Committee Reports > List of Committees > Joint > 1999 > Committee on Justice, Equality, Defence and Women's Rights > Report - Proposals for Legislation for a Human Rights Commission Bill

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Report

of the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality and Women’s Rights on Proposals for legislation by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform for a Human Rights Commission Bill

Report

of

the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality and Women’s Rights

on

Proposals for legislation by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform for a Human Rights Commission Bill

Contents

REPORT

Introduction

1.Proposals by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform for a Human Rights Commission Bill were referred to the Joint Committee pursuant to paragraph (2)(a)(v) of the Committee’s Orders of Reference by order of Dáil Éireann of 24th February, 1999, and by order of Seanad Éireann of 4th March, 1999. The proposals are contained in Appendix 1 to this report.

2.The Joint Committee gave preliminary consideration to the proposals and written evidence received thereon at a meeting held on 30 March. The Committee considered further written evidence and heard oral evidence from a number of interested parties at a meeting held on 8 April. The minutes of evidence taken at that meeting are contained in Appendix 2 to this report.

3.The Committee takes this opportunity to thank the following organisations for their assistance in its consideration of the proposals:

(i)Amnesty International

(ii)the Combat Poverty Agency

(iii)the Free Legal Advice Centres

(iv)The Irish Council for Civil Liberties

(v)Pavee Point.

Basis for the Establishment of a Human Rights Commission

4.The Belfast (or Good Friday) Agreement requires that

“a new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, with membership from Northern Ireland reflecting the community balance, will be established by Westminster legislation, independent of Government, with an extended and enhanced role beyond that currently exercised by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, to include keeping under review the adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, making recommendations to Government as necessary; providing information and promoting awareness of human rights; considering draft legislation referred to them by the new Assembly; and, in appropriate cases, bringing court proceedings or providing assistance to individuals doing so”

and that the Irish Government establish “a Human Rights Commission with a mandate and remit equivalent to that within Northern Ireland”.

5.The relevant provisions of the Agreement (Chapter 6: Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity) are contained in Appendix 3 to this report. Those provisions of the Northern Ireland Bill (as initiated) which relate to the establishment of a human rights commission are contained in Appendix 4.

Guiding Principles

6.The Commission can be viewed both as a requirement of the Belfast Agreement which must be fulfilled and as an opportunity to reflect and strengthen international human rights norms in domestic institutions and legislation.

7.A number of bodies which gave evidence made reference to what they considered to As the Committee understands matters, The Paris Principles are a set of be shortcomings in the proposals having regard to the Paris Principles.

8.principles formulated at the first international meeting of national institutions convened by the UN Centre for Human Rights in Paris in 1991 which were intended to establish a generic model for national institutions. These principles were subsequently adopted by the Commission for Human Rights and the United Nations General Assembly¹.

9.The Committee found it useful to examine the proposals with regard to the standards articulated in the Paris Principles and a number of references are made to that document throughout. A text of the principles is contained in Appendix 5.

Membership of the Human Rights Commission

Method of Appointment

10.The current proposals provide that the members of the Commission will be appointed by Government.

11.The Irish Council for Civil Liberties expressed the view that “there should be some safeguard to protect against a future government, perhaps irked by the independence of the Commission, selecting members more sympathetic to its own views”. The Council suggested that consideration might be given to providing that the membership of the Commission should be approved by a two-thirds majority of both Houses of the Oireachtas as is the case in South Africa.

12.The Combat Poverty Agency went so far as to suggest that it might be appropriate “that open competition processes would be employed in relation to key Commission posts such as the Head of Commission”.

13.The Committee is of the view that there is an issue of “justice seen to be done” to be addressed in this regard and recommends that the Commission should be nominated by Government but appointed by the Houses of the Oireachtas, perhaps on the same basis as is the Ombudsman.

President of the Commission

14.In evidence to the Committee, concern was expressed by Amnesty International and other groups that the proposals as currently framed, in requiring that the President of the Commission hold judicial office in the Superior Courts or be qualified to hold such office, reflected a clear bias in favour of the legal profession at the expense of experience or expertise in the field of human rights. Striking examples of what this means in practice were given to the Committee in the course of evidence: the proposals would preclude the appointment of both the current Chief Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and the current United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights.

15.The Committee recommends that the same qualification criteria should apply in relation to the Presidency as applies to ordinary membership of the Commission.

Ordinary Members of the Commission

16.The Paris Principles envisage that a body such as the Commission should be representative of wide cross-sections of the public in its composition (see Appendix 5 under the heading Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism).

17.The Committee notes that the corresponding provisions in the Northern Ireland Bill (as initiated) were as follows:

”In making appointments ….., the Secretary of State shall as far as practicable secure that the Commissioners, as a group, are representative of the community in Northern Ireland.”.

18.Bodies which gave evidence to the Committee expressed a number of concerns in relation to the qualifications for appointment envisaged in the case of the Irish Commission which can be summarised as follows:

(a)the number of members proposed (viz. a president and not less than four and not more than eight other members) is unlikely to result in a sufficiently representative body; the Commission should have at least the same number of members (i.e. 9 ordinary members) as its Northern Ireland counterpart

and

(b)the proposed qualifications for membership , being biased in favour of the legal profession, would further militate against the Commission being broadly representative of society . In this regard, the necessity of gender balance was advocated by Amnesty International and the need to ensure that community and voluntary sector interests are given a voice in the context of the Government’s national anti-poverty strategy was suggested by the Combat Poverty Agency.

19.The Committee is of the opinion that the initial membership of the Commission will play a significant role in determining its modus operandi and ethos in the longer term.

20.In this context, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties expressed the view that “the proposed criteria for appointment of members of the (republic’s) Commission are unlikely to produce the sort of dynamic People’s Commission Brice Dickson² has suggested”. While this view may be unduly pessimistic, the Committee accepts that the current proposals would not, of themselves, produce such an outcome.

21.The Committee acknowledges that there will be a significant legal dimension to the workings of the Commission but considers that any necessary expertise in this regard could in large part be provided by the staff of the Commission or through the temporary engagement of persons with requisite knowledge.

22.On the other hand, the Committee is of the opinion that the proposals as currently framed do not guarantee sufficient representation of or co-operation with the range of views envisaged by the Paris Principles, viz. representatives of the following:

▸non governmental organizations responsible for human rights and efforts to combat racial discrimination, trade unions and concerned social and professional organizations (for example, associations of lawyers, doctors, journalists and eminent scientists);

▸trends in philosophical or religious thought;

▸universities and qualified experts;

▸Parliament;

▸Government departments (participating in deliberations only in an advisory capacity).

23.The Committee recommends that, as a minimum, the categories of person qualified for membership of the Commission should include those set out in the Paris Principles; and that consideration should be given to replacing provisions (2)(a) to (c) of Head 2 of the proposals with provisions which would mirror that part of the Paris Principles referred to above.

24.The Committee also recommends that the proposed size of the Commission should be increased to facilitate the appointment of a more representative body.

Disqualification from Membership of the Commission

25.The Irish Council for Civil Liberties expressed concern in relation to a number of the grounds on which cessation of membership of the Commission would be automatic. Concern was also expressed that the proposed right of Government to dismiss a member of the Commission “for any … stated reason” was “far too wide and could lead to abuse”.

26.The Committee is of the opinion that parliamentary involvement in relation to dismissal from membership would strengthen the necessary independence of the Commission and recommends that dismissal from membership should be effected by resolution of either House of the Oireachtas on motion made which cites stated misconduct or conduct incompatible with membership of the Commission or asserts some other grounds on which dismissal is warranted.

27.The Committee notes that the proposals envisage that membership of either House of the Oireachtas or the European Parliament would result in automatic disqualification from membership of the Commission and draws attention to the fact that the Paris Principles do not view membership of a parliamentary body as being incompatible with membership of a human rights commission. The Committee recommends that these provisions be reviewed.

Functions of the Commission

Role of the Commission in relation to Statute Law (Head 4(1))

28.The Irish Council for Civil Liberties stated in evidence that the Commission should have the power not just to review the adequacy and effectiveness of the law and practice as they stand, but also to draft legislation.

29.The Committee is of the view that Head 4(1), providing as it does that the Commission will “keep under review the adequacy and effectiveness of law and practice in the State relating to the protection of human rights”, gives the Commission discretion to advocate legislation (which would include the preparation of draft legislation if it considers that this is the best way in which to proceed in particular circumstances).

30.FLAC suggested that the Commission should have the right to review proposals for legislation. While accepting that there is merit in this suggestion, the Committee would be reluctant to recommend that this power be granted to the Commission as of right because, in practice, this could lead to further lengthy delays in the legislative process.

31.As an alternative, the Committee recommends that, as a matter of administrative practice, a copy of every Bill initiated should be furnished to the Commission, enabling it to make its views known if it considers this to be necessary.

32.ICCL also favoured a broadening of the Commission’s remit under Head 4(1) by the addition of “and to promote and ensure the harmonisation of national legislation regulations and practice with the international human rights instruments to which the State is a party and to ensure their implementation”. The Committee considers that this could best be achieved by an amendment of the definition of human rights contained in Head 14. That issue will be addressed later in this report.

Relationship of Commission to other statutory authorities

33.Head 4(5)(b) provides that “where the Commission considers that the matter drawn to its attention falls within the remit of another statutory authority with powers of enquiry, it shall refer the matter to such authority for appropriate action”.

34.The Irish Council for Civil Liberties expressed the view that the Commission should not be automatically precluded from investigating any matter that falls within the remit of another statutory body with powers of inquiry and suggested that it should have discretion to refer complaints to other bodies as and when considered appropriate.

35.FLAC expressed the view that the Commission should be given power to supervise arrests and detention under emergency legislation, especially in the light of the recent enactment of anti-terrorist legislation, with power to inspect any gaol or other place of detention. FLAC also advocated the appointment of an Independent Commissioner for the Holding Centres.

36.The Committee understands the concerns expressed and notes that the Paris Principles envisage “as broad a mandate as possible, which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text, specifying its … sphere of competence”. However, the Committee is of the view that no useful purpose would be served by permitting the Human Rights Commission to duplicate the responsibilities or functions of other statutory authorities.

37.As the Committee sees matters, the appropriate role of the Commission in relation to other statutory authorities should be one of ensuring that the legislative framework within which each operates and the procedures and practices of each serve to vindicate and protect human rights and it would be open to aggrieved persons or groups to bring matters to the attention of the Commission in this context. The Committee is of the opinion that the Minister’s proposals permit this and that this would be entirely consistent with the Paris Principles.

Reports of the Commission (Heads 4 and 15)

38.Head 4 of the Minister’s proposals envisages that the functions of the Commission will include the following requirements:

“(6)to publish its reports, opinions, advice and the outcome of its studies or research or any enquiry referred to in the preceding paragraph;

(7)not later than the 31st day of March in each year to prepare and submit to the Government a report on its activities in the immediately preceding year, copies of which shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas”.

39.Head 15 of the Minister’s proposals envisages that “the Commission shall, before the end of a period of two years beginning with the date of its establishment, make to the Government a Report containing such recommendations as it thinks fit for improving

(a)its effectiveness; and

(b)the adequacy and effectiveness of any of the functions conferred on it by this Bill or in the light of developments in human rights”

40.The Committee notes the ICCL’s view that the Commission’s review of its work should also deal with how the work of the representative Committee could be made more effective. The Committee sees this as being a matter for the Commission and the representative Committee themselves in the first instance.

41.In order to emphasise the independence of the Commission from Government, the Committee recommends that reports of the Commission should be laid before each House of the Oireachtas at the same time as they are submitted to Government or otherwise published.

Evidence under Oath and Failure to Produce Documents or Give Evidence

42.Head 4 (5)(c) provides that, for the purpose of conducting enquiries as referred to in that head, “the Commission shall have the same powers to obtain information and documents relevant to the matter being enquired into as are provided for the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act, 1980”.

43.The Irish Council for Civil Liberties was concerned that it would not automatically follow that the Commission should have power to summon persons to give evidence under oath; and that failure to produce documents or give evidence before the Commission would constitute a specific offence.

44.The Committee recommends that these should be specifically provided for.

Power to Conduct Enquiries in Public

45.The Irish Council for Civil Liberties also expressed concern that, as is the case with the Ombudsman, the Commission would be precluded from conducting enquiries in public.

