Committee Reports > List of Committees > Joint > 1930 > Committee on the Courts of Justice Act 1924 and the Civil Jurisdiction of the Courts > Report - Courts of Justice Act 1924 and the civil jurisdiction of the Courts

REPORT.

The Joint Committee of the Dáil and Seanad set up to consider and report what amendments, if any, are required in the Courts of Justice Act, 1924, the Acts amending same and any other Statutes affecting the civil jurisdiction of the Courts of Saorstát Eireann report as follows:—

1. In this Report the Committee set forth the results of their deliberations on the general functioning in civil matters of the several courts of justice of Saorstát Eireann adding at the end a list of their Recommendations with regard to miscellaneous matters connected with the respective Courts.

1.—DISTRICT COURT.

2. The evidence produced to the Committee was to the effect that the District Court is functioning to the general satisfaction. The Committee recommend that its present jurisdiction in contract and tort, viz., £25 and £10, respectively, should be maintained.

2.—CIRCUIT COURT.

3. The greater number of the witnesses who appeared before the Committee directed their evidence to the jurisdiction and working of the Circuit Court and to the mode of appeal from that Court, and sharp differences of opinion on these subjects were revealed. The Committee had submitted to them the evidence of judges, barristers, solicitors, representatives of commercial and agricultural interests, and officials, who had an intimate knowledge of the working of the Court, and many of whom had personal experience of the legal systems which prevailed prior to the establishment of the Circuit Court.

4. The Circuit Court was constituted under section 37 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1924 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act of 1924”) with the jurisdiction in civil cases defined by section 48, and the jurisdiction transferred to it by section 51 of that Act. It was intended to take the place, in conjunction with the District Court, of the previously existing County Court which had a jurisdiction in contract and tort up to £50 and also “to take over so much of the High Court jurisdiction as related to the everyday legal business of the country which ought to be disposed of locally.”

5. Under section 37 of the Act of 1924 the Saorstát was divided into eight circuits which were specified in the schedule to the Act, and were constituted on the assumption that there would be about the same volume of work in each of the circuits. It was also provided by the Act of 1924 that, generally speaking, cases should be tried in the local venue.

6. The Circuit Courts have now been in existence for nearly six years. They have been working without Rules of Court and without any prescribed scale of costs. The Committee are glad to be able to report that, notwithstanding these unfavourable conditions, the Circuit Court itself has on the whole given satisfaction to litigants and to the public. It has, however developed certain defects, some of which may be remedied by Rules of Court, while others will require to be remedied by legislation.

7. Soon after the Circuit Court commenced to function it was found that ordinary work in Circuit No. 1, which comprises the City and County of Dublin, was much too heavy for a single judge, with the result that heavy arrears accumulated. The work on the Midland Circuit, which comprises six counties, also fell into arrear, as did also the work on the Northern Circuit, though not to the same extent. It therefore became necessary to appoint two additional Circuit Judges, who are not permanently assigned to any Circuit, one of whom will be required in the Dublin City and County Circuit, and the other will assist the judge of any Circuit who requires assistance owing to pressure of business, illness or other cause. These additional judges were appointed under section 9 of the Courts of Justice Act, 1928 (No. 15 of 1928).

8. The Committee propose to deal first with the jurisdiction and working of the Circuit Court, and secondly, with the mode of appeal from the Circuit Court.

(A) Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.

9. Under section 48 of the Act of 1924 it was enacted that the Circuit Court should have and exercise the following jurisdiction in civil cases:—

(i) On consent, without any limit as to amount of claim or value of property involved in the proceedings, where all necessary parties sign, before the hearing, a prescribed form of consent;

(ii) In cases of contract and tort (with one or two exceptions), where the claim does not exceed £300;

(iii) In title to land and rectification of the register, where the Poor Law Valuation of the property in question does not exceed £60;

(iv) In probate matters and actions and suits for the administration of estates, where the value of the personalty does not exceed £1,000 and the Poor Law Valuation of the land does not exceed £60;

(v) In equity cases (including the winding-up of companies) within the same limits as in probate actions and administration suits, and in winding-up cases where the issued capital of the company does not exceed £10,000;

(vi) In bankruptcy, in Local Bankruptcy Courts which may be established under the Local Bankruptcy (Ireland) Act, 1888, in any Circuit; and

(vii)In certain proceedings by the State or any Minister or Government Department to recover any sum not exceeding £300.

10. In addition to the jurisdiction conferred on the Circuit Court by section 48 of the Act of 1924, there was transferred to the Circuit Court by section 51 of that Act all jurisdiction, not expressly excepted, which at the commencement of the Act was vested in or capable of being exercised by Recorders, County Court Judges, and Chairmen of Courts of Quarter Sessions, save such jurisdiction of Justices at or of Courts of Quarter Sessions as was conferred on or transferred to the District Court.

Contract and Tort.

11. The portion of this jurisdiction to which witnesses directed most of their evidence was the jurisdiction in contract and tort. In order to ascertain the extent to which litigants had taken advantage of the higher jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, the Committee obtained from the Department of Justice a return of the cases of contract and tort entered for hearing in the Circuit Court during the three years ending August, 1929, and divided into groups according to the amount claimed.

12. From this return it will be seen that the total number of these cases was 34,710, that of these no less than 26,810 were cases in which the amount claimed did not exceed £50, and that 4,710 were cases in which the amount claimed exceeded £50 but did not exceed £100. It therefore appears that about 77 per cent. of the cases of contract and tort entered for hearing in the Circuit Courts were cases which would have been within the £50 limit of jurisdiction of the former County Court; and allowing for the decrease in the value of money, over 90 per cent. of the cases entered for hearing in the Circuit Court during these three years would have been within, or very little above, the jurisdiction of the County Court.

13. The great majority of the witnesses who gave evidence on the working of the Circuit Court were of opinion that no alteration ought to be made in the jurisdiction in cases of contract and tort. Their opinion was based on the fact that the higher jurisdiction of the Circuit Court was popular with litigants and with the general public, that the Circuit Court had worked satisfactorily (notwithstanding that it was not provided with Rules of Court), and that the costs of the larger cases in the Circuit Court were substantially less than in similar cases in the High Court.

