4.4 and 5.6 million passengers per annum could be attracted to the services by 2010.
• A €5 fare (benchmarked against bus competitors) would yield projected revenues of €22-28 million by 2010. Experience in Europe shows that Airport travellers pay a substantial premium for a quality, reliable service
• The gap between revenue and operating cost would see revenue outstripping direct operating costs (not including capital costs) by about €15 million per annum.
• The procurement of the project could be achieved through a PPP approach.
• No cost benefit analysis of the project has yet been carried out, though one is planned.

6.4 Assessment

DART link to Airport M1 and Malahide Rd. Park & Ride stations Vs Metro project

• If the project objective is to provide a rail link between the Airport and the city centre, then that objective can be fulfilled much more cheaply by opting for the Iarnrod Éireann DART option. The Metro will have direct construction costs of €1.1 billion to build. Without analysing the estimated Airport DART cost of €350-€440 million, it is safe to say that the final figure will be substantially less than the cost of the Metro project. However, if the objective of the Metro project is to build the first link in a major infrastructural undertaking designed to solve Dublin transport problems, then the Metro project has undoubted advantages.
• While the cost would be lower than for the Metro project, the benefits of the Airport DART are unlikely to be anywhere near as great. The RPA projects that only about 25% of its total patronage will come from the Airport. Most of the Airport-city centre DART route is already served by the Northern Line of the DART and the area between the Airport and Grange Road has no major population centres as it is in the Airport flight path. In contrast, the Metro project will open up the north side of Dublin city, providing a transport link/regeneration to Swords, Ballymun, Finglas, and Glasnevin etc.
• The Metro project opens up the north side of Dublin city. The fact that it goes through the Airport is almost incidental (only 25% of patronage will come from the Airport). Therefore, it is questionable whether a DART project that does little more than link the existing DART line to the Airport is the best use of limited financial resources.
• The Airport DART would share a line with the Dublin-Belfast diesel train and the commuter services from Dundalk, Drogheda, Balbriggan and Skerries. These heavier trains cause the track to deteriorate faster than would be the case with DART alone. Consequently, there will need to be more frequent engineering work on the line. This will lead to greater passenger disruption than would be experienced if the Metro option were chosen.
• DTO believes that with the DART terminating at the Airport, there would be a substantial disbenefit from the reduced capacity of the DART north of Grange Road (to Howth and Malahide).
• Given that it will operate on a line with limited capacity, the limited frequency of services possible may mean that the Airport DART only provides a short-term solution for linking the Airport to the city centre. A bout of economic and population growth may quickly overtake the project.
• The Metro, being on a dedicated rail route with regular train frequencies, is more likely to produce reliable performance, compared to the Airport Dart which has to compete with other conflicting line occupancy as it heads for the City Centre.
• Since 2000, Iarnrod Éireann has managed very large projects (approximately €300 million per annum) and has stated that it has met all its targets. This can be attributed in large part to the new environment of competition for funding from LUAS and Metro projects. The competition for passengers (now using buses) that will come from LUAS is providing a further incentive for CIE improvement. It would be regrettable if the abandonment of the Metro project were to reduce the incentives currently driving CIE forward.
• An important consideration in linking the Airport to the city centre, is the location that Airport passengers want to arrive in or depart from in the city centre. Therefore, with the Airport Dart, the question is whether or not Connolly is the best “city centre” location, or does the Metro provide a better “city centre”. It is likely that the answer will be that the Metro is the best.

The DART option will provide a cheaper, stop-gap piece of infrastructure that links the Airport to the city centre, while the Metro project offers the first phase of a long term solution to Dublin’s traffic problems.

6.5 Conclusion

The Iarnrod Éireann proposal is not a satisfactory alternative to the Metro proposal.

Chapter Seven – ‘Do Nothing’ Scenario

7.1 Project costs avoided

The principal ‘benefit’ of not progressing the Dublin Metro proposal or the Iarnrod Éireann project would be that the construction and financing charges for the project would not be incurred. This construction sum avoided would been around €1 billion for the RPA project and roundly €440 million for the Iarnrod Éireann project. The ongoing financing charges would also be avoided. This would have been about half of the construction costs.

If the proposal would have been provided through a PPP approach, then the State would save the ongoing liability for access and usage charges once the project had been commissioned and was operational. The saving by the State would not happen for some years – if construction were to happen in year 2006, the earliest year of operation would be 2010 (given a construction period of 4 years).

Whilst the major costs of construction and financing charges and possibly the related access and usage charges would be avoided, the initial work of scoping and initial design works by various parties engaged by RPA and Iarnrod Éireann would have been incurred.

The administration of RPA and Iarnrod Éireann would need to be examined to see if there would be any scope for reducing their staff levels/budget following decisions not to proceed with the Metro or Iarnrod Éireann alternative. However, these potential savings are unlikely to be significant.

7.2 Impact of continuing as now – no Metro services

As was demonstrated earlier in this report, the impact of the first Dublin Metro line from the city centre to the Airport and on to Swords, was expected to be considerable. This is borne out by the experiences of several European cities which have introduced Metro services – indeed, often the expected impact has been far exceeded in passenger patronage and the benefits of reducing / eliminating road congestion and its related effects.

The DTO has undertaken a study of what would be the effect of ‘do nothing’ scenario which has indicated the following effects –

• Peak hour 0800 – 0900 am

–expected reduction in car share to 40% not achieved, it would remain at 51%, an estimated increase of 5 million car passenger journeys per year or roundly 10,000 per day




–the transfer from bus to Metro was expected to be a reduction in modal share from 49% to 20%, an estimated 14 million passenger journeys per annum or roundly 40,000 per day




–the return of more passengers to car journeys from having no Metro services would inevitably mean more motor traffic and, therefore, a speed reduction from 21.5 kph to 19.4 kph




–journey times to and from the city centre would also increase

• Off- Peak

–some 7% of car passenger journeys (6.5 million per year or roundly 10,000 per day) not transferring to the Metro, thus increasing the car proportion from 57% to 64% of all journeys




–the transfer from bus to Metro was expected to be a reduction

• in modal share from 36% to 16%, an estimated 19 million
• passenger journeys per annum or roundly 6,000 per day

–as seen above on traffic speeds, in the off peak there would be

• an estimated small decrease to 27.8 kph from 28.4 kph
• journey times would increase by only a few minutes

These DTO estimates are conservative as they are based upon passenger flows at the time of the strategy review. Since its publication, journey times have increased, so the transfer to Metro would probably be larger. Additionally, because of the potential ease of access to the city centre from the suburbs served by the Metro, it is reasonable to assume that there would be additional passenger journeys generated as citizens increase their visits to the city centre. If the Metro were not built, these would not happen.

7.3 Disbenefits and financial impact

The overall DTO strategy has portrayed an estimated benefit, of about €2 billion per annum, for the introduction of the plan of improvements to address Dublin’s future traffic needs – an assessment based upon the cost of road congestion a few years ago at the time of the strategic review. Dublin Chamber of Commerce quotes even higher figures.

It is recognised that a major contributor to this benefit is the introduction of Metro services included in the plan. The current proposal is for just the first line of the Metro services from the city to the Airport. It is, therefore, difficult to put a value on this service alone. Applying some broad degree of management experience and judgment, it is estimated that the financial disbenefit of not proceeding with the Metro would be of the order of €250 million per annum.

7.4 Assessment

It is our opinion that there will be a substantial disbenefit in terms of road traffic volumes from not progressing with a Metro proposal.

In addition to the impacts shown above, there will also be other effects such as greater noise, pollution, environmental damage, and a reduction in the quality of life for residents in the area and travellers.

A decision to not support the development of the Metro will certainly not facilitate and enable early regeneration and development of areas on the route. Without modern and effective transportation being provided, it may well be necessary to review whether or not such development is feasible and viable.

Another feature, not easily evaluated, is the impact on Ireland economically. The Dublin Chamber of Commerce considered that, without improvements in traffic flows to and from the Airport and the city centre, and around the city and its surrounding regions, international investors will be reluctant to consider Ireland as a viable location for investing funds. Without such investment, there will be an associated adverse effect upon job creation.

Essentially, the positive benefits forecast by RPA, detailed in Chapter 3, will not be realised if the Metro from St. Stephen’s Green to Dublin Airport/Swords does not proceed. These benefits are:

-reduced journey times




-reduced road congestion




-reduced accidents

7.5 Conclusion

As the proposal will bring economic benefits, a decision to “do nothing” will mean the loss of those benefits.

Chapter Eight – Dublin Metro Group Proposals

8.1 Introduction

Mr. Cormac Rabbitt and two other members of the Dublin Metro Group gave evidence to the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Transport on 28 May 2003. At the end of the meeting, the Joint Committee recommended that the Dublin Metro Group should be allowed to make a presentation to the Cabinet transport sub-committee.

A meeting between Mr. Cormac Rabbitt and Myles O’Reilly and William Clelland-Harris, on behalf of O’Reilly Consultants took place on 20^th January 2004. Following the meeting, Mr. Rabbitt sent additional information to the consultants.

Mr. Cormac Rabbitt made a further submission on his views on the way forward to the consultants on 5^th March 2004.

8.2 Summary of Presentation by Dublin Metro Group to the Joint Oireachtas Committee in May 2003

Dublin Metro Group was formed in 1991 in response to a request from the Minister for Transport for proposals on upgrading Dublin transport. The Group’s 1992 proposal has not changed in terms of maps and costs.

The Group used the example of Madrid, where 56 kilometres and 75 kilometres of Metro were built over two four year periods. On this basis, the Group believes that the cost of building an 11.5km Metro to the Airport would be €52 million per kilometre or €600 million in total. They believe that this figure is “more than robust”. It was stated that the Group would “guarantee” the price if they were appointed to do the work. The Group would seek a €100 million capital grant and a 30 year operating concession.

As regards Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) and other such factors that tend to cause delay, the Group believes that because the project is underground there will be fewer hold-ups. It was stated that the planning process should not present too many problems. An EIS could be done in 6 months. It was stated that the level of on-street disruption would be minimal. All the proposed stations would be situated under or on public open spaces. The Metro would go under very few houses – possibly as few as 3 or 4.

In terms of compensation, a €3.6 million figure was stated to be a maximum figure. The Group favours a DBFOM contract, utilising design, build, lump sum, turn-key construction contracts as happened in Madrid, which avoid court proceedings and time wasting. Contractors or consortia know how to deliver products, and if their necks and their borrowings are on the line they have to make projects work. The Group envisage the Airport-Ranelagh link as the first of a number of Metro lines. This route would link DIT, the Mater Hospital, Ballymun, DCU, and the Metro Park in Santry. Others would include Blanchardstown-Grafton St. and a 7.5km ring rail line that would link the largest hospital in Ireland with the Grafton St. and O’Connell St. areas and the Liberties.

The Group stressed that the key to building the Metro quickly and affordably was to build in parallel. Doing this, the Airport route could be ready by 2007. If a Madrid type statutory environment was in place, it could be completed by Christmas 2005.

The soil conditions in Dublin are far better than in Madrid. Materials costs would be the same as in Madrid and, while labour costs would be higher, the project would not be costly because driving a tunnel boring machine is not labour intensive.

The Group believes that, because the incremental costs of tunnelling are very small, the Metro should go underground almost all the way, until north of Ballymun.

The Group favoured single bore tunnelling as the better method.

8.3 Submission by Dublin Metro Group 15^th November 2003

This submission was forwarded by Mr. Cormac Rabbitt to O’Reilly Consultants and was included in the November report.

Affordable: Metro to Dublin Airport can be completed for under €650m¹, and be virtually self-funding through operational revenue and commercial exploitation.

Time: Can be built and in operation within 32 months after statutory process allows construction to start. Statutory process time can be reduced and total project time could be reduced to well below 48 months - the Metro could be opened within 2007.

Approach: Utilise IFSC business and the Madrid Metro build approaches.

IFSC proves we can do things in Ireland when there is the will to so do. It also highlights the business approach rather than the engineering approach to providing a workable solution in Dublin. The Madrid Metro build approach proves a Metro can get built quickly in less than 32 months and at a reasonable total cost of about €50m per km.

The IFSC procurement template can simplify the statutory process. The Madrid Metro build template can bring in the Dublin Metro at an acceptable price. As they did:

1. Put the Metro Project to market for tender then choose way forward from factual/buildable alternatives - no more market consultation;
2. Approached the Metro as a business opportunity, which requires a State grant to get off the ground and not just as provision of infrastructure by the State;
3. From first day, develop a Consortium business plan focused on getting passengers (because the operator should be involved from day one and also in order not to provide the Metro system as a civil engineering project). Link Statutory Process, Route Selection, Operation, & Contractor into the Consortium.
4. Set operational targets/requirements through negotiated process and enshrine them in Bylaws overseen by the RPA and the statutory Transport Regulator.

Time for Route Selection, EIS & CPO (REC): Mr. Rabbitt stated that he had undertaken REC successfully many times for road schemes and can carry out the required REC for a Metro in a fraction of the time perceived by some as necessary.

This is because REC for underground rail is significantly more determinable than for on-street rail (which requires a considerable amount of time to obtain and analyse information for boundary treatments, flora, fauna, soil, air, noise, views, etc.) In particular, land referencing can be done quickly with additional resources allocated over a short time period.”

