Committee Reports > List of Committees > Dáil > 1971 > Committee of Public Accounts > Final Report - Northern Ireland Relief Expenditure

MIONTUAIRISC NA FIANAISE

(Minutes of Evidence)

Déardaoin, 5 Lúnasa, 1971

Thursday, 5th August, 1971

The Committee met at 4 p.m.

DEPUTY P. HOGAN in the chair.

ORDER OF THE DÁIL OF 1st DECEMBER, 1970.

Examination of Mr. Séamus Brady continued.

11826. Chairman.—We understand that you wished to have your evidence or submission put on record and to do that it is necessary for you to give it to us here in person. I would remind you you are on oath. Perhaps you could, at this stage, read out whatever statement you wish to make.

—Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have purposely waited until the Committee disposed of certain other more important matters before raising the question of the evidence given by Mr. Eoin Neeson, Director of the Government Information Bureau, to the Committee. Mr. Neeson’s evidence is inaccurate at some points, and I am sorry to say that at others he is plainly not telling the truth.

I refer first to his answer to Question No. 10499 of his evidence which dealt with my appointment to the Bureau. I was informed by Mr. C. J. Haughey that my appointment to the propaganda unit had been made by the Cabinet and that he had been asked to contact me. Mr. Neeson’s suggestion that I was in some ways foisted upon him by Mr. Haughey contrasts strangely with the situation in which I was the only professional newspaperman at his disposal willing to enter Northern Ireland at the time. Further, he expressed the view to me that his team was “short of writers”, and it was at my suggestion that Mr. Michael Foy, an experienced newspaperman who is Information Officer to the Irish Sugar Company, was later invited to join the team.

I should point out that, at the outset, I was the only member of the team who was not a State company or State employee. I would refer to Question No. 10501 where he was asked whether he would employ me. The answer given by Mr. Neeson is unworthy of him. My reputation in the professional sense speaks for itself; his own professional experience in journalism is limited to say the least. Why, moreover, if he had any such reservations, did he write to me to thank me for my work for the team in the terms expressed in his letter of November 24th, 1969, which is enclosed?

I refer to Question No. 10506 about the attendances at conferences I was not supposed to have attended. I attended three such conferences chaired by Mr. Neeson. I travelled on each occasion from the North of Ireland after receiving a telephonic instruction to this effect from Captain J. J. Millar of Aer Lingus, who had been seconded to the team, who was operational chief at 65 Merrion Square, Dublin, where the team established temporary headquarters.

I refer next to Question No. 10509. Mr. Neeson is in error here. On September 18th, 1969, I called to see Mr. Neeson about the Voice of the North proposal. I was required to wait for some thirty minutes in the general office outside his room in Government Buildings. When I finally was admitted to see him, we had a conversation lasting approximately fifteen minutes. Mr. Haughey, he told me, had already discussed the new paper with him. One does not rush into Mr. Neeson’s office. His office is private and he may be seen only by appointment through his secretary. I am leaving out the name of the secretary.

I refer to Question No. 10545. Mr. Neeson’s account of the booklets’ transaction is untrue. His statement that “we had no knowledge of either of these booklets before October 3rd when the decision was taken to purchase copies of the booklet attributed to Mr. Corrigan”, is a blatant lie.

The facts in relation to the “Terror in Northern Ireland” booklet is that Mr. Paddy Devlin, M.P., came to me in the last week of August, 1969, in my capacity as a member of the Bureau team and handed me a manuscript which consisted mainly of taped interviews from priests and victims of the shootings and burnings in Belfast. I note that Mr. Neeson now says he considered “it was inflammatory material of a totally propagandist nature which we could not possibly distribute”. The Committee should examine this booklet, and compare it with the inflammatory and propagandist news sheet which Mr. Neeson had printed in three languages in the Irish Times on the pogrom in Belfast and which he caused to have distributed throughout the world.

I brought the Devlin manuscript (which had been compiled by a group of Belfast social workers) to Mr. Neeson and explained that Mr. Devlin was flying out from Dublin on Sunday, September 7th, 1969, to attend the British Labour Party annual conference at Blackpool, and wished to have 1,500 copies of the manuscript in pamphlet form for distribution at the conference. Mr. Neeson agreed and instructed me to make arrangements to have the manuscript printed and to send the bill to him. I arranged with Mr. Frank Burke, works manager of the Cityview Press, 5 Campbell’s Row, North Circular Road, Dublin, to rush the printing in the circumstances. The 1,500 pamphlets were delivered to Mr. Devlin in Dublin on the evening before his flight.

