Committee Reports::Report - The Treaty of Amsterdam::24 April, 1998::Appendix

Presentation on the Amsterdam Treaty
to the
Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs

Irish Congress of Trade Unions

1. Background to Trade Union Approach to Amsterdam Treaty

❑Irish Congress of Trade Unions is part of the wider European trade union movement - affiliated to the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC)

❑Disillusionment with the Maastricht ratification process which undermined the credibility and legitimacy of the European project. The lack of transparency and the ineffective communication generated disillusionment among the citizens of Europe. The Maastricht Treaty failed to address the real issues of concern to ordinary citizens employment, improved living and working conditions, social exclusion etc.

❑The Amsterdam Treaty cannot be seen as a ‘stand-alone’ development. Must be put into the wider context of European developments. particularly the fall-out from the Maastricht Treaty and the potential pitfalls along the way to the single currency. Decisions will be made shortly about the conversion rate of the Irish Pound which will have major consequences for the stability of the Irish economy and people’s living standards. If the proper balance is not achieved by going in at an an entry rate which protects jobs and living standards, then there will be further disillusionment. For this reason. Congress believes that an entry rate of 2.50DM is the appropriate rate.

❑In the lead-up to the Amsterdam Treaty, the trade union movement formulated a clear policy and strategy to ensure that the Amsterdam Treaty would not just concern itself with institutional and technical issues but that the opportunity would be taken to renew and revitalise the spirit of European solidarity. From the start of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in March, 1996 to the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty in June, 1997, the trade union movement pressed for the inclusion of the two key issues of Employment and Social Rights in the Treaty. This was part of the European-wide trade union campaign to get the IGC to address some real issues in the Treaty and to produce some real solutions to the problems of unemployment. social protection and citizens rights in the European Union.

2. Employment: A Long Road to Amsterdam

❑Commission’s White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment published in 1993.

❑Confidence Pact on Employment - initiative by President of the Commission (1995).

3. Key Trade Union Demands

❑Set employment targets and give them the same status as the monetary criteria for EMU.

❑Put in place an effective mechanism to monitor progress in the Member States and to intervene if necessary.

❑Education and training activities to be increased at all levels. A specific proposal to allocate 1% of Europe’s GDP to adult education and training.

4. Does the Amsterdam Treaty meet these Objectives?

❑From a situation where there was no reference to employment at the beginning of the IGC process to the inclusion of a new Title on Employment in the Treaty - it marks a very important breakthrough

❑There is now a need to put ‘flesh on the bones’ of what is in the Treaty.

❑Luxembourg Summit on Employment (November 1997) brought forward the implementation of the Employment Title ahead of ratification. Social partners are involved in the preparation of the Government’s report on its fulfilment of the different criteria set down in the Guidelines adopted at the Luxembourg Summit.

5. Social Rights

⇒Incorporation of the Social Agreement into the Treaty - thereby ending the UK opt-out.

⇒Incorporating the Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of Workers into the Treaty.

6. What does the Amsterdam Treaty provide on these Issues?

❑Incorporates into the Recuals a reference to the Charter on Fundamental Social Rights for Workers.

❑Strengthens Article 119 of the Treaty dealing with equal pay and broadens the reference to equal treatment in the workplace.

❑A new article on non-discrimination which empowers the EU to take action to combat discrimination based on sex, race, religion, disability, age and sexual orientation.

❑Provides for co-operation between the Member States to fight against social exclusion.

7. Conclusion

Whilst the Amsterdam Treaty is not going to radically change the direction in which Europe is going. Congress believes that it contains important new elements in the areas of employment and social rights. These have the potential to impact significantly on the lives of the citizens of Europe. If these provisions can be activated and developed in a meaningful way, then the Amsterdam Treaty could come to be regarded as an important milestone on the way to building a Citizens’ Europe.

THE AMSTERDAM TREATY

Six years ago, when the Maastricht Treaty was agreed. Europe’s Heads of State and Government concluded that further changes in the EU’s policies. powers and its decision-making capacity were needed. More importantly, it was decided that the EU’s Treaties should be adapted in good time to prepare the Union for enlargement. In benchmarking the Treaty agreed at Amsterdam in the early hours of 18 June against these political objectives one could reasonably come to the conclusion that Europe’s senior politicians did not deliver. The FT’s editorial summed up the situation with the headline “Amsterdam is no Maastricht”. European Report was a bit more blunt remarking “last minute compromises emerged on enough points to allow the Dutch Presidency to claim success without inviting open incredulity”.

Instead of opening the way to enlargement. a last-minute addition to the Treaty states that a further Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) may be required to tackle the very issues that triggered the IGC in the first place. A limit of five new members has. de facto, been imposed prior to the completion of (yet another) comprehensive review of the Union’s institutions. On a positive note, the enlargement process will be launched within six months.

EU’s leaders failed to agree to key changes because they go to the core of national sovereignty: voting rights at Ministers’ meetings and the right to appoint a member to the European Commission. Germany’s concerns blocked progress on extending voting by qualified majority. Another factor was the very sensitive nature of issues under negotiation e.g. defence and security.

The Amsterdam Summit was characterised by fractious debate, occasional bouts of bad temper, a noticeable cooling of the Franco-German alliance, a less confident German Chancellor, but a more positive UK attitude. This was not the sort of atmosphere conductive to constructive compromise.

A litmus test of the new Treaty is whether the European Parliament will campaign for its ratification. The Parliament’s President. Jose-Maria Gil-Robles. the leader of the Socialist Group, some Liberals and the Greens, have adopted a somewhat critical attitude, notwithstanding the additional powers conferred on the Assembly. MEPs will be voting on the details of the draft Treaty in November. Therefore, most governments will not begin their national ratification procedures until the end of the year at the earliest.

The new Amsterdam Treaty makes a few significant changes from a business perspective. The emphasis on competitiveness and flexible labour markets and the ending of the UK opt-out on social policy are two positive elements. The Treaty will have many indirect effects. For example, the re-balancing of power in favour of the European Parliament has implications for monitoring and lobbying of Parliamentary activity.

In this Issue

★ The Irish Business Bureau is the EU representative office of the Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) and the Chambers of Commerce of Ireland (CCI).

★ The European Monthly Newsletter provides up-to-date information about current European Union developments which affect the interests of Irish business.

★ All the documents referred to in this newsletter are available to member companies, on request, from the Bureau.

More importantly, the Amsterdam Treaty represents a further discernible step towards deeper European integration. It should therefore be supported.

This Newsletter reviews the draft Treaty of Amsterdam (dated 19 June 1997) with the aim of i) explaning the content of the new Treaty on European Union (TEU II), and ii) identifying the provisions that are of direct interest to Irish business and employers. The important conclusions agreed at the Summit on EMU are also covered.

INTRODUCTION

The draft Treaty is the product of the work undertaken by the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) over the past 15 months. The European Council reached agreement on the draft Amsterdam Treaty at its meeting on 16-18 June. Final legal editing and harmonisation of the texts will be completed with a view to signature of the Treaty in October 1997 in Amsterdam. The target date for its entry into force is 1 January 1999.

Of primary concern to business and employers are the new provisions on the EU’s decision-making process and Treaty changes under the heading of “The Union and the Citizen”. Of longer term interest are the new clauses on flexible co-operation. Significant changes have also been agreed in the area of fundamental freedoms and non-discrimination. Briefing about CFSP and JHA is provided as these are key political issues, although of little direct interest to the business community.

THE UNION’S INSTITUTIONS

The primary purpose of the IGC was to prepare the EU for future enlargement, with a Union of more than 20 Member States being a possibility by the year 2002. It did not achieve this objective. The results were “mediocre” according to the Commission’s President. A further IGC will have to take place before enlargement. The new provisions that were agreed imply some further loss in national sovereignty, with a commensurate (but very limited) streamlining of the EU’s overly-complex decision-making procedures.

•From the date of enlargement, are-weighting of the Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) system was proposed that would take greater account of the actual population of the Member States. Another option under consideration involved what is called a “double majority” voting system - whereby decisions could only be blocked if the countries representing the majority of the EU’s population so agreed. A decision was postponed until the next IGC. The so-called “loannina Compromise” will continue to operate in the meantime.

•On enlargement, the number of European Commissioners should be limited to twenty, with the five largest Member States sacrificing one position. Ireland and other smaller countries would not accept a situation where they would lose the right to nominate a Commissioner. There is agreement on a range of measures to strengthen the power of the President of the Commission, including the exercise by him/her of policy leadership. After 1999, the President’s nomination will have to be approved by the European Parliament.

•A reduction in the number of policy areas covered by the unanimity rule - except for issues involving the EU’s budget, taxation rates, enlargement and constitutional questions - was discussed in the final stages of the IGC. Contrary to expectations, most issues relating to the Internal Market, including indirect taxation, and decisions on the Structural Funds, industry and transport did not end up being subject to QMV. Proposals about social exclusion and equal opportunity will be adopted by QMV.

•The number of legislative procedures involving the European Parliament will be reduced to from twenty to three - assent, co-decision and consultation. The co-decision powers of the European Parliament will be extended and simplified to a considerable extent. MEPs and Ministers will have Joint powers of decision as regards social policy (as it relates to most areas covered by the Agreement on Social Policy, and on equal opportunities and equal treatment), public health, employment incentives. transport policy, Structural and Cohesion funds, R & D, and the environment. The co-operation procedure will be abolished except insofar as EMU is concerned (given the desire not to reopen, even incidentally, these provisions). The number of MEPs will be capped at 700. Ireland could lose three of its fifteen MEPs when the Parliament is enlarged.

•The powers of the Court of Justice have been extended and clarified in relation to the safeguarding of fundamental rights, the legality of Council decisions, actions by the Union on asylum and immigration, as well as certain issues relating to co-operation in police and judicial matters.

•The role of national parliaments will be strengthened. For example, all Commission consultation documents and proposals for legislation will be sent to the Oireachtas for comment. It is also envisaged that a grouping of the European Affairs Committees (COSAC) of national parliaments will have a more important role to play.

•The Committee of the Regions will be afforded greater administrative autonomy: it may be consulted by the EP: and it may also be consulted in future on proposals relating to employment, social matters and public health.

•The Court of Auditors will be given additional powers to detect irregularities, including the right of access to the premises of any body that manages EU funds.

•The Economic and Social Committee will have to be consulted as a matter of course on EU proposals in the areas of employment, social policy and public health.

•The proposal that the Union should have a legal personality (akin to that available to other international organisations) was not agreed.

•The location of the seats of the institutions have been agreed; twelve sessions of the European Parliament must be held in Strasbourg.

The biggest winner will be the European Parliament. given the significant number of policy areas that will henceforth be the subject of co-decision. Even more so than is the case at present, lobbying the Parliament will be a sine qua non in the future.

Employers will not be too pleased that employment and social policy will be covered by co-decision, and that the ECOSOC and the Committee of the Regions will be given additional consultation rights on these sensitive issues.

THE UNION AND THE CITIZEN

A somewhat cynical (and unfair) view expressed in Brussels is that some of the following issues lack any substance; that they are somewhat cosmetic (“window dressing”): and were pursued because some Member States need them for PR purposes in order to gain public support for the IGC. The argument goes that unless the EU citizens see something practical in the new Treaty they will not vote for it. In fact, the well-being of Europe’s citizens were very much to the fore during the negotiations.

An objective of the Treaty will be “the promotion of a high level of employment”. This is to be done by developing a co-ordinated strategy for employment. A new chapter on employment includes language based on the so-called “Essen conclusions” on employment. The social partners’ role is seen as passive, as their only involvement is to respond to eventual consultation with the new Employment Committee (which has already been established). The provisions are mainly procedural and aspirational in orientation and will. of themselves, not create one job. Responsibility for employment policy will continue to remain with Member States. Some Government voiced reservations about the real worth of the chapter. At the end of the day, something had to be said about employment, and the IGC duly delivered. On a positive note, the Treaty lays considerable emphasis on promoting a skilled and adaptable workforce and labour markets responsive to economic change.

There is an extension of the EU’s powers in the area of social exclusion (especially poverty), the elderly or disabled persons and equal pay for equal work or work of equal value. The co-decision procedure will be extended to certain EU social policy issues (but not to agreements concluded by the social partners at European level). The Social Agreement will be integrated into the Treaty. This will provide a single, coherent and effective legal framework for Community actions. The UK is committed to implementing the Directives already agreed under the Agreement and those which may be adopted before the entry into force of the new Treaty. The UK PM has made it crystal clear that he does not want the Commission to bring forward new EU social policy legislative proposals for the foreseeable future. Such proposals will have to take account of the need to maintain the competitiveness of the Community economy (but not that of individual companies). While Europe’s social partners were not asked for their collective views on the Treaty changes that affected them, what is proposed should not give rise to any particular difficulty.

As a direct consequence of the BSE crisis, new provisions on public health protection have been introduced. The focus will be on diseases that are of danger to human health. It is envisaged that specific provisions will be introduced setting minimum requirements in respect of the quality and safety of organs, and blood and blood derivatives. Measures in the veterinary and plant health fields will also be introduced. These provisions will affect the pharmaceuticals, food and tobacco industries.

A new Article will be introduced, without prejudice to Articles 90 and 92, calling on Member States to “take care that services of a general interest operate on the basis of principles and conditions which enable them to fulfil their mission”. There is deep suspicion in business circles that this new provision will be used by State monopolies to roll-back or postpone the current liberalisation process.

Achieving “a balanced and sustainable development” will become an explicit Treaty objective. The need to integrate environmental protection requirements into the definition and implementation of all Community policies will be recognised. The Commission intends to prepare environmental impact assessment studies when making proposals which have significant environmental implications. The proposal to extend QMV in the environment field was rejected.

The new Treaty will facilitate the introduction (and enhancement) of new consumer rights.

A non-binding Declaration calls for the drawing up of guidelines for improving the quality of the drafting of legislation to help ensure proper implementation by governments and a better understanding by the public and business. A major omission is any reference to the impact that EU proposals have on business. Proposals from UNICE on cost benefit analyses and impact assessment were not accepted by the IGC negotiators. However. The Protocol of subsidiarity (paragraph 9) - which has legal force - sets out some practical rules that the Commission will be obliged to follow before new legislative proposals are brought forward. The omission of a substantive reference to regulatory reform issues is a missed opportunity.

All citizens will be given a right of access to EU documents and information. The Institutions will be encouraged to become more open in their decision-making.

Declarations/Protocols have been made about public broadcasting, the abolition of the death penalty, the social significance of sport, voluntary service activity, island regions, animal rights, and how subsidiarity - the notion of leaving to the level of Member States matters which are more properly addressed at that level - and proportionality are to be implemented by the Institutions.

A task of the Community will be “a high degree of competitiveness”. Although, European business lobbied to have competitiveness classified as a distinct Treaty objective, the fact that any mention at all was made of this crucial issue is a step forward.

FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

A major new section on fundamental rights and non-discrimination has been agreed. Its key provisions are as follows:

•The underlying principle will be that the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental rights and the rule of law. Such matters will fall within the ambit of the Union and will be a pre-condition for any country applying to join the Union.

•The Union will respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the Rome (1950) Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.

Confirming their agreement to fundamental social rights as defined in the.....1989 Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers.

•In the event of a serious and persistent breach by a Member State of these principles, the voting rights of the country in question could be suspended.

•The Council will be given authority to take action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age, or sexual orientation (this is a very considerable extension of the provisions on non-discrimination).

•One of the tasks of the Union will be to promote equality between men and women and to eliminate inequalities.

•Individuals will have adequate protection of personal data where the institutions of the Union are concerned.

Employers may not be too pleased by the tacit recognition given in the Treaty to the Charter on Fundamental Workers’ Rights. This could mean that the Charter’s (non-binding) provisions could be invoked to justify calls for new legislative action, or in support of rulings of the Court of Justice. Furthermore, employers should note the incorporation of the Convention on Fundamental Freedoms. Assurances have been given that its provisions will not conflict with the EU’s Directives and jurisprudence.

CFSP

What sort of security and defence provisions could be included in an EU Treaty was the crunch issue. The main elements of what are called the Petersberg Tasks - peace keeping, crisis management and humanitarian assistance-will be incorporated. The inter-relationship between the EU, the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO in relation to operational matters was not sorted out, although the EU will be allowed to borrow NATO assets (including troops and armaments) via the WEU.

Proposals to merge or “integrate” the EU and the WEU were dropped largely due to UK opposition (and US sensitivities). If a phased merger had been agreed in principle, this would have represented a major policy achievement as this would have been a first step towards a European defence policy independent of NATO. While Ireland was prepared to see the WEU’s role expanded, perhaps via a closer institutional link with the Union, it was opposed, as were some other Member States, to the issue of decision-making on defence/military issues by QMV. The issue of mutual territorial defence commitments does not arise. There is an acceptance that the key decisions on the shape of the new system will be taken in NATO. CFSP actions (except defence) will be funded out of the Community budget.

There was no clear consensus as to how Foreign Policy Co-operation could be made to work better. The unanimity rule will stay for all fundamental policy decisions. A constructive abstention procedure will be allowed to facilitate actions being taken by those Member States that wish to do so. Relatively minor changes have been agreed. For example, the setting up of a policy planning and early warning unit and re-inforcing the office of the Secretary General of the Council so that the EU has one spokesperson on Foreign Policy issues. The Secretary General of the Council will become the High Representative for CFSP.

Compared with initial expectations, the changes in the area of CFSP are of an incremental nature and of limited interest to Ireland. Securing a more clear-cut defence identity for the EU is at least five years off.

New (but limited) provisions on the EU’s External Economic Relations are included in the section on CFSP. These extend the Commission’s power to negotiate at international negotiations (such as those within the WTO), agreements on services (GATS), and intellectual property rights (TRIPS). The new provisions on the management of the EU’s trade policy - while quite minimalist in nature - are to be welcomed for the good reasons, despite the fact that it is the world’s largest trading entity, the EU is not as effective as it should be in using its diplomatic influence and its economic capacity in its relations with third countries. Ireland, in a minority, supported an extension of the Commission’s competence. The Commission is unhappy that its role was not enhanced to a greater extent.

JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS

Another major new series of provisions covers the free movement of persons, asylum and immigration. The main features of a new Title in pillar one, inspired by the Schengen Accords on passport-free travel, include the following:

Enlargement

While the issue of enlargement has not featured prominently in the positions taken by most NGOs, the way it is handled will have a huge impact on the economic and social development of Europe, and on the possibility of decent work for all Europeans. The Amsterdam Treaty was meant to lead the way to the inclusion of new European nations and set the basis of the European Union for the Third Millennium. Most of the analysis has focused on the failure of the treaty to finalise constitutional mechanisms which can accommodate enlargement. In the long term the Treaty’s failure to allocate significant new cohesion expenditure to help new members develop their economies may be of far greater importance. The implications weaker economies entering a single labour market without adequate investment support is likely to be high levels of worker migration. This will cause problems both in the countries from which workers emigrate and the countries they move to. It will contribute to increased unemployment and social exclusion right across Europe.

Areas of work for Unemployed Groups

The first task of unemployed organisations must be to analyse the Treaty as it will effect the unemployed in their own country. This should involve initiating a widespread and serious debate about whether progress should be assessed in a practical and political way in relation to developments from Maastricht, or whether the new Treaty should be challenged on a much wider basis on how it addresses the situation of mass unemployment which currently faces us.

Such a debate should inform the position to be taken in any referendum or ratification process within your own member state.

On a more practical level, the Treaty opens up a number of new avenues for lobbying:

•The new Employment Committee: find out which civil servants/ministers are on this Committee, and what influence it is likely to have - and what influence we can have on it.

•The new ‘incentive measures’ in the Employment Chapter. What role should unemployed organisations seek either as applicants for this funding or as monitors of its use. What input can we have into the design of the new programmes.

•Review under Article 120. What areas of policy do we think should be reviewed, how can be put the onto the agenda and how can we have an input into the review.

• A commitment that within five years (by 2004), all controls on persons, be they citizens of the Union or nationals of third countries, will be removed when crossing internal borders.

•Common set of checks will be introduced on persons at the external borders of the Member States.

•New rules will be introduced on asylum, as will measures on refugees and displaced persons. However, most decisions must be taken unanimously.

•Measures will be introduced defining the rights and conditions under which nationals of third countries who are legally resident in a Member State may reside and have access to employment.

•The free movement of persons will be guaranteed among thirteen member states. As the UK wanted to protect its Common Travel Area it did not wish the EU to apply the Schengen acquis (on the gradual abolition of checks at the common borders of most Member States). Ireland will not be bound either, but could opt to accept some or all of the provisions at any time in the future. Ireland will be able to participate in work in this area.

More detailed provisions on police law enforcement, customs and judicial co-operation on criminal matters will be introduced. The objective is to proceed with common actions to prevent and combat crime by, for example, approximating the rules on criminal matters in the Member States and facilitating extradition. The resources of the European Police Office (EUROPOL) will be used. The Court of Justice will have jurisdiction over these new provisions and the actions will be funded under the Union’s budget.

Solid progress has been made on third pillar issues. This is because there is a good measure of agreement that the Maastricht Treaty provisions on JHA are extremely vague and, to date, the policy has been somewhat of a failure. Thus more robust action is foreseen in relation to crime, drugs, visas, asylum, border controls and immigration. Again, all are issues of visible relevance to the electorate. The Commission will have a right of initiative (and consequently the Parliament will be consulted on its proposals). Internal security, policing and the enforcement of criminal law will remain intergovernmental in nature.

FLEXIBILITY

This rather innocent-sounding topic was very much at the heart of the IGC. In short, “flexibility”, or flexible integration, is all about applying Treaty language to a concept that would legitimise a hard-core approach to EU integration. It represents an important departure. The basic argument is the Member States that so wish could progress to a higher degree of integration (“enhanced co-operation”) without the remaining Member States being able to block such a move. An “opt-up” clause was thus included in the Treaty.

For example, in theory at least, if the participants in the Single Currency wished to harmonise, or approximate further, their taxation rates they could do so without interference from the non-participating countries. In reality, this is a device to get around the unanimity rule. The current Schengen arrangement is cited as a practical expression of what could be achieved within the competence of the EU’s Treaties. The idea of flexibility is also relevant in the field of CFSP.

Clauses have been included in the draft Treaty in order to establish the limits of closer co-operation between the Member States. For example, future co-operation should not affect the acquis communautaire. nor the rights, obligations and interests of those Member States which do not participate, nor distort, the conditions of competition. Because these pre-conditions are so wide-ranging and the triggering of flexible co-operation will be subject to unanimity, it is hard to envisage many concrete areas where flexible co-operation could be envisaged. The Union’s budget will not contribute to actions carried out by participating countries under this heading.

CODIFICATION

There are now a dozen basic Treaties and Acts, not to mention Protocols containing a total of nearly 800 Articles. Work was undertaken in parallel to the IGC to simplify the Treaties as a separate exercise from the substantive negotiations. A number of obsolete Articles have been identified and these will be incorporated into the Amsterdam Treaty. An “unofficial” codification of the Treaties will be produced in due course.

EMU - SUMMIT DECISIONS

The Amsterdam Summit reached agreement on legal texts and political resolutions that will facilitate a smooth passage to, and a successful functioning of, the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union.

Specifically, the Council agreed two Regulations that form part of the Stability and Growth Pact for ensuring budgetary discipline in EMU. (Formal decisions will be adopted very soon). These Regulations also cover the obligations of Member States not participating in the euro area. A framework now exists for effective multilateral surveillance. The excessive deficit procedure is set down in precise language which requires, inter alia, the proceeds of sanctions to be distributed to Member States participating in the euro areas and not having an excessive deficit.

The principles and fundamental elements of a new Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM 2), to be established as from 1 January 1999, have also been approved. A+/- 15% fluctuation margin has been endorsed. Intervention at the margins will, in principle, be automatic and unlimited, with very short-term financing available.

Complete agreement has been secured on the two Regulations which constitute the legal framework for the euro. The first confirms the conversion rate on a one-to-one basis between the official basket of currencies and the euro. The legal continuity of contracts and other legal instruments are confirmed. The second Regulation spells out what will happen after the single currency becomes a reality in 1999.

A separate resolution was agreed to keep employment firmly at the top of the political agenda of the Union. According to the European Report “It took every trick of the linguistic contortionist to reconcile the irreconcilable”. The extent to which this commitment is any different in substance from previous declarations is a moot point. Welcomed features include the recognition that improving European competitiveness is a pre-requisite for growth and employment, and the emphasis on the employability of workers. The general impression is that the much-hyped Employment Summit to be held next November will generate more paper than jobs. The last such Summit (in Rome in June 1996) was one of the biggest non-events of the year. It remains to be clarified as to why the Summit called on Europe’s social partners to use the social dialogue to underpin Ministerial work on employment. Obviously, the social partners joint input on employment to the Dublin Summit has been forgotten.

As a consequence of these decisions, most of the technical preparations for EMU have now been accomplished. At a political level, there is an absolute commitment regarding the implementation of the Stability and Growth Pact.

(In the spirit of the Summit’s conclusions on EMU the Government should publish Ireland’s latest economic convergence programme as adopted by ECOFIN Ministers in June. This document will form the basis of Ireland’s Stability and Growth Programme that must be presented by March 1999).

EMU - GOVERNMENT’S CHANGEOVER PLAN

The Government’s National Changeover Plan for the introduction in Ireland of the single currency was made by the (then) Minister for Finance Ruairi Quinn, at IBEC’s Annual Conference on 29 May.

The Plan sets out a framework for implementation of the changeover to the euro by Government Departments, the Revenue Commissioners, the Central Bank, the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA), banks and building societies and the Irish Stock Exchange.

• Government Departments will accept payment in euros as well as in Irish pounds.

• All budgetary, financial and economic publications from the Department of Finance will provide summary information in euros.

•Central Bank operations in the Irish wholesale money and foreign exchange markets will be denominated in euros.

•Revenue will accept payment of tax in euro as well as in Irish pounds; Revenue will also accept returns and declarations in euros from companies and for self-assessed income tax for accounting periods which begin on or after 1 January 1999.

•New issues of Irish Government bonds, bills and notes which would otherwise have been denominated in Irish pounds and other currencies which are being replaced by the euro will be denominated in euros.

•All outstanding Irish Governments bonds, bills and notes which were issued in and are to be redeemed in Irish pounds will be re-denominated in euros.

•Payments into Irish Government personal savings products operated by An Post, as agent for the NTMA, will be accepted in euros as well as in Irish pounds.

•Companies may file their accounts with the Companies Registration Office in euros.

•Banks and building societies will process lodgements and payments expressed in either Irish pounds or euros.

•Irish equities will be quoted, traded and settled on the Irish Stock Exchange in euros only.

•All bonds and equities information published by the Irish Stock Exchange will be published in euros.

•A Currency Changeover Board will be established under the aegis of the Department of Finance to oversee the detailed implementation of the changeover, including the areas of public and consumer information.

For further details contact Philip Hamell (Department of Finance) at (01) 6045123.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

The Commission’s point of departure was that the IGC was not a routine or a theoretical exercise; it was quite simply an opportunity to strengthen the political unity of Europe. Therefore, the Commission pursued what might be described as a maximalist agenda. The Dutch Presidency had, initially at least, higher ambitions in terms of the content of the Treaty. The President of the European Parliament called for “limited but substantial progress”. This sentiment captures the essence of the new Treaty. While the agenda for EU constitutional change grew well beyond what was envisaged when the 1996 IGC was originally planned, one (disappointing) outcome of the current round of talks is that a fundamental review of the EU, including constitutional consolidation, must await at least one other IGC.

The positive result at the Summit will trigger the opening of enlargement negotiations within six months.

The Commission will now bring forward by mid-July its AGENDA 2000 package of proposals, including such controversial issues as the size and priorities of the EU budget (2000-2005), a reform of Structural Policy. CAP reform and a strategy to stagger the enlargement process.

Getting the European electorate to sign up to what has already been described by the Commission as “dull stuff” will be the biggest challenge of all. The draft Treaty - all 146 pages of it - is not exactly bed-side reading material. It is, however, very much a citizens’ Treaty. No doubt the government will translate its key provisions into simpler language when a White Paper is published in due course.

Given the quite different positions that have emerged between the French and German governments as regards Monetary and Economic Union and the conclusion agreed at Amsterdam on the introduction of the Single Currency, several conclusions could be drawn. Firstly, EMU will go ahead on schedule. Secondly, a “softer” euro may emerge as it is now inevitable that the qualifying rules will be interpreted in a flexible manner. Finally, upwards of twelve countries could join at the outset.

(Editor’s Note: The material on the draft Amsterdam Treaty is based on the provisional version of the draft Treaty of Amsterdam as it appears in document CONF/ 4001/97 dated 19 June 1997).

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PEACE AND NEUTRALITY ALLIANCE

OBJECTIVES

1.It is within the OSCE and a reformed United Nations, and not the EU, that Ireland should pursue its security concerns.

2.Ireland should pursue a positive neutrality and independent foreign policy and not join or form an association with any military alliance, such as the WEU or NATO.

3.Ireland should seek to promote European and International security through a policy of disarmament and demilitarisation and should therefore oppose the militarisation of the EU.

4.Ireland should refuse to cooperate with or condone in any way policies or military groupings which maintain nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction.

5.Irish troops should only serve abroad as peacekeepers under the auspices of the UN

The Amsterdam Treaty Referendum

The Peace and Neutrality Alliance was established to maintain a policy of Irish Neutrality and to oppose the transformation of the EU into a nuclear armed superstate.

The Referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty will probably be held on the 22nd of May. The Treaty effectively ends the State’s commitment to the policy of neutrality in so far as Article J7 commits its signatories to the;

The common defence policy is to be framed in the context of the link between the EU and the WEU (a nuclear armed military alliance).

PANA will be campaigning for a No vote. Our aim is to ensure that the Treaty is renegotiated and Irish Neutrality is retained by the inclusion of a Protocol similar to the Danish Protocol which would exclude us from defence commitments within the the WEU.

PANA is open to all who support our objectives, whether as individual member or as groups. I urge you to renew your membership or join if you are not already a member.

The Referendum on the Amsterdam Treaty is of great historical significance. In 1918 with the establishment of the Dail we ended our commitment to a common defence policy within the British Union, and in the last 80 years neutrality has become a cornerstone of our Foreign Policy and our Independence. It is now proposed to end that policy and establish a common defence policy within the EU. Major political parties in Ireland and Europe make no secret of the fact that they wish the European Union to develop into a nuclear armed superstate. PANA needs your active support in its campaign to maintain a policy of neutrality and to seek security through the UN and the OSCE rather than the EU/WEU.

INFORMATION BULLETIN

The Peace & Neutrality Alliance was established in 1995 to maintain a policy of Irish Neutrality and to oppose efforts to transform the European Union into a nuclear armed superstate. The groups that have supported our objectives and have affiliated to and/or supported PANA include;

From Positive Neutrality TO Nuclear Insanity

The Amsterdam Treaty is a major attack on the policy of Irish Neutrality and a further decisive move towards the transformation of the European Union into a nuclear armed superstate.

Eamon de Valera, president of the executive council of the Irish Free State 1932-7, Taoiseach 1937-48, 1951-4, 1957-9; uachtarán 1959-73 (Irish Press photo, taken on the occasion of a Radio Éireann broadcast on ‘The nations food requirements’, 3 December 1941).

The EU will now decide matters with defence implications and have a defence arm. The Treaty commits the state to “the progressive framing of a common defence policy”. It envisages the full integration of the nuclear armed military alliance, the Western European Union, into the EU. It advocates the use of the WEU in “peacemaking” and “crisis management”, creates a EU Foreign and Security Policy Supremo; establishes an embryonic Foreign Office; and brings cooperation on armaments into the EU. It moves the state from having a policy of positive neutrality towards a policy of nuclear insanity.

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

The Amsterdam Treaty, inserts a new Article J.1 into the European Treaties, with the following opening sentence:

“The Union shall define and implement a common foreign policy covering all areas of foreign and security policy......”

This replaces Article J.1 of the Maastricht Treaty, which stated, “The Union and its member states shall define and implement” the common and security policy. The new Treaty therefore attaches a common foreign and security policy to the Union itself.

A new Article J.2 is inserted, empowering the Union itself, rather than the Member States acting in cooperation, to pursue the objectives of the common foreign and security policy by, “defining the principles and general guidelines of the common foreign policy, deciding on common strategies, adopting joint actions, adopting common positions and strengthening systematic cooperation between Member States in the conduct of policy.”

DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS

A new Article J.3 is substituted for Article J.8.1. and 2 of the Maastricht Treaty. It states, ‘The European Council shall define the principles of and the general guidelines for the common foreign and security policy, including for matters with defence implications’

This Article gives an explicit role to the European Council in military and defence issues greater than the Maastricht Treaty.

TOWARDS A COMMON DEFENCE

A new Article J7 replaces J4 of the Maastricht Treaty. It states, ‘The common foreign and security policy shall include all questions relating to the security of the Union, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy, in accordance with the second subparagraph, which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. It shall in that case recommend to the member states the adoption of such a decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.’

There is no Article in the Irish Constitution which prevents the State from entering a military alliance, as Irish Neutrality has always been a policy with political rather that legal power.

If this Treaty is passed we will be committed to the progressive framing of a common defence policy. The “second subparagraph” refers to the EU/WEU link, so that the proposed common defence policy is to be based on that link.

Since the terms of the Treaty will be part of our Constitution, the commitment will be part of our Constitution. A commitment which did not apply to our neutrality.

The Referendum previously held to ratify the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 stated that;

“No provision of this constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the European Union.”

In short, the Maastricht Treaty is superior to any article the Irish Constitution.

However, it only applies to obligations necessitated up to and including the Masstricht Treaty.

The Supreme Court ruled that every further step in the transfer of power to Brussels by the Irish people would need another Referendum. and the Amsterdam Treaty is in that category. It is likely that the proposed Referendum, will give the new Amsterdam Treaty, which is a development on Maastricht, the same superiority over our own Constitution.

The Peace and Neutrality Alliance is therefore calling for a Referendum to amend Article 29.2 of our Constitution which reads,

‘Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes by international arbitration or judicial determination’, by adding,

‘To this end the State shall, in particular, maintain a policy of non-membership of military alliances’.

This would make clear that the Irish people did not want the EU to develop into a nuclear armed superstate. It would copper fasten our neutrality, and even by seeking support, we would be exposing who does, and who does not, support Irish Neutrality.

PANA believes is not possible with any level of credibility to state that one supports Irish Neutrality while at the same time agreeing to the phrase, ‘the progressive framing of a common defence policy’, contained in the Amsterdam Treaty. No Irish politician can credibly advocate a policy which they did not wish to implement.

Article J.7(3) States: “The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain member States and shall respect the obligations of certain member-States, which see their common defence realised in NATO, under the North Atlantic Treaty and be compatible with the Common Security and Defence Policy established within that framework.”

It is sometimes claimed this article protects our neutrality. Yet how can the “policy of the Union” … be compatible with the common security and defence policy established within that framework” (NATO’s) and not “prejudice” the security and defence policies of the neutrals?

DANISH PROTOCOL

“With regard to measures adopted by the Council in the field of Articles J.3(1) and J.7 of the Treaty of the European Union, Denmark does not participate in the elaboration and the implementation of decisions and actions of the Union which have defence implications, but will not prevent the development of closer cooperation between member States in this area. Therefore Denmark shall not participate in their adoption. Denmark shall not be obliged to contribute to the financing of the operational expenditure arising from such measures”.

There was no reason why Ireland could not also have insisted on a similar Protocol.

THE EUROPEAN ARMS INDUSTRY

The last sentence of the new article J.7.1. encourages Member States to cooperate in order to develop the European Arms industry and armaments policy. It states;

“The progressive framing of a common defence policy will be supported, as member States consider appropriate, by cooperation between them in the field of armaments.”

In the context of the Titley Report of the European Parliament, this provision has serious implications for Ireland which has a small but growing arms trade as can be seen in the report Links: Ireland’s Link’s with the Arms Trade and Military Industry published be AfRI, which clearly established the involvement of Irish companies in the international arms industry.