14. On the other hand, a number of witnesses, including the practising barristers who gave evidence on behalf of the Bar Council, were of opinion that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in cases of contract and tort was too high and ought to be reduced to a figure which would nearly correspond to the former jurisdiction of the County Courts, i.e., cases where the amount claimed does not exceed £100. These witnesses based their opinions mainly on the grounds that many of the larger cases in the Circuit Court involved difficult questions of law, and required the services of experienced Counsel, and that they could not be satisfactorily dealt with in country venues where the legal authorities are not available to Counsel or to the Judge. It was also urged by these witnesses that the higher jurisdiction of the Circuit Court which tempted very junior barristers to spend most of their time in the Circuit Courts, was having, and would continue to have, an injurious effect on the quality of the Bar, and would eventually affect the quality of the Bench. The danger of the evil effect of the larger jurisdiction of the Circuit Court on the quality of the Bar was acknowledged by eminent country solicitors, who at the same time were opposed to any reduction in the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court.

15. The Committee recommend that the present jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in cases of contract and tort should be maintained. The Committee are, however, of opinion that some of the more serious objections urged against the maintenance of the existing jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in cases of contract and tort may be removed by certain provisions to which legislative effect should be given.

Transfer of Actions from the High Court.

16. Under Article 64 of the Constitution, the High Court is “invested with full original jurisdiction in and power to determine all matters and questions whether of law or fact, civil or criminal.” and this without any limit as to the nature or amount of the claim. It is however, enacted by section 25 of the Act of 1924 that “when any action shall be pending in the High Court which might have been commenced in the Circuit Court, any party to any such action may, at any time before service of notice of trial thereof, apply to the High Court that the action be remitted or transferred to the Circuit Court, and thereupon, in case the Court shall consider that the action is fit to be prosecuted in the High Court it may retain such action therein, or if it shall not consider the action fit to be prosecuted in the High Court it may remit or transfer such action to the Circuit Court.” In determining whether, in any particular case, a litigant should be deprived of his constitutional right of access to the High Court, it would seem to be proper for the Court, on the hearing of an application under this section to transfer an action from the High Court to the Circuit Court, to consider as a matter of judicial discretion whether the action was of such a nature as to be in the words of the section, “fit to be prosecuted in the High Court.” The Committee were, however, referred to a ease of Hosie v. Lawless (1927 I.R. 470) in which the Supreme Court, reversing the decision of a judge of the High Court, held that this was not the true construction of section 25 of the Act of 1924, and that in view of “the policy” of the Act, the question for the Court on an application to transfer an action from the High Court to the Circuit Court was not whether the action was fit to be prosecuted in the High Court but “whether there is anything in the action which takes it out of the general policy, and makes it more fit to be tried in the High Court than in the Circuit Court” The Committee were informed that the effect of this decision has been that the Circuit Court has now practically exclusive jurisdiction in all actions which are within its jurisdiction, and that no action is retained in the High Court which is within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court. Without expressing any opinion on the constitutional question raised by this decision, the Committee are of opinion that if an action is of such a substantial or important nature that it is reasonable that it should have been commenced in the High Court, it ought not to be transferred to the Circuit Court on the grounds that it could have been commenced and prosecuted in the latter Court. The Committee, therefore, consider that on an application to remit or transfer an action from the High Court to the Circuit Court the question for the Court should be whether, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, it was reasonable that the action should have been commenced in the High Court, and the Committee recommend that this should be provided for by the necessary legislation. Any objection that this might impose an additional burden upon litigants is met by recommendations as to costs contained in a later paragraph of this Report.

Default Procedure.

17. Evidence was produced to the Committee by representatives of the commercial community that considerable delay in obtaining judgment in undefended actions for the recovery of debts or liquidated demands in money is occasioned by the infrequent sittings of the Circuit Court in areas outside the city of Dublin, as a result of the number of counties in which the Judge must operate. The Committee are of opinion that special arrangements should be made for the marking without delay of judgments in actions for the recovery of debts or liquidated demands in money where the defendant has not appeared or where having appeared he does not file a defence. Some witnesses suggested that the marking of judgments should be delegated to the County Registrar. The Committee, however, do not accept this view. While the marking of judgment in such cases is generally a matter of routine, questions frequently arise as to the nature of the claim and the service of the civil bill which need judicial determination. The Committee consider that the power of marking judgments should be limited to the judge. They consider further that with modern facilities for travel it should be possible for the Circuit Judge to attend at the principal circuit town of each county at reasonable intervals, say, once a month, to mark such judgments, and they recommend that arrangements should be made accordingly.

Registration of Judgments.

18. (a) In his evidence to the Committee the Master of the High Court called attention to an anomalous state of the law in connection with the registration of judgments. Under section 336 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1857 a judgment creditor who has obtained a judgment in one of the “Superior Courts” is obliged to register his judgment within twenty-one days in order to obtain priority for his judgment debt in the event of the subsequent bankruptcy of the judgment debtor. This section of the Bankruptcy Act of 1857 only applies to judgments of one of the then existing superior Courts or of the present High Court, and would not include a judgment of the Circuit Court, with the result that a judgment creditor who has obtained a judgment in the Circuit Court is in a superior position to a judgment creditor who has obtained a judgment in the High Court in the event of the subsequent bankruptcy of the judgment debtor. This anomaly should be removed by making statutory provision for the registration of judgments of the Circuit Court in the Central Office in Dublin, and by the necessary amendments of the Bankruptcy Act of 1857.

The Committee are, however, of opinion that, in carrying this recommendation into effect, a distinction should be made between judgments of the Circuit Court for sums not exceeding £100 and those for larger amounts. As already pointed out in this Report, more than 90 per cent. of the cases of contract and tort entered for hearing in the Circuit Courts for the three years ending August, 1929, were cases in which the amount claimed did not exceed £100, and were therefore cases which, allowing for the decrease in the value of money, would have been within, or very little above, the jurisdiction of the County Court. Decrees of the County Court had no priority in the subsequent bankruptcy of the defendant, and to give priority in bankruptcy judgments of the Circuit Court for sums under £100 would in effect be to confer an advantage on a class of creditors who did not enjoy it before 1924. The Committee are, therefore, of opinion that a judgment of the Circuit Court for a sum not exceeding £100 over and above costs should not be given any priority in the event of the subsequent bankruptcy of the judgment debtor.

(b) The Committee also recommend that the right to register a judgment as a mortgage should be confined to judgments for sums exceeding £50 over and above costs.

(c) Provision should be made for the registration in the Central Office of recognisances and State bonds entered into in the Circuit Courts.

(B) Appeal From Circuit Court.

