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Joint Committee on European AffairsInstitutions of the European Union - Suggestions for Change by the EU Convention on the Future of Europe.Overview following Discussions by the Joint Committee with the Irish Convention Delegates in relation to the drafting of the proposed Convention Constitutional TreatyJoint Committee on European AffairsInstitutions of the European Union - Suggestions for Change by the EU Convention on the Future of Europe.Chairman’s Overview following Discussions by the Joint Committee with the Irish Convention Delegates in relation to the drafting of the proposed Convention Constitutional TreatyThe Joint Committee has been engaged in an on-going discussion of the issues, which have been pre-occupying the EU Convention on the Future of Europe since its establishment in February 2002. In this regard it has, on a number of occasions, discussed a variety of areas raised at the Convention. Most of these issues been the subject of in-depth discussion at Convention working group level as well as at Convention plenaries and many of the changes, on which there was majority agreement at the Convention, have now appeared in the draft articles of the treaty proposed by the Convention Praesidium. The EU Institutions, a fundamental area for the Union (some would say the most important area), however, have been the subject of little discussion at the Convention. The primary reason for this was to attempt to get everything else in place before dealing with what might be the most contentious area. At its meeting on 8 April 2003 the Joint Committee, which was attended by Deputy John Bruton, Oireachtas Delegate to the Convention and Minister of State Dick Roche TD, Government Delegate to the Convention, the situation relating to the changes in the Institutions proposed at the Convention were discussed in some detail. It was agreed that following the meeting I would set out the broad views of the Joint Committee on some of the main issues under discussion. The attached paper outlines the situation regarding the proposals provisionally made by certain delegates at the EU Convention and the current thinking of the Joint Committee on issues in regard to these proposals. Gay Mitchell TD Chairman Institutions of the European Union - Suggestions for Change by the EU Convention on the Future of Europe.Views of the Joint CommitteeThe Laeken Declaration in 2001, under the heading “more democracy, transparency and efficiency in the EU” sets out a series of questions on what measures, if any, should be taken to enhance the democratic legitimacy and transparency of the Institutions of the EU. The Convention Secretariat in its paper “The Functioning of the Institutions” (see Appendix I) describes the current situation in each of the institutions. A number of proposed changes by certain Convention delegates, which are briefly outlined under, suggest ways of enhancing these Institutions. The Joint Committee, having heard from the Government Delegate to the Convention, Minister of State Roche and the Oireachtas Representative and Convention Praesidium Member, Deputy John Bruton, and having examined the main proposals for Institutional change, concurred broadly with the views of the Delegates and expressed the hope that these views would be included in the final draft of the proposed treaty. There was also broad agreement for the main trust of the Government’s paper (CONV 646/03) on which it was noted that more than 20 member and accession States have declared support. The Joint Committee agreed that, in relation to the proposed changes in the Institutions, two key general principles: - (i) maintaining and reinforcing the Community Method and (ii) preserving the institutional balance of the Union, would have to be guaranteed. Changes in the InstitutionsThe main changes suggested at the Convention on the Future of Europe in the three central institutions (the Council of Ministers, the Commission, and the European Parliament) as well as in the European Council are outlined hereunder. The conclusions under each point are in italics. EUROPEAN COUNCILa)The election of a President for up to five years. Currently, the Member State holding the rotating six-month Presidency of the EU chairs the meetings of the European Council (the Council of Heads of State and Government). The larger Member States (principally the UK, France, Spain and Germany) now propose the appointment by QMV, in the European Council, of a five-year (or a two and a half year) full time President of the European Council. They maintain that the change is needed to make the Council’s work more efficient and to give an enhanced international profile to the EU. During the debate in plenary on Institutions, many of the smaller member States, the Commission and many European Parliament delegates rejected the proposal as they felt that it would disturb the balance between the institutions, weaken the Commission (particularly the Commission President), give too much power to the larger Member States and not be very effective as regards the international profile. ConclusionsThe Joint Committee would want the current institutional balance to be maintained. The Joint Committee might feel, in particular, that it is in Ireland’s and indeed the Union’s interest to ensure that the Commission retains all of its current prerogatives. It has not been fully explained how this Presidency role would interact with the Commission President and the proposed dual-hatted Minister for External Affairs. This also cuts across the principle of the rotating Presidency, which the Joint Committee would like to see retained, at least in some formulation (see under Council of Ministers). COUNCIL OF MINISTERSa)The appointment of a European Minister for External Affairs who would take on the dual role of High Representative and Commissioner for External Affairs. There is a level of support at the Convention for merging the functions of the High Representative and the External Relations Commissioner. The Commission representative agreed with this merger and suggested that this individual should be known as the Secretary of the EU. However, the French/German suggested title of European Minister of External Affairs received more support (a Secretary General of the Council would also be appointed). The Commission suggested that the Secretary of the EU should be appointed jointly by the Commission President and the Council and would after a transition period autonomously exercise the Commission’s right of initiative in terms