Committee Reports > List of Committees > Joint > 1998 > Committee on Public Enterprise and Transport > Report on the meeting with the RPII to consider ionising radiation

HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS

Report of the Joint Committee on Public Enterprise and Transport on Meeting with Radiological Protection Institution of Ireland to consider Ionising Radiation

October 1998

HOUSES OF THE OIREACHTAS Report of the Joint Committee on Public Enterprise and Transport on Meeting with Radiological Protection Institution of Ireland to consider Ionising Radiation

October 1998

Contents

Introduction

The Joint Committee on Public Enterprise and Transport was established following Orders of Reference of the Dáil and Seanad of 23 October, 1997. In addition, Standing Orders state that the following powers may be conferred on a Committee:

“(1) power to take oral and written evidence and to print and publish from time to time minutes of such evidence taken in public before the Select Committee together with such related documents as the Select Committee thinks fit;”.

This report of the Joint Committee on Ionising Radiation was agreed at its meeting on 1 October, 1998.

________________

Seán Doherty, T.D.

Chairman

AN COMHCHOISTE UM FHIONTAIR PHOIBLÍ AGUS IOMPAR

JOINT COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC ENTERPRISE AND TRANSPORT

Déardaoin, 26 Feabhra, 1998

Thursday, 26th February, 1998

The Joint Committee met at 2.30 p.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT:

Deputy Liam Alyward,

Deputy Martin Brady,

Deputy Austin Currie,

Deputy Brendan Daly,

Deputy Seán Fleming*,

Deputy Noel O’Flynn,

Deputy Ivan Yates.

Senator Peter Callanan,

Senator Liam Fitzgerald,

Senator Tom Fitzgerald**,

Senator Fergus O’Dowd.

Deputy Seán Doherty in the Chair.

Chairman: We have a meeting today with the Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland. Do members wish to put a time limit on the meeting?

Deputy Daly: No.

Chairman: I am suffering from influenza and I have asked the Vice-Chairman, Deputy Daly, to take the Chair at some point during the meeting. I welcome Dr. Tom O’Flaherty, Chief Executive, Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland, Mr. John D. Cunningham, Assistant Chief Executive and Mr. Frank Turvey, Assistant Chief Executive. I appreciate the attendance of the members of the delegation at short notice and their willingness to answer questions.

The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland is a national organisation. It is concerned with hazards to health from ionising radiation and radioactive contamination of the environment. I hope our visitors will provides details of the extent and the causes of hazards with particular emphasis on hazards relating to and associated with Sellafield. The Institute is also interested in the storage of nuclear waste and its discharges into the sea and any other questions that may arise. I call on Dr. O’Flaherty to make an introductory presentation.

Dr. O’Flaherty: Thank you, Chairman, for your invitation to us to attend the Committee which we are pleased to address. I will give a short overview of the responsibilities of the Institute and will then ask my colleagues to make a contribution regarding their areas of expertise.

The Radiological Protection Institute of Ireland was established in 1992 under the Radiological Protection Act, 1991. It has a budget of just under £2 million per year and a staff of approximately 45. The remit of the Institute is to address all hazards associated with ionising radiation, a form of radiation which is capable of altering the structure of the atom. Examples include the type of radiation involved in nuclear power, nuclear weapons, X-rays and radiation treatment of cancer. It is to be distinguished from another form of radiation which can be globally described as non-ionising radiation, which is the form of radiation associated with mobile telephones, television transmission, electricity power lines and so on. That area is outside the responsibilities of the RPII.

As is well known, ionising radiation can be damaging to health in two distinct ways. Very high levels of exposure to ionising radiation can cause very severe injury and death if the exposure is high enough. It can also cause severe burns. People who undergo radiation treatment suffer loss of hair if the doses are very high. Another effect associated with lower doses is an increase in the risk of cancer many years after the exposure. This effect is not certain to occur but the greater the dose the greater the possibility that a person will contract cancer later in life. This is the kind of danger that is of most concern regarding the exposure of people in this country to radiation from sources such as Sellafield or radon in houses.

Of the major issues with which the Institute is concerned, one is the threat to Ireland from Sellafield and other nuclear installations overseas.

Frank Turvey will speak in detail about these and I will not discuss them further.