19. Section 61 of the Act of 1924 provides that in civil cases there shall be an appeal from any order or judgment of the Circuit Court to two judges of the High Court sitting in Dublin, and that this appeal “shall be on law and fact, or upon either,” with certain exceptions not material to be herein mentioned. Section 62 of the Act of 1924 provides that such appeal should be grounded on the report of an official stenographer, but that “the Court which hears such appeal may, if it think fit, admit fresh evidence, either oral or on affidavit, and may refer any matter arising on the report of the official stenographer to the Circuit Judge for his observations thereon, and may either order a new trial or enter such judgment, in the case, as to the Court shall seem fit”. This last-mentioned section did not give power to the Court hearing an appeal from the Circuit Court to rehear the evidence of any witness whose evidence was contained in the stenographer’s report; but this omission was rectified by the Courts of Justice Act 1928 (No. 15 of 1928).

20. The Committee are of opinion that it was intended by the Oireachtas that there should be an effective appeal on fact, i.e., that the Court, on the hearing of an appeal from the Circuit Court, should be entitled to differ from the finding of the Circuit Court Judge on a question of fact as distinguished from a question of inference from facts.

21. The Committee, however, found it necessary, having regard to the evidence of some of the witnesses, to consider the general question of the desirability of an effective appeal on fact, in other words, whether or not section 61 should be repealed and legislative provision be made which would expressly confine the power of the Court on the hearing of an appeal from the Circuit Court to differ from the Circuit Court Judge as to findings of law and as to inferences from facts. The evidence submitted to the Committee was overwhelmingly in favour of the view that there thought in this country to be an effective appeal from the Circuit Court on questions of fact. Over ninety per cent. of the cases decided in the Circuit Courts are cases in which the amounts recovered are under £100 and (allowing for the diminution in the value of money) would have been within, or very little above, the jurisdiction of the old County Courts. In cases which, although of great importance to the litigants, involve comparatively small amounts, it cannot be expected that the issues of law and fact will be as clearly knit and the necessary proofs as carefully directed as in cases involving larger amounts. For this reason it frequently happens on the hearing of a case in the Circuit Court that the case, through no fault of the judge, is mistried, i.e., that all the facts necessary to the proper trial of the legal issues involved are not available or brought out in evidence, and the power given to the Judges of procuring fresh or additional evidence on the hearing of the appeal has not afforded an effective remedy. If justice is to be done in cases of this kind an effective appeal on questions of fact is necessary. In the opinion of the Committee, no system of modified pleadings which might be applied to cases in the Circuit Court will, to any great extent, remedy this evil. The preliminary advice which is necessary to a correct statement of the legal issues and the direction of proofs which is necessary to the production of the proper evidence, would increase the costs in these cases to an extent out of all proportion to the amount involved.

The Committee are, therefore, of opinion that there ought to be an effective appeal on fact to the High Court from all judgments and orders of the Circuit Court.

22. The Committee are further of opinion that the mode of appeal which is prescribed by section 62 of the Act of 1924, viz., an appeal grounded on the report of an official stenographer is unsatisfactory and ought to be discontinued. In the first place, even if it were open to the appellate tribunal to differ from the finding of the Circuit Court Judge on a pure question of fact, this mode of appeal makes it very difficult to go behind the facts of the case as found by the Circuit Court Judge, or to ascertain that all the relevant facts were before him. In the next place the report of the official stenographer, through no fault of the stenographer, frequently fails to convey an accurate impression of the evidence of a witness, and even when it does so, there is a natural disinclination on the part of the appellate tribunal to differ from the finding of fact of the Circuit Court Judge who has seen and heard the witnesses, and is the best judge of their credibility. Another serious objection to this mode of appeal is the frequently inordinate length of the stenographer’s note, due to the fact that evidence apparently irrelevant to the issues raised in the Circuit Court may become relevant on the hearing of an appeal, and cannot therefore be rejected by the Circuit Court Judge. For the same reason it is necessary for the solicitors in an appeal to brief the entire of the stenographer’s note, often at great and sometimes at unnecessary cost, and Counsel in opening an appeal finds it necessary to read the entire note—a practice which seems to be largely responsible for the relatively much longer time which appeals on the stenographer’s note take than appeals took under the old system of rehearing. Compared with cases reheard on appeal from the County Courts, similar cases heard on appeal from the Circuit Court take at least twice as long; and the costs of appeals from the Circuit Court in these cases are frequently so high as to amount to a denial of the right of appeal.

23. Having come to the conclusion that the present mode of appeal from the Circuit Court is unsatisfactory, and so unsatisfactory that it ought to be discontinued, the Committee had next to consider the mode of appeal which in their opinion should be substituted therefor. On this question the evidence of the witnesses was overwhelmingly in favour of a rehearing of the case on appeal by a judge or judges of the High Court sitting locally, and the Committee recommend this form of appeal. This will be a return in cases in the Circuit Court in which the amount claimed does not exceed £100, to the old system of County Court Appeal to the Assize Court. Objections have been urged to the latter system, but, on the whole, it gave satisfaction to litigants and to the public. The principal objection made by some witnesses to an appeal by way of rehearing was that the hearing in the Circuit Court would in many cases be in the nature of a direction of proofs, and that on the rehearing on appeal litigants would “mend their hand” to the great encouragement of perjury. The Committee were not impressed by this objection. In many of the smaller cases in the Circuit Court the instructions for the proceedings are given by poor and ignorant people, and are necessarily hurriedly taken, and there is no formal direction of proofs, with the result that it is only when the case has been heard that the true legal issues are discovered, and the necessary evidence ascertained. In many of these cases the only chance of ultimate justice being done is by a rehearing on appeal, and so far as the encouragement of perjury is concerned, the Committee are of opinion that there is much less chance of successful perjury where there is a rehearing of the case on appeal.

24. It may be objected that the substitution of a rehearing for the present appeal from the Circuit Court on the stenographer’s note will, in cases where the amount sued for is over £100, give an entirely new form of appeal. To this objection the obvious answer is that in these cases the Act of 1924 gave a new right of appeal on questions of fact, and that a rehearing on appeal is the only way of making this right effective.

25. On the question whether the rehearing on appeal from the Circuit Court should be by one or by two judges of the High Court, the majority of the witnesses were of opinion that the rehearing should be by two judges, and the Committee agree with this opinion. The appeal under section 61 of the Act of 1924 is to two judges of the High Court, and in cases in which the amount sued for exceeds £100 the rehearing on appeal should certainly be by two judges.