46.The Committee notes that, whereas subsection (1) of section 8³ of the Ombudsman Act, 1980, provides that “an investigation by the Ombudsman under this Act shall be conducted otherwise than in public”, head 4(5)(d) of the Minister’s proposals provide that “the procedure for conducting enquiries shall be such as the Commission considers appropriate in the circumstances of each case”. The Committee further notes that the power of the Ombudsman to obtain information and documents (which powers are to be made available to the Commission under Head 4 (5)(c) ) are contained in section 7 of the 1980 Act and would not therefore appear to limit the Commission’s discretion to conduct enquiries in public.

47.The Committee is accordingly satisfied that the Minister’s proposals give the Commission sufficient and appropriate discretion as to how to conduct enquiries.

Legal and other assistance

48.The Irish Council for Civil Liberties expressed concern that the wording of heads 4 and 5 appeared to confine legal assistance, or the Commission’s ability to take action itself, to actions before Irish Courts.

49.The Committee sees no real grounds for this concern and assumes that this will continue to be the case when the Bill is published.

North-South Issues

50.Paragraph 10 of the Belfast Agreement provides as follows:

“It is envisaged that there would be a joint committee of representatives of the two Human Rights Commissions, North and South, as a forum for consideration of human rights issues in the island of Ireland. The joint committee will consider, among other matters, the possibility of establishing a charter, open to signature by all democratic political parties, reflecting and endorsing agreed measures for the protection of the fundamental rights of everyone living in the island of Ireland.”

51.The Irish Council for Civil Liberties viewed this as an important and radical development meriting a separate section in the Government’s Bill, with consideration being given to issues such as funding and staffing to facilitate its meetings and work.

52.The corresponding provision in the Minister’s proposals is to be found at Head 4(9) which provides that it shall be a function of the Commission “to take whatever action is necessary to establish and participate in the representative Committee…”.

53.The Committee is of the opinion that the Minister’s proposals take sufficient and appropriate account of the need for flexibility.

Funding of the Commission

54.The Paris principles envisage that a body such as the Commission will have “in particular adequate funding. The purpose of this funding should be to enable it to have its own staff and premises, in order to be independent of the Government and not be subject to financial control which might affect its independence”.

55.The Committee recommends that salaries and expenses of the Commission should be met from moneys voted separately by the Oireachtas rather than by way of grant or grant-in-aid contained in the Vote for the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform.

Chief Executive Officer of the Commission

56.Head 8(1) of the Minister’s proposals envisage that the written contract under which the Chief Executive will hold office will be determined by the Commission and approved by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform with the consent of the Minister for Finance.

57.The Committee is of the view that there is a strong likelihood that the work of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform will fail to be reviewed by the Commission from time to time. In those circumstances, so as to put the independence of the Chief Executive beyond doubt, the Committee recommends that the contract of the Chief Executive should not require the approval of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.

Functions and Accountability of the Chief Executive

Functions (Head 9)

58.Notwithstanding reservations expressed in evidence by the ICCL, the Committee is satisfied that the functions of the Chief Executive as set out in Head 9 are appropriate.

Attendance of the Chief Executive before a Committee of the Houses of the Oireachtas (Head 9A)

59.Head 9A of the Minister’s proposals envisage that the Chief Executive will be precluded from questioning or expressing an opinion on the merits of any policy of the Government or a Minister of the Government or on the merits of the objectives of such a policy when giving evidence to the Committee of Dáil Éireann established under the Standing Orders of Dáil Éireann to examine and report to Dáil Éireann on the appropriation accounts and reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General.

60.Again, the Committee considers such provision to be entirely appropriate having regard to the purpose which such evidence is intended to serve.

Attendance before other Oireachtas Committees (Head 10(1))

61.Head 10 (1) of the Minister’s proposals envisages that the Chief Executive shall, at the request in writing of a Parliamentary Committee, attend before it to give account for the general administration of the Commission.

62.The orders of reference of Joint Committees currently require that they consider, inter alia:

“such Annual Reports or Annual Reports and Accounts, required by law and laid before either or both Houses of the Oireachtas, of bodies under the aegis of the Department(s) [referred to earlier in their orders of reference], and the overall operational results, statements of strategy and corporate plans of these bodies, as it may select.

Provided that the Joint Committee shall not, at any time, consider any matter relating to such a body which has been, or which is, at that time, proposed to be considered by the Committee of Public Accounts pursuant to the Orders of Reference of that Committee and/or the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act, 1993.”

63.In view of the fact that reports of the Commission may deal with both operational and policy matters (and as Committees may on occasion, seek the assistance of representatives of the Commission in other contexts), the Committee views Head 10(1) as being unduly limiting.

64.The Committee recommends that the question of who should represent the Commission at meetings with Oireachtas Committees, other than when annual accounts of the Commission are under scrutiny, should be one for the Commission itself to decide.

Staff of the Human Rights Commission (Heads 11, 12 and 13)

65.Head 11 of the Minister’s proposals envisages that the following will require the consent of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Minister for Finance

(1)the appointment of such and so many persons to be members of the staff of the Commission as it may from time to time determine.

(2)the terms and conditions of service of members of the staff of the Commission.

(3)the remuneration and allowances payable to members of staff of the Commission.

66.The Committee has already made reference to its view that there is a strong likelihood that the work of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform will fail to be reviewed by the Commission from time to time. In those circumstances, so as to put the independence of the Commission beyond doubt, the Committee recommends that the consent of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform should not be required in these matters.

67.Head 12 envisages inter alia that The Commission, in determining the remuneration or allowances for expenses to be paid to members of its staff, or the other terms or conditions subject to which such members hold or are to hold their employment, shall comply with any directives in this regard which the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform may give to the Commission with the consent of the Minister for Finance.

68.For the reasons already outlined, the Committee recommends that the Minister for Finance should be the directing authority in such matters.

69.Head 13 outlines the provisions to be proposed to be made in relation to superannuation arrangements for staff of the Commission and again envisages a role for the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform.

70.For the reasons already outlined, the Committee recommends that the Minister for Finance should be the sole authority in such matters.

Definition of Human Rights (Head 14)

71.Head 14 of the Minister’s proposals envisages that, “for the purposes of the Bill, the term ‘human rights’ shall be taken to mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in international human rights instruments which have been given the force of law in the State, or such other international human rights instruments as may be prescribed by the Minister by order under this Head to which the State is or may become a party, the provisions of which have been given the force of law in the State”.

72.Pavée Point indicated in evidence to the Committee that, while it considered that the use of International human rights instruments as a frame work for defining human rights is useful, however, they do not have the force of law and therefore could hamper the work of the Commission. The Commission should be allowed to provide a clear formulation of rights not to be discriminated against.

73.The Irish Council for Civil Liberties indicated in evidence to the Committee that it was “seriously concerned” about the proposed definition of human rights, pointing out that no such instruments had been given the force of law here; and that, even if the European Convention on Human Rights (EHCR) were incorporated in the near future, this would still exclude what ICCL regarded as the key UN covenants and conventions (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the International Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child).

74.Both ICCL and Pavée Point were of the view that the proposal as currently framed might undermine the work of the Commission from the outset. Pavée Point suggested that the Commission itself should be allowed to provide a clear formulation of rights not to be discriminated against.

75.A memorandum entitled Human Rights Commission Bill - definition of human rights and the related question of incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into Irish law⁴ was submitted by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform at the request of the Committee. The memorandum, in summarising the thinking behind the proposed approach, also summarised the arguments for and against.

76.As regards future developments, the memorandum indicated that

”the Government, taking account of the work of the All Party Committee on the Constitution and the 1996 Report of the Constitution Review Group, is to bring forward measures to strengthen and underpin the constitutional protection of human rights. The proposals in this regard were to draw on the European Convention on Human Rights (EHCR) and other international legal instruments in the field of human rights, and the question of incorporation of the ECHR is to be further examined in this context, the intention being to ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights in the State as will pertain in Northern Ireland.”

77.The memorandum also made reference to the fact that the 1995 UN Handbook on the Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights recommends that such a body will possess clearly defined subject matter jurisdiction, stating that an institution may, for example, be restricted to discharging its functions only insofar as activities can be related to rights protected in a Constitution, or it may have a broad remit and have its legislative basis in international human rights instruments to which the State concerned is a party.

78.The memorandum went on to point out that, if the Commission were to be allowed to take into account the provisions of not only the ECHR but also the other well recognised international human rights norms to which Ireland is a party e.g. the European Convention on Human Rights and relevant UN International Covenants

(a)this would present a difficulty as none of those instruments currently form part of Irish domestic law. Rights which may flow from them are thus neither cognisable nor justiciable before Irish Courts at present

and

(b)it might be considered inappropriate to give the Commission a wide role in identifying rights under its provisions as such a role might be held to conflict with that given to the Attorney General under the Constitution as the vindicator of fundamental / human rights under the Constitution and his role as adviser to the Government on the compatibility of legislation (including draft legislation) with both the Constitution and international human rights obligations.

79.The Committee has already stated its opinion that the Commission can be viewed both as a requirement of the Belfast Agreement which must be fulfilled and as an opportunity to reflect and strengthen international human rights norms in domestic institutions and legislation (and, indeed, the memorandum submitted by the Department develops this argument also).

80.As the Committee sees matters, there is a choice to be made at this point in relation to where the initiative should lie in defining and developing the concept of human rights in an Irish context.

81.The proposals effectively envisage that such a role will be confined to the Government in that

(a)the Human Rights Commission would be bound by the definition of human rights contained in Head 14 when discharging its functions; and

(b)rights embodied in international human rights instruments to which the State is or may become a party following the passage of the Act must both be given the force of law in the State and prescribed by order of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform before forming part of the definition.

82.The Committee recommends that the wider definition of human rights advocated by bodies such as the ICCL and Pavée Point be adopted.

83.As the Committee sees matters, this would permit the Commission to act as an advocate in relation to the development of the concept of human rights in Irish law. As the Committee sees matters, the difficulties referred to arising from the fact that this might include rights contained in international instruments which are neither cognisable nor justiciable before Irish Courts at present would not arise in practice as the Commission could be expected to have regard to existing Irish domestic law where this is appropriate to the discharge of its functions.

84.Similarly, the Committee sees no conflict in relation to the existing role of the Attorney General as the vindicator of fundamental / human rights under the Constitution. As the Committee sees matters, the work of the Commission will, in any event, complement that of the Attorney General in this regard.

85.By the same token, the Attorney General’s role as adviser to the Government on the compatibility of legislation (including draft legislation) with both the Constitution and international human rights obligations does not, as the Committee sees matters, obviate the need for or desirability of ongoing review in order to keep abreast of social change, international developments and advances in the understanding of human rights matters— this was the view of the majority members of the Constitution Review Group in its 1996 Report who also considered that that a Human Rights Commission should be responsible for such work.

17th June, 1999

(signed) Eoin Ryan, T.D.,

Chairman

Appendix 1: Proposals by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform for a Human Rights Commission Bill

Head 1: Establishment of Human Rights Commission

Provide that

(1)there shall stand established on the establishment day a body known as the Human Rights Commission, or in the Irish language An Coimisiún Ceartanna Daonna, to perform the functions conferred on it by this Bill;

(2)the Human Rights Commission shall, subject to the provisions of this Bill, be independent in the exercise of its functions;

(3)the Human Rights Commission shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and an official seal and power to sue and be sued in its corporate name and to acquire, hold and dispose of land or an interest in land, and to acquire, hold and dispose of any other property;

(4)the Human Rights Commission shall have all such powers as are necessary for or incidental to the performance of its functions under this Bill;

(5)the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform may, by Order, appoint a day to be the establishment day for the purpose of this Bill.

Head 2: Appointment of members of the Human Rights Commission.

Provide that

(1)the Human Rights Commission shall consist of a President and not less than four nor more than eight other members all of whom shall be appointed by the Government;

(2)the Government shall appoint to the Human Rights Commission only persons appearing to them to be suitably qualified

(a)by the holding of a Judicial Office in the Superior Courts or being qualified to hold such office in the case of the President of the Commission, and

(b)by experience as a barrister/solicitor or,

(c)by reason of such other relevant experience, qualification or training as, in the opinion of the Government, is appropriate, having regard to the functions of the Human Rights Commission in the case of the other members of the Commission;

(3)A person who holds such Judicial Office may, without relinquishing that Office, be appointed with his or her consent to the Commission, but, unless otherwise provided by the terms of his or her appointment, he or she shall not be required to perform his or her duties under statute as the holder of Judicial Office while he or she remains a member of the Commission.