Mr. Neeson further thought so highly of the idea of canvassing the Labour Party members, apparently, that he instructed Mr. Aidan O Hanlan, of Bord Fáilte, and Mr. Con Howard, of External Affairs (both of whom were at that time acting as Press Attaches at the London Embassy on behalf of the propaganda team) to travel to Blackpool to lobby at the conference.

I contacted Mr. Neeson a few days afterwards and informed him that I had asked the printer to hold the type of the pamphlet and suggested that it should be reprinted in booklet form. Mr. Neeson not only agreed, but instructed me to get an artist to design a proper art cover. I have a commission for this work to a Dublin artist, Mr. Colm Holohan, and brought the artwork to Mr. Neeson for his approval, which he readily gave.

Mr. Neeson was fully aware of the production of this booklet at all stages and personally gave me instructions as to the quantity to print. His suggestion that there was no cover arrangement about payment is untrue. Why, if there was no such arrangement, would I have gone to the trouble to submit two types of bills? (See Documents No. 1 in my previous submission).

Mr. Neeson’s answer to Question No. 10558 is completely at variance with the facts. Colonel James Breen and Captain J. J. Millar, who were both on the temporary staff of the team, can testify otherwise. So, too, can Mr. Paddy Devlin, M.P.

I refer to Questions Nos. 10611, 10612 and 10613. Mr. Neeson at no time acknowledged the bills which I submitted to him. Mr. Neeson could not remember whether he had acknowledged bills to me.

I refer to Questions Nos. 10712 and 10713. Mr. Neeson is here being dishonest. I was the only member of his team to produce material from Northern Ireland. I contributed much of the caption material and organised about 40 per cent of the photographs which were used in the only news sheet which the unit produced. I returned from the North on three successive week-ends and worked in the Bureau over each Sunday producing news stories which were sent out by Telex to the Press Attaches abroad. Any of the Press Attaches can verify this and several of them later paid tribute to the material which came from me. I edited the Devlin booklet and I taped and rewrote the Corrigan booklet, and handled the print production of both.

I am leaving out reference to the Cameron Report. I do not think it is relevant. I wrote a detailed report on the Bogside battle which was made available to each member of the Cabinet. I was further required on occasions to advise different members of the team on the value of material which was being culled from newspapers. I undertook some risk acting for the Bureau as I did in the North at the time. And I have no doubt that Mr. Neeson got more value for the £240 I received in fees than from any of the other members employed in the team—and any of these members will be glad to vouch for this.

I did not seek any situation, temporary or otherwise, under Mr. Neeson. I was asked by Mr. Haughey on behalf of the Government to give my services, which I did gladly. It ill becomes Mr. Neeson to sneer at me now.

11827. Chairman.—Do you wish to read any Appendix into it?

—Yes, on page 3 the reference to the “Cameron Report” is coming out, no other amendments.

11828. What about the covering note at the end which you have given to the Committee?

—The letter I put in, Chairman, is from Oifig Eolais an Rialtais, dated 24th November, 1969, addressed to me at 21 Upper Mount Street, Dublin 2, my then office. It states:

Dear Seamus,

I would like to thank you for your contribution to the operation in which we were all recently involved.

Everybody put a good deal of hard work into it to make it the success that it was.

Yours,

Eoin,

Director.

Mr. Brady withdrew.

Captain James J. Kelly in attendance, accompanied by Mr. P. Sutherland, barrister-at-law and Mrs. Moynihan, solicitor.

Mr. Sutherland.—Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, by way of introductory comment I should again refer to the fact that Mr. Gibbons has failed to afford Captain Kelly the right to cross-examine him on his evidence to this Committee. I would refer the Committee to the Supreme Court judgment delivered on the 24th June, 1971, in the Padraic Haughey case.

With reference to this Committee that judgment stated among other things that “a person whose conduct is impugned must be afforded reasonable means of defending himself”. One of such reasonable means is the right of cross-examination. Without such means no accused could make an adequate defence of his good name. The Constitution of this State guarantees that the State, so far as practicable, will, by its laws, vindicate the citizen’s good name. This Committee saw fit to afford Captain Kelly his constitutional rights as defined by the Supreme Court in this judgment but Mr. Gibbons, by his non-appearance, has effectively precluded my client from exercising these rights. Not alone has he defied the Constitution but the Minister has contemptuously dismissed this Committee which was set up by the Parliament of which he is a member.