26. The Committee are of opinion and recommend that the appeal from the Circuit Court by way of rehearing should be heard locally in convenient centres, and at least twice a year at intervals which will, so far as possible, ensure the hearing of all pending appeals within six months from the date of the notice of appeal.

27. If the present mode of appeal from the Circuit Court is altered, and the appeal is by way of a rehearing, a question will arise as to the retention of the official stenographer at the hearing of civil cases. The Committee heard a good deal of evidence on this question, and are of opinion that the official stenographer should be retained. This does not mean that his note should form part of the record in the Circuit Court, or that it should necessarily be briefed for Counsel, or be transcribed, but it should be available, and any party to the action should be entitled to a transcript on payment therefor of the prescribed fees.

28. In submitting their recommendations on the subject of the appeal from the Circuit Court the Committee desire to emphasize the general dissatisfaction with the present mode of appeal expressed by the great majority of the witnesses who gave evidence before them. It is of the utmost importance that the legal system of the Circuit Court should be satisfactory not only to the litigants but to the public generally.

3.—HIGH COURT.

(a) Constitution.

29. The High Court is constituted under section 4 of the Act of 1924, and consists of “not more than six judges, namely, a President and five ordinary judges.” The High Court at present consists of six judges, one of whom (Mr. Justice Wylie) is not called upon to discharge any duties other than those of the judicial and administrative work of the Land Commission. In addition to the ordinary work of the High Court itelf, two of the five available judges of the High Court are called on to form the Court of Criminal Appeal whenever it sits; one of them has to preside at the sittings of the Central Criminal Court which take place four times a year and are frequently very prolonged; and two, and sometimes four, of them are occupied for many weeks in hearing appeals from the Circuit Court.

30. The Committee had the advantage of hearing most valuable evidence on the working of the High Court from its President, who has occupied that position since the constitution of the Court in 1924. In the opinion of the President the only flaw in the working of the High Court has arisen from the under-manning of the Court, which has led to delay and to a certain amount of dissatisfaction due to delay. And his view was that if it had been adequately manned from the beginning, there would have been no complaint about the working of the High Court. Owing to the number of judges being insufficient to cope with the work, there was a serious accumulation of arrears in the High Court at the close of the year 1926. These arrears were confined to the appeals from the Circuit Court, of which there were over 700 in the list and then unheard. In order to clear off these arrears, four Commissioners were appointed under the Circuit Court Appeals Act, 1927 (No. 10 of 1927). These Commissioners sat from early in April, 1927, until the 24th of November, 1927, except during the legal vacations, and cleared off all the appeals from the Circuit Court which were actually pending at the date of the passing of the Act (31st March, 1927). They actually heard 527 appeals, the remainder of the then pending appeals having been withdrawn or struck out. It appears from a return with which the Committee have been furnished by the Department of Justice that at the close of the year 1929 there were 212 Circuit Court Appeals waiting to be heard, some of which must have been in the list for more than 12 months. The Committee are impressed with the very serious hardship caused to litigants by the long delay in the hearing of these appeals. Nine out of ten of the actions heard in the Circuit Courts are cases in which the amount claimed does not exceed £100. In most of these cases the litigants are in humble circumstances and can ill afford a delay which often amounts to a denial of justice. No matter what form the appeal from the Circuit Court may take, the Committee are clearly of opinion that due provision should be made for a speedy and regular hearing of Circuit Court appeals. If the present mode of appeal from the Circuit Court is retained, the duty of hearing these appeals should be a first charge on the time of two of the judges of the High Court nominated from time to time by the President for that purpose. As there are about 300 effective appeals every year, and as two judges sitting together dispose on the average of only three or four appeals a day, it would require between 75 and 80 Court days, or roughly four months of the legal year, to obviate arrears of appeals. In view of these figures the Committee agree with the President of the High Court that if the present form of appeal from the Circuit Court is retained, he will require at least one additional judge and possibly two additional judges, to keep the work of the Court up to date. On the other hand, if the mode of appeal from the Circuit Court is altered to a re-hearing in local venues, it is evident that an addition to the number of High Court Judges will be necessary. Appeals by way of re-hearing would not take as long to hear as appeals on the stenographer’s note; but on the other hand they would probably be more numerous. Assuming that these appeals would be heard by two judges, and that the appeal circuits would go out at least twice a year, it is estimated that each circuit would last about a month. On this assumption the circuits for the hearing of Circuit Court appeals would occupy the judicial time of four of the High Court Judges for two months of the legal year, and would therefore necessitate such an addition to the judicial strength of the High Court as would be required if the present mode of appeal from the Circuit Court were maintained. The Committee are satisfied that, even if the judge by whom the judicial and administrative work of the Land Commission is performed could be called upon to assist in the ordinary work of the High Court, his assistance would not give appreciable relief to the High Court as long as the work of Land Purchase remains unfinished. The Committee, therefore, recommend that such addition to the number of judges of the High Court as may be necessary to enable that Court to perform all its work without any accumulation of arrears should be made without delay.

(b) Functioning.

31. The recommendation of the Committee on the question of retaining in the High Court certain actions commenced there which are within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court has already been set out. There is, further, a class of actions frequently brought in the High Court which is within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court, namely, actions to recover debts or liqudated demands in money. These actions consist very largely of claims for simple contract debts due for goods sold and delivered. The Committee consider that the prosecution of very small claims of this character in the High Court is an abuse of the process of the Court and frequently involves hardship on a defendant who has a good defence but thinks it cheaper to pay the claim than to incur the risk of High Court costs. The Committee are, however, of opinion, having regard to the right of access to the High Court provided by the Constitution and to the fact that in many cases it may be to the greater convenience of the parties to proceed in the High Court, that facilities for the prosecution in the High Court of actions of the character indicated above should be made available. The Committee recommend that in actions in the High Court for the recovery of debts or liquidated demands in money in which the sum recovered does not exceed £25, it should be provided that in no event shall the plaintiff recover more than the costs of a similar action in the District Court. And in a similar action in the High Court in which the sum recovered does not exceed £100, it should be provided that in no event shall the plaintiff recover more than the costs of a similar action in the Circuit Court.

32. At the same time the Committee do not think that an action in the High Court for the recovery of a debt or liquidated demand in money should be transferred to the Circuit Court unless the Court is satisfied that the defendant has a good defence to the action or some part thereof or has disclosed such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend.

