Committee Reports > List of Committees > Joint > 2004 > Committee on European Affairs > Report No. 08 - Turkey and Accession to the European Union

Summary and Conclusions

The information contained in this report is based on a fact finding visit by members of the committee to Ankara and Istanbul, two meetings of the Joint Committee with the Turkish Ambassador to Ireland and the Institute of European Affairs and desk research. The Joint Committee is aware that it has not, and could not have, the resources to undertake a truly comprehensive review of current political and civil life in Turkey nor to measure in detail possible outcomes of Turkish membership of the European Union, either for the Union or for Turkey. Nonetheless, it believes that it is important that the Committee should express a view on the broader issues raised by the decision facing the European Council on 17^th December, 2004 and that it should suggest criteria which might be used in coming to this decision.

The Helsinki European Council meeting in December 1999 concluded that:

“Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the Union on the basis of the same criteria as applied to the other candidate States. Building on the existing European Strategy, Turkey, like other candidate States, will benefit from a pre-accession strategy to stimulate and support its reforms.”

As part of the pre-accession strategy, the Commission reports regularly to the European Council on progress made by each of the candidate countries in preparing for membership. Consequently, the Commission has published a series of yearly Regular Reports on Turkey, covering the years 1998 to 2004.

The Copenhagen European Council meeting in December 2002 concluded that:

“The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process. If the European Council in December 2004, on the basis of a report and a recommendation from the Commission, decides that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the European Union will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.”

The Brussels European Council meeting in June 2004 concluded that:

“The Union reaffirms its commitment that if the European Council decides in December 2004, on the basis of a report and recommendation from the Commission, that Turkey fulfils the Copenhagen political criteria, the EU will open accession negotiations with Turkey without delay.”

The European Commission has submitted its report and its recommendation is that accession negotiations should begin.

The very fact of opening negotiations with Turkey is a step of great significance for the relations of the Union with Turkey. The Union has had a long-standing relationship with Turkey, including a unique customs union, which makes it very difficult to pretend that the next phase - accession negotiations - are anything other than part of a continuum. To suggest that it is possible to open negotiations for membership on some kind of exploratory basis, or that negotiations do not have full membership but some other type of arrangement as their goal, is disingenuous. To open negotiations with anything less than full membership as their objective would represent a real rupture in existing EU-Turkey relations. But opening negotiations is stepping out on a journey with a very uncertain destination.

The fact of being a candidate for EU accession will have a profound impact on Turkey economically and socially. It is clear that many of the constitutional and legal changes of the last years have been driven by the prospect of starting negotiations, and it can be expected that economic changes and changes in regional government will be the same. If the Union refuses to open negotiations it is possible that the drive for constitutional and legal change will falter and the chances for economic development will be reduced. What is not clear is what will happen if Turkey is told “maybe - we’ll see”.

Even if a clear decision is taken by the European Council on 17^th December 2004, the time period involved makes it very difficult to be certain of the outcomes in a number of areas. In order to quantify any of the economic impact, enormous assumptions must be made as to EU policies in 15 years time, as well as how the Turkish economy will develop. However, these will become, even if only over a long period, quantifiable and will be subject to final ratification by the Turkish government and, presumably, people, and by the governments, and possibly, people of the existing EU.

The basic constitutional tenets of Turkey are not comparable to those of most of today’s members of the Union.

○It seeks to be a secular state, but the state administers one religion, and places serious impediments in the way of minority religions.

○The military play a role as a constitutional guardian of this secularism in a way which is unique internationally.

○While all states treasure their national cohesion, the interpretation of this principle in Turkey means that any expression of minority ethnicity is treated as a threat to the state.

Economic and political elites (including the military) are in favour of entry to the European Union. These are the same parts of society which are committed to modernising and opening society and the economy. There is difficulty in distinguishing whether membership is a tool or a goal. Public opinion surveys show a majority in favour of membership, but it is not certain that there is a true understanding of the implications of membership or of the sharing of sovereignty which is an essential part of the European project.

Membership of the Union will place huge burdens on Turkey. The costs and effort required of all levels of society and the economy in adopting the acquis will be enormous, at a time when the Turkish economy is only beginning to climb back from the brink of collapse.

For the Union the implications are also substantial.

○Turkey is a poor country, with great regional disparities and very dependent on agriculture. Both of these aspects will make large demands on EU funding.

○Turkey has borders in some of the most sensitive parts of the world, which will make demands on the European Union’s foreign policy, its neighbourhood policy and its security policy.

○Turkey has a young, mobile, but not very highly educated population which may seek to migrate to other parts of the Union.

○Turkey’s population will give it a presence in the institutions which will have a profound impact on all existing members.

○Turkey maintains a large army presence on the Island of Cyprus and refuses to recognise the Republic of Cyprus which is a member state of the European Union.

Turkish membership, precisely because of its differences, could have a very positive effect on the Union itself. Precisely because of Turkey’s geopolitical role, the Union will have increased weight on the world stage. The extension of the internal market will bring benefits to all. The support which Union membership can give to constitutional and social change in Turkey will ensure a closer relationship with an Islamic country, and the advantage of supporting a modern, market-economy driven Islamic role model. Membership of a secular, Islamic country could prove that the Union is not just a Judeo-Christian club and that membership is open to those who meet criteria of human and social rights and not just of history.

But it will be a real test for the Union. It is not certain that a European Union, which at that time will be dealing not just with the 5^th enlargement but with a Union which contains Romania, Bulgaria, almost certainly Croatia and probably other countries, will have the administrative capacity, the political will or the developed “sense of self” to be able to deal with the challenge posed by the entry of a poor country with some 70 million people.

It is the view of the Committee that Turkey has made huge efforts to bring its constitution and all its judicial and administrative systems into line with the Copenhagen Criteria, and it does not underestimate the difficulty of the task, or what has been achieved. However, there is still a long way to go. The Committee is not convinced that the changes are irreversible or that all layers of Turkish society are as committed to making these changes as the current government clearly is.

The Committee believes that enough progress has been made in meeting the Copenhagen Criteria for the current regime to be given the support it needs to continue.

Conclusions

The Committee is of the view that a decision should be taken on 17^th December 2004 to open negotiations with Turkey. These negotiations should be with the goal of full membership, and should be undertaken in good faith.

However, because the negotiations have been opened and the goal is clear, it does not mean that it is inevitable. The issues dealt with in the body of this report must be dealt with, and there must be the possibility of constant monitoring - and support.

Turkey must continue to demonstrate that it is improving its record in human and social rights, and it must be possible to break off the negotiations if this continuing improvement does not take place. Turkey must also undertake to recognise Cyprus. It must ensure that outstanding disputes with its neighbours are settled. Equally, the Union must be honest with itself and with Turkey about the effort which will be required to make a success of Turkish membership.

The Commission recommends a three pillar approach to the negotiations:

○The first pillar would aim to support the reform process in Turkey and ensure its irreversibility. This would be done by closely monitoring Turkey’s performance within the framework of a revised Association Partnership.

○The second pillar would concern the actual negotiations on each chapter of the acquis and would aim to ensure Turkey’s compliance with EU legislation. For obvious reasons, the negotiations with Turkey will certainly be long and complex. Therefore, for each chapter of the negotiations, the Council should lay down benchmarks for the opening and closure of negotiations, including a satisfactory track record of implementation of the acquis communautaire. Long transition periods may be required. Permanent safeguard clauses may also be considered in sensitive areas such as free movement of workers.

