Committee Reports > List of Committees > Joint > 2004 > Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights > Report No. 02 - Final Report into the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings

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Tithe An Oireachtas

An Comhchoiste um Dhlí agus Ceart, Comhionnanas,

Cosaint agus Cearta na mBan

An Tuarascáil Deiridh maidir leis an Tuarascáil ón gCoimisiún

Fiosrúcháin Neamhspleách faoi Bhuamáil Bhaile Átha Cliath agus

Mhuineacháin

Márta 2004

______________________

Houses of the Oireachtas

Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights

Final Report on the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry intothe Dublin and Monaghan Bombings.

March 2004

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chairman’s Preface

Acknowledgements

Chapter 1 Introduction and Victims’ Voices

Introduction

Victims’ Voices

Biographical Details of the Victims of the Dublin and Monaghan

Bombings

Appendices

Chapter 2 Whether the Report of the independent Commission of

Inquiry into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 1974 addresses all

of the issues covered in the terms of reference of the Inquiry.

Introduction

The findings of the Barron Report in relation to the Identity of the

Perpetrators and the Issue of Collusion

Adequacy of the Garda Investigation

Missing Documentation in this Jurisdiction

The Role and Response of the Government of the Day

Composition of the Bombs

Concerns highlighted by certain individuals regarding the Barron Report

Chapter 3 The lessons to be drawn and any actions to be taken in

the light of the Report, its findings and conclusions.

Introduction

The Government’s Role in Garda Investigations

The Establishment of Cabinet Committees

The Role of Forensic Science

The Retention of Evidence

The Retention of Documents

Inter —Jurisdictional Cooperation

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The Role of Non Governmental Organisations

Peace and Reconciliation Process

Adequate Support for Victims and their Families

Chapter 4 Whether, having regard to the Report’s findings, and

following consultations with the Inquiry, a further public

inquiry into any aspect of the Report would be required

or fruitful.

Introduction

Internal Issues which solely related to matters which could be resolved

within this Jurisdiction

External Issues relating to the identity of the Perpetrators and alleged

Collusion.

The Recommendations of the Sub-Committee whether there should be

further investigations/ inquiry on the Identity of the perpetrators and on

the issue of collusion.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1: The Orders of Reference of the Joint Committee

Appendix 2: The Orders of Reference of the Sub-Committee

Appendix 3: Procedures and Methodology.

Appendix 4: The list of the members of the Joint Committee

Appendix 5: The list of the members of the Sub-Committee

Appendix 6: The text of the advertisement seeking submissions on the Barron

Report.

Appendix 7: The List of persons/ bodies to whom invitations were extended to

make oral/ written submissions.

Appendix 8: The List of persons/ bodies who lodged written submissions with

the Sub-Committee

Appendix 9: The List of persons/ bodies who made oral submissions to the Sub-

Committee

Appendix 10:The List of persons/ bodies from whom correspondence was

received by the Sub-Committee

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Appendix 11: Copy of letter of instruction sent to Mr. Justice Peter Cory together with

relevant portion of Weston Park protocol

Appendix 12: Letter dated 26 March 2004 received from Mr. Peter Ryan, Assistant

Secretary to the Government

Appendix 13: Letter dated 6 February 2004 received from Mr. Paul Murphy,

Secretary of State for Northern Ireland

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Chairman’s Preface

At the outset, the Sub-Committee wishes to commence this Report by expressing again

its deepest sympathy with the victims and relatives of the victims of the Dublin and

Monaghan bombings of 17th May 1974.

The “Dublin and Monaghan Bombings” refer to:

The bomb explosions that took place in Parnell Street, Talbot Street and South

Leinster Street, Dublin, on 17 May, 1974.

The bomb explosion that took place in Church Square, Monaghan, on 17 May, 19741

In human terms the true cost of these atrocities is incalculable. The Sub-Committee

wishes to acknowledge the enormous suffering endured by both the victims and their

families, which in many cases is still ongoing. We accept as a Sub-Committee that this

on-going suffering is accentuated by the lack of closure, the failure to bring the

perpetrators to justice and the ongoing suspicions of collusion.

It is hoped that the publication of both the Barron Report and this Report will go some

way towards alleviating the distress these individuals have suffered over the years.

We acknowledge the sense of isolation that the victims and families have experienced

due to the perceived inactivity on the part of successive Governments over the years in

relation to the matter until Mr. Bertie Ahern, T.D. as Taoiseach took action in 1999. As

Ms Alice O’Brien told the Sub-Committee:

“It was 25 years after the bombings before a Taoiseach would agree to meet the

families and survivors. We met Mr. Ahern in 1999, which started the process, which

resulted in the Barron Inquiry. After 4 years of assessment we now have Judge

Barron’s Report.”

At the outset of this Report, it is important to recall the words of Mr. Justice Henry

Barron in his statement to the Oireachtas on the 10th December last where he stated:

“The Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 17th May 1974 remain the most devastating

attack on the civilian population of this State to have taken place since the “Troubles”

began.”

A total of thirty-four people, including one pregnant woman, plus one stillborn child,

died as a result of the explosions. Many more were injured. We have heard submissions

made by some of the victims and their relatives. They will not be forgotten.

Some insight into the nature of the atrocities, which were perpetrated on the streets of

Dublin and Monaghan, may be gleaned from the following report of the Talbot Street

bomb that appeared in the Irish Press the following day:

1 The original orders of reference assigned to Mr. Justice Liam Hamilton referred to North Street, but the bomb

in fact occurred outside Greacen’s Bar, Church Square, Monaghan.

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“Seconds after the blasts, as the pall of smoke rose from the streets, dazed survivors

saw the normal home-going rush of people turned into a scene of carnage. There were

bodies, some limbless, some blasted beyond recognition, some burned, lying on the

pavements. Scores of others badly injured and many knocked out by the blast or

shocked by the impact were hurled into windows and side streets. For some time it

was impossible to distinguish between the dead and the injured.”

It is very important that the Oireachtas can and does enquire into matters of great public

interest, such as the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. It is important also, that the

central characters are heard in the Oireachtas, which is the primary seat of democracy

and the centre of public representation in Ireland. We believe that the Oireachtas is an

appropriate forum where efforts should be made to find the truth at the heart of matters

of great concern. We have been elected by the people and as such we must act as their

public representatives in matters of public importance. The Oireachtas is a unique

forum which is widely recognised and reported on by the media, and in which an

informed citizen’s approach can be taken in respect of hearing, examining and enquiring

into important public matters, albeit with legal and procedural advice.

As I have indicated previously, we hope that the hearings combined with the Report has

moved this process forward, with a view to bringing finality to the families and to the

victims of these atrocities.

The Committee is indebted to Hugh Mohan S.C. and Paul Anthony McDermott B.L. for

their pro-active role in advising and assisting the Committee. The Committee is greatly

indebted to Mairéad McCabe, Clerk to the Committee, for her dedication and

commitment to the work of the Committee over the period. Credit is also due to the

many persons on the staff of the Oireachtas who have spent long hours on the

organisation and secretarial backup to whom we are very grateful.

The Joint Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women’s Rights hereby adopts

as a report of the Joint Committee, the Report of the Sub-Committee on the Barron

Report in accordance with the resolutions of Dáil Éireann and of Seanad Éireann dated 17

December 2003.

In adopting the report of the Sub-Committee, the Joint Committee wishes to emphasise

that all views expressed by the Sub-Committee in the report and all conclusions drawn

and recommendations made therein are those of the Joint Committee.

We commend this report to the Houses of the Oireachtas.

Signed

__________________________

Mr. Sean Ardagh T.D.,

Chairman of the Joint Committee on Justice,

Equality, Defence and Women#x2019;s Rights.

31 March 2004.

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Chapter One

Introduction and Victims’ Voices

INTRODUCTION.

By Motions of Referral by Dáil Éireann and Seanad Éireann dated 10th December, 2003,

both Houses of the Oireachtas requested the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality,

Defence and Women’s Rights, or a Sub-Committee thereof, to consider, including in

public session, the Report of the Independent Commission of Inquiry in to the Dublin

and Monaghan Bombings and to report back to both Houses within three months

concerning:

(i) whether the Report of the independent Commission of Inquiry

into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings of 1974 addresses all of

the issues covered in the terms of reference of the Inquiry.

(ii) the lessons to be drawn and any actions to be taken in the light

of the Report, its findings and conclusions.

(iii) whether, having regard to the Report’s findings, and following

consultations with the Inquiry, a further public inquiry into any

aspect of the Report would be required or fruitful.

These are the circumstances, which led the Joint Committee to establish the Sub-

Committee on the Barron Report. The Committee was empowered under the Motions of

Referral to accept, including in public session, submissions on the Report from

interested persons and others, and to report back to the Houses, and analogous powers

were conferred on the Sub-Committee. This Report has been issued accordingly.

VICTIMS’ VOICES

1.1 The examination of the Report of the Independent Commission (hereinafter

referred to as the Barron Report) commenced with oral submissions from

surviving victims of the atrocities and bereaved relatives. The Sub-Committee

wished to hear from these persons at the outset of its hearings in order to place

them at the centre of its work. It was also felt that hearing from the victims and

their relatives would focus attention on the grief and distress which these people

still endure.

1.2 The accounts of the bombings and their aftermath were both horrific and moving.

The Sub-Committee noted the dignity with which each of the victims and

relatives recounted their stories. One could not fail to be impressed by how they

faced the difficult task of coming before the public forum of an Oireachtas

Committee in order to make their statements. A number of sample quotes have

been included below in order to give an idea of what the Sub-Committee heard.

However, in order to get a full picture of the events of the day, it is necessary to

read the full transcripts, which are available on the Oireachtas website.

1.3 Mr. Derek Byrne told the Sub-Committee how at the age of 15 he was caught up

in the blast of the Parnell Street bomb. He was pronounced dead on arrival in

Jervis Street Hospital and placed in a morgue. It was only when he later woke up

that the hospital authorities realised he was alive and brought him to the

operating theatre to treat his injuries. He stated: “I am still attending hospital. The

stigma of the bombings is the scars I carry. When I was a teenager I was refused entrance into

night clubs and discotheques and still to the present day you have a stigma attached to you...”.

1.4 Mr Noel Hegarty, who was injured in the Talbot Street bomb, described “waking

up in hospital with a priest leaning over and anointing me”.

1.5 Ms Alice O’Brien stated of Mr Paddy Doyle (since deceased), whose daughter

Anna and her two children died in the Parnell Street Bombs:

“When Paddy came out of the mortuary he nearly had a heart attack. He said

it was like a slaughterhouse and that they were just throwing pieces of bodies

together here and there to make up a body. He never got over that.”

1.6 Mr. Pat Fay also remembered how he had to identify the body of his father:

“Nobody knows what it is like to go into a morgue, to literally climb over

bodies, arms and people blown to pieces and to go up to a slab and look at what

is left of one’s father.”

1.7 Mr. John Byrne stated of the Parnell Street bomb:

“I will never forget them; it will never leave me. I was completely devastated.

My working life was destroyed. I suffered terrible trauma and shock. I have

been attending hospitals for the last 28 years. I am still attending today. I am

still on medication even to this present day, 28 years later. That is how I feel

about the bombing which will never leave me.”

1.8 Ms Bridget Fitzpatrick also recalled the aftermath of the Parnell Street bomb:

“I went home with a big bandage around my leg holding my two lovely boys. I

marched up Sean McDermott Street where I am proud to say I live. There were

lovely, decent people living on it — neighbours. About 500 people from all the

flats and the houses cheered me and my two sons up the street.” She

continued:

“I was never treated for my injuries. I never knew what to do. I did not get time

to think about it because I had to rear my children. I am not looking for

sympathy; I am looking for justice for people like me.”

1.9 Mr. John Molloy also detailed the scene of the Parnell Street bomb. He felt he was

“looking into hell from what he saw. People were lying on the roads moaning, with bits of pieces of

bodies here and there.” So great was his trauma at witnessing these scenes that he did

not realise that he had been injured in the blast himself and was in need of

medical attention.

1.10 Mr. Joe O’Neill, who was injured in the Talbot Street bomb, described the scene

in the immediate aftermath:

“I walked out of the shop. I could not see, since my eyesight had gone dark. I

could not understand why it was so dark. I thought it was winter. I got out to

the footpath. I could see bodies on the street. It appeared to me as if a

steamroller had come down the street and run over everybody. I looked down

at my side and could see what I thought was yellow stuff pouring out of it.”

1.11 Ms. Michelle O’Brien lost her mother in the Talbot Street bomb. She described

her father arriving home from work to realise that her mother was missing:

“He started to search the hospitals and in the early hours of Saturday morning

he found her remains in the morgue. He knew it was our mother because she

had worn a green coat and by her wedding ring which I am proud to wear

today.”

1.12 Mr. Anthony Phelan whose sister died in the bombings recounted a similar

incident experienced by his parents:

“My parents were told that she was unrecognisable. My father was not allowed

to see the body. We have relations in Dublin and they informed my father that

she could only be recognised by the ring she was wearing.”

1.13 Mr. Garrett Mussen was one of the youngest victims of the bombings. He and his

father were blown “pretty much clear to the back of the room we were in and reasonably

seriously injured.”

1.14 Mr Liam Sullivan described the scene in the Richmond Hospital:

“I will never be able to explain what I saw over there. It was like a

slaughterhouse. There were bodies everywhere and people being operated on.”

1.15 Ms Philomena Lawlor-Watson was injured in the South Leinster Street bomb

and stated:

“I can remember covering my face with my hands and waiting to feel something

to penetrate my body or to see an arm or a leg disappear. My hair stood

straight up and my ears and scalp were full of tiny pieces of glass. One of my

fingers was bleeding and there was a slit in the red shirt I was wearing and a

wound on my left rib cage.”

She continued:

“How am I now? I am still quite jumpy and I suffer nightmares, not every night

but many nights. I sometimes wake after loud bangs, obviously recalling the

episode. My husband tells me that I jump in my sleep. I still feel shaky in the

city centre, large stores and places of entertainment. I am constantly watching

for anything suspicious or any person who is acting in a suspicious way.”

1.16 Ms. Iris Boyd, whose father died in the Monaghan bomb spoke of her guilt at why

she had not returned to the car earlier, in which case they might have avoided the

blast:

“One lady told me not to be carrying the guilt, that I was not responsible. She said:

‘My son was killed by a bomb in Belfast. He had never been in this bar before he

went in on a Sunday morning and the bomb went off and killed him. He had

every right to be in that bar whenever he wanted. Your father had every right

to be in town just as you had every right to be in town but the bombers had no

right to be there.’

I had never thought about it like that before and it just lifted it all off my

shoulders. It made me look at life so differently. I thought ‘Yes, that’s right.

Why am I blaming myself? It’s not me who is to blame. They should not have

been there. We had every right to be where we wanted to be. They had no right

to be there’. That changed it all for me. I did not have to go back. I was so

thankful to that lady for saying that. Thank you.”

1.17 Mr. Tim Grace asked us to reflect on the fact that it was by total chance that his

wife was killed:

“During the day and in the afternoon, I looked after the baby for my wife. She

had been suffering from flu during the week. The baby was teething and she was

not in the best form so I said to her that she should take the car, go into town

and have a look around. She went into town and parked the car in Gardiner

Street, just around the corner from Talbot Street. She was obviously killed on

the way back at 5.30 pm when the bomb went off. The elements of chance are, as

I pointed out, colossal.”

1.18 Mr. Kevin O’Loughlin spoke of the agony of waiting for his mother to arrive

home, knowing that her route home from work along South Leinster Street

coincided with one of the bombsites. Although they had no news of her fate, he

remembered how the family “were aware that there was something terribly wrong because

we knew that she would have passed down that way. She would always come the same way.” He

recalled how his father eventually found his mother’s body in the morgue where

he identified her. Because of the horrific nature of her injuries, the rest of the

family were prevented from viewing her body:

“I did not see my mother’s body when she was killed and I have no memory of

what she looked like. She was wiped off the face of the earth in the eyes of myself

and my brother. One day she was there and the next she was gone.”

1.19 Ms. Marie Power lost her younger sister Breda in the blast. She found it

extremely difficult to cope with the reality of her death:

“I never thought she was really gone until I saw her memorial card. That was

when I really knew she was not coming back. She was 21, engaged to be married

and had her whole life in front of her.”

1.20 Mr. Brian Fitzsimmons whose wife and son were injured in the Monaghan bomb

spoke of how “the after effects were the worst part of it. For a long time afterwards my wife

would not go out and would not enter crowds or anything like that.”

1.21 Ms. Marie Sherry described being injured in the Parnell Street bomb and stated

that her physical injuries were nothing when compared to the mental turmoil

that she has suffered since:

“I can only describe my life, particularly in my 20s and 30s although not so

much now, as one of constant alert. For weeks and months after the bombs I

used to go home and say, ‘Mum, any news on those people who did the

bombing? Was anybody charged?’ There never was news. There were no names.

Nobody was charged. I lived my life thinking ‘These guys are walking around.

They could be sitting beside me in the cinema. They could be on the bus. These

guys are free to do the same thing again’. It was just awful and it ruined my life.

I did not want to go into town to socialise with my friends, I did not like being

in a pub and I did not like being at the cinema ... Only when one has been

through it can one realise how horrific it is to live ones life like that. I wish it

had never happened. It was just awful.”

1.22 Mr. Thomas O’Brien told the Sub-Committee of the anguish suffered by members

of his family following the murder of his brother, his sister-in-law and his two

nieces in the bombings:

“My father died in 1972 and when Johnny, Anna, Jacqueline and Anne-Marie

died, my mother was heartbroken and she is still. Johnny was the eldest brother

of 11 and I often wonder what the two kids would be now. They would be in

their 30’s and could be married and so on. We will never get over it.”

1.23 Ms. Gertie Shiels told the Sub-Committee:

“These were people going about their daily lives, doing nothing untoward, and

they deserved to be able to do that, to come and go from work.”

She continued:

“My aunt certainly did not deserve to die like that, nor to be ignored in her

death, in that it appeared that she was of no importance to anybody.”

1.24 Mr. Edward Roice urged the Sub-Committee to address the feelings of neglect

which he and other victims of the bombings have suffered:

“It has gone too far, as the other speakers have said. The Dublin and

Monaghan bombings are like dirty words to some higher ups. The attitude is to

ignore it and maybe they will forget about it. But we will never forget. My time

and my wife’s time is possibly getting short and I hope, before I close my eyes,

that something will come out of this. I appeal to the Chairman and the

members of the Committee to do their best to press this case for us. We are

tired waiting.”

1.25 Ms Bernie McNally sustained serious injuries in the Talbot Street bombing. She

made an important observation to the Sub-Committee:

“Today has been harrowing, listening to the cross-section of people, the stories

and the ongoing suffering that people must deal with 30 years later. More

families and survivors are unable to be present due to work commitments and

illness, while many have died while waiting to get justice.”

1.26 Mr. Frank Durkan Attorney-at-Law, appeared before the Sub-Committee on

behalf of Ms. Joan Ann Burke from Artane, now living in the U.S. She was caught

in the blast of a bomb at Sackville Place on 1st December 1972, and again on 17th

May 1974. Mr. Durkan called for a formal public inquiry in order that someone be

made accountable for these atrocities. He stated:

“She was a citizen of this State, injured in one of the most horrific crimes that

ever happened in this country. Surely, she ought to know why and how.”