33. The Committee are further of opinion that, in the case of an action brought in the High Court for debt or liquidated demand in money payable by the defendant on a summary summons to which the defendant has entered an appearance, and in which it is open to the plaintiff to apply to the Court on motion for liberty to enter final judgment for the amount of his claim, the action should not be transferred to the Circuit Court unless the defendant satisfies the Court that he has a good defence to the action or some part thereof, or discloses such facts as may be deemed sufficient to entitle him to defend.

34. Notwithstanding the provisions of section 25 of the Act of 1924 entitling any party to any action which might have been commenced in the Circuit Court to apply at any time before service of notice of trial that the action be remitted or transferred to the Circuit Court the Committee were referred to a case of Smith v. Offaly County Council (1929 I.R. 618) in which the President of the High Court held that a motion to transfer an action commenced by summary summons claiming a liquidated sum and to which an appearance has been entered cannot be brought before the summons has been set down by plaintiff for hearing by the Master under the procedure prescribed by Order XV. Rule 1 of the Rules of the High Court. The Committee respectfully accepting this decision as the true construction of section 25 of the Act and of the Rules of the High Court, consider that an application to remit or transfer an action from the High Court to the Circuit Court should be made to a judge of the High Court by any party at any time at or after appearance is entered and before service of notice of trial, and either before or after the summons has been set down by the plaintiff for hearing before the Master. The Committee consider that the motion to transfer should be permitted at the earliest possible opportunity so as to relieve the parties of avoidable costs.

(c) Jurisdiction of the Master.

35. The Report of the Judiciary Committee recommended that a large number of applications to the High Court which are therein specified should be “heard and determined by the Chief Official or Master of the Central Office”; and this recommendation was, to a large extent, carried out by Rules of Court made under the Act of 1924, which purported to give the Master of the High Court the powers therein mentioned. A number of these powers were of a judicial or semi-judicial nature and a question arose whether, having regard to Article 64 of the Constitution, many of the orders made by the Master were ultra vires. It appears that this question is still sub judice. The Committee were informed that no general definition of “judicial power” can be given, and that each particular case will have to be taken and ruled upon separately. In these circumstances the Committee found some difficulty in dealing with the jurisdiction of the Master of the High Court. In the interest of cheaper and speedier justice it is essential that a number of the applications which may have to be made in the course of the proceedings in an action should be dealt with by the Master instead of by the Court. And the Committee consider that this is a matter of such importance that it should be made legally possible by the necessary legislation. At the same time the Committee are of opinion that the matters over which the Master should be given jurisdiction should be confined to applications which deal with procedure, and should not extend to any application the result of which will determine the right or liability, if disputed, of any party in respect of the legal or equitable relief claimed in the action or any part thereof.

36. The Committee are also of opinion that applications to remit or transfer an action from the High Court to the Circuit Court should be excluded from the jurisdiction of the Master.

4.—SUPREME COURT.

37. By section 5 of the Act of 1924 it is enacted that the Supreme Court shall consist of three judges of whom the President shall be the Chief Justice. The President of the High Court is ex officio an additional judge of the Supreme Court (section 6) and in case of the illness, etc., of a judge or judges of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice may request any ordinary judges or judges of the High Court to sit on the hearing of any appeal in the Supreme Court (section 7). Under section 8 the Chief Justice may, from time to time, request any two or more judges of the High Court to sit with himself or with a judge of the Supreme Court as a Court of Criminal Appeal.

38. Article 66 of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall, with such exceptions (not including cases which involve questions as to the validity of any law) and subject to such regulations as may be prescribed by law, have appellate jurisdiction from all decisions of the High Court, and by section 18 of the Act of 1924 it is enacted that “subject as in this Act is provided, there shall be transferred to the Supreme Court the jurisdiction which at the commencement of this Act was vested in or capable of being exercised by the existing Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Judicature in Ireland or any judges or judge thereof.”

39. Article 66 of the Constitution further provides that the “decision of the Supreme Court shall in all cases be final and conclusive, and shall not be reviewed or capable of being reviewed by any other Court, Tribunal or Authority whatsoever; Provided that nothing in this Constitution shall impair the right of any person to petition His Majesty for special leave to appeal from the Supreme Court to His Majesty in Council or the right of His Majesty to grant such leave.”

40. The principal question which the Committee had to consider with reference to the Supreme Court was its constitution. In each of the other Dominions the Court which corresponds to the Supreme Court in Saorstát Eireann consists of not less than five permanent members. In Canada the Supreme Court consists of six judges, in Australia the Federal High Court consists of six judges, and in the Union of South Africa the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court consists of the Chief Justice and four other permanent members. In the case of the Union of South Africa, which, in respect of its constitution, is supposed to resemble this country more closely than the other Dominions, it is worth while noting that when the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court was originally constituted in 1909 it consisted of the Chief Justice and only two other permanent members; and in 1920 it was found necessary to increase its membership to five, i.e., the Chief Justice and four other permanent members. It is also to be noted that in each of these Dominions there is still an effective appeal to the Privy Council. In these circumstances the Committee had to consider whether it is satisfactory that the Supreme Court of Saorstát Eireann, which is in effect a final Court of Appeal, should consist of only three permanent members. In considering this question the Committee had the advantage of hearing the evidence of the Chief Justice and of the President of the High Court. Both these eminent judges are of opinion that the Supreme Court should consist of more than three judges. As a member of the Judiciary Committee which advised the Executive Council in relation to the establishment of the Courts of Justice in Saorstát Eireann in 1923 the Chief Justice recommended five as the number of members of which the Supreme Court should consist, but his recommendation was rejected on economic grounds. In his evidence before this Committee the Chief Justice again expressed his opinion in favour of five judges as against a smaller number, and was of opinion that the Supreme Court should not consist of less than four judges. He also pointed out that with a Supreme Court of three there was the possibility of an ultimate minority decision prevailing where the appeal was taken from the decision of two High Court Judges. Further, a court of three leaves no margin for illness or for personnel engaged in other work, e.g., in the Court of Criminal Appeal. He was further of opinion that if the Supreme Court were to consist of five judges there should be a provision that four judges should form a quorum. The President of the High Court was also of opinion that if the Supreme Court is to be a final Court of Appeal it should be made as strong as possible, and he considered that a Supreme Court of five judges would be more satisfactory than one consisting of only four. He also expressed the opinion which was shared by the Chief Justice that judges of the Supreme Court should not be called upon to assist in the work of the High Court.

41. The Committee have given the most careful consideration to this question. They are convinced that the peace and credit of the country will depend more than on anything else on the impartial and efficient administration of the law by courts which will have the confidence and respect of the people and of the legal profession. In the case of the Supreme Court as the ultimate Court of Appeal in this country they do not think that, efficient as it now is and may continue to be, it ought to consist of only three members.