(4)Where a person who holds Judicial Office is appointed to be the President of the Commission, the following provisions shall have effect;

(a)in case on being so appointed he or she is an ordinary judge of the Supreme Court, then for so long as he or she continues to hold that judicial office -

(i)the number of ordinary judges of the Supreme Court shall be exceeded by one and

(ii)the references in section 6(2)(b) of the Courts and Courts Officers Act, 1995 and section 14(1)(a) of the Law Reform Commission Act, 1975 shall be construed accordingly.

(b) in case on being so appointed he or she is the President of the High Court or an ordinary judge of the High Court, then for so long as he or she continues to hold the judicial office held by him or her on so being appointed -

(i)the number of ordinary judges of the High Court shall be exceeded by one, and

(ii)the reference in section 2 of the Courts (No. 2) Act, 1997 and section 14(b) of the Law Reform Commission Act, 1975 shall be construed accordingly.

(c)in case he or she is the President of the High Court, he or she may, for so long as he or she continues to be a member of the Commission, from time to time appoint an ordinary judge of the High Court to exercise on his or her behalf (and which judge is hereby empowered to exercise) all the jurisdiction exercisable by the President of the High Court under section 10(5) of the Courts (Supplemental Provisions) Act, 1961 as amended.

(5)the term of office for a member of the Human Rights Commission, including the President, shall not exceed 5 years and such member shall hold his or her office on such terms and conditions as are determined by the Government at the time of his or her appointment, and shall be eligible for reappointment for a further term not exceeding 5 years;

(6)the Commission may act notwithstanding any vacancy or vacancies among its members;

(7)the Government shall nominate the persons who, on the establishment day, are to comprise the members of the Human Rights Commission;

(8)on the establishment day, the persons nominated under the next preceding provision shall stand appointed under this Bill to membership of the Human Rights Commission;

(9)the Government in making the appointments under this Head shall have regard to the need to ensure that membership of the Commission includes both men and women.

Head 3 Disqualification of members of the Human Rights Commission

Provide that

(1)where a person who is the President or an other member of the Human Rights Commission is

(a)nominated as a member of Seanad Eireann,

(b)elected as a member of either House of the Oireachtas or to the European Parliament, or

(c)regarded pursuant to section 19 of the European Parliament Election Act, 1997 as having been elected to the European Parliament to fill a vacancy,

the person shall thereupon cease to be President or an other member of the Commission.

(2)a person who is for the time being entitled under the Standing Orders of either House of the Oireachtas to sit therein or who is a member of the European Parliament shall, while so entitled or such a member, be disqualified from becoming President or an other member of the Commission

(3)a person who is a member of the Commission shall be disqualified from holding and shall cease to hold office if that person is adjudged bankrupt or makes a composition or arrangement with creditors or, on conviction on indictment by a court of competent jurisdiction, is sentenced to imprisonment, or if he or she ceases to be ordinarily resident in the State.

(4)the Government may dismiss a person from his or her office as the President or a Commissioner if satisfied that

(a)he or she has without reasonable excuse failed to discharge his or her function for a continuous period of three months beginning not earlier than six months before the day of dismissal, or

(b)he or she has been convicted of a criminal offence, or

(c)he or she is unable or unfit to carry out his or her function, or

(d)for any other stated reason.

Head 4: The functions of the Human Rights Commission

Provide that the functions of the Human Rights Commission shall be

(1)to keep under review the adequacy and effectiveness of law and practice in the State relating to the protection of human rights;

(2)to consult or engage with such national or international bodies or agencies as it sees fit which have knowledge or expertise in the field of human rights;

(3)to make such recommendations to the Government as it deems appropriate, or, following a request by the Government, in relation to the measures which the Commission considers should be taken to strengthen, protect and uphold human rights in the State;

(4)to promote understanding and awareness of the importance of human rights in the State and that for these purposes the Commission may undertake, sponsor, commission or provide financial or other assistance for research and educational activities;

(5)for the purpose of exercising its functions under this Head, to conduct such enquiries as it considers necessary or expedient, subject to the following provisions -

(a)in the case of a matter which may be drawn to its attention, the Commission may, at its discretion, decide not to carry out an enquiry or to discontinue any enquiry which has commenced, if it believes or becomes aware that the matter is trivial, or vexatious or manifestly unfounded, or that the person concerned has an insufficient interest in the matter, or that the matter relates to or is concerned with legal proceedings already in being or concluded,

(b)where the Commission considers that the matter drawn to its attention falls within the remit of another statutory authority with powers of enquiry, it shall refer the matter to such authority for appropriate action,

(c)for the purpose of conducting enquiries as referred to in this head, the Commission shall have the same powers to obtain information and documents relevant to the matter being enquired into as are provided for the Ombudsman under the Ombudsman Act, 1980,

(d)the procedure for conducting enquiries shall be such as the Commission considers appropriate in the circumstances of each case,

(e)the Commission shall attach such conditions concerning the confidentiality and disclosure of any information, document or thing obtained by it during the course of its enquiries, as it thinks proper in all the circumstances,

(f)a statement of admission made by a person to the Commission during an enquiry shall not be admissible as evidence against that person in any civil or criminal proceedings;

(6)to publish its reports, opinions, advice and the outcome of its studies or research or any enquiry referred to in the preceding paragraph;

(7)not later than the 31st day of March in each year to prepare and submit to the Government a report on its activities in the immediately preceding year, copies of which shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas;

(8)to apply to the High Court or the Supreme Court for liberty to appear before the court to act as amicus curiae, at the absolute discretion of the court;

(9)to take whatever action is necessary to establish and participate in the representative Committee referred to in paragraph 10 of the section entitled “Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity” in the Belfast Agreement of 10 April, 1998.

(10)in appropriate cases, to provide assistance to persons in accordance with the provisions of Head 5 and to take constitutional actions involving law or practice on behalf of persons seeking the protection of human rights in the State.

Head 5: Legal and other assistance

Provide that

(1)this head applies to -

(a)proceedings involving law or practice relating to the protection of human rights which a person has commenced or wishes to commence

(b)proceedings in the course of which such a person relies or wishes to rely, on such law or practice

(2)where a person applies to the Human Rights Commission for assistance as referred to in Head 4(10), and the Commission is satisfied that the matter is not within the ambit of the Statutory Scheme of Civil Legal Aid and Advice in Civil and Criminal cases, or any other scheme, or the matter could more effectively or conveniently be dealt with by another statutory authority such as the Data Protection Commissioner, the Equality Authority, the Director of Equality Investigations, the National Disability Authority or the Office of the Ombudsman, the Commission may grant the application on any one of the following grounds

(a)that the case raises a question of principle

(b)that it would be unreasonable to expect the person to deal with the case without such assistance because of its complexity, or for any other reason

(c)that there are other special circumstances which make it appropriate for the Commission to provide the assistance requested.

(3)In any case where the Commission grants an application under the previous subhead, it may

(a)provide or arrange for the provision of legal advice,

(b)arrange for the provision of legal representation

(c)provide any other assistance which it deems appropriate in the circumstances.

(4)Any arrangements made by the Commission for the provision of legal assistance to a person may include provision for recovery of expenses from that person in certain circumstances.

Head 6: Seal of Human Rights Commission

Provide that

(1)The Human Rights Commission shall, as soon as practicable after its establishment, provide itself with a seal which shall be authenticated by its President or some other member of the Commission authorised by it to act on its behalf and by the signature of an officer of the Commission authorised by it to act in that behalf.

(2)Judicial notice shall be taken of the seal of the Commission and any document purporting to be an instrument made by the Commission and to be sealed with the seal (purporting to be authenticated in accordance with subhead (1)) of the Commission shall be received in evidence and be deemed to be such instrument without proof, unless the contrary is shown.

Head 7: Grants to Human Rights Commission

Provide that

(1)In each financial year there may be paid to the Human Rights Commission out of monies provided by the Oireachtas a grant of such amount as the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, with the consent of the Minister for Finance, may sanction towards the expenses of the Commission in the performance of its functions.

Head 8: Chief Executive Officer of Human Rights Commission

Provide that

(1)The Commission shall appoint a person to be the Chief Executive of the Commission.

(2)The Chief Executive shall hold office under a written contract of service (which contract may be renewed) for such period as is specified in the contract, and subject to such terms and conditions (including terms and conditions relating to remuneration and suspension and termination of employment) as may be determined by the Commission and approved by the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform with the consent of the Minister for Finance.

(3)In subhead (2) “remuneration” includes allowances for expenses, benefits in kind and superannuation

(4)The Civil Service Commission Act, 1956, shall not apply to the appointment of a person as the Chief Executive of the Commission.

Head 9: Functions of Chief Executive of Commission

Provide that

(1)Notwithstanding any other enactment, the Chief Executive of the Commission shall manage and control generally the staff, administration and business of the Commission, and shall perform such other functions as may be conferred on him or her by or under this Bill or by the Commission.

(2)The Chief Executive shall be responsible to the Commission for the performance of his or her functions [and the implementation of the Commission’s policies].

(3)The Chief Executive shall provide to the Commission such information (including financial information) in relation to the performance of his or her functions as the Commission may from time to time require.

(4)Such of the functions of the Chief Executive as may, from time to time, be specified by him or her may, with the consent of the Commission, be performed by such member of the staff of the Commission as may be authorised by the Chief Executive.

(5)The functions of the Chief Executive may be performed during his or her absence when the position of the Chief Executive is vacant by such member of the staff of the Commission as may, from time to time, be designated for that purpose by the Commission.

Head 9A: Accountability of Chief Executive

Provide that

(1)The Chief Executive shall whenever required by the Committee of Dáil Éireann established under the Standing Orders of Dáil Éireann to examine and report to Dáil Éireann on the appropriation accounts and reports of the Comptroller and Auditor General, give evidence to that Committee on the matters provided for in subsections (1)(a) to (d) of section 50 of the Employment Equality Act, 1998.

(2)In the performance of duties under this section, the Chief Executive shall not question or express an opinion on the merits of any policy of the Government or a Minister of the Government or on the merits of the objectives of such a policy.

Head 10: Attendance of the Chief Executive before Oireachtas Committee

Provide that

(1)Subject to subheads (2) and (3), the Chief Executive shall, at the request in writing of an Oireachtas Committee (meaning a Committee appointed by either House of the Oireachtas or jointly by both Houses of the Oireachtas (other than the Committee on Members’ Interests of Dáil Éireann or the Committee on Members’ Interests of Seanad Éireann) or a sub committee of such a Committee) and in this head referred to as “the Committee”, attend before it to give account for the general administration of the Commission.

(2)The Chief Executive shall not be required to give account before the Committee for any matter which is or has been or may at a future time be the subject of proceedings before a court or tribunal in the State.

(3)Where the Chief Executive is of the opinion that a matter in respect of which the Chief Executive is requested to give an account before the Committee is a matter to which subhead (2) applies, he or she shall inform the Committee of that opinion and the reasons for the opinion and, unless the information is conveyed to the Committee at a time when the Chief Executive is before it, the information shall be so conveyed in writing.

(4)Where the Chief Executive has informed the Committee of his or her opinion in accordance with subhead (3) and the Committee does not withdraw the request referred to in subhead (1) -

(a)the Chief Executive may, not later than 21 days after being informed by the Committee of its decision not to do so, apply to the High Court in a summary manner for determination of the question whether the matter is one contemplated under subhead (2), or

(b)the Chairperson of the Committee may, on behalf of the Committee, make such a application, and the High Court may determine the matter.

(5)Pending the determination of an application under subhead (4), the Chief Executive shall not attend before the Committee to give account for the matter the subject of the application.

(6)If the High Court determines that the matter is one to which subhead (2) applies, the Committee shall withdraw the request referred to in subhead (1), but if the High Court determines that subhead (2) does not apply, the Chief Executive shall attend before the Committee to give account for the matter.

Head 11: Staff of the Human Rights Commission

Provide that

(1)The Commission shall appoint with the consent of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Minister for Finance such and so many persons to be members of the staff of the Commission as it may from time to time determine.