The annual production of defence equipment in the European Union is approximately £40 billion, which is 3% of annual industrial output. The industry employs 600,000 people directly and 400,000 indirectly. Germany, France, Italy, the UK and Sweden account for 90% of the EU arms trade which has a 20% share of the world export market for major conventional weapons. However the Titley Report makes it clear that the there has been a cut back in orders for military equipment leading to fierce competition especially with the US.

“Neither the European defence identity nor the common foreign and security policy of the EU can be credible without a strong European armaments industry.”

“A European armaments policy would be easier to pursue if there was a consensus on the major objectives of the Common Foreign and Security Policy—”.

There can be little doubt that one of the main reasons for having a common foreign and security policy, which would be greatly strengthened if the Amsterdam Treaty is passed, is to expand and develop the European arms industry. It gives a clear signal that such expansion should happen in Ireland as well.

History of Neutrality

s we celebrate the 1798 Rebellion when the United Irishmen sought to break the link with the British Union and establish a sovereign Irish Republic, we remember that it was Wolfe Tone who first advocated Irish neutrality at the time of a potential English/Spanish War in 1789. The tradition of neutrality was maintained by the Young Irelanders and the Irish Republican Brotherhood in the 19th century. However most of political leadership supported a common foreign policy within the British Union.

In the 20th century Redmond encouraged thousands upon thousands of Irish to die for that common foreign and defence policy. It was not to last. At the start of the century, James Connolly, Francis Sheehy Skeffington and Seán T O’Ceallaigh, who later became President of Ireland 1945-59, had established the Irish Neutrality League. This happened to revive support for Irish neutrality which became central to our belief in National Independence. The Leader of the Irish Republican Brotherhood, Michael Collins, with De Valera and others led the Anti-Conscription Campaign, and ended this common defence policy with the establishment of the Republic in 1918 and replaced it with one of neutrality.

Successive Irish Governments supported the League of Nations as a global organisation offered the best chance for world peace and the role of small nations in achieving that peace. The commitment to the policy of Irish neutrality was so strong that when the Irish Constitution was passed in 1937 there was no reference to it in the text. The entire Dail, except James Dillon who went on to lead Fine Gael, voted to support Irish Neutrality in the 2nd World War. The policy gave rise to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and a long and honourable service to peacekeeping in the service of the United Nations.

An MRBI poll in Sept., 1996 showed that 69% of the people wanted to maintain a policy of Irish Neutrality, 20% wanted to change it and 11% had no opinion. Now it is proposed in the articles of the Amsterdam Treaty to revert to the political values of John Redmond, and with the same possible consequences for another generation of Irish people.

Instead, Ireland should stay loyal to the tradition of Tone, the Young Irelanders, the IRB and others who helped found the State. Ireland should seek to develop a European Union which is an Association of Sovereign and Democratic States, whose membership is similar to the OSCE, a regional grouping of the UN, where common security is achieved through a process of dialogue, negotiation and demilitarisation. Common Security is a global and an international issue, not a “European” issue. It is through a reformed UN that Ireland should seek to achieve Common Security, a reformed UN that was properly financed by a tax on international currency transactions. Currency speculators and holders of Ansbacher accounts would feel much better if they knew that some of their money was being used to end the poverty throughout the world that gives rise to insecurity and war.

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

The WEU was established in March 1948, was overtaken by the establishment of NATO in 1949, and lay dormant until relaunched in the mid-Eighties as a potential defence arm of the European Union. Its members include Belgium, France, German, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the U.K. During its relaunch, at the Hague in 1987, the WEU issued a “Platform on European Security Interests”, calling for a EU common defence and strengthened solidarity between the EU and NATO.

The Platform also reaffirmed support for nuclear defence and stated that nuclear weapons were required “to confront a potential aggressor with an unacceptable risk.”

WEU membership brings a binding security guarantee even stronger than NATO’s. The WEU attached two declarations to the Maastricht Treaty in which it made clear its evolving role as the defence component of the EU and its binding link with NATO.

The Amsterdam Treaty clearly envisages full integration of the WEU into the EU in due course.

“is an integral part of the development of the Union providing the Union with access to an operational capability..... It supports the Union in framing the defence aspects of the common foreign and security policy as set out in this Article. The Union shall accordingly foster closer institutional relations with the WEU with a view to the possibility of the integration of the WEU into the Union, should the European Council so decide.”

This integration has to be adopted according to the constitutional requirements of the Member States. A protocol to Article 7 of the Treaty calls for arrangements for enhanced cooperation between the EU and the WEU to be ready within a year of the Amsterdam Treaty being ratified. Since the EU Commission, the EU Parliament, the Governments of Germany, France, Holland, Belgium, Italy, and Spain, all support the merger of the WEU with the EU there can be little doubt about the signal an Irish Government is giving by supporting this Treaty.

CRISIS MANAGEMENT & PEACEMAKING

“Questions referred to in this Article shall include humanitarian and rescue tasks, peacekeeping tasks and combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”

The phrase, “shall include”, means that military actions which the WEU undertakes on behalf of the EU are not confined to the tasks mentioned, but may go beyond them. Article J.7.2 explicitly lists the “Petersburg tasks” The words “crisis management,” and “peacemaking” are not defined and their interpretation therefore will be left to the Council. They could include any military intervention in any war situation. It appears member states can opt out of any such engagement. However Denmark, but not Ireland, insisted on a Protocol added to the Treaty so that it would be specifically excluded from any involvement military, political, or financial in decisions taken in regard to military involvement undertaken by the EU under the articles of this Treaty. In practice, however, it would prove very difficult for any Irish Government,-representing even before the EU’s expansion, less that 1% of the EU’s population- to distance itself from military action after agreeing to the terms of the Amsterdam Treaty.

“The member States shall support the Unions external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity.”

AN EU FOREIGN OFFICE

Article J.8 gives the Secretary General of the Council of Ministers the function of;

This makes an EU civil servant a full-time executive supervising the implementation of the EU’s common foreign and security policy. It creates the embryo of an EU Dept. of Foreign Affairs. The Treaty also establishes a Common Foreign and Security Policy planning and early warning unit run by the General Secretary.

MAJORITY VOTING ON SECURITY

Article J. 13 provides for foreign and security decisions to be taken by qualified majority voting.

“when adopting joint actions, common positions or taking any other decision on the basis of a common strategy, (and) when adopting any decision implementing a joint action or a common position.”

This means that an individual state like Ireland can be overruled, subject to the qualification that if a member State, “for important and stated reasons of national policy,” objects to such a vote, it will not proceed, but may be referred to the European Council, the Heads of State and Government, for decision by unanimity. However, in practice, states have very rarely used this device, and small states such as Ireland will be under great pressure to accept majority decisions.

THE EU COMMISSION

Article C of the Maastricht Treaty is amended so as to enjoin cooperation between the Commission and the Council of Ministers in ensuring consistency between the EU’s common foreign and security policy and other areas of the Treaty. This and other articles strengthens the involvement of the EU Commission with EU foreign policy and security matters.

The Peace & Neutrality Alliance

This document was produced with the help of the Green Group of the European Parliament. PANA is open to membership to all groups and individuals who accept our objectives which are as follows:

1.It is within the OSCE and a reformed United Nations, and not the EU, that Ireland should pursue its security concerns.

2.Ireland should pursue a positive neutrality and independent foreign policy and not join or form an association with any military alliance, such as the WEU or NATO.

3.Ireland should seek to promote European and international security through a policy of disarmament and demilitarisation and should therefore oppose the militarisation of the EU.

4.Ireland should refuse to cooperate with or condone in any way policies or military groupings which maintain nuclear weapons or any weapons of mass destruction.

5.Irish troops should only serve abroad as peacekeepers under the auspices of the UN.

THE REFERENDUM

Denmark, Portugal and Ireland are likely to be the only states where there will be a Referendum. So the political elite throughout the EU which is committed to the creation of a nuclear armed, centralised and anti-democratic superstate, will create it without any effective reference to the vast majority of the people of the EU. Only 2% are being asked to ratify the Treaty by way of Referendum.

In Denmark the Government established an Independent Commission in June 1997 to allocate £2.5 million to the different sides in the debate before the Referendum in May 1998. So at least there is a democratic debate in one state.

In Ireland the Government published a White Paper written by the civil servants that helped in the negotiations at the end of January 1998, and plan to have a referendum in April or May of 1998. They have appointed an Independent Commission and allocated it £2.5m to provide ‘fair’ coverage to the different sides in the debate, as a consequence of the McKenna Judgment of the Irish Supreme Court.

This is not democracy in any meaningful sense of the word in the EU. Apart from Denmark, Portugal and Ireland, the Amsterdam Treaty will become law throughout the EU with virtually none of the people of the European Union having any real idea of what it is about. It is a good example of how the the political elite of Europe intend to destroy effective democracy in the 21st century. This is why more and more people are opting out of actually voting. The turn out at the last election in Ireland was the lowest since the foundation of the state.

This is why the Peace and Neutrality Alliance seeks the support of the Irish people 200 years after they opposed the British Union, to once more support Irish Democracy by voting against the Treaty and to then seek amendments which will exclude Ireland from aspects of the Treaty which attempt to slowly strangle our neutrality and national democracy.

Message from Patricia McKenna MEP

It means that Ireland can take a strong stance on world affairs. Instead of joining nuclear-armed bodies, we can push for disarmament. We can fight world poverty, promote human rights, tackle the arms race and demand respect for the environment.

As billions are being spent on armaments to “strengthen” the EU’s common foreign and security policy (CFSP) Ireland should be working against that unjustifiable waste in a world full of poverty.

But successive governments have undermined Irish neutrality by bringing us closer to nuclear alliances like the Western European Union and softening Ireland’s position on issues like human rights abuses by repressive regimes.

During this crucial period in the history of the EU, Irish neutrality needs to be invigorated.

I fully support the Peace & neutrality Alliance (PANA) in protecting our neutrality and encouraging a more open debate on the future direction of Irish foreign policy.

Quotations

“A small nation has to be extremely cautious when it enters into alliances which brings it, willy-nilly, into those wars. As I said during the last war, the position was that we would not be consulted in how war would be started- the great powers would do that- and when it was ended, no matter who won, suppose the side we were on won, we would not be consulted as to the terms on which it would end.”

“You cannot have a European Common Foreign and Security Policy without a European Army”

Leo Tindermans, Rapporteur, EU Parliament’s Common Foreign and Security Policy Committee to a Briefing Session of members of the Dail and Seanad 21/1/98

“The United States, the world’s other great and successful currency union, has strong federal political institutions. Europe has yet to develop in that direction, but it will have to do so.”

“There is no alternative to a Federal State. European unification must be seen through to a successful conclusion.”

The Labour’s Party’s commitment to peace means that we will seek to solve disputes through peaceful means, turn our back on the barbarism of war, and strengthen our position as a military neutral nation outside all military alliances.”

Fianna Fail are committed to nuclear disarmament. We will oppose any moves to edge Ireland closer to membership of an alliance still committed to the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. We oppose Irish participation in NATO itself, in NATO- led organisations such as the Partnership for Peace, or in the Western European Union beyond observer status. Fianna Fail in government will not participate in any co-operative security structure which has implications for Irish neutrality without first consulting the people through a referendum.

Fianna Fail will strive to achieve a fresh vision of the European Union as a political and economic community, rather than a military superpower or a federal superstate.”

Des O’Malley PD Spokespersom on Foreign Affairs to meeting with PANA delegation 14/5/98

EUROPEAN DEFENCE DEBATE

BRIEFING PAPER TWO by CAROL FOX, Research Officer, Peace & Neutrality Alliance

There are now discussions taking place in Dublin of real importance. The European Union is having an Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) which will make major decisions about the future course of the European Union and the place of defence in that Union. This will effect the future shape of Europe. It could also mean the end of Ireland’s Neutrality.

Last Autumn, the Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) published a pamphlet. “European Defence Debate”, which outlined how the EU’s thinking about post-Cold War Europe was, unfortunately, being shaped by NATO. The Maastricht Treaty made the NATO-linked, nuclear weapons based Western European Union (WEU) an “integral part of the development of the EU” and charged it with implementing EU decisions and actions which had “defence implications’. The IGC now intends to strengthen that WEU-EU link even further. And, as our first pamphlet predicted, the Irish Government is steadily being sucked into the NATO-fying of the EU under the guise of peacekeeping and humanitarian missions.

Ireland’s Neutrality is on a crash course with Fortress Europe — and it’s ironic that that crash landing is to be made on Irish soil. The Dublin IGC is set to: 1) further the merger of the WEU into the EU; 2) bring some majority voting into Common Foreign and Security Policy decision-making; 3) select a Foreign and Security policy Supremo akin to NATO’s Secretary-General; 4) strengthen the armaments industry in Europe; 5) facilitate the dispatch of “mobile”, “rapidly deployable” military forces to the world’s “trouble spots”.

The Irish Government is worried about this. But the EU is about trade-offs, as we’re constantly reminded, and hasn’t Ireland’s EU membership brought it over £18 billion? Surely, says the anti-neutrality lobby, we should be willing to “defend” our benefactors?

How far is the Government willing to compromise Ireland’s neutrality and its distinctive world role? Does it have any choice? Or is the NATO lobby just too powerful?

THE WHITE PAPER

The Government’s recently published White Paper expresses strong support for Ireland’s Neutrality, and highlights the positive role it has played internationally, Ireland will remain Neutral, says the White Paper, and will not be seeking membership of the WEU or of NATO. However, it then goes on to express an interest in military cooperation with NATO and the WEU. In terms of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP), “the Government have decided to explore further the benefits that Ireland might derive from participation” and the Government is to discuss with the WEU involvement in humanitarian and peacekeeping areas of the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks.

A key question here is why are we prepared to play around the edges of organisations we are fundamentally opposed to? The White Paper states quite strongly that Ireland will not be joining NATO or the WEU. It says this because it knows full well the Irish people would be strongly against any such membership. This is not just because of support for Neutrality (which is high); it is also because of long-standing opposition to NATO and by extension the WEU. NATO represents a Cold War militaristic approach to “security” based on the threat of nuclear weapons. Its “defence” strategy is based on the willingness to use indiscriminate and inhumane weapons of mass destruction, i.e. to commit war crimes, a view of nuclear weapons upheld in July by the International Court of Justice at The Hague.

The nuclear-based WEU is no better. It is merely the European wing of NATO. It is now also unfortunately the evolving military wing of the EU. And although Maastricht designated the WEU as the “vehicle” for bring defence into the EU. NATO is still firmly in the driver’s seat. The WEU could not exist without NATO: its weapons are NATO’s; its soldiers are NATO’s: and its instructions have to be approved by NATO. Its mutual defence pact is underpinned by NATO. There have been recent moves to “Europeanise” the decision-making of the WEU (see below), but NATO would still be involved both logistically and at the planning level.

So, despite expressing strong support in the White Paper for the UN and its European regional grouping, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) as forums for the development of international and European security, the Government is helping to strengthen and enlarge two military bodies — the WEU and NATO — which are directly opposed to the values and ideals upon which Irish foreign policy is purportedly based. However, this approach is not opposed to Ireland’s “interests” as defined by the Government: strong membership of the EU and no banishment to any outer core of the EU because of inability to be a full player in EU matters. Ireland qualifies for the inner core economically but not militarily. Cooperation with the WEU/NATO in “peacekeeping” and “humanitarian assistance” is Ireland’s opening bid at the IGC. How much the EU will up the ante will be revealed over the coming months.

Meanwhile, domestically the Government doesn’t have a lot of room for manoeuvre. Fianna Fail, the Greens, the Workers Party and a number of NGOs (including nearly every major development group in Ireland) have vehemently opposed NATO’s Partnership for Peace as has one of the Government’s own Coalition partners. Democratic Left. (PfP is an “ill-disguised off-shoot of NATO”). In the Dail, Democratic Left’s Kathleen Lynch accused NATO of “touting” the PfP around Europe in an “attempt to establish its control of security arrangements in post-Cold War Europe” and Fianna Fail leader. Bertie Ahern, said PfP membership would be seen as a “signal that Ireland is moving away from its Neutrality and towards gradual incorporation into NATO and the WEU” Both he and Green MEP, Patricia McKenna, said a Referendum would be required before the PfP could be agreed to.

Thanks to the landmark legal case Patricia McKenna pursued all the way to the Supreme Court, the Government will no longer be able to use public funds to push only its side of the argument in future referenda. If the PfP does come to a vote, the proNeutrality case will at last be given a more democratic airing — something it was denied in the Single European Act and Maastricht Referenda.

The Referendum idea deserves full backing. The Government likes to point to the fact that other Neutrals have joined the PfP. But that doesn’t mean they were right to do so. And how much public debate did the Neutrals have before their Governments signed up? Virtually none.

The Government feels aggrieved that anyone could feel the PfP has anything to do with NATO (well, hardly anything). This was dealt with in our last pamphlet. However, let us look at just one aspect of the PfP: “interoperability”. The major NATO commanders have proposed the following definition of PfP “interoperability”: 1) the training of personnel and units in NATO doctrine, procedures and practices which are capable of working effectively within NATO or NATO-led organisations on specific operations; 2) adapting or procuring equipment which interfaces with that of NATO; 3) selection and training of staff officers in NATO doctrine and procedures, so as to be able to fill staff appointments with NATO or NATO-led Headquarters or national posts dealing with NATO/Partnership matters”. (NATO Review, July 1996).

Does this mean that PfP Irish officers would be able to “learn” about NATO’s nuclear “deterrence” and first-strike policies and the “thinking” behind deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in “crisis management” operations?

High Government leaks prior to the White Paper had indicated a strong preference for joining the PfP and that a decision to sign up would be taken “fairly soon”. The strength of the Opposition has obviously surprised the Government. It’s also obviously surprised one of its chief academic advisers, Prof. Patrick Keatinge (Senior Research Officer, Institute of European Affairs) who views the PfP as “a sort of state of the art playschool for peacekeepers”. (Bosco with bullets!). It now appears that the PfP has been put on hold.

But signing up for the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks looks much more imminent. The White Paper said the Government would “discuss” with the WEU the “possibility” of taking part in the Petersberg Tasks. In little over a month, Dick Spring announced to a meeting of the WEU that Ireland was “ready” to participate in Petersberg Tasks carried out by the WEU on behalf of the EU in the context of an evolving Common Foreign and Security Policy. The WEU had taken a decision to allow WEU “observers” to participate in the “Petersberg Tasks” on a case-by-case basis, a move The Irish Times deemed a “symbolic step towards giving the EU an operational military arm”.