8.4 Meeting with Consultants on 20^th January 2004

Mr. Cormac Rabbitt made the following points:

1. The interest of the DTO in Metro came about as a result of the proposals by the Dublin Metro Group, (DMG) which first made its proposals public in 1991. Initially, there had been very considerable opposition to the concept of going underground in Dublin. This opposition had been from State bodies and others.
2. The DMG was confident of its costs.
3. The operator should ideally lead the project process. The sooner the operator and contractor are involved in it, the better.
4. The selection of rolling stock is very critical to the success of the project. The rolling stock is a significant ongoing cost each year. The operating cost can be reduced if the rolling stock is correctly specified.
5. The tunnelling costs can be reduced by selecting the most appropriate boring machines taking into account safety and speed.
6. It would be possible to build the Metro in less than 36 months. This was substantially faster than was being proposed by RPA.
7. Professor Melis of Madrid had shown that a very efficient outcome could be achieved with proper management of the project, the use of appropriate technical practices, and an organizational system that allowed for on the spot technical solutions to be devised as the Metro was being built.
8. The Irish railway gauge should also be used for Metro so that the Metro could use existing track, where appropriate.
9. Contributions could be made to the cost of the Metro by concession associated property development and also by tax incentives in certain circumstances.
10. There should be no internal partitions between train carriages. This reduces costs.
11. Each carriage should have sets of four double doors.
12. Peak demand is four times the average demand.
13. The Airport service should be designed on the basis that each train could do two round trips during peak hours.
14. For this reason, the Metro should not go to Swords as there are areas within Dublin of very much higher priority.
15. Steel wheel technology is more appropriate than the rubber tyre technology.
16. In a single tunnel, side platforms are less costly than a central platform.
17. The Metro should be segregated at all times to reduce the risk of accidents to users.
18. The Infrastructure Bill might pose some difficulties in relation to its constitutionality.
19. The favoured route was from Ranelagh, Stephen’s Green, Broadstone, Liffey Junction, Ballymun to the Airport. This would make use of some existing land that had been set aside from the closure of railways in the past. However, all routes should be considered as part of the EIS, CPO due process.

8.5 Proposal 5^th March 2004

On the 5^th March 2004, Mr Cormac Rabbitt forwarded the communication below to O’Reilly Consultants.

“With reference to certain aspects of our presentation to the Joint Committee on Transport (JCOT) on 21 May 2003 and your Report, the message we sought to get across, as per the title of our presentation, was ‘Knowing what can be done and doing it with Confidence’. The conclusion we wanted the Committee to take away was, as per our final slide, ‘We know what can be done and can do it with Confidence’ so let us do it.

To substantiate/make our case, we used solid information from the Madrid Metro, the Dublin Port Tunnel, and the presentation we made to the Cabinet Ministers Sub-Committee on Infrastructure and PPPs’ on the 11 April 2000 along with the extensive experience and track record of our group.

The core of our presentation was for a Metro network that could be achieved in Dublin by taking full advantage from the fact that ‘Our forefathers laid out Dublin’s railway-lines and road network in a pattern that could provide a fully integrated rail & bus transportation system second to none’.

In short and, as we confirmed during our JCOT Presentation, we want an opportunity to do what is called a Public Works Concession.

Our ambition is as:

1. Envisaged/allowed for in the Transport (Railway Infrastructure) Act, 2001; and
2. In line with the many Government statements and actions supporting PPPs.
   For item a) we could apply for a Railway Order as envisaged by the Act (which established the RPA) in compliance with Section 37 (1) that states ’… any other person with the consent of the Agency, may apply to the Minister for a railway order’.
   At our JCOT presentation the motion was passed to the effect that they would ask the Cabinet sub-committee to allow the Dublin Metro Group make a presentation to it. Senator Norris in introducing a motion stated that (Page 15 of web file) DMG should be given ‘the opportunity to make a submission directly and specifically to Government on the Irish situation and on how this project could be implemented. Let the Cabinet then ask all the difficult questions. I am convinced that this group could answer them. This committee should recommend that, after the submission from Madrid, we have an Irish submission from the Dublin Metro Group specifically on putting in this network.’
   The Chairman responded (Page 10 of web file) that ’… we ask the Cabinet sub-committee to allow the Dublin Metro Group make a presentation to it.’
   In line with the foregoing we request that you support in your recommendation a) the JCOT motion and b) that the RPA consent to DMG applying for a railway order so that we can submit directly to the Government specifically on putting in this network.”
   [End of communication]

8.6 Consideration of Dublin Metro Group Proposals

Undoubtedly, the Dublin Metro Group has made a significant contribution to the discussion about the provision of a Metro system for Dublin. Mr. Rabbitt has undoubted knowledge and many skills that are appropriate for the building of a Metro. In our view, it would be useful if Mr. Rabbitt’s extensive knowledge could be harnessed for the development of the Dublin Metro system.

Dublin Metro Group has proposed that it would, in effect, be awarded a franchise for the building of a Metro line from the city centre to the Airport. In May 1997, the Dublin Metro Group, supported by Mitsui and Nishimatsu, made an offer to the then Minister for Public Enterprise to build a complete Metro system from Sandyford to Dublin Airport and the Tallaght routes, or modification thereof, on a lump sum turnkey basis. The offer included design, build, finance, operate and maintain (DBFOM) and the obtaining of the planning process for the Metro, or some variation thereof.

If Dublin Metro Group was awarded a contract, it would mean that Dublin Metro Group would, in addition to doing all of the above, operate independently of the Railway Procurement Agency, which, essentially, would have only a limited function in relation to the Metro once a decision had been made to award a concession for a period of, say, 25-30 years.

8.7 Competition

Although the Dublin Metro Group has been a strong lobbyist for the provision of a Metro, it must be remembered that the RPA has had discussions with many other parties on bidding for the Metro. The Government could decide to award a concession to a private group without a formal competition. It would seem, however, that, in the interest of openness and transparency and ensuring the best value for passengers and tax payers, the most appropriate way forward for Government, if it wishes to award the project to a private consortium, would be to have a competition for the award of the franchise to design, build, finance, operate and maintain the Metro service.

The Dublin Metro Group could then be part of a consortium that would make a proposal to design, build, finance, operate and maintain the Metro for a specified number of years. The Dublin Metro Group would respond to the criteria specified by an evaluation panel. If there were a number of bidders, while the Dublin Metro Group may emerge as the leader of the winning consortium, it is possible that another bidder may also do so. This other bidder could then consider whether it might wish to use the expertise of the Dublin Metro Group to implement its plans.

However, if the Metro project is developed by a State agency, then the Dublin Metro Group could also bid for the construction and/or operation of the Metro.

8.8 Conclusion

1. If a contract is to be awarded for a “franchise” to design, build, finance, operate and maintain the Metro, then this should be by open competition.
2. It would be expected that the Dublin Metro Group would be one of the bidders.
3. If, however, the Metro is to be progressed by a State agency, then Dublin Metro Group could also be a bidder for the construction and/or operation of the Metro.

Chapter Nine – Views of Other Interested Parties

9.1 Platform 11

9.1.1 Background

Platform 11 is a recently established group campaigning for better rail services. They lobby and campaign at a national and local level for maximisation of the potential of the existing rail infrastructure. Most of Platform 11’s proposals do not relate directly to the Metro.

9.1.2 The D-Connector – the final link in Dublin’s heavy rail transportation network

Platform 11’s “d-connector” is a plan to use the Phoenix Park line as the thread to link together all of the city’s major railway stations to form an urban, integrated railway hub. This would allow connections between InterCity trains and commuter services, while at the same time opening up new commuter stations in heavily populated areas, and also improving freight access to and from Dublin Port.

They did not believe that a Metro is the way forward. It is their position that a Metro without integration with heavy rail would benefit just Dublin based commuters. They believe that, as most cars entering the city are coming from surrounding counties, investment in transport infrastructure should be targeted there.

Their plan for the Phoenix Park line would link the Sligo line, lines coming through Heuston Station, Connolly Station and Spencer Dock Station. They believe that Glasnevin Junction is the perfect place to construct a transfer station to link all these lines. Having sought engineering advice, they are fully satisfied that Glasnevin Junction transfer station could be built for around €75 million.

Platform 11 also supports Iarnrod Éireann’s plan for an Interconnector and believes that Iarnrod Éireann’s plan for an Airport DART is preferable to a Metro. However, if a Metro were to be built, they strongly believe that it should intersect with the Phoenix Park line at Glasnevin Junction transfer station to allow for full integration of the Greater Dublin suburban network.

They are also confident that any change in the Metro alignment to bring it to Glasnevin Junction (and build an underground station beneath their proposed transfer station) could be accommodated from an engineering standpoint.

9.1.3 Assessment

• Platform 11’s preference for a DART link to the Airport is based on cost and maximising existing infrastructure considerations. When the project is viewed as one designed to open up the north of Dublin, as opposed to one designed to simply link the Airport, they acknowledge that the issue becomes more complex. The Airport DART alternative is considered in the Iarnrod Éireann section of this report.
• Platform 11’s proposals for a transfer station at Glasnevin Junction accommodating an underground Metro station are very interesting and clearly merit evaluation. Changing the alignment of the route might increase the cost of the project.

9.2 Chamber of Commerce

9.2.1 Background

Dublin Chamber of Commerce represents the interests of large and small businesses in Dublin. The Chamber provides a range of services to business, including lobbying for improvements in transport links to and within the city.

9.2.2 Views of the Chamber of Commerce

It is the view of Dublin Chamber of Commerce that Dublin’s transport problems can only be remedied by major investment in public transport, of which the Metro is now the most critical element.

They believe that the Critical Infrastructure Bill should be prioritised to allow the Metro to be developed on a lower cost basis.

According to the Chamber, at present a multiplicity of agencies is responsible for traffic management in the capital and these agencies are all working to their own different agendas. The Chamber wants to see the establishment of a single transportation and land use authority for the city.

They are satisfied with the DTO’s “Platform for Change” and with the RPA routes that they had seen.

The Chamber is also of the view that the Government must "re-energise" its commitment to the Public Private Partnership (PPP) process, as they believe that there is an emerging view that the Government was seen to be stalling on its commitment to attract private sector funding into public infrastructure projects. The Chamber wants the Government to increase capital borrowing to fund transport projects. They point out that the Department of Finance was opposed to the DART when it was at the planning stage.

There is no consensus on what monetary figure should be put on the disbenefit caused by congestion in Dublin. A number of years ago, CIE estimated the cost of congestion to be approximately £1 billion. The EU Tapestry Programme conducted a study that estimated a figure of around €15 billion for Ireland as a whole and €8 billion for Dublin. The Chamber of Commerce prefers the figure of €3 billion, which is derived from an EU White Paper.

They stress that this is a cost which is borne both by business and the taxpayer and are disappointed that the Government has only committed to spending €1.6 billion on transport projects in 2004. Partly as a consequence of poor transport infrastructure, Ireland’s position in the World Competitiveness league tables is deteriorating. They believe that an active transport policy is required to market Ireland as a destination for foreign direct investment. The Chamber believes that the money is there to remedy that situation - both from Government borrowings and from the private sector.

The Chamber asserted that the level of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is being affected by poor transport infrastructure. For an economy that is so reliant on FDI, a first-world transport system is essential. The expansion of the EU will bring increased competition for FDI from low cost countries. In order to compete for this investment, Ireland needs to have a long-term vision for the development of a transport infrastructure for Dublin.

9.2.3 Assessment of Chamber’s Views

The Chamber’s position that the cost of congestion is causing significant financial hardship to Dublin is of concern. Although an exact figure is almost impossible to quantify, it would seem that the figure runs into billions of euro each year. The financial cost of congestion is borne by individuals and businesses. The cost of traffic congestion has a real, tangible, financial impact on citizens.

9.3 Mark Bishop

9.3.1 Background

Mr. Mark Bishop, a Dublin-born civil engineering student at the University of Dundee, submitted proposals to the Joint Committee, which he stated could achieve 100% integration of Dublin’s rail systems without the need for an underground travelator. Mr. Bishop’s proposal was made following a newspaper report that there was to be an underground travelator from D’Olier Street to Tara Street to achieve integration with the DART Line.

9.3.2 100% integration with no underground travelator in 3 realistic simple steps

Mr. Bishop’s proposal sets out how a “one-change rail plan” and 100% integration could both be achieved in line with the DTO’s plans using only two city centre tunnels and existing lines and without a travelator. He envisages the DART going from Greystones to Maynooth. His proposal requires the building of Iarnrod Éireann’s Interconnector Tunnel to allow the DART go from Howth to Sallins/Naas. His Metro would run from Swords to Shanganagh. The LUAS would run from Tallaght to the Point Depot, as currently planned. The proposal involves no more than two lines intersecting at any one station and thus avoids overcrowding and simplifies station design.

Mr. Bishop’s proposal, while interesting and commendable, is a variation of plans already in the public domain. As it involves the building of the Interconnector and alteration to the DART route, it falls outside the scope of this report.

9.4 Conclusions

1. Platform 11’s proposal that the Metro be routed through Glasnevin Junction, thereby integrating all national “heavy” rail routes, merits evaluation.
2. Dublin Chamber of Commerce’s views that
1. “Dublin’s transport problems can only be remedied by major investment in public transport, of which the Metro is now the most crucial element”,
2. the level of Foreign Direct Investment is being affected by poor transport infrastructure,

must be taken into account in considering whether the Metro should be built or not.

Chapter Ten – Comparison between State Funding and PPP

We give a general background to the development of PPP’s in Appendix Nine.

10.1 UITP and Funding Metros

The following comments from the UITP (The International Association of Public Transport) in April 2003, are relevant to the consideration of funding Dublin Metro:

“Metro systems are heavy infrastructures that require high levels of investment in order to be built and maintained. In addition to conventional forms of direct investment by the public authorities, the parties involved – the authorities themselves, operators, manufacturers, and financial institutions – are endeavoring to develop new partnerships.

These involve contributions from direct and indirect beneficiaries, deriving optimal value from property and real-estate assets along Metro lines and around Metro stations, not to mention stock market flotations of operation companies, staff contributions to company capital or, quite simply, the involvement of private partners in investment and operations.

Given the high stakes involved, Metro is prompting the search for new, innovative approaches in the case of public transport. Although this is an opportunity for Metro, it is one that must form part of a proper institutional framework that guarantees the social dimension of this public service.”

Whilst not specifically mentioned, PPP is undoubtedly a significant means of bringing together the expertise of the private sector (in its many forms as indicated) and the public sector requirements to improve transport infrastructure provision.

10.2 Project Investment- Capital funding

Under a PPP means of funding, the PPP providers under contract, may be responsible for arranging the funding of a project through each of its stages of design, construction, and commissioning into operational use.

This would mean that the State does not need to provide any capital funding during the building phases, which may last several years. Because the PPP provider will be conscious of the need to minimise capital provision, it will usually make significant efforts to conclude each stage of building as quickly as possible.

The early completion of a project will mean the Government can start to effectively provide the new and improved services to the users at an earlier date than is usual with a fully controlled State project.

Equally, the PPP provider can minimise the funding by reduced timescales and start to recover its capital funding, as soon as operations commence through the availability payment and usage charging.

10.3 Comparison to Government funding

If the project were to be funded by the Government, it would be its responsibility to achieve this by one of two options –

1. use funds it has available,
2. borrow the money.

