Committee Reports > List of Committees > Joint > 1998 > Committee on European Affairs > Report - EU Institutional Reform in the context of Enlargement

TITHE AN OIREACHTAIS

An Comhchoiste um Ghnóthaí Eorpacha

Athchóiriú Institiúideach an AE i gcomhthéacs an Mhéadaithe

HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS

Joint Committee on European Affairs

EU Institutional Reform in the context of Enlargement

October, 1998

TITHE AN OIREACHTAIS

An Comhchoiste um Ghnóthaí Eorpacha

Athchóiriú Institiúideach an AE i gcomhthéacs an Mhéadaithe

HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS

Joint Committee on European Affairs

EU Institutional Reform in the context of Enlargement

October, 1998

CONTENTS

1.The Joint Committee of European Affairs considered the question of institutional reform of EU institutions in the context of enlargement at its meetings on 30 September, 1998 and 14 and 28 October, 1998.

2.The Joint Committee had already noted the outcome of the informal meeting of Chairmen of European Affairs Committees held at the Belgian Parliament, Brussels on 5 July, 1998 and examined subsequent correspondence received from the Chairman of the meeting, Mr. Mark Eyskens, former Prime Minister, Member of the House of Representatives of Belgium.

3.The Chairman reported to the Joint Committee on the discussions which had taken place at the meeting of the Institutional Affairs Committee of the European Parliament on 21 and 28 September, 1998 at which national parliaments’ European Affairs Committees had been invited to participate.

4.The Joint Committee has noted the Protocol on the Institutions with the Prospect of Enlargement of the European Union to the Treaty of Amsterdam and its provisions:

(i)with regard to modification of the voting system in the Council before the next enlargement;

(ii)the related (conditional) possibility of each state nominating only one Commissioner;

(iii)the convening, at least one year before EU membership exceeds 20, of an Inter-Governmental Conference to carry out a comprehensive review of the composition and functioning of the institutions (of the EU).

5.The Joint Committee also notes the declaration by Belgium, France and Italy annexed to the Final Act of the Treaty and those countries’ view that the strengthening of institutions is an “indispensable condition” of enlargement. The view of these States on this sensitive issue has been reaffirmed at parliamentary level, with the Chairmen of the respective European Affairs Committees organising informal meetings of their counterparts in other EU States to discuss the issue. The most recent of such meetings is referred to in paragraph 2. above. The next one will be held in Rome in early November. A similar view was also articulated by some of our interlocutors in the course of a visit by the Oireachtas Joint Committee to some of the applicant countries in central and eastern Europe in early July of this year.

6.The Joint Committee is of the view that it is premature to look beyond the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty on institutional matters even before the Treaty has been ratified. In light of this, at its meeting of 30 September, 1998 the Joint Committee agreed that the Chairman should reply to the letter of 10 September, 1998 from Mr. Eyskens. In that letter the Chairman pointed out that EU institutional affairs are a nexus of complex questions concerning the role of an existing and enlarged Union in the world, relationships between EU institutions, the functioning of those institutions and their relationship to the European citizen. These issues were examined in the course of the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty which subsequently contained provisions on such relevant areas as external relations, institutions including the European Parliament and national parliaments, subsidiarity, transparency and quality of legislation. It should be noted that Ireland was entirely satisfied with the outcome of the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations and the balances contained in its provisions in relation to institutional matters. Ireland would wish to see the ratification and entry into force of the Treaty at the earliest possible date in order to permit the benefit of its provisions in this area to be fully realised.

7.Because of the importance of the issue of institutional reform in the context of enlargement, the Joint Committee considers that this is a matter which should be brought to the attention of the Houses of the Oireachtas. The Joint Committee wishes to state clearly that Ireland’s very firm position on Commission reform must remain. The Joint Committee considers that we must insist on nominating a full member given our belief that the institution must be broadly balanced as well as sensitive to national concerns in a Member State and acceptable to public opinion.

8.The current debate on institutional reforms leads the Joint Committee to reflect on the unrealised potential of COSAC. The Joint Committee is of the view that COSAC, which is the formal structure for bringing the European Affairs Committees of the member States together once in the course of each Presidency, could develop its potential. If COSAC had the flexibility, not enshrined in its current rules, to hold special meetings, over and above its regular six monthly sessions, to deal with important and urgent issues as they arose, this would obviate the need for individual countries to have to organise ad hoc meetings on their own initiative.