The Institute is the regulatory authority for all uses of ionising radiation in medicine, industry, education, etc. Regulation is through a licensing system and there are 1,200 licensees. We monitor radiation doses to 5,500 employees who use radiation in the course of their work.

People are aware that there is a risk of lung cancer if people are exposed to high levels of radon in their dwelling or workplace over a number of years. We have been carrying out a national survey to delineate areas of particular susceptibility to radon levels and are nearing completion of this work.

The Institute also participates in the development and operation of the national emergency plan for nuclear accidents which the country would depend upon in the event of a major accident at, for example, Sellafield. The RPII is extremely conscious of the very high level of public concern regarding the hazard posed by Sellafield which is constantly reinforced by reports of incidents. There were two such incidents in the past few weeks involving exposure of two workers to an abnormal dose of radiation and the discovery that pigeons in the locality had accumulated very high levels of radioactivity in their flesh due, apparently, to gaining access to contaminated material on the site. There are also new developments, such as the proposed mixed oxide fuel plant which is currently under consideration.

The job of the RPII is to evaluate these hazards on a factual, scientific basis. My colleagues will provide a brief outline of this work for the Committee. John Cunningham will deal with the effects of the continuing and long-standing contamination of the environment resulting from routine discharges from Sellafield and its effects. Frank Turvey will discuss the second issue of great concern to us, namely, the risk of a major accident at Sellafield or another nuclear instillation in the UK which could cause major contamination in Ireland.

Deputy Daly took the Chair.

Mr. John Cunningham: I wish to talk about the radioactive contamination of the environment, its sources and our monitoring programmes and results. Many will know that there are three principle sources of contamination. From the late 1950s to the mid 1960s we suffered fallout from the atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. The other sources of contamination were the Chernobyl accident of 1986 and the discharges from the Sellafield nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Cumbria. There is still a legacy from the nuclear weapons programmes. Long living fallout radionuclides, such as tritium, carbon-14, caesium-137 and plutonium-239 continue to contribute to the inventory of artificial radionuclides in the environment.

The accident at Chernobyl resulted in measurable contamination of land and sea. The effects on the marine environment were short lived and not detectable after a short period. However, on land the long lived radionuclides, notably caesium-137, continue to contribute to contamination levels. It has become mainly fixed in our agricultural soils and does not readily transfer into foodstuffs. However, in the upper peat areas, it is still mobile and is taken up by grazing sheep. We are continuing our monitoring programme here.

The discharges from Sellafield to both the air and sea began in the 1950s. The main atmospheric discharge has been Krypton-85, a radionuclide of low radiological toxicity. The fire in one of the Windscale piles in 1957 released large quantities of radionuclides to the atmosphere, mainly iodine-131 and polonium-210. These nuclides were dispersed over Europe and there is no evidence of Ireland having been effected to a significant extent. Discharges from Sellafield to the marine environment reached their maximum in the mid 1970s and declined steadily until 1986. From that time they have been relatively constant. A notable exception has been a recent increase in the discharge of technetium-99 which began in 1994 and is continuing at an increased level, reducing slightly in 1997.

We contribute a small amount of radioactivity to the marine environment through discharges to sewage systems from hospitals using radionuclides for medical purposes. These give rise to some contamination close to the outlet pipes, but the radioactivity has a very short half life and will, consequently, disappear quite quickly.

The Institute established its national radiation laboratory in 1987 which enabled it develop a comprehensive monitoring programme. Prior to this the monitoring programme was very limited due to insufficient means. The objectives of our programmes are to assess the exposure of Irish people arising from contamination of the environment, to estimate the risks to human health from such exposure, to assess the distribution of the significantly contaminating radionuclides and to identify trends with a view to assessing possible future effects.

We take samples of sea water, sediments and seaweeds as well as fish and shell fish from our main fishing ports. We examine a range of fish species as well as the more common shell fish, prawns, oysters, lobsters and mussels. We also examine the seabed of the Irish Sea and undertake annual cruises into the western Irish Sea where sea water and sediment samples are taken.

We are constantly monitoring air at 11 locations around the country. In Dublin we examine atmospheric Krypton-85, the main gaseous radionuclide discharged from Sellafield. We also examine rainwater to see what is being washed out of the air. In addition the Institute has a continuous gamma dose rate monitoring system at 12 locations, each fitted with an alarm which sounds if there is an increase, thus immediately notifying us.