1.27 Mr. Ed O’Neill, whose father was murdered in the Parnell Street bomb, made a

statement to the Sub-Committee. He indicated that he did not want any

sympathy but rather a proper and full investigation into the murder of his father

and the other victims.

1.28 Similar recollections of personal experiences of the bombings were recounted one

after another by the victims and their relatives. The Sub-Committee

acknowledges how harrowing it was for the members of the Group to recall the

events of the day and wishes to thank them for their contributions. It is clear that

many of the victims and relatives have still not recovered from their experiences.

Mr. Frank Massey, whose daughter was killed in the South Leinster Street bomb,

summed up the views of many of the victims and the bereaved when he stated in

his submission:

“As an ordinary citizen and the father of a beautiful murdered child, the

circumstances of whose death have not been fully or properly investigated,

leaving my family and I with a great loss and a disappointment in the society in

which I brought up my seven children to believe, I demand a public inquiry in

her name and in the names of all who died or were injured on 17th May, 1974”.

1.29 Initially, Mr. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin S.C., instructed by Mr. Greg O’Neill, solicitor,

made a statement to the Sub-Committee on behalf of the Justice for the Forgotten

Group. He outlined the background to the establishment of the Justice for the

Forgotten Group and the series of events, which led to the publication of the

Barron Report and ultimately to the hearings, which were held by the Sub-

Committee. He stated:

“By affording us an opportunity to publicly present the case for a public

inquiry the Committee is discharging an important function. First, it indicates

the concern with which the issue is being considered and enables the public to

be better informed of the grounds for an inquiry ... Consideration of the report

carried out in discussion with Ministers behind closed doors would not be

satisfactory at this stage.”

He observed:

“We all appreciate that public inquiries are not established on the basis of

allegations or idle speculation. There must be legitimate facts which raise a

legitimate and grave concern.”

He concluded:

“From our perspective, the Barron report is a ringing endorsement of the case

for a public inquiry. It is akin to an opening statement for such an inquiry; it is

not a closing statement. It validates the relentless campaign of those who will

appear before the Committee today. This is a campaign driven by these people’s

deep sense of obligation to ask fundamental questions about what was done to

and for their loved ones and themselves. I will conclude by acknowledging that

all the people appearing before the committee today have, by their commitment

to pursue the truth over the past ten years, done this country an enormous

service.”

BIOGRAPHICAL DETAILS OF THE VICTIMS OF THE DUBLIN AND MONAGHAN

BOMBINGS

Patrick Askin (44): Forestry worker, married, Glaslough, Co. Monaghan. Killed in the

Monaghan bomb. Survived by his wife, Patricia and four young children: sons Paul and

Patrick, aged 6 and 7 and two year old twin daughters, Sonia and Sharon.

Josie Bradley (21): Civil Servant, single, Coolfin, Kilcormack, Co. Offaly. Killed in

Talbot Street, Dublin. Survived by her parents, May and Chris, twin sister, Marian and

eight other siblings.

Marie Butler (21): Temporarily employed as a shop assistant at Clery’s while awaiting a

nursing place at Sir Patrick Dun’s Hospital, single. Vilierstown, Cappoquin, Co.

Waterford. Killed in Parnell Street, Dublin. Survived by her mother, Mary.

Anne Byrne (35): Housewife married, Donaghmede, Dublin. Killed in Talbot Street

while on a shopping trip. Survived by her husband, Michael, and two children: Michelle,

aged 8 and Trevor, aged 4.

Thomas Campbell (52): Agricultural worker, single, Silverstream, Co. Monaghan.

Killed in Monaghan. Survived by his mother and sister, Mary, also two stepsisters. His

mother never recovered from the shock of his death and died six weeks later.

Simone Chetrit (30): A French citizen visiting Ireland with a number of other French

students on an English language course. She was due to return to her home in Paris the

following morning. She was single and was survived by her parents, brothers and Elie,

Maurice, Marcel and Albert and sister Yvette. She was killed in Talbot Street.

Thomas Croarkin (36): Agricultural worker, single, Tyholland, Co. Monaghan.

Seriously injured in Monaghan and survived until 24th July, 1974 when he died in the

Richmond Hospital, Dublin. Survived by his mother and seven siblings.

John Dargle (80): John was a pensioner, who lived alone at Portland Row, Ballybough,

Dublin. It seems he had served in the British Army and was working at the Corporation

Fruit Market in Dublin. He was killed in the Parnell street bombing.

Concepta Dempsey (65): A shop assistant in Guiney’s Talbot Street, Concepta was

single and lived at Chord Road, Drogheda, Co. Louth. She was seriously injured in

Talbot Street and survived until 11th June when she died in the Mater Hospital. She was

survived by five nieces and nephews: Vincent, Deirdre, Gertie, Raymond and Aidan.

Collette & Baby Doherty (21): Collette ran a shop in Sheriff Street with her husband

John. She was nine months pregnant when she was killed in Talbot Street. She was

survived by her husband John, daughter Wendy, aged 22 months, her parents, Michael

and Winifred and siblings. Wendy was with her when she was killed and was found

wandering an hour later, relatively unharmed.

Patrick Fay (47): He was employed in the GPO, married, a native of Ardee, Co. Louth,

he lived in Artane, Dublin. He was survived by his wife, Maura and only son, Pat, who

15

had moved to live in London. He was killed in Parnell Street, having just filled his car

with petrol at Westbrook Motors.

Elizabeth Fitzgerald (59): She had lived with her husband, Christopher in

Phibsborough. Both we re injured in the Parnell Street bombing. She survived until 19th

May 1974, while her husband, Christopher, recovered in the Mater Hospital.

Breda Grace (35): Married, housewife and living in Portmarnock, originally from Tralee,

Co. Kerry. She was survived by her husband, Tim and 12 month old son, Edward. Breda

was killed in Talbot Street.

Archie Harper (73): An active man who still ran a farm and family pub in his native

Co. Monaghan. He was survived by his wife and only daughter, Iris. He was injured in

the Monaghan bombing and died on the following Tuesday night, 21st May, at 11.45 p.m.

Antonio Magliocco (37); Italian citizen. Restaurant owner, survived by his wife, Anna,

and three young children, Tommassino, Corrado and Marinella. He was a native of

Casalattico, near Cassino, in Italy. He was killed instantly in the explosion in Parnell

Street, while visiting his brother Mario’s restaurant. His wife and family moved back to

Italy a number of years after his death, but his brothers and sisters remained in Ireland.

May McKenna (55): Originally from Monaghan and Dungannon, Co. Tyrone, but lived

in Talbot Street (over O’Neill’s Shoe Shop). She was employed at Clery’s. She was

survived by her sister, Margaret McNicholl, brother-in-law and three nephews. May

was killed instantly in the Talbot Street explosion.

Anne Marren (20): Worked in Department of Posts and Telegraphs in Hawkins Street.

She was a native of Lavagh, Ballymote, Co. Sligo. She was survived by her father, two

sisters and two brothers. Anne was killed in the Talbot Street explosion.

Anna Massey (21): Worked at Lisney’s Auctioneers and from Sallynoggin, Dublin.

Anna was the eldest of seven girls and was a twin. She was survived by her parents,

Frank and Annie, and sisters. She was engaged to be married and her wedding was due

to take place in July 1974. Anna was killed in the South Leinster Street explosion.

Dorothy Morris (57): Employed at Cadbury’s. Dorothy had five siblings and lived all

her life in Kimmage with her mother and sister, Georgina. She was killed in the Talbot

Street explosion.

O’Brien Family — John O’Brien (24), Anna O’Brien (22), Jacqueline (17 mths) &

Anne-Marie (5 mths): Lived in Gardiner Street, originally from Finglas. John worked

in Palm Grove, the ice-pop factory. This entire family was wiped out in the Parnell

Street explosion.

Christina O’Loughlin (51): Worked in the Shelbourne Hotel as a french polisher.

Resided in Townsend Street, Dublin. She was survived by her husband, Kevin and two

adult sons, Kevin Junior and Pius. Christina was killed in the South Leinster Street

explosion.

Edward John O’Neill (39): Self-employed painter and decorator who lived in Dominick

Street with is wife, Martha and five children: Denise, Angela, Billy, Edward Jnr., and

16

Niall. Edward was killed and his two young sons were seriously injured in the Parnell

Street bombing. His wife gave birth to a stillborn daughter three months after his death.

Baby Martha O’Neill (stillborn): Stillborn child of Edward and Martha O’Neill, born in

August 1974.

Marie Phelan (20): Worked in the Civil Service. Originally from Ballyvoreen,

Woodstown, Co. Waterford and living in Dublin. Survived by her parents, Kitty and

Billy, and brothers, Pat and Anthony. Marie was killed in the Talbot Street explosion.

Siobhán Roice (19): Worked in the Civil Service. Originally from Thomas Street,

Wexford town and living in Dublin. She was survived by her parents, Johanna and

Edward, sisters Aileen and Elizabeth and brother James. Siobhán was killed in the

Talbot Street explosion.

Maureen Shields (46): Originally from Hollyford, Co. Tipperary. Maureen moved to

Dublin where she worked in the Civil Service until her marriage to Leo in 1953. They had

one son and two daughters. Maureen was killed in the Talbot Street explosion.

Jack Travers (28): Self-employed, single and from Park Street, Monaghan Town. Jack

still lived with his family and was very athletic. He was engaged to be married. Survived

by his parents, brother Jim, sisters and fiancée. Jack was killed in the explosion in North

Street, Monaghan.

Breda Turner (21): Worked in the Civil Service, in the Income Tax Office, she was

engaged to be married the following Easter. Originally from Thurles, Co. Tipperary, she

had moved to Dublin and was survived by her parents, Biddy and Jimmy, and brother

and sisters. She was killed in the Parnell Street explosion.

John Walshe (27): Single, from Crumlin, Dublin. He was survived by his father and

mother, sisters Anne and Mary and girlfriend Joan. He was killed in the Talbot Street

explosion.

Peggy White (45): Part-time restaurant worker. She was survived by her husband, Joe,

a daughter and three young sons. She lived in Belgium Park, Monaghan town. Peggy

was injured in the bomb in North Road, Monaghan town and died on the night of the

bombing.

George Williamson (72): A bachelor farmer from Castleshane, Co. Monaghan. George

was survived by his sister, Margaret and two brothers, Isiaiah and Jesse, as well as nieces

and nephews. He was killed in the explosion in North Road, Monaghan.

Chapter Two

Whether the Report of the independent Commission of Inquiry into the Dublin and

Monaghan bombings of 1974 addresses all of the issues covered in the terms of

reference of the Inquiry.

INTRODUCTION

2.1 A number of submissions both written and oral were received by the Sub-

Committee and were of assistance to it in its deliberations on the question of

whether the Barron Report addressed all the issues covered in the terms of

reference of the Inquiry. These submissions were received by the Sub-Committee

on foot of invitations to lodge submissions, which were extended directly, and by

public advertisement. Some submissions contended that matters appeared to

have been overlooked in the Report. Other submissions argued that Mr Justice

Barron may have misconstrued issues in the course of preparing his report.

2.2 The areas where concern was expressed about the Barron Report can be broken

down into the following broad categories:

(i) the findings of the Barron Report in relation to the identity of the perpetrators and the issue of collusion.

(ii) adequacy of the Garda investigation;

(iii) missing documentation in this jurisdiction;

(iv) the role and response of the Government of the day;

(v) composition of the bombs; and

(vi) concerns highlighted by certain individuals regarding theBarron Report;

2.3 On foot of their written submissions, a number of parties were invited to make

oral submissions before the Sub-Committee to clarify issues, which had been

identified. As the examination process progressed, other parties were identified

and invited to attend before the Sub-Committee. The names of all of the parties

who made oral and written submissions are set out at Appendices.

2.4 The Sub-Committee also invited Mr. Justice Henry Barron to assist with certain

issues, which had been raised by relevant submissions. Prior to his appearance

before the Sub-Committee, Mr. Justice Barron was supplied with relevant

written submissions.

2.5 The approach taken by Mr. Justice Barron may be summed up by his comment:

18

“... I do not like to be dogmatic. I do not like to say, ‘Of course we did

everything we could have done’. I am being reasonable.”

The Sub-Committee is grateful to Mr. Justice Barron for this approach, which it

believes, was both correct and helpful.

2.6 The Sub-Committee wishes to state that it was not its function to re-investigate

the Dublin Monaghan bombings. Rather, the role of the Sub-Committee was to

examine whether Mr. Justice Barron considered all the issues covered in the

terms of reference of his Inquiry.

2.7 The Sub-Committee found the Report of Mr Justice Barron to be well written

and well presented, and is grateful to him for this. It was also felt that, subject to

the comments below, Mr. Justice Barron addressed the issues as best he could in

the circumstances. The Sub-Committee notes that he faced a number of

difficulties such as length of time since the atrocity, his lack of any powers of

compellability, the resources available to him, and the lack of co-operation from

the U.K. authorities.

THE FINDINGS OF THE BARRON REPORT IN RELATION TO THE IDENTITY OF THE PERPETRATORS AND THE ISSUE OF COLLUSION.

2.8 This was an area, which concerned the Sub-Committee greatly. A number of

parties made submissions to the Sub-Committee in relation to this issue. The

submissions of these parties were taken very seriously by the Sub-Committee

during their deliberations.

2.9 In relation to the identify of the perpetrators, Mr. Justice Barron stated quite

categorically:

‘The Inquiry is satisfied that the persons principally responsible for carrying

out the bombing attacks on Dublin and Monaghan were loyalist

paramilitaries. This was the view of the security forces on both sides of the

border at the time, and most of the information available to the Inquiry points

to that direction.’

2.10 He went on to say: ‘ A number of factors point to the involvement of two groups, one from

Belfast, the other from Portadown/ Lurgan’. He noted that since 1993, the official UVF

position was that the bombings were authorised by the leadership at the time.

His report contains a reasonable amount of detail on the identity of the

individuals suspected of carrying out the bombs and the means they used.

2.11 In relation to the issue of collusion, Mr Justice Barron indicated that he felt there

had been a misconception about what the Report had done in this regard. He

informed the Sub-Committee that the Report does generally indicate that there

was a high level of collusion operating in Northern Ireland at the time of the

bombings. However, while he felt there was direct evidence that collusion was

operating in Northern Ireland at that time, he also felt there was no evidence to

suggest direct collusion in relation to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. He

was at pains to point out that the two positions are very different. He stated:

“Basically what we were trying to do was not to conclude anything if the

evidence we had would make the conclusion unfair to whoever we were

accusing ... The problem about the Report is that it is not a judgment in the

sense of having listened to one side and then to another side and one decided

which side one wished to accept. We put into the report as much evidence as we

believe is reliable or has a basis in reliability. We have given conclusions. I am

prepared to accept that other people may take different views as to what

conclusions should be reached in relation to the facts in the report.”

There is a significant amount of material in the Barron Report which points to a

link between some of those who were suspected of having a role in the bombings

and the security forces in Northern Ireland. However, he did state that when it

came specifically to the bombings, he had no direct evidence to suggest such a

link.

2.12 Mr. Justice Barron did note that it had been asserted there was a significant

element in the security forces in Northern Ireland, which was opposed to the

efforts towards a political solution, which were then being pursued by the

Labour Government. He quoted the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland,

Mr. Merlyn Rees, in relation to a subversive faction in British Army Intelligence:

‘ It was a unit, a section out of control. There is no doubt it reflected the views

of a number of soldiers.’ “ Let’s go in and fix this lot’’, and so on. But that it

went on, and that it went on from Lisburn, and it went on from the Army

Information Service and those associated with it, I have no doubt at all.’

2.13 Mr. Justice Barron also quoted from a letter from Mr. Colin Wallace, former

British Army Senior Information Officer in Army Headquarters, to a former

colleague, in which he wrote on 14 August, 1975:

‘ .... There is good evidence that the Dublin Monaghan bombings were a

reprisal for the Irish Government’s role in bringing about the Executive.

According to one of Craig’s people, some of those involved the Youngs, the

Jacksons, Mulholland, Hanna, Kerr and McConnell were working closely with

SB and Int. at that time.’

Mr. Justice Barron remarked in his Report that Mr. Wallace was making these

allegations as early as 1975, but noted that his letter does not contain any

objective evidence to support the claims. Mr. Justice Barron had access to Irish

Army intelligence and from that he was able to note that the security forces in

Northern Ireland had a significant level of intelligence on loyalist groups and Mr.

Justice Barron was therefore of the view that this made it harder to accept the

proposition that the bombings of 17 May 1974 came as a total surprise to the

security forces in Northern Ireland.

2.14 Even taking into account all the information received from Colin Wallace, John

Weir and Fred Holroyd, Mr. Justice Barron felt he could not go beyond the

conclusions reached in his report in relation to collusion.

2.15 The Sub-Committee notes that at very least, the Barron Report itself contains

suggestions that collusion at some level did in fact play a part in the events of 17th

May 1974, and rather than allay the Sub-Committee’s suspicions about collusion,

the further submissions made by various parties at the series of oral hearings have

only served to heighten those concerns.

Justice for the Forgotten

2.16 Mr. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin S.C. appeared on behalf of the Justice for the Forgotten

group instructed by Mr. Greg O’Neill, solicitor. He stated:

“The Barron Report confirms that there is evidential substance and

foundation to the allegations that the Garda investigation was compromised,

that the RUC did not co-operate, that the Government did not assist, that

there is reasonable basis for the suspicion of collusion, and that assertions

made by ‘Hidden Hand - the Forgotten Massacre’ had substance”.

He also observed that:

“... we say that the Barron Report significantly fails to achieve the goal of the

entire process. In that regard, we say the process was established, with the

Barron Commission, this committee and the question of a further stage. The

aim of the entire process was to find out the truth in relation to the bombings,

the truth in relation to the Garda investigation, the truth in relation to State

action and the truth in relation to collusion. We say that, in a substantive

sense, that has not been achieved.”

Mr. Seán Donlon

2.17 Mr. Seán Donlon, former Secretary General in the Department of Foreign Affairs,

was in 1974 the Assistant Secretary in charge of the Northern Ireland desk. It was

his belief that there was collusion at a general level. This was based on his regular

contact with responsible individuals in the North and from a litany of court cases

involving collusion at local level. In response to a question by Deputy Power, he

stated:

‘However, I would certainly with the passage of time, use the word

‘probability’ rather than ‘possibility’ when it came to collusion.’

UK Documentation

2.18 When asked to consider the problems associated with the lack of original

documentation supplied by the British Government to the Inquiry, Mr. Justice

Barron stated that his attempts to address the issues with which he was charged

21

were frustrated. He pointed out that had he received the same levels of support

from the British Government as he did from the Irish government he would have

had much more information.

“If one does not see the original documentation and one does not see it in its

context, it is obvious one is not getting the full picture.”

2.19 In the opinion of Mr. Justice Barron, the fact that the Inquiry never saw original

intelligence documents and was only allowed access to sixteen pages of a

summary of the documents, was a hindrance to its work.