9.The Joint Committee recommends to both Houses that debates on this report should be held as soon as possible in order to allow all members to make known their views to the Government on the question of institutional reform.

____________________

Bernard J. Durkan, T.D.

Chairman

October 1998

AN COMHCHOISTE UM GHNÓTHAÍ EORPACHA

JOINT COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Imeachtaí An Chomhchoiste

Proceedings of the Joint Committee

Dé Céadaoin, 28 Deireadh Fómhair, 1998

Wednesday, 28th October, 1998

1.The Committee met at 2.09 p.m.

2.Members Present:

The following Members were present:

Deputies Seán Barrett, Ulick Burke, Pat Carey, Michael Collins, Bernard J. Durkan (in the Chair), Tony Gregory, Séamus Kirk, John McGuinness, Gay Mitchell, Seán Power and Jack Wall and Senators Camillis Glynn (in substitution for Senator Paddy McGowan), Helen Keogh and Don Lydon. Senator Rory Kiely also attended.

3.Report on EU Institutional Reform In The Context of Enlargement.

The Chairman brought forward a report on “EU Institutional Reform in the context of Enlargement” which was read and agreed.

Ordered: To report accordingly.

4.Adjournment.

The Committee adjourned at 4.00 p.m. until 10.30 a.m. on Friday, 30th October, 1998.

Appendix I

Advisory committee on European Affairs

INFORMAL MEETING OF THE CHAIRPERSONS OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COMMITTEES ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

BRUSSELS, 6 JULY 1998

CONCLUSIONS

1.None of the participants at the informal consultation of 6 July 1998 is in any way mandated by his own parliament, parliamentary committee or government. They gathered due to an individual preparedness to work together of the members of parliament. All participants - coming together in a sort of ad hoc discussion committee - were convinced of the necessity for institutional reforms, in the spirit of the protocol provided by the Treaty of Amsterdam, that will be approved by the 15 parliaments. The participants are however of the opinion that the reform of the European institutions is very urgent and that it is most desirable to involve the parliaments of the 15 member states, so as to avoid a dangerous defcit of democracy and increasing distrust of the political process by public opinion.

2.Besides, according to the present European treaties, the national parliaments still maintain a large judicial authority concerning intergovernmental matters and therefore remain an essential link in the European decision-making process. In the case of community matters it is of the utmost importance that the national parliaments - together with the European Parliament - should put pressure on the European Council and the authorised European Councils of Ministers in order to urge the policy responsibilities to include reforms, with a view to more suitability for the purpose, partnership and democratic transparency within the EU. In addition to all this, there remains the beginnings of setting the trend towards subsidiarity, which implies that only the matters that exceptionally cannot be handled by the individual member states are raised to the European level.

3.The responsibilities of the parliaments have also to do with the lack of any other efficient alternative. Normally,

1)if the 15 parliaments take absolutely no initiative on the subject of institutional reforms of the EU, then these reforms will sooner or later be settled intergovemmentally, without any parliamentary involvement, by the Ministers in the European Councils.

2)if each of the 15 governments approves a separate resolution off their own bat and with differing concepts, positions and proposals, the Ministers in the European Councils, in consequent incoherence, will place these different positions next to one another with no follow-through.

3)the valuable and useful alternative is therefore to develop a maximal synergy between the 15 parliaments and the European Parliament This partnership must lead to harmonised visions on institutional reforms, which does not necessarily mean that these visions will be linked together equally. The striving for harmony and convergence does not yet mean making everything uniform.

4.There is no danger that the initiative of our inter-parliamentary discussion committee will delay the approval of the Treaty of Amsterdam in the respective parliaments. In almost all parliaments it is being underlined that institutional reforms are necessary. The governments have also indicated initiatives. Belgium, Italy and France have taken steps in this connection (the so-called BIF initiative) and under the Austrian chairmanship of the EU, informal and formal meetings will be devoted to this subject.

5.Finally, it must be emphasised that the informal inter- parliamentary discussion committee is no alternative to the more all-embracing operations of the COSAC. Our committee has a specific task (institutional reforms), which is limited in time.