5.—LAND COMMISSION ANNUITY DEFAULTS.

42. Evidence has been produced to the Committee that the costs of a decree in the case of small debts in respect of Land Commission Annuities are high out of all proportion to the amount of the debt, and unduly inflate the original liability. In the case of a decree for 13s. 4d. the costs are stated to be, approximately, 11s.; in the case of a decree for £2 9s. 0d., approximately, £1 3s. 0d.

Only in a very small proportion of cases is the liability to pay contested, the debt being admitted, and the only matter to be dealt with is the inability or unwillingness of the annuitant to meet his obligations. The Committee feel that the application to such cases of the present scale of costs is productive of great hardship, and they recommend that a new and considerably reduced scale should be fixed by legislation and be made applicable to uncontested cases for the recovery of sums not exceeding £10.

6.—COURT STENOGRAPHERS.

43. The work of the Court stenographers was discussed with many witnesses. There was general agreement that on the whole it was remarkably well done, but objection was taken to the fact that in some cases the stenographers are only part-time employés. This, it was pointed out, had proved unsatisfactory in a number of instances and left an opening for possible irregularities. The Committee recommend that the stenographers should be given regular official status on a whole-time basis and be formed into a special service, the members of which should be transferable to any Court in which they might be required, either permanently or temporarily.

7.—MISCELLANEOUS RECOMMENDATIONS.

(i) District Court.

44. That in section 69 of the Act of 1924 the word “ten” be substituted for the word “six.”

45. That in section 72 of the Act of 1924 all the words from the commencement of the section to the word “Provided” be deleted and the words “The age of retirement of Justices of the District Court shall be seventy-two years” be substituted.

46. (a) That provision be made that District Justices be treated as regards pension rights in the same manner as Circuit Judges.

(b) That the existing District Justices who on reaching retiring age have not served fifteen years shall be entitled to such pension as they would have received if they had completed fifteen years’ service.

47. That provision be made for service of default civil bills on companies incorporated under the Companies Acts and on corporations, and that the mode of service be that prescribed by the Companies Consolidation Act, 1908.

48. That provision be made, in other than cases by way of default procedure, for substituted service where personal service is impracticable or inconvenient whether by reason of the matters referred to in Rule 76 of the District Court Rules dated 9th July, 1926, or by reason of the inaccessibility of the defendant’s residence or such other good and sufficient reason as may satisfy the District Justice.

49. That section 79 of the Act of 1924 be amended so as to provide that

(a) in contract cases the jurisdiction by the said Act vested in and transferred to the District Court shall be exercised by a Justice for the time being assigned to the District wherein the contract was made or wherein the defendant or one of the defendants ordinarily resides or carries on any profession, business or occupation; and in cases where the defendant does not ordinarily reside or carry on any profession, business or occupation in any District, or, if there be more than one defendant, where no one of the defendants ordinarily resides or carries on any profession, business or occupation in any District the jurisdiction shall be exercised by a Justice for the time being assigned to the District wherein the defendant or one of the defendants is found,

(b) in tort cases the jurisdiction by the said Act vested in and transferred to the District Court shall be exercised by a Justice for the time being assigned to the District wherein the tort was committed or wherein the defendant or one of the defendants ordinarily resides or carries on any profession, business or occupation,

(c) in ejectment cases the jurisdiction by the said Act vested in and transferred to the District Court shall be exercised by a Justice assigned to the District wherein the premises sought to be recovered are situate or wherein the defendant or one of the defendants ordinarily resides or carries on any profession, business or occupation.

50. That the default affidavit shall be primâ facie evidence of the facts therein stated notwithstanding that notice of intention to defend has been given.

51. That a statutory power of set-off and counterclaim respectively be conferred.

52. That section 77 of the Act of 1924 be amended by inserting in A at the end of paragraph (iv) a further paragraph empowering County Councils, Urban District Councils and Town Commissioners to sue for rates.

53. That in respect of trespass of cattle, the limitation upon the amount that may be awarded as imposed by section 20 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1851, and the other conditions necessary to bring the case within that section be repealed—as recommended in Report of Judiciary Committee dated 25th May, 1923.

54 (a) That section 18 of the Enforcement of Court Orders Act, 1926 (No. 18 of 1926) be amended so as to provide that a District Justice may, on an application for committal, take further evidence from the debtor as to his then existing means, and shall order the imprisonment of such debtor unless such debtor proves to the satisfaction of the Justice his inability, not occasioned by his own conduct, act or default to pay.

(b) That the said section be further amended to provide that on payment by the debtor of such instalment or instalments as are due at the time of the application for committal, with costs, a debtor arrested and/or imprisoned under the section, shall be entitled to be released immediately.

(c) That the lodgment of an appeal from an order made under section 17 or section 18 of the Act shall operate as a stay of execution.

55. That discretion be given to the Justice of the District Court to determine, within a fixed limit, the period of imprisonment which may be imposed in respect of the non-payment of a sum, or in respect of the default of a sufficient distress to satisfy such sum, adjudged by conviction under or by virtue of any statute relating to revenue under the control of the Revenue Commissioners.

56. That there should be statutory enactment of the provisions of Rule 88 of the District Court Rules dated 9th July, 1926.

57. That a District Justice shall have the same powers of procuring the attendance of witnesses in the District Court in the exercise of his jurisdiction in civil cases as are vested in him in the exercise of his jurisdiction in criminal cases.

58. That where a plaintiff resides out of Saorstát Eireann, the defendant may require before the case is proceeded with that the costs of a dismiss shall be lodged with the District Court Clerk.

59. Whereupon a case being called the defendant produces a dismiss or dismisses obtained by him against the plaintiff (or against any one from or under whom the plaintiff claims) for the same cause of action, that the plaintiff shall not be at liberty to proceed with the case until he has paid or satisfied the defendant the amount of such dismiss or dismisses.

60. That legislative effect be given to the provisions of Rule 179 of the District Court Rules dated 9th July, 1926.

61. That legislative provision be made that any affidavit for use in the District Court may be sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths, a District Justice, or a Peace Commissioner having jurisdiction in the Court area in which the affidavit is sworn.

62. That section 84 of the Act of 1924 be amended by deleting the words “the District or any part of the District of the Justice lies” and substituting the words “the said District Court is situated.”

(ii) Circuit Court.