The View of the Sub-Committee

2.20 In relation to the identity of the perpetrators, Mr. Justice Barron compiled a

wealth of material, which supports his conclusion that the bombings were

carried by the two groups of loyalist paramilitaries (one in Belfast and the

other in Portadown/Lurgan). There is still a degree of speculation as to the

definitive line- up of individuals actually involved in each stage of the

preparation, planning and placing of the bombs. The Barron Report will

serve as a useful starting point in assisting any further enquiry.

2.21 With regard to the issue of collusion, the Sub-Committee has a limited

function namely, to review the Barron Report and cannot therefore come to a

different conclusion. The Sub-Committee would like to acknowledge the

difficulties faced by Mr. Justice Barron in his attempts to explore this issue

fully. There is no way of knowing what might be contained in

documentation which exists in Northern Ireland and the UK without

gaining access to that documentation. However, even based on the material

he did manage to gather, the suggestion that members of the security forces

in Northern Ireland could have been involved in the bombings is in Mr

Justice Barron’s own words, ‘neither fanciful nor absurd’. In addition, the

Sub-Committee is concerned that a number of responsible persons and

groups who made submissions have come to the conclusion that collusion

played a part.

2.22 Until such time as the relevant original documentation is released by the UK

Authorities and the issue addressed in the jurisdiction where the bombs

were prepared and planned, namely, Northern Ireland, it may not be possible

to come to definitive conclusions in this regard. The question of what any

further inquiry can achieve in this regard will be considered later in this

Report. The Sub-Committee acknowledges that the failure to bring closure

on this particular aspect has exacerbated the pain and suffering of the

victims and their relatives.

ADEQUACY OF THE GARDA INVESTIGATION

2.23 The Barron Report was extremely critical of the manner in which the

investigation into the bombings was conducted. In addition to considering the

Report and the submission of Mr. Justice Barron, the Sub-Committee also

received submissions both oral and written from the Garda Commissioner and

the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. The areas of concern were:

(i) The actual conduct of the investigation;

(ii) The winding-up of the investigation;

(iii) The interaction between the Gardaí and their counterparts

in Northern Ireland in respect of the interviewing of

suspects; and

(iv) The exchange and handling of intelligence.

Adequacy of the Garda Investigation

2.24 The following representatives of An Garda Siochána appeared before the Sub-

Committee:

Mr. Noel Conroy, Commissioner of An Garda Síochána

Mr. Fachtna Murphy, Deputy Commissioner

Mr. Joe Egan, Assistant Commissioner

Mr. Martin Callanan, Detective Chief Superintendent

2.25 The Garda Commissioner, Mr. Noel Conroy addressed conclusion number 1 of

the Barron Report with regard to the Garda investigation, which states:

“The Garda investigation failed to make full use of the information it

obtained. Certain lines of inquiry that could have been pursued further in this

jurisdiction were not pursued”

2.26 The Commissioner strenuously objected to these criticisms saying:

“I can tell you that they were conscientious officers who would leave no stone

unturned, as far as I am concerned, in the investigation of any serious crime,

never mind this outrageous crime.”

2.27 Mr. Justice Barron told the Sub-Committee that any allegations that the Garda

investigation was deliberately wound down were investigated by the Inquiry and

no truth was found in any of them. Any suggestion of such had been vehemently

denied by the Government and Mr. Justice Barron stated:

“...there is absolutely no truth in it. We felt we should make this clear. I have

read the relevant portions and am perfectly prepared to say the Report may

not be as clear as it should have been”.

Witnesses in other jurisdictions

2.28 In relation to the interviewing of witnesses from another jurisdiction, the

Commissioner pointed out that this would be done by the police force of the

jurisdiction in which the suspects lived. It would not have been normal

procedure for the Garda to interfere with residents in another jurisdiction.

2.29 The officer in charge of C3 (the section of the Garda Síochána dealing with

intelligence) controlled issues relating to the interviewing of witnesses from

another jurisdiction. If the Garda authorities need enquiries to be made in

another jurisdiction, a request will emanate from the relevant investigating officer

to the Commissioner and he deals with it. The same procedure is still in place

today.

2.30 One of the reasons given for this procedure relates to the different legal systems,

which apply in various jurisdictions. One has to be careful to obtain evidence in a

legally admissible manner. The Commissioner pointed out:

“... one has to depend on one’s local police force to deal with all those issues and

to make sure whatever evidence is obtained, if it is obtained, will be admissible

in law later on.”

Preserving crime scenes

2.31 When directed to consider the manner in which the investigation of the crime

scene was carried out, the Commissioner felt it had been conducted in a thorough

and professional manner given the facilities and services at the time. He did point

out that in today’s world, there would undoubtedly be a different approach taken

to the preservation of crime scenes. An illustration of this was the way in which

procedures have changed over the years.

2.32 In 1974, procedures regarding preserving crime scenes, photography and mapping

were outlined in the Manual of Criminal Investigation. This Manual has been

changed twice since 1974 as a result of the development of new techniques in

relation to investigation procedures and forensic science.

Interplay between the Gardaí, the then Department of Justice and the Director of

Public Prosecutions

2.33 One issue, which concerned the members of the Sub-Committee greatly, was the

lack of communication, which appeared to exist between the Department of

Justice and the Gardaí in 1974. The Garda Commissioner outlined the nature of

the relationship, which now exists between the two bodies.

2.34 Information is made available to officers in the Department of Justice, Equality

and Law Reform on a daily basis. It is their job to then brief the Minister in

whatever way they see fit. Any direct communication between the Garda

Commissioner and the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform is limited

to keeping him informed on security issues pertaining to the State.

2.35 As regards the interplay between the Garda, the Minister and the Director of

Public Prosecutions, the current Minister for Justice, Mr. Michael McDowell

T.D., stated:

“The function of an Garda Síochána is to report serious crime for prosecution

to the Director of Public Prosecutions and he will, on occasion, give it

instructions as to how the investigation should proceed. The Minister for

Justice, Equality and Law Reform nowadays never gets involved in telling

Gardaí how to do their day to day operational work”.

2.36 If a similar atrocity happened tomorrow, the Minister indicated that he would

not be the one to contact the Gardaí. Rather, An Garda Síochána would contact

his Department very quickly and would brief the Security Division in the

Department in order to brief the Minister accordingly.

2.37 The Minister told the Sub-Committee that it is usual for members of the police

forces from both parts of this Island and the Security Division of the Department

to be represented at meetings where issues pertaining to the security of the State

would arise. Sometimes those meetings would also be attended by An Taoiseach,

the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Minister for Foreign

Affairs. While individual incidents are occasionally discussed at the meetings,

generally a mutual de-briefing on all that has transpired since the previous

meeting is not carried out.

Other issues

2.38 Mr. Justice Barron clarified points he made in his report in relation to the role of

the Attorney General of the day. He outlined how the Gardaí, if they had any

evidence on a particular case, sent a file to the Attorney General for his opinion

on whether there was sufficient evidence to prosecute. However, even if there

was no evidence, the Gardaí could at any time go to the Attorney General for his

advice as to whether there were any steps which could be taken to further the

investigation.

2.39 Mr. Justice Barron made the point that the level of evidence, which the Gardaí

needed in order to support a successful prosecution, was very different to the

level of information, which an Inquiry such as his own needed in order to come to

any conclusions. Whether or not the allegations could be proven did not concern

the Inquiry in the same way as it would have concerned the Gardaí and so a

different standard must apply.

2.40 Mr. Justice Barron, in his submission, further elaborated on the statement in his

report that he found no evidence to support the proposition that the Garda

investigation was wound down through political interference.

2.41 Although Mr. Justice Barron has found no evidence to support this theory, he still

was not able to ascertain why the investigation was wound down and in fact, he

stated that in his view, “ there was no single reason why the investigation ended when it did.”

It is nonetheless extraordinary that the investigation into an atrocity of this scale

could or should be wound down so soon.

2.42 Mr. Justice Barron requested, and the Garda Commissioner agreed, to establish

an internal inquiry on why the investigations ceased when they did. Even though

the most senior Gardaí involved in the investigation are deceased, this matter is

still an issue of real concern for the Sub-Committee.

The View of the Sub-Committee

2.43 The Barron Report at page 275 details certain specific criticisms relating to

the Garda investigation. Nothing the Sub-Committee has heard detracts

from these conclusions. They are:

(i) That the Garda investigation failed to make full use of the information that it obtained, notably in relation to lines of enquiry and seeking to interview suspects.

(ii) That the State was not equipped to conduct an adequate forensic analysis of the explosions. Vital clues were lost by the failure to act promptly in the collection and

preservation of evidence.

(iii) That no proper chain of evidence was maintained and /or recorded in relation to the forensic samples or photographs. Critical forensic samples and photographs have as a result been lost or mislaid.

2.44 The Sub-Committee is of the view that Mr. Justice Barron did address the

issue of the Garda investigation and that he was successful in collating

evidence to support his own conclusions in relation to this issue. As was

pointed out repeatedly during the course of our deliberations by almost all of

the interested parties, the Dublin/Monaghan bombings represent the single

biggest atrocity in the history of this State. Despite this fact, the

investigation was wound down in August 1974 at a time when it appears that

the investigation teams were aware of:

(i) the size and probable composition of the bombs;

(ii) the names of several persons whose photographic identities had been recognised with greater or lesser degrees of certainty by witnesses. They either connected

them with the bomb cars or believed them to have been acting suspiciously, so that it was reasonable to infer that they may have been in some way involved in the bombings;

(iii) the names of several persons whom the Garda authorities, and other official sources, both here and elsewhere, believed to have been involved in the atrocities.

2.45 The Sub-Committee believes that an Inquiry with statutory powers should

be established to investigate the following sole issues, namely:

1. Why was the Garda investigation into the Dublin and Monaghan bombings wound down in 1974?

2. Why did the Gardaí not follow-up on the following leads?:

(i) Information that a white van with an English registration plate, was parked outside the Department of Posts and Telegraphs on Portland Row and was later seen parked in the deep sea area of the B&I ferry port in Dublin, and the subsequent contact made with a British Army officer on a ferry boat leaving that port.

(ii) Information relating to a man who stayed in the Four Courts Hotel between 15 and 17 May 1974, and his contacts with the UVF.

(iii) Information concerning a British Army corporalallegedly sighted in Dublin at the time of the bombings.

2.46 The form this Inquiry should take is fully set out in Chapter 4 at pages 54-56.

However, it should have the benefit of the work undertaken by the internal

Garda investigation and accordingly, should be able to conclude its work on

this issue in a relatively short time frame.

2.47 The manner in which crime is investigated is an operational one for the

Garda authorities. However, the Sub-Committee does feel that there should

be some mechanism in place for reviewing major Garda investigations and

assessing the progress that is being made (see further details in Chapter 3). It

should be recognised that where a major incident occurs, the trauma of the

victims may be further exacerbated by any perception on their part that

sufficient steps are not being taken to bring the perpetrators to justice.

MISSING DOCUMENTS ACTION IN THIS JURISDICTION

2.48 One of the most extraordinary revelations contained in the Barron Report is that

there is an amount of official documentation, which has disappeared. Given that

this was the largest atrocity in the State, it is astonishing that better care was not

kept of these documents and there exists no complete explanation as to their

whereabouts.

Garda Files

2.49 Mr. Justice Barron told the Sub-Committee he was satisfied that he had received

all the documentation that was available from An Garda Síochána. When asked

by Senator Jim Walsh about the extent of missing Garda files, Mr. Justice Barron

stated:

“What is missing as far as the Garda documentation is concerned is known as the security file relating to the bombing in Dublin. It is a limited file. The Garda has furnished to us a large quantity of documentation one way or another, which it has still from the investigation at the time but, regrettably, one of the most important things is the photographs and they are not available.”

2.50 Although Mr. Justice Barron indicated to Deputy Joe Costello that he was

handicapped to some extent by not having the 1974 Dublin bomb intelligence file,

and was therefore unaware of the contents, he qualified this remark by saying:

“To a large extent, it is fair to say the same documentation is on the

Department of Justice file but it would have had, perhaps, internal reports or

considerations of what was going on and so on. I do not know.”

2.51 Although it would appear that the missing Dublin bomb intelligence file would

have been duplicated in part to a file in the Department of Justice, this

corresponding file was also missing.

As a result of what the Sub-Committee felt was a degree of confusion in relation

to the exact nature and extent of missing Garda files, a number of questions were

put to the representatives of the Garda Síochána who attended the hearings.

2.52 The Commissioner provided the Sub-Committee with a list of the twelve files

which could not be located despite exhaustive searches and which remain

missing at this point in time. They consist of:

(a) 3C 38/71 File entitled “Border Incidents”

(b) 3C 104/71 File entitled “the appointment of Detective Garda

(name not included) to Detective Branch”

(c) 3C 15/71 File entitled ‘IRA activities”

(d) 3C 38/73 File entitled “Border Incidents”

(e) 3C 68/73 File entitled “Robbery at the Starlight Ballroom,

Clones”

(f) 3C 15/74 File entitled “IRA activities”

(g) 3C 35/74 File entitled “UDA”

(h) 3C 936/74 File entitled “Dublin Bombings”

(i) 3C 1781/74 File entitled “Suspect Motor Cars”

(j) 3C 35/75 File entitled “UDA”

(k) 3C 27/76 File entitled “Garda Transport Radio Equipment”

(l) 3C 1146/76 File entitled (name not included)- this file related

to a suspect for a crime other than the Dublin/Monaghan bombings and which is

currently within the remit of the Commission.

2.53 When asked by Deputy Seán Ardagh to consider the matter of the missing

security file on the Dublin bombings, the Commissioner considered that it was

likely that a copy of the file in question had been sent to the Department of

Justice. As the Monaghan file had turned up in the Department, he felt there was

no reason to believe that the Dublin file was not sent to the Department at the

same time as its Dublin counterpart:

“..I must presume that if it got one, it got the two. I do not think it went missing

purposely.”

2.54 A Register was kept which detailed when and where files were sent if they left

the Garda storage facility. However, this Register had also gone missing and

therefore it was impossible to determine conclusively whether or not the Dublin

bombing file was actually forwarded to the Department of Justice.

2.55 Although the C3 files were of central importance in the investigation of

subversive activity at the time, the Commissioner felt that it was possible that

much of the information contained within the missing files would actually be

contained in other files which had been made available to Mr. Justice Barron:

“The fact that a small number of files could not be found does not mean that

the information in other files does not contain the information contained in

missing files.”

2.56 The Sub-Committee was told that the copies of the security files, which are

unavailable for the years 1974 and 1975, are available at the Special Detective Unit.

These copies were exact copies and were seen by Mr. Justice Barron during his

investigation. When asked by Deputy Seán Ardagh if he was satisfied that the

copy of the security file on the Dublin bombings was complete, Assistant

Commissioner Egan stated:

“There is no reason to think that it is not. It runs in tandem with all the other

years and there does not seem to be anything missing from it.”

2.57 When asked to consider the statement of Mr. Justice Barron in his Report to the

effect that there were certain files in C3 which would not have been kept by the

Special Detective Unit which are still missing, Assistant Commissioner Egan told

the Sub-Committee that this must arise out of some confusion in describing the

files.

2.58 In relation to the comment made by Mr. Justice Barron in his report:

“but the files kept by Security and Intelligence (C3) at Garda Headquarters

would have included more than just the files kept by the Security and

Intelligence (C3) division, of which SDU was merely a part.”

The Garda authorities informed the Sub-Committee that it is not possible due to

the lapse of time, to confirm whether this statement accurately reflects the

situation at the time, as the relevant files at the Security and Intelligence (C3)

were not available and could not be located for the work of the Commission of

Inquiry. They stated in a written submission to the Sub-Committee:

“The most that can be said is that it is highly probable that a great deal of

similarity exists between the files at the Special Detective unit and those at

Security and Intelligence (C3), in light of the fact that it was standard practice

at the time, for operational reasons, to make such material available to the

Special Detective unit.”

2.59 With regard to the missing photo album, the Commissioner commented:

“It was very valuable at the time with regard to fixing on suspects, but it must

be remembered that the manner in which these photographs were taken meant

that they could not be used in evidence. The Garda would need to find some

other mechanism to deal with that issue if we were in a situation of producing

evidence and making evidence available for presentation in the Courts.”

2.60 Mr. Justice Barron was not furnished with the security file on the Dublin

bombings. This appears to have gone missing. The annual files relating to the

UVF/UDA were not available for the years 1974 and 1975. Annual files relating to

payments made to confidential sources were also not available

Department of Justice Files

2.61 Mr. Justice Barron felt there was nothing in the documentation made available to

him from the Department of Justice files, which suggested the existence of a file

on the Dublin bombings, which had subsequently gone missing. However, he did

indicate that all the evidence points to the fact that there had to be such a file in

existence at some point in time. If the file in relation to the Monaghan bombings

was found in the Department, it is logical to conclude that the equivalent file in

relation to the Dublin bombings should also be there.

“The impression we got was that there was no point in following it up because

they just had no evidence about it at all. The documents seemed to suggest they

never existed in the first place but we know they had to.”

2.62 Mr. Justice Barron stated that he had not followed the issue up with the

Department of Justice as far as he might:

“I do not really think we discussed the absence of files with them to any great degree. We were more interested in the procedures which were operating in the Department at the time with the Gardaí.”

2.63 In order to shed some light on the missing documents in the Department of

Justice, the following representatives from the Department of Justice, Equality

and Law Reform appeared before the Sub-Committee.

Mr. Michael McDowell, T.D., Minister for Justice Equality and Law Reform,

Mr. Timothy Dalton Secretary General,

Mr. Ken O’Leary Assistant Secretary, and

Mr. David Walker Assistant Principal Officer

2.64 The Sub-Committee was particularly interested in the manner in which files are

retained and preserved in the Department, both today and in the past.

2.65 The Minister outlined how files and other documents dealing with the activities

of paramilitary groupings are maintained in a small unit of the Department

known as the Security and Northern Ireland Division. Access to that unit is

severely restricted. The only people outside that unit who have access to those

documents are the Minister, the Secretary General and the Assistant Secretary

General. No other persons have access to that documentation. This is the

situation, which has pertained in the Department for as long as anyone can

remember.

2.66 The Minister felt that the explanation for the paucity of documentation on the

bombings was probably because most of the exchanges in relation to these

matters took place between the Minister, his senior officials and the Garda

authorities. As a result, they were not documented. He pointed out that time

devoted to discussion of matters of State security is not necessarily matched by a

corresponding volume of paperwork.

2.67 The only documentation, which appears to have gone missing in the Department,

is the Garda report on the incident. However, there appears to be a copy of this

file in Garda Headquarters.

2.68 No file appears to have been opened by the Department on receipt of the Garda

report on the Dublin bombings. The Minister pointed out that simply because a

file was received from the Garda authorities did not mean that a corresponding

file would be opened in the Department of Justice. This would only occur if there

was work to be done on it, if there were inquiries, parliamentary questions or

issues arising, which were of relevance to the Minister or the Department.

2.69 Furthermore, all files opened on any incident were logged in a Register, which

was kept in the Department. That Register is still in existence, and there is no

record in it of any file on the Dublin bombings ever having been created.