The EU would also have to define its financial perspectives for 2014 onwards before accession negotiations with Turkey can be concluded. This might imply a substantial review of the structural and agricultural funding arrangements for Turkey.

○The third pillar of the strategy would aim to strengthen the cultural and political dialogue, by means not yet devised, between the EU and Turkey on the level of civil society

The Joint Committee supports this approach

Turkey has been the subject of a number of reports covering its political and economic circumstances, and drawing conclusions as to whether it is, or is likely to be, a suitable candidate for membership of the European Union. Clearly the Joint Oireachtas Committee does not have the resources, nor would it be appropriate to undertake the kind of detailed technical examination already undertaken by the European Commission, the Council of Europe and the OECD, in addition to a number of research institutes. But the Committee has had the opportunity to visit Turkey, even if briefly, and believes that a step as significant as this should be debated within the Oireachtas, and it seeks, in adopting this report, to highlight the issues of primary concern to it and to the Irish people.

This report is divided into three:

○the current situation in Turkey and the extent to which the Committee believes the Copenhagen Criteria are met;

○the implications for the existing European Union of such an enlargement; and

○the specific issues relating to having Turkey as a member.

Chapter 1: Turkey as Candidate

In the last few years a number of events have had the effect of modernizing Turkish society and the economy.

The decision of the Helsinki Council, in 1999, gave a clear goal to those forces within Turkish society who wished for EU membership, and laid down equally clearly the objectives which Turkey needed to fulfill to ensure that its candidature would be accepted.

The decisive majority won by the AKP party in the 2002 elections meant, that for the first time in 15 years, one party had an absolute majority in parliament. The strong mandate given to the present government, and the break which it marked with the past, has provided Turkey with a platform from which necessary political and constitutional changes can be made.

The financial crisis of 2001 meant that Turkey became dependent on the support of the IMF. This entailed the introduction of greater transparency and openness in the operation of the economy and a move away from the previous, highly politicized way of doing business. Relations with the IMF are strained, and its presence is resented but the beneficial effect of the kind of economic planning which was required remains, and the Turkish economy is growing strongly.

Turkey realized that it needed to face the potential of instability, in a region further destabilized by war in Iraq, and seek to bring its Kurdish minority into a democratically legitimate relationship with the state.

In 1959, Turkey applied for associate membership of the European Economic Community (EEC). After a delay caused by the Turkish military coup of 1960, the Ankara Agreement of association was signed in 1963. It held out a prospect of membership at some stage. In the Ankara Agreement there was a commitment to the gradual establishment of a customs union, which in accordance with details set out in the Additional Protocol of 1970 was to be finalised after a period of 22 years. After several delays, the customs union entered into force only in 1996. It led to a wide-ranging abolition of customs duties and quotas, without achieving the free movement of people, services and capital originally envisaged.

In April 1987, Turkey submitted an application for membership to the European Community (EC). It took the European Commission until December 1989 to produce an Opinion, approved by the European Council two months later, refusing accession negotiations on several grounds. It was pointed out that the Community itself was undergoing major changes following the adoption of the Single Act; it would therefore be inappropriate to become involved in new accession negotiations at this stage. Furthermore, the economic and political situation in Turkey, including “the negative consequences of the dispute between Turkey and one Member State of the Community, and also the situation in Cyprus” led the Commission to believe that it would not be useful to open accession negotiations with Turkey straight away.

In 1995, the Turkey EU Accession Council finalised agreement on the Customs Union, which entered into force on 1^st January 1996.

The Luxembourg European Council of 1997 confirmed Turkey’s eligibility for accession to the European Union. “Turkey will be judged on the basis of the same criteria as the other applicant States. While the political and economic conditions allowing accession negotiations to be envisaged are not satisfied, the European Council considers that it is nevertheless important for a strategy to be drawn up to prepare Turkey for accession by bringing it closer to the European Union in every field.”

The decision was clearly stated at the Helsinki European Council in 1999 that if Turkey were adjudged to have met criteria, known as the Copenhagen Criteria, these negotiations could begin. Therefore, much rests on this criteria and whether Turkey could be deemed to have met them. The Commission believes that it has.¹ The European Parliament has also supported the opening of negotiations.²

Turkey needs to meet economic and political criteria, although the Brussels Council speaks only of meeting the political criteria. In the past, it has not followed the budgetary or economic policies which would allow it to meet the onerous economic terms of being a member of an internal market, which includes some of the most developed economies and markets in the world. Meeting these criteria requires huge political and administrative commitment and capacity.

Neither has Turkey, in the past, shown the kind of observance of human, political and social rights which is expected of a European constitutional democracy. It has not always been a parliamentary democracy and the power of the army in Turkish political life, exercised a number of times, leaves a legacy of concern about Turkey’s compatibility as a member of a Union.

Recent surveys show that around 75% of the electorate would vote in favour of accession if a referendum were to be held at this time, the principal motive being the expectation of important economic benefits. However, answers to other questions indicate the persistence of a strong Euroscepticism among Turkish people. Anxieties concern the possible loss of national and religious identity, erosion of traditional values and the weakening of Turkish independence and sovereignty. There is concern at being excluded by Europe and a perception that much harsher membership conditions are being imposed on Turkey than on other candidates.

The drive for membership comes from many parts of Turkish society. For the current AKP government, the prospect of membership of the European Union can both help to underline their intentions in promoting democratic reform as genuine and, in the future, allow more religious freedom and genuine multiculturalism than at present. For the secularists, the EU can help to ensure a continued separation of state and religion, and guarantee that a weakening of the power and ultimate control of the military does not open the door to fundamentalism.

It is not certain that the main drivers of the move towards accession are completely united within themselves. Some of the military are not happy with the reforms as

they have been implemented, and it is likely that there will be considerable internal opposition within the AKP. Among the issues which are likely to prove contentious is the sharing of sovereignty, which, given the primacy of the integrity of the state in political and constitutional priorities, will require major adjustments.

The prospect of membership is seen by many progressive forces as the way forward, to guarantee constitutional change and democratic reform. Human rights groups have asked their international counterparts to be careful of their criticism of the delivery of Turkish reform, in case failures are used to block the start of negotiations. Minorities churches see in this process a way out of the many difficulties which beset them. Turkey’s unique positioning as a secular state, on the edge of Asia with a devout Moslem population appears to need some kind of guarantor. Up to now it has been the Kemalist tradition as embodied by the military. If this bulwark is taken away, other supports will be needed, and the European Union is seen by those in favour of accession as the best possible external validator of Turkey for the twenty first century.

Therefore a very serious question arises if the Union is not prepared to engage. It is not likely that the reforms which have taken place are irreversible, so a refusal to negotiate, or negotiations which turn into something less than full membership could have a very profound effect on Turkey. It is also possible that Turkey will find that the burdens of membership are too great and will dis-engage. If that were to be the case, the European Union would have a particular responsibility to see to it that those who placed the greatest hopes in membership are not required to pay the greatest penalty for failure.