Regarding foodstuffs, we examine milk from a selection of ten major milk processing plants together with major drinking water supplies on a county by county basis. We also examine many samples of agricultural produce including all diary products, beef, sheep meat, etc. In addition, we are continuing to monitor activity in live sheep in the upland peat areas and check sheep randomly coming into local slaughter houses. We want to ensure that sheep meat coming onto the market is acceptable for consumption.

The results of these monitoring programmes are published in a series of reports. I gave the Committee a copy of one of our most recent ones which covers the terrestrial side. Our marine work has been published in a series of reports and we will be issuing a new one shortly.

The consumption of fish and shellfish is the route by which Irish people are likely to be exposed to radiation. The dose to a heavy consumer of fish, someone who eats a large quantity of fish and shellfish from landings at north east ports every day, is two microsieverts per year. This is a slight decrease from 1993 which was 3.3 microsieverts. The significance of these doses can be put in perspective by comparing them with the annual average dose of about 3,000 microsieverts to a member of the Irish public, from all sources of radiation and to the annual dose limit of 1,000 microsieverts for members of the public from controlled sources of radiation. It is a small dose and not significant from the health point of view.

The increased discharge of technetium from Sellafield is a matter of concern. The highest concentrations in Irish coastal waters, were, like the other radionuclides discharged from Sellafield, found along the north-east coast. However, technetium-99 is a radionuclide of low radiotoxicity and the dose to a typical seafood consumer is less than 0.1 microsieverts, which is a very small dose. However, that situation is changing and we will continue to look at it closely.

The mean krypton-85 concentration in air over Dublin increased from 1.3 becquerels per cubic meter in 1996 to 1.34 becquerels per cubic meter in 1997. These are small increases but are in line with other parts of Western Europe.

The monitoring of sheep on 20 upland farms around the country and local slaughterhouses indicates that some sheep on a limited number of farms continue to have high caesium-137 levels, in excess of the limit considered suitable for marketing. However, the majority tested in 1996 and 1997 had levels below 500 becquerels per kilo - which is the level considered suitable for marketing - with none exceeding 1,000 becquerels per kilo. However, before being slaughtered the sheep are grazed on lower pastures where their activity levels decrease rapidly. Over 90 per cent of the sheep tested at local slaughterhouses had contamination levels less than 100 becquerels per kilo, the lower level of detection of the method we are using. The results indicate that the consumption of sheepmeat does not constitute a health concern.

Our programme shows that the levels of artificial radioactivity in the Irish terrestrial environment do not give rise to any significant health risk to the Irish people. The concentrations are low and do not give any cause for concern. It is expected that krypton-85 concentrations in air will increase slightly as THORP reprocesses more spent fuel. Reprocessing has also been on the increase in Russia and I am sure we will measure some effect from that. While these will not give rise to a health hazard, efforts to develop the technology to reduce or eliminate krypton-85 discharges should be pursued actively and krypton retention plants installed at reprocessing plants.

The consumption of fish and shellfish is the most important pathway and we will continue to look at that carefully. The concentrations at the moment are low. Revised discharge authorisations for Sellafield came into effect in 1994. The installation of a new plant caused an increase in technetium discharges. While technetium is a radionuclide of low toxicity and its presence makes only a small contribution to the radiation dose to a fish consumer, these discharges are unnecessary. We are making representations at international level so these discharges can be stopped.

It is clearly objectionable from an Irish viewpoint that contamination of our marine environment should result from the operation of nuclear installations in other countries. Nevertheless, it is evident that the levels of radioactive contamination of the Irish Sea do not justify any misgivings on health grounds about eating fish or about swimming or engaging in any other activity in or near the sea along the east coast of Ireland.

However, we consider the discharges unnecessary. They should be reduced with a view to eliminating them as soon as possible.

Mr. Turvey: I will talk about the probability and consequences of accidents. I know the Institute is interested in accidents which might happen at Sellafield and elsewhere in the UK but I would like to start by talking about the possibility of accidents involving sources of ionising radiation which we use in Ireland. We have used such sources for a long time. Our use dates back to the beginning of the century when radium was used at the Dublin Radium Institution for the treatment of cancer. Since then, the use of radiation sources in medicine has expanded and we use a much wider variety of sources today.