2.70 The only way these files could exist is if a decision was made, at their time of

opening, not to register them. The Minister could think of no possible motive,

which might influence any member of the Department of Justice to do this in the

immediate aftermath of the events.

The View of the Sub-Committee

2.71 After hearing all of the submissions in relation to this issue there is

considerable confusion as to which documents are actually missing, whether

or not the missing documents are copies of original ones that are still in

existence and whether or not documents referred to as being missing were

ever in existence in the first place. However, what is very clear is that the

Dublin and Monaghan bombings were the single greatest atrocity to have

taken place since the foundation of the State, and for that reason alone it is a

matter of fundamental concern that clarity is brought to this issue. Whilst

the Sub-Committee has received no suggestion that the documentation was

either deliberately destroyed or misplaced, the very fact that there is an issue

about missing documentation is a matter of considerable disquiet to the Sub-

Committee, and it is of the view that it requires an investigation which

would have statutory powers.

2.72 The Sub-Committee is of the view that an investigation be established which

can categorically determine the following:

(i) the exact documentation (Departmental, Garda, intelligence and any other documentation of relevance) that is unaccounted for;

(ii) the reasons explaining the missing documentation;

(iii) whether the missing documentation can be located; and

(iv) whether the systems currently in place are adequate to prevent a re-occurrence.

The form this Inquiry should take is fully set out in Chapter 4, pages 54-56.

THE ROLE AND RESPONSE OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DAY

2.73 The Barron Report contained a number of adverse comments in relation to the

response of the Government of the day to the atrocities. Two Cabinet members of

that Government took issue with comments made by Mr. Justice Barron, which

were critical of the manner in which the situation had been dealt with by the

government. They felt that some of his criticisms were based on a fundamental

misunderstanding as to the roles of various government Departments. These

individuals appeared before the Sub-Committee to air these concerns.

2.74 Dr. FitzGerald, in his submissions, indicated that he was concerned with the fact

that in his report, Mr. Justice Barron had placed emphasis on certain comments

made at an inter-Governmental meeting held on 11th September 1974. The Barron

Report states:

“Notwithstanding the information supplied in the course of those meetings,

there appears to have been no follow through by any of those who became

aware of it. Nothing was apparently raised at the meeting. Names were not

sought, nor the evidence which justified the internment, nor the allegation that

they had been responsible for the Dublin bombing.

Following the meetings, there is no evidence that the information was passed,

either to the Minister for Justice or any of his officials, or indeed to the Garda

Commissioner or any other Garda Officer. Certainly, Patrick Cooney, the

then Minister for Justice was never made aware of it, nor is there any record of

such information being passed to An Garda Síochána.”

2.75 Dr. FitzGerald submitted that had he been aware that Mr. Justice

Barron intended to focus on the lack of follow-up to comments

regarding internment made by Mr. Harold Wilson P.M. at an inter-

Governmental meeting, he would have explained to him the different

roles of certain bodies in Irish-British relations. Specifically, he would

have expanded on the relationships, which existed between the

diplomatic corps, the Department of Justice and the Garda Síochána.

2.76 Dr. FitzGerald pointed out that as Minister for Foreign Affairs he would not have

thought it appropriate to respond to, or get involved in, individual cases. He felt:

“It would have cut across the correct channels. We now know, of course that

those channels worked very well. [The Taoiseach] would not have thought it

appropriate to respond and I suspect that if I had responded he would have

rightly been unhappy that I had risen to the bait.”

2.77 Dr. FitzGerald told the Sub-Committee that at the time, it was not the

Government’s remit to intervene in the activities of the police and the

Government would not normally take a proactive approach in the investigation of

a matter such as the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.

2.78 When asked to consider conclusion number 7 in the Barron Report i.e. that the

Government of the day showed little interest in the bombings Dr. FitzGerald

stated:

“It was not clear to me what the Government should have done that it did not

do. The only issue, I suppose, was whether the Government should.. at some

point have tried to establish why the inquiries had not got any further, or

where they were getting. However, that is not really a function of Government.

There is — or should be — great sensitivity among politicians about interfering

in the process or with the police”

2.79 In relation to collusion, Dr. FitzGerald did not recall any suggestion of active

British involvement in the bombings, either at the time of the bombings

themselves or indeed for a long time afterwards. He stated:

“... I can only say that given the fact that I was rather persistent in these

matters, to the irritation of the British, if I had such a suspicion I would have

been minded to pursue it. I probably would have had to consult first before

doing so, but I would have wanted to pursue anything of that kind, as I did in a

lot of other cases. I have no recollection of that happening.”

He did not recall the question of whether Gardaí should sit in on interrogations

conducted by the RUC as ever having being raised at Government level.

Mr. Patrick Cooney

2.80 Mr. Patrick Cooney was the Minister for Justice at the time of the Dublin and

Monaghan bombings. He met with Mr. Justice Barron during the preparation of

his Report and had concerns about a number of issues contained in it.

2.81 Mr. Cooney pointed out to the Sub-Committee that in his opinion, the task

assigned to Mr. Justice Barron and set out in the terms of reference of the

Commission of Inquiry, was a formidable one. He stated:

“In discharging that task, he, as the sole member of the Commission, had to

contend with a number of difficulties, which I feel are well nigh insuperable. It

made his task almost impossible to complete.”

One major concern of Mr. Cooney related to the fact that interviews, which were

conducted with witnesses, were not recorded verbatim. The only records of

meetings were written in long hand by an assistant. Mr. Cooney felt that these

notes were an inadequate method of recording the meetings and as a result might

not fully reflect the discussion.

2.82 Like Dr. FitzGerald, Mr. Cooney took issue with conclusion number 7 in the

Barron Report, which found that the Government of the day failed to show the

concern expected of it and showed little interest in the bombings. Mr. Cooney

felt that this conclusion was reached as a result of a fundamental

misunderstanding on the part of Mr. Justice Barron, as to the nature of the

relationship, which existed between the Department of Justice, the Government

and the Garda Síochána. He felt that the report indicated a misapprehension on

the part of Mr. Justice Barron, that the Department and the Government

controlled the activities of the Gardaí in their conduct of investigations. He

emphatically disagreed with this. Any form of undue interference would have

been anathema to the principles of democracy:

“We were aware, as was the Department of Justice, of what was being proposed

by the Garda and we had to accept its professional assessment of how it was

going to deal with this serious crime. The two most senior detectives in the

State headed up the investigation with a dedicated force of 40 officers. It was

unprecedented. As Minister for Justice, I would have been happy with that and

happy that that was an appropriate response from the Garda.”

2.83 In considering whether the Government should have done anything about

allegations of collusion in relation to the bombings, he stated:

“There was no evidence at that stage; there were suspicions of collusion

between maverick elements of the security forces in the North and the

probable-putative bombers but there was no hard evidence of collusion on

which the Government could have gone to the other Government to make a

complaint.”

2.84 Another problem faced by the Government related to the fact that the suspects

were from Northern Ireland. Even if an admission of guilt had been procured from

a suspect in the North, the prosecution and trial of the offences would be held in

the Republic. This would have meant that the suspect would have to be

extradited to the Republic to stand trial. Mr. Cooney indicated that the

likelihood of a successful extradition would have been slim in the political

climate of the time, due to Irish law and policy on extradition.

2.85 He also felt that Mr. Justice Barron had misunderstood the role and function of

the Attorney General in his report. Conclusion 5 of the Report states:

“Although the investigation teams had in their opinion no evidence upon which

to found a prosecution, there is no evidence that they sought the advice of the

Attorney General, in whose name criminal prosecutions were at that time still

being brought. Had the Attorney General reviewed the file, it is likely that

advices would have been given as to what further direction the investigation

might take.”

Mr. Cooney was of the opinion that this conclusion in the Barron Report suggests

that the failure to consult was a factor in the failure to find evidence. Mr. Cooney

submitted that the Attorney General had no role in investigating crime or in

directing the Gardaí in the investigation of crime. He stated:

“He did not want to see a file and a file would not be sent to him until there was

a file or prima facie evidence against named persons and then he would deal

with it.”

2.86 With regard to any perceived failure by members of the Department of Justice to

keep their counterparts in the Department of Foreign Affairs fully updated in

relation to all matters, Mr. Cooney explained that certain information was

obtained in confidence by the Gardaí and shared with the Department of Justice,

and the failure to pass on this information was sometimes the price which had to

be paid in order to preserve confidentiality and protect Garda sources.

Mr. Justin Keating

2.87 Mr. Justin Keating was the Minister for Industry and Commerce at the time of

the bombings and made a number of points to the Sub-Committee in his oral

submission. The first related to the fact that he was unaware of the establishment

of a Cabinet security committee by the Government, despite the fact that he was

a Minister at the time it was established. He stated:

“ I do not remember it being set up and I know that for some period I did not know that it existed. I now know who were its members. I did not know at the time, for example, that the Minister for Foreign Affairs was not a member. That sub-committee functioned. I think it was quite powerful and it had access

to the Taoiseach, but I believe that it functioned with too little reference to the Government as a whole... That is fine, except for the fact that collective responsibility applies to governments.”

Another point elucidated on by Mr. Keating was the nature of the political

situation, which pertained at the time of the bombings. When asked by Deputy

Máire Hoctor if he felt that the Government did not act in a determined way

because of the political climate, which existed thirty years ago, Mr. Keating

stated:

“I have already mentioned extradition which was a sensitive issue. It was less

sensitive than the fact that if there were to be a revelation of co-operation

between British state terrorists and Northern Unionist terrorists, the country

would have become practically ungovernable. The outrage and reaction here

would have been so powerful as to make it ungovernable.”

Mr. Seán Donlon

2.88 Mr. Seán Donlon was assigned to the Northern Ireland desk in the Department of

Foreign Affairs from 1971 to 1978, and from 1974 onwards, was the Assistant

Secretary in charge of that desk. His task in the early 1970’s was the collection of

information in Northern Ireland, which related to the behaviour of the security

forces.

2.89 Mr. Donlon informed the Sub-Committee that Mr. Justice Barron had given what

he felt was a misplaced emphasis in his report to comments made at high-level

meetings in 1974. He considered that the judge’s comments displayed a lack of

understanding on his part as to the relationship, which existed between the

Department of Justice and the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the informal

methods of conveying information between those two Departments.

2.90 He detailed his examination of the records of all the high level Anglo-Irish

meetings which took place between 1973 and 1975, and confirmed to the Sub-

Committee that no outrage however serious was ever discussed at that level.

2.91 He confirmed that major efforts were in fact made after the Dublin and

Monaghan bombings to step up security and investigate co-operation, and that

these efforts culminated in a security meeting which took place in Baldonnel in

September 1974.

Mr. Donlon stated that there was a pattern of collusion in Northern Ireland at

that time. He referred to close collaboration between elements of the RUC and

members of loyalist paramilitary organisations. In particular, there seemed to be a

pattern of collusion in parts of Armagh, East Tyrone and parts of Belfast. He

stated:

“ When I saw where the cars used in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings

originated, something clicked and that is when I began to get suspicious. In

subsequent years, after the bombings, references were frequently made to this

possibility by people in Northern Ireland who I would see but, much though I

would press them at the time- it was something that was pressed very heavilythey

could never come up with evidence that was remotely useable either in

intergovernmental relations or in a court of law. Obviously we would not have

needed the high test - the court of law test - to raise something with the British

either at official or political level. If we had enough information, we would

have raised it. We hunted for it but we could never get the information”

2.92 He was directly involved in preparing a case successfully taken on behalf of

Ireland against the UK in the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg in

relation to the ill treatment of prisoners in Northern Ireland. It was while

gathering this information that the issue of collusion arose, but he was never able

to gather any specific or hard evidence on it to have it raised at inter-

Governmental level or have any action taken as a result. Mr. Donlon did however

36

comment on the very different relations, which exist between this jurisdiction

and the UK now as opposed to in 1974.

The View of the Sub-Committee

2.93 One of the complaints made was the importance that Mr. Justice Barron was

attaching to the question of whether the Irish Government of the day had

failed to show adequate concern and that an opportunity should have been

afforded to allow a response on this issue. Mr Justice Barron dealt with this

criticism very fairly in reply to a question put by Deputy Paul McGrath

stating:

“One of the problems we faced was that in doing an independent inquiry we had to stand back from the people that we were dealing with. That was a consideration. Looked

at from the point of view I believe the Deputy is looking at it, maybe it was unfair.”

The Sub-Committee can understand why Mr. Justice Barron, who was not

conducting a formal adversarial hearing, would not have wanted to refer

back to every person mentioned in his report to get a response before

publication. At the same time, the Sub-Committee notes and accepts that the

persons in question had substantive points to make, and the hearings held by

the Sub-Committee afforded them such an opportunity. The Sub-Committee

cannot speculate on whether Mr. Justice Barron would have changed his

views, had he had the benefit of those submissions before he produced his

Report.

2.94 In any event, the Sub-Committee notes that the atmosphere and political

landscape was very different thirty years ago to what it is today. As Mr.

Cooney said that the ambience in which the Barron Report was prepared is:

‘... light years removed from the fraught and frenetic times of

1974. The burned out British Embassy was still standing as a

stark reminder that democracy could very quickly become

anarchy. Atrocities were being committed, mainly by the

Provisionals, mainly in the North, on a distressingly regular

basis. Some of those atrocities spilled over here. I think Dr

FitzGerald mentioned the murder of our colleague and your

predecessor Senator Billy Fox. Armed robberies on post offices, banks and mail vans were commonplace. Demonstrations and agitation were being formented and agitators bussed in. There were hunger strikes and unrest in the prisons. It was a very fraught time. The contemporary context has always to be kept in mind when

considering the task that Judge Barron had to contend with.’

Mr. Justice Barron himself noted in respect of the alleged failures of the

Government of the day: “The fact that this report is looking at the issue with

the knowledge of 2003, rather than that of 1974, affords some explanation for

this failure.” And he also noted:

“What we are saying is that today, in 2003, when a

catastrophe of this nature arises, public reactions quite

different. All the things that are being done today were not

being done in the past. That is all we are saying. In other

words, there was a much harsher regime then than there is

now that we felt was something of a justification for the

Government not doing the sort of things that would be

expected of it today but we still felt that it did not do as

much.”

2.95 Subject to the caveat that it would have been of assistance to Mr. Justice

Barron to have had the submissions of the relevant persons in advance of his

Report, the Sub-Committee believes that he was entitled to form a view in

relation to the issue of the response of the Government of the day, albeit

strongly challenged by others. However, it is not the function of the Sub-

Committee to resolve this issue. There is no doubt that things would be done

differently today. For example, in modern times much greater emphasis is

placed on the needs of victims than might have been the case in the past. As

was indicated by Mr. Justice Barron in response to a question put to him by

Deputy Finian McGrath:

“The first time I remember anybody getting highly concerned

about people involved in catastrophes was following the

Lockerbie disaster which was some ten years after this.”

COMPOSITION OF THE BOMBS

2.96 A specific complaint was made regarding Mr. Justice Barron’s handling of the

issue of the composition of the bombs. Justice for the Forgotten sought the

assistance of Mr. Nigel Wylde as an explosives expert. Mr. Wylde was explicitly

critical of Mr. Justice Barron’s conclusions in this area.

Mr. Nigel Wylde

2.97 Mr. Wylde is a former British Army officer commissioned from the Royal Military

Academy, Sandhurst in 1968, and retired from the British Army in 1991. In 1970 he

was trained as an ammunition technical officer, specialising in guided weapons.

He was also involved in bomb disposal of both terrorist and conventional

munitions. During the months from June to October 1974, he held responsibility

for terrorist bomb disposal in the 321EOD unit in Belfast. (EOD stands for

Explosives Ordinance Disposal)

2.98 Mr. Wylde was interviewed by Mr. Justice Barron during the course of the

preparation of his report. Mr. Wylde felt that in a number of areas, Mr. Justice

Barron had misinterpreted what he had said and wished to clarify these matters

before the Sub-Committee.

2.99 The main thrust of Mr. Wylde’s submissions to the Sub-Committee centred on

his view that the UVF did not have the knowledge to construct a bomb of this

type in 1974. From this, he deduced that the bombs must have come from

captured IRA stocks, which would indicate a level of collusion in relation to the

Dublin and Monaghan bombings.

2.100 Mr. Wylde’s main concerns centred on Mr. Justice Barron’s conclusions in

relation to possible ANFO (i.e. homemade explosives) deposits at the scene of the

bombings. The Barron Report states that:

“EOD and ballistics officers who had encountered ANFO residues on other

occasions conducted a rigorous search of each site. To suggest that they failed

to find the clumps of ANFO deposits which were large enough to be visible on

television camera or footage seems unlikely”.

Mr. Wylde disagreed with the above conclusion reached by Mr. Justice Barron for

the following three reasons.

(i) Firstly, he disagreed with the Barron Report’s findings that

the photographic evidence on the ANFO issue was poor. Mr.

Wylde felt that the quality of some of the photographs was

still very good and pointed that that he had experience in

examining photographs of explosion scenes, and felt that

they should be examined by other photograph experts. It

was his view that re-crystallised ANFO was used.

(ii) Secondly, he felt that the Barron Report did not make it clear

that these were the first ANFO explosions to occur in the

Republic of Ireland. He submitted to the Sub-Committee

that even if the evidence of ANFO explosives having been

used was apparent at the scene, the chances of recognising

such evidence was very remote, as he contended that it

would have been the first time that experts from the

Republic would have been exposed to the debris left behind

in the wake of an ANFO- fuelled bomb blast. He also pointed

out that the emergency response services would have

immediately washed away much of the relevant bomb debris

evidence.

(iii) A third matter which concerned Mr. Wylde related to

whether or not the UVF had acquired the skills needed to

manufacture the bombs by 1974. He laid considerable

emphasis on the fact that the three bomb attacks occurred

within a 90 second time frame. He submitted that in order to

undertake an operation of such precision required

considerable skills in bomb-making, skills, which in his

opinion the UVF probably did not acquire until 1976, 1977 or

perhaps 1978.

Other submissions received on this issue

2.101 The Sub Committee received written and/or oral submissions from the following:

(i) Explosive experts currently serving in the Defence Forces

including former members of the EOD (Explosives

Ordinance Disposal);

(ii) Retired explosive experts who had served in the Defence

Forces EOD;

(iii) Retired State Forensic Scientist Dr. James Donovan;

Army Explosive Experts

2.102 Colonel Joseph O’Sullivan, Director of the Ordinance Corps with overall

responsibility for EOD (Explosives Ordinance Disposal) and Lieutenant Colonel

Rory Kelleher appeared before the Sub-Committee representing the Defence

Forces, in order to assist with the deliberations of the Sub-Committee on the

issue of explosives.

2.103 Before their appearance, they had read the submissions produced by Mr. Nigel

Wylde, which had been furnished to Mr. Justice Barron. They had also read Mr.

Wylde’s written and oral submissions to the Sub-Committee.

2.104 Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher informed the Sub-Committee that he attended the

scene of the Dublin bombings on the day. His function was to inspect the three

bombsites and included making an estimate of the quantity of explosives used.