The IGC would have undoubtedly been requiring some such move from Ireland. But before dealing with the options to be considered at the IGC, a few words about the White Paper on the subject. The Government, as already stated, is opposed to full WEU membership, despite the fact that one of the Government parties — Fine Gael — is in favour of it. Because it has a mutual defence commitment, WEU membership would mean the end of Neutrality and would require a Referendum. What is particularly worrying about the Government’s treatment of the options open is that it never mentions nuclear weapons in its deliberations. When dismissing WEU full membership, the fact that it is a nuclear alliance is not one of the grounds for dismissal. (Former Minister for Foreign Affairs, Prof. James Dooge, set himself apart from his Fine Gael colleagues by recently stating that “WEU member ship is out” as far as he was concerned because the WEU was “nuclear”.

Also (in Section 4.114) when setting down the “underlying principles” which will guide the Government in discussing EU defence, nuclear weapons are only mentioned in the context of aspirations for disarmament. The reasons for this omission are obvious: if the Government said Ireland would refuse to join or cooperate with any nuclear alliance it would scupper any future dealings with the WEU, the EU’s chosen defence entity.

The White Paper also states for the first time that Irish troops could be sent abroad under a banner other than the United Nations’. When discussing taking part in the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks, the White Paper states “it is envisaged that such operations would be carried out at the request of the UN. of the OSCE, or of the EU under the Common Foreign and Security Policy”. (4.84). When pressed on this point at the press conference following the White Paper’s publication. Mr. Spring stated he thought it “unlikely” that participating in the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks would mean participating in peacekeeping not mandated by the UN. (In recent months, the Government has come up with a form of wording stating that the “legitimacy” of WEU Petersberg actions must be “provided through decisions of the UN or the OSCE”. But this could be very broadly interpreted... and the word “mandate” is conspicuously absent).

This raises fundamental questions. Why would Ireland want to peacekeep for anyone other than the UN? ... or peacekeep without a UN mandate? Also, who’s in charge? As James Downey, writing in the Irish Independent (20/3/96) points out, sending our troops peacekeeping with the WEU “would mean Irish troops serving under, ultimately, NATO command”.

“Preparations are being made”. (John Lucey of PDFORRA, before the Oireachtas Committee on Legislation and Security) for Irish defence forces to be involved in European defence arrangements. One of the reforms is the creation of a younger army and compulsory retirements are being objected to by PDFORRA. The Progressive Democrat TD, Mr., Peadar Clohessy, commented at this meeting that the defence forces could “one day be standing side-by-side with the French Foreign Legion and the American Marines”. Irish soldiers in their thirties “would not be able to keep up with that”.

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE

The development of WEU/EU relations will be central to the IGC’s defence and foreign policy decisions. There are several options available: maintaining the status quo is not one of them. Even the EU Neutrals are willing to strengthen the WEU links— the Swedish and Finnish Governments have offered proposals to ensure that all EU members, whatever their military status, should have an equal say in EU mandated WEU missions, and Austria’s Foreign Minister has even hinted that Austria may consider full WEU membership, thereby relinquishing its neutrality. The majority of EU states want a complete EU/WEU merger. So does the EU Commission. The Commission President. Jacques Santer, says this option is “clearly destined to be”. The Commission report to the IGC also advocates qualified majority voting in foreign and security policy matters and states its belief that “a real CFSP must lead to a common defence”.

No such merger will occur at this IGC but there will be a strong push for a timetable towards such a merger. Meanwhile, it’s likely that the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks (which include combat missions as well as peacekeeping) will be brought more closely into the EU. The Commission and the EU Council’s own Reflection Group (which includes our Gay Mitchell) propose this. The Reflection Group makes it clear that a majority favour the ‘gradual integration of WEU into the EU, in parallel with the development of European operational capabilities”. A full merger would involve ultimately a mutual defence commitment. It would also involve a direct link between the EU and NATO. The European Parliament has also proposed a WEU/EU merger but has stopped short of adopting the WEU’s Article Five mutual defence commitments.

However, a common thread of the Commission, the Council (through the Reflection Group) and the European Parliament is that in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy the minority must not always be able to obstruct the majority. New decision-making procedures, with some form of qualified majority voting, should be introduced. The three groups also agree that under such arrangements, there can be opt-outs, but opt-outs at a price. The Reflection Group puts it like this: “the possibility has been suggested of applying a non-binding principle to the effect that, while no one can be obliged to take part in military action by the Union, neither should anyone prevent such action by a majority group of member-states, and this without prejudice to the required political solidarity and adequate financial burden sharing”. After the IGC. Ireland could find itself funding and supporting politically WEU/EU military actions which it disagreed with.

MESSAGE FROM PATRICIA McKENNA MEP, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE GREENS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.

As billions are being spent on armaments to strengthen” the EU’s common foreign and security policy(CFSP), Ireland should be working against that unjustifiable waste in a world full of poverty.

But successive governments have undermined Irish neutrality by drawing us closer to nuclear alliances like the Western European Union (WEU) and softening Ireland’s position on issues like human rights abuses by repressive regimes.

During this crucial period in the history of the EU, Irish neutrality needs to be reinvigorated.

I fully support the work of the Peace and Neutrality Alliance (PANA) in protecting our neutrality and encouraging a more open debate on the future direction of Irish foreign policy.

FRANCE AND GERMANY PUSH FOR EU DEFENCE

France and Germany are the two countries pushing hardest for a a European defence union. German Government officials have publicly stated that all EU states must eventually be part of the WEU and NATO, and that Germany has very little sympathy for Irish Neutrality, given the huge monetary benefits Ireland has received from EU membership. Chancellor Kohl regards neutrality as the single remaining obstacle to Irish membership of any future hardcore of EU states.

France is preening itself for a leading role in EU defence. During its nuclear testing in the Pacific. France said it was in part ensuring that “Europe” would have a credible and reliable nuclear “deterrent”: France’s. President Chirac has also embarked on major reforms in France’s armed forces, streamlining them for a new world role: “My plan is for France in six years time to be capable of deploying 50,000 to 60,000 men rapidly. During the Gulf War we had trouble sending 10,000 men”, said Chirac (23/2/96 The Guardian). Chirac is ending conscription and aiming to emulate the “professionalism” of the British army. “But in order to enhance the kind of mobility necessary to engage in today’s more limited warfare, the French intend to build-up European collaboration. That means strengthening the defence wing of the EU and building up the ties with the Germans in the infant European army — the Eurocorps”. (Will Hutton, The Guardian, 28/2/96). The French Defence Minister, Charles Millon, (Le Monde, February 96), while explaining the new reforms, first lauded the French nuclear deterrent as “a key strategic asset for the Europe under construction”. He continued: “The new conditions which regulate France’s own security and our commitment to act as peacekeepers in the world increasingly require the deployment of our troops outside France. Developing our ability so that we can project our power abroad is a key element in the reforms”.

The Germans, while initially wary of France’s military cutbacks, particularly its withdrawal of troops from Germany, are determined to develop a mobile capacity of their own. The same day the French and German foreign ministers were meeting in Freiberg to complete the joint French-German submission to the IGC, the German Defence Minister announced that “The essential structural, staff and material conditions for taking part in missions in the framework of international crisis management will be created by the year 2000”. Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (February ’96) referred to the fact that today’s army needs “rapid reaction tasks forces” and “long-range projection from outside a country’s borders”, all necessary for the new “crisis management”.

EU INTERVENTION FORCES

In our last pamphlet, “European Defence Debate”, we outlined the establishment of EUROCORPS, viewed as an embryonic European Army; EUROFOR, a marine-air rapid action force; and EUROMARFOR, a maritime force, — all linked with the WEU and NATO and designed to ensure more rapid European projection of its armed forces. “These operational structures constitute a set of assets whose rules of employment reflect the dual vocation of the WEU as the defence component of the EU and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO)”. (WEU Council of Ministers, 14/11/95). “European Defence Debate” also explained the establishment of NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 1994 as a way to provide NATO with a new role after the Cold War: the CJTF with its multinational rapid reaction forces is designed to give NATO the flexibility to intervene outside NATO territory. Recent NATO decisions will place the CJTF at the disposal of the WEU as well, initially for its Petersberg missions. This follows on the WEU’s report to the IGC, stating that “Relations with NATO would be maintained and further strengthened. Flexible arrangements for the use of NATO assets and capabilities and, as soon as developed, the CJTF, will facilitate WEU missions entrusted by the EU”.

What are the ambitions of the EU? What sort of foreign interventions might the EU be contemplating in the future? For instance, France has military commitments in eight African countries and 10,000 troops stationed there. Over the past thirty years it has intervened nearly every year in some part of Africa, and its disastrous policies in Rwanda heightened the genocide there. How many Petersberg Tasks will now be being carried out in Africa and at whose invitation? Will Irish peacekeepers, wearing their new WEU/EU helmets, now be working at the behest of French colonial interests in various parts of the world?

THE ARMS INDUSTRY

Similar questions have to be asked about the Middle East where the arms industry could entangle the EU in military adventures. Of the ten countries which lead the world in arms purchases, seven are Arab. Many of the weapons being sold to them come from EU states. And some arms purchases are linked with defence treaties. For instance, the United Arab Emirates who have bought billions in arms from EU states insists on defence treaties with any countries supplying it with weapons. It also insists on the supplier sending personnel to help them use the weapons when fighting breaks out! The arms glut in the Middle East has reached absurd proportions. with unnecessary weapons being supplied to armies incapable of using them. After the Gulf War — a war in which French and British troops saw themselves staring down the barrels of guns they had supplied to Iraq — there were promises that the Middle East would no longer be the target of enthusiastic arms merchants. The promise was short-lived.

The EU’s evolving defence identity and common foreign policy is certain to be shaped by such commitments. economic interests and colonial ties.

The EU is the largest exporting arms bloc. The Intergovernmental Conference will be dealing with the issue of EU arms sales, but as much in hopes of assisting the “ailing” European arms industry as in establishing some sort of code of practice. Certain infamous arms sales, such as the £50m sale by the British of Hawk jets to Indonesia, in defiance of ten UN resolutions, and the production and sale of land opt-outs, but opt-outs at a price. The Reflection Group puts it like this: “the possibility has been suggested of applying a non-binding principle to the effect that, while no one can be obliged to take part in military action by the Union, neither should anyone prevent such action by a majority group of member-states, and this without prejudice to the required political solidarity and adequate financial burden sharing”. After the IGC, Ireland could find itself funding and supporting politically WEU/EU military actions which it disagreed with.

FRANCE AND GERMANY PUSH FOR EU DEFENCE

France is preening itself for a leading role in EU defence. During its nuclear testing in the Pacific, France said it was in part ensuring that “Europe” would have a credible and reliable nuclear “deterrent”: France’s President Chirac has also embarked on major reforms in France’s armed forces, streamlining them for a new world role: “My plan is for France in six years time to be capable of deploying 50,000 to 60,000 men rapidly. During the Gulf War we had trouble sending 10,000 men”, said Chirac (23/2/96 The Guardian). Chirac is ending conscription and aiming to emulate the “professionalism” of the British army. “But in order to enhance the kind of mobility necessary to engage in today’s more limited warfare, the French intend to build-up European collaboration. That means strengthening the defence wing of the EU and building up the ties with the Germans in the infant European army — the Euro-corps”. (Will Hutton, The Guardian. 28/2/96). The French Defence Minister, Charles Millon. (Le Monde, February ’96), while explaining the new reforms, first lauded the French nuclear deterrent as “a key strategic asset for the Europe under construction”. He continued: “The new conditions which regulate France’s own security and our commitment to act as peacekeepers in the world increasingly require the deployment of our troops outside France. Developing our ability so that we can project our power abroad is a key element in the reforms”.

EU INTERVENTION FORCES

In our last pamphlet, “European Defence Debate”, we outlined the establishment of EUROCORPS, viewed as an embryonic European Army; EUROFOR, a marine-air rapid action force; and EUROMARFOR, a maritime force, — all linked with the WEU and NATO and designed to ensure more rapid European projection of its armed forces. “These operational structures constitute a set of assets whose rules of employment reflect the dual vocation of the WEU as the defence component of the EU and as a means to strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance (NATO)”. (WEU Council of Ministers, 14/11/95). “European Defence Debate” also explained the establishment of NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) in 1994 as a way to provide NATO with a new role after the Cold War: the CJTF with its multinational rapid reaction forces is designed to give NATO the flexibility to intervene outside NATO territory. Recent NATO decisions will place the CJTF at the disposal of the WEU as well, initially for its Petersberg missions. This follows on the WEU’s report to the IGC, stating that “Relations with NATO would be maintained and further strengthened. Flexible arrangements for the use of NATO assets and capabilities and, as soon as developed. the CJTF, will facilitate WEU missions entrusted by the EU”.

THE ARMS INDUSTRY

Similar questions have to be asked about the Middle East where the arms industry could entangle the EU in military adventures. Of the ten countries which lead the world in arms purchases, seven are Arab. Many of the weapons being sold to them come from EU states. And some arms purchases are linked with defence treaties. For instance, the United Arab Emirates who have bought billions in arms from EU states insists on defence treaties with any countries supplying it with weapons. It also insists on the supplier sending personnel to help them use the weapons when fighting breaks out! The arms glut in the Middle East has reached absurd proportions, with unnecessary weapons being supplied to armies incapable of using them. After the Gulf War — a war in which French and British troops saw themselves staring down the barrels of guns they had supplied to Iraq — there were promises that the Middle East would no longer be the target of enthusiastic arms merchants. The promise was short-lived.

The EU’s evolving defence identity and common foreign policy is certain to be shaped by such commitments, economic interests and colonial ties.

The EU is the largest exporting arms bloc. The Intergovernmental Conference will be dealing with the issue of EU arms sales, but as much in hopes of assisting the “ailing” European arms industry as in establishing some sort of code of practice. Certain infamous arms sales. such as the £50m sale by the British of Hawk jets to Indonesia, in defiance of ten UN resolutions, and the production and sale of land mines, have made the demands for a code even more insistent. The code has the backing of over 600 European NGOs plus the European Parliament and some EU Governments, including our own. But curbs on arms sales are going to have to cope with the economic reality of a £40 billion a year industry, representing 2% of EU industrial production and one million workers. They also have to cope with the reality of the EU Commission.

A report of the Commission stresses how badly hit the European defence industry has been in the past decade, losing out to its American competitors and costing up to 600,000 job losses in the past decade. This is totally unacceptable for an EU embarking on a defence role: “Maintaining and securing a competitive European defence related industry is … a precondition for a European defence and security”. The report advocates closer cooperation with NATO, the WEU, and the Western European Armaments Group and also proposes channelling structural funds into “dual-use” research projects which could, in theory, assist the civilian as well as the military sectors.

The Irish Presidency must ensure that the defence industry is not given a boost from EU funding and policies. What has happened to the socalled “peace dividend” at the end of the Cold War? It was to be used, in part, to help reduce arms production and to lessen economic dependence on the arms industry.

NATO: STILL ALIVE AND KICKING

NATO’s Partnership for Peace, which Dick Spring seems so eager to join, has been described by NATO this way: “Active participation in the PfP will play an important role in the evolutionary process of the enlargement of NATO”, (Study on NATO Enlargement”, September 1995, NATO Report). PfP membership does not require Ireland to join NATO, but it certainly implies Irish support for NATO and assistance for NATO’s maintenance and growth.

And busily growing it is. The PfP was launched as a means 1) to calm the security fears of the Central and East European countries post-Cold War — a half-way house to full NATO membership; 2) to find a new role for NATO in order to justify its continued existence after the collapse of the Soviet Union: NATO has reformed itself into a “peace-keeper” and “doer of humanitarian deeds”. But NATO is certainly not the proper vehicle to do either of these things.

NATO has been hijacking the security role in Europe. The OSCE would have been the proper forum for bringing Europe back together, along with a reformed, strengthened United Nations. Instead, we have the militaristic approach of NATO which threatens to redivide the Continent and waste scarce resources on more armaments.

The United States military is moving into former Warsaw Pact bases in Hungary, and British troops leaving Germany are bringing their low-flying Tornadoes and 60-tonne Challenger tanks onto the playing fields of Poland and Ukraine. There are plans to transfer advanced weapons systems (including F-16 and F-18 fighter aircraft and Cobra attack helicopters) to Central and Eastern European countries. This is clearly against the spirit if not the letter of the major Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) and Russia is understandably perturbed. In the process of fulfilling the PfP’s aim of the partners “adapting their military forces and equipment to NATO standards”, arms have already been flogged to former Warsaw Pact states. Last February, the British “convinced” Slovenia to reconsider the £35m military communications contract Slovenia had awarded to Israel. Slovenia should buy British or other European defence equipment, said Britain’s Foreign Secretary. Mr. Rifkind if it wanted to join NATO: the necessity of “matching Alliance standards”. The first ever meeting of NATO’s Industrial Armaments Group held outside NATO territory occurred in Prague in 1995 as part of PfP-cooperation in promoting defence industry collaboration.

The U.S. think-tank, RAND. has estimated for NATO that the cost of enlargement to include the Central and Eastern European countries in NATO could be £50 billion plus over a ten-year period. In addition there would be a need for loans and grants to finance replacing obsolescent weapons.

The Czech and Slovak Republics, Hungary, and Poland are the four countries most likely to become NATO’s next members, and, on RAND’s estimates, they could be in for bills of up to $35 billion over the next ten years. monies they can ill-afford to spend. It’s a peculiar approach to “security” that requires crippling amounts of money to be squandered on “military infrastructure” and “modernised” NATO-friendly weaponry (i.e. more sales for Western arms manufacturers). The limited resources of all the countries concerned would be much better directed to assisting their economies, reducing unemployment. etc., and in supporting the much broader security agenda of the OSCE and the UN. And wouldn’t the peoples of Europe feel much more secure if a few billion were spent on closing down Chernobyl and other explosive nuclear reactors, rather than preparing more states to join NATO?