1.1 Constitution

Islamic fundamentalism and Kurdish separatism have long been seen by the secularist establishment, especially the military, as the two main challenges to the integrity of the Turkish state, leading some to see minority cultural and religious rights as potentially threatening. The present constitution is a legacy of the military intervention of 1980. It has been subject to major change, although there are those who would argue that it should have been scrapped rather than amended.

There have been two major constitutional reforms, in 2001 and 2004 and eight legislative packages adopted by Parliament between February 2002 and July 2004. Efforts have been made by the Reform Monitoring Group, chaired by the deputy Prime Minister with responsibility for human rights, to drive forward the necessary changes at local level and to deal with the administrative bottle necks.

Since 2003, the death penalty has been abolished, for all except the military penal code, and work on that is underway.

The changes which have taken place have been driven forward at the highest level and with great skill and energy. There is a problem however with implementation at local level. There appears to be a commitment to these changes in areas such as the big cities, but it is less certain that this is the case in rural, or more backward areas.

The State and Religion

The secular nature of the Turkish state is one of its truly unique characteristics, and a legacy of Ataturk. There is a strongly held view that having Turkey as a member of the European Union proves that a country, made up almost exclusively of devout Moslems, can be citizens of a modern, economically successful, and forward looking democracy. However, the guardians of the bequests of Ataturk are to a very large extent the military, as confirmed in the constitution, who are concerned that Turkey remain secular. While over time, and with appropriate strengthening of the constitution and of constitutional safeguards, a role for the military may not considered to be necessary, that is not the case now, nor will it be in any likely timescale for membership.

The argument about Turkish membership, outside Turkey, is very often dealt with in terms of pro or anti-Islam, but the debate inside the country shows that the issues of secularism v Islam is far from settled. Secularism is both a cultural and constitutional issue. The principle that an individual’s beliefs are private and cannot be imposed generally is one that is central to all European democracies. However, each member state of the Union has its own version of secularism, ranging from the laicite of France, where the visible expression of religious beliefs must be kept quite separate from every public occasion, to the United Kingdom which has an established church and where the head of state is head of the church.

Turkey is more secular than many other European countries. Any form of external sign of religious observance, such as the headscarf, is forbidden within any official context, and the idea of religious education in schools being obligatory is excluded. Divorce was introduced in 1923, votes for women in 1935, right to abortion in 1983, and the equal division of goods in the case of divorce was recently introduced.

But the Turkish state is the opposite of the European model of a secular state. It has done all in its power to standardise the most diversified religion — Islam. Islam has no institutional church, such as the main Christian churches have, there is a community of believers. The organisation of religion is undertaken by a Directorate for religious affairs, which is part of the Prime Ministers Office. It trains and administers the imams, it provides the sermons for Friday ceremonies in the mosques, and organises the pilgrimage to Mecca. In 2002 this directorate had a budget of €400 million. Therefore Islam may be said to be a state religion. But it is a fundamental tenet of the Kemalist state that religion remains the private belief of each citizen, and there is a ban on Koranic laws in social and political life.

Turkish secularism does not extend to promoting or even protecting other churches. No church or religious community may have a legal personality. For that reason, acquiring property becomes impossible. The difficulties encountered by the Christian minority churches, in particular the Orthodox are striking. The Greek Orthodox Church has just several thousand members, compared to several hundreds of thousands when the state was founded, eighty years ago. The Patriarch of Istanbul is the spiritual head of all Orthodox Christians. He is required to be a Turkish citizen and his election must be approved by the Turkish state. If a council to elect a new Patriarch does not decide within eight days, the government reserves the right to nominate the new Patriarch.

It is also made impossible for the Church to train or bring in new clergy. One of the most historic seminaries has been closed and the Church cannot get permission to re-open it. Clergy coming from other countries may stay only three months.

Buildings, some of them used by the Church for 1500 years, and an essential part of a European patrimony, are taken over by the state. The state will not repair them or allow the Church to repair them. Parish goods and buildings are seized by the state and made over to other institutions such as schools.

This state of affairs, which actually seeks to end, over time, the existence of the Orthodox Church, is something which would be unacceptable in any western European state. The major religions in Turkey are protected (to a certain extent) by the Treaty of Lausanne, but the position of minorities not mentioned in the Treaty is even worse. Turkey may be secular but it is very far from being pluralist.

Role of Military

The army’s considerable influence on Turkish public life is based on its institutional role and the prestige and confidence it enjoys in Turkish society. Much of this is explained by modern Turkey’s foundation in 1923 by a soldier, Mustapha Kemal, or “Ataturk”, and the military’s subsequent unswerving devotion to the values he defended, which have taken the form of a set of principles known as Kemalism. Also compared with a political class that was unstable and often fairly unreliable, it was permanent. The army has the role of “oracle and paterfamilias” and is accepted as such even by the media. The military are not opposing the drive for membership of the European Union, but it is not unanimous, although the current Chief of Staff appears to favour such a move. Turkey has the largest armed forces in Europe (790, 000) and spends proportionately more on defence (4.8% of GDP) than any other European member of NATO.

The dominance of the military is exercised through the National Security Council. This is a consultative body made up of civilian and military members.

Its function was to give an opinion to the government on every thing to do with national security. The Secretary General, a member of the military, exercised power in the name of the Prime Minister and operated as the head of government of an unofficial state, giving orders directly to the administration and the legal services. It had its representatives on the commission for the audiovisual, for education and for all the major sectors of public life. The National Security Council could decide which issues came within its terms of reference, and a dossier could be taken over by the Council thereby depriving the government of its right of decision. As every issue could be considered to have a national security implication, it was in a position to rule on topics such as teaching a minority language as having implications for the unity of the state.

The National Security Council was subject to a separate legal system, so that military officers were judged by their peers. The Chief of Staff was nominated by the president of the Republic on the proposal of the prime minister, so he was equal in rank to the prime minister and superior to the Minister for Defence.

As part of recently introduced constitutional changes, an attempt has been made to strengthen civilian control of the military, with substantial changes to the role and composition of the National Security Council, including a civilian Secretary General. For the first time also, the military budget is audited by the Court of Auditors. The office of the Secretary General now only serves the administrative needs of the Council which has a purely consultative function. Military courts may no longer try civilians for criticizing the military service. However the military retain substantial power through informal channels.

Military service is obligatory for all young men and can last up to 18 months. There is no right of conscientious objection, and for young men living abroad, failure to undertake military service can result in loss of citizenship. This has resulted in some young Turkish men living in Germany becoming stateless.

Judiciary

While the military is among the most admired institutions in the state, the judiciary is among the least respected. Judges are employees of the ministry of home affairs, and while they cannot be sacked, they can be moved around every three years. The courts have been bogged down in the huge number of prosecutions begun by public prosecutors, because their career prospects are based on numbers, rather than quality.

However, as part of the reforms, important changes have been made to the judicial system. The principle of the primacy of international and European human rights conventions over domestic law was enshrined in the Constitution. State Security Courts were abolished and some of their competencies were transferred to newly created Regional Serious Felony Courts. Parliament adopted a new Civil Code and a new Penal Code, which will enter into force in April 2005. A draft new Code of Criminal Procedure and draft Laws on the Establishment of the Judicial Police and on the Execution of Punishments remain to be adopted.