(2)The terms and conditions of service of a member of the staff of the Commission shall be such as may be determined from time to time by the Commission with the consent of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Minister for Finance.

(3)There shall be paid by the Commission to the members of its staff such remuneration and allowances as it, with the consent of the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Minister for Finance, from time to time determines.

(4)The Civil Service Commission Act, 1956, shall not apply to the appointment of the staff of the Commission.

Head 12: Remuneration of Staff of Commission

Provide that

The Commission, in determining the remuneration or allowances for expenses to be paid to members of its staff or the other terms or conditions subject to which such members hold or are to hold their employment, shall have regard to Government or nationally agreed guidelines which are for the time being extant and to Government policy concerning remuneration and conditions of employment which is so extant and, in addition to the foregoing, the Commission shall comply with any directives with regard to such remuneration, allowances, terms or conditions which the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform may give to the Commission with the consent of the Minister for Finance.

Head 13: Superannuation provisions applicable to staff of Human Rights Commission

Provide that

(1)As soon as may be after its establishment, the Commission shall prepare and submit to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform a scheme or schemes for the granting of superannuation benefits to or in respect of such of its staff (including the Chief Executive) as the Commission shall think fit.

(2)Every such scheme shall fix the time and conditions of retirement for all persons to or in respect of whom superannuation benefits are payable under the scheme or schemes, and different times and conditions may be fixed in respect of different classes of persons.

(3)The Commission may at any time prepare and submit to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform a scheme amending or revoking a scheme previously submitted and approved under this section.

(4)A scheme or amending scheme submitted to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform under this section shall, if approved by the Minister with the consent of the Minister for Finance, be carried out by the Commission in accordance with its terms.

(5)If any dispute arises as to the claim of any person to, or the amount of, any superannuation benefit in pursuance of a scheme or schemes under this section, such dispute shall be submitted to the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform who shall refer it to the Minister for Finance whose decision shall be final.

(6)No superannuation benefit shall be granted by the Commission to or in respect of any of its staff (including the Chief Executive), nor shall any other arrangement be entered into for the provisions of any superannuation benefit to such persons on their ceasing to hold office, other than in accordance with such scheme or schemes submitted and approved under this section or with the consent of the Minister and the Minister for Finance.

(7)Every scheme submitted and approved under this section shall be laid before each House of the Oireachtas as soon as may be after it is approved and if either House, within the next twenty-one days on which that House has sat after the scheme is laid before it, passes a resolution annulling the scheme, the scheme shall be annulled accordingly, but without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done thereunder.

(8)In this section “superannuation benefit” means pensions, gratuities and other allowances payable on ceasing to be Chief Executive or member of staff of the Commission.

Head 14: Definition of Human Rights

Provide that

for the purposes of this Bill, the term “human rights” shall be taken to mean the human rights and fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in international human rights instruments which have been given the force of law in the State, or such other international human rights instruments as may be prescribed by the Minister by order under this Head to which the State is or may become a party, the provisions of which have been given the force of law in the State.

Head 15: Review Provision

Provide that the Commission shall, before the end of a period of two years beginning with the date of its establishment, make to the Government a Report containing such recommendations as it thinks fit for improving

(a)its effectiveness; and

(b)the adequacy and effectiveness of any of the functions conferred on it by this Bill or in the light of developments in human rights;

Head 16: Expenses

Provide that the expenses incurred in the administration of this Bill shall, to such extent as may be sanctioned by the Minister for Finance, be paid out of monies provided by the Oireachtas.

Schedule 1

For illustrative purposes only and not forming part of the Bill

Human Rights Treaties to which Ireland is party but while applicable in Ireland, they are not part of its domestic law.

European Treaties

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) 1950

Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1952

European Agreement on the Abolition of Visas for Refugees 1959

European Social Charter 1961

Protocol No 2 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1963

Protocol No 3 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1963

Protocol No 4 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1963

Protocol No 5 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1966

European Code of Social Security 1968

European Convention on the Legal Status of Children Born Out of Wedlock 1975

Convention for the Protection of Individuals With Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data 1981

Protocol No 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1983

Protocol No 8 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1985

Protocol No 9 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1990

Universal Treaties

Slavery Convention 1926, amended by Protocol 1953

Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951

Convention on the Political Rights of Women 1952

Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 1954

Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices similar to Slavery 1956

Convention on the Nationality of Married Women 1957

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 1961

International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1966

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 1967

Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination Against Women 1979

Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989

International Labour Organisation Conventions

Convention No 29 concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour 1930

Convention No 87 concerning Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise 1948

Convention No 98 Concerning the application of the Principles of the Right to Organise and Bargain Collectively 1949

Convention No 100 Concerning Equal Remuneration for Men and Women Workers for Work of Equal Value 1951

Convention No 102 Concerning Minimum Standards of Social Security 1952

Appendix 2: Evidence Taken at Meeting of 8 April, 1999

Chairman: At 11.30 a.m. Is that agreed? Agreed. Item No. 2 concerns the Human Rights Commission. A number of witnesses are to be called so we will wait for them.

I would like to welcome the delegations. Proposals for legislation under the human rights commission were referred to the joint committee by order of Dáil Éireann on 24 February and Seanad Éireann on 4 March. A copy of the proposals was circulated with the agenda for the meeting of the joint committee. Written evidence has been received from the following organisations: Pavee Point Traveller Centre, free legal advice centres, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties, Amnesty International and the Combat Poverty Agency. As I said earlier, the Pavee Point representatives were unable to attend the meeting today. Representatives from the free legal advice centres include Ms Siobhán Phelan, Chairperson of FLAC, Maureen Maguire, solicitor with FLAC and Aine Breathnach, administrative and legal office. You are all welcome.

Maureen Maguire: We are glad to be here today.

Chairman: Thank you. From the Irish Council for Civil Liberties we have Siobhán Ní Chúlacháin and Michael Farrell. I understand Judy Walsh is not present. From the Combat Poverty Agency we have Joan O’Flynn and Liz O’Sullivan. We are also joined by Mary Lawlor from Amnesty International.

As we deal with the heads of the Bill, you can comment on them.

I understand there are no observations on head 1 of the Bill. Does anyone want to comment on head 2 of the Bill?

Ms Mary Lawlor: We are very concerned about the limitations being placed on the composition of the Human Rights Commission in terms of the President and Commissioners. It is required that the President should be a High Court, a Supreme Court judge or someone qualified to be a judge and Commissioners should be lawyers or should have relevant experience. Amnesty believes that although people with legal experience should be on the Commission, it is equally crucial that the Commission includes people who have human rights experience, who are fully representative of civil society and there would be a gender balance. We are also a little worried that judges by their nature are usually elderly men and that they may be a little out of touch.

Chairman: I understand the Combat Poverty Agency will to make some comments.

Ms L. O’Sullivan: Yes. Head 1 of the Bill deals with the size of the Commission. As the number of aids is relatively small, that would make it difficult to ensure there is adequate representation of various interests and expertise. Under this head we want to draw particular attention to the relevance of the national anti-poverty strategy introduced by the Government two years ago. It actively promotes the involvement of the community and voluntary sector in terms of policy, its implementation and programme development. The size of the proposed commission will compromise the extensive involvement of community and voluntary sector interests in it. We are concerned this may mitigate against the pluralist membership advocated by the Paris principles, the bedrock on which the Human Rights Commission is being developed.

We want to name specific groups we would like covered under the membership, in particular groups from a poverty perspective, including groups who work with the unemployed, travellers, people with disabilities, ethnic minorities and so on.

Does the Chairman wish to deal with these points in chronological order or should I go through all the points under this head of the Bill?

Chairman: I will hear all your points under this head of the Bill.

Ms. L. O’Sullivan: We acknowledge the appointment process proposed in the Bill is the traditional method of Government appointment to commissions, but we are concerned that this may be a missed opportunity. The Human Rights Commission is symbolic of a new set of values or new ethos in our society and there is an opportunity to make appointment mechanisms more transparent than heretofore. There has been a public advertisement for commissioners in Northern Ireland. One of the strengths of that approach is that is allows for the formal development of a job specification for a commissioner. It would allow areas of expertise and the areas of interest the commission is looking for in terms of composing its membership to be named. We recommend the development of job specifications for the commissioners and a public advertisement for commissioner posts.

Under head 2 of the Bill, I wish to reiterate a point Mary made about the requirement that commissioner candidates must be drawn from the Judiciary and have other relevant experience. At a minimum, the recruitment and selection process of commissioners should be reflective of a human rights approach and, in particular, employ objective and measurable criteria such as experience and knowledge of human rights issues and the requirement of a track record of human rights promotion and protection. We are a little concerned about 2C, which suggests that other relevant experience is a criteria for membership of the commission. That is a vague term and open to interpretation. As a preference, we would want to set a minimum standard of objective and measurable criteria. We acknowledge the need for strong legal and judicial experience within the commission, but there is also a need to reflect the wider social interests. As the commission is currently proposed, its focus is too narrow. It lacks wider social authority. Its social authority would be enhanced if membership comprised of a wider social base.

On 2.5, we particularly welcome the five year duration of appointments for commissioners. That is a positive development and quite realistic from a planning point of view.

Head 2.9 refers to the gender mix of the commission. We want a stronger gender balance. We stipulate a gender balance of 40 per cent of either gender that is available in other places might be incorporated in the new commission. That gender balance should be extended. A similar approach should be adopted for the commission membership of other social groups. That should be a target set for social groups, naming people living in poverty, the unemployed, travellers, gays and lesbians, older people, people with disabilities, religious minorities and ethnic minorities. That concludes our points on head 2 of the Bill.

Chairman: Has ICCL any comments to make?

Ms S. Ní Chúlacháin: We have some points to make under this head of the Bill, which we consider is particularly important. The members of the Human Rights Commission will make or break it. The powers of the commission are useless unless people appointed to it choose to exercise them. We are particularly concerned that the Bill should be correct on the matter of the members of the Human Rights Commission. It should be comprised of at least nine commissioners, like the Northern Ireland Commission. Under the heads of the Bill, there is a possibility that the number of commissioners could be reduced to four, but such a commission could not possibly be representative of the people. It is important that the commission should be as large as possible.

We are concerned about the proposals in relation to the post of chief commissioner. We reiterate the concerns in that regard expressed by others here. Because of the nature of the pool of candidates suggested, the likelihood of having a chief commissioner who is a woman under the age of 50, disabled or a member of a minority group is very small and unlikely to change in the long term. From that point of view, to limit candidates to members of the superior courts or a person eligible to be a member of them would a mistake. It would be a mistake to draft the Bill with a particular judge in mind because when that judge is no longer there it might be difficult to find another judge to take that position. Under the current schema for the chief commissioner, there is no guarantee that we will get a chief commissioner with a good human rights record. We might get a very good judge, but it is not the same. It is important the chief commissioner, who will have a public face, should have a human rights track record, be associated in the public’s mind with human rights issues and have clout in the human rights community and among public representatives.

Brice Dickson described his commission in the North as a people’s commission and as reaching out to all people who have any idea about how human rights abuses should be tackled and organised. He has travelled around to meet NGOs and community groups. Given the nature of the job, it is difficult to see a member of the superior courts travelling around the country to meet community groups and grassroots activists or going to travellers’ halting sites to meet travellers and deal with their issues. Under the criteria outlined for the post of chief commissioner, Brice Dickson would not qualify and neither would UN Commissioner for Human Rights, Mary Robinson. Given that, the committee should make recommendations in this regard that would be useful and important for the future of the Human Rights Commission. I am not saying that the chief commissioner should not be a member of the superior courts, but the Bill should be worded to enable a lay person be appointed to that post. That should hold not only for the post of chief commissioner but for the general make up of the commission. I consider the commission will be slightly top heavy with lawyers.

We would like the commission to include other members of the NGO factor and to be more representative. Lawyers are an important part of the mechanism and are already involved in implementing and interpreting human rights and bringing them to the attention of the courts. A commission made up of lawyers or its meetings would not be the most exciting we could have. I have already made the point about the numbers being too small.

As regards the appointment of members of the commission, there is talk about appointments being made by the Government. However, that would be restrictive. In South Africa, for example, its commission must be elected by a 75 per cent majority vote in the assembly and the senate under the constitution. We believe that nominations could be voted on by both Houses of the Oireachtas as is done for the Ombudsman. It would introduce public debate - it is important to have publicity about the appointments - and it would limit the risk of the jobs being given or being seen to be given to political cronies. It is important that the commission be seen to be independent. From that point of view, a wider vote that just a Government appointment would be useful.