63. That section 40 of the Act of 1924 be amended by the deletion of the figures “70” and the substitution therefor of the figures “75.”

64. That the Act of 1924, section 48 (i) be amended so as to include consent arrived at during the progress of the suit.

65. That jurisdiction in probate matters and actions should be extended to the Counties of Dublin, Meath and Kildare.

66. That the sections of the Act of 1924 defining the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in civil cases should be amended so as to provide explicitly that subject to such limitations as are imposed by the Act, the Circuit Court shall exercise locally in civil cases, both at law and in equity, all the jurisdiction of the High Court.

67. That jurisdiction in the winding-up of companies and in lunacy and minor matters should not be exercised by the Circuit Court.

68. That in the case of an action for unliquidated damages remitted, the Court to which it is remitted should have the same jurisdiction as might have been exercised by the Court in which such action was originally brought.

69. That the plaintiff should have the right to abandon excess—

(a) before the hearing, provided that a statement of the plaintiff’s intention so to abandon appears on the originating document with an undertaking to accept the amount awarded by the Court in full satisfaction and discharge of the sum alleged to be due;

(b) at the hearing, provided that the plaintiff gives an undertaking to the Court to accept the amount awarded by the Court in full satisfaction and discharge of the sum alleged to be due.

70. That there should be statutory enactment with the necessary adaptation to the Circuit Court, of the provisions of Rule 179 of the District Court Rules dated 9th July, 1926.

71. (a) That section 52 of the Act of 1924 should be amended to provide that in tort cases the jurisdiction by the said Act vested in and transferred to the Circuit Court shall be exercised by the judge for the time being assigned to the Circuit wherein the tort was committed or wherein the defendant or one of the defendants ordinarily resides or carries on any profession, business or occupation.

(b) That a proviso should be added to section 52 of the Act of 1924 to the effect that nothing in the section shall repeal a provision in any other Act which requires or permits an action or proceeding to be brought in any particular venue.

72. That a statutory power to change the venue to another Circuit Court area should be conferred on the Circuit Court.

73. That in the case of ordinary civil bills and civil bill ejectments the solicitor for the party should have power to accept service accompanied by an undertaking to appear—with liability to attachment in case of non-compliance.

74. That provision be made in other than cases by way of default procedure for substituted service where personal service is impracticable or inconvenient whether by reason of the matters referred to in Rule 76 of the District Court Rules dated 9th July, 1926, or by reason of the inaccessibility of the defendant’s residence or such other good and sufficient reason as may satisfy the Circuit Judge.

75. That provision be made for service of default civil bills on companies incorporated under the Companies Acts, and on corporations, and that the mode of service be that prescribed by the Companies Act, 1908.

76. That where a plaintiff resides out of Saorstát Eireann, the defendant may require before the case is proceeded with that the costs of a dismiss shall be lodged with the County Registrar.

77. Whereupon a case being called the defendant produces a dismiss or dismisses obtained by him against the plaintiff (or against any one from or under whom the plaintiff claims) for the same cause of action, the plaintiff shall not be at liberty to proceed with the case until he has paid or satisfied the defendant the amount of such dismiss or dismisses.

78. That where the amount claimed in contract or tort is over £50, the originating document should contain a pleading sufficient to disclose the cause or causes of action and should set out such particulars as are required in a statement of claim in the High Court and should set out the date of hearing. The defendant should be called upon to file within a fixed period a statement of defence similar to that required in the High Court. In equity cases a similar statement of defence should be required.

79. That the default affidavit shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated notwithstanding that notice of intention to defend has been given.

80. That there should be statutory enactment of the provisions of Rule 88 of the District Court Rules dated 9th July, 1926, with such adaptation as may be necessary to apply same to the Circuit Court, and with the substitution of the word “twelve” for the word “six” wherever the latter occurs.

81. That where the amount of a decree does not exceed £100 or in the case of a dismiss where the amount sued for does not exceed £100, there should be a fixed scale of costs; in all other cases the costs should be taxed. Costs to include witnesses’ expenses.

82. That it be provided by legislation that a Rule (or Rules) shall be made to the effect that

(i) costs shall follow the event unless the judge shall for special cause stated in the order otherwise direct. An appeal shall lie from the grant or refusal of this order;

(ii) if there are two or more defendants, and the plaintiff succeeds against one or more but fails as to another or others, the unsuccessful defendant may be ordered to pay the costs not only of the plaintiff but also of the successful defendant or defendants. In any such case the judge may grant a decree with costs against any one or more of the defendants and grant a dismiss as to the other or others of the defendants either with or without costs as he shall think fit;

(iii) in a case where the scale of costs is applicable, witnesses’ expenses shall be in the discretion of the judge without limit as to amount. (In this connection it is recommended that 27 & 28 Vic., c. 99, sec. 52, and so much of 14 and 15 Vic., c. 57, sec 101, as deals with the expenses of witnesses be repealed).

83. That a new licence granted by the Circuit Court shall not require confirmation save where the Circuit Court grants such licence subject to its being confirmed at a Circuit Court not later than twelve months from the granting of such licence.

84. That legislative provision be made that any affidavit for use in the Circuit Court may be sworn before a Commissioner for Oaths, a County Registrar, or a Peace Commissioner having jurisdiction in the Court area in which the affidavit is sworn.

85. That a notice of appeal shall not operate as a stay of execution unless, in case a defendant is appellant, sufficient security is given for the sum recovered and costs, or for the costs awarded in case no sum is recovered or, in case a plaintiff is appellant, sufficient security is given for payment of the costs awarded. The security suggested should be given either by way of a recognisance with sufficient sureties, the sureties to be approved of by the County Registrar, in such sum as the Circuit Judge or the County Registrar may fix, or by lodgment of such sum as the Circuit Judge or County Registrar may fix. Notwithstanding the aforesaid Recommendation, the provisions of section 69 of Deasy’s Act should continue in force.

86. That in workmen’s compensation cases the appeal should not be to the High Court, but, as formerly, to the Supreme Court, and on a point of law only.

87. That from a Provisional Order of the Department of Local Government and Public Health made under the Labourers (Ireland) Acts or the Housing of the Working Classes Acts there should be no appeal from the order of the Circuit Court made on appeal

88. That, on the application of any party to any proceeding before him, and with the consent of all the parties, the Circuit Court Judge shall refer any question of law arising in any case before him to the High Court for determination, and the determination of the High Court thereon shall, except by leave of the High Court, be final and conclusive and not appealable.

(iii) Circuit Appeal Court.