Other structural changes included the creation of Intermediate Courts of Appeal and a family courts system throughout the country. There has been progress in aligning the rights of the defence with the relevant European standards. A Justice Academy was established and training on international law and human rights for judges and prosecutors has intensified. The higher courts, such as the Court of Cassation, have delivered judgments applying the amended provisions adopted by the various packages of political reforms. Nonetheless, there is sometimes still a restrictive interpretation of the reforms, in particular by prosecutors.

Recent initiatives, funded by the European Union and member states governments have been involved in re-training judges, particularly in the area of human rights. A recent EU visit concluded that this programme has been a success and that recent judgements of the courts have demonstrated this. However, the resources available to the judiciary, including in particular the Court of Cassation (supreme court of appeal) are totally inadequate.

Human and Social Rights

Torture

This government has exercised zero tolerance of the practice of torture. Penalties were increased and steps were taken to ensure that hearings were held under urgent procedure and prison sentences could not be suspended or commuted in to fines. All prosecutors have been ordered to investigate personally any allegations of torture or ill-treatment rather than entrusting such inquiries to the police or gendarmerie.

Human rights groups active in Turkey were under constant pressure with many of their staff jailed over the years, but the situation has now improved and the role of such groups is now recognised by the government. These groups keep a record of those claiming to be tortured, according to the UN definition of torture.³ According to records, 300 have claimed to be tortured in ’04. There is no record of a death under torture so far in ’04. There have been 4 rapes of detainees reported.

Torture can happen in detention by the police, the gendarmerie or in interrogation stations. It can also happen in pre-detention. The main groups which suffer are Leftists, Kurds or any other separatists, Islamic fundamentalists, and members of minority groups.

There is no doubt - even according to the European Commission’s latest report - that torture continues, although its use is no longer systematic. Leyla Zana (the Kurdish member of parliament recently released from imprisonment) stated at the European Parliament that there is no more systematic torture and that progress (although inadequate) had been made on the torture issue. It appears that the government have made real efforts to stamp out the practise of torture, but the cultural changes at local level have not necessarily taken place yet, and in spite of genuine changes in the law and the administration of justice, no member of the security services has been imprisoned for torture.

According to the Association of Human Rights’ report, in the first half of 2003 the prosecution of a total of 63 members of the security forces in 11 courts for torturing 42 persons resulted in 29 discontinued proceedings because the time limit had been exceeded, 13 acquittals, 8 convictions with suspended sentences and 13 prison sentences whose application was partially or wholly suspended.

There are judgements against Turkey by the European Court of Human Rights, confirming that its current investigation procedures do not comply with Articles 1 and 3 of the Convention. EU projects have worked with the police on the improvement of methods for taking statements, and moving the emphasis to evaluating evidence, rather than relying on confessions. The EU is supporting work to establish a proper complaints mechanism.

Trade Union Rights

Significant constraints remain on the right to organise and the right to collective bargaining, including the right to strike. Turkey has still not accepted Article 5 (“right to organise”) and Article 6 (“right to bargain collectively” including the right to strike) of the European Social Charter. Although an Economic and Social Council was formally established in 2000 with a view to promoting social dialogue, such dialogue remains weak.

Position of Women

Article 10 of the Constitution now includes the provision that men and women shall have equal rights and that the state has the duty to ensure that this equality is put into practice. The new Penal Code is generally progressive in terms of women’s rights, addressing such crimes as “honour killings”, sexual assault, including within marriage, and virginity testing. Despite legal and practical initiatives to tackle the problem of discrimination and domestic violence this remains a major problem. Sustained efforts will be required to ensure that women take an equal place in society.

Many women are subjected to various forms of physical and psychological violence within the family. These include, sexual abuse, forced and often early marriages, unofficial religious marriages, trafficking and “honour killings”. Part of this abuse may be due to the harsh application of Islamic culture, but it could also be part of the culture of a conservative, backward, rural culture.

In March 2004 a judge sentenced the perpetrator of an “honour killing” in Sanilurfa to life imprisonment and implicated family members were given long prison sentences.

Women remain vulnerable to discriminatory practices, due largely to a lack of education and high illiteracy rate (19% of women in Turkey are illiterate and in the Southeast this figure is considerably higher). In some provinces of the Southeast, 62% of girls are reportedly enrolling in primary education and 50% in secondary. The widespread practice of the non-registration of girls in some parts of the Southeast contributes to this situation. Moreover, the portrayal of women in school textbooks reinforces such discrimination.

34% of professionals are women and 42% of students in further education are women. However, women are underrepresented in elected bodies and government (4% of members of Parliament and one Minister). Virtually none of the legislation to protect or promote women in the workforce has been implemented.

Disabled

As regards the rights of disabled people, in July 2004 a circular was issued stating that at least 3% of the staff in public institutions with more than 50 employees should be disabled and/or ex-convicts. According to official sources, there has been a significant increase in the recruitment of disabled persons since last year. However, Turkey has still not accepted Article 15 of the European Social Charter

Rights of Minorities

Turkey has signed and or ratified several international conventions, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the International Convention on Social and Cultural Rights, even if with reservations. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe decided in June 2004 to end the monitoring procedure for human rights infringements which was started in 1996.⁴

Kurds

The principle of territorial integrity is one of the absolute principles of the Kemalist state. The concept of any kind of autonomous region for eg. Kurds is completely unacceptable. In order to suppress the Kurdish rebellion, the state spent some$100 bn and conscripted at least 2.5 million draftees. The issue was seen uniquely as one of national security.

However, since 1999, the situation has been eased to a small extent. The ban on the use of the Kurdish language was abolished and there is currently radio and TV broadcasting in Kurdish - which amounts to 30 minutes per week. Kurdish is very occasionally used in public events in the southeast, but there are still restrictions in the areas of broadcasting and education.

It is extremely difficult to learn Kurdish and it may only be taught to over-18 year olds, based on a police certificate etc. The Council of Europe has identified that this has become not only an ethnic or cultural issue, but also a social and humanitarian one. No official information of any kind is available in any language except Turkish and given that in parts of the east and south-east many, in particular women and girls who are less likely to have attended school, speak only Kurdish, they are completely excluded from the most basic social and political life of the country. They have no access to the law, to the courts, or to health care.

There is a constitutional requirement that a political party must obtain 10% of the national vote before being allowed be represented in parliament. (This has not prevented a proliferation of smaller parties, because parties have split on entering parliament and are allowed remain.) While such a threshold is a feature of the constitutional systems of other European countries, the 10% figure is very high, and will hinder any possibility of Kurdish representation.

Return of Displaced Persons

Large numbers were internally displaced in the conflict with the Kurds. NGOs suggest that the number of displaced persons is much greater than official statistics indicate (the total number is estimated at 3 million).

The situation of internally displaced persons (IDPs) is still critical, with many living in precarious conditions. Turkey began a dialogue with international organisations in view of addressing the weaknesses of the “Return to Village and Rehabilitation Programme” which were highlighted by the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Displaced Persons following his visit to Turkey in 2002. There have been approximately 1,500 applications to the ECtHR on this subject.