Ms Maguire: We share the views of our colleagues. We believe that in line with the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission there should be no limit on the numbers of commissioners. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission has to date appointed nine commissioners in addition to the chief commissioner. Given the commission’s wide remit, FLAC believes that such a limitation could impede the commission from fulfilling its obligations effectively.

As regards the appointment of a president, we are also concerned that the present commission will be allocated to a judge of the superior courts or someone qualified to be a judge in those courts. FLAC believes this is unduly restrictive and would exclude many eminently qualified persons. The UN High Commissioner would not qualify under the present provisions. The current makeup of the superior court Judiciary would indirectly discriminate against certain groups - for example, women, disabled persons and ethnic minorities. Furthermore, FLAC is concerned that the Bill does not impose any requirements, such as relevant human rights experience which would be central for such a position.

As regards the commissioners, we agree with our colleagues that there is a bias towards members of the legal profession. A commitment to human rights is not stated as a requirement where candidates qualify by virtue of their experience as barristers or solicitors. We are concerned about that. We also refer to the UN Paris principles which require pluralist representation and suggest inclusion of representatives of a wide spectrum of non-governmental organisations responsible for human rights. To ensure conformity with these minimum standards, the pool from which commissioners are drawn should not be weighted in favour of lawyers.

Our final concern is about appointments. We are concerned that all appointments will be made by the Government. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission’s predecessor, the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, known as SACHR, was the subject of much criticism over the years because it was a Government appointed body. It is essential that the Government follows the lead of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission and operates open procedures in respect of recruitment to the commission. FLAC believes that all appointments should be on the basis of merit. Job specifications should be published and a wide range of candidates sought. FLAC wants a commission which is dynamic, approachable and, above all, transparent. The commission must be accountable and the minutes of meetings and other documents should be open to the public.

Chairman: The legal profession seems to be unpopular.

Deputy Howlin: One of the submissions will impact on the shaping of the legislation because there is agreement on this side for the points made. As regards the presidency of the commission, the functions and skills of a judge will not necessarily be the most appropriate to the president of a human rights commission. Would the delegation agree that there might be a difficulty with a senior judicial person heading up the commission in that the commission might have occasion to take legal action and it would be incongruous for a senior judicial figure to initiate action in the courts? That might not be the best precedent to set. Perhaps the legal minded people might like to comment on that point.

Deputy Higgins (Mayo): I join with Deputy Howlin in welcoming the submissions which are helpful. This type of consultative process is crucial from the point of view of conditioning us in advance of dealing with the legislation. All the submissions are excellent and the delegation can rest assured we will take on board what has been said.

Most of us agree that a minimum of four and a maximum of eight is totally inadequate from the point of view of getting a representative cross-section. We are at a loss to know what type of thinking was behind the drafting of the qualifications, particularly in relation to aptitude training experience. We share the reservations about the absolute imperative that it must be someone with a judicial or legal background. It reminds me of the time I was a member of Mayo County Council when all the senior executive positions from county manager down were dominated by engineers. I do not know what qualifications engineers had which meant they were so multi-skilled they could deal with the most sensitive issues. That is one of the myths which surrounds this type of body.

The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission is in place and Mr. Brice Dickson has been appointed although he does not have legal training. It has not been established long so it may not have confronted the type of situation to which Deputy Howlin referred. Does the delegation see that as a potential problem?

Ms Ní Chualacháin: In the North it was not an option to make a judge the chief commissioner as there would have been a huge outcry. The Irish Government might have managed to stir up the process. The NGO community would have found that a member of the Judiciary would be unacceptable in the North. That is not the problem here.

Deputy Howlin has put his finger on one of the problems which is when the human rights commission instigates legal proceedings on behalf of a complainant or when it brings an amicus curiae brief before the courts there is a question of a potential for bias to be perceived more than anything else because it is unlikely the chief commissioner would represent himself before the courts. It is obvious from Brice Dickson’s appointment that judicial training - he is a professor of law - is not a necessary qualification for the job.

We are glad the committee has also expressed concern about the appointment of members of the Judiciary to the chief commissioner’s post. We would like to see it being open to a larger pool of candidates.

Deputy O’Sullivan: Should the legislation facilitate a broader representation of interests on the commission or should it be more specific - apart from the gender balance which we all agree should be more specific - in terms of the representation of human rights interests and the various organisations referred to by the Combat Poverty Agency?

Ms O’Sullivan: There are advantages to both. Facilitating legislation is a positive mechanism.

Obviously, however, it is open to interpretation. One can have a generous interpretation of it or a narrow, less generous one. The agency does not have a specific view as to whether it should nominate particular categories, but it could certainly nominate particular categories as innovative examples so that there is little doubt about certain groups being named and being visible within the composition of the commission.

Deputy Howlin: That would be to indicate a schedule?

Ms O’Sullivan: Yes.

Deputy Ardagh: I am delighted that the various groups are here to enlighten us all on the issue of human rights and how they see it developing. Looking at this, as a piece of paper it appears to have been prepared by lawyers in that its first function is to examine the legal statutes to see if their human rights sections are set out properly in a manner which respects people’s human rights.

I am thinking about how the former President, Mrs. Robinson, opened the boundaries of the Presidency. Before anything else one has to look at the functions of the help force and what it is supposed to do. Maybe we are putting the cart before the horse. There is much talk about the various bodies, including travellers, single parents, battered spouses, gay and lesbians, whose human rights have traditionally been denied. Is the commission there to work on behalf of people whose human rights are denied or is it there to ensure that the laws of the State reflect good human rights practice, as such? There is a whole question regarding the legislation in toto to see whether to approach the matter from a legal framework or from a personal and practical framework. This appears to be a legal framework by judges for judges. I am delighted to meet the representatives here because their opinions certainly open up our minds about other ideas that are involved.

Ms O’Sullivan: It is a challenge to get the full representation that one might like on a commission because of practical arrangements. Notwithstanding that, one of the options for the legislation might be to consider a form of procedure for consultation with a range of interests so that the legislation itself would set down an obligation or duty upon the commission to undertake consultation with various interest groups on an ongoing basis. While there may not be full representation on a commission there will at least be a formal channel of communication with a commission that is to lay down the legislation. That is another option as well as a requirement around the indicative scheduling or the facilitative approach to the legislation that members may wish to consider.

Ms Lawlor: The starting point should be with people who are fully representative of civil society, rather than specifying certain groups within the legislation. In setting up the commission it will be crucial to establish financial and physical independence from the Government.

Deputy Howlin: As regards the way views might be dealt with, in drafting the Dublin Docklands Development Board, a broad consultative committee was drawn from all local interests. A huge list of virtually anybody who had any input in it was drawn up and categorised into different groups, each of which is required to make nominations. The Minister selects from the nominations. That process might be looked at. I will give some attention to that before Committee Stage.

Chairman: We will now move on to Head 3. I would ask members of the committee to restrict their contributions to questions from now on. If we stray we will never get through it. Does anybody want to raise the matter?

Deputy Howlin: We have the observations in front of us.

Chairman: We will move on to Head 4: functions of a commission.

Deputy J. Higgins (Mayo): Can we briefly ask members where are the omissions or inadequacies in relation to Head 3? This is a crucial section relating to functions.

Chairman: The first group is the Irish Council for Civil Liberties.

Mr. Farrell: After the membership of the commission, that matter is the next most important, along with the definition of human rights. We have a number of concerns about the list of functions which we feel are too restrictive. The idea of a human rights commission has been sponsored by the United Nations in the last 20 or 30 years and has come to the fore, particularly in the last ten years with the Paris principles. The idea is that the human rights commission should try to get countries to live up to the standards of the international human rights conventions and instruments. It should be spelled out at the beginning that one of the chief functions of the commission is to ensure that legislation, law and practice conform to the fundamental principles of human rights as laid down in the international instruments.

The commission should have the power not just to review the adequacy and effectiveness of the law and practice as they stand, but also to draft legislation. That is clearly part of the requirements on the Northern commission under the agreement which says that the Southern commission should have an equivalent remit. By vetting legislation we do not feel it should encroach of the rights of the legislators but that it should be possible for the commission to express views on whether draft legislation is likely to infringe international commitments or, alternatively, how draft legislation could be improved to conform to international commitments. Obviously, it is better to get in at the beginning rather than at the end.

On those lines, for instance, section 41 which states, “to keep under review the adequacy and effectiveness of existing legislation”, we would like to see it say something like “and to promote and ensure the harmonisation of national legislation regulations and practice with the international human rights instruments to which the State is a party and to ensure their implementation”.

We feel that promoting understanding and awareness is a very important part of the commission. Earlier, Deputy Ardagh asked whether the commission will be there to review legislation or to promote people’s rights. We would not see a contradiction there but we would see the commission as having two functions, one of them being education and awareness. The commission would go around the country explaining what human rights are, what people’s entitlements are and how they can access them. That is another reason why we feel so strongly about the membership. It should be one that is capable of outreaching, liaising and interacting with community groups. The education and awareness section is important but we also feel it should stress international standards, not just domestic ones.

The holding of inquiries by the commission is a very important aspect and the Paris principles say it is an essential part of the functions of a human rights commission. The heads say that basically the commission should not hold an inquiry where any other body has a remit. We feel that is very restrictive. For example, the Garda Síochána complaints board deals with individual complaints. Suppose, for instance, there is an allegation that there is conduct by the Garda Síochána towards asylum seekers or non-Europeans that indicates either racism or a lack of sympathy or understanding to the customs of people of different traditions.

That is probably not specific enough for the Garda Síochána Complaints Board but is precisely the type of thing into which the human rights commission should be able to inquire.

Where it says “it shall refer the matter to another authority”, we believe it should say “may refer” because there may be circumstances in which it would be more appropriate to the human rights commission and should not be restricted. Powers to obtain information are very important. The Government criticised the British proposals for the Northern commission as not giving sufficient powers to the commission. We believe it should have those powers. We would be fairly happy with the powers of the Ombudsman with two queries. First, we are not certain whether the Ombudsman has the power to compel the giving of oral evidence, although he has the power to compel the production of documents. We believe it is important the commission should be able to compel people to give evidence under oath if it is holding an inquiry.

Second, the Ombudsman’s inquiries are all held in private. We believe it is important the commission should be able to hold inquiries in public if it wants to. We give the example of the Lawrence inquiry in Britain, although it is a different type of thing. It has a hugely important function in educating the British public about racism. We believe that we could have a similar situation here and a public inquiry would be very important. Those are our views on the functions, and it is important they are clear.

Finally, there has been some discussion on taking legal proceedings. We feel it should be made clear that the commission should be able to assist people in taking cases to the European Court of Human Rights or the UN Human Rights Committee as well as domestic legislation. Those are precisely the bodies which establish human rights - the dimensions of human rights entitlements. If it is not included, it would probably be ruled out in terms of funding. We had the opportunity to speak to the Australia Human Rights commissioner who was in Dublin last week. He gave us a copy of their annual report. A page in that report sets out the functions of the Australian commission which, if circulated, may be useful to Members.

Chairman: We will circulate it. I call on Ms O’Flynn.

Ms O’Flynn: We welcome the functions as outlined, particularly one to five and eight. We welcome in particular function two, the positive commitment to consultation. However, in line with the discussion earlier, we believe there is a need to suggest that NGOs, particularly, those working with groups who experience disadvantage and discrimination need to be named as a specific subset under that heading.

Like the council, we believe promoting understanding and awareness of the importance of human rights is a fundamental prerequisite for meaningful expression and realisation of human rights. We suggest not only a proactive approach, as described by Michael Farrell, but also that it is incorporated into lifelong learning opportunities from early childhood education to adult education in both formal and informal education settings.

We believe a couple of areas could be incorporated into the function. One is a function relating to conciliation and adjudication of complaints and another relating to enforcing decisions. Finally, we felt if the powers were constructed as duties, it might give them more weight.

Chairman: Thank you. I now call on Ms Lawlor from Amnesty.

Ms Lawlor: For us, it all centres on number one. We take as read much of the other matters. As regards keeping under review the adequacy and effectiveness of law and practice in the State relating to the protection of human rights, it is very vague and worrying. We believe very strongly that one of the core functions should be to review existing as well as proposed legislation to ensure, as Michael Farrell said, the provisions are consistent with international human rights standards and to be empowered to recommend legislative changes or amendments where necessary.