I would like to emphasise that this short address is made without prejudice and reserving any rights which my client should decide to exercise in the courts of this land with regard to this non-appearance. I would submit that the personal rights of a citizen of Ireland have been trampled upon by the unconscionable behaviour of Mr. Gibbons in failing to attend before this Committee.

I propose to now deal with some of the evidence put before this Committee by Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Gibbons has inferred by his evidence that Captain Kelly participated in the purchase of arms as an Army officer without having authority to do so. That, I think, is the kernel of the evidence which has been given by Mr. Gibbons. In many respects it is my client’s contention that the evidence given to this Committee by Mr. Gibbons is false evidence. It is evidence contradicted not alone by other reputable witnesses who have come before this Committee but it is also contradicetd by Mr. Gibbons himself in sworn testimony that he has given.

It is hardly surprising that Mr. Gibbons has failed to attend this Committee for cross-examination. I intend to deal with some, but I stress only some, of the more glaring anomalies which are presented by Mr. Gibbons’s evidence.

Mr. Gibbons was at great pains throughout the evidence which he gave to this Committee to explain the reasons why he took no steps against Captain Kelly upon learning of the activities in which he was engaged. He denied knowledge of Captain Kelly’s existence until 1970. On one occasion he actually stressed the month of March, 1970, and he stated that in February, 1970, he had no real idea of Captain Kelly’s intentions. His evidence on these points was contradicted by Captain Kelly, and it was contradicted by Colonel Hefferon. But he also contradicted himself.

In this regard I would refer you to Book 24, Question 10856. This question was put to Mr. Gibbons relating to Captain Kelly’s visit to Frankfurt in February of 1970. In his answer, Mr. Gibbons said that Colonel Hefferon had told him at that time that Captain Kelly “had applied for leave to visit his sister who was sick in Frankfurt. I asked Colonel Hefferon if, in fact, Captain Kelly had a sister in Frankfurt and Colonel Hefferon said yes, he had. I asked Colonel Hefferon could it not be a perfectly legitimate visit of a brother to a sister and he said yes, of course it could .... Even at that, I didn’t assume that Colonel Hefferon was consulting me as to the advisability of the granting of this leave but he did mention his anxiety about Captain Kelly’s intention of getting arms. I said this before and I said it on oath and I am repeating it now.”

Further on the same topic on the 21st of April, 1970, at Question 11185, Mr. Gibbons stated: “This expression ’cover story’ is absolutely new.” That was a categoric statement which was amplified at or around that particular question I have referred to. I submit that this evidence was false and that Mr. Gibbons well knew the purpose of Captain Kelly’s visit to Frankfurt in February and he well knew that that purpose was to “vet” arms.

Mr. Gibbons, in evidence before the Central Criminal Court on the morning of September the 25th, mentioned this matter in the following terms. Mr. Finlay had put it to him in the following way: “so that the Director of Intelligence told you and I suggest to you that this would have been some time around the middle of February—” and Mr. Gibbons interjected and said: “Probably”—“that Captain Kelly, he believed, was going to ‘vet’ arms and that he was giving as cover or ostensible reason for that the vacation to his sister, a trip to his sister in Frankfurt.” Mr. Gibbons replied “Yes”.

So it can hardly be said that this was a new concept, the concept of a cover story. It can hardly be suggested by Mr. Gibbons that it was not made quite clear to him at that stage what the real purpose of that visit was. I suggest that Mr. Gibbons denied knowledge of this concept of a cover story to this Committee because he knew that, if he admitted knowledge of it, he would have shown conclusively to this Committee that he was aware of and acquiesced in the real purpose of Captain Kelly’s visit to the Continent on the 19th of February, 1970. Indeed, why should the visit of Captain Kelly to his sister have been brought to the notice of the Minister at all except insofar as that visit was a visit to “vet” arms and was believed to be so by Colonel Hefferon, as he had stated?

I would refer, Mr. Chairman, to a date at or around the end of March, 1970, when Captain Kelly told Mr. Gibbons of the abortive importation attempt made on the 25th of March. Mr. Gibbons again attempted to justify his failure to act against Captain Kelly by inferring that he had no clear idea of what was happening. He mentioned this meeting in reply to Question 10888 where he said:

He told me nothing of his intentions in the future.