Given the pressures on Government to do many things, it is unlikely that the first option would be possible. The alternative is, therefore, that funding would have to be provided through borrowing.

Governments, usually, have the ability to achieve this at a lower borrowing rate than a private sector company. A private company or organisation (such as a PPP consortium) can be more risky and potentially vulnerable on repayments.

In addition to gaining loan facilities, Governments then have ongoing periodic instalment payments to return the loan to the lender. Also, there will be interest to be paid at regular intervals until the loan sum is repaid. The overall outgoing can therefore, be substantially higher than the original sum borrowed. However, when expressed in net present value terms, the total outgoing over say 30 years will equate to roundly the original sum borrowed.

If the Government were in the fortunate position of adopting option i), after paying out the sum of capital to acquire the investment proposal, there may well be no further outgoing sums to be paid. However, it might expect the operation company or body for the Metro to repay the loan with or without interest to the Government. What is often forgotten in circumstances where the Government uses its own funds, is that there is a ‘price’ of what was the alternative use for those funds. At the very least it would be forgoing the interest receivable if the funds were invested in a bank or other financial establishment. Further, it might be felt that the available funds would be better used in provision of other Government services such as healthcare, social benefits, security, etc. By forgoing these opportunities and investing its available funds in a Metro, it is costing the State a hidden ‘cost’ of not progressing or delaying these necessary service improvements. One could argue that such cost of delay should be borne by the successful investment that has gained available Government funds.

We give below a comparison of State Funding vs PPP

10.4 Conclusion

1. The building of a Metro is a suitable project for the use of a PPP.
2. If the Metro is financed from the Government’s capital programme, other Government capital expenditure projects might have to be delayed.
3. Therefore, a PPP arrangement is the preferred choice between direct Government funding and a PPP.

Chapter Eleven – Future Finance Implications of PPP

11.1 PPP : Annual Availability and Usage

Once the project has been commissioned by the PPP provider, operation of revenue earning services can commence. The PPP provider will be responsible for daily availability and reliability of the project – its infrastructure and rolling stock – and the related daily and periodic maintenance. The Government or its relevant parastatal authority will generally be responsible for operation of services or it might commission another contractor to operate services under contract or a franchise arrangement.

11.2 Assessment

It is understood that RPA has been instructed to provide a Metro proposal using the PPP method of funding.

RPA will have to seek tenders and prices for construction by both means and through financial modelling and execution of evaluation procedure already set by the Department of Finance, make a decision on whether to recommend PPP or not.

The evaluation process will ensure that maximum value for money is obtained through –

• Contractualisation and or formalisation of relationships to :

–provide the Metro facilities




–operate the Metro



• provision of incentives to constructors and operators by way of adjustments to contracts to meet changes in costs for improvements (such as timeliness of construction or operations), reliability of availability of facilities to the operator.
• measures, such as benchmarking, to demonstrate value for money.

If a decision is made to use a PPP approach for the construction of a Metro, it is likely that an annual “availability” charge will be payable by the Department of Transport for thirty years after the Metro is available to be used to carry passengers.

The level of availability payment will be dependent on the successful bidder’s estimate of the cost of providing the Metro infrastructure and the time that the bidder estimates it will take until Metro trains start to run and revenue is received.

However, another very important variable in relation to Exchequer Funding is the level of fares to be charged. The RPA projections are based on a gross fare of €1.50 with a yield of 97 cent after discounts, special offers, etc. These are assumptions that are likely to change in the future (the fare levels were set at the proposed LUAS fare in 2002 – the final fares agreed for LUAS are higher.) The yield factor assumed is based on Dublin Bus 2001 yield.

Another issue that will affect the level of availability payment will be the designation of the Metro for VAT purposes. Arguably, the construction and operation of the Metro could be zero rated, thus reducing costs significantly.

There will be a need for many details to be decided upon before an availability payment can be satisfactorily estimated.

However, on the basis of the assumptions used for the RPA Metro 3 (b), we calculate that the annual availability payment would be about €158 million per annum.

If the fare was increased three times, this would reduce the net cost to the Exchequer to €110 million per annum.

If, in addition, the interest rate was reduced to 3.5% instead of 5%, then the availability payment would be €80 million.

If the infrastructure costs are lower than projected by RPA, the availability payment would be further reduced. If the Critical Infrastructure legislation is enacted, this should reduce both the construction costs and the time for operating revenue to be received.

It is possible, therefore, to envisage a proposal that would not cost the taxpayer any long-term availability payment. However, this depends on many actions being taken by Government to facilitate the Metro and on a consortium being willing to take on the risks involved.

11.3 Conclusion

If a PPP arrangement is entered into, there will, almost certainly, be an annual subvention payable from the Exchequer.

The level of subvention will vary significantly depending on decisions to be made in the future.

The costs of building Metro stations can be part funded by the commercial interests who will benefit from the location of the stations.

Chapter Twelve – International Experience of Metros for Cities

12.1 Comparable European cities to Dublin

Dublin City Council indicated in the population census for 1996 that 481,854 persons resided in their area, and in the Greater Dublin area / County, there were 1,058,264 persons.

The DTO Strategy document ’A Platform for Change’ indicated a different population for the Greater Dublin area at 1,410,000 persons. A more up to date figure for year 1999 shows a rise to 1,460,000 persons. A projected population for year 2016 is given and used for planning purposes, at 1,750,000 persons. Information given to a conference last November reported actual population for year 2001 at 1,500,000 persons.

A website about cities in Europe has data on Europe’s top 500 city populations. Dublin city is revealed as having a population of 482,000. Looking at data from websites that feature Metro railways, light railways (LRT), and tramways, the following cities may have faced similar difficulties to Dublin in determining whether or not a Metro system will deal with road traffic congestion problems -

• Denmark - Copenhagen, population 499,000 - Metro
• France -Lille, population 172,000 - Metro (2) and Tramway
• France - Lyon, population 415,000 - Metro (3), Tramway (2), and Rack Metro
• France - Marseille, population 800,000 - Metro (2), and Tramway
• France - Toulouse, population 359,000 - Metro
• Greece - Athens, population 772,000 - Metro (3) and Trolleybus
• Portugal - Lisbon, population 563,000 - Metro (3) and Tramway
• Spain - Barcelona, population 1,455,000 - Metro (5), LRT (4), and Tramway
• Spain - Bilbao, population 351,000 - Metro, LRT (2), and Tramway
• Spain - Madrid, population 2,824,000 - Metro (10)
• Spain - Valencia, population 736,000 - LRT (3) and Tramway
• Switzerland - Zurich, population 337,000 - LRT (2) and Rack LRT
• UK - West Midlands, population 2,600,000 - Metro / LRT
• UK - Glasgow, population 616,000 - Metro (old)
• UK - Edinburgh, population 449,000 - LRT / Metro planned
• UK, Manchester, population 431,000 - LRT (2)
• UK, Newcastle on Tyne, population 282,000 LRT (3)
• UK - Sheffield, population 530,000 - LRT

An analysis of European Union (EU) capitals has been undertaken together with two other European capitals that are outside of the EU States. The analysis appears in full as Appendix Seven at the back of the report.

It is interesting to see that all of the capitals of current EU members have Metro services except Ireland and Luxembourg.

Similarly, most have tramway systems, with Dublin soon to start its own services with the LUAS lines.

Some Metro systems date back a long way - London from 1863, Paris from 1900, Berlin from 1902, Athens one line from 1904, and Madrid since 1919. More modern systems have been built in the latter half of the 20th century with several capitals having their first Metro systems in the 1970s – Brussels and Vienna 1976, Amsterdam 1977, Helsinki 1982. The most recent city to acquire a Metro system is Copenhagen in 2002.

Of the incoming countries that will join the EU soon, three countries already have experience of Metro systems - Budapest since 1896 (recently announced its fourth line is to be built), Prague since 1974, and Warsaw started a system in 1995.

Oslo, whilst outside of the EU, has had a Metro system since 1966 with four lines in operation.

It is clear from this analysis that Dublin is entering the Metro development on the back of a wealth of experience which can be seen throughout the EU.

12.2 Comparison to Newcastle on Tyne

The terms of reference specifically identify Newcastle on Tyne as a city to compare to Dublin. Whilst Dublin has a larger city population than Newcastle city, the Dublin region is comparable to the Tyne and Wear region - both having populations of just over 1 million people.

The city of Newcastle lies on the north bank of the river Tyne in the north east of England. Newcastle is one of two cities and three boroughs which together comprise the Tyne and Wear area - the two cities are Newcastle and Sunderland, and the three Metropolitan boroughs are Gateshead, North Tyneside and South Tyneside. Like Dublin with the river Liffey cutting through it, Tyne and Wear has the river Tyne passing through the area.

Newcastle has been leading the renaissance of the region in the transformation from traditional industries of ship building and coal mining to cater for new industries, while developing its waterfronts to meet tourism demands and recreational purposes. Newcastle has a high level of commuting with approximately 80,000 people entering the city every day to work and up to 100,000 travelling into and around the city in the evenings visiting places of entertainment. There was inevitable traffic congestion.

In the 1970s, poor transport was pinpointed as a serious brake upon the area’s economic regeneration and development, despite the fact that a heavy rail system radiated from Newcastle to many outlying areas. The rail transportation met the needs of yesterday not today and certainly not the perceived future needs driven by modern demands. One can see some similarities with Dublin and its evolution in recent years.

A new era of light rail development in the UK enabled Tyne and Wear to be one of the first areas to have a new Metro system, initially based largely in Newcastle. Phase one consisted of 59.5 km railway using existing live heavy rail urban and suburban routes and a section of line available but closed to passenger trains. These routes were connected through the city centre in new tunnels (7.6 km) and a new bridge (352 m) over the river Tyne. Some of the existing railway lines were electrified whilst others were operated by diesel traction. As part of the development the whole network was electrified. Tunnelling commenced in the city centre during 1974, along with station works for a main heavy rail / Metro interchange at Central Station and another four principal exchange points.

During 1980 to 1984 phase one became operational with 3 routes serving 56 stations. New rolling stock - 90 twin-car sets - which were similar to those used by Frankfurt street railway were introduced. Each car has seating capacity of 68 to 84 passengers and a further 188 standing room capacity. Operationally, up to 3 sets form a train giving passenger capacity of around 450 seated and 1,100 standing passengers.

Trains are driver only operated with two-way radio contact with a central control centre. Signalling and train control is automatic with on-board train information conveyed by transponders to track level equipment, which operate crossover points and information to station platform display boards.

An extension to Newcastle Airport was opened in 1991.

From inception, passenger traffic grew such that by year 2001/02 the network was carrying 33.4 million passenger journeys and demand for extension, growing for sometime, was high. As a result, a new 18.5 km extension to Sunderland was approved late in year 1999. This involved taking over 14 km of an existing heavy rail route and recreating 4.5 km infrastructure on a disused heavy rail railway alignment. This new development cost approximately £100 million and it was operational in year 2002.

The Metro is owned and operated by Nexus, a brand name for the Tyne and Wear Passenger Transport Executive (PTE).

The benefits can be seen as -

• Making best use of the transport infrastructure
• Modal shift to public transport through integrated transport provision
• Reduced congestion, road traffic volumes, road accidents
• Equity and social inclusion
• Environmental sustainability, healthy lifestyles and improved quality of life for local people.

12.3 Cities in Europe of comparable size

Overall

An examination of the whole of European city capitals has been undertaken. This reveals that of the 15 European Commission States, only Dublin and Luxembourg Ville have no Metro systems.

Additionally, most have light railway systems except Helsinki, Dublin, and Luxembourg - it is noted that Dublin is in the process of commissioning its first system through the coming LUAS lines which appeared in St Stephen’s Green on the 15^th March 2004. Similarly, most of the European Commission States have a tramway system - Dublin, Luxembourg, and Madrid being the exceptions.

Of the States which are about to enter membership of the European Commission, limited information was obtained. This revealed that Budapest, and Warsaw have Metro systems and light rail systems, and Prague has a Metro system. These three States and some of the other States have tramway systems.

A detailed table has been prepared and appears in summarised format as Appendix Seven.

Lille

Lille in Northern France was the first city in 1983 to adopt a fully automated urban Metro called ’Villeneuve d’Ascq Lille (VAL)’ to link two major regions as the backbone of the city’s transport infrastructure. It was an immediate success with healthy passenger ridership and operates at a profit.

Extensions have already been achieved by an interchange with heavy rail, a connection with international heavy rail services to London, Paris, and Brussels, and a branch line. Further development is planned.

Lyon

Lyon is a sprawling city at the confluence of two major rivers and covers a regional conurbation of a similar size to the Dublin area. Despite excellent bus services, and trolleybus services, it still suffered much congestion. In 1978 it built its first Metro system which covers four lines. In 2000, it built an extension which covers a track length of 31 km - it cost €2.3 billion, albeit over two decades - an average cost per km of €76 million.

In 1996, Lyon decided to complement its Metro with a two line tramway system which fully opened late in 2000. It is to be extended to service the local Airport as part of a development to an eleven line system.

Detailed planning and co-ordination ensures the city’s various transport modes complement each other, thus helping to alleviate road congestion and improve the environment.

Lisbon

Lisbon started construction of its underground Metro in 1955 and opened it for operations in late 1959 with passenger journeys of 15 million in its first year. It is ever expanding with new stations to cater for passenger demand. It covers four lines, and at the turn of the century, it carried passenger journeys of 140 million per annum - a nearly ten fold increase over 40 years.

An inner ring Metro of roundly 27 km is proposed together with an outer ring Metro covering nearly 25 km. These will cost just under €1 billion and €500 million respectively. It is expected that they will be funded through a PPP arrangement.

Athens

Athens is a sprawling Metropolis with large conurbations surrounding the ancient city. It has recently upgraded its very old (1869) Metro system and built two new Metro lines. Before these two additions with a length of 18 km and a cost of €2 billion, Greater Athens suffered badly from road traffic congestion and major pollution, which threatened its heritage of ancient artefacts. For much of the day traffic crawled through the wide roads of the city centre, and at peak times there was frequent gridlock for several hours. Now the traffic flows reasonably smoothly through the city centre, but still there is congestion on the road arteries approaching the city centre, especially from the east where a new Airport has been built.