6.The discussion held on 6 July 1998 in Brussels, has led to the following concrete proposal.

1.All participants of the discussions of 6 July are to receive a condensed report of the assembly as quickly as possible.

2.A message is being formulated, which following the advice of the participants, will be made known to the members of governments who will be participating in the informal discussions under Austrian chairmanship (24 and 25 October 1998). This message - with references to a number of initiatives - will contain an `appeal’ in which the governments will be called upon to take up their responsibilities.

3.An informal editorial committee - e.g. consisting of participants from the BIF countries, of the “troika countries” and of the European Parliament will make an attempt to formulate ideas - possibly with alternatives - about a number of concrete institutional reforms.

These will take as their starting point the so-called Amsterdam Triangle i.e.

1.The extension of the qualified majority

2.the re-weighting of the votes in the European Council of Ministers and/or bringing in a double majority and finally

3)the composition of the European Commission. The suggestions will be provided in written form to all participants, so they can state their reactions. Also, if the positions taken do not appear to coincide, it is important for the governments to be aware of which positions are being developed in the 15 parliaments and where the margins are drawn in order to come to a consensus. The process will be carried out in writing as much as possible.

4.In a later phase, and insofar as our informal discussion committee displays solidarity and suitability for the purpose, it could be considered whether to deliberate and discuss more fundamental reforms, to do with for example :

-the common foreign and security policy

-the third pillar (police, justice, immigration)

-a possible evolution towards a European 2-chamber system

-the institutionalised partnership between the 15 parliaments and the synergy with the European Parliament.

-European integration on the basis of subsidiarity and its application.

The conclusions of chairman Mark Eyskens are approved by the meeting, which broke up at 4.30 pm. A new gathering will certainly be held in the Autumn.

The Chairman,

Mark EYSKENS

Member of the House

Member of the Advisory Committee on European affairs

Former Prime Minister of Belgium

COURTESY TRANSLATION

ROYAUME DE BELGIQUE

ASSEMBLEES LEGISLATlVES NATIONALES

Brussels, September 10th, 1998

Mister President and Dear Colleague,

Concerns : follow up of !he informal meeting of the Presidents of the parliamentary committees on European affairs - Brussels, 6 July, 1998

During the meeting on July 6th, 1998 at the House of Representatives of Belgium, it was agreed that an “appeal” would be transmitted to the informal Council organised by the Austrian presidency on October 24th and 25th, 1998.

This special Summit on the future of Europe shall be devoted to the institutional aspects of the European Union.

Further to the informal meeting of July 6th, 1998, which I chaired, I have drawn up the enclosed draft appeal on the basis of the general reflexion note I sent to you on August 14th, 1998. It goes without saying that the Chairman of each committee on European affairs has the right to handle this document according to the internal provisions of his assembly.

In order to respect the autonomy of the parliamentary assemblies, we propose that they transmit this document, if they decide to do so, to the above mentioned Council via their own government.

Mark EYSKENS

Former Prime Minister

Member of the House of representatives

To the Presidents of the Committees on European affairs

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

Appeal to the Heads of State and government from members of Parliaments of the EU member states and the European Parliament

The vital and urgent institutional reform of the European Union

Without an urgent and thorough institutional reform, the danger is real that the European decision making will come to a standstill at a time when European Union leaders are facing most important and complex challenges.

As the twentieth century draws to a close the European Union is facing a challenge that is without precedent and without equal: to bring all the states of Europe together in a European integration project. The countries of Europe are linked by commonly shared values of democracy, freedom, social justice and human rights, which are deeply engrained in their cultural histories and identities. The end of the Cold War brought about a favourable structural breakthrough in the otherwise tragic chapter of European history that this century will be known for. European unification, gradually extending to a Union of 25 to 30 member states, will bring with it a radical change to the concept, objectives, structures and operation of the original European Community, the foundations of which were laid fifty years ago after the Second World War.

Doubling the number of member states of the Union in the next few decades is an exceptional challenge that also includes risks regarding our ability to maintain a cohesive European integration project. However, history shows that risks have to be taken if opportunities are to be seized.

Nevertheless the risks must be calculated and the potential obstacles correctly assessed in order to overcome them. In so doing, one inescapable issue is brought to light: the reform of the EU institutions in the light of the coming enlargement in order to create more effectiveness, more democracy, and more involvement of the people.