However, on September the 25th the following exchange took place in the Central Criminal Court between Mr. Thomas Finlay and Mr. Gibbons regarding that precise meeting. Mr. Finlay said: “Did Captain Kelly also inform you that on that occasion the importation of the arms was being tried to be arranged in some other way?” Mr. Gibbons replied: “Yes” to that question. He said: “Yes, I said to him at that time and in fact I hoped as well that this would be true but I said something like this: ‘I suppose that consignment is gone west anyway’ and he said: ’No, it is not. It will be possible to retrieve it in some way or another.’” Mr. Finlay then said: “Am I right in understanding that he made it clear to you that he was going to go on assisting in an attempted importation?” Mr. Gibbons replied to that: “This was clear at that stage, yes.”

On the same point on the 28th of September, Mr. Finlay asked: “Didn’t you then have a conversation with him in which he indicated that further attempts to bring in arms were going on and spoke about the Adriatic and you made an inquiry about Trieste?” Mr. Gibbons again replied: “Yes. I should point out at this stage, my lord”—he said—“that if I may say it was I that related to Captain Kelly rather than Captain Kelly volunteering the information to me that the source of the arms that were to have come from somewhere in Belgium and I asked him would this port be Antwerp because Antwerp was the only port I could think of that was a port within Belgium.” Mr. Finlay then said: “And apart from Antwerp did he then to on and tell you that he and the others concerned were continuing their efforts to bring in arms and suggest to you on your recollection that the Adriatic might be used getting from you the comment: ‘Would it be Trieste?’”. Mr. Gibbons replied again in the affirmative. He said: “Yes. He referred rather vaguely to some place in the Adriatic.”

This appears to me to be a direct contradiction between the evidence to this Committee and the evidence before the Court. Mr. Finlay then said: “Didn’t you know then, Mr. Gibbons, that this officer, still serving in the Intelligence Section of the Irish Army, was intending to continue participating in the importation of arms?” And the answer again was: “Yes.” How can Mr. Gibbons equate that evidence with his evidence to this Committee on oath? I submit that he either misled this Committee or he misled the Court.

He further said in answer to Question 10896:

… what even the approximate nature of his activities were I have no knowledge.

How can that be consistent with the evidence given before the Court? Either one or the other is the correct version. I submit that he had full knowledge at that time. I submit that from his own testimony that statement is proved to be false. Mr. Gibbons admitted on the 25th of September, 1970, that Captain Kelly, within a few days of the incident, conveyed to his mind the precise circumstances of the abortive attempt to import the arms. He also conveyed to the Court the fact that he was fully aware that Captain Kelly intended to continue with this attempt to import arms.

The whole tenor of Mr. Gibbons’s evidence is to the effect that Captain Kelly was engaged in an operation which was in no way related to Government policy, a policy, I might add in passing, which permitted the training of citizens of Northern Ireland in Fort Dunree, which permitted the movement of 500 rifles to the Border, presumably for possible distribution, and, in this regard, I would turn to the directive given by Mr. Gibbons to the Chief of Staff on February 6th, 1970. This directive was one in terms as follows: “To prepare and train for incursions into Northern Ireland. This was clearly illustrated during Colonel Hefferon’s evidence to the first arms trial on September 29th. In reply to Question No. 11125 put by this Committee to Mr. Gibbons, he stated:

I gave certain instructions to the Chief of Staff on 6th February but they were totally unrelated to anything that Captain Kelly was doing.

I submit that that is an absurd statement, having regard to the position which Captain Kelly had held throughout the period from August until April. It was at all times known by Mr. Gibbons precisely what Captain Kelly’s functions were. Captain Kelly was acting under orders and concerned solely with the protection of the minority in the North in being a liaison between the minority in the North and politicians in the South but I will deal with that in one moment.

The evidence of Colonel Hefferon to this Committee proves conclusively, I submit, that Mr. Gibbons knew of these functions and authorised them and that this authorisation and knowledge goes back to November of 1969 at the latest. How can Mr. Gibbons baldly state to this Committee that this directive was in no way related to Captain Kelly’s operations? He further stated on the same subject that Colonel Hefferon was present at that meeting with the Chief of Staff purely by coincidence. The true facts of that meeting, I suggest, were that Mr. Gibbons instructed Colonel Hefferon to stay and the reason he did so was that he was fully aware of the importance of the Intelligence Section of the Army in relation to the directive.