Currently, a new Metro is being built which will have two routes into the city from the Airport. One route will be an extension to join a new line opened a few years ago, and the other will initially open this year from the Airport as far as the Olympic Games stadiums and facilities. Thereafter it will enter the city through the northern part of the conurbation areas. The two lines from the Airport to the city centre will cost €1.4 billion.

The existing three line Metro system handles around 500,000 passengers per day. After the above planned developments it is expected that around 750,000 passengers will be carried each day.

12.4 UITP summary view of Metro experience

The above cities recognised that road solutions alone would not solve their traffic problems, a rail solution was the only significant way of addressing and eradicating the problem.

The International Association of Public Transport (UITP) last year made the following statement, which aptly sums the view of many cities who had reached problems with road traffic congestion -

"Originally designed to combat urban traffic congestion in large cities, Metro systems are no longer confined to the role of providing transport infrastructure. Nowadays, they are becoming an urban structuring tool, around which mobility policy is developed, and a key factor in improving the quality of life."

Their position paper indicated that around the world, Metro systems carried 150 million passengers per day - 34 times the average daily number of air passengers. This comparison demonstrates the economic and social importance of developing, organising and operating Metro systems.

12.5 Conclusions

1. Every EU capital except Luxembourg Ville and Dublin has a Metro system.
2. Almost all European cities of comparable size to Dublin have Metros.
3. The Tyne and Wear area, which incorporates Newcastle and Sunderland, has a successful Metro system.

Chapter Thirteen – Structure and Management of Metro Project

There are two principal options in relation to the management and funding of the Metro:

1. Establish a State company (for example, Dublin Metro Limited) which would be responsible for the Metro.
2. Hold a competition for the award of a franchise for designing, building, financing, operating and maintaining the Metro for a period of 25-30 years. The franchise would then be awarded to a private sector company. The franchisee might receive an on-going subsidy or availability payment.

Within the first option, there are also two choices:

1. Provide State funds for the capital expenditure.
2. The State Agency would enter into a PPP arrangement for the building of the infrastructure with a private company who would be paid an availability payment. The State company could also enter into an arrangement with a private company to operate the Metro (for example, Connex will operate the LUAS for RPA).

13.1 First option of Metro being developed and managed by a State agency

From our research there are many issues to be considered in relation to the establishment of the Metro. Among these are the following major issues on responsibility and accountability:-

1. Should the Metro come within the responsibility of Iarnrod Éireann who is currently responsible for the DART service? It is clear that the DART service can be extended from the east coast to areas like Kildare and Maynooth.
2. The LUAS will be operated by Connex and will be the responsibility of the Railway Procurement Agency for its future development.

–Should the Metro be organised in the same way as LUAS?

–Should Dublin Bus have responsibility for the Metro?

–Should the bus regulator become a transport regulator and be responsible for the Metro?

A further issue to be considered is the merits of combining design, construction, operation and maintenance in one body, such as RPA, compared to the separation of design/construction away from operations.

Our conclusion, having considered these issues, is that the Metro service should be established as a separate service from the services of Iarnrod Éireann, Dublin Bus and LUAS.

While there will be a need for integration and co-ordination, the Metro should essentially compete with other services for passengers. A Metro is a quite different service than is available from mainline rail, from buses or from the LUAS. The Metro can carry large numbers of persons at speed in a way that other services cannot do. The Metro generally requires to be underground, which brings about issues that do not have to be considered in relation to other services. A Metro for Dublin could be compared with the provision of similar services in many other cities. A Metro can be on a dedicated track that it does not share with other priorities such as inter-city rail services or road users.

Having considered the above issues, we give an outline of how a Metro agency could be structured:

1. A company can be established as a State Agency, such as Dublin Metro Limited (DML) possibly in the long term under the joint control of, or in partnership with, the four local authorities in Dublin County. The key activities/roles of the company should be:

–To deliver the Metro system for operation by 2008




–To reduce the timescale for delivering to 36 months




–To ensure value for money in investment funding




–To provide customer focus as the primary aim of the Metro




–To co-ordinate Metro operations into the overall transportation needs of Dublin

DML could be responsible for all aspects of the development of the Metro. These include responsibility for design, construction, commissioning, maintenance and operation. This involves either using RPA as agents, in an advisory role, or the transfer of required RPA resources to the company.

The company should have an executive chairperson to strategically direct the company. He or she would have to be able to demonstrate experience of successfully building a Metro system elsewhere in Europe. (For example, Professor Melis, if he were available, would seem to have the necessary experience and competence to undertake such a role, but there may be others with similar experience).

The Chairperson should have authority to avail of whatever resources are needed to bring about a successful Metro service for Dublin.

The Board of DML could make the decision on the route, the number of stations and all other issues relating to the provision of the service from St. Stephens Green, via the Airport to Swords.

DML could be responsible for the following:

–The obtaining of planning permission




–The preparation of the environmental impact statement




–Public consultation




–The obtaining of the railway “works order”

The costs and benefits of the Metro to the State will depend upon the decisions made in relation to the construction costs and the design of the trains, etc. All of these decisions could be made by DML, so as to provide the most cost effective service, consistent with meeting the needs of users and providing the anticipated benefits to Dublin City and County.

DML could consider the best option for funding the Metro to ensure value for money. As it is expected that the revenues from the sale of tickets for the Metro will be greater than the operating costs, the provision of finance by the Exchequer will only be required during the construction of the Metro.

DML could consider how to embrace the Government decision that the Metro would be undertaken through a PPP arrangement. There are many other financing methods for the Metro, including the issue of Government backed bonds and the provision of finance from the National Pension Reserve Fund. If the borrowing for the Metro project is to be excluded from Government borrowing for the purpose of the Eurostat test on compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact, then a PPP arrangement is the only solution other than full private sector involvement. With proper planning and with an aggressive approach to costs, it will be possible to deliver the Metro at lower costs than some anticipate. However, there can be no certainty that the project could exist without a State or local authority subsidy to repay the capital cost.

DML should be aware that, with a PPP arrangement, an important part of State infrastructure will be controlled by a private company for a period of 30 years. However, the risk on development and construction will be borne by the private company. DML has to ensure it is managed effectively and that the State is not unduly exposed should the private sector company get into difficulty. Nevertheless, if, because of financial constraints, the Government wishes to proceed with a PPP arrangement, then the following approach is possible:

DML would be responsible for the design and the operation of the Metro service. Contractors would be invited to tender on the basis of a predetermined design for the infrastructure. Tenderer’s proposals would relate only to the annual charge they would make over a 30 year period for the making available of the track to DML. This annual charge would cover the building of the Metro and its ongoing periodic and daily maintenance to provide the Metro for its operators.
On this basis, the full responsibility and risk for cost overruns would be borne by the contractor and the contractor would continue to be responsible for the provision of the infrastructure – track, structures, stations, control systems, rolling stock - for a 30 year period. At the end of that time, the infrastructure would transfer to DML. Because DML would be designing and operating the Metro system, DML would have a strong incentive to specify the most economical and advantageous design, consistent with providing the Metro service.

Once the initial Metro is well on its way to being constructed, DML could begin developing the next stages to introduce desired additional routes and services.

Among the objectives of DML could be:

-The provision of a Metro service for Dublin at the lowest possible cost consistent with ensuring high usage of the Metro.




-The operation of the Metro to the highest standards of safety.




-The transfer of passengers from cars, buses and taxis to the Metro system




-Improve the quality of life for Dubliners.




-Ensuring the Metro plays a significant part in assisting re-generation and economic development in the areas through which it passes.

DML should ensure that customer’s views are heard and listened to. Customers have to be seen as:

-The passengers who will use a Metro.




-The residents of areas through which the Metro will pass.




-The visitors who come to see or pass through the city.




-The business community who depend on easy access for employees and customers.




-Investors in facilities that will enhance trade.




-Government– national and local – whose job it is to provide effective transportation.

Furthermore, a Metro has to complement and enhance existing and potential transport capacity.

DML could be composed of a panel of experts. These experts would need to be ‘champions of progress’, individuals with a proven record of effective achievement on delivery of projects and / or services. They must have a mentality of being able to encourage a culture of ‘cutting through obstacles and procedures’ to gain delivery that is urgently needed.

13.2 Second Option – Competition for Franchise to Design, Build, Finance, Operate and Maintain

If the preferred method of proceeding with the Metro proposal is the award of a franchise to a private sector organisation, a competition could determine the organization to win the contract. The winning bidder would proceed to build and operate the Metro in accordance with the bidding criteria as a private sector concern. In effect, the winning bidder would be given a franchise for the Metro from St. Stephen’s Green to Dublin Airport/Swords.

A body (almost certainly the RPA) would ensure that the terms of the contract were being fulfilled and that the specified level of quality of service was being provided.

The first step in preparing for a competition would be to appoint an evaluation panel. The panel would draw up the rules of the competition and decide how the award would be made. The award will need to be based on a number of criteria, one of which will be cost/benefit to the State. Other criteria will include the proposed number of passengers to be carried and when the Metro can come into operation.

The drawing up of the criteria for the award of the contract will require decisions by Government on many detailed issues.

13.3 Government Actions

Prior to a competition, or parallel to it, the Government should enact a Critical Infrastructure Bill to facilitate the construction of the Metro and the obtaining of the necessary permissions for its operation.

The evaluation panel might be given a period of, say, three months to draw up the specification for the Metro. The panel would be advised by the RPA throughout the process of the selection of the franchisee. However, when the award of the contract to the successful franchisee is made, it would then be the responsibility of the successful franchisee to undertake all of the tasks necessary to meet the commitments it made in its proposal to the evaluators.

13.4 Conclusions

There are three ways in which a Metro can be brought into operation.

–A State company, for example, Dublin Metro Ltd, using State finance




–A State company contracting out certain activities such as construction of the infrastructure and the operation of the system, using a PPP approach




–A private contract for a franchise for a specified period, say 25 to 30 years, awarded through open competition, as above

There are strong arguments in favour of each of these options and each of them could satisfactorily provide a Metro service.

However, if the Government decides not to award a franchise to a private consortium, then the Government should establish a new state agency (for example, Dublin Metro Ltd) to take overall responsibility for the construction and operation of the Metro.

In our view, the most effective method of proceeding with the project is the awarding of a franchise to a private company after a public competition on the basis of agreed criteria.

Chapter Fourteen – Critical Infrastructure Bill

The meeting of the Joint Committee with Professor Melis and the discussions with Mr. Cormac Rabbitt show that the cost of building the Metro is dependent significantly upon the time from making a decision to proceed until it is completed.

RPA estimate that it will take 6.5 years from the date of a decision to proceed to the opening date. If, therefore, a decision to proceed is made in mid-2004, the Metro could be open at the end of 2010. This assumption is based on no changes to existing legislation.

Obviously, the benefits only begin to flow from the time of completion of the project. The sooner that these benefits are made available the better.

For these reasons, it is important to facilitate the development of the Metro project by changing existing legislation. Many of the points below have been suggested by either Professor Melis or Mr. Rabbitt.

Points that should be included in a Critical Infrastructure Bill are as follows:

1. The State should legislate to acquire ownership of land below a certain number of metres from the surface so as to eliminate the need for discussions and decisions in relation to compensation for the building of the tunnels.
2. A revised form of compensation/arbitration/land acquisition should be provided for. Even if the State owns the land below a certain number of metres, there will be a need for land acquisition for stations and for other purposes such as park and ride facilities. While all owners should receive appropriate compensation for the compulsory acquisition of the properties, delays and excessive cost could be avoided with changes in legislation.
3. Provision should be made for the undertaking of tunnelling on a 24 hour, 7 day per week basis until the tunnelling is completed. This proposal would reduce the time that the tunnel boring machines are under any particular property. The tunnelling machines will, of course, be required for less time if the fullest possible use is made of them, thereby reducing costs. By non-stop tunnelling, safety of the tunnels is enhanced.
4. A form of public consultation/public enquiry and environmental impact statement should be combined so as to reduce time delays in the planning process. It is possible that the most expeditious means of dealing with this issue will be to provide for a specific planning board for projects of this type, thereby, bypassing the existing planning appeals board.
5. There should be a limited form of environmental impact statement permitted by the legislation. As much of the project is underground, the same form of impact statement that would be required for an on-street project is not required.

The critical infrastructure proposals have been the subject of examination by a Cabinet sub-committee for quite some time. The introduction of a Critical Infrastructure Bill will not be an essential pre-requirement of the Metro project but the measures above would greatly reduce the cost and deliver the Metro more quickly than would otherwise be possible.

14.1 Conclusion

The Government should enact Critical Infrastructure legislation to facilitate the building of the Metro in the shortest possible time.

Chapter Fifteen –Conclusions and Recommendations

15. 1 Chapter conclusions

The conclusions in each chapter are as follows:-

Chapter Two – Costs and Benefits

1. The Cost Benefit Analysis prepared for the RPA shows benefits in excess of costs.
2. In general, the cost benefit analysis prepared for the Rail Procurement Agency understates the benefits that the Metro will bring to users of its services.
3. Many of the assumptions appear to be conservative.

Chapter Three – Cost Competitiveness

1. The RPA construction cost estimates now appear to be comparable with international Metro project costs.
2. The actual cost will be established by open tender for which international companies will bid. We are not aware of any reason why the costs of building a Metro system in Dublin should not be similar to those in other countries.

Chapter Four – The Metro to Swords

On the basis of the RPA cost benefit analysis, the Metro should terminate in Swords. We note that Fingal County Council has offered to part-fund the extension of the Metro to Swords.

Chapter Five – Bus Alternatives

Bus transport will not provide the same range of benefits as a Metro service.

Chapter Six – Iarnrod Éireann Alternative

The Iarnrod Éireann proposal is not a satisfactory alternative to the Metro proposal.

Chapter Seven – Do Nothing

As the proposal will bring economic benefits, a decision to “do nothing” will mean the loss of those benefits.

Chapter Eight – Dublin Metro Group

1. If a contract is to be awarded for a “franchise” to design, build, finance, operate and maintain the Metro, then this should be by open competition.
2. It would be expected that the Dublin Metro Group would be one of the bidders.
3. If, however, the Metro is to be progressed by a State agency, then Dublin Metro Group could also be a bidder for the construction and/or operation of the Metro.