Following the second world war, industry began using similar types of sources, mainly in the processing and manufacturing industries, for a variety of functions such as measuring weight and density. These sources function extremely reliably and accurately and are preferred to more traditional ways of measurement. Many sources of ionising radiation are being used in Irish industry.

Its use in research has also increased greatly since the second world war, in other countries in the world, both developed and developing. There have been a number of serious accidents and tens of people have been killed and hundreds have suffered severe injury. Fortunately, there have been no such accidents in this country.

One accident is noteworthy and occurred at Irish Steel in 1990 in Haulbowline in Cork. They imported some scrap from another country and unknown to them, it included a disused source of the kind I spoke about. It went into the furnace, was melted down and the plant was widely contaminated. It cost the company about £1.2 million to clean up.

We can and have had accidents, as I just illustrated. We need to make sure such accidents do not happen again. There is a lesson to be learned from that particular accident. Sources that are not being used anymore tend to get mislaid and lost and most of the accidents in other countries have been associated with disused sources. Although our licensing system requires the holder of such disused sources to keep them in safe custody, it would be safer if we could put them in a national central store. I hope we can set up such a facility in the not too distant future.

To conclude on accidents in Ireland, I believe that providing the Radiological Protection Institution of Ireland can maintain its present regulatory vigilance and providing that a national store for disused radioactive sources can be set up, accidents causing harm to health or the environment involving sources of ionising radiation can be avoided.

Turning to accidents abroad, there is safety in distance and we all understand this intuitively and the science confirms that. We at the Institute, therefore, focus attention on the closest large sources of ionising radiation which are the nuclear plants on the west coast of the UK, the reactors, the fuel reprocessing plants, the places where they store the spent fuel taken out the reactors and the places where they hold the very high level radioactive waste.

The risk of a reactor or any other nuclear plant, such as a reprocessing plant, suffering a severe accident and causing harm to health and the environment cannot be easily determined. There are at least three reasons for that. The first is that such severe accidents are rare events and, therefore, one cannot look back on the history or the statistics as with road accidents, for example, and forecast what the accident rate will be for next year. Secondly, the details of the plant design and the reliability of the components contained in the plants and the safety assessments done by the experts in those countries are not available to us. Thirdly, even when all those technical details are available the process of determining the risk, which is known as probability risk assessment, is hugely complicated, extremely expensive and time consuming and at the end of the day it is not all that accurate.

The RPII cannot put a number on the risk or probability of a severe accident at a nuclear facility in the UK or elsewhere. Nevertheless, we can use our knowledge and technical judgment to gain some insights into the level of risk to which this country is exposed. We have supposed three severe accidents at levels five, six and seven on the international scale of accidents. This scale of accidents is rather like the Beaufort Windscale and the Richter scale and has seven steps, the seventh being the worst accident. Chernobyl would have been a scale seven accident.

As I said, we have supposed three severe accidents at levels five, six and seven at certain sites on the west coast of the UK. We assumed unfavourable weather conditions and have estimated what the effects might be on our environment and health. In broad terms, the result of our studies indicate that for the level five accident, which is assumed to have a probability of about seven in one hundred thousand per nuclear facility per year, the consequences for Ireland would be less than those suffered as a result of the Chernobyl accident. The supposed accident at level six would have roughly the same consequences as Chernobyl and that has a probability of one in one million per nuclear facility per year. Finally, the level seven accident, which would have a probability of less than one in ten million per facility per year, would be expected to exceed the harmful effects we experienced at the time of Chernobyl and afterwards.

No deaths would be expected in the immediate aftermath of the worst supposed accident, that is, that at level seven. However, an increase in cancers over a period of about 25 years or so would be expected assuming present day models for the effects of low levels of radiation are valid. We assume certain relations between low level radiation and health effects in the absence of complete knowledge and are pessimistic in those assumptions.

The probabilities of the three supposed accidents might be described in ordinary language as being highly unlikely, improbable and highly improbable. Unfortunately, however, they cannot be described as being impossible just as a meteor strike on this country killing about ten people cannot be ruled out. In fact, it is calculated to be as probable as the accident we have supposed at level five of the international nuclear event scale.