It has been stated that it was never intended to put the February 6th directive into effect. However naive such a suggestion might be, implying as it does duplicity on the part of the Government, I submit that Mr. Gibbons himself was very concerned with Army plans for incursions into Northern Ireland. In fact, he demanded that a military appreciation of the Defence Forces capabilities for such incursions, which had been prepared previously should be on his desk on the Monday immediately following the 6th of February. This military appreciation was subsequently discussed by Mr. Gibbons with Captain Kelly. It was discussed after Captain Kelly’s return from the Continent on April 4th.

This conversation, which is of some importance, arose when Captain Kelly referred to the 500 rifles which had been moved to the Border at Dundalk and, in discussing this with Mr. Gibbons—the movement which had taken place on 2nd April—Captain Kelly suggested that it would be a ridiculous and dangerous operation to distribute such arms in Northern Ireland, no matter what the contingency. The reason for his feeling that it would be ridiculous and dangerous to distribute the arms was, first, that the arms could be traced to the Defence Forces and secondly—and in this context, probably more importantly—that a follow-up action would be required by the Defence Forces if they were to be used effectively.

Mr. Gibbons agreed on that occasion with Captain Kelly and made some derogatory references to the plan for limited incursions into Northern Ireland which were direct references to the appreciation which Mr. Gibbons demanded to have on his desk on the Monday following February 6th.

Mr. Gibbons, in reference to the meeting at a town in Cavan in the first week of October 1969, which has been described, I think before this Committee as the Genesis of the whole matter, stated in Book 24, in reply to Question 11346, that at the time when Colonel Hefferon complained to him of the passage of money between Captain Kelly and a member of the IRA in Cavan, he referred to this particular meeting, and I submit that Colonel Hefferon never made such an allegation regarding Captain Kelly’s conduct and that he denies having made such an allegation.

I suggest that such a complaint or one on similar lines emanated from Mr. Berry, the now retired Secretary of the Department of Justice, and that this allegation was, in fact, referring to a meeting which Captain Kelly had with the Defence Committees in Bailieboro on the 4th and 5th of October 1969. I would suggest that Mr. Berry conveyed this information to An Taoiseach and that, in turn, An Taoiseach conveyed the information to Mr. Gibbons. In this regard I would refer you to Question 11250 of Book 24 where Mr. Gibbons stated:

I have already told you that Mr. Berry’s attention was directed to Captain Kelly as early as October.

It could hardly be pure-coincidence that the Bailieboro meeting occurred at that time and it is Captain Kelly’s testimony that Mr. Berry could have been referring to the Bailieboro meeting, which was not an IRA meeting. Perhaps the evidence given by Mr. Berry to this Committee will bear out this submission. Mr. Gibbons has throughout this inquiry laid emphasis on the point that the contact between Army officers and the Minister could only be maintained through proper channels.

This particular point was also raised by Mr. Gibbons throughout the arms trial and he crystallised it in the answer to Question 11466 where he stated:

No. The Chief of Staff, the Quarter-Master-General and the Adjutant-General are all soldiers but the link between the Department of Defence as such and the Army as such is made through that channel. This is the way it works.

The implication of that statement is that any other direct contact between members of the Army and the Minister would be irregular. The impression has thereby been created, and I suggest, consciously, that Intelligence Officers did not and could not operate directly under the Minister. This is not the case and my client contends that the Director of Intelligence has now, and has over a period of 30 years at least had direct access to Intelligence Officers, if only because he is charged with a special and sensitive aspect of national security and I suggest that it is only logical that this must be the course adopted by a Minister for Defence. He must be in a position to have direct access to his Director of Intelligence or any particular operative within that framework who is dealing with national security. My client contends that he personally had this access, in conjunction with Colonel Hefferon, and that Mr. Gibbons is now denying the regularity of this procedure for the purpose of denying knowledge of the events leading up to the attempted importation.