The danger is very real that the entry of new member states without a thorough institutional reform will lead to a dilution of the Union, an erosion of the benefits of the community, increasing administrative complexity and inefficiency, and a growing lack of credibility among public opinion in the European member states. The EU would then deteriorate into an extensive free trade zone, with the ambition to complete a cohesive European political project abandoned, at least implicitly.

In this scenario of enlargement without institutional reform it is clear that the countries that join European economic and monetary union (EMU) could encounter considerable problems. The most probable development would consist of the EMU states forming an increasingly separated block within a large diluted Union. Thus a two or three speed Europe would then be institutionalised without the prospect of a close union of all democratic countries in Europe. The dream contained in the Treaty of Rome, to achieve “an increasingly closer union between the peoples of Europe” would then have passed us by.

Without institutional reform an efficient common foreign and security policy (CFSP = second pillar), including the gradual integration of the WEU into European structures, would be impossible. The same applies with respect to the third pillar for police and judicial matters.

In the meantime the complexity and opacity (the workability of integrated co-operation, the 3 pillars with their subsystems, the Euroland institutions that will lead a de facto existence, comitology, etc) of the EU will become ever greater, certainly in the minds of public opinion which is feeling increasingly alienated by the workings of the European institutions.

Despite the improvements made by the Treaty of Amsterdam to the co-decision power of the European Parliament, there is still a case of a democratic deficit, especially with regard to parliamentary control over European Commission policy.

On account of the non-application of the principle of the qualified majority, the harmonisation of tax and social security matters is extremely difficult, if not impossible. Within EMU countries this will lead to the development of competing tax systems and tax erosion. Distortions threaten to arise as a result that could form a threat to the operation of Monetary Union.

According to a protocol attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam, negotiations between member states (intergovernmental) on institutional reform must start as soon as the number of EU members exceeds 20. From this it follows that the enlargement from 15 to 20 member states does not include a requirement to negotiate over the institutions. But the Amsterdam protocol also says that institutional negotiations may begin before the EU has its next new entrant. It is in this context that the BIF initiative (Belgium, Italy and France) has to be seen.

The protocol also adds that when the next enlargement comes into effect, the composition of the Commission will have to be adjusted to one person per member state, on condition that the weighting system for the votes in the European Council of Ministers is adjusted at the same time, either by using another weighting system for the votes of each member state, or by introducing a double majority where the second vote would be based on the population represented. In the absence of agreement on these reforms, the current system would remain in force and the general provision of the protocol would be the one applied negotiations on institutions must start as soon as the EU has expanded to more than 20 members. '

For the moment the Amsterdam protocol marks out the areas considered to be a priority for the institutional negotiations: the composition of the Commission and the weighting system for the votes of each member state. A number of member states immediately added a third element to the above two, ie. the generalisation of the qualified majority (QMV). This brings about the Amsterdam triangle: 1/ greater use of qualified majorities, 2/ different composition of the Commission and 3/ different weighting system for votes. .

These three issues, inextricably bound up with each other, have to be tackled urgently if the EU leaders want to secure the construction of a united Europe and preserve it from inefficiency and the increasing lack of credibility among public opinion and European electors.

Solutions are possible whereby one must strive for conciliation of standpoints.

The discussions in the fifteen national parliaments and in the European Parliament, are a proof thereof.

The democratic institutions of Europe offer their good offices, in a constructive way, to the political leaders of the EU.

The reform of the EU institutions ultimately depends on the awareness by these responsible of the need and urgency of these reforms, on the political will to develop these reforms, and on the imagination of those dealing with such problems.

An Comhchoiste um Ghnóthaí

Eorpacha

Teach Laighean

Baile Átha Cliath 2

Joint Committee on European Affairs

Leinster House

Dublin 2

☎ (01) 618 3000

GTN 7113

Fax (01) 618 4123 / 618 4124

Ref: EA28/02/09/01

Mr. Mark Eyskens

Former Prime Minister

Member

House of Representatives

Brussels

Belgium

Dear Mr. Eyskens

Thank you very much for your letter of 10 September enclosing draft appeal to the Heads of State and Government.