Russia is not happy about NATO expansion but accepts that certain States will be joining. However, they do not want the Baltics or the Ukraine in NATO and they do not want NATO troops or nuclear weapons anywhere near their borders. Russia itself has joined NATO’s PfP (a decision by Yeltsin that the Parliament only narrowly failed to reverse). But PfP membership has not eased Russia’s worries about NATO’s plans. Some of the East European countries are also having second thoughts, with the Czechs promising their people a referendum on the issue. The Czech opposition Social Democrats have called for no nukes and no troops, a concern also being taken up by the Hungarians and Poles. Belarus and the Ukraine have called for a nuclear-free-zone in Central Europe. NATO is refusing to give any such guarantees.

There is a real danger of a new line being drawn across Europe. As the British American Security Information Council (BASIC) and the Centre for European Security and Disarmaments have pointed out in their recent report on NATO enlargement; “The continent could divide into two camps: the strong and relatively rich West, protected militarily through NATO and economically through EU tariff barriers: and the relatively poor, unprotected East. “Fortress Europe writ large” NATO’s — and the WEU’s — donning of the mantle of “peacekeeper” is also a dangerous development. The concerns about the reasons for such “peacekeeping”, “crisis management” interventions have already been mentioned in the commentary above. The suitability of armies to carry out and assist humanitarian missions has also been critically questioned by the aid agencies. The International Red Cross and Oxfam, in particular, have expressed concern that this new development is more motivated by narrow political agendas than humanitarianism, that it’s not cost effective, and that it’s jeopardising the perceived impartiality of the aid agencies.

The same case could be made for the perceived impartiality of Irish peacekeepers. As our last pamphlet argued, to peacekeep alongside and as a “partner” to a nuclear military alliance is going to be severely damaging to Ireland’s high reputation as a neutral non-nuclear country devoted to UN peacekeeping. Both the WEU’s Petersberg Tasks and NATO’s Partnership for Peace include missions which are war-fighting. Ireland may argue that it can opt out of these (for the moment anyway) and confine itself to peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. But, as the above criticism by the aid agencies has shown, carrying out humanitarian tasks with the WEU and/or NATO could be counter-productive. And if missions changed from peacekeeping to peace-enforcing, it would be very difficult for Ireland to remain aloof, either in terms of being seen to back such enforcement or in actually taking part in it.. In any case, by definition, Ireland’s peacekeeping forces would not be suitable for such a role: peacekeeping skills and equipment are for keeping the peace, not for making war. Ireland’s particular — and hard-earned expertise in this area should remain in the service of the UN and UN-mandated OSCE actions only. Otherwise we stand to lose our major contribution to world peace.

President Robinson, speaking at the National Forum on Development Aid in Dublin recently, called into question the international communities’ “dual approach to conflicts”, and she cited Bosnia. There, when it came to military resources, the “sky was the limit” as the Dayton Accord had shown. However, when it came to helping civilian groups deal with the conflict, funds weren’t there.

This is exactly what is happening. The organisations with a broad remit when it comes to international security and development, the OSCE and the UN, are being starved of funds while the military alliances in Europe are being bolstered and enlarged. If the OSCE had been properly funded and functioning, then the horrors in the former Yugoslavia may have been greatly curtailed: early warning, observers on the ground, accurate information, other conflict prevention measures were totally lacking.

Ireland, during its Presidency of the IGC, can only do so much. But it will be overseeing what could be far-reaching changes in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. This is not the time to abandon or seriously cripple our Neutrality. It is a policy we can be proud of, unlike the policies pursued by many of our EU partners. As Fintan O’Toole has written, their nuclear and arms selling policies — in which tyrants have even been supplied with electric shock torture equipment — have made the word “security” a “sick joke” to the “wretched of the Earth”. Ireland has a good reputation for standing up for the “wretched of the Earth”. Propping up NATO/WEU and the European arms industry is a pretty poor substitute.

THE PEACE AND NEUTRALITY ALLIANCE

For further information contact, PANA, 113 Springhill Ave., Blackrock, Co. Dublin Tel: 01-2808247, 01-2844765, 01-2894315, 01-2806700 E-Mail: vmacdowe@iol.ie

This document was produced with the help of the Green Group of the European Parliament. PANA is open to all those who accept our objectives which are as follows:

1. It is within the OSCE and a reformed United Nations, and not the EU, that Ireland should pursue its security concerns.

2. Ireland should pursue a positive neutrality and independent foreign policy and not join or form an association with any military alliance, such as the WEU or NATO.

3. Ireland should seek to promote European and international security through a policy of disarmament and demilitarisation and should therefore oppose the militarisation of the EU.

4. Ireland should refuse to cooperate with or condone in any way policies or military groupings which maintain nuclear weapons or any weapons of mass destruction.

5. Irish troops should only serve abroad as peacekeepers under the auspices of the UN.

The National Platform

For Democracy, Employment, Neutrality For a Europe of the Nations, not a Federal EC Superpower

As I said to you when I phoned you on Friday last, I was surprised to read in last week’s newspapers that members of Mr Brendan Halligan’s Institute of European Affairs, a very partisan ‘Eurofederalist’ body, had appeared before the Committee to discuss the Amsterdam Treaty. Our organisation was not aware that the Committee was conducting ‘hearings’ on Amsterdam with a view to bringing out a report on the Treaty. If we had known that, we would, as a body which has had a long interest in issues of European integration and which believes that it would not be in the interest of the Irish people to ratify Amsterdam, have been happy to make a detailed critical submission before now. As it is, I am happy to accept the invitation of the Committee Chairman, Mr Bernard Durkan, communicated orally through you, to attend the next meeting of the Committee on Wednesday next. I should be glad to deal with any questions the Committee members may have, arising from this letter or from the acompanying preliminary material that I am sending you.

As you told me yesterday, IBEC and the Peace and Neutrality Alliance are making oral submissions to the Committee at its meeting on Wednesday next. If I may so, I believe that it is in the public interest that other organisations that may be critical of aspects of Amsterdam - for example, ISME and the Irish National Organisation of the Unemployed - should also be informed of the Committee’s consideration of the Treaty and be given an opportunity of making representations to the Committee also, if it is to produce a report that does justice to the ‘downsides’ as well as ‘upsides’ of the Treaty.

Since I spoke to you, I have been informed that at your Committee’s meeting last Wednesday, aspersions were cast on the academic work of my colleague, Dr D. Rossa Phelan, who is Jean Monnet Lecturer in European Law at TCD, by Professor James Dooge and Dr Brigid Laffan of the Institute of European Affairs. Dr Phelan has written the path-breaking study, Revolt or Revolution: The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community (Round Hall, Sweet and Maxwell, 1997), which many regard as the most significant and original intellectual contribution on European integration to have come out of Ireland this past quarter-century. If I may say so, I consider it shameful that such aspersions should have been cast at a meeting of the Committee without Dr Phelan being there to defend himself, and I would like you to express my view to the Committee’s members that in the circumstances it should consider inviting Dr Phelan himself to make a presentation to the Committee relating to his work for the IEA, which was so improperly criticised in his absence. I understand that when Dr Phelan contributed to the IEA’s book, Amsterdam, What the Treaty Means, he was put under some pressure by those associated with the publication, including Professor Dooge, to ‘tone down’ the views he expressed regarding the implications of Amsterdam for Ireland’s Constitution. I believe that it is Dr Phelan’s views on this aspect of the matter, rather than concern about his academic accuracy, which motivated the criticisms that were made of his work at your Committee’s meeting last week.

May I hasten to add that Dr Phelan is not a member of the National Platform organisation, or in any way associated with it. Nor is he a member, so far as I know, of any other group likely to be involved in the Amsterdam Treaty debate. His views are those of a legal authority who has studied the Treaty and who is very knowledgeable on European and Irish constitutional law. He is also an independent private citizen. I myself met him for the first time only three years ago, when he joined the TCD Law Department, and when I asked him recently what his views were regarding public attitudes to Amsterdam, he remarked that he was not against the Irish people ratifying the Treaty, so long as they knew what they were doing; but that he feared that as things stood - especially in view of the lack of public discussion so far on aspects of Amsterdam other than its Common Foreign and Security Policy provisions - such ratification in ignorance might well happen, with regrettable later consquences when the people realise what had occurred.

Presumably the Joint Oireachtas Committee is also concerned to avoid that, which is why I make the suggestion that the Committee consider inviting Dr Phelan to make a submission, or else appear personally before the Committee, before it adopts or publishes any report on Amsterdam. In the meantime, I enclose for the information of the Committee a photocopy of the chapter which Dr Phelan wrote for the Institute of European Affairs publication referred to. When I attend on Wednesday I propose to bring with me for presentation to the Committee a copy of Dr Phelan’s monumental study of the evolution of the European Community and its implications for the Irish Constitution. I appreciate that the Committee may be already familiar with this book; but if they are not, they should certainly find it helpful for their own deliberations. I would like to emphasise that I make the above remarks regarding Dr Phelan entirely on my own account, and without any reference to him, and indeed without his knowledge; for he might well not wish me to make them.

As regards the National Platform’s views on the Amsterdam Treaty, this organisation of which I am secretary has not yet produced its final documentation on the Treaty, as we have been preoccupied in recent months with publishing critical material on the single currency project, and we do not have the resources of money or personnel that are available to such Eurofederalist bodies as the Irish Council of the European Movement and the Institute of European Affairs. However, we shall have our final critical document on Amsterdam ready over Easter, and will let you have copies of it at once for circulation to Committee members. When it is ready and circulated, I would welcome the opportunity of appearing before the Committee again to answer any questions its members might have on it.

In the meantime, may I ask you to bring this letter and the accompanying items to the attention of the Committee members for their information. The National Platform exists to produce critical material which would appeal to the widest range of interests, on the political Left, Right and Centre, opposed to the Eurofederalist integration project. The organisation is opposed to the Amsterdam Treaty on democratic and internationalist grounds. It is concerned that such debate on the Treaty as has been reported in the media to date has been about Amsterdam’s Common Foreign and Security provisions, although if ratified it will affect many other areas of Irish life, as the Treaty is tantamount to a new Constitution for the European Union, with huge implications for the Irish Constitution, as the enclosed items show. Our organisation expresses the hope that the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs will not produce any report on Amsterdam until it has fully informed itself of the case against these other aspects of the Treaty, as well as the case in favour. I attach a short memo for the information of the committee which draws attention to some of these other aspects. This also adverts to the May 22 date, which the Taoiseach, Mr Ahern, has suggested might be a suitable date for the referendum. In our organisation’s view, it would be a democratic outrage for the Government to propose having the Amsterdam Treaty referendum on the same day, or around the same time, as a referendum on Northern Ireland. It would be constitutionally unprecedented to have such diverse issues - each hugely important in their own right - tied together artificially like that. It would cause great public confusion and mean that neither issue could be properly considered. I would like to express the hope that the members of the Oireachtas Committee will share this view, whatever their views on Amsterdam itself, and will urge the Government to pull back from such a course.

May I ask you to circulate this letter, and the accomanying items, to the members of the Oireachtas Committee before my meeting with them on Wednesday next.

Yours sincerely

Anthony Coughlan, Secretary

(International Coordinator, The European Anti-Maastricht Movement - TEAM)

PS. Because of the possible public interest of this matter, I am circulating copies of this letter to some media people whom I know

Chapter 12

The Context of Ratification

The purpose of the proposed Amsterdam Treaty will be to amend the Treaty on European Union and the treaties establishing the European Communities. This chapter deals briefly with the meaning those proposed developments would have for Irish constitutional law.

The incompatible projects of nationhood/statehood and federation/ integration give rise to increasingly profound constitutional difficulties. As integration progresses, nationhood retains a formal, if increasingly content-free, survival in constitutional structure. Community law requires the ratification by Member States of proposed treaty changes. In the case of Ireland, this translates into a requirement under Irish constitutional law for a referendum. As a result, these incompatibilities must be confronted. Simultaneously, there is pressure, in litigation and in the fragmentation of politics, for the referendum process itself to reflect its popular democratic basis. This combination leads to a technically rich constitutional context, of which six aspects are addressed here.

THE MEANING OF RATIFICATION

The separation of meanings in different legal orders - Community, public international, and national - is something which must be recalled constantly.

Public International Law

What the word “ratification” means generally is confirmation by a formal act of a previous act done. The ‘sense of confirmation is clearly seen from the Irish word for ratification, daingnigh, which means to fortify, to make fast, or to confirm.

In public international law, ratification is a means for a state to express consent to be bound by a treaty which is negotiated by a representative of a state. The law of treaties rests primarily on the notion of consent: generally, a state which has not expressed its consent to a treaty cannot be bound by it. Article 11 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that: “The consent of a State to be bound by a treaty may be expressed by signature, exchange of instruments constituting a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so agreed.” According to Article 16 of the Vienna Convention, unless a treaty otherwise provides, instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession establish the consent of a state to be bound upon their exchange, deposit or notification.

European Community Law

The law of the European Union sets out a specific procedure for the adoption of an amending treaty. The Member States are following this procedure, set out in Article N (TEU). According to this procedure, the amendments must be determined by common accord - that is to say, they must be agreed by the Member State governments. This was signalled on 2 October 1997 when the representatives of these governments formally signed the draft treaty. Article N then further provides that: “The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by all the Member States [“tar eis a ndaingnithe ag na Ballstait go leir”] in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements.”

This means two things. First, consent to be bound by the provisions of this treaty is expressed by ratification by a state in accordance with its own constitutional requirements. Second, a treaty does not amend the existing treaties until this ratification is performed.

This ratification, in accordance with each state’s constitutional requirements, is a uniform Union legal requirement for an amending treaty to come into force. But there is no Union legal specification of what constitutes constitutional requirements. (In the light of Joined Cases San Michele v. High Authority [1967] ECR I it is unlikely that the Court of Justice would attempt to review any Member State’s instrument of ratification.) So the constitutional requirements can very from one Member State to the next. They do, because of their different constitutional systems. Furthermore, within each Member State there may be more than one way to ratify a treaty or it may depend upon the type of treaty proposed. In some instances a majority vote in a house of parliament may suffice; in others a popular referendum may be necessary. In addition, Member States can adopt, and have in the past, additional mechanisms not constitutionally required (and by implication not required by Union law), such as a referendum whose significance is solely political

Irish Constitutional Law

The Constitution does not mention the ratification of treaties. It does have requirements, however.

First, every international treaty, other than one of a technical and administrative nature, to which the state becomes a party shall be laid before Dail Eireann (Article 29.5.1 and 3).

Second, in order for any treaty, other than one of a technical and administrative nature, which imposes a charge on public funds to bind the state, the terms of the agreement must be approved by Dail Eireann (Article 29.5.2 and 3).

Third, following Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] IR 713 (SC), the Government cannot relinquish its own powers or restrict the sovereignty of the state without constitutional authorisation. The Courts can restrain this. The proposed treaty requires Ireland to cede a further part of its sovereignty in its internal actions and in its external relations with other states - both Member States and other countries.

As a result, ratification of this treaty must be authorised by an amendment to the Constitution - unless it could be successfully argued that this proposed alienation and restriction lay within the scope of the present authorisation in Article 29.4.3-6. These provisions provide explicitly for the state s membership in the Communities and the Union. But the text of the proposed treaty specifies developments which are major and new and which affect powers of government and the sovereignty of the state. A restrictive interpretation of the text minimising these developments is unlikely to be the interpretation of the Union institutions or of the other Member States. Thus, a referendum is necessary.

One can also discern the requirement of a referendum in another way. While the scope of the authorisation in the Constitution was extended to allow the state to ratify the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union, the type of authorisation has not varied. In other words, no government has attempted to introduce any sort of blanket authorisation to future treaty change. The proposed treaty is making more profound changes to Ireland’s EU membership obligations than were proposed by the 1987 SEA. Since the Constitution had to be amended on that occasion to permit ratification of that treaty, it follows logically that the Constitution must also be amended to allow for ratification of the proposed Amsterdam Treaty. An amendment in the same style would provide simply “The State may ratify the Treaty of Amsterdam signed at Amsterdam on the 2nd day of October 1997”

Constitutional requirements apart, it is also unlikely that any government would think it politically desirable not to have a referendum, or to expose itself to another Crotty-type case. The government’s decision to hold a referendum early in 1998 to ratify the Amsterdam Treaty illustrates this.

The Amendment Process

Amendment of the Constitution requires popular approval by way of a referendum. The rules for this are set out in Articles 46 and 47 of the Constitution.

In addition to these basic rules, there is also the Referendum Act, 1994 which must be read in conjunction with the Election Act, 1992. Together these two Acts provide the detailed rules under which referenda are conducted. The rules for referenda are almost identical to the rules for elections, despite the considerable differences between the nature of the two processes. Elections determine the membership of the representative sovereign or parliament which then represents the will of the people. In the Irish case this is Dail Eireann. Referenda, by contrast, provide for the direct exercise of popular sovereignty to change the limits within which the government acts.

Many other countries have specific referendum codes which set down detailed, tailored rules for popular monitoring, campaigning, broadcasting, and funding of referenda. Ireland does not have such a set of rules. Instead, the rules which do cover Irish referenda are derived largely from British practice - despite the fact that Britain lacks a written constitution and thus can only employ referenda as very formal tests of public opinion rather than as a forum for constitutional decision-making. As a result, there is significant criticism of the democratic basis upon which referenda are conducted in Ireland

The basis for such criticism is most obvious when elected representatives in the Oireachtas - grouped into political parties - support a proposed amendment to an extent which varies significantly from the level of popular support. This has been evident in the last four referenda dealing with bail, divorce, the Maastricht treaty and cabinet confidentiality. This may be also expected to occur in the referendum to ratify the Amsterdam Treaty.

The impact of this imbalance - where, for example, all the major parties back a proposed referendum - is important. One example is to be found in the mechanism for monitoring the casting and counting of votes. The Acts mentioned above give the power to nominate persons to conduct such monitoring and supervision exclusively to members of the Oireachtas.

Therefore, when opinion in the Oireachtas is overwhelmingly in favour of a referendum, the monitoring of the referendum process is overwhelmingly in the hands of the promoters of that referendum. The decision of the Minister for the Environment in the divorce referendum that he did not have the power to alter this state of affairs - by making alternative provisions for the nomination of personation agents at polling stations, for example - was challenged in Sherwin v. Minister for the Environment (11 March 1997 Unreported decision of Costello, P. (HC)). That case established that the Minister does in fact have such power.