Using a TNT table, he estimated the quantity of explosives at approximately 300

lbs. His interpretation from his inspection of the site was that a mix of

commercial explosives and ANFO (i.e. home-made) had been used.

2.105 He accepted the proposition that the hosing down of the bomb sites by the Fire

Brigade prior to his arrival, would have either eliminated or removed to a distance

most of the residue that might have been of forensic value. With regard to the

level of skill needed to set the three bombs to explode within such a short time

frame, he stated that no great level of skill would have been required to set a

clock.

2.106 When asked if he would have been familiar with ANFO and the debris to be

expected from a bomb made primarily with it, he pointed out to the Sub-

Committee:

“We would have worked with ANFO material for a number of years before

that. The other two officers and I would have been quite familiar with ANFO

material. We would have come across it either in finds in realistic situations or

as shown to us on a refresher course.”

2.107 Part of the task of the Army would have been to preserve evidence that could be

used in forensic analysis and to pass it to the Gardaí. However, he was not aware

that there was a time scale involved in passing on material for forensic analysis in

order to preserve its evidential value.

2.108 Colonel Joseph O’Sullivan was concerned that Mr. Wylde had adopted the view

that only the IRA and certain sections of the British Army had the capacity or

knowledge to deliver working bombs to the Republic, and felt that the

conclusions drawn by Mr. Wylde in this regard were highly speculative. He also

felt that the documents provided by Mr. Wylde contained a degree of confusion

in relation to explosives.

2.109 On the basis of the documents available to him, his own training and experience

in the EOD and the knowledge of events in Ireland at the time, it was Colonel

O’Sullivan’s opinion that Loyalist paramilitaries had the necessary materials and

capacity to construct the types of devices used in the Dublin and Monaghan

bombings in 1974.

2.110 From an examination of the limited chemical and physical analysis, he felt that he

could not tell with any level of accuracy what explosive compounds were used in

the bombs:

“The indications from Mr. Hall and Dr. Donovan are that there could have

been ANFO ammonium-nitrate explosive and there could have been

commercial nitro-glycerine, gelignite type explosives. Those are indications,

but. Like Mr. Hall and Dr. Donovan, we cannot state anything with certainty.”

2.111 He made reference to the fact that within a week of the Dublin/Monaghan

bombings, two other incendiary devices were located near the border which were

similar in nature to those used in Dublin and Monaghan and were not of a

republican origin. This led him to believe that loyalist paramilitaries had the

knowledge to make these devices, in light of the possible origins of those devices.

However, Commandant Patrick Trears (retired) who later appeared before the

Sub-Committee, and who attended at these bomb scenes, stated categorically in

relation to one of these episodes by way of reply to a question put by Deputy Paul

McGrath:

“ A couple of weeks after the Dublin and Monaghan bombings, there was a

bomb in Clones which was reported as a Loyalist bomb. That was not a

Loyalist bomb. I know it. I dealt with that bomb in Clones. It was in two milk

churns. It was about a 500 lb bomb.”

Commandant Patrick Trears (retired)

2.112 Retired Commandant Patrick Trears is an explosives expert and was formerly an

EOD officer in 1974. He attended at the site of the Dublin bombings in the

immediate aftermath. He was of the view that there was a high degree of

expertise in the composition of the bombs. He stated that he was familiar with

ANFO, both in its stable form and after it had been exploded. He was of the view

that the type of explosive used in the bombs was ANFO, but that there was a

commercial mix through it, and that judging from the size of the craters left by

the bombs, one could establish that it was high explosive. He felt there was a

high degree of expertise in putting together that composition and in reply to a

question put by Deputy Costello, stated:

“I figured that you could not have done it better, I could not have done it

better myself”

2.113 Again, in reply to a question by Deputy Costello as to whether the UVF had

sufficient expertise, he replied that while he had no expertise on this issue, his

judgement was: ‘I do not think they were up to the game at all’.

State Forensic Science Laboratory: Dr. James Donovan

2.114 Dr. James Donovan was a forensic scientist in the State Laboratory at the time of

the bombings and examined debris from a number of the explosion sites. He

appeared before Mr. Justice Barron during his investigations to give his views on

what he considered to be the likely components and origins of the bombs and to

elaborate on a number of points raised by Mr. Nigel Wylde.

2.115 Dr. Donovan stated that he believed from his examination of the debris that he

received in the State Laboratory that the bombs were made of ammonium nitrate,

diesel oil, nitrobenzene, a booster charge of gelignite and some firing mechanism.

2.116 He said that this type of bomb was the type commonly used by terrorist groups at

that time. However, he did point out that it was unlikely that the UVF could

have had access to that type of explosive at that time. He did observe that he had

heard that a UVF group in Fermanagh was the only group at the time with access

to ovoid prills of ammonium nitrate (i.e. re-crystallised ANFO) at the time and

that there was evidence in the debris from one of the bombs that prills of this

nature were used in the bombings, in that two prills of burned ammonium nitrate

had been found in the rubber from one of the cars.

2.117 He indicated that there was a strong possibility that the prills of ammonium nitrate could have come from pure gelignite, which would suggest the use of commercial explosives. Commercial explosives are extremely powerful and he was at a disadvantage in not having more pieces of metal from the cars involved in order to see how they were torn and therefore to deduce the exact nature of the bombs.

2.118 Dr. Donovan pointed out that the hydrocarbon could have been either vaporised

by the heat of the explosion or may have been in the open air long enough to evaporate. He also stated that the hosing down of the scene with water would have had a major effect on the hydrocarbon oil.

2.119 As regards the suggestion that the UVF were not sophisticated enough to carry

out an operation of this nature, Dr. Donovan replied:

“From what I have heard about the UVF at that time, I would have thought it would have needed direction of some sort to assemble the bomb, know where to park it for maximum effect, detonate it and get away”

2.120 Another point made by Dr. Donovan related to possible analysis of the make up of

the bombs through examination of the photographic evidence. He stated:

“I know they could give a rough assessment of the size of a bomb but they

certainly could not give any indication as to the make-up of that bomb.”

Mr. Justice Henry Barron

2.121 Mr. Justice Barron stated that his Inquiry was at all times aware of the views of

Mr. Nigel Wylde, and of his opinion that the bombs were made with recrystallised

ammonium nitrate, and the reasons upon which he based this opinion.

2.122 He informed the Sub-Committee that these views were taken into account in his

preparation of the Report. He felt the question of whether or not the bombs were made with ANFO was adequately dealt with in his report.

2.123 The suggestion that the ingredients for the bombs must have come from captured

IRA stocks was investigated by the Inquiry. Mr. Justice Barron felt that this

Inquiry had addressed this issue extensively:

“..not only did we go to the army with his report, but we took the suggestion that it was captured IRA stocks seriously and we went to the Northern Ireland Office to find out the way in which stocks were treated — how they were stored, got rid of and so on — and we set that out in the report. We took his suggestion, or his opinion, seriously. There is no doubt about that.”

2.124 All of the information supplied to the Inquiry by Mr. Nigel Wylde was forwarded

to experts in the Defence Forces who would have had a degree of forensic

expertise in the area. They prepared a report, which was furnished to Mr. Justice

Barron, which concluded that Mr. Wylde’s theory was reasonable but

speculative.

2.125 Mr. Justice Barron also indicated that he had taken the views of Dr. James Donovan into account in the preparation of his report.

2.126 Mr. Justice Barron did inform the Sub-Committee that the photographs upon which Mr. Wylde based his thesis were never examined by any other photographic expert in the field.

2.127 When asked by Senator Jim Walsh whether he had consulted military experts to

obtain their observations and views in respect of the allegations that the bombings had the hallmarks of an operation carried out by trained military experts, Mr. Justice Barron remarked:

“We received reports from all these people, including the various military officers who had investigated the sites at the time. We had evidence from theexplosive ordnance officers who said they searched and searched but found nothing.”

2.128 There was a number of different opinions as to the origin of the bombs but, having considered them all, the Inquiry had come to the conclusion that it could not definitively accept that the bombs were made from a form of ANFO.

2.129 Having taken all of these issues into consideration, Mr. Justice Barron took the view that he could not be sure that the conclusions arrived at by Mr. Wylde were correct. He stated:

“All I can say is that we had various things to consider and, on the totality of what we had to consider, we decided that we could not accept his theory...If you read the report, you can see why we took the view we did. I am not an expert in this field. The only experts in the field we went to were the army and they said

it was speculative.”

The Reply Made by Mr. Nigel Wylde

1. Mr. Wylde made a further written submission in order to clarify his position. He

stated that all witnesses agreed with him that the bombs used in the Dublin

bombings probably comprised ANFO and a smaller commercial explosive booster

charge. However, the question which remains to be answered is the nature of the

ANFO used and that it could be one of four options:

(i) re-crystallised ANFO

(ii) commercial ANFO

(iii) ANFO manufactured from ammonium nitrate content fertilizer

(iv) ANFO manufactured from pure ammonium nitrate

2. He stated that his submission and that of Commandant Trears suggested that it

was re-crystallised ANFO.

3. He took issue with Colonel O’Sullivan’s submission that the Defence Forces had

experience of dealing with re-crystallised ANFO in terrorist bombs prior to the

Dublin Monaghan bombings on 17th May 1974. He stated that there was no

evidence of an instance where re-crystallised ANFO was used in car bomb

attacks prior to this date. As a result, he felt that Colonel O’Sullivan was not in a

position to accurately identify the type of ANFO used in the bombs, as he had no

prior experience of it. He argued that Colonel O’ Sullivan’s assumptions were

unsupported by evidence.

4. He again made the point that the remaining photographs of the bomb scenes

should be examined by photographic experts.

The View of the Sub-Committee

2.130 In respect of the issue of recognising ANFO, Commandant Trears and

Lieutenant Colonel Kelleher have both said that they would have recognised

it and are of the view that it was not present when they visited the scene.

2.131 In respect of being able to now identify ANFO through the use of a

photographic expert, it is something, which Mr. Justice Barron might have

considered. Nonetheless, the Sub-Committee is of the view that Mr. Justice

Barron did address the issue and considered the various possibilities.

However, in any event, even if it could be shown conclusively what material

was used in the composition of the bombs, this in itself does not determine

the provenance of those bombs and would only be useful in the context of a

more effective and wider ranging inquiry into the question of the identity of

the perpetrators and whether or not there was collusion. In this context, it

should form part of the investigation that the Sub-Committee recommends

below in relation to the identity of the perpetrators and the issue of collusion.

(See Chapter 4 page 75-76).

CONCERNS HIGHLIGHTED BY CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS REGARDING THE BARRON

REPORT

2.132 A number of individuals contacted the Sub-Committee and highlighted their

concerns regarding the findings of Mr Justice Barron in his Report. Mr. Michael

Culligan and Mr. Harry Havelin made written submissions. These two

individuals did not meet with Mr. Justice Barron.

2.133 Mr. Culligan remembered two Gardaí running towards North Earl Street before

the bomb went off at about 5.18 or 5.23 pm and got the impression that they may

have had some sort of prior warning. He also indicated that these Gardaí may

have been running to a crime scene although he accepted the possibility that they

may have had nothing to do with the subsequent bombings. Mr Havelin recalled,

three hours prior to the Dublin bombings, being asked by Gardaí whether he had

seen any Northern Ireland registered cars in the area of Lambay Road and Walsh

Road, and also whether there was any bed and breakfast or rented

accommodation in that area. Mr. Justice Barron explained that he did not speak

to them because he did not know of their existence. In any event, in response to a

question from Deputy Paul McGrath as to whether their submissions might have

altered his views, Mr. Justice Barron stated:

“I really do not think that if we got that information it would have added anything to what we said.”

2.134 Mr. Seamus Fitzpatrick contacted the Sub-Committee and informed it that while

he had met with Mr. Justice Barron, he disagreed with Mr. Justice Barron’s

treatment of his account of events.

2.135 Mr. Fitzpatrick remembered seeing the bomber’s car park in Parnell Street at 4.32

p.m. and engaged verbally with the driver. He was convinced that the person he

saw on that day was the driver of the bomb car, and believes he was in a position

to give relevant identification evidence. He was also critical of the Gardaí, as a

statement purporting to be his was dated 18 May 1974 at 12.45 p.m., when in fact

he remembered making a statement on 17 May at 7.30 p.m. There was another

statement purporting to be his dated 27 May 1974, and in this regard, he did not

recall making any statement on that date.

2.136 He recalled two Gardaí visiting his house in October 1974, when the Garda

investigation was supposed to have been wound down in August of that year.

2.137 Mr. Justice Barron pointed out to the Sub-Committee the fact that there was

another account, which contradicted Mr. Fitzpatrick’s account. Mr. Mortimer

and Mrs Teresa O’ Loughlin stated that they had seen the bomber’s car parking in

Parnell Street at approximately 5.12 p.m. This account had also been given to the

Gardaí.

The View of the Sub-Committee

2.138 The Sub-Committee is not in a position to resolve the apparent discrepancy

between the two accounts. Insofar as these issues concern the Sub-

Committee, it is satisfied that Mr. Justice Barron adequately explored the

various aspects of those issues and therefore did address this matter within

his terms of reference. The Sub-Committee is particularly grateful to those

who took the time and effort to make submissions and fully accepts their

sincerity. However, the Sub-Committee does not believe that Mr. Justice

Barron can be criticised for opting for one account over another on the basis

of the information available to him.

Chapter 3

The lessons to be drawn and any actions to be taken in light of the Report, its

findings and conclusions.

INTRODUCTION

3.1 The Sub-Committee has been specifically requested to report on “the lessons to

be drawn and any actions to be taken in the light of the report, its findings and

conclusions.” In the Abbeylara decision, Maguire v Ardagh [2002] 1 IR385 at 700

Hardiman J stated:

“[T]here would appear to be absolutely no reason ... why an Oireachtas committee should consider itself debarred from ‘probing issues’ which areessentially of a ... ‘policy nature’. That, one would have thought, is a centralfeature of the Oireachtas committee.”

3.2 During the course of our deliberations, which includes the considerable written

and oral submissions, a number of areas from which lessons could be drawn were

identified. They are:

i) The Government’s Role in Garda Investigations.

ii) The establishment of Cabinet Committees.

iii) The Role of Forensic Science.

iv) The Retention of Evidence.

v) The Retention of Documents.

vi) Inter-Jurisdictional Co-Operation .

vii) The role of Non-Governmental organisations.

viii) Peace and Reconciliation Process.

ix) Adequate support for Victims and their Families.

THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN GARDA INVESTIGATIONS

3.3 It is absolutely imperative that the Government and the Garda Síochána have a

good working relationship within a clearly defined structure. The Gardaí must

have the ability to conduct their day-to-day affairs without any undue

interference from Government. However, at the same time the Government has

an overall responsibility to ensure that the Gardaí are working in an effective

manner.

3.4 The Sub-Committee notes that the recently published Garda Síochána Bill

addresses this issue in a general manner. Section 40 of the Bill provides for a

mechanism which requires the Garda Commissioner to keep the Minister fully

informed of the following:

a) matters relating to significant developments concerning —

(i) The preservation of peace and public order in the State.

(ii) The protection of life and property in the State.

(iii) The protection of the security of the State.

and

b) any other matters that, in the Commissioner’s opinion, should be brought

to the attention of the Minister.

3.5 The same provision also requires the Garda Commissioner to submit to the

Minister, when required, a report on any matters connected with the policing or

security of the State or the performance of the Commissioner’s other functions

that may be specified in the requirement. A report of this nature would be made

in the form and within the period that may be specified in the Minister’s requirement.

3.6 The Sub-Committee is of the view that this development, which seeks to

address the lack of formalisation of the relationship between these two State

entities, is essential and long overdue. It is absolutely critical that the above

proposal is enacted into law, and upon the enactment of this legislation, a

dedicated set of guidelines should be drawn up which will give effect to Section 40.

3.7 The Sub-Committee is of the view that the failure to adequately advance an

investigation when a serious crime has taken place should be a matter of

discussion between the Garda authorities and the Department of Justice,

Equality and Law Reform, in order to address public concern.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CABINET COMMITTEES

3.8 It is understandable that the Cabinet may from time to time wish to establish a

Committee of its members to deal with a particular issue or area of concern.

3.9 The Assistant Secretary to the Government, Mr. Peter Ryan, has informed the

Sub-Committee in a letter dated 26 March 2004 of the role of the then Cabinet

Committee on Security. He stated that:

(i) The Cabinet Committee on security was set up in 12 March 1974 and is recorded in the minutes of the meeting held on that date and was subsequently notified to all members of the Cabinet.

(ii) It was chaired by the Taoiseach. The Tánaiste, the Minister for Defence and the Minister for Justice were members.

(iii) Minutes were kept of its proceedings and other Ministers and officials attended as necessary.

(iv) The decision setting up that Committee had no formal requirement to report to Government.

3.10 In relation to the workings of current Cabinet Committees, Mr. Ryan stated that:

(i) Such committees are part of the internal working of Government, and are established on a case-by-case basis.

(ii) They can only be established by a specific decision of Government.

(iii) They cease to exist at the end of term of office of a particular Government.

(iv) Regular reporting to Government is provided for in the relevant framework.

3.11 The Sub-Committee is of the view that the Government should consider

publishing its framework detailing the above measures, including formal

reporting structures, in order to allay any public concerns.

THE ROLE OF FORENSIC SCIENCE

3.12 The manner in which evidence is collected and stored was an issue, which

concerned the Sub-Committee, as it is this evidence, which is the foundation

upon which any potential prosecution will be based. Therefore it is imperative

that evidence be preserved correctly. This was not the case with the forensic

evidence relating to the Dublin and Monaghan bombings.

3.13 The Dublin and Monaghan bombings occurred thirty years ago. Because of that

length of time one could be lulled into the false view that an atrocity of such a

scale is unlikely to re-occur given the current state of the peace process. However,

the recent events in Omagh and Madrid illustrate that the threat of such an

atrocity happening in this country has to be seriously considered and the

necessary contingency plans put in place, not least in the area of forensic science.

3.14 Dr. James Donovan was the state forensic scientist who examined the debris from

the bombings. He was surprised by the lack of volume in the amount of debris

and evidence, which was brought to him for examination. He felt that due to the

nature of the explosion much more should have been furnished to aid him in

determining both the nature of the explosives and their possible origins.

3.15 However, Dr. Donovan did point out that the amount of debris was limited

because:

“Nobody quite knew how much to gather with these sort of bombings. As far as I recall, that was the first one of these sort of bombings in this jurisdiction.”

As a result, the people involved in the gathering of this evidence lacked

experience in the collection of materials of this nature and as such vital evidence

may have been overlooked.

3.16 The lack of knowledge in relation to the gathering of forensic evidence resulted in

the evidence not being kept in sealed packages. Had it been stored in packages, it

might have delayed evaporation of nitrobenzene, nitroglycerine, tinitro or other

chemicals. Nylon bags would have been necessary to maintain chemicals of this

nature and to protect the exhibit from any outside influences. Evidence of the use

of these chemicals in the bombings may have vanished forever because of the

methods in which they were stored prior to analysis.

3.17 Dr. Sheila Willis, the current Director of the State Forensic Science Laboratory,

appeared before the Sub-Committee to detail the difference between the forensic

procedures which existed at the time of the bombings and those which are in

place today.