Chapter Nine – Views of Others

1. Platform 11’s proposal that the Metro be routed through Glasnevin Junction, thereby linking all national “heavy” rail routes, merits evaluation.
2. Dublin Chamber of Commerce’s views that
1. “Dublin’s transport problems can only be remedied by major investment in public transport, of which the Metro is now the most crucial element”,
2. the level of Foreign Direct Investment is being affected by poor transport infrastructure,

must be taken into account in considering whether the Metro should be built or not.

Chapter Ten – Comparison between State Funding and PPP

1. The building of a Metro is a suitable project for the use of a PPP.
2. If the Metro is financed from the Government’s capital programme, other Government capital expenditure projects might have to be delayed.
3. Therefore, a PPP arrangement is the preferred choice between direct Government funding and a PPP.

Chapter Eleven – Future Finance Implications of PPP

1. If a PPP arrangement is entered into, there will, almost certainly, be an annual subvention or availability payment payable from the Exchequer.
2. The level of subvention will vary significantly depending on decisions to be made in the future.
3. The costs of building Metro stations can be part funded by the commercial interests who will benefit from the location of the stations.

Chapter Twelve – International Comparisons

1. Every EU capital except Luxembourg Ville and Dublin has a Metro system.
2. Almost all European cities of comparable size to Dublin have Metros.
3. The Tyne and Wear area, which incorporates Newcastle and Sunderland, has a successful Metro system.

Chapter Thirteen – Structure and Management

There are three ways in which a Metro can be brought into operation.

–A State company, for example, Dublin Metro Ltd, using State finance




–A State company contracting out certain activities such as construction of the infrastructure and the operation of the system, using a PPP approach




–A private contract for a franchise for a specified period, say 25 to 30 years, awarded through open competition

There are strong arguments in favour of each of these options and each of them could satisfactorily provide a Metro service.

However, if the Government decides not to award a franchise to a private consortium, then the Government should establish a new state agency (for example, Dublin Metro Ltd) to take overall responsibility for the construction and operation of the Metro.

In our view, the most effective method of proceeding with the project is the awarding of a franchise to a private company after a public competition on the basis of agreed criteria.

Chapter Fourteen – Critical Infrastructure Bill

The Government should enact Critical Infrastructure legislation to facilitate the building of the Metro in the shortest possible time.

15.14 Importance of Decision to be made

The decision of the Joint Committee on whether to recommend that the Metro between St. Stephen’s Green and Swords be constructed or not is of importance for the following reasons:

1. This would be the first underground railway and the first Metro to be built in Ireland.
2. This would be the first major public transport project to be provided using a PPP.
3. If funded by a PPP, the project will almost certainly (depending on Government decisions) require an on-going State availability payment.
4. Although, the Metro will be environmentally friendly, there will be major disruption along the proposed route during construction.
5. When construction commences, the Metro will impact on future decisions in relation to public transport provision in the Greater Dublin Area.

Any decision to recommend a Metro is, therefore, a major one.

15.15 Recommendation to Proceed

Having considered the case for the provision of the Metro in considerable detail, we are convinced that it should be provided.

In coming to this view, we note that:

1. The benefits exceed the costs and, therefore, there will be a positive return on the investment.
2. The Irish Rail alternative would only provide a service to Dublin Airport and not to the many other areas that the Metro could serve.
3. Buses have considerable disadvantages compared with a Metro.
4. The Dublin Chamber of Commerce believes that a Metro is essential to reduce traffic congestion and its enormous associated costs in Dublin.
5. The cost of “do nothing” is considerable in respect of benefits not achieved and of traffic congestion. Doing nothing will impact on Dublin’s ability to be an internationally competitive capital of an internationally competitive country.
6. Every other capital city in the EU 15, with the exception of Luxembourg Ville, has a Metro system.

Appendix One – Detailed Assumptions

This appendix and Appendix Two gave some of the detail of the assumptions on which the Cost Benefit Analysis of Metro Route 3 (b) is based. However, in order to meet the RPA confidentiality requirements, we have to delete the assumptions made and the basis of the assumptions except for the information on passenger numbers contained in Appendix Two

[refused permission to publish]

Appendix Two- Assumptions on benefits

Passenger Numbers

Non-Car Transfer Demand 2016 (Millions of Passengers per annum)

Car Transfer Demand

Overall Total of Passengers

Passenger numbers on Metro by 2016 = 24.28 million

Or 466,923 per week – average

Or 66,703 per day – average

Or 4,447 per hour (assuming 15 hours)

However, assumption made that peak hour demand will be 11,206. Non peak hour demand is 3015.

This assumption is based on a formula obtained by a survey of Dublin Bus passengers. The break down between peak hour and non-peak traffic is 1040:3807

Where will morning peak-hour passengers come from?

Are these assumptions reasonable?

Remember the assumptions are only for the morning peak hour.

Over the day, the numbers of passengers will be approximately the same each way.

The numbers boarding at peak hour can be best understood if they are considered by minutes instead of by hour.

Assessment

It does not seem unreasonable to assume that 78 and 109 passengers per minute would board the Metro at peak times over the ten stops.

Can the Metro carry the passengers?Will there be sufficient capacity?

Each carriage can carry “comfortably” 155 passengers.

A train can have three carriages.

Number of passengers per train = 465

Requirement is to move 6528 passengers in one direction at peak time. This requires 14 trains or a train every 4 to 5 minutes.

The peak hour requirement of 11,207 passengers needs 24 trains.

Value of Time Growth

The assumption is made that only 5% of passengers will use the Metro for work.

The assumption is made that the mix of work to non-work time savings = 5%:95%

Because business persons will use the Metro from the Airport to the city and because the service will also be used by business persons during the day, the assumptions of 5% work time for users of the service seems low.

Assumptions are made that the average value of time should be increased in accordance with changes in real future changes in wage rates.

The ESRI assumptions in their Quarterly Review of April 2002 are as follows:-

And real growth of 2% per annum thereafter.

Assessment

The real growth of 2% per annum after 2005 seems unreasonably low, particularly when no allowance is made for inflation in calculating the value of time.

Appendix Three Definition of a Metro

There has been much debate around the world, on what is the best solution for city and major conurbation passenger transportation. There is also confusion on what terminology is used - underground trains, tramways, light railway trains (LRTs), Metro railways, suburban trains, commuter trains, and heavy rail trains. Most commonly, one sees railways described as LRTs and Metros, where in fact they mean different things to different countries and people.

In simple terms, tramways and LRTs are mainly surface ‘light railways’ which operate on roadways in competition with other road vehicles or on dedicated sections of roads and streets for the sole use of the rail driven vehicles. In some locations whilst the sole use of the route is the tram or LRTs, in cases of urgency, emergency vehicles may temporarily use the route to speed their way through road congestion - this can be seen as an added benefit of having such a dedicated rail passenger transport system.

Other dedicated railways which have their own routes and segregated infrastructure, are described as heavy rail systems. These are used for the provision of underground, Metro, suburban / commuter, and mainline trains. However, it is common to segregate the mass transit passenger services like Metros / underground trains from the other heavy rail services. The main reason for segregation is the need to run frequent, regular, reliable, and punctual interval trains over relatively short distance routings, which might not be possible if these services had to ‘compete’ with longer and medium distance train services between cities, towns, and hinterland conurbations.

The other main difference between ‘on street’ and ‘off street’ services, is that the former are provided by short trains of a few carriages which are slow and stop frequently. Whilst the latter are services provided by longer trains between two and twelve carriages, they stop less frequently at stations which are at least one kilometre apart, and consequently, can travel at higher speeds. Occasionally, they may be only one carriage [rare] and at the other extreme they can have more than twelve carriages depending upon the available platform sizes and carriage lengths.

Appendix Four - DTO Strategy / vision for Dublin

A4.1 ‘A Platform for Change’ November 2001

The DTO vision statement for the Greater Dublin Area is –

-a city and region which embraces the principles of sustainability




-encompassing a leading European city, proud of its heritage and looking to the future




-having at its heart the national capital, seat of Government and national centres of excellence




-a strong, competitive, dynamic and sustainable region




-a living city and region, on a human scale, accessible to all and providing a good quality of life for its citizens

These visions are supported by broad objectives, which require specific development of transportation to complement and facilitate achievement of the objectives -

-improve accessibility and reduce congestion




-sustain economic development and regeneration




-enhance goods distribution in a sustainable way




-reduce growth in the demand for transport, especially private transport




-reduce the need for car commuting by improving the reliability, availability and quality of public transport




-reduce travel times and congestion




-ameliorate direct environmental effects of transport - noise, air pollution, and greenhouse gas emissions, promote cycling and walking as safe, sustainable and healthy means of transport




-improve transport safety




-improve accessibility to ports and Airports for passengers and goods




-improve accessibility to and from the Greater Dublin area.

The DTO Steering Committee added two quantitative transport objectives for the horizon year 2016 -

-reduce the level of congestion on the road network to 1991 levels, when the average speed in the morning peak hour was 22 kph




-provide adequate capacity for all journeys to work and education, which make up the vast majority of trips in the morning peak hour.

A4.2 Latest experience on the Dublin transport scene

The DTO forecast of growth in passenger transport needs, used in producing ’A Platform for Change’ (PFC), have in the ensuing few years since publication, proved to be conservative.

Transport demand, despite the consequences of congestion particularly, has seen dramatic growth. At a Transport Conference in November 2003, the following factors influencing traffic demand were reported -

In each of these factors, the position projected by DTO for 2011 was already exceeded in year 2001 actual terms, 10 years earlier than forecast. The consequential growth in demand has moved as follows -

This represented substantial 58% growth in four years since 1997 when there were 250,000 journeys in the morning peak period. Heavy rail journeys experienced an increase of 33%, journeys by bus rose by 87%, and car journeys increased by 54% - overall road journeys (car and bus) rose from 229,000 in year 1997 to 367,000 in year 2001, an increase of 60%.

Passenger journeys by road in year 2001 differed from the PfC forecast for year 2016 as follows -

The fact that the car journeys in year 2001 already exceed the PfC for year 2016 is to be expected as the latter reflects the expected transfer of journeys from car to other rail oriented journeys (LUAS and Metro). However, the fact that the level of road journeys has grown substantially between years 1997 and 2001 means the need to convert users from car to rail is urgent and requires the projected plan to develop rail solutions to be implemented sooner rather than later.

A4.3 DTO Projected solutions

The DTO Strategy, derived from the Vision Statement, sets out the following public transport elements which needed to be applied -

-improve DART / suburban (heavy) rail network




-extension of the on-street LRT network (LUAS)




-development of a higher capacity segregated METRO network




-expanded bus network




-improved integration and attractiveness of the public transport network: park and ride, integrated fares / ticketing, interchanges, information

The specific Metro strategy required a network as follows -

The DTO’s indicative implementation programme for the Metro is -

A4.4 Projected benefits

The benefits need to be seen from the perspective of travellers (as passengers on public transport and car users), the community who suffer from the effects of travel congestion, the businesses who depend upon travellers as employees and / or as customers and visitors, and the Governmental bodies – national and regional.

The immediate impact of the DTO Strategy is felt by travellers who, once the overall programme of improvements is achieved in year 2016, will see reductions in travel time, more comfortable journeys, and safer travel. Consequently there will be less stress which will positively influence workplace productivity, and in the case of residents and visitors to the city centre, potentially greater enthusiasm for shopping and sightseeing in the city centre.

The communities of Dublin will welcome benefits from less traffic congestion and all its consequences such as noise, pollution, accidents and stress. Residential areas will become safer and better places to live and residents will have a greater feeling of freedom.

Businesses in the Greater Dublin Area will benefit from both the employee and customer points of view. Employees will arrive more punctually and reliably for work, they will be more productive rather than ‘tired’ after their journeys. Customers will increase their visits to business premises, particularly retail outlets in the city centre and local shopping centres. The many tourist attractions of Dublin should enjoy greater levels of visitors.

The business of Ireland will dramatically improve from the ‘feel good’ factor which will bring national, regional and local benefits to Government authorities. The reputation of Ireland and Dublin should improve in status amongst its European partners. The level of business may well increase due to the ease of access to facilities in Dublin. Environmentally, Ireland will be able to demonstrate reductions in pollutants and emissions.

These benefits arise from application of the whole strategy portrayed by the DTO. The individual contribution from each transport sector and component is not identified in the strategy and programmes of improvement. However, it has to be recognised that the development of public transport will be the greatest contributor, and much of this will be due to the introduction of the Metro network.

The overall DTO programme projects a cost benefit ratio of 3.08 and an internal rate of return of 15.8%. This is based upon capital and operational expenditures of €11.4 billion (net present value of cashflows), and evaluated benefits of €35.1 billion (net present value of evaluated benefits). The largest element of benefit is gained by users - worth around €32.5 billion, followed by accident savings €1.6 billion, pollution - air and noise - savings of just under € 1 billion.

The benefits of the Metro network have not been specifically evaluated by the DTO, but will be major contributors to the cost benefit ratio and the internal rate of return.

Appendix Five RPA Detailed Costs

Savings Summary Sheet Listing and Risk Assessments

This information has been deleted because of the RPA confidentiality requirement.

Appendix Six - Comparison to the Madrid experience

At the Oireachtas Committee on Transport meeting on the 28 May 2003, RPA presented its strategy for the proposed Metro service and endeavoured to justify its estimated outlay.

The cost estimates considered by the Joint Committee were as follows:

The Joint Committee requested the Consultants to analyse the reasons for the differences. This explanation below has been constrained by the RPA restriction on the publication of certain information.

Reasons for Differences

1. Future Value of Time

The first basic and fundamental difference between these estimated figures is that Madrid and DMG are discussing price levels at an unidentified moment in time. The RPA estimate is based upon the emerging value of money expected to be spent over the lifespan of the project, expressed in nominal 2009 terms.

2. Cost Reductions

RPA also reported in their presentation that, when they submitted the Outline Business Case (OBC) to Government in November 2002 with its cost estimate of €4.881 billion, the Government requested a revision of the proposal which aimed at reducing the capital outlay. The result was that RPA reduced the estimated cost significantly.

Among the reductions made were the following:

• Shorter alignment and two fewer stations
• 24/7 working
• Station finishes
• Remove escalators
• Reduce depot facilities
• Eliminate substations
• Reduce automatic ticket machines/barrier gates
• Reduce signal control and telecommunications
• Reuse disposable materials
• Specification design changes
• TBM residual values

The total value of the above reductions was €496 million.