The risk of harm to our health and environment, although small, is real and necessitates the maintenance of an emergency response system which John Cunningham described. Such a system is actively encouraged by international agencies and is a requirement for parties to the international nuclear safety convention, of which we are one.

There is another risk which is, unfortunately, an unquantifiable nuclear risk and that would be associated with military nuclear activities, notably those associated with nuclear weapons and power plants. We do not have information about such matters and can hardly even make a guess at the probability. On a comforting note, favourable weather conditions and our distance from a severe nuclear accident may mean that Ireland could avoid any effects. The winds are mainly from the north to the south west sector and are frequently strong. Both these factors help to preserve Ireland from atmospheric contamination originating in the east.

Acting Chairman (Mr. Daly): I thank the delegation for the very comprehensive and clear explanation of their responsibilities and activities in this area. A number of Members wish to raise questions.

Deputy Brady: I thank the delegation for their presentation. What agencies are involved in the emergency plan? For example, would the Army or Civil Defence be involved? What would be the response time? Is it feasible to carry out exercises on the plan? I am aware that Civil Defence hold fall-out exercises from time to time. What would your involvement be with those agencies?

We hear a lot about masts for mobile telephones and their locations throughout the country. They are usually located in residential areas adjacent to schools. People fear them as they are injurious to ones health although the World Health Organisation say no proof of this exists. I would be interested to hear the delegation’s views on that matter.

People also fear chemical factories and emissions from them. If a high incidence of cancer occurs for an unknown reason in a particular area people are inclined to associate this with emissions from chemical factories. We do not have any medical evidence that such emissions can be associated with the incidence of cancer.

Dr. O’Flaherty: Emissions of non-radioactive chemicals from chemical plants or masts for mobile phones - though they were mentioned briefly in the presentation - do not come within the remit of the RPII. They emit non-ionising radiation and therefore do not come within the statutory responsibilities of the RPII.

Acting Chairman: Does someone have responsibility for them, perhaps the EPA?

Dr. O’Flaherty: The EPA would have a responsibility in relation to chemicals.

Acting Chairman: They monitor emissions from incinerators?

Dr. O’Flaherty: Yes. The EPA leave radioactivity matters to us. We do not cross territories.

Mr. Cunningham will respond to the question of arrangements under the emergency plan for nuclear accidents.

Mr. Cunningham: After Chernobyl there was a great deal of confusion. There was a serious problem due to a misunderstanding of what the level of contamination in Ireland was. It nearly presented a very serious economic problem in relation to a significant and severe loss to our agricultural exports, dairy products and beef to the Middle East, North Africa and South America. It was clear we had to put arrangements in place to provide a very rapid effective response to whatever situation might arise even if we were only marginally affected. It is extremely important that we provide a rapid response to the situation. We have put in place a nuclear emergency plan. The Institute has a major responsibility in it but it encompasses all the relevant authorities and agencies, notably those in the area of health and agriculture. Local authorities also have a role to play. It is very important that we be able to assess what the contamination levels are; what the risk to the Irish people would be; what the risk to our agriculture would be and to then take whatever steps are necessary to mitigate that risk and protect the Irish people if such action were necessary. The sort of counter measures one might take would be evacuation. Based on studies of accidents abroad I do not think evacuation would ever be necessary. If a radioactive plume came our way, sheltering would reduce its effects. If radioactive iodine was present in the air the health boards would distribute iodine tablets but that would need to be done very quickly. The most likely scenario is that we may need to look carefully at foodstuffs and their restriction if contamination levels were high.

The question was asked, who is involved? All the relevant Government Departments: the Department of Health and Children, the Department of Agriculture and Food, the Department of the Environment. The Department of Defence and the Civil Defence is involved in the monitoring programmes which might be put in place. In terms of introducing counter measures, local authorities would bear some responsibility. It is essentially an integrated plan.

In relation to exercises, we have held some. They are very important. We have learned many lessons from those exercises. We are looking at the plan to ensure that not only is it brought up to date because technology and responsibilities have changed but to make it more effective. We will continue to hold exercises to check its effectiveness in providing a rapid response. At present the Institute provides an on-call service. If an accident occurs anywhere international arrangements are in place whereby notification comes quickly to Ireland to the Garda communications centre. One of us is always on call to receive a message from the Garda communications centre and put in-train whatever is required. I have contact numbers for people in all the Departments and agencies. With the assistance of the Garda the plan can be put in-train very quickly. I assure members the plan will work and give an effective response.