With regard to the question of institutional reform, EU institutional affairs are a nexus of complex questions concerning the role of an existing and enlarged Union in the world, relationships between EU institutions, the functioning of those institutions and their relationship to the European citizen. These issues were examined in the course of the negotiation of the Amsterdam Treaty which subsequently contained provisions on such relevant areas as external relations, institutions including the European Parliament and national parliaments, subsidiarity, transparency, and quality of legislation. It should be noted that Ireland was entirely satisfied with the outcome of the Amsterdam Treaty negotiations and the balances contained in its provisions in relation to institutional matters. Ireland would wish to see the ratification and entry into force of the Treaty at the earliest possible date in order to permit the benefit of its provisions in this area to be fully realised.

I intend to propose that our Joint Committee make a report to the Houses of the Oireachtas on all recent discussions on institutional changes in the context of EU enlargement, that the issues involved are brought to the attention of all Members of the Irish Parliament.

With best regards

Yours sincerely

__________________

Bernard J. Durkan, T.D.

Chairman

30 September 1998

Appendix II

An Comhchoiste um Ghnóthaí Eorpacha

Teach Laighean

Baile Átha Cliath 2

Joint Committee on European Affairs

Leinster House

Dublin 2

☎ (01) 618 3051

GTN 7113

Fax (01) 618 4123 / 618 4124

MEETINGS OF E. P. INSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS COMMITTEE - PARTICIPATION OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS

21 and 28 September, 1998 - Brussels.

1.Meeting/Round Table of 21 September

The round table, jointly organised by the EP Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens’ Rights and the Institutional Affairs Committee, dealt with the theme: Improving the Substantive and Formal Quality of Community Legislation. The meeting also dealt with the preparation of a submission from the EP for the informal European Council meeting in October 1998 on the political future of the EU. The Round Table was co-chaired by Mr. Willy De Clercq MEP and by Mr. Biagio de Giovanni MEP, the respective Chairmen of the two Committees.

Mr. Bernard Durkan TD, Chairman of the Joint Committee, represented Ireland.

Introducing the topic of better legislation, the rapporteur Mr. Cot MEP recognised that it was important to legislate better but the question was how to do it. The process of arriving at legislation involved significant compromises, which in turn gave rise to difficulties in implementing the legislation. One needed a strong personality to impose codification. The renumbering of the Treaties would help to make Community legislation more understandable. Commissioner Oreja said that the quality of Community legislation was not a new problem. It was often too detailed, thus obscuring its essence. Maastricht and Amsterdam constituted a balance between an increase in competences and excessive centralisation. Legislation should be as simple as possible. Directives were preferable to regulations because they gave MS a choice in how to implement them. Mr. Durkan commended the Commission for identifying the problem of excessive bureaucracy. He noted that the Joint Committee on European Affairs vetted draft EU legislation. The Joint Committee could also take the third stage of a Bill originating in the Department of Foreign Affairs. These functions were important, given the increasing belief among people that the bureaucracy had too much power. Other speakers from the national parliaments of Denmark, Germany, Netherlands, France and Greece reasserted the need to improve the quality of legislation; the desirability of discarding unnecessary rules; the need for more joint meetings between national parliaments and the EP.

In relation to guidelines with regard to the structure and drafting of Community acts, the rapporteur Ms. Palacio MEP recalled the key reference point which is Declaration 39 of the Amsterdam Treaty which states that the EP, the Council and the Commission ought a) to establish by common accord guidelines for improving the quality of the drafting of Community legislation and follow those guidelines when considering proposals for Community legislation or draft legislation, taking the internal organisational measures they deem necessary to ensure that the guidelines are properly applied and b) make their best efforts to accelerate the codification of legislative texts. She pointed out that legislative language is the fruit of negotiation and compromise and is, therefore, by its nature unclear. Speakers from the national parliaments of some countries (Italy, Denmark) spoke of measures which had been introduced in their parliaments to deal with this issue e.g. the establishment of committees for legislation, aimed at improving the quality of legislation.