Other consequential reductions were then made to the RPA estimates. The following items are not considered to be direct construction costs:

• Risk management
• Design/management
• Insurance
• Cost escalation
• VAT
• Interest
• Financing

3. Direct Construction Costs Only

Another significant difference is that RPA had included items other than direct construction costs whereas Madrid is referring to direct construction costs.

To be comparable, one must refer to RPA’s direct construction costs only.

4. Mono-tube Tunnels

After RPA recommended cost reduction measures, it visited Madrid and now considers that a further potential change might be considered if this is acceptable to the Government’s Railway Inspectorate. This is the adoption of a mono-tube construction for two line/two way working of trains, in place of twin bored tunnels - this could reduce costs by an estimated value of €144 million.

Total RPA Construction Costs

When all of these points are taken into account, the RPA direct construction costs are €1.08 billion.

This is near to the broad outline estimate of Professor Melis from Madrid who has quoted the figure of €1.05 billion based on his direct experience in Spain building new and extension Metro railways and after allowing for higher Irish labour rates.

The result is that the direct construction cost quoted by RPA is close to and comparable with what had been estimated by the expert from Spain.

Dublin Metro Group

The difference between the DMG proposal and the RPA proposal is next explained.

RPA’s proposal is for a Metro line from the Airport to St Stephen’s Green. DMG’s proposal is for a line from the Airport to Ranelagh. The DMG’s proposal is lower in cost estimate because it uses the Spanish experience of costs at roundly €38.5 million per kilometre, upgraded by DMG to €45 million per kilometre – in their words "a safe estimate". A significant difference between Madrid and Dublin is that line 12 in Madrid was built in 35 months between years 1999 and 2003 – therefore, at lower price levels. The DMG proposal of upgrading the estimate to €45 million per kilometre (about 20%) may be optimistic given there will be a longer build period in excess of 35 months and during years 2003 and 2007, which inevitably will be at higher price levels.

True Costs

In the course of time when the Metro system is agreed in principle, the true cost will emerge through the procurement process and competition between contractors / consortiums who bid for the project.

All of the above are merely estimates based on assumptions that may change.

Summary revisions of direct construction costs in 2002 prices

Original proposal - €1.72 billion

Less cost reduction measures - €0.496 billion

= €1.224 billion

Less reduction for use of mono-tube tunnels - €0.144 billion

= €1.080 billion

Appendix Seven – Analysis of EU Capitals

Appendix Eight State Funding

The ability of any country to fund its own development and investment depends upon its national finances.

The most striking single feature about State income and expenditure is its growth relative to the economies which support it. The formal State consumes between a third and a half of all value added. It does this for two primary reasons:

• The task of the State has become much more complex and expert. There are more things to be done, and a greater expectation that these things will be done by public sector organisations rather than by the end user, buying services on their own behalf
• The scope of welfare has grown immensely. The OECD estimate that around a third of all value added is diverted to social transfers, mediated by the State. Additionally, there is huge pressure to extend this.

The drive to spend more has not been matched by equivalent taxation, creating a funding gap – a deficit. This deficit has been met by borrowing, often adding as much as 1.5% to the cost of capital. The importance of a solid system of State finance was not recognised in the early stages of deficit funding and new money was issued, regardless of its implications for the future. Ireland has benefited during the period of the ‘celtic tiger’ and has raised community expectations that Ireland can promote and fund its own development. European efforts to achieve fiscal near-neutrality have been driven by the Euro project.

One consequence of these economic pressures is inevitably, a deferment of development and investment, where it is clear there is insufficient State funding. One of the few ways of increasing State funds is the raising of more taxation – not a very popular move or decision by Governments.

Conventional sources of income taxes may be fully-tapped in many nations. Figure 2 shows the extent of income and employment taxes in a range of countries. An individual who works in Portugal can expect to ‘give’ around 30 weeks in the year to the State.

Whilst direct taxation increases are resisted, many value added taxes now contribute around a third of all tax revenue on average in the OECD nations. These are particularly favoured to grow as they enlist the services of all in the value chain to collect them, and are thus relatively resistant to de-location. It is for the trader to capture the tax elements due to them, after all.

Tax is, of course, primarily aimed to finance the State. It is, however, also for two other purposes. One of these is to influence activity, such as transportation improvements which can improve the quality of life, economic development, urban regeneration, trade, and environmental benefits. Second, however, it is used to transfer income from one group to another - between the wealthy and the poor.

A8.1 The mitigation of expenditure to public-private partnership (PPP)

Fiscal balances are important in creating an environment of low inflation. If the State prints money, the results will probably be inflationary. However, if the State borrows money from abroad to finance projects, this increases money supply in the short term and this, too, can be inflationary. Further, major State projects can increase money velocity, with like results. As a result of this, many States have learned to control the ability of their agencies to borrow. Lack of control can be seen from extreme examples from Latin America - and more recently, from Asia – where one saw State organisations borrowing with no reference to central Government, pouring money in to the economy and running up huge external debt. Local authorities in the UK and continental Europe issued bonds and in other ways borrowed huge sums when real interests rates were negative in the early 1970s, and were crippled by the results of this in the 1980s. Their actions contributed to inflation and central Government had to bail them out – with more inflationary consequences – a decade later.

Having learned from this lesson, Governments have become extremely careful about allowing public sector organisations to raise their own funds. In most cases, revenue surpluses are paid into a central fund, and then redistributed in conjunction with tax monies. Each activity has then to compete with all others, often in a politicised environment in which public social services, health, and education do battle with the needs of State transport, justice and the environment.

Some States have been divesting themselves of as many activities as they reasonably can – sometimes as a means of raising funds to reinvest in more priority areas. In 1980 Britain, for example, the State owned or was the dominant shareholder in the order of half of industry. It owned the mines, ports and forests, almost all of energy production, telecommunications and most broadcasting, car making and defence manufacture, much of the aerospace complex and transportation. Health provision and education were essentially statal activities, and farming and fishing were both intensely regulated and wholly dependent on State subsidies.

There has been radical change in most of these areas, although some remain State-dominated. In general, however, the aim of policy has been consistently to create a competitive arena where once a State monopoly existed. Policy has sought to create expert regulatory frameworks.

Many of these new structures have removed the financing burden from Government. The managerial burden has often changed, rather than lessened, but the custodians of this have a more focused and customer orientated task. The quality and cost of the service provided has, almost invariably, improved out of all recognition. Nevertheless, the issue of how to fund public infrastructure remains a crucial and a painful one.

There are a range of infrastructural issues – such as city transportation – that require very considerable investment, if private affluence is not to be met with ‘public squalor’. Most of these projects offer a social rate of return which is very attractive, and can be constituted such that a commercial partner can extract a satisfactory return. Partnerships of this sort remove managerial and financing burdens from State shoulders, but may add regulatory complexity and will certainly require new skills from those in the public sector who oversee operations, contracts and specifications. At issue is the mechanism by which activities which have a Government imprimatur, even if not strictly of the Government, can raise capital without compromising the management of inflation.

These considerations stand between major investment in public utilities and a continual stranglehold on expenditure. There are two issues - first, the means by which the private sector investor is to extract a return, second, the apportionment of risk between the private investor and the State.

• A company which, for example, builds and operates a transport facility on behalf of the State must be paid for this. It retains ownership of the capital, and expects a return on this. If the State builds the facility and then runs it, it faces a one-off sum, plus a chronic drain. If it works with a private partner, however, only the chronic cost remains, plus the return which is due to the investor. The private investor may well operate the facility more efficiently than the State will, and apposite regulation may well force costs and profits to levels which make this option very attractive.
• The private owner also takes a risk. If the State carries some of the resulting financial risk, then this is in actuarial terms equivalent to State borrowing. If it carries none, then there is no effect on State borrowing, and the private partner borrows on purely commercial terms. However, there are also political risks to be considered. If the State will not underwrite risk, then the venture must be allowed to go bankrupt if it under-performs. It must be allowed to make huge sums if it does well. This can be a hostage too fortune that political policy makers are unwilling to accept.

PPP provided ‘free’ State transport services can be priced where a structure of this sort begins to emerge. Passengers can be given the means to choose between various modes of transport and to decide where they place their patronage. Social support vouchers and / or transport-specific ‘currencies’ can be used, where there is a fear that cash subsidies might be abused. Whilst this offers ideological comfort for some, the practical overheads to doing this might seem greater than any benefits that seem likely to flow from it. This is particularly true where choice becomes a personal decision and an expert matter, with location / geography having a major role to play. Regulators, rather than customers, may well be the way to ensure that transport provision of a high quality is delivered and ensuring it is what is needed.

This is a complex area which carries huge political risks. The fear of entering this new world of PPP has, on occasions, prevented progress being made. As a result, we have few entrepreneurial schemes for the provision of, for example, effective urban transit systems. Some nations have been more daring than others, and some have been more effective in managing the consequences of their initiatives than their peers. The issues of efficiency, managerial clarity, and financing have, particularly in improved transportation as a long term solution, been deeply muddled together in public debate, to such an extent that many of the issues are now hard to discuss because of deep seated views and stances adopted. There is, therefore, a major task of clarification to kick-start a way forward to effect change that is clearly necessary.

Whilst the above points bring to the fore the experience of parts of Europe, it is felt very pertinent to the situation in Ireland.

A8.2 Forces that will increase pressure on Governments to spend more

Governments have a schedule of increasingly complex tasks to satisfy people’s expectations by delivering improved services – improved transportation in Dublin to overcome traffic congestion is a typical example. In addition, they have to ensure that competitiveness is maintained. This evokes a complex web of requirements, from competing demands to improve transportation infrastructure – are ‘Dubliners’ demands best met by more buses, road improvements, road congestion charging, better heavy rail solutions, more LUAS projects, or progressing underground and Metro developments?

All of this costs time as well as money and creates a major managerial task – often described as ‘paralysis by analysis’ of ‘let’s have more information’ or ‘lets leave the decision to another day’. Meanwhile, time costs money and in the end, a desirable project has increased substantially in cost of production and delivery.

In the resulting battle for scarce financial resources, the rational expenditure aimed to improve services such as transport are likely to struggle to be a winner for State funds. Indeed, many in Government will struggle to recognise – or want to recognise arguments – regarding the economic-rationalist and / or hidden social and environmental benefits of a long term transport project. It is, however, rational to prefer the ‘want it now’ through a quick fix short term solution, compared to long term solutions ‘tomorrow’.

A8.3 What is a Public Private Partnership?

A public-private partnership (PPP) can be defined as “any collaboration between public bodies, such as local authorities or central Government, and private companies”.

Many European Governments are keen to expand the range of public private partnerships because they believe it is the best way to secure improvements in public services, given the demands to improve services and increasingly limited State funds

Often private companies are more efficient and better run than public bodies. In trying to bring the public and private sector together, the Governments hope that the management skills and financial acumen of the private sector business community will create better value for money for taxpayers.

A8.4 Private Finance Initiative (PFI)

Governments and local authorities have always paid private contractors to build railways, roads, and many other public facilities out of State funds. Many Governments sought ways of getting the contractors to foot the bill.

Private Finance Initiative (PFI) emerged in the latter quarter of the last century, whereby contractors pay for the construction costs and then rent the finished project back to the public sector. This allows the Government to get new facilities without raising taxes.

The contractor, for its part, is allowed to keep any cash left over from the design and construction process, in addition to the ‘rent’ money. Many critics say that the Governments, through PFIs, are just mortgaging the future - and the long-run cost of paying the private sector to run these schemes is more than it would cost the public sector to build them itself.

Because of this criticism, an alternative form of funding emerged in the late 1990s which is a variant of PFI, namely, the PPP.

A8.5 What are the drawbacks of PPP?

Critics argue that taxpayers will end up footing the bill for PPP. However, this can be a short sighted viewpoint which does not properly evaluate a balanced view of what State funding really costs taxpayers compared to what the PPP costs the taxpayer. This comes about by the mere fact that the initial outlay funded by Government finance is quickly forgotten once spent, the sum rarely goes onto a financial balance sheet, and the ongoing interest burden of the State funding is either forgotten as it is not a real expense or, if it is real, it is buried as mere revenue account expenditure. The ongoing PPP costs are easily seen and have to be paid thus are accounted for.

The funding of transportation by the State is frequently confronted by railway managements who seek a ‘level playing field’ between the competing transport modes of railways and roads. When they invest in new assets such as infrastructure and rolling stock, the cost is capitalised in their balance sheet and has to be absorbed through annual amortisation and / or depreciation as the asset is used. When there are road improvements, the ‘capital cost’ is written off as it is incurred through Government annual expenditure plans, the sum of money does not feature on any balance sheet – consequently, the annual cost of a road after year one is nil whereas the annual cost of the railway is around 1/40^th of the capital cost each year for the life of the asset, 40 years.

PPP can be seen as similar in that the amortisation of the railway infrastructure is replaced by an asset availability and usage charge.

There is also some concern that the private companies who form a part of the PPP, have been accused of cutting corners in order to maximise profits once they have been contracted. This has led to the view that such companies may break even on their initial capital outlay within a few years and thereafter all its profit. This can be a misleading view as it conveniently forgets the financing charges that the company may have taken on board to gain the funds that enabled them to develop and build infrastructure projects.

A8.6 What are the arguments for PPP?

Advocates of PPP say that many facilities such as transport improvements, hospitals, and schools would not be built at all if it was not for private finance - the public money was simply not available.

Often, it is clear that projects, once authorised, are built and operational much earlier than if left to State funding and Government controlled building.

Similarly, it is claimed that PPP has lead to a dramatic increase in the quality of public services which would not have been achieved so early compared to development and construction through State funding.

Performance-related penalties that are now built into most PPP contracts will ensure a continuing improvement in standards, far in advance of anything that could be achieved in the public sector, they argue.

PPP is a fast, effective - and in the short term at least - cheaper way of getting new facilities built.

PPP is still in its infancy in many European countries, the majority of public works are still directly funded by Government.

However, European Governments in particular are gearing up for a massive increase in private involvement in public services in the years ahead. Additionally, local authorities and other State parastatals are increasingly being steered towards PPP.