Another example, concerning the executive arm of government, came to a head in McKenna v. An Taoiseach [1995] 2 IR 10 (SC). This made it clear that the Government cannot spend public money in the promotion of a particular referendum result. The effect of this judgment on the Commission’s effort to supply the public with information on the Amsterdam Treaty - which may be felt by those opposing its ratification to be promotional - has yet to be tested.

On the experience of recent referenda, it is likely that opponents of the Amsterdam Treaty’s ratification will demand proportionate time and participation with that treaty’s advocates, rather than accept a share which is set relative to party strengths in the Oireachtas as is current practice. This would include time in political broadcasts and current affairs coverage on radio and television, funding of referendum expenses (to produce and distribute publications, for example) and representation in polling stations to monitor the conduct of voting. The Oireachtas could stem the piecemeal litigation of these issues in the Courts by legislating for a comprehensive referendum code, which would promote the participation of referendum supporters and opponents rather than maintain the existing monopoly which is granted to the legislative and executive branches of government.

In terms of the development of Irish constitutional jurisprudence, the case-law of the 1960s which expounded on the effect of fundamental rights in restraining the executive and the legislature was only the first stage of development. The second and third stages will be the proper division and functioning of levels of sovereignty (representative, popular, and Community) and the interaction of levels of law (statutory, Community, public international, written constitutional and unwritten constitutional (including natural)). Litigation around referenda is a likely flashpoint to spark development in jurisprudence at these levels. It is into this jurisprudential, constitutional, statutory, and political context that an Amsterdam referendum will fall.

The Internal Effect of Community Law

Even if the Dail approves the Amsterdam Treaty, and the Constitution is amended to allow the state to ratify it, the treaty will still not yet be part of domestic law. The internal legal effect of a treaty must be determined by the Oireachtas (Article 29.6). Consequently, although not forming part of ratification, the European Communities Acts 1972-1995 would have to be amended for Irish law to embrace the changes to the treaty as domestic law.

The Constitutional Importance of the Proposed Treaty

Various features of the Amsterdam Treaty have been analysed in previous chapters. Three of the more radical propositions are taken here as examples of innovations which conflict with constitutional law and hence will necessitate a constitutional amendment to permit ratification.

First, the proposed new Article F [6] and F.1[7] The new Article F(1) [6(1)] founds the Union on principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. These are stated to be principles common to the Member States. However, in this Treaty they are being relied upon as principles of the Union. Article F.1[7] provides a procedure for sanctioning a Member State on the proposal of the Commission, or of one-third of the Member States, for failure to comply with these principles. This can result in a suspension of Community law rights, including voting rights in the Council, while the obligations of membership continue.

The change in direction of principle and sanction is enormously important. It inverts the present position where the principles of Member States can be invoked as a comparison to a supranational organisation with relatively undemocratic institutions, and moves the Union away from an organisation founded on its Member States to an organisation founded upon its own values. These values have a specifically Union meaning, and the Union can sanction members for non-compliance.

Even though the Union would be no longer founded on the Member States, the present guarantee in a revised Article F(3) [6(3)] - The Union shall respect the national identities of its Member States - would stand. This important guarantee, however, is from the Union to the Member States, and is not in the nature of a reservation by the Member States from the Union.

Second, the new Article J[11-28] provides the Union with a competence for the progressive framing of a common defence policy which might lead to a common defence, should the European Council so decide. This is similar in some respects to the former competence in this area which existed under the Maastricht treaty. However, the competence is unusually worded. It is very difficult to distinguish between a competence for a progressive framing and a competence for that which is to be progressively framed. The difference in substance between a highly developed common defence policy and a common defence is unclear: the Community has a common agricultural policy but not a common agriculture. It is important to focus on a few of the proposed changes.

Under the present Article J [11-28] the competence is one which both the Union and its Member States shall define and implement. Under the new, the Union alone is competent. Under the old, the possibility of a common defence was left up to future treaty amendment. Under the new, the European Council may decide without necessarily amending the treaty.

There is no requirement on the European Council to make this decision at any point - they can continue to develop a common defence policy without ever deciding to call it a common defence. However, if at some point the European Council takes a formal decision, it shall recommend (but not oblige) the Member States to adopt the decision in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Unlike in amendments to the treaty, this is not an obligation.

Furthermore, although the position is not crystal clear, it seems that as a matter of Irish constitutional law there would be no requirement for a referendum. This is because if the Constitution is amended to license ratification of the proposed treaty which encompasses the competence to frame progressively a common defence, and to take a formal decision to institute a common defence, there will not necessarily be any development which would amend the treaties or add a new treaty competence for which a referendum would be required. The closest available precedent was the decision to have universal direct elections to the European Parliament, which had to be adopted in accordance with constitutional requirements (Article 138(3) (EEC)). This did not necessitate any further constitutional amendment.

The new Article J [11-28] arguably marks the end of the constitutional competence to remain neutral. Neutrality itself, it is important to remember, is not constitutionally mandated. However, there are constitutional provisions on sovereignty, independence, the common good, and the designation of the organs of government which exercise the power delegated by the popular sovereign through the Constitution. These provisions conflict with the extension of Union competence in this area.

Third, the external relations competence of the Union is very widely expanded, and that of the Member States contracted.

The Amsterdam Treaty provides that in some areas closer cooperation between groups of member states may be achieved without the participation of all. While individual Member States may veto such proposals, the concept of “flexibility” is designed to reduce the impact of the requirement of unanimity for closer integration (see Chapter 3). The treaty makes no provision for any flexibility in existing arrangements. Indeed, where flexibility has had to be applied to new policy areas such as the Schengen arrangements, this option is specifically ruled out for new Member States (see Chapters 9 and 10). Thus, the Union continues within its present constitutional logic of federalisation by increasing the obligations on Member States, restricting the scope and execution of their sovereignty, and redefining the basis of the Union itself. While there is no standard calibration of constitutional change, the proposed changes at least vie with the Treaty on European Union as the most radical since the 1957 creation of the EEC.

Constitutional Coherence

The Constitution was enacted for a sovereign, democratic, and independent nation on the basis of popular sovereignty and natural law. It was enacted in part with the very purpose of giving greater legal force and political emphasis to the separation of the state from foreign control. It is increasingly incoherent to maintain this constitutional structure while subjecting it to the constitutional structure of the European Union. If the full constitutional significance of what is at stake is confronted, at least three options present themselves.

First, the attempt might be made to maintain the constitutional status quo and thus to ignore the signs of incoherence which emerge between the national constitution and European law. Comparative constitutional history teaches that incoherence can be maintained in an operational state for a surprisingly long time. However, such is easier in a nation without a written constitution or a tradition of constitutional litigation.

The second option is to revise radically the existing constitution or to adopt a new one in which the common good, goal and meaning of society, sovereignty, the limitations of powers, and fundamental rights and values are located primarily in a European Union context. This would make sense from a legal perspective, but the depth of political integration to date continues to lag behind the depth and scope of legal penetration, although this varies from state to state.

The third option is to require a treaty-based guarantee, either by a protocol if designed just for Ireland, or by a treaty article if designed for all Member States. This guarantee would recognise that in case of competing Union and national constitutional claims, the national constitutional claim has priority to the extent necessary to maintain coherence. This has several attractions: coherence, a strong guarantee of constitutional independence, minimum disruption to a Community legal order and the assurance of the supremacy of Community law - since the guarantee would itself form part of Community law and would relieve the natural reticence of national judiciaries to embrace the full logic of Community law claims. It also has the attraction of taking the Community’s, and Ireland’s, constitutional claims seriously and reacting harmoniously to Community developments at the serious and reflective level at which they are being planned and executed.

Timing

There is no requirement on the Member States as to the order in which the Amsterdam Treaty must be ratified. If Ireland delayed ratification, and another Member State ultimately failed to ratify, then there would not be any need for a referendum. This is because treaty changes pursuant to Article N(EU) require unanimity. The failure of a state to ratify means that the treaty cannot come into force.

Summary

In the present constitutional context, all institutions of Government, executive, legislative and (unless the Oireachtas enacts a referendum code or opponents of the Treaty become inactive) judicial, are poised to play their different parts in the ratification of the Amsterdam Treaty. Ultimately, the people will decide. The nature of the undertaking means that fundamental, structural constitutional questions arise which must be resolved, in some form, for ratification to take place. This presents the opportunity, or, depending on one’s perspective, the ultimately unavoidable necessity, of addressing how the Constitution, in its structure, substance, and processes, and the constituent treaties of the Union, should evolve coherently together. Full confrontation of what is at stake, to lose and to gain, may lead to revision in both.

NOTES

1. More general treatments of the constitutional position are G. Hogan and A Whelan. Ireland and the European Union: Constitutional and Statutory Texts and Commentary (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1995), Phelan, Revolt or Revolution The Constitutional Boundaries of the European Community (Dublin: Round Hall Sweet & Maxwell 1997), and Phelan and Whelan, Report to the F.I.D.E. Conference (1997) Irish Journal of European Law.

3. The State may become a member of the European Coal and Steel Community (established by Treaty signed at Paris on the 18th day of April, 1951), the European Economic Community (established by Treaty signed at Rome on the 25th day of March, 1957) and the European Atomic Energy Community (established by Treaty signed at Rome on the 25th day of March, 1957). The State may ratify the Single European Act (signed on behalf of the Member States of the Communities at Luxembourg on the 17th day of February, 1986, and at the Hague on the 28th day of February, 1986). The State may ratify the Treaty on European Union signed at Maastricht on the 7th day of February, 1992, and may become a member of that Union.

No provision of this Constitution invalidates laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the State which are necessitated by the obligations of membership of the European Union or of the Communities, or prevents laws enacted, acts done or measures adopted by the European Union or by the Communities or by institutions thereof, or by bodies competent under the Treaties establishing the Communities, from having the force of law in the State.”

Some issues relating to the Amsterdam Treaty

(Preliminary memo from the Research Group of The National Platform to the Oireachtas Joint Committee on European Affairs, April 8 1998)

May 22 as the Amsterdam referendum date? : It appears that the only reason the Government is considering holding the Amsterdam Treaty Referendum on May 22 is to fulfil an informal commitment to the Brussels Commission and others that the Irish referendum will be held before the Danish one, which is six days later, on May 28. This is because it is generally assumed that voters in the Republic will readily vote for Amsterdam, whereas there is some doubt over that happening in Denmark. None of the other 15 EU States, so far as can be ascertained, has ratified this Treaty yet. There is no time-limit for its ratification, and no reason whatever why the Irish referendum on Amsterdam should not be put off to June or until the autumn. So the Irish people are in effect having a rushed and ill-prepared-for referendum, purely in order to encourage or pressurise the Danes, depending on one’s viewpoint. It also seems to be the case that the Government is aiming to have a Northern Ireland referendum on the same day, May 22, to ensure a big turnout in favour of a Northern settlemet; and it is assumed that voters will then scratch a ready Yes to Amsterdam also, even though they may know little about it. If this happens, it will be a democratic outrage; for it would surely be quite wrong, as well as constitutionally unprecedented, to have a referendum on the same day on such very different issues as the North and the Amsterdam Treaty - each hugely important in their own way, but with no connection with one another. If that happens all genuine democrats, whatever their views on the pros and cons of Amsterdam, should do all they can to make the Irish people aware of the political cynicism and contempt for democratic norms which such a development would undoubtedly exemplify.

Some controversial issues of the Treaty:

The Common Foreign and Security Policy: It is hard to see how the Amsterdam Treaty’s commitment to ‘the progressive framing of a common defence policy’ (Art.J7) is compatible with the maintenance of Irish neutrality in any longer term. This aspect of the Treaty, which is of great public importance, is being thoroughly criticised by the Peace and Neutrality Alliance(PANA), to which the National Platform is affiliated. The National Platform’s own particular contribution to the forthcoming referendum debate will be in seeking to explain why people should be opposed to areas of the Treaty other than its Common Foreign and Security Policy provisions. Some these are briefly mentioned below.

There is growing concern at present throughout Europe that, while in form the Amsterdam Treaty is an international agreement between States, in substance it amounts virtually to a constitution for the European Union, and in a sense a new Constitution for Ireland also. Thus Amsterdam gives effective legal personality to the Union for the first time, although that term is not used in the actual text. Amsterdam founds the EU on principles - which are open to interpretation by the European Court of Justice, the Union’s ‘Supreme Court’ - instead of on its Member States, which is a constitutional shift of profound significance. The Maastricht Treaty provision that the EU ‘and its Member States’ have a common foreign and security policy, is replaced by the Amsterdam provision that the Union on its own has such.

Amsterdam gives the EU the power to harmonise vast areas of civil and criminal law and procedure: ‘Procedure’ could include trial by jury for example, which exists in the Anglo-Saxon countries, but not in the continental. Is it being alarmist to point out that decisions on such hugely important matters will pass to the supranational, European level, as a consequence of the Amsterdam Treat being ratified, and could well lead to very objectionable changes being imposed on us down the road, with the Irish people having small chance of influencing them?

Cross-border policing by a European FBI: Amsterdam introduces an embryonic European Federal police force, Europol. This body currently consists of civil servants, but under Amsterdam it will consist of policemen in future, who will be able to take part in cross-frontier police operations. In due time this could permit British policemen to operate south of the Border and southern policemen to operate North of it.

A two-tier or three-tier European Union: The flexiblity, or ‘closer cooperation’, clauses of the Treaty permit an inner group of EU States to adopt closer integration amongst themselves, use the institutions of the Community to implement that, and in effect present the outer group with political and economic faits accomplis. This effectively abolishes the veto which the Irish electorate currently has on further integration for such sub-groups; for if a sub-group of the EU wishes, for instance, to establish a European economic government for themselves, and to use the EU institutions for that purpose, the Irish people will no longer have to be consulted by referendum, as permission is to be given for such a development on May 22, if the Government sticks to that suggested date. The eurozone countries are already signalling their intention to move to harmonising tax-structures, which has major implications for Ireland. Amsterdam will permit them to use the EU institutions for this purpose. These provisions of Amsterdam in effect institutionalise a two-tier or three-tier Union/Community, which it has always been a key aim of Ireland’s European policy to oppose.

The European Union gets power to decide our human rights: Amsterdam gives a human rights competence to the EU for the first time, so that any national content of human rights disappears into thin air and the ultimate decision-taking power is shifted to the European level, which could raise very sensitive issues here. The content of our human rights, as decided or legislated on by the EU under Amsterdam, may prove in time to be better or worse than the rights we already have; but we do not know what their content will be. What our human rights amount to will depend on what the EU Council of Ministers may decide in this area down the road and, perhaps even more importantly, on the developing jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice. Henceforth the ECJ can invent human rights. Over the years the ECJ has become a court with a mission, a profoundly dangerous thing. It is a highly political body, dedicated to extending the supranational competence of the EU over its Member States into ever widening areas of life and society.

Article 6A, anti-discrimination and ‘political correctness’: The Amsterdam Treaty’s Article 6A on non-discrimination gives a vast legislative competence to the European Union, even though the Irish Constitution already provides for equality before the law, and even though all EU Member States have bound themselves to abide by the European Convention on Human Rights. It introduces a kind of ‘political correctness’ that does not represent majority opinion in Ireland or other Member States, and can be enforced through courts of law only be seriously damaging domestic and family law, the law of adoption and other places in which the distinction between heterosexual and homosexual becomes important. Article 6A states that the Council of Ministers ‘may take appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.’ Strictly construed - and this kind of provision has been strictly construed in America - this would forbid any kind of compulsory retirement age, as ‘ageist’, and any kind of privileges for marriage as against other forms of sexual relations? It could theoretically be used to impose women priests and female Mullahs as requirements of European law, which overrides national law in case of conflict. And what is meant by sexual orientation? Is paedophilia a sexual orientation? Do we really want to sign up to a sloganising article like this Article 6A, whose sole purpose is to impose upon us the post-modern morality of Brussels, without allowing the Irish people the time adequately to consider it, or to ponder the immense and lasting revision of our institutions that would be involved in implementing it? Jurisdiction over human rights matters has a hugely federalising political potential, as the history of the USA has shown. It is totally unnecessary to give the EU a human rights jurisdiction, as these matters are perfectly adequately covered by national Constitutions at present, as well as by the European Convention on Human Rights.

EU law declared supreme by Amsterdam: In the Amsterdam Treaty reference to subsidiarity turns out in reality to mean more centralisation. In the ‘Protocol on Subsidiarity’, tucked away in Paragraph 2, is a reference to the sanctity of ‘the principles developed by the Court of Justice regarding the relationshp between national and Community law.’ The very phraseology ought to set alarm bells ringing; for properly the Court is not there to ‘develop principles’. Its job is supposed to be to interpret the Treaties. What this clause refers to is the dictrine developed by the European Court of Justice that its own rulings have precedence, not just over national law, but even over the constitutional or basic laws of the Member States. This doctrine has been explicitly rejected by some national supreme courts, by France’s in 1975 and by Germany’s in 1993. But the European Court has never accepted this stance of national Supreme Courts. It claims that its jurisdiction comes from the European treaties which, it holds, have created a new legal order superior to national constitutions. If this were true there could be no doubting the EU’s federal statist character. The defining characteristic of a federation is that sovereignty is not dispersed amongst its states, but is enshrined in its Constitution as interpreted by its supreme court. According to the European Court’s view, it is now Europe’s supreme court, since its authority does not derive from the Member States but from the treaties. Once Amsterdam comes into force, this extraordinary and legally imperialist interpretation will have legal validity.

Employment provisions as window-dressing: The employment provisions of Amsterdam are just so much rhetoric, without real substance. They provides for the drawing-up and issuing of reports and recommendations on unemployment, but what can happen on the ground as a result would have no direct impact in improving employment in the EU Member States compared to the detailed provisions of Maastricht and the Stability Pact, whose effects will tend to increase unemployment.

The blank cheque constitutional amendment still remains. The proposed constitutional amendment to ratify Amsterdam gives the State wide discretion to opt into further measures of integration in future - without having to come back to the Irish people in a referendum. The new amendment is less wide that the original constitutional amendment, which caused a row between the Government and opposition parties, but it is alarmingly wide nonetheless, and is a virtual blank cheque for numerous potentially objectionable developments over coming years and decades.