of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. The French/German proposal wants the European Minister of External Affairs to be appointed by the Council under the QMV rule with the approval of the Commission President. While CFSP issues would be decided by QMV (or even enhanced qualified majority), it would not apply to matters of national importance for Member States and the Commission would not have the right of imitative in relation to CFSP issues. ConclusionsThe Joint Committee would wish to see that if this were to happen there would be clear accountability to the two Institutions and that the integrity of each Institution would be preserved. However, it would want to retain unanimous voting in Council especially in sensitive areas such as defence. In addition, the powers and functions of the European Minister for External Affairs/Secretary would have to be spelled out in his/her own right and also vis a vis other institutional offices such as the President of the Commission, the Council Presidency and, if pursued, the President of the European Council. b)Public access to Council when it is performing its legislative function. There has been a good deal of debate in Council as well as at the Convention on this subject and there is a substantial majority in both in favour of transparency in Council. In relation to this proposal the European Parliament delegates, in particular, want the full legislative process in Council to be conducted in public. Other delegates, on the other hand, would be satisfied to accept that only the opening of debates and final decision on legislative proposals should be in public. There is an understanding by those in the latter group that a certain amount of privacy should be allowed for more flexibility and negotiating space in the discussions among Ministers before decisions are finally reached. RecommendationThe Joint Committee, while agreeing with the need for more transparency in Council, would accept that position suggested by the latter group. c)The extension of qualified majority voting (QMV) to most areas of legislation and decision-making, including CFSP and Justice areas. While the Nice Treaty extended the scope of QMV to a number of additional areas a majority of delegates in the Convention, responding to the expected difficulties of reaching agreement under the unanimity rule after the envisaged Union enlargement to 25 after 1 May 2004, have sought an extension of QMV to cover most areas. This issue has become more contentious as enlargement approaches. The six larger member States within the anticipated 25 (Germany, France, UK, Italy, Spain and Poland), who will represent approx 75% of the total population of the Union, believe their position would be further eroded and consequently, among other things, they are pushing for qualified majority voting to address this perceived inequality. While many delegates would support QMV as a general rule, exceptions were noted both at the Convention level and working group level, particularly in relation to (a) economic governance where there was no consensus on taxation, (b) external relations where unanimity was insisted on for certain areas, (c) in freedom, security and justice where recognition existed that in certain cases, the unanimity rule should continue to apply and (d) in defence where it was accepted that individual member States would continue to decide on their involvement. ConclusionsIn principle, the Joint Committee has no problem in supporting the call for further QMV to ensure more efficiency and flexibility in the preparation of Union legislation. However, it would have concerns in respect of some sensitive cases, eg defence and taxation, where Ireland would want to retain unanimous voting in Council. d)The abolition of the Pillar system. The consensus reached at the Working Group on Legal Personality, and also in plenary, to establish a single legal personality for the Union was understood to mean that, inter alia, the existing three Pillar system would be merged into one. The foregoing will tend to lead to the communitarisation of CFSP and Justice and Home Affairs issues and, indeed, the Commission and many of the European Parliament delegates have pressed for this. This would not be technically problematic in relation to a number of areas and the reports from the Working Groups on External Relations and Justice Freedom and Security show this to be the case. The groups and the plenaries also show that a number of sensitive areas will have to be excluded from the Community/Union competence. ConclusionsThe Joint Committee recognises that the merging of the pillars into one would contribute to the simplification of the treaties and give greater coherence to the Union’s constitutional architecture. Provided adequate provision is made to ensure that certain sensitive areas remain the preserve of the Member States, the Joint Committee would be able to agree with the proposal. e)Changes to the rotating Presidencies The rotating system of presidencies has been very valuable in bringing the Union closer to the individual citizen in each of the Member States during the six months of their Presidency. It also creates a sense of ownership of the Union and highlights the central role which all States play in its running. On the other hand, there is the argument that because of the complex nature of the Union it is very difficult for Member States, particularly the smaller ones to cope with the running of the Presidency. In addition, six months is deemed by many to be too short a time to maintain the necessary continuity required to bring many tasks to fruition. It is argued that these negative aspects of the rotating presidency will exacerbated when the membership increases to 25 and beyond. A French /German proposal would give the European Minister for External Affairs the chair of the External Relations Council, the Secretary General the chair of the General Affairs Council (GAC), the JHA Council and the Eurogroup Council would elect a president from within their own members for two years and the other Council formations would be presided over by rotating presidencies. The Commission proposes that the European Council, GAC and Coreper should be rotated every six months. All other Councils including External Affairs would have presidencies elected for one year. Another version offered by the Benelux countries is that all Council formations, with the exception of the External Relations Council and the GAC, which should be chaired by the Secretary of the Union and the Commission President respectively, should retain the current