Many Governments are custodians of infrastructure built many generations ago that are no longer suitable for current and future needs, thus are declining in quality and unable to fully satisfy the needs of customers. To avoid continued decline, ailing public services need to be regenerated and modified to satisfy the future needs of users – limited State funding means other means must be sought to deal with such issues and avoid crisis in public service provision.

PPP can be a suitable means of bringing about change.

Appendix Nine - Benefits of a Metro

Some Metro systems are not cost effective in terms of operational revenues from the ‘farebox’ being sufficient to cover direct operational cost. Some others do cover operational costs, but the surplus operational margin is not enough to repay capital outlay (or in a PPP situation insufficient to cover the access / usage charge).

However, a Metro system has to be seen as a ’national and / or a city asset’. One can be confident that the necessary financial support to cover operational deficits or capital cost deficits will be more than covered by financial savings by the avoidance of disbenefit that can be seen as the benefits of having an effective Metro system or network.

Many benefits arise from having a Metro system as a passenger transport carrier, as summarised as follows:-

• Mass movement of passenger flows - less congestion
• Quicker transits for passengers - less stress, ready to work
• Safer travel - less accidents and personal injuries
• Environmentally friendly - less noise, pollution
• Comfortable travel - pleasure to travel, not a chore
• Quality of life improved - relief from constant traffic flows
• More frequent travel - more use of retail and leisure facilities
• Road traffic remaining can travel quicker - lower operating costs
• Reduce demand for bus transport - save capital / operating cost
• Improved communications - attracts external investment

The effect of the disbenefits - financial and physical - are not borne directly by national Government, but are borne by -

-consumers directly,




-by local communities,




-by businesses,




-and Governmental bodies such as

-local Government,




-bus operators,




-hospitals,




-historic monuments, etc.

Because they are so widespread, they are rarely summarised to evaluate the cost to the national economy, thus become hidden and forgotten. A view from the DTO is that disbenefits cost in the region of, currently, €2 billion per annum. Dublin Chamber of Commerce has provided estimates ranging from €1.27 billion to €8 billion.

Metro solutions are initially expensive in isolation, but they are a long term asset and solution to offset the hidden costs of the disbenefits of road congestion that quickly become accepted, with reluctance, as inevitable.

Appendix TEN - DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR RAILWAY SAFETY CASES

Subject to adoption by Railway Safety Authority

DRAFT GUIDELINES FOR RAILWAY SAFETY CASES

Contents

1. INTRODUCTION
2. BACKGROUND TO RAILWAY SAFETY REGULATION
   2.1 Proposed Legislation
   2.2 Safety Case regime
   2.3 Railway Undertaking’s Safety Case
   2.4 Revision of Safety Cases
   CONTENTS OF A RAILWAY SAFETY CASE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Railway Undertaking’s Name and Address

1.2 Description of Operations

1.3 Description of Infrastructure and Rolling Stock

1.4 Safety Policy Statement

1.5 Safety Objectives for Railway Undertaking

1.6 Demonstration of Commitment to Safety

1.7 Glossary of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Jargon

2.0 ORGANISING, PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING

2.1 Introduction

2.2 Organisation

2.3 Co-operation

2.4 Communication

2.5 Consultation

2.6 Training and Competence

2.7 Control of Contractors

2.8 Change Management (Systems and Hardware)

2.9 Safety Case Revision

2.10 Interface Agreement

3.0 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT

3.1 Applicable Risk Criteria

3.2 Methods and Processes for Hazard Identification

3.3 Methods and Processes for Risk Assessment

3.4 Significant Findings and Control Measures Taken

3.5 Conclusions

4.0 STANDARDS AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

4.1 Listing of Other Relevant Documents

4.2 Justification and Document Control

5.0 PERFORMANCE REVIEW AND MANAGEMENT

5.1 Data Collection

5.2 Data Processing and Trend Analysis

5.3 Target Setting and Monitoring

5.4 Continuous Improvement

5.5 Confirmation of Compliance

5.6 Annual Reviews

5.7 Annual Safety Plans

6.0 ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

6.1 Investigation and Root Cause Identification

6.2 Co-operation with Others

7.0 EMERGENCY PLANNING

7.1 Procedures for Dealing with Accidents and Emergencies (including Evacuation)

8.0 PROCUREMENT

8.1 Procurement of Premises, Plant, Substances, and Services

8.2 Procurement of Major Infrastructure Works and New Rolling Stock

9.0 AUDITING

10.0 CONCLUSIONS

11.0 ANY OTHER BUSINESS

12.0 REFERENCES (Safety Case)

SAFETY CASES ANNEXES

A1 INTERFACE AGREEMENT

A2 NEW WORKS ASSESSMENT

A3 ROLLING STOCK ASSESSMENT

4 REFERENCES

5 GLOSSARY

1 Introduction

Legislation is currently being developed by the Minister for Public Enterprise [1], which will provide that railway undertakings shall prepare and submit a safety case to a new independent body to be known as the Railway Safety Authority (RSA). The RSA, when satisfied, will formally accept the safety case and issue a safety certificate. A railway undertaking cannot commence operations, or continue to operate its business unless it is the holder of a safety certificate. This document has been produced to assist railway undertakings by providing guidelines on the contents of a railway safety case. This document is a draft only and is subject to formal adoption by the Railway Safety Authority on its establishment.

A safety case is a documented demonstration of a railway undertaking’s approach to the management of safety and is based around a description of its safety management system. The safety case also includes a description of the company’s operations and details of a systematic risk assessment, including results and analysis of actual accident statistics.

The guidelines are aimed at those persons within railway undertakings who will be primarily responsible for the development of the safety cases. Although the Guidelines are advisory only railway undertakings will be required to have regard to the suggested contents in developing their safety cases.

It is expected that each railway undertaking will determine a strategy for the production of its own safety case, and thence identify its appropriate content and level of detail. In developing its safety case, a railway undertaking will be required to consult with its staff and their representatives.

The level of detail required (including with respect to the sophistication of the risk assessment) is likely to be proportionate to the nature and complexity of the operations of a railway undertaking and hence to the risks being controlled. Nevertheless, in the case of large railway undertakings, a significant amount of consideration and detail will be required.

The Guidelines are designed in such a way as to facilitate the presentation by a railway undertaking of a coherent approach to the management of safety.

Railway undertakings must carry out their operations in compliance with their accepted safety case. They must keep their safety case up to date, making amendments to reflect changes in their operations as necessary.

In order for the safety case to be a “living” document reflecting the reality of the railway’s operations at any point in time, the situations where a revision is to be considered should be clearly understood. The railway undertaking should clearly state its intentions and conditions for periodic review and revisions due to changes in the systems or equipment.

2 BACKGROUND to Railway Safety Regulation

2.1 Proposed Legislation

The draft legislation [1] places a duty on each railway undertaking, during the operation of its railway, to ensure so far as is reasonably practicable, the safety of all persons. In amplification and support of this general duty each railway undertaking must prepare a document, referred to as a safety case, describing in various particulars how the undertaking will control the risks its operations present to persons who may be affected by them. In the future a railway undertaking may not operate unless it has a safety case which has been accepted by the RSA.

In addition, a railway undertaking shall not bring into operation new works or new rolling stock unless it has submitted a safety assessment (New Works Assessment or New Rolling Stock Assessment respectively) to the RSA and had that assessment accepted.

The draft legislation will give power to the RSA to accept safety cases from railway undertakings, and to monitor, inspect, audit and enforce compliance with safety cases and investigate and report on certain railway accidents.

The draft legislation will also provide for the establishment of an independent advisory body to be known as the Railway Safety Advisory Council and define its functions.

2.2 Safety Case regime

The last ten years have seen major changes in the licensing of railway developments world-wide, with an increasing emphasis on railway undertakings to proactively demonstrate their adequate control of risks to the regulatory bodies.

As part of this safety demonstration, methods for the systematic prediction and assessment of safety performance are now routinely applied both to existing railway operations and to the design of new works and rolling stock projects. This approach will require railway undertakings to document the hazards and associated risks together with measures in place to eliminate and control them.

The approach is often characterised by a further duty being placed on the safety regulator to examine the adequacy of these arrangements. The powers of the safety regulator vary somewhat between countries, but rights and duties to monitor continuing compliance of the undertakings with their safety responsibilities are usual.

A safety case regime typically embodies the following principles:

• A legal duty to manage risks lies with the organisation that creates the risks or is affected by risks created by others and requires them to describe how these risks are effectively controlled. However, a description is not sufficient without the active commitment of the railway undertaking to effectively implement these control measures in practice.
• The organisation that creates the risk or is affected by a risk created by others, in this case the railway undertaking, must identify the hazards, assess the risks, develop effective control measures and keep a current documentary record of these. The control measures should cover design and hardware, systems and procedures, and human factors in a coherent whole. The railway undertaking must also implement and document the control measures and keep them up to date. It should also make and, where appropriate, test arrangements for managing emergencies and mitigating their consequences.
• A safety case approach includes a goal-setting framework rather than a wholly prescriptive one, because it requires railway undertakings to think for themselves. It is considered that the flexibility of goal-setting is more likely to lead to arrangements for controlling risk which are tailored to the particular circumstances, and which, through safety case maintenance and re-submission, will remain so. Also, within a goal-setting context, a safety case regime defines elements of the management arrangements required.
• A safety case regime does not provide a guarantee of safety, however, the involvement of the safety regulator. within a safety case regime. should give society an added level of confidence that railway undertakings are capable of discharging their legal responsibilities to control the risks,. A safety case regime imposes more rigid frameworks on the safety regulator and requires more positive regulator engagement than other approaches to regulation. The railway undertaking’s documentation provides part of the basis for targeting safety regulator intervention.

Preparing a safety case and keeping it up to date requires a systematic approach to safety, which is vital if risks are to be properly and consistently identified, controlled and minimised. A systematic approach can also pay dividends by helping railway undertakings to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and use resources to their best effect. One example of such an approach, which is increasingly in use for new railway works, is “The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety for Railway Applications” EN50126 [2].

2.3 Railway Undertaking’s Safety Case

The draft legislation will require railway undertakings to prepare a safety case and, following independent assessment of the safety case by a suitably qualified person or body, submit it for acceptance to the RSA.

The draft legislation will provide that a safety case shall achieve the following two objectives:

1. it shall demonstrate that the railway undertaking has the ability to properly assess and effectively control risks to the safety of persons, in compliance with its general duty;
2. it shall provide a working document by which railway management and the RSA can ensure that the accepted standards and safety systems are being properly implemented and continue to be maintained.

The draft legislation will also require that the safety case shall, in principle, contain at least the following components:

1. a general description of the operations, or proposed operations, of the railway undertaking;
2. a statement of the safety policy and objectives of the railway undertaking;
3. identification of the hazards arising from the operations of the railway undertaking, and an assessment of the risks, and details of the measures in place, or proposed, to mitigate such risks;
4. the management and organisational arrangements necessary for the implementation and management of railway safety;
5. arrangements for monitoring, audit, and consequent review and revision of the safety case.

2.4 Revision of Safety Cases

The draft legislation will require the railway undertaking to revise its safety case in circumstances where:

1. the railway undertaking considers it appropriate to do so,
2. new works or new rolling stock are accepted by the RSA;
3. the RSA issues a notice in writing to the railway undertaking requiring it to do so.

The draft legislation sets out requirements for the handling of revisions and the commissioning of an independent assessment by a suitably qualified person.

Railway undertakings have to manage the safety case itself by revising the contents to reflect amendments and revisions to their systems. Safety case amendments should be clearly identified and fully justified, taking into consideration any new or changed hazards and changes to the risk profile.

The railway undertaking should provide details of the system for identifying and assessing potential revisions to the safety case. These details should set out the changes which would be expected to initiate a revision.

3 contents of a RAILWAY SAFETY CASE

This section includes suggested contents of a safety case and a brief summary of the subjects which should be included. The contents of a safety case need not necessarily follow the order suggested but should be in a sufficiently logical order to present the evidence sought in a clear and comprehensible way.

A balance will need to be struck between the material to be included in a safety case, and supporting information which can be provided on request. If RSA considers a safety case to be insufficiently detailed, it will request that further information be added to the safety case. As a guiding principle, safety cases should be presented as self-contained documents which:

• present the main arguments clearly and succinctly so that the main principles can be readily understood; and
• include sufficient detail to lend conviction to the arguments.

Where safety cases refer to other supporting documents, they should be referenced and the safety case should make clear where they reside. This is for the benefit of RSA and of others reading or assessing safety cases, and more importantly those who need to access the documentation as part of the daily railway operation

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An executive summary which explains the undertaking’s general strategy for risk control, highlights the greatest hazards to persons, and describes the structure of the following safety case to demonstrate that there are comprehensive systems in place to assess and to control risk.

Confirmation that the risks to all exposed groups of persons have been reduced to a level which is safe so as far as is reasonably practicable.

1.0 INTRODUCTION

1.1 Railway Undertaking’s Name and Address

The name and address of the person (usually a senior management position within the railway undertaking) who is responsible for compliance with the processes described in the safety case.

1.2 Description of Operations

An overview description of the operation of the railway undertaking, including numerical details of the size and scope of the operation, and key geographical boundaries or operational interfaces with other railway undertakings or outside parties (e.g. in the form of simple maps and drawings).

1.3 Description of Infrastructure and Rolling Stock

A general description of the railway infrastructure (including gauge and types of signalling and train control), premises, rolling stock and equipment intended to be used by the railway undertaking for the operations proposed.

1.4 Safety Policy Statement

A high-level statement of the railway undertaking’s policy regarding the prevention of risk and the protection from hazards to all persons who may be affected by its activities.

1.5 Safety Objectives for Railway Undertaking

A general statement of how the undertaking will set objectives for the maintenance and, where appropriate, the improvement of safety, and how progress towards them will be measured.

1.6 Demonstration of Commitment to Safety

A clear statement of the intention to implement the safety policy and meet the objectives. Details of the managerial and supervisory structure, and supporting services where relevant, which will enable the intentions to be realised.

1.7 Glossary of Abbreviations, Acronyms and Jargon

A point of reference to clarify the meaning of any abbreviations, acronyms or jargon used in the safety case document.

2.0 ORGANISING, PLANNING AND IMPLEMENTING

2.1 Introduction

A reiteration of the railway undertaking’s safety policy, confirming its commitment to implement any safety measures identified from the risk assessments, and provide an outline of its plan to do so.