A law on the compensation of damages incurred by the victims of terrorism was approved. Although work has started to define a more systematic approach towards the Southeast, no integrated strategy with a view to reducing regional disparities and addressing the economic, social and cultural needs of the local population has yet been adopted. The return of IDPs is hampered by the relative economic underdevelopment of the East and Southeast. The major outstanding obstacles preventing IDPs from returning to their villages are the government sponsored village guard system; the problem of landmines; the absence of basic infrastructure; and the lack of capital and employment opportunities. The discretionary power of each provincial Governor also plays a crucial role in the implementation of the legal and administrative provisions regulating return. Future measures need to address specifically the recommendations of the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative for Displaced Persons. The attitude of the Turkish government is striking in its lack of urgency

Armenia

It will be necessary to normalise relations with Armenia. The issue of the disappearance of the large Armenian population from west Armenia remains to be dealt with. Genocide has been always denied by the Turkish government. The Armenian government has not pressed the issue, but has not sought to prevent it being pursued by the Armenian Diaspora. The situation has been further exacerbated by the eruption and evolution of the war in Karabakh.

1.2 Economic

Turkey is considered to be a lower middle-income economy. Its per capita income is relatively low compared to the EU. The GDP per capita in terms of Purchasing Power (PPS) was in 2003 at 28.5% of the EU-25 average, comparable to the level of Bulgaria and Romania. Measured in current prices in 2003, the Turkish GDP was equivalent to about 2% of the GDP of EU-25 or just half of the ten new Member States.

With its population of about 70 million, Turkey is broadly equivalent to the ten new Member States taken together and accounts for 15.5% of the EU-25 population. The demographic trend differs significantly from the present Member States, with an annual average population growth of 1.8%, compared to 0.2% of the EU-25. However, the declining trend in population growth rates will in the longer term turn the current demographic structure into that of an ageing society similar to what most Member States currently face. Turkish accession would add over 80 million additional consumers to the EU25 total of 452 million, although with a per capita purchasing power substantially lower than the EU25 average. Compared to previous acceding countries Turkey is larger, more populous and poorer. It is also more protected in market terms than most.

After a period of severe crisis in 2000-01, the Turkish economy has bounced back and is now among the fastest growing economies in the OECD. Inflation has also declined sharply and could fall to a single digit annual rate in 2005 for the first time in decades. Convergence with EU acquis and close co-operation with the IMF and the World Bank have contributed to this momentum. However only strong and sustained growth, together with structural reforms, can help absorb the growing working age population into employment. In its recent report, the OECD has outlined a virtuous circle which could allow Turkey a sustained 7% growth rate. The recent programme of macro-stabilisation and institutional reforms, endorsed by two successive governments have begun the process of addressing the weaknesses in the economy. Combined with the process of sharply reducing inflation, confidence has improved, which has helped stop the drift to the black economy, and combined with a positive response to the opening of accession negotiations, could have a beneficial effect on foreign investment.

The black economy is believed to be in the order of 50% of the registered economy, partly due to the numbers who have moved from rural areas, seeking work and are living in shanty towns on the fringes of large cities. Such an economy feeds off itself, because it means that legitimate business is subject to very high taxes and costs, and the temptation increases all the time to resort to the black market.

Agriculture

Agriculture is of key importance to Turkey, both in social and economic terms. About half of Turkey’s area of some 79 million hectares is devoted to agriculture, which is roughly in line with the EU27 average (48%). Turkish accession would therefore add about 39 million hectares to the EU’s agricultural area. This would represent 23% of the EU-25 agricultural area. In 2003 roughly one third of the workforce was employed in agriculture, and in the same year the sector represented 12.2% of GDP. The climatic and geographical conditions across the country permit a wide range of different farming activities. Roughly 50% of Turkey’s agricultural area is devoted to arable crops (of which about 20% is fallow land and 20% irrigated), 25% to permanent meadows and pastures and 2.5% to permanent crops. There are significant regional differences in production patterns.

The farm structure in Turkey shows similarities with some of the new member states and with Bulgaria and Romania. According to the 2001 census there are approximately 3 million agricultural holdings in Turkey (compared to nearly 13 million in the EU-25), most of which are family farms employing family labour. Figures for the average size of holdings suggest that holdings are small by EU standards (6 hectares on average compared to an EU-25 average of 13 hectares). Subsistence and semi-subsistence farming is an important characteristic of Turkish agriculture, as is the case in certain regions of the current EU and in Bulgaria and Romania. These farms are typically characterised by productivity being low and only a small fraction of production being marketed. They are difficult to reach with traditional market and price policies, but are crucial for the income security and livelihood of the majority of the rural population in Turkey. The competitiveness of its agriculture and agri-food enterprises is, on the whole, less on average than in the EU.

Historically, Turkey has had a highly protected agricultural market in tariff terms. While import protection remains high, since 2000 Turkey has been implementing an agricultural reform programme aiming at re-orienting agricultural support, achieving a balance of supply and demand, creating a more competitive agricultural sector and reducing state involvement. The reform process is still not complete, but it has had some positive impact, for example on the levels of the most trade distorting types of support. It is clear however that Turkey’s agricultural policy still differs substantially from that of the EU. However, some sectors of Turkish agriculture see real potential once they have free access to the European market, with the possibility of year round supply of Mediterranean type fruit and vegetables — the California of Europe.

Regional Disparities

Two thirds of the total Turkish population live in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir and other large cities. In these cities, over 80% of total value added is generated. Istanbul and other large cities have experienced high immigration from rural areas. Turkey is characterised by large regional disparities which broadly follow a West-East pattern. The richest regions are located in the western part of the country while the poorest ones are at the eastern border. The richest region Kocaeli, an important manufacturing location, has a GDP per capita of more than 90% above the national average (46% of the EU-25 average). At the other end of the scale, the poorest regions Agri and Van have only about one third of the national GDP per capita (8% of the EU-25 average).

Environment

The view of the European Commission is that a great deal needs to be done to bring Turkish environmental policy up to an EU standard. In particular, it expresses concern at the loss of habitats. The cost of an environmental clean up to meet EU standards will be of the order of $20bn. Turkey has not ratified the Kyoto agreement.

1.3 Standard of Administration

Parliament adopted in June and July 2004 a package on the reform of the public administration. This includes in particular a Framework Law on Public Sector Reform, a Law on Special Provincial Administration, as well as a Law on Municipalities and Metropolitan Municipalities. Taken together, the purpose of the four laws is to reform the division of competences and duties between the four levels of administration (central, provincial, metropolitan and municipal) and to improve performance. In principle, this wide ranging and ambitious reform aims to convert the country’s centralised, hierarchical and secretive administrative system into a decentralized, participatory, transparent, responsive and accountable model.

Apart from the law on Metropolitan Municipalities, the reforms could not enter into force as several articles under these laws were vetoed by the President on the grounds that they violate the relevant constitutional provisions, in particular those related to the unitary character of the public administration. As a result, Parliament will have to review the legislation.

Corruption

Turkey has ratified the appropriate international agreements against corruption. A number of anti-corruption measures have been adopted, in particular in establishing ethical rules for public servants. A Parliamentary report about corruption cases involving former members of the government was published in July 2003. Despite these legislative developments, corruption remains a very serious problem in almost all areas of the economy and public affairs.

1.4 Cyprus

The Turkish government supported the Annan plan, and played a very positive role in its preparation. But the Turkish government refuses to recognise the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey has refused to sign the protocol which would adapt the Ankara Agreement to take account of the accession of the new Member States. Pending this signature, it has not extended the Customs Union to the Republic of Cyprus.