Deputy Yates: We have no economic gain from Sellafield even if there was no risk of an accident. One cannot exclude that there is no reason to favour Sellafield. Litigation is underway by the STAD group in County Louth and the LRG group. What interaction has the Institute had in support of their legal case and what services have been made available? That these groups have and are doing health, engineering, nuclear physicist and other technical assessments begs the question that the RPII monitoring is de facto inadequate.

What does the Institute see as the resultant gain from Sellafield? If the generator and magnox reactors were out of date and the plant closed, one of the problems with nuclear fuel is that it has an eternal shelf-life. Do the Institute see a situation that if Sellafield closed tomorrow there would still be a risk to us. Can you quantify that risk post-closure. What interaction is taking place with the legal case; the fact that it had to do further research begs questions about the Institute’s research in terms of the permanent risk from Sellafield.

Radon gas is another issue and Dr. O’Farrell has a chart of the country outlining areas of risk and parts of my constituency are high risk. Constituents had an analysis carried out and they found to their horror that there was a high reading of radon gas in their houses. I tabled a Parliamentary Question to find out what directives had issued to local authorities to try and ensure people carried out tests and what follow-up action would be taken. There was little or no implementation of follow-up action. Further to the analysis on the existence of radon gas, who is alerting the public on the ground and what will local authorities or health boards do to assist people who might be at risk?

Dr. O’Flaherty: With regard to Sellafield and the court case brought by the STAD group, the work in which RPII has been involved has been carried out at the behest of the Minister and Department officials. I recognise it would not be advisable to go into the detail of that. Our work involves advising the Minister and working with legal advisors to the Government on issues relating to the case. The residents’ group feel additional studies should be carried out over and above those carried out by RPII but this does not mean we should accept what we have done is inadequate. We believe it gives a sufficient picture of the situation but it would be accepted in any situation where scientific work is involved, something further can always be done. Supplementary information of interest may be obtained from additional studies. A balance must be struck in the degree to which the RPII works on monitoring the consequences of Sellafield.

The question of the end game in respect of Sellafield is obviously a very big issue. The activities on site and the results of them, the materials that accumulate on site and the highly contaminated buildings cannot be wiped away with the stroke of a pen. Even if the most radical decisions were made regarding cessation or winding down of activities, there would be a residue of radioactive waste and decommissioning of plants on site would take many decades.

I turn to radon and what is being done to correct problems where we and others have identified buildings needing remedial work. Definite measures have been put in place for new buildings in recent months. The regulations require radon remediation measures in all new dwellings and certain other buildings and more intensive measures in areas designated as high radon areas. On the other hand, in regard to existing buildings, we fully recognise the situation is far from satisfactory in respect of remedial action being taken. It is up to the individual householder to decide whether to carry out remedial measures in his or her house when a radon problem has been diagnosed and it is not for us to say whether this is the right policy. Remedial measures have been taken in a great number of schools. The position with regard to residential dwellings is not as good as it should be.

Senator O’Dowd: I welcome Dr. O’Flaherty and his team and acknowledge the work the RPII has done and is doing in terms of informing and educating the public. Its availability for conferences and to make a case objectively is also to be welcomed. However, I am not happy with the document in certain instances.

When Dr. O’Flaherty talks about the probability of accidents in the nuclear industry generally, he says it would have been highly unlikely that an accident on the scale of Windscale would have happened, but it was a level 5 accident. There is a degree of complacency in the report when it states “These accidents are highly unlikely, improbable or highly improbable respectively.” The reality is accidents happen as they did in Russia and the UK and there is great concern about this.

There is no comment in the report on the storage of radioactive waste on the site and, in particular, the controversial proposals which Nirex had last year. It went through the planning process and thankfully the proposals were rejected. I regret also that there is no mention that Nirex must produce plans for underground storage. I presume that is matter of ongoing concern for the RPII.

I hail from County Louth and agree with Deputy Yates that there is great concern there about the operation of Sellafield. Dr. Cunningham states in his article in regard to the Windscale accident:

However, there is no evidence of Ireland having been affected to any significant extent.

Published medical opinion states children were affected in a school in Dundalk. Malformation at birth has been attributed to the Windscale fire by medical people. It is not the case that there is no evidence and I refute Dr. Cunningham’s statement.