European Union enlargement is not in Ireland’s interests: The Amsterdam Treaty is said to have been drawn up to open the way to enlargement of the Union. But is enlargement of the Union in Ireland’s interests? The National Platform organisation holds that enlargement is not good either for us or for the applicant countries. If the Union is enlarged there will be less money for Ireland, and our political influence on the European institutions must inevitably decline, as it has to be shared with more and more new members. Irish farmers are rightly worried at the implications of admitting Poland to the EU, which has more farmers than the rest of the EU put together! As for the applicant countries, EU membership will destroy their national democracy, just as it has done for us, although at present the populations of the various East European applicant States are full of naive ideas, based on ignorance, on what EU membership entails.

Foreign land-buying: Denmark has a protocol in the Amsterdam Treaty restraining foreign land-buying in Denmark. Why does Ireland not have a similar protococol, in view of the way in which foreign buying of land is raising land prices, contributing to soaring housing costs and changing the social composition of various parts of the country?

There are many other objectionable features to the Amsterdam Treaty. Thee above are listed as just some of the issues that need to be examined by the Oireachtas Committee on European Legislation, and by citizens generally, as they seek to find out what is in this complex Treaty. Doubtless these issues will figure in the submissions that will be made by citizens in due course to the Referendum Commission, and fall to be considered by that body for the Yes/No statements which it is statutorily required to draw up and publicise, as a result of the implementation by the Oireachtas of the Supreme Court’s judgement in the McKenna case.

Compiled and issued by the Research Group of the National Platform, 24 Crawford Ave., Dublin 9 (Tels: 830 5792 / 608 1898)

TREATY OR CONSTITUTION?

By Jens-Peter Bonde, Member of the European Parliament’s Committee on Institutional Affairs, the Danish June Movement

Democracy is the type of government, which give voters the last say in the legislation of its country. One can have direct democracy, in which the electorates decide individual laws directly by referenda. One can have indirect, representative democracy, in which the electorates choose representatives, who then in turn decide the laws. In both types of democracy, however, laws can be changed again, if not before then following a new general election, when people can elect a new majority in parliament and get a new law. The voter always has the last say in the type of rule we refer to as democracy.

Democracy means government by the people. That is the political system in the fifteen West European countries, which have joined together in the European Union. They are all representative, parliamentary democracies, where voters have the last say. Democracy is guaranteed in the national constitutions, and we demand that a country must be democratic to become a member of the European Union.

How is it then with democracy when we share sovereignty and make laws jointly in the EU? Do the voters also have the last say in EU laws? Is it possible to regret a certain law and change it, perhaps following a new election?

One should think so considering that EU have similar institutions as in our national types of government. In EU there are both a Council of Ministers, a Parliament, a Court, and a Commission, the names are misleading because these institutions have completely different roles than those we know from our parliamentary democracies.

To put it a little crudley, the Parliament in EU is not a parliament but a council. The Council is not advisory but more a parliament, which makes laws - even behind closed doors. The commission is not merely a commission, which prepares new legislation but a central and very powerful political institution in the EU structure. The Court does not limit itself to judge according to law but operate both as a legislative and constitutional assembly. And the voters? We can join in elections but not alter legislation in EU!

The electorates could perhaps accept this lack of democracy if the EU concerned itself only with limited areas of cross-border interests where national parliaments are unable to legislate effectively anyway. This could for example be the case of sea and air pollution. This could perhaps be accepted if it was only 10% of the laws in our member states that are ultimately decided by civil servants behind closed doors in Brussels.

Our constitution demands that all laws are made democratically and can be changed again democratically by our national parliaments. Yet this core constitutional rule is now made an exception.

With the Amsterdam Treaty are moving new areas of legislation and decisions away from open parliaments to civil servants and ministers in the EU.

Therefore the main point at issue remains: Should the EU be an area of cooperation between independent nations or end up as the creation of a new state?

The Amsterdam Treaty does not make the EU a new state, but it is beginning to look like one.

The Amsterdam Treaty

It will no longer be possible to prevent EU Integration with a ‘no’ from one small country. A set of new provisions for ‘strengthened cooperation’ is being introduced which under various conditions allows a group of EU countries to proceed further with integration in areas not everyone wants to join in on. 10-12 countries could therefore form a joint Union military force which in practice would operate as the Union’s army. Denmark and a couple of neutral countries may keep out of taking part but they are still politically committed.

The reality will be that the biggest countries will be able to determine events for everyone. They can go ahead with a project without fully taking into account countries which at the present time do not want to join in. The model is familiar from Schengen cooperation where a majority of countries first determine the content of a piece of legislation which is then applied in all countries. The model is there in monetary union where a new stability pact will force countries outside the monetary union to pursue exactly the same economic policy as those in the Union.

We do not get the reintroduction of the environment guarantee which for example persuaded the Danes to vote yes to the EC package in 1986. Then, in Article 100a(4) of the Treaty we had the right to keep and introduce better environment standards than those adopted by qualified majority in Brussels. This environment guarantee was changed by the Court in a judgment in 1994 which made it a condition for the Commission to approve every diverging rule. We might also say that the enviornment guarantee was changed to an exemption arrangement administered by the Commission. Only with the support of a majority in the Commission can a country have better rules than those decided by the majority, and only if there are special circumstances arising in that specific country.

OPENNESS. There is agreement on introducing a general principle about access to documents in the new Treaty. The same rule is also to be found in the existing provisions on openness but it is some slight progress that the institutions are committed to a principle of openness in the Treaty. The general provisions will be adopted following the so-called conciliation procedure in which Parliament has an opportunity to reject the implementing provisions. That is progress, because the entire Parliament is agreed about the need for openness.

But when we come to the practical obstacles to openness, they are not removed, rather the opposite. Because it is the majority in the Council of Ministers who do not want to bring in real openness. If they did wish to, it could happen today by simple majority, i.e. by 8 of 15 countries voting in favour. Only a simple majority is needed to change the Council’s rules of procedure. Under the Amsterdam Treaty, a qualified majority of 62 of the 87 votes in the Council of Ministers is required to support the new rules on openness. Three countries such as France with 10 votes, Spain with 8 and, for example, Germany, with 10 Votes can vote out any greater transparency even if the other 12 Member States should be in favour.

In other words progress on openness at the present time is one step forward and one step back.

FOREIGN POLICY. Externally, the EU will speak with one voice to a greater extent. It will be possible for practical foreign policy to be decided by qualified majority. But the Member States still have to agree on issues on which decisions may be taken by qualified majority. The European Council decides on which foreign policy issues the EU acts as a community and takes decisions by majority, while very sensitive areas will continue to require unanimity.

The common foreign policy will be bolstered by a ‘political planning and early warning unit’ made up of officials from the Commission, the Western European Union and various Member States. The embryonic Community foreign ministry will take shape in the Council of Ministers’ secretariat headed by the Secretary-General of the Council. He will be called The High Representative of the European Union.

MILITARY FORCES. The foreign and security policy will also acquire a military dimension but the bill will be sent to those involved. There is agreement on introducing the military responsibilities referred to in the Western European Union’s Perersberg Declaration. On this point the Blair government has now given its assent. In other words the EU will have military responsibilities which Denmark has reservations about. On the other hand, Blair has not accepted an amalgamation of the Western European Union and the EU. The British, like Denmark, want defence in NATO without the influence from the EU. The final compromise about a possible merger of WEU and EU will be taken inside one year.

POLICE. The biggest breakthrough in the Amsterdam Treaty is in the area of judicial policy. In 1993, the EU introduced judicial cooperation into the Treaty, but in a separate intergovernmental pillar in which every country had to agree to implement decisions. These decisions are at present implemented as conventions which require the approval of the national parliament. The integrationists think that this is too slow. They are now getting two breakthroughs.

First, all matters concerning the free movement of people, border controls, refugees and immigration issues are being shifted from the intergovernmental third pillar to the supranational first pillar which comprises the original Treaty of Rome as expanded by the 1987 Single Act and the 1993 Maastricht Treaty. There will be a transitional period of five years. At the beginning, ministers must be in agreement as at present. But after the five years, decisions after a unanimous decision may possibly be taken by majority and the national parliament can be out-voted. In other words judicial policy will be adopted in the same way that economic cooperation is today, principally by qualified majority.

Supranational methods will also be introduced into the third pillar. It will be possible in future to adopt frame work decisions equivalent to directives under EC cooperation and compel the Member States to adopt the same rules. This paves the way for supranational Commission initiatives and supervision by the Court. In future it will be possible to put conventions into force in the approving countries when they are approved by half of the Member States. This paves the way for judicial cooperation and the establishment of a common federal police force.

CONSTITUTION? There is agreement on giving the EU a set of common fundamental rights but there is no agreement on the entire substance of these. It was therefore left to the Court to develop a common set of fundamental rights from the ‘Member States’ constitutions and international human rights on which a start has already been made. At the same time, a broader non-discrimination principle is introduced so that the Amsterdam Treaty in practice can operate as a constitution. The Council will be able, acting unanimously, to ‘take measures to combat discrimination on the grounds of sex, race or ethnic origin, religion and faith, disability, age or sexual orientation’ states the latest draft Treaty from the Dutch Presidency. For equality between the sexes this is a minor step forward compared with the formulation hitherto but not enough to justify a female yes to the Amsterdam Treaty.

The European Parliament will be greatly strengthened. The Parliament will have a right to approve the appointment of the President of the Commission and the cooperation procedure will be replaced across the board (apart form monetary union) by the conciliation procedure which gives Parliament the right of veto over legislation.

A declaration on the so-called ‘subsidiarily principle’ is added to the Treaty but it does not guarantee any subsidiarity. On the contrary, it states that the principle does not affect areas in which the EU has jurisdiction at the present time.

The text also approves the supranational principle concerning the precedence of EU law.

On Union citizenship, the Treaty states that it supplements national citizenship. It may be up to the Court to decide where the one starts and the other begins.

If you look at the form it is still a Treaty between sovereign states, because you need all signatures to amend it.

But if you look at the context it is more like a constitution for a new state with important powers still in the hands of the 15 prime ministers.

From an electoral point of view the Amsterdam Treaty is a new constitution. Our national constitutions will only cover marginal political areas, and at the day of the election, we can only amend a minority of the rules which bind us.

Therefore there ought to be referendums in all EU-member states on the Amsterdam Treaty, and not only the already decided refendums in Ireland, Portugal and Denmark.

Why the Amsterdam Treaty is incompatible with the fundamental principles of national constitutions

by Georges Berthu and Philippe de Villiers

THE PROPOSAL TO REVISE the European treaties, which the European Council adopted at Amsterdam on 17th June, has been dismissed rather too quickly as a text of secondary importance containing only minimal measures and destined to be ratified without significant discussion. This is not our opinion.

While it is true that the Amsterdam treaty carefully avoids dealing with monetary questions, and while it is true that it hardly prepares Europe for its inevitable Eastward enlargement, it does, however, profoundly change the institutional balance of the European Union and in this sense deserves the nickname ‘Maastricht II’.

Indeed, many of the reforms which are envisaged are in contradiction with the fundamental principles recognised by the legal systems of most EU member states. We will cite here six different categories, which apply to the French constitution but which, because they are of a general nature, can be transposed to most other national legal systems.

1 The subordination of National Constitutions

For many years, the European Court of Justice has recognised the primacy of Community law, not only over ordinary national law, but also over the constitutional law of member states. Logically, this includes laws which have been voted by referendum. This extremist position - which is in fact incompatible with the right of peoples to self-determination - has never been clearly endorsed by the governments of the member states, and certainly not by the peoples concerned. Some national constitutional courts, such as the German Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe in 1993, have affirmed the opposite principle - namely the superiority of national constitutions over Community law - but no one has yet tried to clear up whether such national courts or the European Court of Justice should have the last word.

The Amsterdam text makes a clear decision on this fundamental question, in the protocol on subsidiarity which has a juridical value, equivalent to that of the treaty. There it is affirmed that, ‘The application of the principles of subsidiarity … shall not affect the principles developed by Court of Justice regarding the relationship between national and Community law’ (paragraph 2). Further it says that the subsidiarity principle ‘does not call into question the powers conferred on the European Community by the treaty, as interpreted by the Court of Justice.’ (Paragraph 3.) In other words, the Amsterdam text recognises without reserve the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice in these areas, including therefore the superiority of Community law over the constitutional principles of the member states.

If this text were accepted by the member states - which seems inconceivable to us - it would fundamentally overthrow the usual rules of democracy. It would also invert the principle of subsidiarity, for national-competences would then be determined by Community law.

Some people may be astonished that a change of such magnitude can be introduced without a clear debate, by means of an obscure text. Alas, this kind of manipulation is common currency in Brussels. The present case is nonetheless striking both because of its exceptional gravity and also because of the arrogance with which the Eurocrats are trying to manipulate us.

2 The removal of the rights of a member state

Article F1 of the Amsterdam text provides that if a member state violates certain vaguely defined principles (‘liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental liberties’) then the other member states can, having established that this is the case by a unanimous vote minus that of the state concerned, decide by qualified majority vote to suspend some of that state’s rights, including its right to vote, without suspending the state’s corresponding obligations.

This provision means that on all matters dealt with by Brussels - even the most important ones, and even the ones which are voted on by unanimity - the rights of a country could be struck down with the stroke of a pen. The fine balance of the treaty which has been so painstakingly negotiated would then have no meaning any more, the Luxembourg compromise would be abolished, and the transfers of power which have been accepted in the different member states by votes in national parliaments or by referenda, would become completely elastic.

This text is not compatible with our constitutional principles, which generally stipulate that all transfers of power to the Union must be precisely defined and limited. To admit the opposite would be to recognise that the Union enjoys superiority over nations. This too would overthrow all our conceptions, as well as simple democratic common sense.

3 The ‘communitarisation’ of the budget for common foreign and security policy

The Amsterdam text provides that the operational expenditure for the common foreign and security policy be included in the Community budget, and moreover in the so-called ‘non-obligatory’ part over which the European Parliament has the last word. This policy is thus being communitarised through its finances, even though the rest of the treaty continues to treat CFSP as an intergovernmental matter, i.e. one which depends on cooperation between national sovereignties.

To undermine the intergovernmental character of this policy is obviously to affect the member states’ liberty of decision-making in this area. In France, at least, it would limit the prerogatives of our national institutions in these areas, such as they are laid down in the constitution.

4 The strengthening of ‘co-decision’

Amsterdam also amends the co-decision procedure which was introduced by Maastricht, strengthening its mechanisms even further to give the European Parliament much greater power. In parallel, co-decision would be extended to twenty-five policy areas, often important ones, not including issues like immigration, asylum and the movement of persons which may be subject to its rules progressively. This power of co-decision poses a fundamental problem, because it is being accorded to a body which is not a proper parliament (since it does represent a ‘European people’) and in which deputies do not represent

INTRODUCTION

The European Union is founded on a series of inter-Government treaties. The most important of these is known as the Maastricht Treaty - which actually includes two Treaties: the Treaty of the European Community (TEC) 1972, and the Treaty of the European Union (TEU) 1992. The Maastricht Treaty is the legal basis for the European Union (EU).

The Process of Revising Maastrict

•The 1992 Maastricht Treaty contained a commitment to revise key aspects by 1996.

•To move this forward the EU set up a “Reflection Group” of nominees from each member state to agree the main priorities for reform. Ireland was represented by Gay Mitchell, then Minister for Local Development.

•The Reflection group reported that making the EU more relevant, membership for Eastern European countries, crime, drugs, social rights and defence were the priorities.

•In order to look further at the issue of social rights, the European Commission set up “Comite de Sage”. This reported in 1996 and was debated by Trade Union, Employer and Community sector representatives at national and EU level.

•A draft new treaty was drawn up by the Irish Government during their presidency of the EU in the second half of 1996, and debated at the Dublin Summit in December that year.

•This was revised by the Dutch when they took over the presidency in early 1997.

•It was agreed by the heads of Government of all member states at the Amsterdam Summit in June 1997. The final wording will be finalised in October 1997.

•It must be ratified by each member state (by referendum or by parliament) by the end of 1998. In Ireland a referendum is expected to take place early in 1998

It was not until the Amsterdam Summit that unemployment came to the fore in the this process. It is not a key theme in the Reflection Group report or in the Comite de Sage Report. Nevertheless, some national governments (including Sweden, Ireland and, after their change of Government, France) did prioritise unemployment and social policy.

What were unemployed people looking for in the new treaty?

The European Network of the Unemployed (ENU) is a network of national unemployed organisations from 15 European countries, the INOU is the Irish member of this network. ENU is affiliated to European Anti-poverty Network (EAPN) in at a European Level. ENU is affiliated to European Anti-poverty Network (EAPN) in Brussels and is a full member of the Platform of European Social NGO’s, a group of NGO’s and voluntary sector networks who are seeking to represent the sector in civic dialogue.

SUMMARY

The design of the Local Development Programme and Area Based Partnerships has been profoundly influenced by European Union (EU) policies and practices. The Treaty which underpins the EU has recently been renegotiated. This Briefing Paper, serves as an information tool for Partnerships to understand the likely impact of this revision on dis-advantaged communities, unemployed people and their own work.

The paper concludes that while the new Treaty represents progress on prioritising and co-ordinating EU employment policy, the new measures fall short of tackling the scale of the problems that now face the EU. The paper indicates that there are a number of areas where the new Treaty will present new opportunities for Partnerships. These include new pilot programmes against unemployment and poverty, as well as opportunities for monitoring national policy.

The ENU argued that the new Treaty needed to bridge the gap between the failures of the present EU in solving the problems faced by the unemployed and marginalised in Europe. ENU set out five key demands:

This section outlines the position taken by ENU prior to the Amsterdam agreement, and then in italics gives a brief indication of what was achieved under this heading:

A commitment to full employment

The ENU believed that the revision of the Treaty presented an opportunity for the EU to commit itself to a Europe of full employment, to a society where everyone who wants to can work for a decent wage. This could be achieved by adding the “achievement of full employment” as a goal of the EU in the Treaty. Earlier European treaties have included a goal of “high employment”, but this commitment proved too vague to have any real impact.

The Dublin Summit considered this but there was too much opposition. The commitment to “high employment” was copied from one treaty to the other - from the TEC into the TEU. It is hard to see how this very technical change makes any difference.