The Committee believes that Turkey has an obligation to recognise Cyprus, since it is now a Member State of the European Union and should also extend the Customs Union to the Republic of Cyprus. Failure to do this could cause difficulties on 17th December 2004 when a decision will be made whether or not to open negotiations with Turkey in relation to accession. This is despite the fact the Turkish Ambassador to Ireland has stated that following the Helsinki European Council, the government was told that Cyprus would not be an issue in accession negotiations and this was reiterated by the then Commissioner for Enlargement.

1.5 What happens if the Union says no ?

It seems likely that the European Council on 17^th December will accept that negotiations should start. That does not mean that negotiations will necessarily conclude successfully. Either Turkey will be deemed not to have met the criteria, Turkey will consider the requirements onerous or unfair, or European public opinion will become so unhappy with the prospect that it will not be possible for the governments of the twenty-five to continue. Each of these could leave relations between the European Union and Turkey embittered and strained.

In Turkey, it will certainly have the effect of leaving the “modernisers” in a difficult position and is likely to turn back the clock in terms of the domestic reforms. The government and the political system could be blamed, and this may strengthen those parts of the military who always mistrusted the European project. Official Turkey may turn away from western Europe and seek to establish better relations with Russia, or even China.

The position of Turkey vis a vis the rest of the Islamic world could also be changed. Turkey’s current position is sui generis, with a close relationship with the United States and Israel. The argument that it would have a positive impact on the rest of the Moslem world if Turkey were to become a full member of the European Union is uncertain, given the unique nature of much about Turkey. But, if negotiations were to fail, it does seem likely that this would have a negative impact, because then it could be said that the European Union had rejected Turkey, only because it was Moslem.

Turkey has an ambivalent relationship with its Arab neighbours, because of the history of the Ottoman Empire in which most Arab States were colonies. The shared religion of Islam does create a special understanding between them. Throughout the rest of the Islamic world, Turkey’s membership of the Union would be a positive contribution in reassuring Moslems, both within and without the union, that the European Union is not antagonistic to the Islamic faith.

Chapter 2: Challenges for Europe

Impact of Previous and Potential future enlargements of the EU¹

2.1 Coherence

Although there are enormous challenges facing Turkey in its efforts to re-model its constitutional and political systems to adapt to the possibility of membership of the European Union, there are equal challenges for the Union in dealing with the issues facing it - apart from any of the particular aspects of an eventual Turkish membership. Turkish membership would take place, not of a Union of 27, but of a larger Union, which is likely to include Croatia and some of the Balkan states. Even if the Turkish accession period is the 10-15 years of which people speak, this marks a huge change in the Union from a group of ten relatively rich countries to more than thirty, the majority of them poor, and many of them still with inadequate administrative capacity.

The opportunity for developing the internal market and the possibilities for growth which is offered by the 5^th enlargement are exciting but need to be developed. The great projects of the Union in the last twenty years are not absolutely guaranteed.

○The development of the internal market is well under way in the existing 15, although it has a long way to go to develop a true market in services. In the new member countries, in spite of strong commitment, the requirement for administrative capacity and the cost to industry of meeting the standards is very high indeed.

○Economic and monetary union is also well under way, but the political anxieties of some members of the 15 and the uncertainty of its future governance, mean it is far from accomplished.

○At the time the decision to begin negotiations, the future of the Constitutional Treaty is not certain. While the Union could probably have muddled on without it, any rejection at this stage will be a blow to its selfconfidence and coherence.

If the European Union is over extended there is a real risk that certain countries, which saw themselves as core would decide to move ahead on issues close to their heart. There is also the possibility that different member states would belong to a number of different “cores”, so that the whole coherence of Union action would be lost.

2.2 Identity

The issue of identity is much harder to deal with, because it is harder to define. Turkey has its own strong system values and spiritual heritage, but it shares very little of the heritage of Christianity and of the Enlightenment of western and central Europe.

The first article of the Draft Constitutional Treaty states:

“The Union shall be open to all European States which respect its values and are committed to promoting them together.”

Is Turkey a European country? The Council of Europe said it was, in 1994.²

The arguments about what constitute Europe become almost circular on reflection. Is Europe a community of history or of values? If it is a community of values, and a country is prepared to make significant efforts to meet these values - thereby showing its real aspiration to European values - does that not make it a European country? Otherwise it becomes an issue of geography, and it does seem difficult to build something as specific as the European Union with its aspiration to shared values purely on accidents of geography.

The history of Turkey is intertwined with that of the rest of Europe, from the time the papacy took refuge in Byzantium, after Rome was sacked by northern tribes. From the fall of Byzantium to the Battle of Lepanto the relationship was one of conflict between the Ottomans and that of other European powers, which has left a bitter legacy in many parts of eastern and central Europe. The Ottoman Empire was an expansionist power but so too were other states which are now members of the European Union.

There is also an argument that much of the territory of Turkey lies outside the geographical definition of Europe. But Ireland, in the Good Friday Agreement, gave an international lead in dividing identity from territory, so it is difficult now for this Committee to return to it as an essential criterion.

However, while strong arguments, on a case by case basis, can be made for each new entrant, it is certain that Ukraine would likely increase its efforts to become a candidate country following a decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey. The geo-political issues raised by Ukrainian membership are very different, but the problem of boundaries raises itself once more. Much of nineteenth century history was dominated by central and eastern Europe’s unfortunate lack of clear geographic and ethnic borders, and it may take many decades of the twenty first century to find a solution which is not based on numbers and power.

2.3 Low growth in Europe

In a recent report, the Joint Committee dealt with many of the problems facing the economy of the European Union. In particular the impact of demographic change was highlighted. Even if the Lisbon target rate of 70% employment is reached, with a constant rate of employment afterwards, an overall decline of employment could be expected after 2010, and the fall in the number of employed people between 2010 and 2030 would be of the order of 20 million workers for EU-25. The decline in the total volume of employment implies a negative contribution of employment to economic growth. In order for a growth rate of 3% to be achieved, there would have to be very large increased in productivity.

Europe’s economy is already lagging behind its main competitor - the US. For instance for the standard of living in the EU to catch up with t hat of the United States within the coming 20 years, the EU would have to experience, on average, an annual growth rate 1.7 point higher than the US growth rate. Europe needs to inject more competition into the field of services, liberalised further the network industries, improve opportunities for business in public procurement, promote labour and skills mobility. For the foreseeable future, growth rates in the European Union are expected to be in the order of 2%.

Turkish membership would give a boost to the economy, because every extension of the internal market does improve activity and growth. Turkish membership would bring 70 million more consumers, but many of them are poor. There is a risk that the existing European Union would not be able to sustain the kind of budget increases which Turkish entry would require, based on the levels of transfers to the previous entrants. To expect Turkey to accept a less favoured treatment than those countries which happened to enter sooner, would go against all the principles of the Union and the statements of the European Councils since Helsinki in 1999.