I have already referred to the fact that Mr. Gibbons has alleged that his knowledge of Captain Kelly’s existence did not take real shape until 1970. He alleged that in reply to Question 11163. He further alleged: “At no time to my knowledge was Captain Kelly assigned as a liaison officer to liaise with anybody; to my knowledge, he was Colonel Hefferon’s Staff Officer, Colonel Hefferon’s young man.” This phrase “Colonel Hefferon’s young man” is one which has come up with some regularity—from Mr. Gibbons, I might add. I would suggest to you that this phrase is one which was made up by Mr. Gibbons. It is one which has not been borne out by Colonel Hefferon’s evidence and I would suggest that at no time was Captain Kelly referred to by Colonel Hefferon as his young man. I would further suggest, for reasons which I will give in one moment, that at all times Mr. Gibbons was aware of Captain Kelly’s real name and discussed him as being Captain Kelly from August or October 1969 right up to April and May 1970.

The plain reality as stated by Colonel Hefferon is that Captain Kelly was discussed by name with Mr. Gibbons in October, 1969. Also at this time Captain Kelly made inquiries for Mr. Gibbons about evidence which was to be given to the Scarman Commission the following day. The inquiries which he made at this stage, in November, 1969, were with relation to Fort Dunree and the possibility that evidence could be given the following day as to what had happened at Fort Dunree training. Captain Kelly obtained the information as was required and rang the Department of Defence, spoke to a secretary of the Department of Defence and gave the information which was required by the Minister. For the Minister to subsequently state, as he did to this Committee, that he had no knowledge of Captain Kelly’s existence as Captain Kelly until 1970 I respectfully submit, is absurd. Mr. Gibbons, himself, has stated to this Committee, as I mentioned, that Mr. Berry’s attention was drawn to Captain Kelly in October, 1969. It could hardly be suggested that Mr. Berry neglected to bring this information to the proper authority. If Mr. Berry brought it to any authority, I would suggest he brought it to the Taoiseach. It seems inconceivable this was not in turn related to Mr. Gibbons.

With regard to the contention that Captain Kelly was not assigned to liaise with anybody it is worthwhile noting the evidence of Mr. Haughey on October 19th in the arms trial. In this evidence it was stated that Captain Kelly was the link between the Cabinet subcommittee on the North and the minority in Northern Ireland. I would submit that both Mr. Ó Moráin and Deputy Boland would be prepared to give evidence that Captain Kelly’s existence as Captain Kelly was well-known to every member of the Cabinet during a period up to Christmas—October, November, December. Captain Kelly came to their notice at or around the month of November. This is the notice of the Cabinet.

In Book 24, paragraphs 11071 and 11072, Mr. Gibbons refers to his attempts to get Captain Kelly out of the Army. He said the more quietly and unobtrusively Captain Kelly were removed from the Army the better. A pertinent question to ask is why did Mr. Gibbons not remove Captain Kelly from the Army or have him courtmartialled in October, 1969? Or in November, 1969, December, January, February or March? Even on his own testimony he new of Captain Kelly’s activities in February, 1970. Why did he not act? I suggest that the reason he did not act was because he authorised Captain Kelly’s activities. When Colonel Hefferon suggested Captain Kelly’s retirement in January, 1970 Mr. Gibbons rejected it. Subsequent to that rejection Mr. Gibbons intimated to Captain Kelly that Colonel Hefferon was too conservative in the issue of having the Army involved in the importation of untraceable arms.

You will remember, Mr. Chairman, that the evidence of Colonel Hefferon as to the reason he wanted Captain Kelly out of the Army was simply because he felt that this could cause damage to the Army as such. It was not that the operation was illegal. The pig smuggling suggestion, I suggest of its nature—I do not intend going into it at length because I suggest it is self-evident—must have been an intended opportunity for Captain Kelly to operate without the restrictions imposed by having to attend to regimental duties. It was an ideal opportunity. It afforded an ideal opportunity for Captain Kelly to operate near the Border and to operate without the control or the restrictions imposed by being a member of the Army.

Mr. Gibbons has emphasised to this Committee—and I think it is a point which has not come out before the Committee at all—that he tried to get Captain Kelly out of the Army. When looking at this emphasis in detail it becomes apparent that he never made any effort to get Captain Kelly out of the Army. What he did do was in April, 1970, he made a proposal that Captain Kelly be seconded to the Department of Agriculture. On September 29th, 1970, in the Central Criminal Court, Commandant Treacy, who was the officer in charge of records at Army Headquarters, gave evidence of his secondment. He produced the only real documentary evidence that there is regarding Captain Kelly leaving the Army. He produced a document to the court which Captain Kelly has signed and which was dated 17th April, 1971. Mr. Gibbons, I suggest, had initiated the proceedings which led to the presentation of this document to Captain Kelly.