89. That the High Court Judge or Judges hearing appeals from Circuit Courts should have power to state a case to the Supreme Court; and that this should be the only form of appeal from such tribunal.

90. That where the amount of a decree does not exceed £100, or in the case of a dismiss where the amount sued for does not exceed £100, there should be a fixed scale of costs; in all other cases the costs should be taxed. Costs to include witnesses’ expenses.

91. That it be provided by legislation that a Rule (or Rules) of Court shall be made to the effect that

(i) costs shall follow the event unless the judge or judges shall for special cause stated in the order otherwise direct. An appeal shall lie from the grant or refusal of this order;

(ii) if there are two or more defendants, and the plaintiff succeeds against one or more but fails as to another or others, the unsuccessful defendant may be ordered to pay the costs, not only of the plaintiff, but also of the successful defendant or defendants. In any such case the judge or judges may grant a decree with costs against any one or more of the defendants and grant a dismiss as to the other or others of the defendants either with or without costs as he or they shall think fit;

(iii) in a case where the scale of costs is applicable, witnesses’ expenses shall be in the discretion of the judge or judges without limit as to amount.

(iv) High Court and Supreme Court.

92. That section 12 of the Act of 1924 be amended by deleting the figures “72” and substituting the figures “75.”

93. (a) That the following recommendation contained in the Report of the Judiciary Committee, dated 25th May, 1923, be adopted:—

“An official stenographer should report the proceedings at every sitting of the High Court, when engaged in the trial of cases, civil or criminal, with witnesses, whether with or without a jury. The official transcript in the former case to include the judge’s charge and any directions or advice to the jury, with all objections taken or requisitions made, and in the latter his judgment, but omitting in both the speeches of counsel.

“Such report to be available to the parties, upon such terms as to payment as the Rule-making Authority shall prescribe.”

(b) That the services of an official stenographer should be available for the Supreme Court to take down and transcribe judgments. The transcription should be submitted to the judges concerned for revision and be afterwards made accessible to the public.

94. That the Rules of the High Court be codified.

95. That provision should be made for a graduated percentage charge for the administration of estates of minors; and that a system of visitation of minors be adopted similar to that in existence in the case of persons of unsound mind.

96. (a) That steps should be taken to bring about reciprocal legislation in Saorstát Eireann, Northern Ireland and Great Britain, so that a judgment of a superior court in any one of these countries may be extended to any one of the others without the necessity of a fresh action on foot of such judgment in such other country.

(b) That similar procedure be adopted in respect of the administration of estates of deceased persons, so that a grant of probate or letters of administration in any one of these countries may be re-sealed in any of the others without the necessity of applying for a fresh grant in such other country.

97. That sections 126 and 243 of 16 and 17 Vic., c. 113, section 97 of 19 and 20 Vie., c. 102, and the following words in section 53 of 40 and 41 Vic., c. 57, namely:—

“And provided also, that in all actions for libel where the jury shall give damages under forty shillings, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to more costs than damages,”

be repealed; and in lieu thereof that there should be a statutory enactment providing that—

(i) in all actions of tort or of breach of promise of marriage where the amount recovered shall be under £100, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to more costs than damages, unless the judge certifies that the action is of such a substantial or important nature that it was reasonably brought in the High Court; an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from the grant or refusal of this certificate;

(ii) in all actions for the recovery of debts or liquidated demands in money where the amount recovered does not exceed £25 the plaintiff shall not be entitled to more than the costs of a similar action in the District Court and in similar actions where the amount recovered does not exceed £100 the plaintiff shall not be entitled to more than the costs of a similar action in the Circuit Court;

(iii) in all actions founded on contract or for damages for breach of contract, save as in (i) or (ii), where the amount recovered does not exceed £300, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to more costs than he would have recovered had the action been brought in the Circuit Court, unless the judge certifies that the action is of such a substantial or important nature that it was reasonably brought in the High Court; an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from the grant or refusal of this certificate; and

(iv) in all actions of ejectment where the plaintiff could have proceeded in the Circuit Court the plaintiff shall not be entitled to recover more costs than the costs of a similar action in the Circuit Court unless the judge certifies that the action is of such a substantial or important nature that it was reasonably brought in the High Court; an appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from the grant or refusal of this certificate.

98. That it be provided by legislation that a Rule (or Rules) of Court shall be made to the effect that

(i) costs shall follow the event unless the judge or judges shall for special cause stated in the order otherwise direct. An appeal shall lie from the grant or refusal of this order;

(ii) if there are two or more defendants, and the plaintiff succeeds against one or more but fails as to another or others, the unsuccessful defendant may be ordered to pay the costs not only of the plaintiff but also of the successful defendant or defendants. In any such case the judge or judges may grant a decree with costs against any one or more of the defendants and grant a dismiss as to the other or others of the defendants either with or without costs as he or they shall think fit;

(iii) in a case where the scale of costs is applicable, witnesses’ expenses shall be in the discretion of the judge or judges without limit as to amount.

(v) General.

99. That Deasy’s Act, 23 and 24 Vic., c. 154, sec. 60, be amended by the deletion of the words “together with … . shillings” and the substitution of the words “and costs”.

100. That the provision of 14 & 15 Vic., 57, section 60, that a solicitor shall sign his name on a civil bill, be repealed.

101. That 27 & 28 Vic. c. 99, section 8 (“Particulars of fees, etc., to be printed on decrees”), be repealed.

102. (a) That the Rule-Making Committees of the Supreme Court, High Court, Circuit Court and District Court respectively shall assemble once at least in every year, on such day or days as shall be fixed by the Minister for Justice, for the purpose of considering the operation of the various Acts affecting the said Courts respectively and of the rules of the said Courts respectively for the time being in force, and also the working of the several offices and the arrangements relative to the duties of the officers of the said Courts respectively, and of inquiring and examining into any defects which may appear to exist in the system of procedure or the administration of the law in the said Courts respectively; and they shall report annually to the Minister what (if any) amendments or alterations it would in their judgment be expedient to make in the said Acts or otherwise relating to the administration of justice, and what other provisions (if any) which cannot be carried into effect without the authority of the Oireachtas, it would be expedient to make for the better administration of justice.

(b) That sections 36, 65 and 90 of the Act of 1924 be amended so as to provide for the inclusion in the Committee, in the said sections respectively referred to, of two persons, not being members of the legal profession, representing the general public, to be nominated thereto by the Minister for Justice.

DANIEL MORRISSEY,

Chairman.

6th November, 1930.