Chapter 3: Implications of membership of Turkey

There is real unease in many parts of Europe at the prospect of Turkey becoming a member, and this unease needs to be reflected in the political debate which is taking place. It is important that this debate happens now and not when promises are given which cannot be delivered on. Much of the unease relates to the fact that Turkey is a Moslem country and as such is considered to be irreconcilably alien. There are commentators who, in seeking to define Europe, believe that it was defined by its fight against Islam - the Moors of Spain and the Ottoman attacks from the east. Others talk of the experience of Turkish migrants and their failure to integrate.

There is also a line of argument which says that Turkey can only be judged if it meets the relevant criteria, same as anyone else. There is an argument that it must join the European Union to show that it is possible to have a successful, modern, democratic Islamic state. (It is important not to mix the arguments: if Turkey cannot be barred because of religion and geography, it cannot be assured membership for reasons of religion and geography!)

This debate has been very heated in some countries, but not so in Ireland. It has lead some commentators to say that Turkey cannot ever be a member, and that it is an error even to begin to contemplate it. Turkey should be offered some kind of special relationship. The Joint Committee does not agree with this point of view. It believes that Turkey, if it meets the relevant criteria, should be allowed aspire to full membership.

However, it is important that this debate takes place - other member states have had different historical or social experiences than Ireland. But the debate must take place in good faith, with a real respect for the beliefs and attitudes of others. Whatever the outcome of such a debate, it in itself could have the value of leading to a better understanding of a culture and society which has been so misunderstood and misrepresented in the West in recent year.

3.1 Migration

Turkey experienced significant outward migration after the early 1960s, when some European countries actively recruited workers. Net outward migration reached its peak in the first half of the 1960s, with about 80, 000 net-migrants per year, or about 0.5 % of the Turkish labour force. This wave of migration did not continue.

Since the 1980s, the flow of migration has been, on the whole, for family reunification purposes. In 2002, about 3 million Turkish nationals were officially registered in the EU-15. The main recipient countries were Germany (with almost 80% or 2.3 million persons), France, Austria and the Netherlands, with substantial, but much smaller numbers. Turkish nationals constitute by far the largest group of third-country nationals in the EU (about 25 % of all third-country nationals).

The status which Turkish workers at present enjoy under Community law lies between that of European Union citizens and third-country nationals, but Turkish nationals do not have the right to move to an EU Member State or between the EU Member States in order to take up employment. However, once duly registered as belonging to the labour force of a particular Member State, Turkish workers enjoy a considerable number of individual rights in that host Member State

There are concerns that a possible large and uncontrolled increase in migration to the EU could lead to serious disturbances in the labour markets of some of the present Member States. Estimates for the long term impact, i.e. by 2025/2030, based primarily on expected income differences, tend to give very varying figures (ranging from broadly 0.5 to 4 million potential Turkish immigrants to EU Member States). Other studies emphasise the relative stability of overall migratory pressures independently of accession or recall the developments observed over time in Spain and Portugal, where initial emigration was subsequently reversed.

Based on the experience that Turkish workers tend to migrate alongside networks of already established relatives, the biggest share of additional migrants to the EU would most likely go to Germany, France, Netherlands and Austria. In addition to the general conditions for economic growth and employment, the actual migration flows are influenced by pull factors such as wage differentials between Turkey and the recipient countries but also by push factors, such as the labour market situation in Turkey itself.

If the virtuous circle which the OECD proposes to Turkey were to occur and it was to introduce appropriate labour market policies, the young population will be integrated into the labour market, the migration potential of Turkey will probably decrease. In particular, sustained progress by Turkey in areas such as social policy, employment, health and education could reduce the pressure for migration. As regards demographic developments, it can be noted that population growth and fertility rates are in decline and estimated by the UN to fall to 1.05 % and 2.0 children per woman in the period 2010-2015.

It is not a coincidence that the countries articulating the greatest concern are those which have the largest number of Turkish immigrants. There has been a marked inability of these communities to integrate into their host countries. The reasons vary: many of the workers who came, came from the poorest regions with an exclusively rural background; they were not encouraged to integrate eg German citizenship laws; the observance of Islam meant that they could not integrate in to culturally very diverse host societies. But what is now clear is that it is not just the original migrants who have not integrated, but in many cases, their children as well.

There is no doubt that this will be one of the most contentious issues in the negotiations and the possibility exists of a permanent safeguard clause to restrict the free movement of workers

3.2 CFSP

Turkey is situated at a regional crossroads of strategic importance for Europe: the Balkans, Caucasus, Central Asia, Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean; its territory is a transit route for land and air transport with Asia, and for sea transport with Russia and the Ukraine. Its neighbours provide key energy supplies for Europe, and it has substantial water resources. Turkey’s membership in the EU should not pose any unexpected problems for the EU’s external relations but the Union will inevitably be drawn closer to several regions of continuing political and economic instability. Turkish membership could however be an asset for the EU in seeking to promote its interest in these regions. Whether the European Union will have the political will to develop the kind of foreign policy and security structures it will need when it extends is territory into such sensitive neighbourhoods is one of the most critical questions relating to Turkish accession

Turkey has the largest armed forces in Europe and spends proportionately more on defence than any other European member of NATO. Through its integration in the western alliance, and membership of many economic and regional organisations, it contributes to the security of Europe and its neighbourhood. Turkish consent, though grudgingly given, within NATO was essential for the EU’s ambitions to create its own military capacity based on access to NATO’s European assets.

Turkey is already a well integrated partner in European policy formation and there is a regular dialogue established as part of the accession strategy. There is ongoing exchanges of view on international issues, such as Southern Caucasus, Western Balkans, the Middle East Process, the Mediterranean and Middle East regions, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan and effective multilateralism.

During the Convention on the Future of Europe Turkey was broadly supportive of proposals to strengthen CFSP/ESDP. It nevertheless favoured a reference to the NATO obligations of certain Member States in the final text.

Turkey has been and remains a key ally of the United States, but was not prepared to support it in its attack on Iraq, and is angry that its advice on the conduct of the early stages of the war were not listened to.

Turkey will be vigilant regarding future developments in Iraq given the large degree of autonomy enjoyed by the Kurds in northern Iraq. There are also significant Kurdish minorities in Iran and Syria (circa six and one million respectively).

Recently Turkey and Iran have up-graded their relationship with regular dialogues on political and security issues. Economic and social relations between Turkey and Syria have drastically improved following the Syrian decision to withdraw its support for the PKK and to deport its leader, Abdullah Öcalan, from Syria in 1998. However, disputes over Turkey’s large-scale programme of dam-building and irrigation in south-east is a very difficult issue.

In the Southern Caucasus, Turkey has very good relations with both Azerbaijan and Georgia. Numerous agreements have been signed with these countries and Turkey also has two diaspora communities from the region.

Turkey has close cultural and linguistic ties with the states of Central Asia. It sought to become a regional leader at the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union but was not able to bear the financial burden at the time. These close geographic and cultural ties have so far provided an advantage to Turkey’s economic initiatives in the region and more than one thousand Turkish companies operate in the region. Turkey also provides military assistance and training in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Kyrgystan.

3.3 Border Security

Turkey’s accession to the European Union would lengthen the external border. To this new external land border of 2,477 km should be added the Black Sea blue border which runs for 1,762 km and the Aegean and Mediterranean blue border which runs for 4,768 km.