2.2 Organisation

A clear description of the organisation and staffing arrangements of the railway undertaking, including where necessary an organisation chart or charts, a demonstration that sufficient numbers of suitably skilled staff are available in each group, and which groups are involved in safety critical and safety related activities.

The management and supervisory structure should be detailed, showing which of them need special competences to keep the operation safe as intended. Any relevant ancillary support groups, such as safety advisors, should also be similarly detailed.

2.3 Co-operation

A description of the systems and procedures for co-ordinating and co-operating with other organisations or individuals whose operations may affect the safe operation of the railway undertaking.

Where appropriate, details of the actions the railway undertaking will take in the event of non-co-operation by these others.

2.4 Communication

A description of the matrix of communications systems, which is essential for safe railway operation. Among potential communication channels will be:-

• Upwards and downwards within the undertaking;
• To and from other railway undertakings as appropriate;
• To and from outside parties such as landowners, local authorities, etc.;
• To and from the Railway Safety Authority;
• To and from passengers and the public..

There is also a distinction to be drawn between real-time communication concerning the current operation of the railway, and longer-term communication to enable planning for safety to take place; the descriptions of communication methods should reflect these differences.

2.5 Consultation

A description of the systems for involving staff, directly or through their representatives, in the development and implementation of the safety management system, and for consulting with staff and their representatives generally on issues relating to safety.

Also needed are systems and procedures for consulting with other parties outside the railway safety case system, such as road authorities and utilities providers, whose operations may impact on the safe operation of the railway.

2.6 Training and Competence

A description, for all jobs which have safety responsibilities, of how the necessary safety-related competences are assessed, and then for each class of employee with safety duties, how any necessary training programme is managed. Management of training should include its provision, assessment of competence afterwards, re-assessment periodically, and the keeping of records.

2.7 Control of Contractors

The arrangements to ensure that contractors and/or their subcontractors, or other persons who are not employees, are sufficiently competent and comply with the railway undertaking’s requirements in relation to safety and the management of risk. These competencies should encompass control of occupational risks to themselves and others, and system risks to the railway. Also the proposed strategy for management and safety monitoring which will be applied by the railway undertaking to such persons should be stated.

2.8 Change Management (Systems and Hardware)

The systems and procedures to ensure that risks arising from changes to the railway undertaking are assessed and properly controlled both during the change process and after its completion. Such changes may include methods of work and duties of staff, and modifications to works, plant and equipment including their maintenance regimes. A strategy to analyse proposed changes through the risk assessment procedure should also be given.

2.9 Safety Case Revision

A mechanism for the periodic review and consequent revision of the railway undertaking’s safety case; when appropriate, or following the introduction of new infrastructure or rolling stock, or as instructed by the Railway Safety Authority. Also details of the system for identifying, assessing and managing the consequences of potential changes.

2.10 Interface Agreement

Details of the actual agreements made with others railway undertakings, in accordance with the specific requirement in the draft legislation, should be given. (Ref. Annex A1)

3.0 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK ASSESSMENT

3.1 Applicable Risk Criteria

Statements of the criteria against which the risk to each exposed group (eg staff, passenger, public etc.) will be compared to determine whether or not further controls are required. Where relevant, the sources or derivation of the criteria should be stated and justified.

3.2 Methods and Processes for Hazard Identification

A description of the processes adopted to systematically identify all reasonably foreseeable hazards which the operation might present to all affected groups of persons. Potential hazards at interfaces (both organisational and physical interfaces) should receive special attention.

3.3 Methods and Processes for Risk Assessment

A description of the processes by which the hazards identified are assessed to determine the frequency and severity of the actual risks which they present to the safety of persons. The descriptions should include the methods of any analyses made and details of any assumptions made about human or hardware performance and reliability. The level of detail required (including with respect to the sophistication of the risk assessment) should be proportionate to the nature and complexity of the operations of a railway undertaking and hence to the risks being controlled.

An appropriate risk assessment should be made to identify the risk arising from or in connection with the railway undertaking’s activities, and to confirm that risks have been reduced as far as is reasonably practicable.

A description of the processes to ensure that identified risks are regularly reviewed to ensure that they are still valid, and not outdated or redundant as a result of changes in circumstances.

3.4 Significant Findings and Control Measures Taken

A presentation of the results of the risk assessments, how they compare with the risk criteria, and a summary of the control strategy in place or proposed for each.

Where identified risks are to be controlled by rules and procedures, or legislative requirements, cross references should be provided.

The form of presentation should enable the most critical risks to be clearly identified and the evidence of control measures should be most detailed for the greatest risks.

3.5 Conclusions

A summary of the risk assessment process, highlighting the greatest threats identified, commenting on any significant shortfall from the criteria, and reiterating the scope of control measures for the greatest risks. Confirmation that risks have been reduced as far as is reasonably practicable.

4.0 STANDARDS AND CONTROL PROCEDURES

4.1 Listing of Other Relevant Documents

A list of the titles and references (but not the contents) of any documents which are regarded as necessary to achieve and maintain the levels of safety on the railway. They will include both those of a technical nature and those of a procedural or operational nature. Sources may range from national or international standards down to internal procedures specific to the undertaking described. The overall strategy for grouping and indexing of the documents should be stated.

4.2 Justification and Document Control

A description of the systems for identifying applicable technical specifications, guidelines, rules and standards (whether or not developed by the railway undertaking), assessing their effect upon risk, and authorising their use. Also the system for assessing, authorising, and distributing revisions to the documents in current use.

A justification of the systems for ensuring that the distribution and revision strategy is properly implemented, and the technical specifications, guidelines, rules and standards are complied with.

5.0 PERFORMANCE REVIEW AND MANAGEMENT

5.1 Data Collection

A description of the data that will be used to measure safety performance, and how it will be collected and recorded. The data will include measures of pro-active accident prevention programmes and, where available, data from audit programmes as well as records of actual accidents and safety-related incidents.

5.2 Data Processing and Trend Analysis

A description of the ways in which the collected data will be categorised and then presented as relevant management information as to trends and progress towards objectives. An outline of the resources and skills which will be applied to this data processing should also be given.

5.3 Target Setting and Monitoring

A description of how the undertaking will determine its safety targets. Also provide details of the intended frequency and rigour of monitoring progress towards the targets and who will be directly involved in reviewing the results.

5.4 Continuous Improvement

A description of the procedures for regular re-evaluation of the safety management system or technical standards, and the initiation of any necessary improvements. Inputs to this process will include the monitoring processes described above and others, such as the results of audits or accident investigations.

5.5 Confirmation of Compliance

A description of the systems for ensuring continuing compliance with the safety management system, including both operational and technical standards, at all levels and by all staff of the railway undertaking. Audit (itemised later) will form part of this process but evidence of a plan to conduct regular compliance checks by supervisors and managers will be expected.

Evidence should be given as to the mechanism which will deliver any necessary changes which the review reveals as necessary.

5.6 Annual Reviews

A procedure should be described which shows that, in addition to any necessary interim action, there is at least annually a full and formal review of both actual safety performance and the effectiveness of the safety management system. The review may lead to the initiation of changes, for which time-scales and a monitoring system should be established. It should be clear that these processes involve the most senior management within the organisation.

5.7 Annual Safety Plans

Outline of how the undertaking will prepare an annual plan in which it both reports its progress towards current objectives and describes and justifies any appropriate revisions to the objectives or the strategy to achieve them.

6.0 ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

6.1 Investigation and Root Cause Identification

Evidence of appropriate arrangements for investigating accidents and other incidents. Investigations should include both those reportable to RSA and others which may be necessary internally to monitor performance more closely.

The arrangements should also show that sufficient skill and rigour will be applied to ascertain not only immediate but also the root causes of accidents, and to make recommendations where appropriate.

6.2 Co-operation with Others

Outline procedures for identifying and working with organisations or individuals in investigating accidents and incidents specifically:-

• For co-ordination of investigations and findings with others (including other railway undertakings) where appropriate.
• For co-operative participation in investigations by others, where appropriate.

7.0 EMERGENCY PLANNING

7.1 Procedures for Dealing with Accidents and Emergencies (including Evacuation)

A description of the systems and procedures for minimising risks to persons when some unplanned or unintended event presents an out of the ordinary threat. The systems will often include the calling and liaison with civil emergency services. Evidence of co-operation and competence through appropriate joint exercises should be given.

Railway undertakings need to identify the types of accident or incident to be covered, examples of which should include:

• The aftermath of a train accident (derailment, collision or fire);
• Fires in premises, especially in public places, and evacuation procedures;
• The aftermath of a severe structural failure, especially of a public place;
• Severe congestion, especially in significantly enclosed public places.

In addition, provide descriptions of the arrangements for liaison and co-ordination with external parties in the case of emergencies occurring off the railway but which affect the operation of the railway.

8.0 PROCUREMENT

8.1 Procurement of Premises, Plant, Substances, and Services

A description of the controls which will be applied to ensure that contractual agreements entered into with third parties give appropriate assurance of safety. In particular, to ensure that no person is exposed to unacceptable risk from the actions or services of external providers to the railway or from equipment and goods supplied to the railway. In addition a description should be provided of the process by which the railway undertaking ensures that the impact of proposed contractual clauses on safety is reviewed and minimised.

Controls should include pre-contract checks on safety awareness, and the safety arrangements of the prospective providers, ensuring that they have and will provide sufficient safety information about their products, and monitoring that their commitments are maintained.

8.2 Procurement of Major Infrastructure Works and New Rolling Stock

In view of the potential technical complexity and risks, more detailed evidence of safety, on a case-by-case basis, is called for in relation to major new works and rolling stock. These will require specific New Works Assessments and New Rolling Stock Assessments respectively to be completed. The recommended contents of these assessments are listed separately in Annexes A2 and A3.

9.0 AUDITING

The safety case should describe the strategy to apply safety auditing as a continuing management and monitoring tool and the resources which will be applied to it. It should state how the results of audits will be fed back into the review and revision process. Also reference should be made to the procedures for commissioning of any audit specifically required by the RSA under the draft legislation.

10.0 CONCLUSIONS

Demonstrate that a robust system for the management of all aspects of safety has been put in place by the railway undertaking and thence that the following objectives have been met:

1. that the railway undertaking has properly assessed and effectively controlled risks to the safety of persons, in compliance with its general duty;
2. a working document has been provided by which railway management and the RSA can ensure that the accepted standards and safety systems are being properly implemented and continue to be maintained.

11.0 ANY OTHER BUSINESS

Matters other than those contained in paragraphs above which the undertaking deems appropriate to include in its safety case to demonstrate its comprehensive control of risks arising from its operations, or such other matters as may be requested by the RSA in particular instances or set down in regulations by the RSA from time to time.

12.0 REFERENCES (Safety Case)

A listing of key supporting documentation used to support and justify any part of the safety case submission. The references should be in a form so as to allow efficient retrieval.

SAFETY CASES ANNEXES

A1 INTERFACE AGREEMENT

Copy of any Interface Agreement which details the systems and procedures agreed between railway undertakings whose operations may affect the safety of each other, to ensure compliance with the general duty imposed on each of them.

A2 NEW WORKS ASSESSMENT

Systems and procedures for the safety-assessment of new and modified works and plant including the design, operation and maintenance of such works, and the independent safety validation of such works. Where the proposed works are applied to an already operating railway, special attention must also be paid to the assessment and control of risks during the interim and change-over period.

Details of the system for identifying and assessing the consequences of potential changes to the safety case as a result of the introduction of new works and plant.

Particulars to be included in a New Works Assessment are expected to include:

1. nature and purpose of the new works;
2. design specifications;
3. standards covering such works;
4. details of the safety management systems governing the design and operation, maintenance and disposal of such works,
5. compatibility of new works with existing infrastructure and railway operations;
6. A demonstration of the safety adequacy of the new works throughout its full life cycle;
7. compliance with any relevant principles and guidelines adopted or published by the RSA ;
8. a statement from the railway undertaking that on the basis of the above, the commissioning and bringing into operation of the new works is consistent with the operation of the railway generally and the general duty of the undertaking under the draft legislation;
9. a list of the proposed changes to the railway undertaking’s accepted safety case;
10. a certificate of safety validation by competent third parties, where appropriate in the opinion of the RSA;
11. any other matters that the RSA or the undertaking deems appropriate, or such other matters as may be requested by the RSA in particular instances or set down in regulations by the RSA from time to time.

A3 ROLLING STOCK ASSESSMENT

Systems and procedures for the safety-assessment of new and modified rolling stock, including the design, operation and maintenance of such rolling stock, and the independent safety validation of such rolling stock. Interfaces between rolling stock design and operational parameters, and the infrastructure on which it will operate, should receive special attention.

Details of the system for identifying and assessing the consequences of potential changes to the safety case as a result of the introduction of new rolling stock.

Particulars to be included in a Rolling Stock Assessment are expected to include:

1. nature and purpose of the new rolling stock;
2. design specifications;
3. standards covering such rolling stock;
4. details of the safety management systems governing the design and operation, maintenance and disposal of such rolling stock;
5. compatibility of new rolling stock with the existing rolling stock and railway infrastructure;
6. A demonstration of the safety adequacy of the new rolling stock throughout its full life cycle;
7. compliance with any relevant principles and guidelines adopted by the RSA and relevant legislation;
8. a statement from the railway undertaking that on the basis of the above, the commissioning and bringing into operation of the new rolling stock is consistent with the operation of the railway generally and the general duty of the undertaking under the draft legislation;
9. a list of the proposed changes to the railway undertaking’s accepted safety case;
10. a certificate of safety validation by competent third parties, where appropriate in the opinion of the RSA;
11. any other matters that the RSA or the undertaking deems appropriate, or such other matters as may be requested by the RSA in particular instances or set down in regulations by the RSA from time to time.

4 REFERENCES

1. General Scheme of Railway Safety Bill, 2001.
2. European Standard ‘Railway Applications – The Specification and Demonstration of Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety (RAMS)’, EN50126, September 1999, CENELEC.

5 Glossary

Note the meaning of terms used in this document may be broader than that given in the draft legislation eg accident

“Accident” - An unplanned or unexpected event which may result in loss, injury or damage.

“Audit” (of a Safety Management system) -A structured process of collecting independent information on the efficiency, effectiveness and reliability of the total safety management system and drawing up plans for corrective action.