Paragraph one is almost like saying it should also monitor and report on compliance with human rights standards. It is very vague. It should be automatic that the commission could review current and proposed legislation and also help formulate legislation when being drafted. That is crucial. Amnesty has worked with many human rights commissions around the world, including in Asia and Africa. It is really important to get the composition and functions right. An Amnesty International mission will visit Northern Ireland and Ireland in early May and will talk to Ministers North and South. If the committee would like an opportunity to meet the delegation, I will arrange it.

Chairman: Thank you. I am sure we will take you up on that.

Deputy Fitzgerald: I refer to the promotion and development of an understanding of human rights in Ireland and the commission’s role in that. Obviously, it will be judged on the range of functions it has and on how well it carries them out. Are there other specific proactive things the commission could do in this area? Despite all the good work for which your organisations have been responsible we have such a long way to go in Ireland in relation to human rights. We are very homophobic and are bad on minority rights and in many areas of women’s rights. In terms of a proactive approach from the commission, do you think the proposals are strong enough to move along that understanding? How can the commission work on this area?

Ms O’Sullivan: As we said already, it is very important and welcome that it is named specifically. It is important for us to do that work, although it is very expensive. The issue of budget, resources and staffing is crucial. We suggested the legislation might look at the formal and informal education sectors as a starting point because when discussing the values and norms of society, education has a key role to play. That is a very important arena and it would be important for the commission to work with curriculum development bodies, like the National Council for Curriculum and Assessment. The Combat Poverty Agency is doing some work with the NCCA currently along with many other agencies.

We must make sure the commission has an outreach role into regional networks. The Combat Poverty Agency has a public education role but given that it is a Dublin based agency, it is quite conscious of how difficult it is for it to do outreach work with regional centres. There are limits on that because of the size of the budget and staff. A lesson from that is the importance of trying to allow the commission to develop regional networks and that they in turn are adequately supported as well as the commission itself. It can only do a limited amount of its own public education work and will have to work with others to have some added value.

Ms Maguire: I would like to talk about the absent powers of which there are two. One was already mentioned and relates to looking at draft legislation. The commission has not been given a specific power to advise on the compatibility of draft legislation on human rights about which we would be concerned. This omission is at odds with the Good Friday Agreement which requires consideration of draft legislation. It is also included in the remit of the Northern Ireland Commission.

It could be argued that commission’s review function under subhead 4.1 implicitly includes a power to consider draft legislation. FLAC believes the experience of SACHR highlights the need to provide specifically for the power to advise on draft legislation. While SACHR had a general power of review, which was exactly as provided under subhead 4.1, its advice was not sought a number of important pieces of draft legislation while it was in operation - most notably, the Criminal Evidence (Northern Ireland) Order, 1998, which curbed the right to silence. There were many other instances including the broadcasting restrictions Bill.

FLAC recommends that subhead 4 of the Bill should be amended to require the Government to automatically refer all draft legislation to the commission with the commission having the discretion to chose which legislation on which to comment.

Furthermore, there should be a duty on the Government to consider the commission’s advice and to respond thereto.

The second power which we believe should be included which is not in the present Bill is the power in relation to the supervision of arrests and detentions under emergency legislation. This power is a function of many of the human rights commissions in the world, including in Sri Lanka and in India. FLAC believes that the inclusion of this power is particularly appropriate in this jurisdiction given the recent enactment of new anti-terrorist legislation. We know that this has not been included in agreements of the Northern commission, but we would submit that there are already a number of safeguards in operation in Northern Ireland to protect detainees which do not feature in this jurisdiction. These include the tape recording of suspects interviews and the appointment of an independent commission for the holding centres. We would be grateful if the committee could take that on board.

Chairman: Are there any other questions or will we move on?

Mr. Farrell: Proposal No. 4.9 refers to the joint committee between the Northern and Southern human rights commissions. We are entirely in favour of it. The point is that it should not be proposal No. 4.9 but a separate section. This, with the membership and the remit of the commission, is the next most important part of it because it provides the opportunity to try to establish throughout the whole island a joint platform of rights which are available on the same level and in the same way throughout the island. It is a most essential part of the programme of national reconciliation and of the settlement. It should not be tucked away here. It should be a section on its own and it should be given great prominence in this Bill.

Chairman: Thank you. I think we would all agree with that.

As there are no submissions on proposals Nos. 5 or 6, we will move on to proposal No. 7?

Mr. Farrell: The Irish Council for Civil Liberties is concerned that the human rights commission must be seen to be absolutely independent. We raised this matter with the human rights unit of the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. We were unhappy with the idea that the funding should come through a particular Department and, of all Departments, that it would come from the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform. With all due respect to the Department, it tends to be the Department about whom the most complaints are made. That is, the Department might say, its job.

The Department states that it is impossible to provide funding without going through a Department. If that is the case, so be it. We would have preferred to see it funded through a different Department, especially a Department which did not have specific responsibilities like the Department of the Taoiseach. Otherwise there will be a fear that if the commission is dependent from year to year for its funding, it will trim its sails in regard to the funding Department.

In addition, irrespective of the Department involved, where it states that there may be paid to the human rights commission a grant of such amount as the relevant Minister, with the consent of the Minister for Finance, may sanction, the Irish Council for Civil Liberties thinks that should state “the Minister, after consultation with the president of the commission”. Otherwise it seems entirely arbitrary that a Minister of a particular Department may decide, in conjunction with the Minister for Finance, how much money the commission receives. A Government, which wanted to cut down the powers of a commission which had annoyed it, could give it the power to do that. If the president of the commission had to be consulted, at least there would be the power then for the president of the commission to complain about it. Some of us may remember years ago there was quite a struggle over the Ombudsman’s office and its funding and the Ombudsman had to campaign more or less publicly to get the funding reinstated.

Chairman: Unfortunately it is a restriction. We all must be accountable, but it is an important one. Are there any other comments on proposal No. 7?

Ms Bhreathnach: To reiterate what the ICCL stated and to reinforce the point, the UN handbook states specifically that, where possible, the source and nature of funding for a national institution should be specified in its founding legislation; and that it would be generally advisable to ensure that the budget of a national institution is not linked to the budget of a governmental department or ministry. Many commissions have been set up on foot of this so its advice should be taken into account.

Chairman: As there are no further questions, are there any questions on proposal No. 8?

Ms Ní Chualacháin: The ICCL has some issues about the chief executive officer. First, the fact that the chief executive officer’s functions are so clearly laid out highlights the fact that the president’s functions are at no time laid out in the Bill. One wonders why-----

Deputy Howlin: Civil servants’ attitudes to administrators as opposed to nominal policymakers.

Ms Ní Chualacháin: Yes. Unfortunately, the chief executive has at least one function which is more than administrative, that is that he or she will be called on to report to Oireachtas committees such as this one. The Irish Council for Civil Liberties would feel it is fine for the chief executive officer to report to Oireachtas committees on financial and administrative detail but that in general reporting to the Oireachtas committees on what the human rights commission has been doing and any other aspect of the commission’s work should be done by the chief commissioner. We would hope that the committee would see fit to include that.

We are also a little concerned about the relationship between the chief executive and the president. How the accountability will work on a day-to-day basis is not clear in the Bill.

Chairman: As there are no further questions on that, are there any on proposal No. 9?

Ms Ní Chualacháin: This is about the appointment of the staff and their remuneration. We are glad that the commission can appoint its own staff and determine their pay and conditions. That is important because obviously the commission will have a good idea of the requirements and necessary qualifications.

The Irish Council for Civil Liberties is a little concern that the relevant Minister, who might be the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, can lay down any directive about terms, conditions, pay and allowance. From the point of view of perceived bias, of independence and of it being there as a threat of potential retribution for an outspoken commission, that should probably be changed certainly to a minimum of having consultation with the president.

Chairman: That relates to proposal No. 11.

Ms Ní Chualacháin: I peg your pardon, Chairman.

Chairman: I just wanted to clarify that in case anybody wanted to go back.

Ms Ní Chualacháin: I am sorry. I jumped ahead.

Chairman: It is all right Please continue.

Ms Ní Chualacháin: I dealt with proposals Nos. 8, 9 and 10 together.

Chairman: Are there any questions?

Deputy Howlin: We need to have the Department of Equality and Law Reform reinstated.

Deputy J. Higgins (Mayo): Is the Irish Council of Civil Liberties happy in relation to proposal 9a. In the performance of duties under this section, the chief executive shall not question or express an opinion on the merits of any policy of the Government or a Minister of the Government or on the merits of the objectives of such policy. Is the ICCL happy enough that the president as distinct from the chief executive can do so?

Ms Ní Chualacháin: As long as the chief commissioner can and does do so.

Chairman: I suppose it comes back to the reason we are getting the chief executive before the committee.

Ms O’Flynn: The Combat Poverty Agency had a question about that and about its potential to limit the independence of the commission.

Chairman: Is that in your submission?

Ms O’Flynn: No. It is only subsequent to seeing the Bill. The Combat Poverty Agency was concerned that it seems contrary to underpinning the commission’s independence and that it may be limiting the strength and effectiveness of the commission as protector and promoter of human rights.

Chairman: There are no other observations and there are no other questions.

Will Mr. Farrell of the ICCL address proposal No. 14?

Mr. Farrell: We regard proposal No. 14 as crucially important because the definition of human rights determines the role of the commission. We are unhappy that the term “human rights” will be taken to mean the human rights guaranteed by the Constitution or embodied in international instruments which have been given the force of law in the State. There are no international human rights instruments which have been given the force of law within the State at present, therefore, that is meaningless. Even if the only such instrument which is currently under discussion, namely, the European Convention on Human Rights - the incorporation of which we strongly support - was incorporated and became law within the State, this would still exclude an entire series of international agreements. I refer to what is know as the “International Bill of Rights”, namely, the Universal Declaration, the UN’s International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Covenant on Economic and Social rights.

Ireland has also signed up to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women. Ireland should have - we advocated that it does so - ratify the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Convention Against Torture. We believe the definition must include all of these matters. As stated earlier, the concept of human rights commissions emanates from UN human rights organisations trying to sell it throughout the world. Human rights commissions have been established in other countries.

A number of international agreements to which we are party, such as the Declaration at the Vienna Conference on Human Rights, 1993, urged the establishment of national human rights commissions in the context of international obligations and the Council of Europe recently reiterated that call. We believe it is essential that this be included in the definition to which the commission works. We believe it should also include the right not to be discriminated against on a series of grounds which forms part of the Employment Equality Act.

We are surprised that the definition has been framed in this way because we understand that the original definition did not refer to international instruments which have been given the force of law within the State. We believe that the original definition allowed the commission to consider all of the conventions.

The Taoiseach made a statement on Human Rights Day, 10 December, in which he said that Ireland would seek not just to follow but to set standards for the world in terms of its human rights commission. We are delighted by that assertion but we believe this definition does not set or follow standards; it is lagging behind them. If it is allowed to stand, it will seriously devalue the work of the commission.

Deputy Howlin: It is extremely important that this point should be addressed. I understand that the Minister has indicated he is open to incorporating the European Convention into the Bill. From the heads we have seen, it appears that the Bill simply establishes the human rights commission and the elements of the Good Friday Agreement which relate to human rights. It seems that the Government operated to a checklist of things it had to achieve in order to comply with the Agreement, rather than dealing with the broader agenda of human rights. I am concerned about the phrase “given the force of law within the State”. I would invite our guests to submit amendments, if not to the committee then to individual Members, on this matter because they will be of use.

The Labour Party recently produced a human rights Bill which stressed the importance not only of writing into our law the European Convention on Human Rights - only Norway, Britain and Ireland have yet to incorporate into national law - but also of incorporating the UN human rights conventions and instruments which we will need if we are to get up to speed, not to mention leading the posse. This is the vehicle we should use to do that. I make no apology for trying to make this model legislation rather than minimalist legislation.

Ms O’Sullivan: With regard to the ICCL’s analysis of the definition in the Bill, in addition, rather than repeating everything Michael said, we are concerned that what is proposed is very delimiting of people’s access to social rights, particularly from an anti-poverty perspective..

Deputy Howlin: It would also affect their economic rights.