As regards the preparation for the informal European Council meeting on 24 October on the political future of the EU, the rapporteur Mr. de Giovanni MEP introduced the Committee on Institutional Affairs’ Motion for a Resolution for submission to the informal Council under the headings of: i) the political future of the Union; ii) respect for the principle of subsidiarity and iii) strengthening democratic legitimacy and effectiveness. He noted, first of all, that the original deadline for the Committee to adopt a resolution for submission to the informal Council had now been put back which allowed more time to discuss it. The resolution would be considered at the Committee’s meetings on 28 September and 5 October and would be voted on at the plenary on 21 October. The issues for the informal Council were subsidiarity and democratic legitimacy. The Committee had discussed these issues with a view to making a submission to the Council. Subsidiarity was being discussed now because the situation was “fluid”: EMU, continuing debate on 3rd pillar. We should not be defensive on subsidiarity; it was a positive “thing”, part and parcel of any federal system. However, the core problem affecting the EU was the balance between the institutions. Speakers (Italy, Spain, France, Austria and others) spoke of the value of COSAC; “re-integration” before enlargement; qualified majority voting and the need for political will to make progress.

2.Meeting of 28 September.

The meeting, to which Chairmen of European Affairs Committees of EU national parliaments were invited, was attended by Mr. Bernard Durkan, TD.

The meeting was dedicated to discussing further the draft motion for a resolution to be submitted to the informal European Council of October 1998 on the EU’s political future. Chairman Di Biagio pointed out the modification which had been introduced into the text following the discussion at the previous meeting on 21 September. He said that the message underlying the text was a simple one: the need for reform of the institutions. The text gave special emphasis (3 paragraphs) to the role of national parliaments. The text also reflected the need to emphasis the role of the Commission from a management and political point of view.

A number of members of the Committee suggested textual changes. Many speakers availed of the reference in paragraph 3 to the Union’s finances to speak about value for money (“juste retour”) in relation to the contributions of member States to the Community budget. Some speakers suggested that it was unbalanced to suggest (para.16) that the Council and the Commission should improve their workings, without also suggesting that the EP had ample scope for improving its own workings.

Mr. Durkan said that the motion was a useful document. He noted that the EU had achieved substantial progress in 25 years. It was important to focus now on what the people needed. He noted how little time is dedicated in the Oireachtas (over and above the discussion in committee) to debating EU affairs. He wondered, in relation to the EU Commission, if those EU countries which assured the smaller member States that their interests would be safeguarded even if they had to forego their own Commissioner, would be satisfied with a similar assurance from the largest member States if they also had to give up their entitlement to nominate their own Commissioner. There had been a growth in euroscepticism throughout the EU: Governments should attack the fundamental issues underlying scepticism.

Chairman di Biagio summed up by saying that he would work on the text of the motion over the following days and would present a redrafted version of it to the Institutional Affairs Committee at its next meeting in Strasbourg on 5 October. Following adoption by the Committee, the text would go forward to the plenary of the EP which would then submit it to the informal European Council in late October.

At the following day’s session of the Institutional Affairs Committee there was a round table on the Commission with the participation of ex-Commissioner Peter Sutherland, current Secretary General of the Commission, Mr. Trojan and former Secretary General, Mr. Williamson. The latter said that he agreed with the proposal which had emanated from the Delors Group that the party groupings in the EP should put forward their own candidate for President of the Commission. Trojan said he “was not necessarily against” the Delors group proposal. He quoted from a Commission document of 7 March 1997 which demonstrated that there was no question of having 1st and 2nd class Commissioners. He said that there will continue to be 2 Vice-Presidents. He said that the current Commission was the first one to tackle seriously financial management and that the Commission would increasingly need people with financial management experience. Sutherland said that he did not think that there should be an automatic right for all countries to nominate a commissioner. However, as the EP was still not seen as credibly representing member States, it was logical that each member State should have its own commissioner. He said that Commissioners who claimed credit for supporting measures favourable to their own country were ultimately a corrosive and destructive influence.

Brian Muldoon

October 8, 1998

Appendix III

Joint Committee on European Affairs

List of Members

Deputies: Seán Barrett (FG)

Ulick Burke (FG)

Pat Carey (FF)

Michael Collins (FF)

Bernard J. Durkan (FG)

Tony Gregory (Ind)

Seán Haughey (FF)

Phil Hogan (FG)

Séamus Kirk (FF)

John McGuinness (FF)

Gay Mitchell (FG)

Seán Power (FF)

Albert Reynolds (FF)

Jack Wall (Lab)

Senators: Helen Keogh

Don Lydon

Paddy McGowan

Maurice Manning

Brendan Ryan

Joint Committee on European Affairs

Orders of Reference

(1) (a)That a Select Committee, which shall be called the Select Committee on European Affairs, consisting of 14 members of Dáil Éireann (of whom 4 shall constitute a quorum), be appointed to consider such Bills, the statute law in respect of which is dealt with by the Department of Foreign Affairs, as shall be referred to it by Dáil Éireann from time to time.