In order to ensure its own security, Turkey already devotes considerable resources to border management; some 64 000 personnel are deployed on border management tasks. Although it is unlikely that Turkey would join Schengen from the day of its accession, it would at some stage become responsible for ensuring an efficient protection of the new external border and hence have to play a key role in ensuring the security of the Union itself.

3.4 Implications for Ireland

The position of the Irish government, at the moment, is neutral to positive. It appears clear that the work done by the 2004 Irish presidency and the good bilateral relations developed, have left a very positive impression in Ankara.

The direct implications for Ireland on the economic or financial front are uncertain, but unlikely to be great. Ireland, however, will certainly benefit from the increase in the size of the internal market and the addition of some 70m new consumers. Ireland will be a net contributor to the EU budget by the time Turkish draw downs are likely to feature to any significant extent, so the issue for this country over the next few years will be in negotiating the financial perspectives package which best suits Ireland.

Turkey will not be a competitor in manufactured goods or agricultural products. It is unlikely to be a competitor for FDI, because the Turkish economy is at a stage of development different to Ireland. On the other hand, a growing Turkish economy may well offer investment opportunities to Irish firms.

Migration is an area where there may be threats or opportunities for Ireland, depending on the state of the labour market in this country or whether complete freedom of movement is part of the final Treaty of Accession for Turkey.

Where Ireland certainly will loose is in the institutional sense. The size of the Turkish population will give it a voting power in the Council equal to that of Germany and will reduce the importance of the voting power of the smaller member states. In particular, in the European Parliament, Ireland will pay a price. Given that the number of members of parliament is capped at 750, and that Turkey would probably have 96 members, the same as Germany, there would be a commensurate reduction in the number of deputies from other countries, including Ireland.

3.5 Implications for Budget

Given its size and level of economic development, Turkey’s accession would undoubtedly have an important impact on the EU budget Just as the EU’s spending policies may undergo important changes prior to Turkey’s accession, the revenue side of the EU budget will also be affected as current arrangements for the funding of EU expenditure are unlikely to remain the same in the future either.

The most useful calculations on what the likely impact for the budget are contained in a working paper, published in June 2004¹. An analysis in 1999 prices of Budget Estimates for Turkey based on the Financial Packages for the New Ten and Bulgaria and Romania and Budget Estimates for Turkey based on 4% GDP limit for structural funds and on the financial package for Bulgaria & Romania gives a total for the first 3 years of €45.5billion, comparable to the €40.8 billion received by the new member states of the 2004 enlargement and in budget receipts per head of population almost identical to the receipts per head of population of the new members.

Based on a theoretical overall internal policies envelope equivalent to that proposed by the Commission in February 2004 for the final year of the 2007-2013 financial perspective, an upwards adjustment to take into account Turkey’s membership using the same method as applied in the case of the ten new member states would result in an additional €2.6 billion of expenditure per year (2004 prices).

Turkey’s accession will also bring with it its own particular challenges which will need to be addressed in the context of the Union’s internal policies, not least in respect of expenditure on citizenship freedom, security and justice given the extent and nature of the EU’s future external border in Turkey.

As far as payments into the EU budget are concerned, this is largely funded on the basis of contributions from the Member States based on gross national income (GNI) or national wealth. Assuming annual GNI growth in Turkey of 4-5% and, for illustrative purposes, a contribution rate (not including traditional own resources) to the EU budget of 1% of GNI, in 2025 Turkey’s contribution to the EU budget would be just over €5.6 billion (2004 prices).

It should be stressed that all calculations are speculative, because the details and the timing of an accession, as well as the configuration of EU policies at that time, are unknown. However, scenarios based on the status-quo show that full integration of Turkey into EU policies represents a considerable financial burden.

In isolation these costs are sustainable, but, in combination with constantly rising expenditures for new member countries, and those required for further ancillary enlargements (Bulgaria, Romania, other Balkan states) as well as those for new tasks (foreign and security policy, Lisbon process), the funds to pay for transfers to Turkey may have to be obtained through an increase in the budget (which means tax rises) or cuts in receipts for current members. Neither prospect would be attractive to member states - but would be a real cost of the rapid pace of enlargement.

3.6 Energy

Turkey has only limited reserves of oil and natural gas, but substantial reserves of coal, particularly lignite. It will have a major role to play in the security of energy supply of the enlarged EU and is expected to develop further as a major oil and gas transit country. Accession of Turkey would extend the EU to the borders of the world’s most energy-rich regions in the Middle East and the Caspian Basin.

Turkey is also well positioned to serve as a central transit route for rising European energy needs. The Greek-Turkish Interconnector gas pipeline project demonstrates Turkey’s contribution to energy security. The project is expected to further connect gas pipelines to Italy and from there to the rest of Western Europe. Turkey has also engaged in the Nabucco natural gas pipeline project, which would extend from Turkey and Greece to Bulgaria and all the way to Austria.

Turkey plays an important role in the development of Caspian energy, notably with the Baku-Tiblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline currently under construction and the planned gas pipeline to run alongside it to Erzerum. Turkey is already cooperating with Russia in the energy sector with the completion of the “Blue Stream” natural gas pipeline which travels from Russia to Turkey under the Black Sea. Moreover, talks are underway to build a new oil pipeline from Russia to Kiyiköy on Turkey’s Black Sea coast and then on to Ibrikbaba on the Aegean, known as the Trans-Thracian pipeline, which would allow Russian oil to reach the Mediterranean without having to pass through the congested Bosporus Straits.

It is also collaborating with the Mashreq countries in the project to bring natural gas from Egypt and eventually Iraq and Iran to the EU. Oil pipelines crossing Turkey will contribute to reduce environmental risks of shipping on the Mediterranean Sea and in the Strait of Bosphorus.

¹ 2004 Regular Report on Turkey’s progress towards accession COM(2004) 656 final

² FINAL A6-0063/2004 3.12.2004 REPORT of the Committee on Foreign Affairs on the 2004 regular report and the recommendation of the European Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession (COM(2004)0656 - C6-0148/2004 - 2004/2182(INI)) and P5_TA(2004)0274. The resolution of the European Parliament of 1 April 2004 on the 2003 regular report of the Commission on Turkey’s progress towards accession and its previous resolutions adopted between 18 June 1987 and 1 April 2004

³ It is torture if ill treatment is continuous, common, purposeful

⁴ See Resolution 1380 (2004) of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

The Resolution says ......

“24. The Assembly considers that over the last three years Turkey has clearly demonstrated its commitment and ability to fulfil its statutory obligations as a Council of Europe member state. Given the progress achieved since 2001, the Assembly is confident that the Turkish authorities will apply and consolidate the reforms in question, the implementation of which will require considerable changes to its legislation and regulations, extending beyond 2004. The Assembly therefore decides to close the monitoring procedure under way since 1996.

25. The Assembly will continue, through its Monitoring Committee, the post-monitoring dialogue with the Turkish authorities on the issues raised in paragraph 23 above, and on any other matter that might arise in connection with Turkey’s obligations as a Council of Europe member state.”

¹ Source: Issues Arising form Turkey’s Membership Perspective. European Commission

° in euros

^* in PPS, 2003 GDP data

² Recommendation 1247 (1994)

¹ Based on Turkey and the European Union: Just another enlargement. Kirsty Hughers. Friends of Europe Working Paper. June 2004