3.18 Her first observations related to the manner in which material from the bomb

scene was preserved. She expressed regret that nylon bags were not used to store

any evidence, which had been collected. It is now recognised that they should be

used to collect items for examination for explosive traces. The use of these bags

increases the possibility of recovering volatile traces from the scene. Nylon bags

are now available in the stores at the Technical Bureau and are part of the kit for

Scenes of Crime Officers, as they are also used for fire examination.

3.19 Whereas at the time of the bombings the length of time between the actual

events and the forensic examination of material from the scene would have been

vital, this is not the case today. Material sealed in nylon bags facilitates analysis

even after considerable passage of time.

3.20 She indicated that inadvertent contamination of evidence is a very real issue at

every crime scene. Undoubtedly such information was known in 1974, but it may

not have been emphasised. Examiners at scenes are usually aware of these issues

today. This is particularly important in a major incident when normal procedures

may not be adhered to because of the logistics of dealing with large volumes of

material and heavy casualties.

3.21 Difficulties relating to dealing with a repeat of an atrocity of the scale of the

Dublin and Monaghan bombings were highlighted. The following exchange

occurred on the 11th February:

Deputy Costello: In your conclusions you say the infrastructure to deal with large-scale trace work in explosives is not in place in the Republic. What do you mean by this?

Dr. Willis: Because the technology is so sensitive at the moment, carrying out analysis to check the presence of traces of explosives left at a bomb scene, for example, would need very specific facilities like a room that is not used for anything else, a room that will never be in contact with bulk explosives. Given

that we have not had a need to use such a facility, we have not got it.

Deputy Costello: If what happened in 1974 was to happen in 2004, we would still have to go to Belfast.

Dr. Willis: We would be in difficulties.

3.22 Dr. Willis acknowledged that adequate training of relevant personnel is being

put in place. However she did also refer to the issue of adequate resources to

provide the necessary facilities.

3.23 In order to fulfil the work of the State Forensic Laboratory there must exist a

close co-operation with the An Garda Síochána. This interaction has traditionally

been marked by a lack of any formal structures. However, in 2002 a Service Level

Agreement was signed between the Director and the Garda Commissioner. This

attempted to formalise the level of service and expectations from each side. It

acknowledges the fact that training in scene of crime issues is regularly delivered

and that reliable results are dependent on correct adherence to procedure.

3.24 The Gardaí have overall responsibility for the management of any crime scene and

for what samples should be taken. Scientists occasionally visit crime scenes and

advise but they have no responsibility for sample taking. The Gardaí recently

prepared a document in consultation with the Forensic Science Laboratory

outlining procedures to be followed in the event of bombings.

3.25 The Sub-Committee notes that Mr. Justice Barron was critical of the forensic

capabilities existing in the State at the time of the Dublin and Monaghan

bombings. It appears that the situation has improved since then. The Sub-

Committee is of the view that adequate measures should be taken to ensure

that the forensic services would have a plan in place and with adequate

resources so as to enable them to cope should an atrocity on a similar scale be

repeated.

THE RETENTION OF EVIDENCE

3.26 In addition to the matter of analysing forensic evidence, there is the separate issue

of the retention of evidence. As no one has been prosecuted, let alone convicted,

for the atrocities, the file on the Dublin/Monaghan bombings is, to use Garda

parlance, in theory still open. However, vital evidence has gone missing, including

certain photographs of the bomb scenes.

3.27 It is of vital importance that proper procedures are maintained by An Garda

Síochána to ensure that all evidence collected in a criminal investigation is fully

documented, logged and retained. It would appear that, in practice, the system

for retaining evidence is very much dependent on the individual investigation

team. The Sub-Committee notes that the High and Supreme Courts have issued a

number of judgments in recent years which have indicated that the Gardaí are

under a legal obligation to seek out and preserve evidence so that the rights of the

accused in any subsequent criminal trial may be properly protected.

3.28 The Sub-Committee is of the view that best international police practice

should be followed and that files relating to unsolved crimes are periodically

kept under active review, and that such reviews are appropriately audited.

THE RETENTION OF DOCUMENTS

3.29 The Sub-Committee was greatly concerned about the manner in which it

appeared that a number of documents relating to the bombings have gone

missing over the years. Dr. David Craig, Director of the National Archives made a

submission to the Joint Committee explaining how the National Archives Act

1986 operates in practice. During the course of his submission, he remarked on

the irony that records which are segregated because they are regarded as

important may subsequently get lost purely because they have been separated

from the main record store. In respect of missing records he stated that:

“They might have been inadvertently destroyed as being just some old records

lying in a filing cabinet that somebody decided to clear out when there was a

shortage of space or something of the sort without any sense of what they were

destroying. They might have been hidden by somebody — that is another

possibility. They might have been hidden either because they were sensitive in a

way that the person who hid them did not want them to be seen by other people.

Alternatively, they could have been hidden — I have known of cases where this

has happened — precisely to save them from destruction, or they could have

been deliberately destroyed.”

3.30 The Sub-Committee noted that the enactment of the National Archives Act 1986

put in place a statutory mechanism for the retention and preservation of State

documents. The principle provisions of the Act provide that Departmental

records must be preserved unless their disposal is authorised in writing by the

Director of the National Archives or another designated officer. Before disposal

the Director must be satisfied that the documents do not warrant retention by

the National Archives. He is entitled to come to an independent opinion on this

matter. It has taken some time to get the current system working effectively.

However the Director of the National Archives is of the view that there is now a

much greater awareness of the responsibilities of departments in relation to

document retention. He stated:

“Without pretending that the letter of the Act has been obeyed in every single

case over the years, it has made a huge difference, and the culture now is to seek

our permission, which was not the case previously.”

3.31 The Sub-Committee is of the view that a situation should never arise where

important documentation goes missing. The National Archives Act 1986

should be properly implemented by each Government Department and

statutory agency. While the Director of the National Archives has his

statutory functions, it is also clear that each Department has its own

obligations to ensure that there is in place a full and proper system for the

retention of documents. The best technology and practices should be used to

ensure that documents are properly recorded and secured. More

importantly, each Department should nominate and appoint a dedicated

documents officer, whose responsibilities would be as follows:

(i) to put in place a standardised system for the retention and filing of documentation;

(ii) to keep an accurate log/record of the documentation; and

(iii) to liaise with the Director of the National Archives in relation to the retention and, if necessary, destruction of documents

In particular, files which deal with security and other sensitive matters in

any Government Department, including the Department of Justice, Equality

and Law Reform, should be maintained, stored and archived in line with best

practice.

INTER-JURISDICTIONAL CO-OPERATION

3.32 Much of the deliberations of the Sub-Committee focused on the question of how

an inquiry in this jurisdiction could be granted meaningful access to documents

and witnesses in another jurisdiction through mutual co-operation (see Chapter

4 of this Report). The Sub-Committee was struck by the marked change that has

taken place in international relations from 1974 to the present date. In 1974, this

State had just joined the then EEC but the country could not have been construed

as being integrated with its European partners in any meaningful sense. Since

that time, Ireland has successfully integrated itself into Europe and European law

is now very much a part of the Irish legal system. At the same time, the

relationship between Ireland and the United Kingdom has also improved to the

extent that there is a very close working relationship between the two

Governments. This has been critical in advancing the peace process. The Sub-

Committee also notes that new developments are emerging in the relatively novel

area of European criminal law.

3.33 It is in this context that the Sub-Committee is of the view that consideration

should also be given to the establishment of a protocol or an agreement,

which would provide mutual recognition among member states of the EU of

civil public inquiries. It must be possible, in appropriate cases, to provide a

civil public inquiry in one jurisdiction with legal recognition in another

member state where it could have evidence gathering and compellability

powers to enable it to fulfil its remit.

THE ROLE OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS

3.34 The Sub-Committee was particularly struck by the contribution that nongovernmental

organisations can make to assist in the resolution of outstanding

issues relating to the conflict in Northern Ireland and in this jurisdiction. In

respect of Justice for the Forgotten Mr. Justice Barron stated:

“We felt that Justice for the Forgotten was very helpful. In one way it was an extension of our investigation arm. It was responsible for getting Mr Wylde’s reports Justice for the Forgotten, for example, and we followed them up as well as we could. It followed up a lot of things. We have ten bulky files of information.”

3.35 The group represented by Desmond J. Doherty and Company, Solicitors, the Pat

Finucane Centre, and British Irish Rights Watch have also been of great

assistance to the Sub-Committee in terms of providing information and

submissions.

3.36 The Sub-Committee is of the view that non-governmental organisations

working in this area should be given every reasonable support and assistance

by the authorities in their endeavours to ascertain the truth.

PEACE AND RECONCILIATION PROCESS

3.37 The Troubles have had an effect on all parts of this island, both North and South,

and on Great Britain. Over the years there have been a huge number of atrocities

committed on both sides of the border, which have left a vast number of families

devastated. The failure to bring many of the perpetrators of these crimes to

justice is something, which it is difficult for those families to come to terms with.

3.38 The Sub-Committee is of the view that it would be useful if some type of

forum could be established where the victims of these crimes could liaise

with each other and address any issues in a non-judgmental fashion. This

forum could operate on a cross-jurisdictional basis. Any initiative of this

nature should be supported by the Government.

ADEQUATE SUPPORT FOR VICTIMS AND THEIR FAMILIES.

3.39 The Sub-Committee recognises that the State has an obligation to its citizens

particularly in the aftermath of an atrocity such as occurred in the Dublin

and Monaghan bombings. The role of the State is not limited to the

investigation of criminal or terrorist activity, but is to provide appropriate

support to those most affected by the atrocity in question. In this regard the

Sub-Committee is of the view, the State should immediately put in place an

inter-agency Strategy, to ensure that practical support measures are made available. Priority areas would include counselling, practical advice, telephone help-lines, and nominated liaison officers being appointed in the various agencies.

Chapter 4

Whether, having regard to the Report’s findings, and following consultations with

the Inquiry, a further public inquiry into any aspect of the Report would be

required or fruitful.

INTRODUCTION

4.1 While the Sub-Committee was assigned a number of tasks, many of the

submissions, focused on the question of whether there should be a further inquiry

and on what format such an inquiry might take. The options open to the Sub-

Committee are extensive, ranging from an immediate full public Inquiry to a more

limited focused form of inquiry.

4.2 To facilitate its deliberations on this issue, the Sub-Committee broke down the

issues which were of concern to it into two different categories:

(i) Internal issues which related solely to matters which could be resolved within this jurisdiction, and,

(ii) External issues which relate to the identification of perpetrators and alleged collusion.

4.3 The nature of any further enquiry the Sub-Committee might recommend varied

in relation to the two different categories. Therefore, it is appropriate that these

issues are looked at independently.

INTERNAL ISSUES WHICH SOLELY RELATED TO MATTERS WHICH COULD BE

RESOLVED WITHIN THIS JURISDICTION

4.4 Chapter 2 of this Report deals with the question of whether Mr. Justice Barron

addressed all the issues covered in the terms of reference of his Inquiry. A number

of issues were identified which the Sub-Committee believed merited further

inquiry. They are as follows:

(i) Issues arising from missing documentation in the Department of Justice and An Garda Síochána.

(ii) Why the Garda Investigation was wound down.

4.5 The Sub-Committee then had to consider the most appropriate manner in which

to address these issues. When considering holding a full public tribunal of

inquiry, it was necessary to have regard to the length of time it would take, its

cost and effectiveness. The Sub-Committee wishes to emphasise that the

effectiveness of any inquiry was considered a key factor.

4.6 The Sub-Committee felt it was appropriate to examine any other options, which

would achieve the same result, and might be a more effective method of resolving

the issues identified above. In this regard, the Sub-Committee considered the

Commissions of Investigation Bill 2004, which is currently before both Houses of

the Oireachtas.

4.7 The Bill contains several new features that are designed to ensure that investigations are carried out in a more timely and cost effective manner, without in any way compromising or encroaching on the proper conduct of an investigation.

4.8 The Commission has a wide range of powers under the new Bill. It has powers:

(i) to direct witnesses to attend;

(ii) to answer questions and to produce and disclose documents;

(iii) to enter into premises to inspect and secure documents if it is reasonable and necessary to do so in the interests of the investigation;

(iv) to decide to hear a witness’ evidence in public.

In addition, the Bill makes it a criminal offence to make a false statement, to

intentionally obstruct the Commission or to fail to comply with a direction, and

provides strong penalties for such offences.

4.9 The Bill requires that there be very defined terms of reference and it allows for the

necessary preparatory work to be completed in private with all the attendant

statutory powers, including the examination of witnesses on oath. The

Commission can decide to hear all or part of the evidence of a witness in public, if

satisfied that it is in the interests of both the investigation and fair procedure.

4.10 A decision on whether or not to propose the establishment of a full Tribunal

following the Report of a Commission of Investigation is a matter for the

Government of the day. That proposal would be submitted to the Houses of the

Oireachtas for its approval.

The recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Internal Issues

4.11 The Sub-Committee is of the view that a Commission of Investigation is an

ideal way to deal with the issues pertaining to this jurisdiction. It should

hopefully resolve the issues in a speedy and effective way, while fully

respecting fair procedures and natural justice. Accordingly, the Sub-

Committee, recommends the Commission as the appropriate form of inquiry

in relation to the following issues:

The Garda Investigation:

1. Why was the Garda investigation into the Dublin and

Monaghan bombings wound down in 1974?

2. Why did the Gardaí not follow-up on the following leads?:

(i) Information that a white van with an English registration plate, was parked outside the Department of Posts and Telegraphs on PortlandRow and was later seen parked in the deep sea area of the B&I ferry port in Dublin, and the subsequent contact made with a British Army officer on a ferry boat leaving that port.

(ii) Information relating to a man who stayed in the Four Courts Hotel between 15 and 17 May 1974, and his contacts with the UVF.

(iii) Information concerning a British Army corporal allegedly sighted in Dublin at the time of the bombings. and

Missing Documentation:

1. The exact documentation (Departmental, Garda, Intelligence and any other documentation of relevance) that is unaccounted for;

2. The reasons explaining the missing documentation;

3. Whether the missing documentation can be located; and

4. Whether the systems currently in place are adequate to prevent a re-occurrence.

4.12 In adopting this method of inquiry the Sub-Committee believes it is the best

and most effective way of resolving the particular issues.

4.13 Whilst this is ultimately a matter for the Government, we would further

recommend that the terms of reference of that Commission of Investigation

be as clear and well-defined as possible. The Sub-Committee believes that

this is the key to a successful investigation, while still ensuring that all issues

are dealt with as comprehensively as possible.

EXTERNAL ISSUES RELATING TO THE IDENTITY OF THE PERPETRATORS AND

ALLEGED COLLUSION.

4.14 These issues concerned the identity of the perpetrators and whether or not there

was collusion. The Sub-Committee devoted much of its time to this matter. All of

the submissions, which were received from victims and bereaved families, urged

that there was evidence in existence relating to the identity of the perpetrators

and on the issue of collusion and that there was a need for a further inquiry into

these issues. They acknowledged the difficulties faced by Mr. Justice Barron in

this regard, notably in relation to co-operation and documents from bodies

outside this jurisdiction, and to an extent were critical of some of the conclusions

he had in fact arrived at.

4.15 However as a starting point, the Sub-Committee feels it is important to re-iterate

some of the salient conclusions arrived at by Mr. Justice Barron in relation to the

identity of the perpetrators and the issue of collusion:

1. The Dublin and Monaghan bombings were carried out by two groups of loyalist paramilitaries, one based in Belfast and the other in the area around

Portadown/Lurgan. Most, though not all of those involved were members of the UVF.

2. It is likely that the bombings were conceived and planned in Belfast, with the mid-Ulster element providing operational assistance.

3. A finding that members of the security forces in Northern Ireland could have

been involved in the bombings is neither fanciful nor absurd, given the

number of instances in which similar illegal activity has been proven.

However, the material assessed by the inquiry is insufficient to suggest that

senior members of the security forces in Northern Ireland were in any way

involved in the bombings.

4. The loyalist groups who carried out the bombings in Dublin were capable of

doing so without help from any section of the security forces in Northern

Ireland, though this does not rule out the involvement of individual RUC,

UDR or British Army members.

The Monaghan bombing bears all the hallmarks of a standard loyalist

operation and required no assistance.

5. It is likely that the farm of James Mitchell at Glennane played a significant

part in the preparation for the attacks. It is also likely that members of the

UDR and RUC either participated in, or were aware of those preparations.

6. The possibility that the involvement of such army or police officers was

covered-up at a higher level cannot be ruled out; but it is unlikely that any

such decision would ever have been committed to writing.

7. The inquiry believes that within a short time of the bombings taking place,

the security forces in Northern Ireland had good intelligence to suggest who

was responsible. An example of this could be the unknown information that

led British intelligence sources to tell their Irish army counterparts that at

least two of the bombers had been arrested on 26 May and detained.

Unfortunately, the inquiry has been unable to discover the nature of this and

other intelligence available to the security forces in Northern Ireland at that

time.

8. A number of those suspected for the bombings were reliably said to have had

relationships with British intelligence and/or RUC Special Branch officers. It

is reasonable to assume that exchanges of information took place. It is

therefore possible that the assistance provided to the Garda investigation

team by the security forces in Northern Ireland was affected by a reluctance

to compromise those relationships, in the interests of securing further

information in the future.

But any such conclusion would require very cogent evidence. No such

evidence is in the possession of the inquiry. There remains a deep suspicion

that the investigation into the bombings was hampered by such factors, but

it cannot be put any further than that.

4.16 These conclusions show that Mr. Justice Barron was able to unearth significant

information, which pointed to the perpetrators and to the likelihood of collusion

being a factor in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings. He did acknowledge that

there were grounds for suspecting that the bombers may have had assistance

from members of the security forces. However, the involvement of individual

members in such activity did not, in Mr. Justice Barron’s opinion mean that the

bombings were either officially or unofficially sanctioned. He emphasised that he

did not possess the necessary evidence to permit him to reach such conclusions.

4.17 It is also self-evident from these findings that the information and witnesses

relevant to these two issues would appear to be based either in Northern Ireland

or in Great Britain. It is also the case that Mr. Justice Barron himself thought that

the scope of his Report on this aspect was limited by virtue of the refusal of the

British Government to supply certain information and to make original

documents available. In response to a question from Senator Jim Walsh, as to

whether he himself was satisfied that he had addressed the collusion issue, he

stated:

‘I do not mean that our review of collusion is exhausted by any means.’

Great Britain and Northern Ireland Documentation

4.18 Before detailing these submissions, it is important to note that during the course

of his deliberations, Mr. Justice Barron requested assistance from Great Britain

and Northern Ireland authorities. He was furnished with a sixteen-page

document outlining a summary of any relevant information on the Dublin

Monaghan bombings, which had resulted from a trawl of their files. The Sub-

Committee invited current and former titleholders from Great Britain and

Northern Ireland to make oral or written submissions to them, to elaborate on

this document and any other relevant matters but these invitations were

declined. The names of these invitees are set out in Appendix 7.