The highest incidence of cancer deaths and respiratory illnesses in Ireland occurs in County Louth and there is genuine concern about dangers to health in the county. The health board believes it is more likely these deaths are caused by cigarette smoking than by the accident at Sellafield. Nevertheless, the high figure in County Louth concerns us. I appreciate and acknowledge the work done by the RPII in County Louth, Clogherhead and Cooley where it has shown people how to deal with the effects of radon gas. The Irish Sea is one of the most radioactive seas in the world. There is evidence of the dumping of other radioactive material following World War II which were only now beginning to know of. UK sources stated that the files on these materials were lost or misplaced. There is a large credibility gap between what is being said to us by the UK authorities and BNFL and what people believe. I could not disagree with what the RPII and its eminent scientists are saying but there is gap between what the Institute is saying and what people believe. We must try to close that gap.

Dr. O’Flaherty: I accept that we might have included the Nirex depository in our presentation. However, it is not possible to include everything in a short submission and it might be considered yesterday’s issue, although it will come back. It is a success for us all so far. I would like Mr. Turvey to comment on the Windscale accident.

Mr. Turvey: I see the point being made. However, in this paper I am looking at the conditions today. The pile which was the subject of the accident in 1957 would not be licensed today. It did not have enough safety features. When I wrote the short description of the sort of accidents we were assuming might happen, I was placing it in a present day context. Therefore, the figures are very different.

There are about 500 reactors in the world. The total experience in reactor years is about 10,000. We have had an accident at Three Mile Island - a modern, western reactor, and another at Chernobyl, a design which was not considered to be up to the same standards as western designs. The usual figure accepted as an expectation of a serious core fuel accident in a western reactor is one in 10,000. That is more or less what has happened. We have had one of those accidents in the US in that period of 10,000 years of reactor experience. This is all theoretical. In the paper and the oral presentation I make the point that the probability of risk assessment is not all that accurate. It is valuable in finding weak points in the designs of nuclear installations, whether reactors or reprocessing plants.

The regulators must use something. We all unconsciously use risk assessment. For example, the figure for road deaths is about 400 per year, equivalent to a risk of one in 10,000. When the figure gets much higher, local authorities and the Department of the Environment and Local Government get concerned and start to do something about it by improving roads or other measures which will reduce the figure. It is the same in the nuclear business; if accidents become too frequent something has to be done. That is the only way we have of implementing some degree of regulation on rare events. One has to go through this somewhat theoretical process of probability risk assessment. This means looking at every component in the reactor and assessing its likelihood of failure. Then one calculates a total sum and comes up with a figure for failure of all the safety systems leading to a serious accident.

Mr. Cunningham: I know there is concern about health in Dundalk and County Louth. There are certain health problems and groups have been identified as having Downs syndrome and so on. We have tried to identify the causes of these problems but we cannot come up with a definitive answer. For many years I have tried to find a definitive link between radiation and possible health problems in Ireland but I cannot find such a link. That is not to say that it is not there. We are continuing to look and this comes back to the STAD group studies. That group has commissioned a number of studies and it is looking to identify links which are causing the health problems. We have not yet established those links but we know that they are there and that is a reason for continued studies I believe it is unlikely to be as a direct result of radiation. However, one can have synergistic effects. We recognise that the concerns are real.

We are carrying out a study of the possible effects of dumping in the Beaufort Dyke and the Irish Sea. We have found that it would be impossible to detect any effect in Irish waters given the already significant signal from the Sellafield discharges. We are looking closely at this matter.

Senator O’Dowd: There is a question over the credibility of the British Government and its agencies who did not reveal information to us until many years later. People do not believe the British nuclear industry. It has no credibility as this has been going on for years and we are only finding out about it now. The Institute cannot be sure that it knows of everything which has been dumped in the Irish Sea.

Mr. Cunningham: One can never be certain about anything.

Senator O’Dowd: I accept that but the fact is that we did not know until this year that radioactive materials were dumped in the Beaufort Dyke.

Dr. O’Flaherty: That is true.