Ms O’Sullivan: Yes, it will affect their economic, social and cultural rights. It will also affect their right to an adequate income, to employment, to education, etc. Our submission outlines a number of other areas such as women’s rights and children’s rights and refers to guarantees of not being discriminated against on the basis of various conditions, one of which would be social origin. I reinforce the ICCL’s position by making those additional points.

Mr. Jennings: Amnesty International believes the commission should be clearly mandated to cover the full range of human rights enshrined in international standards, including but not limited to those regional and international treaties to which Ireland is party.

Ms Maguire: We are concerned that human rights will be perceived merely as constitutional rights. The principles surrounding human rights have developed greatly during the past 50 years and Ireland has an opportunity to develop them and incorporate them into national law.

Chairman: On behalf of the committee I thank our guests for their observations which, I assure them, will be taken into consideration. The committee will be urging the Government and the Minister to take the points made into account. We will hopefully be holding the Taoiseach to his promise that Ireland will provide the international community with a good example in this area. I thank our guests for the work they invested in this matter. We appreciate their submitting their various observations.

Ms Ní Chualacháin: When will the next step be taken? Will the committee issue a report?

Chairman: We are going to make that decision now.

The witnesses withdrew.

The Joint Committee entered private session and adjourned at 3.45 p.m.

Appendix 3: The Belfast Agreement, Chapter 6

”Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity

Human Rights

1.The parties affirm their commitment to the mutual respect, the civil rights and the religious liberties of everyone in the community. Against the background of the recent history of communal conflict, the parties affirm in particular:

•the right of free political thought;

•the right to freedom and expression of religion;

•the right to pursue democratically national and political aspirations;

•the right to seek constitutional change by peaceful and legitimate means;

•the right to freely choose one’s place of residence;

•the right to equal opportunity in all social and economic activity, regardless of class, creed, disability, gender or ethnicity;

•the right to freedom from sectarian harassment; and

•the right of women to full and equal political participation.

United Kingdom Legislation

2.The British Government will complete incorporation into Northern Ireland law of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), with direct access to the courts, and remedies for breach of the Convention, including power for the courts to overrule Assembly legislation on grounds of inconsistency.

3.Subject to the outcome of public consultation underway, the British Government intends, as a particular priority, to create a statutory obligation on public authorities in Northern Ireland to carry out all their functions with due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity in relation to religion and political opinion; gender; race; disability; age; marital status; dependants; and sexual orientation. Public bodies would be required to draw up statutory schemes showing how they would implement this obligation. Such schemes would cover arrangements for policy appraisal, including an assessment of impact on relevant categories, public consultation, public access to information and services, monitoring and timetables.

4.The new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission (see paragraph 5 below) will be invited to consult and to advise on the scope for defining, in Westminster legislation, rights supplementary to those in the European Convention on Human Rights, to reflect the particular circumstances of Northern Ireland, drawing as appropriate on international instruments and experience. These additional rights to reflect the principles of mutual respect for the identity and ethos of both communities and parity of esteem, and - taken together with the ECHR - to constitute a Bill of Rights for Northern Ireland. Among the issues for consideration by the Commission will be:

•the formulation of a general obligation on government and public bodies fully to respect, on the basis of equality of treatment, the identity and ethos of both communities in Northern Ireland; and

•a clear formulation of the rights not to be discriminated against and to equality of opportunity in both the public and private sectors.

New Institutions in Northern Ireland

5.A new Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, with membership from Northern Ireland reflecting the community balance, will be established by Westminster legislation, independent of Government, with an extended and enhanced role beyond that currently exercised by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, to include keeping under review the adequacy and effectiveness of laws and practices, making recommendations to Government as necessary; providing information and promoting awareness of human rights; considering draft legislation referred to them by the new Assembly; and, in appropriate cases, bringing court proceedings or providing assistance to individuals doing so.

6.Subject to the outcome of public consultation currently underway, the British Government intends a new statutory Equality Commission to replace the Fair Employment Commission, the Equal Opportunities Commission (NI), the Commission for Racial Equality (NI) and the Disability Council. Such a unified Commission will advise on, validate and monitor the statutory obligation and will investigate complaints of default.

7.It would be open to a new Northern Ireland Assembly to consider bringing together its responsibilities for these matters into a dedicated Department of Equality.

8.These improvements will build on existing protections in Westminster legislation in respect of the judiciary, the system of justice and policing.

Comparable Steps by the Irish Government

9.The Irish Government will also take steps to further strengthen the protection of human rights in its jurisdiction. The Government will, taking account of the work of the All-Party Oireachtas Committee on the Constitution and the Report of the Constitution Review Group, bring forward measures to strengthen and underpin the constitutional protection of human rights. These proposals will draw on the European Convention on Human Rights and other international legal instruments in the field of human rights and the question of the incorporation of the ECHR will be further examined in this context. The measures brought forward would ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights as will pertain in Northern Ireland. In addition, the Irish Government will:

•establish a Human Rights Commission with a mandate and remit equivalent to that within Northern Ireland;

•proceed with arrangements as quickly as possible to ratify the Council of Europe Framework Convention on National Minorities (already ratified by the UK);

•implement enhanced employment equality legislation;

•introduce equal status legislation; and

•continue to take further active steps to demonstrate its respect for the different traditions in the island of Ireland.

A Joint Committee

10.It is envisaged that there would be a joint committee of representatives of the two Human Rights Commissions, North and South, as a forum for consideration of human rights issues in the island of Ireland. The joint committee will consider, among other matters, the possibility of establishing a charter, open to signature by all democratic political parties, reflecting and endorsing agreed measures for the protection of the fundamental rights of everyone living in the island of Ireland.”

Appendix 4: Provisions of the Northern Ireland Act, 1998, which relate to the Appointment of a Human Rights Commission

Extract from Northern Ireland Act 1998

1998 Chapter 47

© Crown Copyright 1998

The text following was obtained from the Internet version of the Act⁵ prepared to reflect the text as it received Royal Assent. The authoritative version is in printed form and is published by The Stationery Office Limited as the Northern Ireland Act 1998, ISBN 0 10 544798 6, £11.00 sterling.

PART VII

HUMAN RIGHTS AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES

Human rights

SCHEDULE 7

The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission

Introductory

1.In this Schedule “the Commission” means the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.

Commissioners’ tenure

2.- (1) Subject to the provisions of this Schedule, a Commissioner shall hold office in accordance with the terms of his appointment.

(2)A Commissioner shall not be appointed-

(a)in the case of the Chief Commissioner, for more than five years at a time; and

(b)in any other case, for more than three years at a time.

(3)A person may resign as a Commissioner or as Chief Commissioner by notice in writing to the Secretary of State.

(4)The Secretary of State may dismiss a person from his office as Commissioner or Chief Commissioner if satisfied-

(a)that he has without reasonable excuse failed to discharge his functions for a continuous period of three months beginning not earlier than six months before the day of dismissal;

(b)that he has been convicted of a criminal offence;

(c)that a bankruptcy order has been made against him, or his estate has been sequestrated, or he has made a composition or arrangement with, or granted a trust deed for, his creditors; or

(d)that he is unable or unfit to carry out his functions.

Commissioners’ salary etc.

3.- (1) The Commission shall pay to or in respect of Commissioners-

(a)remuneration;

(b)allowances and fees; and

(c)sums for the provision of pensions,

in accordance with directions of the Secretary of State. (2) Where a person who by reference to any office or employment is a participant in a scheme under section 1 of the Superannuation Act 1972 becomes a Commissioner or the Chief Commissioner, the Minister for the Civil Service may, notwithstanding any provision made under sub-paragraph (1)(c), determine that the person’s service as Commissioner or Chief Commissioner shall be treated for the purposes of the scheme as service in that office or employment.

Staff

4.- (1) The Commission may employ staff subject to the approval of the Secretary of State as to numbers and as to remuneration and other terms and conditions of employment.

(2)Employment with the Commission shall be included among the kinds of employment to which a superannuation scheme under section 1 of the Superannuation Act 1972 can apply, and accordingly in Schedule 1 to that Act (in which those kinds of employment are listed) after “Commission for Racial Equality” insert- “Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission”

(3)The Commission shall pay to the Minister for the Civil Service, at such times as he may direct, such sums as he may determine in respect of any increase attributable to sub-paragraph (2) in the sums payable out of money provided by Parliament under the Superannuation Act 1972.

Annual report

5.- (1) The Commission shall, as soon as reasonably practicable after the end of each year, make a report to the Secretary of State on the performance of its functions during the year.

(2)The Secretary of State shall lay a copy of the report before each House of Parliament.

Money

6.The Secretary of State may make grants to the Commission out of money provided by Parliament.

7.- (1) The Commission shall keep proper accounts and financial records.

(2)The Commission shall-

(a)prepare a statement of accounts in respect of each financial year containing such information, and in such form, as the Secretary of State with the consent of the Treasury directs; and

(b)send a copy to the Secretary of State and to the Comptroller and Auditor General within such period after the end of the financial year as the Secretary of State directs.

(3)The Comptroller and Auditor General shall-

(a)examine, certify and report on the statement of accounts; and

(b)lay a copy of the statement of accounts and of his report before each House of Parliament.

(4)For the purposes of this paragraph-

(a)a financial year is a period of twelve months ending on 31st March; but

(b)the first financial year is the period beginning with the day on which section 68 comes into force and ending with the first 31st March which falls at least six months after that day.

Procedure

8.- (1) In determining its own procedure the Commission may, in particular, make provision about-

(a)the discharge of its functions by committees (which may include persons who are not Commissioners);

(b)a quorum for meetings of the Commission or a committee.

(2)The validity of any proceedings of the Commission or a committee shall not be affected by-

(a)a vacancy in the office of Chief Commissioner; or

(b)a defect in the appointment of a Commissioner.

Disqualification

9.In Part III of Schedule 1 to the House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975 (other disqualifying offices) at the appropriate place insert- “Northern Ireland Human Rights Commissioner”.

10.In Part III of Schedule 1 to the Northern Ireland Assembly Disqualification Act 1975 (other disqualifying offices) at the appropriate place insert- “Northern Ireland Human Rights Commissioner”.

Status

11.The Commission shall not be regarded as the servant or agent of the Crown or as enjoying any status, immunity or privilege of the Crown; and property of the Commission shall not be regarded as property of, or held on behalf of, the Crown.

Appendix 5: The_Paris Principles_

Competence and responsibilities

A national institution shall be vested with competence to promote and protect human rights.

A national institution shall be given as broad a mandate as possible, which shall be clearly set forth in a constitutional or legislative text, specifying its composition and its sphere of competence.

A national institution shall, inter alia, have the following responsibilities:

▸To submit to the Government, Parliament and any other competent body, on an advisory basis either at the request of the authorities concerned or through the exercise of its power to hear a matter without higher referral, opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports on any matters concerning the promotion and protection of human rights; the national institution may decide to publicize them; these opinions, recommendations, proposals and reports, as well as any prerogative of the national institution, shall relate to the following areas:

•Any legislative or administrative provisions, as well as provisions relating to judicial organizations, intended to preserve and extend the protection of human rights; in that connection, the national institution shall examine the legislation and administrative provisions in force, as well as bills and proposals, and shall make such recommendations as it deems appropriate in order to ensure that these provisions conform to the fundamental principles of human rights; it shall, if necessary, recommend the adoption of new legislation, the amendment of legislation in force and the adoption or amendment of administrative measures;

•Any situation of violation of human rights which it decides to take up;

•The preparation of reports on the national situation with regard to human rights in general, and on more specific matters;

•Drawing the attention of the Government to situations in any part of the country where human rights are violated and making proposals to it for initiatives to put an end to such situations and, where necessary, expressing an opinion on the positions and reactions of the Government;

▸To promote and ensure the harmonization of national legislation regulations and practices with the international human rights instruments to which the State is a party, and their effective implementation;

▸To encourage ratification of the above mentioned instruments or accession to those instruments, and to ensure their implementation;

▸To contribute to the reports which States are required to submit to United Nations bodies and committees, and to regional institutions, pursuant to their treaty obligations and, where necessary, to express an opinion on the subject, with due respect for their independence;

▸To cooperate with the United Nations and any other organization in the United Nations system, the regional institutions and the national institutions of other countries that are competent in the areas of the promotion and protection of human rights;

▸To assist in the formulation of programmes for the teaching of, and research into, human rights and to take part in their execution in schools, universities and professional circles;

▸To publicize human rights and efforts to combat all forms of discrimination, in particular racial discrimination, by increasing public awareness, especially through information and education and by making use of all press organs.