4.19 The Sub-Committee wishes to express its grave disappointment at the response

received to these invitations. An examination of the Northern Ireland and Great

Britain records from the time in question would be necessary for any examination

of this area. However, neither the Sub-Committee nor Mr. Justice Barron were

afforded the co-operation which the gravity of the atrocity required.

Submissions made to the Sub-Committee on the Question of the identity of the

Perpetrators and the Issue of Collusion

4.20 The Sub-Committee received submissions from various parties on the question of

the identity of the perpetrators and the issue of collusion, which centred on

information, which they said was available, and would be of assistance in

identifying the perpetrators and would deal with the issue of collusion.

The Pat Finucane Centre

4.21 The Pat Finucane Centre is a human rights non-governmental organisation who

have compiled a significant volume of research material into the area of collusion

in Armagh, Down, Tyrone and the border areas in the 1970’s. The following

representatives of the Pat Finucane Centre appeared before the Sub-Committee:

(i) Mr. Paul O’Connor,

(ii) Mr. Alan Brecknell, and

(iii) Ms. Johanna Keenan.

4.22 Their submission to the Sub-Committee centred on the context in which the

Dublin and Monaghan bombings took place. They have engaged in researching

collusion by serving members of the security forces with loyalist paramilitaries in

the perpetration of terrorist activities in Northern Ireland at that time.

4.23 The various points made in their written and oral submissions to the Sub-

Committee were considered when evaluating whether further investigation into

the bombings of 1974 is warranted.

4.24 The Pat Finucane Centre gave specific details in relation to the matters set out

below;

(i) That elements of the Glennane group, who were identified in

the Barron Report as having played a “significant part in the

preparation for the attacks”, in fact carried out a large number of

terrorist attacks and were responsible for the deaths of

dozens of people and injury to hundreds more.

(ii) That the failure to bring the perpetrators of the Dublin and

Monaghan bombings to justice allowed that group to

continue to conduct terrorist attacks on both sides of the

border.

(iii) That the criminal justice agencies in Northern Ireland

covered up the widespread activities of this group (they gave

details of the various court cases) and that their activities are

indicative of a culture of collusion which existed in the area

during the mid 1970’s and which resulted in a failure to bring

the perpetrators of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings to

justice.

4.25 They outlined to the Sub-Committee their extensive research into the activities

of the Glennane group. Ms. Johanna Keenan told the Sub-Committee of the

special relationship which they believe existed between those operating out of

Glennane and the Portadown UVF.

4.26 The Pat Finucane Centre also submitted to the Sub-Committee that the farm at

Glennane was used as a “drop-in centre for the RUC, UDR, British Army and for loyalist

paramilitaries.” The representatives also submitted that in their view it was highly

unlikely that senior officers in the RUC were unaware of this fact.

4.27 Their information was compiled using information from official sources,

information relating to court cases and convictions. They also had specific

information about the alleged perpetrators of the attacks. They also based their

determinations in relation to collusion on information relating to ballistic links

which they believed demonstrated that there was co-operation between groups

in four areas: Glennane, Portadown, Annaghmore and Dungannon, in terms of the

weapons those groups were using to carry out multiple attacks.

4.28 The representatives of the Centre believed their research demonstrated a pattern

of collusion existing in Northern Ireland at the time of the bombings and that:

“the Dublin and Monaghan bombings were not a once off event in terms of the

coming together of members of the security forces and loyalist paramilitaries.

The individuals came together on numerous occasions... to carry out multiple

murders.”

Justice for the Forgotten

4.29 During the course of their submissions both Mr. Cormac O Dúlacháin S.C. and

his instructing solicitor Mr. Greg O’Neill detailed the results of investigative

work that their group had either undertaken or become aware of. Those results

pointed to a picture of widespread collusion that was operating at that time. In

particular, Mr. O’Neill told the Sub-Committee:

‘It is our view that the Rock Bar case presents the most compelling evidence for the existence of systemic collusion by the security forces in Northern Ireland into crimes which are connected to the Dublin and Monaghan Bombings through the combination and permutations of the perpetrators suspected of

involvement and through the identification in terms of the evidence of people like Colin Wallace, of people who are actual members of the security forces in Northern Ireland or were agents of the security forces in Northern Ireland, these groups having been infiltrated by military intelligence.’

Deputy Peter Power asked Mr. Colin Wallace whether in his view, it was

possible that the idea to bomb Dublin and Monaghan came from intelligence or

from loyalist paramilitaries. He replied:

‘ the problem is that in 1974, because of the intense atmosphere and hostility towards the power sharing executive, it is very difficult to draw a line between the two. As I said to Mr, Justice Barron, the people we suspected of doing the Dublin and Monaghan bombings were either members of the security forces or had been, that is either RUC or UDR. That does not exclude the possibility that intelligence officers from one of the other agencies manipulated the people and gave them information to help them plan the operation. At arough guess, it would take about thirty people to carry out that type of operation, in terms of all the support and so on involved. My concern is that bearing in mind that intelligence was effective in 1974, that group was a major threat to the security forces in 1974. I cannot believe that we did not ge tinformation about those bombings, bearing in mind how closely the group worked with former serving members of the security forces in 1974. The relationship was too close for it not to be seen’.

The Chairperson, Deputy Seán Ardagh, asked Mr. Wallace whether there was

any specific evidence to show that any members of the British security forces

were involved in the Dublin and Monaghan bombings and he replied: ‘I am sure

that that evidence exists’.

Mr. Seán Donlon

4.30 In reply to a question from Deputy Paul McGrath, in relation to the issue of

collusion, Mr. Donlon stated:

‘As far as I could see, there was a pattern of collusion within Northern Ireland.

For example, I think there were areas where the RUC was driven to pick up

certain people and to intern or arrest them, not because of anything the RUC knew, but because of information given to them by people who were loyalist paramilitaries. I think there was a very close collaboration in some areas between elements in the RUC and members of loyalist paramilitary

organisations. That was information I picked up from people I would very

highly respect, particularly solicitors, priests, politicians and people on whose

judgment I would rely and who could give me very practical instances and

point to court cases in Northern Ireland, which clearly indicated collusion to

me.’

British Irish Rights Watch

4.31 Ms. Jane Winter, Director, made submissions on behalf of the British Irish Rights

Watch which is an independent non-governmental organisation that focuses on

the conflict and the peace process in Northern Ireland.

4.32 She observed that Mr. Justice Barron had made three very important findings on

the issue of collusion without having sufficient evidence to ground these

conclusions, namely;

(i) that the loyalists had the necessary knowledge and expertise

to carry out the bombings.

62

(ii) that the British authorities had no prior knowledge of the

bombings which could have been passed on.

(iii) that there was no external assistance given to the loyalists

who were responsible.

4.33 She felt these were issues, which could only be adequately dealt with on an

examination of the original British intelligence documents, which would require

co-operation from the UK authorities.

Submissions on the issue of a further inquiry

4.34 Many of the discussions centred on the means by which access to documents in

the UK and Northern Ireland could be procured. The Sub-Committee considered

the potential difficulties, which arose with each option.

4.35 A large number of submissions were received which analysed the advantages and

pitfalls associated with the different types of inquiry which could be established

as a result of the work of the Sub-Committee. These submissions were of

considerable help to the Sub-Committee in its deliberations. The parties who

provided the Sub-Committee with submissions of this nature were:

(i) Representatives of the O’Neill family, the O’Brien family and Ms

Bernie Bergin;

(ii) Justice for the Forgotten;

(iii) British Irish Rights Watch;

(iv) Irish National Congress;

(v) Irish Council for Civil Liberties;

(vi) The Pat Finucane Centre;

(vii) Professor Colin Warbrick;

(viii) Mr. Paudge Connolly T. D.; and

(ix) Michael Collins S.C. and Antonio Bueno Q.C.;

The O’Neill family, the O’Brien family and Ms Bernie Bergin

4.36 Mr. Michael Mansfield Q.C. and Mr. Eoin McGonigal S.C. (with Ms. Miriam

Reilly B.L.) instructed by Mr. Desmond J. Doherty, Solicitor, appeared on behalf

of the above parties and submitted that as a result of the ratification by Ireland of

the European Convention on Human Rights, the Sub-Committee had little or no

option but to recommend a full public inquiry pursuant to the Tribunals of

Inquiry Act 1921, as amended.

4.37 The Convention became part of Irish law on 31st December 2003 pursuant to the

European Convention on Human Rights Act 2003. Article 2 of the Convention

reads:

“Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No-one shall be deprived of

his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his

conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law.”

The duties which arise out of Article 2 were examined in the English case of

Regina v Secretary of State for the Home Department (Respondent) ex parte Amin

(FC)(Appellant) [2003] UKHL 51. In that case, the House of Lords looked at the

obligations imposed by Article 2. The Court pointed out that if the substantive

obligations regarding the protection of life are to mean anything, an effective

investigation into the loss of life is required to fulfil a State’s obligations under

the Convention. Mr Mansfield Q.C. stated:

“Where the substantive obligations are triggered to protect life and so on, if there had been a violation of that and people have lost their lives, there is a concomitant obligation to investigate it according to certain minimum standards”

4.38 It was submitted that the case of McCann v UK (1995) 21 EHRR 97 established

what this minimum standard should be, namely a mechanism whereby the

circumstances of a deprivation of life by the agents of a state would receive public

and independent scrutiny.

4.39 The nature and degree of scrutiny, which satisfies this minimum threshold,

would depend on the individual circumstances of the case. Those minimum

requirements were:

(i) that the investigation must be effective;

(ii) that there must be a sufficient element of public scrutiny of

the investigation to secure accountability, in practice as well

as in theory;

(iii) that the next of kin must be involved in the procedure to the

extent necessary to safeguard their legitimate interests.

4.40 It was put to the Sub-Committee that the legitimate interests of the next of kin

had not been protected as required for the following two reasons:

(i) They did not have privilege in relation to any statements

made by them to Mr. Justice Barron or the Inquiry. This

restricted their ability to voice their views. This would not

be the case in a full public inquiry.

(ii) A full public inquiry would allow the next of kin to be aware

of what others might say about them and allow them a

chance to address any comments made.

4.41 Mr Mansfield Q.C. argued that the minimum requirements have not yet been met

in this instance and that they could only be satisfied by a full public inquiry.

4.42 It was submitted that the Amin case made the point that there should be no prejudgment in advance of an inquiry as to what it might achieve:

“It might not come up with anything but that does not matter; there will have

been, as it were, an adherence to the Convention and the rights that arise out of

it, and the public will be reassured that the determination, as it were, has

arisen in a public and open way, as demanded by that.”

4.43 The submission was made that simply because any further inquiry was unlikely

to unearth any new facts or knowledge was not a relevant consideration for the

Sub-Committee to take into account.

4.44 When considering the difficulties surrounding access to documentation in

foreign jurisdictions, it was submitted that the Letter of Request procedure could

be adopted seeking the relevant documentation. This was possible under the

Tribunals of Inquiry Act 1921 which applied not only in this jurisdiction and also

in the UK, and also under the English Evidence (Proceedings in other

Jurisdictions) Act 1975. Mr. McGonigal S.C. pointed out that this procedure had

been utilised to assist the McCracken Tribunal of Inquiry and as a result,

documentation was obtained in the U.K. An article detailing this experience in

the UK and in the Cayman islands, which was written by the barrister involved,

Mr. Michael Collins S.C. was submitted to the Sub-Committee.

4.45 Mr Mansfield Q.C. stated:

“Psychologically, politically and diplomatically, the British would find it extremely difficult to say ‘We will not answer these letters of request.”

It was submitted that any decision of an agency of the English Government not to produce documents, following the lodging of letters of request could be a potential breach of rights arising from the Convention.

Justice for the Forgotten

4.46 The legal representatives for Justice for the Forgotten suggested that the Sub-

Committee examine the question of whether the Barron Report brought finality

or closure. Mr. Cormac Ó Dúlacháin S.C. stated:

“The questions that follow are in some respects simple. Are there genuine issues

to investigate? Are there serious issues that need to be pursued on foot of the

Barron report? We then move on to an important area in which political

judgment has to be exercised. In the scale of things, how grave are these issues?

What is serious to one person is not as serious as to someone else, and a

judgment has to be made in terms of the gravity of this issue.”

4.47 Mr Ó Dúlacháin S.C. posed the question as to whether these issues were

amenable to further inquiry, and at what cost. He did point out that cost is more

than simply a question of money, and that there might also be a political cost to

be taken into account. It was suggested that questions, which remained to be

answered, included who was responsible for the bombs, whether there was

collusion and why no one has ever been brought to justice. Mr Ó Dúlacháin S.C.

queried whether the Barron report was to be the end of the line and whether or

not the official State response would that there should be no further inquiry. In

this context, he argued that it should not be, as the Barron Report was no more

than “one person’s journey through a mass of material with no meaningful assistance.” The

Barron process lacked a public probing and the current end result was, in his

client’s view, unsatisfactory. The Report may have contained a wealth of

information but it lacked comprehensive analysis or conclusion.

4.48 He stated:

“Why a public inquiry? The reason for a public inquiry is that there is no other

means available to the relatives. There is nowhere else they can effectively go.

There is no ongoing criminal investigation into collusion. There never was a

Garda investigation into collusion and there is no indication that this will ever

take place.”

4.49 He suggested that there were clear areas that had never been investigated and

which could give rise to new information, such as the incident in Dublin Port in

1974, and also information which Irish Prisons Service records may hold

regarding communications with loyalist prisoners who were in Mountjoy Prison

at that time. He noted that the criminal investigation into the Lockerbie bombing

took 12 years to get to trial.

4.50 Mr Greg O’Neill, solicitor, also addressed the Sub-Committee and urged us to

recommend a public inquiry in this jurisdiction. He said that the issue of

collusion is not something beyond the ability of this State to inquire into on its

own, even without British involvement. He was of the view that for the Irish

Government to:

‘put up one’s hands and say “As a sovereign Parliament in a sovereign State,

we cannot investigate this if those we suspect of harbouring the colluders do

not co-operate, is to give the last word to a foreign Government over events

that happened within a sovereign State”.

4.51 He felt that the relevant issues could be defined, focused and demystified. He

reminded the Sub-Committee of the amount of good investigative work that had

been done by bodies such as the Pat Finucane Centre, which could be of use to an

inquiry in this jurisdiction.

British Irish Rights Watch

4.52 In the submission made by Ms Jane Winter on behalf of British Irish Rights

Watch, she stated:

“In our view, there is a difference between the UK’s failure to supply Judge

Barron with the information he requested, and a refusal by the UK to cooperate

with a public inquiry established by the Republic of Ireland, its

partner in the peace process.”

4.53 She submitted that any public inquiry set up this jurisdiction could draw

inferences from a failure of the British government to co-operate. This possibility

might encourage the UK authorities to co-operate rather than suffer political

embarrassment:

“If pressure were brought to bear in the corridors, as it were, of the UN,

Ireland would find many allies and the UK could find itself very embarrassed

if it were not co-operating with a country with whom it says it is in partnership

in a peace process in an endeavour to lay some of the issues that are regrettably

left over from the conflict.”

4.54 British Irish Rights Watch felt that in light of the current political climate and

the nature of relations between Ireland and the UK a joint resolution of both

Houses of the Oireachtas calling on the British Parliament to co-operate with a

public inquiry was something which might yield a positive response.

4.55 Ms. Winter agreed with the submissions made by Mr. Mansfield Q.C. that

should the British Government refuse to co-operate with an Irish public inquiry,

the victims would then have an opportunity to bring a case in the UK Courts

seeking to enforce their rights under Article 2 of the European Convention on

Human Rights, basing their claim on the Amin case. This might ultimately result

in the British authorities being forced to co-operate with any Inquiry which

might be established. However, the Sub-Committee notes that adopting this

course of action could be problematic in light of the recent House of Lords

decision in the case of In re McKerr [2004] UKHL 12.

4.56 Ms. Winter was at pains to point out however, that she was not advocating a

type of cross-jurisdictional inquiry. She was not aware of any inquiry of this

nature ever having been set up either in this State or in the UK, and she felt that

any attempt to convene an inquiry of this nature would be fraught with difficulty.

4.57 Ms. Winter also agreed with the submission of Mr. Mansfield Q.C. that the

Human Rights Act 2003, which incorporated the European Convention on

Human Rights into Irish law, has imposed certain obligations on the Irish

Government. Article 2 of the Convention affords the relatives of victims of

unexplained deaths a right to an effective investigation into those deaths.

Regardless of whether or not the British authorities would co-operate, it was

submitted that a public inquiry is the only mechanism in Irish law that could

adequately vindicate the rights of the relatives of the victims of the bombings.

Ms. Winter stated:

“That means that the victims of the Dublin and Monaghan bombings have the

right to an effective investigation and the agency to which they should look to

vindicate that right is their own Government.”

4.58 She stated that if a public inquiry was not established this Government:

“will be guilty of the indifference towards the victims identified by Judge Barron on the part of the government of the day.”

The Irish National Congress

4.59 The representatives from the Irish National Congress also referred to the efforts,

which were made in Britain to investigate the Lockerbie bombing, and drew a

parallel with what had happened in this country. Mr Paul McGuill, Secretary of

the Congress pointed out that the question of official State-sponsored collusion

in acts of political violence is complex and vexing. Covert actions and

conspiracies are difficult to prove and little evidence is committed to paper. Just

because the task is difficult that does not mean that the task should not be

undertaken. He compared it to peeling layers off an onion and advocated further

inquiry.

The Irish Council for Civil Liberties

4.60 Mr. Conor Power B.L. of the Irish Council for Civil Liberties focused his

submissions on the State’s obligations under Article 2 of the European

Convention for Human Rights. He suggested that the Sub-Committee should

consider whether an inquiry would produce an effective result in the context of

the State’s obligations. He said that any tribunal of investigation should be

independent from both the Irish and British authorities. However, he felt that a

cross-border inquiry might get bogged down in legal issues and might therefore

be delayed. He also suggested that a tribunal should be in a position to offer

compensation.

The Pat Finucane Centre

4.61 The submission made by the representatives of the Pat Finucane Centre was

quite different in many respects from that of other interested parties. They were

in a position to show that they had carried out detailed research into the

activities of loyalist terrorists who were active at the time of the

Dublin/Monaghan bombs. Mr Paul O’Connor submitted that their group could

show that there was ample evidence still available for consideration, not just in

security files, but also in ordinary prosecution files in Northern Ireland. They felt

that a public inquiry would be the appropriate mechanism to obtain this

information and have it investigated.

Professor Colin Warbrick

4.62 Professor Colin Warbrick is a Professor of Law at Durham University and his

principal field of expertise is in International Law. He was directly invited by the

Sub-Committee and he focussed his submission on two main areas:

(i) The prospects of success in obtaining international cooperation

for a public Tribunal in this jurisdiction under the

Tribunals of Inquiry Act, 1921. This also involved a

consideration of the European Convention of Human Rights,

and the obligations, which arise by virtue of Ireland’s

ratification of the Convention.

(ii) What options might be available to the Sub-Committee

other than a purely domestic inquiry.

4.63 At the outset, Professor Warbrick emphasised to the Sub-Committee the

importance of considering the issue of potential co-operation from the British

authorities:

“The guiding principles mean that States can do very little without cooperation

but can do almost anything with co-operation.”