Senator O’Dowd: The public has a right to be vigilant and cynical about these matters. They feel that the UK authorities have not been up front with information when these events were taking place. Is the Irish Sea one of the most radioactive seas in the world? If so, what can we do about it? The statement says that we need have no worries about fish or shellfish and that is very important. Surely it must have some impact on marine life? It is affecting the food chain.

Mr. Cunningham: The Dead Sea is between five and ten times more radioactive than the Irish Sea. However, the Irish Sea has been contaminated to a significant degree by the discharges from Sellafield. It is important to assess the level of exposure of the Irish public to radiation. Our extensive monitoring programmes have measured the levels of exposure and have found them to be very low. Therefore, the risks of an effect occurring are very low indeed. One can always assume that for every dose of radiation, there is a possible effect and that the higher the dose, the higher the effect and vice versa. As the levels of exposure are very low, the risks of an effect are very low.

Senator O’Dowd: I acknowledge that the RPII has been very helpful and informative but many people in County Louth feel Ireland should have a strategy aimed at the closure of Sellafield. Does the RPII have a view on that?

Acting Chairman: That is a political question.

Senator O’Dowd: I do not accept that. This is a very important issue. Many people are worried about the dangerous effects a possible accident at Sellafield could have on the population here. The people of County Louth are certainly concerned and believe the Government should have a strategy to address that. I will put the question another way; how much pressure does the RPII exert on Sellafield?

Dr. O’Flaherty: We would be committed to fulfilling the Government’s strategy for the closure of Sellafield and also to the diminution, in every possible way, of the types of contamination issuing from it. The RPII is not complacent about this issue and recognises there are many uncertainties about the situation. Where there are uncertainties, the most pessimistic view is the one which should be taken. That being said, we must present our scientific findings and they indicate that the situation is not as bad as some would have feared. We are confident that people should not have any qualms or misgivings about the consumption of fish caught in the Irish Sea. Any degree of contamination in the fish is absolutely insignificant relative to radioactivity issuing from natural sources. At the same time, the RPII does not wish to play down the risks which exist.

Senator O’Dowd: Conclusion No. 6 states that favourable weather conditions and/or distance from a severe nuclear accident may mean that Ireland would avoid any effects. It also states that as winds come mainly from the north and south-west and are frequently strong, this helps to preserve Ireland from atmospheric contamination originating in the east. The problem is that an accident could occur on a day when the wind could be coming from the east. I do not wish to be rude or offensive but there is a degree of complacency in that conclusion which I cannot accept.

Acting Chairman: In fairness, the conclusions were only intended as a guide for Members. I presume detailed information is available in the RPII’s annual report.

Dr. O’Flaherty: The annual report is sent to all Deputies and Senators.

Acting Chairman: As regards the 11 monitoring locations, are there any sizeable variations in readings from one to another? An increase from 1.3 to 1.34 becquerels was outlined in respect of Dublin. Is there any explanation for that or can the increase be quantified?

Mr. Cunningham: The RPII does have 11 or 12 continuous gamma dose rate monitors throughout the country and there is a difference between them which can range from 10 to 20 per cent in the highest and lowest cases. That is caused by the natural environment in which the detectors are placed.

Dr. O’Flaherty: The difference between east and west is important in terms of marine contamination.

Mr. Cunningham: Marine contamination is greatest at the point of discharge at Sellafield and decreases with distance from Sellafield. Consequently, one can barely detect Sellafield traces on the west coast.

The slight increase in levels of krypton-85 is quite simply due to the fact that increased quantities of nuclear fuel are being reprocessed at Le Hague in France, THORP in the UK and in the Russian reprocessing plants. They are the main contributors to krypton-85 in our environment. With the increase in THORP throughput in the next few years, I expect to see a further small increase in that figure. Although I do not expect it to pose a threat to people’s health, I believe that technology is available which should be put in place to reduce these discharges.

Acting Chairman: I thank the delegation for its informative presentation to the Committee. This problem will not go away and we may call the RPII before the Committee again at some future stage. I thank the representatives for giving us the benefit of their professional expertise in this area.

Dr. O’Flaherty: We thank Members for their interest and attention.

The Joint Committee adjourned at 3.50 p.m.

Appendix 1

Appendix 2

List of Members of Joint Committee on Public Enterprise and Transport

* Deputy Seán Fleming substituted for Deputy Dick Roche.

** Senator Tom Fitzgerald substituted for Senator Des Hanafin.