(b)For the purpose of its consideration of Bills under paragraph (1)(a), the Select Committee shall have the powers defined in Standing Order 78A(1), (2) and (3).

(c)For the avoidance of doubt, by virtue of his or her ex officio membership of the Select Committee in accordance with Standing Order 84(1), the Minister for Foreign Affairs (or a Minister or Minister of State nominated in his or her stead) shall be entitled to vote.

(2) (a)The Select Committee shall be joined with a Select Committee to be appointed by Seanad Éireann to form the Joint Committee on European Affairs to—

(i)consider such matters arising from Ireland’s membership of the European Communities and its adherence to the Treaty on European Union, as it may select,

(ii)consider such—

(I)programmes and guidelines prepared by the Commission of the European Communities as a basis for possible legislative action and such drafts of regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions of the Council of Ministers proposed by the Commission,

(II)acts of the institutions of those Communities,

(III)regulations under the European Communities Acts, 1972 to 1995,

(IV)other instruments made under statute and necessitated by the obligations of membership of those Communities,

as it may select,

(iii)consider such other matters as may be jointly referred to it from time to time by both Houses of the Oireachtas, and

(iv)represent the Houses of the Oireachtas at the Conference of European Affairs Committees (COSAC),

and shall report thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas.

(b)The quorum of the Joint Committee shall be 5, of whom at least 1 shall be a member of Dáil Éireann and 1 a member of Seanad Éireann.

(c)The Joint Committee shall have the powers defined in Standing Order 78A(1) to (9) inclusive.

(d)The following persons may attend meetings of the Joint Committee and of its sub-Committees and may take part in proceedings without having a right to vote or to move motions and amendments:

(i)members of the European Parliament elected from constituencies in Ireland (including Northern Ireland),

(ii)members of the Irish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and

(iii)at the invitation of the Joint Committee or of a sub-Committee, as appropriate, other Members of the European Parliament.

(3)The Chairman of the Joint Committee, who shall be a member of Dáil Éireann, shall also be Chairman of the Select Committee.

(1) (a)That a Select Committee consisting of 5 members of Seanad Éireann shall be appointed to be joined with a Select Committee of Dáil Éireann to form the Joint Committee on European Affairs to—

(i)consider such matters arising from Ireland’s membership of the European Communities and its adherence to the Treaty on European Union, as it may select,

(ii)consider such—

(I)programmes and guidelines prepared by the Commission of the European Communities as a basis for possible legislative action and such drafts of regulations, directives, decisions, recommenda-tions and opinions of the Council of Ministers proposed by the Commission,

(II)acts of the institutions of those Communities,

(III)regulations under the European Communities Acts, 1972 to 1995,

(IV)other instruments made under statute and necessitated by the obligations of membership of those Communi-ties, as it may select,

(iii)consider such other matters as may be jointly referred to it from time to time by both Houses of the Oireachtas, and

(iv)represent the Houses of the Oireachtas at the Conference of European Affairs Committees (COSAC),

and shall report thereon to both Houses of the Oireachtas.

(b)The quorum of the Joint Committee shall be 5, of whom at least 1 shall be a member of Dáil Éireann and 1 a member of Seanad Éireann.

(c)The Joint Committee shall have the powers defined in Standing Order 62A (1) to (9) inclusive.

(d)The following persons may attend meetings of the Joint Committee and of its sub-Committees and may take part in proceedings without having a right to vote or to move motions and amendments:

(i)members of the European Parliament elected from constituencies in Ireland (including Northern Ireland),

(ii)members of the Irish delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, and

(iii)at the invitation of the Joint Committee or of a sub-Committee, as appropriate, other Members of the European Parliament.

(2)The Chairman of the Joint Committee shall be a member of Dáil Éireann.