Linking this commitment of full employment to other economic goals

Many of Europe’s most powerful institutions, like the European Central Bank, were only linked to narrow economic goals, like low inflation. ENU wanted the Treaty ensure the broad economic and social interest of all its citizens guide all institutions.

There was no commitment to full employment so no possibility of linking this to institutions. The Employment Chapter is not enough to balance the array of taxation and interest rates policies. Competitiveness has now been included, not just as something which is needed to achieve other goals, but a goal in its own right.

Change the EMU Convergence Criteria to include unemployment

In order to achieve a single currency, the Maastricht treaty laid down rules about how the member states would “converge” to a common position of low public debt and low inflation. ENU argued that countries that wanted to join the single currency should also converge on a low level of unemployment. This would rebalance the damaging impact which these Convergence Criteria have had on public spending and unemployment across Europe.

The new Treaty does not change the Convergence Criteria to include unemployment. It is worth noting, however, that pressure to do so suddenly emerged after a new Socialist French Government was elected just prior to the Amsterdam Summit. While this demand got nowhere, the compromise was a “Resolution on Growth and Employment” outside the Treaty. Ironically, this Resolution is the only place where we can find the word “unemployment”, but only in the context that “primary responsibility” for fighting against it lies with the members states.

Introduce a social audit

ENU argued that all new initiatives should be audited for their impact on jobs, poverty and the quality of people’s lives.

The Treaty requires regular reviews of progress on the Social Chapter. Reports to date under similar headings of the Social Protocol have had little impact on poverty issues, but this could be improved, particularly through the European Parliament.

Include the voluntary sector as a social partner

ENU wanted structures for democratic representation of unemployed people in the decision making structures of Europe.

There is no further development of the role of Non Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in the body of the Treaty. There is no mention of the process of Civic Dialogue - a process of involving NGO’s in policy and decision making in parallel to the process of traditional social partnership.

Ireland’s innovative methods of social and civic dialogue could give us an active role in promoting this debate, particularly in the Social Policy Forum in June 1998.

The new employment chapter in the treaty

Chapter 5, the new Employment Chapter is the most important development on employment. It draws existing non-binding agreements such as the Essen Agreement and gives them legal standing.

What is the Essen Agreement?

The Delors White Paper on Growth Competitiveness and Employment and the European Council of Employment Ministers meeting in Essen (December 1994) defined EU employment policy. This definition of EU employment policy, known as the Essen Agreement, defined what was needed to reform member states’ employment policies and gave the EU a co-ordination and monitoring role. The five priorities were as follows:

Multi-annual programmes:

The Essen Agreement proposed that member states introduce multi-annual employment programmes, progress of which would be reported at national seminars and compiled into a European Employment Report. This monitoring process would be complemented by analysis, research and co-operation in the field of employment and greater collaboration in the field of labour market policy.

Greater Co-ordination

At the heart of the Employment Chapter is the goal of “promotion of co-ordination between employment policies of the member states, with a view to enhancing their effectiveness by developing a co-ordinated strategy for employment.” This co-ordination is focused on monitoring and reporting similar to the Essen Agreement.²

Partnerships can learn from best practice elsewhere and can critically evaluate the Irish Government’s national report or seek to be included in a consultation process prior to the compilation of national reports.

Employment Committee

The new Treaty established an “Employment Committee”, which brings together two participants from each member state and the European Commission to monitor progress on the co-ordination of employment policy. Although similar in structure to the EU Monetary Committee, the Employment Committee will have less influence. The Employment Committee will seek advice from the social partners. In the Irish context, this includes representatives from community groups who have a role in monitoring Partnership 2000.

Funding for Incentive Measures to help promote good practice in job creation

The Employment Chapter allows the funding of “incentive measures” to assist exchange of experience and best practice. This funding is only available for pilot programmes over a five year timescale. In the past, similar programmes like ERGO have proved useful to policy makers and practitioners.

Unemployed organisations and Partnerships could have a role as applicants for this funding or as monitors of its use.

Is the Employment Chapter strong enough?

The Employment Chapter does not mention unemployment or the unemployed. Employment generation is seen as entirely about “supply side measures” - interventions to improve the employability and flexibility of workers. There is no consideration of measures - such as European Bonds - to stimulate the demand for labour. Ironically, this “supply side” approach which is largely irrelevant to continental Europe, is currently very relevant in Ireland, where demand for labour is strong. This represents an unusual opportunity for Local Partnerships to demonstrate their capacity to deliver such programmes.

On the other hand the Employment Chapter represents a beginning and a structure to work in, a space for employment policy in the EU. The Employment Committee, the reporting structure and the incentive measures are all tangible outcomes of the Treaty Revision.

Other key demands from NGO’s in the treaty debate

Fundamental Rights

Many NGOs sought a charter of fundamental rights to be included in the new Treaty. In response the European Council’s Social Charter (1961) is mentioned in the Treaty Pre-amble, but the legal impact of this reference remains unclear until a test case is taken. There is, however, scope for the EU to report on progress in relation to fundamental rights. Many Europeans were advocating for rights to be extended to non-EU citizens (residents) but the Treaty copper-fastened national citizenship as the only route to European citizenship. This will have serious ramifications for the refugees and migrants across Europe and increasingly in Ireland.

Anti-discrimination

An anti-discrimination clause is included³ in the new Treaty but the clause is weak, saying only that the Council “may” act if every member agrees. It is not pro-active and seeks only to combat discrimination rather than promote equality. There is no way for people who have suffered discrimination to use this clause.

Even worse, a proposal to prohibit discrimination on the basis of “social origin” (e.g. the social class you come from) was left out. The idea of mentioning social origin was the first practical attempt to include a class analysis in the discrimination debate. As social class is the largest single cause of labour market marginalisation, its exclusion from the list represents a serious set back for unemployed people.

Social Policy

With the agreement of the UK the Social Protocol is now written into the Treaty as a new Chapter 4. This represents significant progress - particularly for the UK - but the impact of this, particularly on unemployment should not be overestimated (the Social Protocol mainly refers to the rights of people in employment). Indigenous Irish employers will welcome this as it removes fears that the UK opt-out would give UK firms a competitive advantage.

The EU is given powers to tackle “social exclusion”, this will allow Poverty 4 or similar programmes to go ahead. As in the Incentive Measures for employment, the limited funding will go to small scale pilot initiatives. It is worth noting here that the concept of area based Partnerships arose out of the experience of EU Poverty Programmes as did other important institutional responses to poverty such as the Combat Poverty Agency.

What the treaty means for the Partnerships

While the Treaty will not be legally enforced until 1998 and must pass a referendum in Ireland, it does open up interesting opportunities for Partnerships to use their experience to influence the development of policy at national and European level, to seek new funding opportunities, and to add new elements to their work.

• The Social Audit: under Article 120 a social audit on some aspect of EU policy will be carried out each year.

European Network of the Unemployed (ENU) Analysis of Amsterdam Treaty

Summary

The Amsterdam Treaty can either be measured in relation to progress from the Maastricht Treaty, or against the wider challenges of growing mass unemployment and poverty in Europe. The different perspectives yield very different opinions: Amsterdam represents significant steps forward in EU competence on employment policy, and a signal recognition of social exclusion; on the other hand there is little reason to believe that the policies encapsulated in the new Treaty will halt, let alone reverse, the economic problems facing Europe or the extent that they are made to fall disproportionately on the poor or marginalised.

Introduction

The European Network of the Unemployed (ENU) set out a range of goals which we argued had to be taken on board in a new Treaty if it were to bridge the gap between the failures of Maastricht and the problems faced by the unemployed and marginalised.

This paper looks at progress on these goals and then looks at progress on other key areas identified by other organisations, principally the European Anti-Poverty Network (EAPN).

Finally it gives some indications of what new opportunities are opened up for work by unemployed groups.

A commitment to Full Employment

There is no commitment to Full Employment and the phrase is not used in the Treaty.

The inclusion of the European Council’s Social Charter in the Pre-Amble of the TEU and in Article 117 of the TEC, represents limited progress as this Charter includes a reference to the goal of full employment.

‘accept as one of their primary aims and responsibilities the achievement and maintenance of as high and stable a level of employment as possible, with a view to the attainment of full employment.¹’

The version of the European Social Charter which is referred to in the Treaty is the version signed in Turin in 1961. The Treaty fails to draw on the extensive additional protocols added in the early 1990s or the revised Charter which was opened for signature on 3rd May 1996.

The goal of ‘high employment’ has been included in the goals of the TEU and much attention has been paid to this. The widely distributed Citizens’ Guide to the New Treaty (EC, 18.6.97) claims ‘Promoting a high level of employment is now in black and white as one of the major objectives of the Union. However, such a commitment was always an objective of the Community and is included in the Treaty of Rome and in the TEC already. It is unclear what practical difference copying this commitment from the TEC to the TEU will make.

Link this commitment to full employment to the key economic articles.

Obviously, in the absence of such a commitment, there are no links to be made. The development of a new Chapter on Employment, however, can be seen as an important step forward from Maastricht.

The Chapter on Employment largely draws existing non-binding-agreements - particularly the Essen Agreement - into the Treaty proper. This gives legal standing to these commitments and formally requires co-ordination between member states. Equally, it could be argued that it represents little that is new or will, in itself, make much difference.

At the heart of the Economic Chapter is the goal of ‘promotion of co-ordination between employment policies of the member states, with a view to enhancing their effectiveness by developing a co-ordinated strategy for employment.’ The limitations of this approach can be seen from the rejection of a ‘common policy for employment’ which had been proposed at the Dublin summit. The fact that different member states have totally different policies will continue to undermine any attempts to co-ordinate them.

One crucial development is the establishment of an Employment Committee. It is unclear whether this will have the same status as the Monetary Committee and this will be largely a political rather than a legal question. However, the Monetary Committee is associated with a range of sanctions and fines for non-compliance with monetary policy (Articles 103, 6(1); 104 (c), 109 (c)), the Employment Committee has no such role. Both committees are advisory, but some are more advisory than others.

Article 5 allows the funding of ‘incentive measures’ to assist exchange of experience, best practice, etc. The scale and scope of these measures is specifically curtailed - not longer than 5 years and to be funded on a pilot and research basis only. This does however give a legal basis for limited programmes such as ERGO or ESSEN.

On the negative side, it has been argued that the Employment Chapter writes in stone the deflationary, monetary policies which have deepened unemployment during the 1990s. Employment generation is seen as entirely about ‘supply side measures’ - interventions to improve the employability and flexibility of workers. There is no consideration of measures to stimulate the demand for labour (For instance European Bonds, which ENU has supported). The Chapter does not mention unemployment or the unemployed.

In further support of this negative view, ‘competitiveness’ has now been written into the Treaty as a core task, as has ‘convergence of economic performance’. Prior to this these have been mentioned as means of achieving goals, or measurements of the achievement of goals. The elevation of competitiveness as a goal in itself represents a serious defeat for a balanced economic and social policy.

Finally the work of the Employment Committee and the Employment policy in general is specifically subjugated to the policies adopted in Article 103(2), on monetary union. This represents the opposite of the priorities proposed by ENU.

ENU believes that the range of changes in relation to economic and financial regulation are not balanced by the developments and initiatives in the labour market and in social protection which are required to create a full employment Europe.

Include unemployment as one of the Convergence Criteria.

There is no change on this. It is worth noting, however, that this demand suddenly became a real political issue in the final days of before the summit due to the position taken by the French Jospin Government. It finally got nowhere in the Treaty, but the compromise was a ‘Resolution on Growth and Employment’ outside the Treaty. Incidentally this mentions the word ‘unemployment’ but only in the context that ‘primary responsibility’ for fighting against it lies with the members states

Introduce a Social Audit

Article 120 of the TEC requires regular reviews of progress on the Social Chapter. Reports to date under similar headings of the Social Protocol have had little impact on poverty issues, but there is some prospect of seeking such a focus, particularly through the European Parliament.

The fact that the UK has now signed up to the Social Protocol means that it has been brought into the body of the text as a new Social Chapter (Chapter 4). While this is useful step forward, its significance should not be overestimated.

Bring the NGOs in as a social partner

There is no further development of the role of NGOs in the body of the Treaty. There is however a strange declaration under Chapter 8 of the TEU (Declaration I), which refers to the importance of ‘voluntary service activities’. It is unclear if this refers to ‘unpaid volunteering’ or to a voluntary, i.e. non-governmental sector, the context and French translation suggest the former.

Other issues

Fundamental Rights.

The Council of Europe Social Charter (1961) is referred to in the Pre-amble of the TEU, and in Article 117. The legal impact of the reference in the Pre-amble is unclear (EAPN wanted this reference to be in Article F of the TEU). It could be taken as forming part of the underlying legislation of the EU, or it could be seen as non-binding. This should be reviewed further, but it is likely that a test case would be necessary to find out.

The reference in Article 117, to the European Social Charter in the Social Policy Chapter 4 is important, particularly as Article 120 allows for regular reports on progress, which could be argued to include reference specifically to the Social Charter and the specific commitments within it.

There is still no capacity for the EU to accede to international charters (ILO, UN, etc). This argument was lost several months ago (see Comite De Sage Report), but still remains a serious set back.

EAPN was looking for rights to be extended to non-EU citizens (residents). In fact a change in Article 8, saying that EU citizenship ‘compliments’ national citizenship can be seen as closing the door on this, as the only route to EU citizenship now is through a nation and there will be no such thing as EU citizenship without national citizenship first.

Anti-discrimination

An anti-discrimination clause is included (Article 6a of the TEC), which is a major advancement from Maastricht, but it falls far short of what was looked for.

The clause only says that the Council ‘may’ act. It is not pro-active and to combat discrimination rather than make promote equality as a key task of the EU. The Council also needs a unanimous decision to act. These limitations raise a question of how a person who has been discriminated against can put the powers in these section into practice. Unless rights can be exercised there is little point in having them.

Even worse, and most significantly for the unemployed, ‘social origin’ which had been included as a ground on which discrimination would be prohibited in earlier drafts was left out in the Amsterdam Treaty. The inclusion of ‘social origin’ was the first practical attempt to include a class analysis in the discrimination/equality debate. As social class is the largest single cause of labour market marginalisation its exclusion from the list represents a serious set back.

Social Policy

With the agreement of the UK the Social Protocol is now written into Treaty as a new Chapter 4. This represents significant progress - particularly for the UK - but the impact of this, particularly on unemployment should not be overestimated.

Article 118 which extends EU competence to tackling ‘social exclusion’ allows Poverty 4 and similar programmes to go ahead. As in the incentive measures of employment, however the scale is limited and will be largely be small scale pilot initiatives. The definition which will be used for ‘social exclusion’ is also unclear. It should be noted also that the Social Policy Chapter remains weaker in aspirations and binding commitments than the neighbouring chapters on the environment and health.

1EMU - European Social Observatory, August 1997, contains a useful analysis of the negative impact of EMU Convergence Criteria on social security spending in each national state. EMU Convergence Criteria are the criteria that member states have to prove before they are allowed enter monetary union.

2Partnerships can find out about monitoring of the Essen Agreement in European Commissions Follow up to the Conclusions of the Essen European Council on Employment Policies. Table de Bord 1996 Brussels-Luxembourg ISBN 9282790231. Office for the official publications of the European Community or Post Essen Follow Up National Seminars, Background information, Department of Employment and Enterprise, November 1995

1 No country has ever been found to be in breach of this commitment see: Lenia Samuel, Fundamental Social Rights: a case law of the European Social Charter.

Appendix IV

Irish Congress of Trade Unions

1. Background to Trade Union Approach to Amsterdam Treaty

2. Employment: A Long Road to Amsterdam

3. Key Trade Union Demands

4. Does the Amsterdam Treaty meet these Objectives?

5. Social Rights

6. What does the Amsterdam Treaty provide on these Issues?

7. Conclusion

THE AMSTERDAM TREATY

In this Issue

INTRODUCTION

THE UNION’S INSTITUTIONS

THE UNION AND THE CITIZEN

FREEDOM, SECURITY AND JUSTICE

CFSP

JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS

Enlargement

Areas of work for Unemployed Groups

FLEXIBILITY

CODIFICATION

EMU - SUMMIT DECISIONS

EMU - GOVERNMENT’S CHANGEOVER PLAN

CONCLUDING REMARKS

PEACE AND NEUTRALITY ALLIANCE

OBJECTIVES

The Amsterdam Treaty Referendum

INFORMATION BULLETIN

From Positive Neutrality TO Nuclear Insanity

COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY

DEFENCE IMPLICATIONS

TOWARDS A COMMON DEFENCE

DANISH PROTOCOL

THE EUROPEAN ARMS INDUSTRY

History of Neutrality

THE WESTERN EUROPEAN UNION

CRISIS MANAGEMENT & PEACEMAKING

AN EU FOREIGN OFFICE

MAJORITY VOTING ON SECURITY

THE EU COMMISSION

The Peace & Neutrality Alliance

THE REFERENDUM

Message from Patricia McKenna MEP

Quotations

EUROPEAN DEFENCE DEBATE

BRIEFING PAPER TWO by CAROL FOX, Research Officer, Peace & Neutrality Alliance

THE WHITE PAPER

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE

MESSAGE FROM PATRICIA McKENNA MEP, VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE GREENS IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.

FRANCE AND GERMANY PUSH FOR EU DEFENCE

EU INTERVENTION FORCES

THE ARMS INDUSTRY

FRANCE AND GERMANY PUSH FOR EU DEFENCE

EU INTERVENTION FORCES

THE ARMS INDUSTRY

NATO: STILL ALIVE AND KICKING

THE PEACE AND NEUTRALITY ALLIANCE

The National Platform

Chapter 12

The Context of Ratification

THE MEANING OF RATIFICATION

Public International Law

European Community Law

Irish Constitutional Law

The Amendment Process

The Internal Effect of Community Law

The Constitutional Importance of the Proposed Treaty

Constitutional Coherence

Timing

Summary

NOTES

Some issues relating to the Amsterdam Treaty

Some controversial issues of the Treaty:

TREATY OR CONSTITUTION?

The Amsterdam Treaty

Why the Amsterdam Treaty is incompatible with the fundamental principles of national constitutions

1 The subordination of National Constitutions

2 The removal of the rights of a member state

3 The ‘communitarisation’ of the budget for common foreign and security policy

4 The strengthening of ‘co-decision’