Composition and guarantees of independence and pluralism

The composition of the national institution and the appointment of its members, whether by means of an election or otherwise, shall be established in accordance with a procedure which affords all necessary guarantees to ensure the pluralist representation of the social forces (of civilian society) involved in the promotion and protection of human rights, particularly by powers which will enable effective cooperation to be established with, or through the presence of, representatives of:

▸Non governmental organizations responsible for human rights and efforts to combat racial discrimination, trade unions, concerned social and professional organizations, for example, associations of lawyers, doctors, journalists and eminent scientists;

▸Trends in philosophical or religious thought;

▸Universities and qualified experts;

▸Parliament;

▸Government departments (if these are included, their representatives should participate in the deliberations only in an advisory capacity).

The national institution shall have an infrastructure which is suited to the smooth conduct of its activities, in particular adequate funding. The purpose of this funding should be to enable it to have its own staff and premises, in order to be independent of the Government and not be subject to financial control which might affect its independence.

In order to ensure a stable mandate for the members of the national institution, without which there can be no real independence, their appointment shall be effected by an official act which shall establish the specific duration of the mandate. This mandate may be renewable, provided that the pluralism of the institution s membership is ensured.

Methods of operation

Within the framework of its operation, the national institution shall:

▸Freely consider any questions falling within its competence, whether they are submitted by the Government or taken up by it without referral to a higher authority, on the proposal of its members or of any petitioner;

▸Hear any person and obtain any information and any documents necessary for assessing situations falling within its competence;

▸Address public opinion directly or through any press organ, particularly in order to publicize its opinions and recommendations;

▸Meet on a regular basis and whenever necessary in the presence of all its members after they have been duly convened;

▸Establish working groups from among its members as necessary, and set up local or regional sections to assist it in discharging its functions;

▸Maintain consultation with the other bodies, whether jurisdictional or otherwise, responsible for the promotion and protection of human rights (in particular ombudsmen, mediators and similar institutions);

▸In view of the fundamental role played by the non governmental organizations in expanding the work of the national institutions, develop relations with the non governmental organizations devoted to promoting and protecting human rights, to economic and social development, to combatting racism, to protecting particularly vulnerable groups (especially children, migrant workers, refugees, physically and mentally disabled persons) or to specialized areas.

Additional principles concerning the status of commissions with quasi jurisdictional competence

A national institution may be authorized to hear and consider complaints and petitions concerning individual situations. Cases may be brought before it by individuals, their representatives, third parties, non governmental organizations, associations of trade unions or any other representative organizations. In such circumstances, and without prejudice to the principles stated above concerning the other powers of the commissions, the functions entrusted to them may be based on the following principles:

▸Seeking an amicable settlement through conciliation or, within the limits prescribed by the law, through binding decisions or, where necessary, on the basis of confidentiality;

▸Informing the party who filed the petition of his rights, in particular the remedies available to him, and promoting his access to them;

▸Hearing any complaints or petitions or transmitting them to any other competent authority within the limits prescribed by the law;

▸Making recommendations to the competent authorities, especially by proposing amendments or reforms of the laws, regulations and administrative practices, especially if they have created the difficulties encountered by the persons filing the petitions in order to assert their rights.

APPENDIX 6: MEMORANDUM ENTITLED Human Rights Commission Bill - definition of human rights and the related question of incorporation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) into Irish law

The Good Friday Agreement

1.In the area of Rights, Safeguards and Equality of Opportunity, the Good Friday Agreement obliges the Irish Government, inter alia, (a) to establish a Human Rights Commission in the State with a mandate and remit equivalent to the NI Commission and (b) to take steps to further strengthen the protection of human rights in its jurisdiction. Specifically, in this latter connection, the Government, taking account of the work of the All Party Committee on the Constitution and the 1996 Report of the Constitution Review Group, is to bring forward measures to strengthen and underpin the constitutional protection of human rights. The proposals in this regard are to draw on the ECHR and other international legal instruments in the field of human rights, and the question of incorporation of the ECHR is to be further examined in this context. The measures to be brought forward are to ensure at least an equivalent level of protection of human rights in the State as will pertain in Northern Ireland.

Relevance to the work of the proposed Human Rights Commission

2.The definition of the term ‘human rights’ is relevant to the role/remit of the new Human Rights Commission to be established in the State under the Agreement. The 1995 UN Handbook on the Strengthening of National Institutions for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights recommends that such a body will possess clearly defined subject matter jurisdiction.

It states that an institution may, for example, be restricted to discharging its functions only insofar as activities can be related to rights protected in a Constitution, or it may have a broad remit and have its legislative basis in international human rights instruments to which the State concerned is a party.

3.On one view, therefore the Commission could be allowed to take into account the provisions of not only of the ECHR but also the other well recognised international human rights norms to which Ireland is a party e.g. the European Convention on Human Rights and relevant UN International Covenants. However, there is a difficulty with this approach as none of those instruments actually form part of Irish domestic law as the Oireachtas has not yet determined that they should be incorporated into Irish law in accordance with the provisions of Article 29.6 of the Constitution. Rights which may flow from them are thus neither cognisable nor justiciable before Irish Courts at present. That position may, of course change in the light of the Government’s commitment in the Agreement to examine that particular matter.

Matters to be considered

4.In the meantime, it may be argued that precisely because the ECHR is not part of Irish law, it would be wrong to give the Commission a wide role in identifying rights under its provisions. Such a role might also be said to conflict with that given to the Attorney General under the Constitution as the vindicator of fundamental / human rights under the Constitution and his role as adviser to the Government on the compatibility of legislation (including draft legislation) with both the Constitution and international human rights obligations.

5.On the other hand, it may be countered that such a wide remit should properly be given to the Commission in the light of best practice in this area as laid down in the 1993 UN Paris Principles on National Human Rights Institutions and as followed in other jurisdictions. Furthermore, it was the view of most members of the Constitution Review Group in its 1996 Report that notwithstanding the many benefits and advantages of the Constitution’s provisions on human/fundamental rights, there was nevertheless a need for an ongoing review in order to keep abreast of social change, international developments and advances in the understanding of human rights matters and that a Human Rights Commission should be responsible for such work.

Related issues

6.Insofar as other related international instruments in the area of human rights are concerned, action is being taken to enable the State to give effect to their provisions. The method by which this is being achieved is not through incorporation of the provisions of the instruments into domestic law. In some cases the provisions of the Convention / Agreement do not require any changes in law or practice. In other cases new legislation or amending legislation may be necessary to ensure that Irish law correctly reflects the obligations in the particular instrument before it is ratified or existing reservations lifted.

7.Instruments which are relevant in this regard are the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (which has now been signed and ratified); the UN Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ( which will be adopted when the relevant Bill is enacted by the Oireachtas); and two UN Conventions on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.

APPENDIX 7: ORDERS OF REFERENCE OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE

Order of Dáil Éireann of 13 November, 1997, as amended by an order of Dáil Éireann of 28 April, 1998 :—

(1) (a)That a Select Committee, which shall be called the Select Committee on Justice, Equality and Women’s Rights, consisting of 14 members of Dáil Éireann (of whom 4 shall constitute a quorum), be appointed to consider such—

(i)Bills the statute law in respect of which is dealt with by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Department of Defence, and

(ii)Estimates for Public Services within the aegis of those Departments,

as shall be referred to it by Dáil Éireann from time to time.

(b)For the purpose of its consideration of Bills under paragraph (1)(a)(i), the Select Committee shall have the powers defined in Standing Order 78A(1), (2) and (3).

(c)For the avoidance of doubt, by virtue of their ex officio membership of the Select Committee in accordance with Standing Order 84(1), the Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Minister for Defence (or a Minister or Minister of State nominated in their stead) shall be entitled to vote.

(2) (a)The Select Committee shall be joined with a Select Committee to be appointed by Seanad Éireann to form the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality and Women’s Rights to consider—

(i)such public affairs administered by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Department of Defence as it may select, including bodies under the aegis of those Departments in respect of Government policy,

(ii)such matters of policy for which the Ministers in charge of those Departments are officially responsible as it may select,

(iii)the strategy statement laid before each House of the Oireachtas by the Ministers in charge of those Departments pursuant to section 5(2) of the Public Service Management Act, 1997, and shall be authorised for the purposes of section 10 of that Act,

(iv)⁶such Annual Reports or Annual Reports and Accounts, required by law and laid before either or both Houses of the Oireachtas, of bodies under the aegis of the Department(s) specified in paragraph 2(a)(i), and the overall operational results, statements of strategy and corporate plans of these bodies, as it may select.

Provided that the Joint Committee shall not, at any time, consider any matter relating to such a body which is, which has been, or which is, at that time, proposed to be considered by the Committee of Public Accounts pursuant to the Orders of Reference of that Committee and/or the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act, 1993.

Provided further that the Joint Committee shall refrain from inquiring into in public session, or publishing confidential information regarding, any such matter if so requested either by the body or by the Minister in charge of that Department; and

(v)such matters relating to women’s rights generally, as it may select, and in this regard the Joint Committee shall be free to consider areas relating to any Government Department, and

(vi)such other matters as may be jointly referred to it from time to time by both Houses of the Oireachtas,

and shall report thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas.

(b)The quorum of the Joint Committee shall be 5, of whom at least 1 shall be a member of Dáil Éireann and 1 a member of Seanad Éireann.

(c)The Joint Committee shall have the powers defined in Standing Order 78A(1) to (9) inclusive.

(3)The Chairman of the Joint Committee, who shall be a member of Dáil Éireann, shall also be Chairman of the Select Committee.

Order of Seanad Éireann of 19 November, 1997, as amended by an order of Seanad Éireann of 30 April, 1998 :—

(1) (a)That a Select Committee consisting of 5 members of Seanad Éireann shall be appointed to be joined with a Select Committee of Dáil Éireann to form the Joint Committee on Justice, Equality and Women’s Rights to consider—

(i)such public affairs administered by the Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform and the Department of Defence as it may select, including bodies under the aegis of those Departments in respect of Government policy,

(ii)such matters of policy for which the Ministers in charge of those Departments are officially responsible as it may select,

(iii)the strategy statement laid before each House of the Oireachtas by the Ministers in charge of those Departments pursuant to section 5(2) of the Public Service Management Act, 1997, and shall be authorised for the purposes of section 10 of that Act,

(iv)⁷such Annual Reports or Annual Reports and Accounts, required by law and laid before either or both Houses of the Oireachtas, of bodies under the aegis of the Department(s) specified in paragraph 2(a)(i), and the overall operational results, statements of strategy and corporate plans of these bodies, as it may select.

Provided that the Joint Committee shall not, at any time, consider any matter relating to such a body which is, which has been, or which is, at that time, proposed to be considered by the Committee of Public Accounts pursuant to the Orders of Reference of that Committee and/or the Comptroller and Auditor General (Amendment) Act, 1993.

Provided further that the Joint Committee shall refrain from inquiring into in public session, or publishing confidential information regarding, any such matter if so requested either by the body or by the Minister in charge of that Department; and

(v)such matters relating to women’s rights generally, as it may select, and in this regard the Joint Committee shall be free to consider areas relating to any Government Department, and

(vi)such other matters as may be jointly referred to it from time to time by both Houses of the Oireachtas,

and shall report thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas,

(b)The quorum of the Joint Committee shall be 5, of whom at least 1 shall be a member of Dáil Éireann and 1 a member of Seanad Éireann.

(c)The Joint Committee shall have the powers defined in Standing Order 62A(1) to (9) inclusive.

(2)The Chairman of the Joint Committee shall be a member of Dáil Éireann.

¹ The Paris Principles were adopted by the United Nations (UN) as an annex to General Assembly resolution 48/134 of 20 December 1993.

² Professor Dickson, Head of Legal Studies at the University of Ulster , is Chief Commissioner of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission.

³ Section headed Conduct of investigations.

⁴ See Appendix 6.

⁵ http://www.legislation.hmso.gov.uk/acts/acts1998/19980047.htm

⁶ Paragraph inserted by order of the Dáil of 28 April, 1998

⁷ Paragraph inserted by order of the Seanad of 30 April, 1998