4.64 In relation to the possibility of procuring documentation from the British

authorities relevant to any investigation of the circumstances surrounding the

bombings, Professor Warbrick agreed with Mr. Mansfield Q.C. that the UK High

Court does have some powers under the UK Evidence (Proceedings in other

Jurisdictions) Act 1975 to facilitate a request from another State for information

relevant to an investigation in that State.

4.65 However, he pointed out three qualifications to this power, which are relevant in

this particular situation.

(i) Requests can only be made by a “Court or Tribunal.”

(ii) UK Courts are concerned to confine their powers under the

Act to civil or commercial matters. They do not allow the

powers to be used to facilitate another State to obtain

evidence to be used in criminal investigations or trials.

Therefore, any evidence obtained from the UK under these

powers could not be used as evidence against a defendant in

any subsequent criminal proceedings.

(iii) Further, it must be demonstrated that the documents

requested are likely to contain evidence, which is

particularly relevant for the purposes of the Tribunal. This

requires a high degree of specificity in the documents

requested and eliminates the possibility of any ‘fishing

expeditions’.

4.66 In response to a question from Deputy Paul McGrath he stated:

“...getting to the stage of getting that order out of the English court is by no

means a simple or certain process. Far from wanting to suggest to you that it

was a simple matter, it was the opposite. I think that there are a number of very

serious hurdles to be overcome before you get to that position.”

4.67 He also disagreed with the submission made to the Sub-Committee by the British

Irish Rights Watch to the effect that it would be possible for any inquiry in this

jurisdiction to draw inferences from the failure of the British Government to

provide documents in relation to collusion. He pointed out:

“...you have got to have something to go on — inferences are not something that

can be drawn against no evidence whatsoever.”

He also considered the possibility of securing the co-operation of the UK

authorities in revealing documentary evidence by using an argument that they are

obliged to so do by virtue of the European Convention on Human Rights.

However, Professor Warbrick felt that any application of this nature would run

into difficulties.

4.68 He referred the Sub-Committee to the Bankovic case. In that case the European

Court of Human Rights held that due to the fact that the victims of any alleged

violations, which could be attributed to them, were outside the jurisdiction of the

signatory States, the claims were inadmissible. Professor Warbrick pointed out

that the same principle might apply in this case and would be a very difficult

obstacle to surmount.

4.69 He agreed with submissions made by other parties that by virtue of Article 2 of

the Convention, there is a requirement on a State to hold an effective inquiry in

circumstances where there is an unexplained death within the State’s

jurisdiction. However, he indicated that although Article 2 of the Convention

imposes positive duties on States to investigate unexplained deaths within their

jurisdiction to minimum standards, this duty is qualified. He stated:

“...the Court seldom holds States to absolute duties in these cases; the running

of time, the demonstrated pointlessness of further investigation, even sheer

expense are factors a State would be entitled to take into account in

determining what it must do about an unexplained death in its jurisdiction.”

4.70 Professor Warbrick also commented that if the Oireachtas did not direct the

holding of an inquiry of some form into the bombings, a question might arise as to

whether Ireland had complied with its Convention obligations under Article 2.

4.71 The rights that are at issue in Article 2 are the rights of the surviving relatives of

the victims of the bombings. Professor Warbrick felt that it was possible that a

claim could be brought by the bereaved relatives to the English High Court,

relying on the provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and or in

civil law. However, this would be a unique claim in the sense that it has not been

tried before under the Convention. He noted that a similar case would shortly be

litigated concerning recent events in Iraq. He also pointed to a potential problem,

namely lack of evidence, in that it would be necessary to show with some degree

of specificity, what documents are in existence, before they can be discovered.

Mr. Paudge Connolly T.D.

4.72 Deputy Paudge Connolly, a T.D. for Cavan-Monaghan, stated that:

“While there is no definitive conclusion to the Barron Inquiry, it signposted

many issues which can only be dealt with by a cross-jurisdictional judicial

public inquiry and I am here to support the relatives in pursuit of that

objective”.

4.73 He did not think that it was good enough that there was a lack of co-operation

from the British and Northern Ireland authorities. He noted that the environment

had changed and that the relationship between Britain, Northern Ireland and

Ireland was now much better than it had been. He stated:

“we are in the midst of a peace process, which should be exploited fully.”

Mr. Michael Collins S.C. and Mr. Antonio Bueno Q.C.

4.74 The Sub-Committee sought and received a joint opinion on certain issues of law

from Mr. Michael Collins S.C. and Mr. Antonio Bueno Q.C. They were

pessimistic as to whether anything worthwhile could be achieved in the absence

of co-operation at inter-Governmental level. They indicated that the legal

position was that it was not certain that a letter of request from any Irish inquiry

would be recognised and acted on by the English courts. They cited relevant

English and Cayman Island authorities in that regard. Even if such a request were

to be granted, they indicated the probability that the British authorities would

assert public interest immunity as the reason for non-disclosure of the

documents. Given the fact that Dr. John Reid, the then Secretary of State for

Northern Ireland took this view when Mr. Justice Barron sought the information

from him, logic would suggest that the same attitude would be taken by the

British authorities in respect of a request from any inquiry in this jurisdiction.

They stated:

“Although we lack detailed knowledge of the material involved, we think it

unlikely that the High Court would not uphold a claim to immunity from

disclosure. In such event, the establishment of any tribunal of inquiry would

turn out to be largely cosmetic, which would be a very unsatisfactory result.”

4.75 They also questioned whether Article 2 imposes any obligation to conduct a

further inquiry into the bombings. They noted that each case depends on its own

facts and circumstances, a consideration of what investigations may already have

been carried out and the purpose and utility of any further investigation. In

particular, they noted that no party had suggested that agents of the Irish State

carried out the bombings. They also noted the lapse of time and stated that the

Sub-Committee needs to consider

“to what extent it may realistically be said that a tribunal of inquiry would

succeed in having available to it a better quality of eye witness or forensic

evidence.”

Despite the lapse of time, they submitted that in their view, there was a

reasonably strong argument that Great Britain has a duty under Article 2 of the

Convention to set up some form of effective, official investigation into collusion

by members of the security forces in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, in

relation to the bombings.

In response to a question from Deputy Joe Costello on whether it was possible for

Ireland to take an action against the UK under the European Convention of

Human Rights, Mr. Collins stated that Ireland:

‘ ... could bring the case to Strasbourg on the grounds that the United Kingdom

Government is in breach of its obligations under Article 2 of the Convention

by virtue of a failure to set up an effective official investigation.’

He further stated:

‘ ... there is a substantial argument that the United Kingdom Government has

a duty to investigate under Article 2 , by virtue of the ancillary and

substantive right to life jurisprudence that has been developed’.

He qualified this statement that this interpretation of Article 2 of the Convention

was not in existence in 1974 and the British authorities may not have understood

that they had any such obligations at that time.

The reply made by Justice for the Forgotten

4.76 Mr. Ó Dúlacháin S.C. felt that the opinion given by Mr. Michael Collins S.C. and

Mr. Antonio Bueno Q.C. placed too much emphasis on the idea that the success

of a Tribunal of inquiry established in this jurisdiction is to a large degree

dependent on securing voluntarily or by legal compulsion access to

documentation in the possession of UK authorities. He felt the request by an

Inquiry in this jurisdiction for documentation could be more varied and so gain

more.

4.77 He also stated that he did not believe that a blanket “public interest immunity”

certificate could be issued by the UK authorities in response to a request made.

Each aspect of any request made would have to be considered and would involve

a legal consideration and judgment in each case.

4.78 Mr. Ó Dúlacháin also felt that the obligations incumbent on a State to protect life

under the European Convention of Human Rights are independent of the taking

of any particular life. He argued that an Inquiry into the issue of collusion can

have the effect of holding States and State institutions to account for their

national and international human rights obligations and that this is an important

public function where the prospects of establishing individual culpability will at

this remove be extremely difficult.

The reply by the O’Neill family, the O’Brien family and Ms Bernie Bergin

4.79 Mr. Eoin McGonigal S.C. told the Sub-Committee that it should not presume

that the UK authorities would not provide documentation if a Tribunal of Inquiry

were to be set up. He felt that the attitude of the UK authorities to date suggests

that they would in fact provide this documentation to any Inquiry, subject to

public interest immunity considerations.

4.80 Mr. McGonigal S.C. submitted that the current Secretary of State’s attitude as

set out in the correspondence was that if a judicial inquiry was set up in this

jurisdiction the documentation would be made available subject to the right to

raise public interest immunity. It was his contention that the public interest

immunity would be determined by an inquiry in this jurisdiction. He referred to

the application, which had been made by the Bloody Sunday Inquiry for similar

type documents. He conceded that this issue may well be the subject of litigation,

but that should not be a reason for rejecting the idea of setting up such an

inquiry.

Mr. Justice Peter Cory

4.81 Mr. Justice Peter Cory is a retired judge of the Canadian Supreme Court who was

nominated and appointed by the Irish and UK Governments, pursuant to the

Weston Park protocol, to conduct an investigation into six instances where eight

individuals lost their lives North and South with particular reference to collusion.

His letter of instruction and the relevant part of the Weston Park protocol is

attached at Appendix 11.

4.82 Mr. Justice Cory was unable to appear before the Sub-Committee due to ill

health. However, he did facilitate the Sub-Committee by speaking with it via a

telephone conference call. He outlined the nature of the inquiries he conducted,

the methodology that he used and his views on the effectiveness of the entire

procedure. The Sub-Committee was anxious to speak with him due to his unique

experience in conducting an inquiry of this nature and is extremely grateful to

him for his assistance.

4.83 Mr. Justice Cory gave the Sub-Committee an insight into how his investigation

conducted its work. For six of the eighteen months of the work, there was a

police team of seven detectives that were selected by a committee of former Chief

Constables in the U.K. These detectives were vetted to ensure that they had no

prior connection with Northern Ireland matters. According to Mr. Justice Cory,

they worked very hard and very carefully. At each stage, they would work one

case ahead of him. When asked specifically had he seen any security

documentation, he stated that he had seen MI5 documentation and believed that

he had seen everything that was relevant. The detectives would bring the

documents to a secure place and hold them until Mr. Justice Cory and his

Counsel had an opportunity to personally peruse each document. He confirmed

that the documentation consisted of both original and photostat copies.

4.84 Mr. Justice Cory personally evaluated the information in the documentation and

used same for the purposes of his reports. He also confirmed that he had been

given access to individuals for interviews where he felt it was appropriate. He

also sought and obtained confirmation from the relevant organisations that they

had produced every relevant document. He emphasised that he remained

completely separate from the organs of State in each jurisdiction and insisted that

he at all times operated independently.

4.85 The method by which he obtained documents was by writing to any persons or

bodies he felt might have documents pertinent to his inquiry. Such letters

contained his terms of reference and placed an emphasis on the fact that the

process was backed by the full co-operation of both Governments. For the

purposes of his inquiries, the only people with access to the documents in various

state institutions were Mr. Justice Cory and two other Counsel who had been

assigned to assist him. They examined all relevant documents in order to discern

the nature of their contents.

4.86 Although he could not be certain, he did not believe that any documentation was

withheld from him for reasons of security, privilege or public interest immunity.

Although he had no statutory powers, which could grant him a right of

inspection, compellability of attendance or discovery of documents, he did not

believe that this had hindered his progress in any way. All the parties he dealt

with were extremely co-operative due to the nature of the agreement, which

existed between the two governments.

4.87 When considering the options open to the Sub-Committee he put forward the

idea of a private inquiry conducted by someone who has the trust and authority

of both sides. This he felt protected the integrity of the process, and is sufficient

to reassure the public that the inquiry is being conducted in a proper manner.

4.88 When asked to consider how an inquiry similar to those he conducted might be

established, he stated:

“I think again it is something that needs an agreement between the two

Governments with regard to these matters. That is the only way of doing it.

Once you have that you have everything.”

He continued:

“It is the co-operation that enables someone who is doing that work to reach a

conclusion. It is only that way that the person can review the material that is

essential to be seen to come to that conclusion.”

4.89 He also believed that where a public inquiry was recommended, that the

preliminary work undertaken in the investigative stage would significantly

reduce the time of any such public inquiry.

An Taoiseach

4.90 The Sub-Committee was grateful to An Taoiseach, Mr. Bertie Ahern T.D., for

agreeing to attend a hearing in order to outline the representations that he has

made to the British authorities seeking their co-operation with the Barron

Inquiry and the responses, which he had received. He stated:

“I simply do not know whether there is more information that might have been

of assistance to Mr. Justice Barron, or would be of assistance to a further

inquiry. However, I have already stated in the Dáil that it is my personal view

that we have received as much information from the British authorities as they

have, or are prepared to, share. I also said that it is my belief that a public

inquiry will not change this position. I say this in the light of the efforts that I

know we expended throughout the course of this inquiry to encourage cooperation,

and which I have shared with you this evening, and also because,

frankly, it is the only conclusion I can draw from the definitive statements in

Secretary of State Murphy’s letter to the sub-committee.”

In response to a question from Deputy Finian McGrath, An Taoiseach stated:

‘ ....It is unlikely that at that time MI5 and MI6 would not have taken a fair

interest in what happened- let us say very carefully that we assume that they

had nothing to do with it and that there was no collusion- and that they would

not have come to assessments after it. It is hard to believe that there was

nothing that they could have reported on. I find it hard to believe that there

was not some report somewhere about these issues....If there any other papers

that would have been useful to us, I think that they were at the level of MI 5 or

MI6.....That is not to say that there is any questions of collusion in that answer;

I am saying that they could have been helpful with papers’.

In response to a question put by Deputy Paul McGrath, he also stated:

‘ Mr. Justice Cory has done outstanding work. He has in a short period of time

done an enormous amount of reading and research..... he got total access to an

enormous amount of records and data. We know that those who sought

information in previous years failed in their efforts.

The question arises: how did he get that in these cases? I think he got it in these

cases because we had made a deal between two sovereign states in Weston

Park that there would be total co-operation with an international judge, that

whoever that person would be the reports would be accepted and that within

our systems we would adhere to their tribunals.’

The view of the Sub-Committee on whether there should be a further inquiry

on the identity of the perpetrators and on the issue of collusion

4.91 The Sub-Committee having considered:

(i) the considerable amount of information contained in the

Barron Report and the careful conclusions arrived at

therein, and

(ii) the submissions made to it during the course of its

hearings

is of the view that this particular area requires further and extensive

consideration and investigation. The above combination of information

received by the Sub-Committee concerning the suspicion that collusion

existed in Northern Ireland between members of the security forces and

loyalist paramilitary groups in relation to the Dublin and Monaghan

bombings, far from dispelling any views to the contrary, has in fact

reinforced that suspicion.

4.92 The question arose as to how the issues of collusion and the identity of the

perpetrators could be addressed in a meaningful way. The form that any

further investigation might take was something, which exercised the Sub-

Committee. The problems that arise are self-evident given the fact that much

of the potentially relevant information and witnesses are outside this

jurisdiction. The Sub-Committee is of the view that access to relevant

documentation and witnesses in the UK and Northern Ireland is vital in

order to investigate and resolve this matter.

4.93 The Sub-Committee received submissions from interested parties as to how

this might best be achieved. The case for a public inquiry was put to the Sub-

Committee by a number of parties. However, the parties who called for a

public inquiry in this jurisdiction accepted that without access to

documentation, information and witnesses in Northern Ireland and Great

Britain relating to the bombings, an inquiry in this jurisdiction would present

difficulties.

4.94 It became apparent to the Sub-Committee that to advance any meaningful

inquiry it is necessary to obtain access to specific documentation outside this

jurisdiction and in seeking to obtain this documentation from the relevant

court one would have to be in a position to point to actual documentation

that exists, rather than attempting a general trawl without any details of

precise documents.

The Recommendations of the Sub-Committee on Whether there should be Further

Investigations /Inquiry on the Identity of the Perpetrators and on the Issue of

Collusion.

The Sub-Committee recommends as follows:

1. The Barron Report taken together with the oral and written submissions

point to the following:

(i) That in all probability the planning of the bombings was

carried out in Northern Ireland.

(ii) That in all probability most if not all of the perpetrators

came from Northern Ireland.

(iii) That in all probability information which identifies and

which concerns the perpetrators still exists in Northern

Ireland and Great Britain.

(iv) That in all probability most of the information touching

on collusion in relation to the Dublin and Monaghan

bombings is in Northern Ireland and/or in Great Britain.

(v) That in all probability most if not all of the relevant

witnesses in respect of perpetrators and collusion reside

in Northern Ireland and Great Britain.

2. The Sub-Committee has given very careful consideration to the various forms

of investigations and inquiries that might be undertaken to bring closure to

these atrocities. They include:

(i) A public Tribunal of Inquiry with full statutory powers.

(ii) An investigation under the Commission of Investigations

legislation, when enacted.

(iii) An investigation based upon the Weston Park proposals.

(iv) A civil suit initiated in Great Britain and/or Northern Ireland by

individual victims and/or relatives.

(v) A civil suit against the British Government initiated in the

European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg.

(vi) An inter/cross jurisdictional Inquiry

(vii) A Truth and Reconciliation Process.

3. The Sub-Committee considers that a public inquiry under the Tribunal of

Inquiries Act 1921 in this jurisdiction would have represented the preferred

form of inquiry. However, because the perpetrators, information and

witnesses are outside of this jurisdiction, there are legal and procedural

difficulties arising from an inquiry initiated in this jurisdiction as set out

previously.

4. The Sub-Committee considers that a Public Tribunal of Inquiry in Northern

Ireland and/or Great Britain is required and represents the best opportunity

to be successful.

5. Before any Inquiry would proceed the Sub-Committee is of the view that

what is required in the first instance, is an investigation based upon the

Weston Park proposals. The terms of reference should be agreed between

the two Governments and should be based upon the terms agreed at Weston

Park, in particular paragraph No. 19. The letter of instruction to Mr. Justice

Peter Cory and the relevant portion of the Weston Park protocol is at

Appendix 11. The Sub-Committee recommends that such an investigation be

conducted on the following basis:

(i) That the judge conducting the investigation be

of international stature.

(ii) That the investigation would have the power

to direct witnesses for interview, the power to

compel the delivery of documentation and to

inspect premises.

(iii) That there should be time limits agreed for the

commencement, duration and conclusion of

the investigation.

(iv) That the judge conducting the investigation

could recommend further action including

whether a public inquiry in either jurisdiction

should be held or not.

(v) The relevant government would be obliged to

implement any recommendation within a

defined time limit

6. In the event of the aforementioned process failing as a consequence of a lack

of co-operation from the Government or authorities in Great Britain or

Northern Ireland, the Sub-Committee recommends that the Irish

Government should consider instituting proceedings in the European Court

of Human Rights in Strasbourg, pursuant to the European Convention on

Human Rights, seeking appropriate declaratory relief against the UK,

requiring it to put in place an appropriate investigation.

7. The Sub-Committee recommends that a resolution of both Houses of the

Oireachtas be passed endorsing this Report and its recommendations, and

would invite the UK Parliament in Westminster to pass a similar resolution.