Secondment was defined in the Central Criminal Court by Commandant Treacy and was defined in his own words that the officer concerned was posted to the Army general list and remained on Army strength and was assigned to the Department to which he was placed on loan, but he was retained on the Army record and strength.” If it was intended that Captain Kelly should quietly and unobtrusively leave the scene and if his activities had been reprehensible, surely it would have been expected that he could have left and been put in a position in the Department of Agriculture, but at least that he would have been taken out of the Army. He was not.

Therefore, Mr. Gibbons never tried to get Captain Kelly out of the Army, as has been testified. Mr. Gibbons has, before this Committee, stated in answers to Questions 10929, 10930 and 10931 that the first he knew of what was intended to be done with the arms was on the 30th April, 1970, when told by Captain Kelly.

However, Colonel Hefferon on 15th October, 1970, told the Central Criminal Court that he told Mr. Gibbons the destination of the arms before he retired on 9th April, 1970. Mr. Gibbons, he alleged, quoted a line of poetry. Yet, again by his evidence in this instance, which I contend was false evidence, Mr. Gibbons has impugned the character of Captain Kelly by inferring that he acted in vacuo throughout this whole operation. In a letter written on 19th January, 1971, by Mr. Gibbons to this Committee it was indicated that Captain Kelly first told him of the source of the money for the arms on 30th April.

This is of some significance because previously in the Central Criminal Court on the morning of October 9th Mr. Gibbons told the Court that Captain Kelly told him on the 1st May, 1970. Of course it subsequently transpired that on 1st May, 1970, Captain Kelly was under arrest. Equally certainly Captain Kelly could not have told Mr. Gibbons on the 30th; he never saw him on that day.

The reality is that the money and its source were discussed by Mr. Gibbons with Captain Kelly in March, 1970. Mr. Gibbons on that occasion leant back in his chair and laughed, making some comment about Charlies’ money. It was during this interview that Captain Kelly told Mr. Gibbons of the destination of the arms. The reason that Mr. Gibbons misled this Committee was that in his own interests it was essential for him to show that his knowledge was after the event.

On Saturday, 24th October, 1970, when the Taoiseach was in New York he explained his dismissal of Mr. Haughey by stating that Mr. Haughey had not kept him informed on a vital matter. On the 9th and 14th May, 1970, Mr. Lynch told the Dáil that the fund under consideration was not the source of the money used in purchasing the arms. On Mr. Gibbons own admission he knew of this fact on 30th May, 1970. On my client’s evidence and on any logical appraisal of the facts he must have known in March, 1970. Why did Mr. Gibbons not inform the Taoiseach? If he did not tell the Taoiseach surely he was also guilty in failing to keep the Taoiseach informed of events.

My client has stood in the dock and he has stood before this Committee, I submit, largely because of the evidence of Mr. Gibbons. Mr. Gibbons is a Cabinet Minister who has shown himself unwilling to stand up with courage to justify his own allegations. I would suggest that some of the evidence to which I have referred today and the anomalies contained in it offer an explanation to his conduct.

In closing I would suggest that at all times Mr. Gibbons was fully aware of the activities undertaken by Captain Kelly and that Captain Kelly acted with the authorisation of the Minister.

11829. Deputy FitzGerald.—I want just to raise a question. In his closing submission are all the statements made ones that we have had in evidence? In the ordinary way a submission of this kind would pull together facts from the evidence and in many cases Mr. Sutherland has done that. It may be simply a fault of recollection on my part that one or two statements seem to me to be one of importance that we have not had in evidence. Could I, through you Mr. Chairman, ask Mr. Sutherland if we will find in the evidence all the statements he made including in particular the last one, which sticks in my mind, that Captain Kelly told Mr. Gibbons the source of the money and the destination of the arms in, I think, March, 1970?

—It did come up here apparently in evidence.

Captain Kelly.—It came up when I was here. It is referred to in Mr. Gibbons evidence also at some point, I do not know exactly where. This question of a—that he laughed when he was told about it and he said it was too serious a matter to laugh about was his answer.

11830. Deputy FitzGerald.—I see, I just want to be sure of this.

Mr. Sutherland.—I have made a reference to Mr. Boland——

11831. Dr. FitzGerald.—I understand that.

The Witnesses withdrew.

The Committee adjourned at 4.55 p.m.