system. A small number of delegates wanted to retain the current system of rotation. However, in discussions in plenary a number of delegates including the Irish Government representative, while insisting on rotation, spoke about team presidencies as a means to overcome the problems seen in the existing system. ConclusionsThe Joint Committee, mindful, of the very positive democratic advantages of the current system would probably wish to retain at least much of its elements. In the circumstances, the Joint Committee might be willing to consider team presidencies for, say, a period of two years, which would have the dual role of spreading the work-load and giving areas of work sufficient time to ensure continuity. COMMISSIONa)The election of the Commission President Currently, the Commission President is proposed by the European Council under the QMV rule with the European Parliament approving the nomination by simple majority vote. Initially, in the Convention there was a good deal of support for the election of the President by the European Parliament with the appointment being approved by the European Council. However, it was pointed out that this type of election would politicise the Commission and might tend to the make the office partisan. Deputy John Bruton’s proposal for universal suffrage in the election of the Commission President, which is mentioned in the Laeken Declaration, while being accepted by many delegates as the most democratically transparent way of involving the citizens of the EU, was felt by others to be before its time (see Appendix II). The Government (Minister of State Roche) has also tabled a proposal for an electoral college involving both the national and European Parliaments (see Appendix III). There has been some support for this from other delegations. ConclusionsMost delegates agree that the election of the Commission President should be more democratic ie involving the citizens or the parliament(s). The Joint Committee would not disagree with that position although on balance an argument could be made for retaining the current system which has the undoubted benefit of ensuring the Commission President’s neutrality vis a vis political groupings (a point made by Commission Vice-President Kinnock). However, if change is made in this area the Joint Committee would want to ensure that (i) the Commission must retain its independence, (ii) whoever is elected must be impartial and (iii) the election is seen to be fair and open. The Joint Committee would perhaps, see this post as part of the overall package and, therefore, in considering this due regard would have to be taken concerning the changes in the other institutions particularly the proposals on a European Council President, the European Minister for External Affairs and also the composition, role and status of the other Commissioners. b)The selection of Commissioners by the Commission President and the role of ordinary Commissioners Proposals have been made by many delegates in the Convention for changes in make-up the Commission: some (Commission and France/Germany) suggest a two tiered system with only some Commissioners having specific portfolios: most want the Commission President to have more power in the selection and task assigning in the Commission: the smaller States want to ensure the equality of all member States in respect of rotation and in the Commission’s operations and composition. There has even been a suggestion (by the EPP) for the re-establishment of the rule of one Commissioner per member State. ConclusionsThe Joint Committee, while anxious to make the Commission as efficient and transparent as possible, would want to ensure that all Member States would have equal rights with regard to all aspects of that Institution. c)The reduction in the number of Commissioners. The Treaty of Nice says that the current system of at least one Commissioner per Member State will be abandoned after the membership of the Union reaches 27. A number of Convention delegates are now saying that the system of one per MS should be preserved, while others say that the number should be reduced to below 20 to make the College more efficient. ConclusionsThe Joint Committee, anxious to avoid reopening this very sensitive area, would accept that the terms of the Nice Treaty should be retained on this issue. It is very important that equality as between MS in the composition and operation of the Commission must be preserved. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTa)Extending co-decision to mostly all areas. The great majority of delegates at the Convention are supportive of co-decision between Council and European Parliament in all areas where QMV applies. One of the areas where this might present problems for countries with large agriculture sectors, such as Ireland and France, is the budget where currently the European Parliament, while it has overall decision rights on the budget, does not have co-decision in relation to compulsory expenditure. (The main item covered by Compulsory expenditure is CAP). ConclusionsWhile the Joint Committee would have no problem extending co-decision rights to the European Parliament on most QMV issues, it would wish to examine what implications that extension might have for compulsory expenditure under the Union’s budget. b)Allow the EP to elect the President of the Commission The EP has been pushing very hard at the Convention to extend its powers in a number of areas including this. While there are grounds for this proposal ie more democratic, one has to be careful not to politicise the Commission or to allow one grouping in the Parliament to control the Commission (although the Benelux proposal for a 2/3 majority of votes in the EP would get over this). It could be argued that the institute which controls the Commission President would control the Union, as the President controls the Commission and through his/her election may have a more dominant role overall. The foregoing would not be so, if a full time President of the European Council is also elected and to a certain extent the appointment of a European Minister for External Affairs answerable to the Council would also have a reducing affect. RecommendationIf there were to be change from the current system, the Joint Committee would be more favorably inclined to either the Deputy Bruton or the Government’s position on this issue (see page 7). The important issue here, as elsewhere in the Institutions question, is to maintain the critical balance between them. 9 April 2003 |
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